Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulated record submitted by the parties, the following Findings of Facts arc made: Following the issuance of its October 13, 1989, jeopardy assessment against Petitioner, Respondent began its efforts to recover the monies allegedly owed by Petitioner. Collectable assets were identified. These identified assets included a bank account at Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A. (Account No. 1595012259) in the name of John M. Brumley Racing Engines, Inc. (Corporation) with a balance of $176.29 and real property that appeared to be owned by the Corporation. Respondent gave written notice of its October 13, 1989, jeopardy assessment against Petitioner to Barnett Bank. In the notice, Respondent requested that the bank not transfer nor otherwise dispose of the funds in Account No 1595012259 without Respondent's consent. Subsequently, the bank notified Respondent that it had taken measures to comply with Respondent's request.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state governmental licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints relative to real estate transactions. (Official recognition of Florida Statutes, TR 6-7) Respondent is now and was at times material hereto, a licensed real estate broker in Florida, having been issued License No. 0149408. The last license to Respondent was as a broker, t/a Marathon Realty at Post Office Box 2386, Marathon Shores, Florida 33052. (Petitioner'S Exhibit 1) On or about May 2, 1985, Respondent solicited and obtained a sales contract entered into by Emily Cathy Cronnon, as purchaser, and W. J. and Delores Sarver , as sellers, for the purchase and sale of certain residential property (contract for sale). (Petitioner'S Exhibit 2) The sales transaction was scheduled to close on or about July 1, 1985, but the transaction did not close. On or about December 2, 1985, the purchaser and sellers terminated the sales contract. (Petitioner'S Exhibit 3) On or about May 13, 1985, the Respondent allowed Emily Cathy Cronnon and her live-in boyfriend, Billy Hull, to take possession and occupy the property with the knowledge and consent of seller W. J. Sarver. In this regard, W. J. Sarver denies giving permission to Ms. Cronnon to occupy the property prior to closing. However, it is found herein and the testimony of Billy Hull and Respondent substantiate the fact that Emily Cronnon and Billy Hull visited Respondent's office during early May, 1985, to find out whether they could move into the Sarver property with their furnishings prior to closing. Initially, Ms. Diabo advised Cannon and Hull that she was not at liberty to permit them to move in. However, she told them that if they liked, they could phone Mr. Server and get his permission. This was done and it is found that Mr. Sarver gave his permission to Respondent to allow Ms. Cronnon and Billy Hull to occupy the premises prior to closing, provided they turned the utilities off and then had the same turned on in their name. This was done, and the contract purchaser (Cronnon) and her boyfriend, Billy Hull, moved in prior to the time that the transaction closed. Respondent received a $500 rental payment from the purchaser on August 19, 1985. (Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2) Respondent deposited said check in an appropriate bank account and waited eleven (11) days for that check to clear. On August 30, 1985, she wrote a $500 check to the Sarvers indicating that the same was rental payment to them for the use of their property by Cronnon and Hull. Respondent customarily waits at least ten (10) days for any check to clear before she writes a check drawn on those same funds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed herein be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings: 1. Accepted as modified. 7. Rejected based on credible evidence herein which reveals that Emily Cathy Cronnon and her live-in boyfriend, Billy Hull, took possession and occupied the property with the prior knowledge and consent of seller, W. J. Sarver. Rejected based on credible evidence which reveals that Respondent did not conceal the rent payment, but rather deposited the rent payment until the funds cleared her bank and she immediately thereafter transmitted the proceeds to the Sarvers. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary to decide the issues posed. Rejected as a conclusion and not a finding of fact. Respondent's proposed findings and conclusions are largely a brief in the form of resolutions of credibility, conflicts, recommendations as to how those conflicts should be resolved, and conclusions in the form of ultimate findings of fact. As such, they are not specifically addressed in the Appendix, but were carefully considered and reviewed by the under signed in preparation of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: JAMES H. GILLIS, ESQUIRE SENIOR ATTORNEY DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE POST OFFICE BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32802 MICHAEL H. DAVIDSON, ESQUIRE WATSON & CLARK POST OFFICE BOX 11959 FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA 33339 HAROLD HUFF, EXECUTIVE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE POST OFFICE BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32502 HONORABLE VAN B. POOLE, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 JOSEPH A. SOLE, ESQUIRE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Raul Romaguera, is a small business party within the meaning of Subsection 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1985). When