Findings Of Fact Same Day (CON 3116) and Doctors (CON 3115) filed applications for a CON to establish a freestanding ambulatory surgical center (FASC) in Dade County, Florida, in the batching cycle that cloned December 15, 1983. Upon the Department's denial of their applications, Same Day and Doctors filed a timely request for a Section 120.57(1) hearing. The Department has not formally adopted a rule which establishes a need formula for calculating and predicting the gross and net need for freestanding ambulatory surgical centers. However, the Department has developed, and consistently applied, a reasonable methodology for assessing the need for these facilities. Under its methodology, the Department attempts to project, two years in the future, the number of outpatient surgical procedures that will not be accommodated at the county's existing and approved surgical facilities. The first step in calculating this future need is to establish the county's current total surgical use rate, hospital outpatient surgical use rate, and FASC surgical use rate. These use rates are an expression of the actual number of surgeries performed, in each category, for each increment of 1,000 county residents. Utilizing the current total surgical use rate, the Department then projects the total surgical demand for the county according to its 1988 population projection. Thirty percent of total surgical demand, in accordance with industry standards, reflects the gross need for outpatient surgical services in 1988. To establish the net need for outpatient surgical services, the Department subtracts from the gross need established for outpatient surgical services those procedures projected to be performed on an outpatient basis at existing hospitals and freestanding centers. This figure is calculated by applying the current outpatient surgical use rate of existing hospitals and freestanding centers to the county's 1988 population projection. The Department further subtracts, from the gross need, the number of surgical procedures which represent the break even point for approved but not opened freestanding centers. The result reflects need, or lack of need, for the county at the two-year planning horizon. The Department's methodology, when applied to the facts of this case, establishes that there is no numerical need for an additional FASC in Dade County, Florida. The record is otherwise devoid of any proof which would establish a numerical need for a FASC in the county. However, notwithstanding a lack of numerical need, the Department has established a policy that If "preexisting clinics," which have been performing surgical pro- cedures similar to those proposed to be performed in the applicant's facility, seeks licensure as ambulatory surgical facilities, they must document that the facility has been operating profitably, and has performed a sufficient number of procedures to exceed the calculated break even level of operation. Special consideration will be given to approval of the project, after assuring that all other criteria are satisfied. Same Day's CON Application Same Day proposes to establish a FASC in Dade County, Florida, at a total cost of approximately $600,000.00. Same Day proposes to perform only non- emergency, elective outpatient surgical procedures. During the first three years of operation, Same Day will only perform ophthalmic surgical procedures. After three years, Same Day will operate as a general all-purpose FASC. It has been operating profitably during the most recent twelve-month reporting period, and the number of procedures performed exceeds the calculated break even level of operation. Same Day has held a Medicare Provider Number and Occupational License for over two years, and is a "preexisting," clinic entitled to special consideration for CON approval. Same Day currently employs all personnel necessary to staff its proposed FASC. Same Day will encounter no difficulty in recruiting additional personnel should the need arise. Jerry Zelman, M.D., Ophthalmologist and President of Same Day, is a leading ophthalmologist in Dade County. Dr. Zelman holds staff privileges at numerous Miami hospitals, is a member of an investigation and peer review board at a Miami hospital, and is a pioneer in outpatient ophthalmic surgical procedures and advanced ophthalmic surgical procedures. Same Day has established that it has the ability to provide quality of care in an FASC setting. Same Day proposes to finance the FASC facility through a mixture of equity and commercial financing. Same Day currently possesses in excess of $200,000 worth of equipment, including operating room tables, lasers and microscopes, and has budgeted approximately $120,000 for additional equipment, as needed. The Tower Bank of Miami is committed to Same Day to fund up to $600,000, 100 percent of the proposed project. Apart from bank financing, the principals of Same Day have sufficient personal resources to provide total funding for the project. Same Day has established by competent substantial evidence that its proposed FASC will be financially feasible on an immediate and long-term basis, that the costs and methods of construction of the proposed facility are reasonable, and that its projected costs and charges for ambulatory surgical services are reasonable. Doctors' CON Application Doctors proposes to establish an FASC in Dade County, Florida, comprised of two operating rooms for multi-specialty purposes, particularly ophthalmic surgery. Doctors has not selected or purchased a specific site in which to locate its proposed facility, but is tentatively interested in locating it in the northwest area of Dade