the underlying action herein occurred, he was licensed as a medical doctor by respondent, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners (Board). On October 27, 1986, respondent filed an administrative complaint against Dr. Romaguera alleging that he had violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (1985), by committing gross malpractice or failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The alleged violation related to Dr. Romaguera's inspection and diagnosis of a patient's tissue in December, 1980 while supervising a pathology department at a Lake Worth hospital. After an evidentiary hearing was conducted on March 24 and 25, 1987, a Recommended Order was entered by the undersigned on May 12, 1987, finding that the charge was unsubstantiated and recommending that the complaint be dismissed. The Recommended Order was adopted by the Board in its entirety by Final Order dated June 19, 1987. A timely petition for attorney's fees and costs was thereafter filed by petitioner on August 18, 1987. The parties have stipulated that, as a result of the Board's Final Order, Dr. Romaguera is a prevailing small business party within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1985). They have also stipulated that, in order to defend against the agency's action, Dr. Romaguera incurred at least $15,000 in attorney's fees and costs. There is no evidence as to what information, oral or written, the probable cause panel had before it when voting to initiate this action. The agency does stipulate that, at some point in the probable cause phase of the proceeding, the panel requested more information on the matter before taking a vote. This is corroborated by an agency memorandum dated April 8, 1986 and introduced into evidence as petitioner's exhibit 1. At the final hearing on the merits of the administrative complaint, the agency presented a number of expert witnesses who concurred in the Board's assessment that Dr. Romaguera had failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment required of a reasonably prudent similar practicing physician in the Lake Worth area. Doctor Romaguera also presented the testimony of an expert who disagreed with this assessment. Hence, the validity of the charges turned on the credibility and weight to be given the various experts by the undersigned.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Parson & Associates, Inc., d/b/a Overhead Door Company of Tampa Bay (Parsons & Associates), is a Florida corporation, having been incorporated under the laws of the State of Florida in March, 1992. The principal place of business for Parsons & Associates is 5134 W. Idlewild, Tampa, Florida. The Petitioner corporation engages in the business of the sale, installation, and repair of overhead doors, both residential and commercial. The corporation has ten (10) full-time employees and one (1) part-time employee. The only stockholders of the Petitioner corporation are: Gail Parsons, the minority owner; and her son-in-law, Robert Briesacher. Gail Parsons owns eighty (80 percent) of the stock of Parsons & Associates. Robert Briesacher, who is not a minority, owns the remaining twenty (20 percent) of the Petitioner corporation. Gail Parsons was the incorporator of Parsons & Associates when it was initially incorporated. She also is its President. Robert Briesacher is the Vice-President. Prior to the incorporation of Parsons & Associates, Gail Parsons, who has a Bachelor of Business Administration degree, worked for the Better Business Bureau. Robert Briesacher had previous experience in the overhead door business, having worked for Overhead Door Company of Clearwater. Briesacher, who at the time was engaged to marry Parsons's daughter, learned from Overhead Door Corporation (the manufacturer) that the manufacturer intended to establish a distributorship in Tampa. Briesacher told Parsons about it. While Briesacher had the knowledge and experience to successfully sell, install, and repair both residential and commercial overhead doors, he had no money to invest in the business opportunity and had no experience running his own business. Thinking that she might be able to help her daughter and future/present son-in-law, and herself, by combining her capital and business and financial skills with his knowledge and technical skill in the automatic door business, Parsons suggested to Briesacher that they go into business together. He readily agreed, and the pursued the opportunity with the manufacturer. Parsons incorporated the business, registered the fictitious name, compiled the business plan, developed the cash flow projections (with Briesacher's help), found the office/warehouse space (which the manufacturer had to approve), and negotiated, executed, and personally guaranteed the lease agreement and negotiated the Distributorship Agreement with the manufacturer. Briesacher provided none of the initial start-up monies for the Petitioner. Gail Parsons is the financial interest holder in the corporation, having made all the initial contributions to capital ($38,000), as well as making all the personal loans to the corporation thereby accepting all the financial risk. Parsons personally guaranteed the promissory note, the credit agreement, contracts required to be personally guaranteed and the warehouse lease. The Distributorship Agreement is a standard Overhead Door Corporation agreement common to all distributors nationwide. It is customary for a manufacturer like Overhead Door Corporation to offer a distributor incentives-- like yellow page advertisement, signage, and telephone numbers--in order to gain market penetration. In the case of Parsons & Associates, Overhead Door supplied a telephone number (the number Overhead Door previously had bought from the prior distributor in Tampa), a year's worth (about $10,000) of yellow page advertising, and some signage. The total fair market value of the incentives to Parsons & Associates was approximately $31,000, but the marginal cost to the manufacturer was less. In the initial months of operation of the business, Gail Parsons had to rely on Briesacher and the first employee they hired, Charles Martin, who worked under Briesacher at Overhead Door of Clearwater, to teach her what she had to know about the technical aspects of the business. She had to learn about the Overhead Door products and the basics of how to install them. This knowledge, which she quickly acquired, soon enabled her to take service orders, schedule the orders, supervise the day-to-day activities, perform trouble-shooting over the telephone and handle all of the sales calls. Meanwhile, Robert Briesacher was in the field with Martin installing and servicing Overhead Doors. Briesacher currently corresponds with the factories on product orders, schedules and supervises the installers, and takes the physical inventory. Commercial bidding is only one portion of the total corporate sales, which includes residential new construction, residential service and residential retrofit. Over ninety-five (95 percent) percent of the business of Parsons and Associates is handled over the telephone from the office where Parsons spends virtually one hundred (100 percent) percent of her time. Parsons is personally responsible for the majority of the residential sales, including negotiating and contracting with contractors, and negotiating and entering into the agreement to provide installation services for Home Depot door sales. Business from negotiating, estimating, and bidding on contracts in the field is a relatively small portion of the company's overall revenues. Gail Parson is involved in the interviewing of prospective employees, including Martin and Charles Jarvis. She confers with Briesacher, but she alone controls hiring and firing. She possesses the knowledge to evaluate employee performance and has demonstrated her supervisory authority and evaluation skills in exercising her authority to fire an employee. Actually, it is not difficult to evaluate the performance of installers: service calls on warranty work and customer complaints generally tell her all she needs to know. The Petitioner/corporation has both commercial and residential outside sales persons who prepare bids for the Petitioner. The minority owner, Gail Parsons, establishes the geographic and profit margin parameters, which ultimately control the bidding process. She inspects all bids prior to executing the contracts, thereby further controlling who, where and under what terms the Petitioner corporation does business. In fact, Parsons recently rejected an accepted bid and cancelled the job because it was too far from Tampa. While both Gail Parsons and Robert Briesacher are authorized to sign checks for Parsons & Associates, Briesacher has signed less than five checks, out of the thousands of checks written. Parsons and Briesacher draw the same salary. However, their salaries are commensurate with the work they perform for the company. Parsons has chosen the salary levels; Briesacher does not even know what Parsons's salary is. Parsons also is entitled to an 80/20 split of any future distributions as a result of the operation of the company. Briesacher has the use of a company truck, while Parsons does not. However, Briesacher is a part-time installer and service man, while Parsons is not. All installers/service technicians at Parsons and Associates have the use of company trucks, not just Briesacher. Currently, in addition to controlling the entire corporation and making all of the business decisions, Gail Parsons sets inventory parameters, purchases the inventory, sells doors in the showroom, knows the purchased products, is responsible for accounts receivable, handles the payroll, and assists in the scheduling and supervising of the installers.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Management Services enter a final order granting Petitioner's application for certification as a minority business enterprise (MBE). RECOMMENDED this 14th day of July, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1268 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-3. Accepted and incorporated. First sentence, rejected as contrary to facts found; the rest is accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, rejected to the extent that it implies that Briesacher has no financial interest. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected, as contrary to facts found, to the extent that it implies Parsons knew it all from the start and that Parsons "supervised" Briesacher and Martin installing and servicing doors; in fact, there was a learning curve. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 8.-11. Accepted and incorporated. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-2. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 3.-4. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected in part as contrary to facts found and as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. (She makes sales and trouble- shoots, and is no longer just learning those aspects of the business.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, except for actually installing and servicing doors, Parsons also does the same jobs as Briesacher to some extent, and some of Briesacher's functions are ministerial in light of Parsons's management decisions. Penultimate sentence, rejected as contrary to facts found and as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; he proposed "piece-work" but Parsons participated in the final decision. (Since it is standard in Florida, it was not a difficult or controversial decision.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. (However, "joint responsibility" should not be construed to mean "equal authority." Parsons has the final say.) Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, while Parsons's knowledge and skill does not exceed the others' in the area of installing and servicing doors, she has enough knowledge to control the business. The characterization "very broad" in the last sentence is rejected as contrary to facts found and as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. However, again, while Parsons's knowledge and skill does not exceed the others' in the area of installing and servicing doors, and while she does not personally install and service doors, she has enough knowledge to control the business. 10.-14. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Again, while Parsons and Briesacher, and other employees, share responsibilities, Parsons has the knowledge necessary to control the business and has dominant control over the business. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathan D. Kaplan, Esquire 6617 Memorial Highway Tampa, Florida 33615 Wayne H. Mitchell, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel Suite 312, Ninth Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Petitioner's response to invitation to bid 93C-116T was properly rejected.
Findings Of Fact An invitation to bid (ITB) for a contract to supply and for a contract to install acoustical ceiling tiles were solicited by Respondent on October 26, 1992. Bid proposals were filed by four bidders, one of which was the Petitioner. On November 18, 1992, bids were opened and posted, and it was determined that the apparent low bidders were bidders other than Petitioner. The bid submitted by Petitioner was rejected by Respondent on the grounds that Petitioner failed to sign the anti-collusion statement. Thereafter, Petitioner timely filed its bid protest to challenge the rejection of its bid. On December 16, 1992, an informal bid protest meeting was held which resulted in the issuance of a letter rejecting the informal bid protest. Thereafter, the bid protest was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, and this proceeding followed. On the first page of the ITB form used by Respondent, the bidder is to insert its name, address, telephone number, and federal employer identification number (or social security number). The bidder is also required to manually sign an anti-collusion statement and to type or print the name and title of the person who signed the statement. Petitioner failed to execute the anti- collusion statement and it did not furnish the information required by this section of the form. The anti-collusion statement is as follows: ANTI-COLLUSION: the signed bidder certifies that he or she has not divulged, discussed or compared his or her bid with other bidders and has not colluded with any other bidder or parties to a bid whatever. (NOTE: No premiums, rebates or gratuities [are] permitted either with, prior to, or after any delivery of materials. Any such violation will result in the cancellation and/or return of materials (as applicable) and the removal from the bid list(s). Also on the first page of the ITB form used by Respondent are certain "General Conditions, Instructions and Information for Bidders", including the following: EXECUTION OF BID: Bid must contain a manual signature of an authorized representative in the space provided above [the signature line for the anti-collusion statement]. Failure to properly sign proposal shall invalidate same, and it shall not be considered for award. ... Also on the first page of the ITB form used by Respondent is the following: AWARDS: In the best interest of the School Board, the Board reserves the right to ... waive any irregularity in bids received ... All awards made as a result of this bid shall conform to applicable Florida Statutes. After Petitioner's bid was rejected, Petitioner's bid was not further evaluated. The uncontroverted testimony on behalf of Petitioner was that its bid for the installation of the tile would have been the lowest bid had it been evaluated. Respondent's past practice has consistently been to reject bids where the anti-collusion statement is not properly executed by the bidder. The rationale for this practice is to safeguard against collusion among bidders. Petitioner's failure to execute the anti-collusion statement was an oversight on the part of Franklin C. Taylor, Jr., the officer who prepared the response on behalf of the Petitioner. Franklin C. Taylor, Jr., executed the "Drug-Free Workplace Certification" and the "Sworn Statement Pursuant to section 287.133(3)(a), Florida Statutes, On Public Entity Crimes" as required by the ITB and attached both certifications to Petitioner's response. Petitioner asserts that it is ready, willing, and able to perform the contract and that the failure to sign the anti-collusion statement was an error that can now be corrected or that can now be waived as a minor irregularity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order which dismisses Petitioner's bid protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Franklin C. Taylor, Jr. Herbert J. Taylor Custom Ceilings of the Palm Beaches, Inc. Post Office Box 9592 Riveria Beach, Florida 33404 Robert A. Rosillo, Esquire Palm Beach County School Board 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5813 Dr. Monica C. Uhlhorn, Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C 320 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869 Abbey G. Hairston, General Counsel Palm Beach County School Board 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C 302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5813
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent operated as a real estate broker or sales associate without a license, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has not been licensed as a real estate broker, broker sales-associate, or sales person in the state of Florida. Respondent entered into an arrangement with Tina Mathews, who holds a valid broker or sales person's license, to find buyers in return for which she would split the commission with him. Although Respondent never showed the properties to prospective buyers, after finding them, he performed other, unspecified tasks to ensure that the deals closed and he would be paid. Respondent's defense is that he did not know that what he was doing was illegal. In fact, this case arose by a complaint filed by Respondent against Ms. Mathews, who had paid him several times in the past for similar work in connection with other transactions. When Ms. Mathews declined to pay Respondent in connection with three other transactions described in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent contacted Petitioner, which, after an investigation, brought these charges against Respondent for two transactions, as identified in the Administrative Complaint, for which Ms. Mathews paid him. In one letter (received June 12, 2007) from Mr. Haque to Petitioner, he acknowledges that he has "done 10 more deals with [Ms. Mathews] in the past for which she compensated me 1/3 of her commission. Enclosed are the HUDS for Ronald Nicolas and Beryl George . . .." These are the two transactions that are the subject of the Administrative Complaint, so there is no doubt that Respondent received compensation for his work on these two transactions. It is difficult to determine exactly what Respondent did to "earn" his share of the commission, although clearly he found the buyers. Although Respondent claims to have substantial work on each of these transactions, he is vague about what he did, and the weight to be accorded this admission is limited due to Respondent's persistent misunderstanding of this case as some sort of vehicle by which he can obtain payment for his share of the commission for the three subsequent transactions about which he filed a complaint against Ms. Mathews. The only remaining element of Petitioner's case against Respondent involves any ownership interest that Respondent may have had in the two properties identified in the Administrative Complaint. A summary of the investigator's interview with Ms. Mathews, who did not testify, states that she told the investigator that the deals that she did with Respondent were with properties that he owned. However, Respondent supplies the needed evidence as to this critical point when, in his post- hearing statement, he refers to this statement from the investigator and disputes it by stating: "The fact is, this is the only property in my complain [sic] I own with Ms. Mathews as agent of record." It is impossible to determine whether this admission applies to one of the two transactions that are the subject of the Administrative Complaint or one of the transactions for which he is, even now, seeking payment. At minimum, though, even if the statement applies to one of the two subject transactions, it applies to only one of them, and, by negative implication, Respondent concedes that he was not an owner of the other property. On the basis of this record, Petitioner has proved all of the above-cited allegations of the Administrative Complaint in connection with both transactions that underlie Count I.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of operating as a broker or sales person without a license and imposing an administrative fine against him of $5000. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas W. O'Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 802 North Orlando, Florida 32801 Reginald Dixon, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Patrick J. Cunningham, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building-North Tower, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Syed Haque 10100 Country Brook Road Boca Raton, Florida 33428
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Respondent, Linda H. Abraham, was licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate broker under license number 0323486. During the months of February and March 1983 Martha L. Tew owned a parcel of waterfront property located in Panama City Beach which was identified as being for sale by a sign on the property reflecting her husband's real estate company. Her husband was Ronald Eugene Tew and Mrs. Tew also held a salesman's license. Mr. Tew was contacted by Gregory A. Peaden, a contractor and developer in the Panama City Beach area on several occasions prior to March 1983 with offers to purchase the Tew property. The contacts with Mr. Peaden subsequently culminated in a contract dated March 8, 1983, between Greg Peaden, Inc., and the Tews in the amount of, initially, $180,000.00. During the negotiations for the property, Mr. Peaden had introduced the Respondent to the Tews as his broker. When, at the time of Use contract, Mr. Peaden advised the Tews he wanted Respondent to get a commission for the sale, Mr. Tew refused to pay any commission indicating that Respondent had performed no service for him; that he, Tew, was a broker himself; and that he had no intention of paying any commission to the Respondent or to anyone, for that matter. After some further negotiation, a second contract was prepared and agreed upon wherein the contract price was raised to $189,000.00 and the Respondent's commission was to be paid with the additional money from Mr. Peaden. The contract in question executed by the parties on March 8, 1983, reflected that the sum of $5,000.00 deposit was paid to Linda Abraham, Inc., by check. Mr. Tew contends that at this point he was led to believe that Respondent had the $5,000.00 check and, he contends, he would not have signed the contract if he had known that the check had not been delivered and placed in Respondent's escrow account. The actual signing of the contract took place in Respondent's office, a mobile home which she shared with Mr. Peaden's business. This trailer home was described as having Mr. Peaden's office on one end, and Respondent's on the other, with the living-kitchen area in the middle used as a reception area for both businesses. Mr. Peaden contends that once the contract was signed by the Tews, he gave a check drawn on one of his business accounts, that of Peaden and Guerino, a property management company he owned, to his secretary, Judy White, to deposit in Respondent's escrow account and thereafter promptly forgot about the matter until the date scheduled for closing, two months in the future. Ms. white, on the other hand, contends that Mr. Peaden at no time gave her a check for $5,000.00 to deposit to Respondent's escrow account. It is her contention that when she received the contract after it was signed, she, on her own, inserted the receipt portion on the bottom of the second page and signed as having received it merely to complete the contract. At the time, she contends, she did not know if the deposit was received from Peaden or not. She has never signed a contract like this before without a deposit and cannot give any other reason why she did it on this occasion. She is certain, however, that at no time did Mr. Peaden ever give her a $5,000.00 check or tell her to draw one for his signature on March 8, 1983, or, for that matter, at any time thereafter. What is more, neither Mr. Peaden nor the Respondent, at any time after the signing of the contract and prior to her departure under less than friendly circumstances approximately a week or so later, ever asked her whether she had made the escrow deposit or discussed it with her at all. Ms. white contends that she left Mr. Peaden's employ because he expected her to perform certain functions she was unwilling to do. When she left his employ, she did not feel there was any unfinished business that needed her immediate attention. To the best of her recollection, there were no sales contracts or deposits left in or on her desk - only bills. According to Respondent, the $5,000.00 deposit by Mr. Peaden was to stay in her escrow account. She understood Mr. Peaden was going to arrange with the bank to borrow the entire cash payment called for under the contract, including the deposit, and when that was done, it was her intention to give him back his $5,000.00 check. Under these circumstances, the amount in escrow would never be paid to the sellers but would be returned to Mr. Peaden and the Tews would receive the entire cash amount called for by the contract from the proceeds of the bank loan. Respondent also indicated that this procedure had been followed at least once, in a prior transaction. Under the circumstances, it is clear that no deposit was ever received from Mr. Peaden nor was it placed in Respondent's escrow account. Therefore, the contract, dated on March 8, 1983, was false in that it represented a $5,000.00 deposit had been received. The check for $5,000.00 dated March 8, 1983, payable to Linda Abraham, Inc. and drawn by Mr. Peaden on the Peaden and Guerino account with the stub admitted to show the date of issuance, does not establish that it was written on March 8, 1983, as contended. This check, number 1349, comes after two other checks, 1347 and 1348, which bear dates of April 4 and September 7, 1983 respectively. Mr. Peaden's explanation that the checks were drafted out of sequence is non-persuasive. Of greater probative value is the fact that neither Mr. Peaden nor Respondent bothered to review their bank statements on a regular basis. The check in question was drawn on an account not related to the construction and development business of Greg Peaden, Inc. Further, examination of Respondent's escrow account reflects that there were approximately eleven transactions over a three year period even though, according to her, she handled numerous other closings as well as this. Her explanation is that in most cases the attorney handling the closing served as escrow agent even though she was the sales broker. Her explanation is not credible. This appears to be a classic situation of movement of accounts to satisfy a particular end. The contract called for closing of the sale to be held on or before May 8, 1983, in the office of Panama Title Company. May 8, 1983, fell on a Sunday. As a result, the closing would not have been held that day, but it was not held the following day, Monday, May 9, 1983 either. Mr. Peaden admits that he had not checked with Panama Title prior to May 9 to see if everything was prepared for the closing. Instead, he contacted the title company for the first time at approximately noon on May 9. Apparently he received disquieting information because he thereafter called his attorney, Mr. Hutto, and asked him to check with the title company to see if and when the closing would be held. Mr. Hutto's inquiry reflected that the title insurance binder was ready but the closing statement and the package were not because the title company required a copy of the contract. At this point Mr. Peaden immediately had a copy of the contract delivered to the title company but later that day was advised that the closing still could not be held because of the failure to provide a survey. Mr. Hutto indicates that the reason given was that the release clauses called for in the contract required the survey to be furnished though he did not necessarily agree with that. In any event, closing was not held on May 9. At this time both Mr. Peaden and Respondent allegedly became concerned about the $5,000.00 deposit. Admittedly, neither had concerned themselves with it from the time of the signing of the contract. At this point, Mr. Peaden indicates that he examined his bank records which failed to show the deposit being made and his subsequent search of Ms. White's desk finally revealed the check, undeposited, still there. On May 11, 1983, a $5,000.00 deposit was made to the account on which the deposit check was drawn and on the same day, May 11, 1983 check number 1349, in the amount of $5,000.00 was presented against the account. When on May 10, 1983, Mr. Peaden and Respondent went to Mr. Hutto's office the primary reason for the visit was because Mr. Peaden had heard that the Tews were planning to sell the property in question to someone else at a price much higher than that agreed upon for the sale to Peaden. At this point Mr. Hutto indicated that if Peaden so desired, Hutto could "fix up the contract to jam up the works" until he could do something about it. His examination of the contract revealed that it was not recorded or acknowledged and under the laws of Florida, acknowledgment is required in order for a contract to be recorded. Hutto asked the Respondent if she had seen the parties sign the contract and when she said that she had, he had his secretary prepare a jurat. Unfortunately, his secretary prepared an affidavit type notary jurat rather than an acknowledgment and Hutto quickly admits that he did not look at it when it was given back to him. He says that if he had, he would have had it changed but in any event, without looking at what was given him, he gave it to the Respondent with the implication, at least, that she should notarize it and have the contract recorded. According to Hutto, Peaden, and the Respondent, the sole purpose for notarization and recordation was to preserve the status quo to protect Mr. Peaden's interest in the property so that the matter could be adjudicated in a lawsuit which was soon to be filed. Respondent contends she never intended any misconduct throughout this transaction nor did she do any of the things alleged in the Administrative Complaint. She contends she never saw the check which Mr. Peaden allegedly gave to his secretary for deposit to her escrow account. She merely assumed that it was given and never checked to insure that it had been placed in her account. She does not know why Mr. Peaden did not give her the check. When she took the contract to the Tews, she was operating under the assumption that the check had been received but did not verify this to insure that it had. She contends that since she represented the buyer, her duties were limited to insuring that he performed and this made it simple. She did not check on him because she had had so much experience with him, him being by far her largest account, if he said something, she believed him and when the contract was executed, she merely instructed the secretary, Judy White, to make the file and did not check on it again. As to the recordation and the notarization after the fact, she acted upon the advice of counsel, she states, and did what was suggested to her by Mr. Hutto. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Hutto did not represent her but instead represented Mr. Peaden and while because of her long-standing relationship with him and Mr. Hutto, she may have felt safe in relying on his advice, the fact remains that Hutto was not her attorney.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's license as a registered real estate broker in Florida be suspended for six months and that she pay an administrative fine of $2,000.00. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur Shell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 John D. O'Brien, Esquire P. O. Box 1218 Panama City, Florida 32402 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a "small business party" sole proprietorship domiciled in Tampa, Florida, with less than 25 employees, and a net worth of less than $2 million. The Respondent previously initiated action against Petitioner as a result of a Medicaid audit of Petitioner's pharmacy and identified an overpayment which it then sought to recover from Petitioner. A timely request for hearing was filed by Petitioner, and the matter was transmitted by the Respondent to the Division of Administrative Hearings where it was assigned Case Number 88-1668. The final hearing was held in Tampa, Florida, on June 22, 1988, before Donald D. Conn, Hearing Officer, and thereafter a Recommended Order was filed on August 17, 1988, which recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing its action against Petitioner, refunding any funds which it had withheld, plus interest, and removing all other sanctions. The Respondent approved and adopted this recommendation in its Final Order entered on September 15, 1988, by the terms of which Petitioner prevailed in the prior action initiated by the Respondent. The Respondent was not a nominal party to the prior proceedings, and there is nothing in the record to show that the Respondent was substantially justified in bringing the prior action, or that any special circumstances exist which would make an award of fees and costs unjust. On November 2, 1988, a Petition for Costs and Attorney's Fees was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Petitioner. The Petition is accompanied by an affidavit and supporting documents which are uncontroverted, and which establish that Petitioner incurred legal fees in the amount of $14,587.50 and costs of $1,437.77, as a result of the prior proceedings in Case Number 88-1668. In the Petition for Costs and Fees, the Petitioner specifically indicated that an evidentiary hearing was not requested. No responsive pleading of any kind has been filed on behalf of the Respondent to this Petition for Costs and Fees.
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that respondent Richard B. Watson holds a license issued by petitioner and has since 1976. He holds license No. 0163723, and has, at all pertinent times, worked as a broker-salesman for Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc., 126- 128 Eglin Parkway Southeast in Fort Walton Beach, Florida. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. On June 13, 1983, Lloyd H. Waldorff executed an employment contract under which Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc. was to have the exclusive right to sell the 25 units Waldorff Properties of Ft. Walton proposed to build as "phase two" of its La Mar West Townhouse Project in Mary Ester, Florida. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. Nobody signed the written agreement on behalf of the broker, but Mr. Waldorff's testimony that Ms. Caldwell or somebody in the agency "accepted" it was uncontradicted, and fully consonant with the other evidence adduced. Mr. Waldorff or his organization needed agreements from prospective buyers to purchase units when built, in order to induce a lender to lend money for construction of phase two. One Saturday, probably in mid-July of 1983, Ms. Caldwell presented him with 18 such agreements. It seemed peculiar to Mr. Waldorff, getting 18 purchase agreements at once; and he was also struck by the number of Californians and other non- Floridians among the putative purchasers. But he had nevertheless signed the agreements himself before Ms. Caldwell gave them to Mr. Watson for attestation; and he later furnished all of the purchase agreements to Security Federal Savings and Loan Association of Panama City in support of an eventually successful application for a $1,100,000.00 construction loan. (T.90) Mr. Waldorff signed the purchase agreements in a back room within the Liz Caldwell Realty, Inc. offices. At hearing he remembered that a woman was present. He did not recall respondent's being there. Seventeen of the 18 agreements furnished the lender were purportedly signed by persons to whose signatures, except in one instance, respondent Watson attested. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. On 16 of the 17 purchase agreements on which he signed as a witness to putative purchasers' signatures, respondent also signed as a witness to Mr. Waldorff's signature in a blank provided under the heading "signed in the presence of:". Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Respondent was aware at the time that Mr. Waldorff, whom he considers a friend, needed such agreements in order to obtain financing. As time for closing on the purchase agreements approached, Mr. Waldorff testified, he became suspicious, and asked Ms. Caldwell to see her escrow account statements, but she put him off. Eventually he asked her if the purchase agreements were "bogus," and she answered by nodding affirmatively. It was at this point, Mr. Waldorff said, that he notified the lending institution of their falsity, and asked for an extension of time in which to repay the construction loan. But the weight of the evidence established that the purchase agreements were shams from their inception and that Mr. Waldorff knew it before he obtained the loans. On September 9, 1985, Paul R. Bratton, III, an investigator for DPR, asked Mr. Watson about the purchase, agreements on which he had witnessed purported parties' signatures. In this interview, Mr. Watson said, with respect to some of the contracts which he had signed as a witness, "that he did not see the buyers or the sellers sign the contract." (T.63) In a deposition he gave in the course of related civil litigation, respondent Watson testified that it was "(p)retty much," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, p.10, "standard procedure" for him to witness signatures which he had not seen being affixed. In response to the question, "Does that mean also you wouldn't know whether these people exist in real life or not?", Mr. Watson answered, "It could be. ..." Id. as 15. Mr. Waldorff told Mr. Watson he was going to use the 18 purchase agreements, all but one of which respondent had signed as a witness, to secure a construction loan even though they were "bogus." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. This conversation antedated the loan closing. Id.