County. Dr. Weiss, one of two principals in Doctors, currently practices at southern Miami Beach, and the majority of his patients reside on Miami Beach. Northwest Dade County is not within Dr. Weiss' primary service area, and it is doubtful that he would utilize the proposed facility even if it were approved. Dr. Weiss' intent was to encourage other physicians to utilize the proposed facility, though he had not secured any commitments. There are at least 31 acute care hospitals in Dade County which offer outpatient surgical services. Additionally, there are two freestanding centers in operation and an additional seven centers which are approved but not yet opened. There is no current, or projected, need for outpatient surgical services, or an access problem, in Dade County. In addition to failing to establish need for its proposed facility, Doctors failed to offer any evidence to establish that it could provide quality of care; that it had available resources, including health manpower, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, to accomplish its project; that its proposal had immediate and long-term financial feasibility; that its proposal would foster competition and serve to promote quality assurance and cost-effectiveness; and, that the costs and methods of the proposed construction were the most effective methods of construction.
The Issue Whether Proposed Rules 10N-6.002, 10N-6.003, 10N-6.004, 10N-6.005 and 10N- 6.006, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioners, Medivision, Inc., and Tampa Surgi-Center, d/b/a Ambulatory Surgery Center, have standing to challenge the proposed rules at issue in these cases. See the affidavits of Larry Cyment and Donna McMillan. Intervenor, Florida Hospital Association, Inc., has standing to participate in these cases. See the affidavit of Pat Haines. The following Intervenors have established their standing to participate as intervenors in these cases through testimony or affidavit: Cataract Surgery Center, Cortez Foot Surgery Center, Ambulatory Surgery Center of Bradenton, Tampa Outpatient Surgical Facility, Naples Day Surgery, Ambulatory Surgical Center, Specialty Surgical Center and Tallahassee Single Day Surgery. Eye Surgery Center, The Eye Associates, FW Associates and Cordova Ambulatory Surgical Center have failed to prove their standing to participate in these cases. The Proposed Rules; Purpose and Adoption. The Health Care Cost Containment Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), published Rules 10N-6.002, 10N-6.003, 10N-6.004, 10N-6.005 and 10N- 6.006 (hereinafter referred to as the "Proposed Rules"), in Volume 16, Number 12, of the Florida Administrative Weekly (March 23, 1990). The purpose of the Proposed Rules is to collect data concerning the provision of ambulatory surgery services in the State of Florida. Data collected by the Board will allow a comparison of patient charges and will create an additional bases for the analysis of trends in the health care field. In particular, data collection will promote the analysis of shifts in the provision of health care from inpatient to outpatient settings. Data concerning patient identity, geographic location, diagnosis, procedures performed and charges for services is required to be collected and submitted to the Board pursuant to the Proposed Rules. In June of 1989, the staff of the Board presented a study to the Board concerning the growth of ambulatory health care services. Staff recommended that the Board direct that steps be taken to explore the possibility of collecting ambulatory surgery data. The Board accepted the recommendation and appointed a Technical Advisory Panel. The Technical Advisory Panel appointed by the Board consisted of nine representatives of various interested groups. Two members were from freestanding ambulatory surgery centers and two members were from hospitals providing ambulatory surgery services. At meetings of the Technical Advisory Panel in July, August, September and October, 1989, the collection of ambulatory surgery services data was considered. The Technical Advisory Panel discussed collection costs, the type of data to be collected, implementation dates, legislative authority, methods of submitting data and the scope of data collection. The Board was made aware of the Technical Advisory Panel's efforts through minutes of the Panel's meetings and other materials provided to the Board. The collection of ambulatory surgery services data was considered by the Board at its October, November and December, 1989, meetings. The Proposed Rules were approved by the Board at its December, 1989, meeting. There is no statutory authority which specifically provides that data may be collected by the Board from "freestanding ambulatory surgical centers." The Board cited Section 407.03, Florida Statutes (1989), as the specific authority for the Proposed Rules. The Board cited Sections 407.003, 407.03 and 407.08, Florida Statutes (1989), as the laws implemented by the Proposed Rules. Scope of the Proposed Rules. Ambulatory surgery services are provided in a variety of settings: hospitals (e.g., acute care, psychiatric and rehabilitation), licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers, physician offices and other unlicensed health care facilities. The Proposed Rules provide that all licensed hospitals included in Groups 1 through 10 and Group 14 of the HCCCB Florida Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual which provide outpatient surgery services and all licensed ambulatory surgery centers in Florida are required to collect and submit 45 data elements to the Board. Psychiatric hospitals and rehabilitation hospitals are not subject to the Proposed Rules. Physicians' offices and other unlicensed health care providers are also not subject to the Proposed Rules. The Proposed Rules are limited to licensed providers of ambulatory surgery services so that the Board's staff can insure that all members of the groups selected data actually collect and report data. The Board cannot insure that all unlicensed providers of ambulatory surgery services, such as physicians' offices, comply with the Proposed Rules. Therefore, if data was required to be collected and submitted by unlicensed providers, the data would be less reliable. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the requirement of the Proposed Rules that only hospitals included in Groups 1 and 10 and Group 14 of the HCCCB Florida Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual and licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers collect and submit data constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Specific Data vs. Aggregate Data. The Proposed Rules require the collection and reporting of 45 specific data elements. Aggregate data concerning ambulatory surgery services could be obtained from insurance companies and used by the Board as an alternative to the more specific data required to be collected pursuant to the Proposed Rules. Aggregate data is a compilation of specific data. Aggregate data can be used to comply with the Board's statutorily required functions. If aggregate data is used, however, it is likely that reporting will be incomplete. Not all information is reported to insurance companies concerning outpatient activity. Therefore, aggregate data obtained from insurance companies would not cover 100% of ambulatory surgery services provided by reporting entities, resulting in the potential for presenting an incomplete or inaccurate picture of ambulatory surgery services. The recommendations and conclusions which can be reached from aggregate data are limited. Specific data allows more flexibility for research purposes. Specific data will assure greater accuracy and comparability of data. Recommendations and conclusions reached from specific data should be more accurate. In order to insure comparability of data, specific data concerning patients, geographic location, diagnoses, procedures and charges must be collected. The Board collected aggregate data concerning ambulatory surgery services through a special study. The Board collected the data from hospitals and, on a voluntary basis, from licensed ambulatory surgery centers. "Typical" charges for specified ambulatory surgery procedures was collected. This collection effort was flawed by the lack of specific data. The accuracy of the reports based upon the aggregate data was criticized publicly. The reports were even criticized by one of the witnesses called to testify by Intervenors, Cataract Surgery Center, et. al. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the requirement of the Proposed Rules that specific data be collected and submitted instead of aggregate data constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority. Confidential Patient Data. Some of the data elements to be reported pursuant to the Proposed Rules constitute confidential patient information. Disclosure of confidential patient information is prohibited by Florida law. The Proposed Rules do not require or authorize disclosure of confidential patient information. The manner in which the data collected will be distributed has not yet been decided upon by the Board. The evidence failed to prove that the Board will not comply with prohibitions against disclosure of confidential patient information. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the requirement of the Proposed Rules that confidential patient information be reported to the Board constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority. Computer Use. The Proposed Rules require that data be submitted by computer tape or computer diskette. Therefore, data will have to be input into a computer system. The Proposed Rules specify the format data must be in when submitted. Most of the language of the Proposed Rules is computer terminology. The terminology of the Proposed Rules will require some knowledge of computers to carry out the requirements of the Proposed Rules. The language of the Proposed Rules is intentionally designed to convey technical information. The general purpose and requirements of the Proposed Rules does not take any special knowledge to understand. Requiring the submission of data by electronic means is designed to assure the accuracy and confidentiality of the data. The requirement of the Proposed Rules that data be reported in computer form and the use of computer terminology does not constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Errors in the Proposed Rules. Proposed Rule 10N-6.002(2) defines "Ambulatory Surgery Services" as procedures "provided in a hospital in its dedicated ASC ..." [Emphasis added]. Instead of "ASC" the Board intended to use the terms "operating room." Proposed Rule 10N-6.005 contains a list of the data elements to be collected and reported to the Board. This Proposed Rule contains the following errors or unclear language: Item 20 is "Facility Fee - Pri. Proc." "Pri. Proc." is an abbreviation for primary procedure. Items 21-24, similar to Item 20, contains the abbreviation "Sec. Proc." instead of secondary procedure. Items 25-27 contain a reference to "Page 3". As published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, there is no page 3. Item 35, which deals with expected methods of payment, refers to "Comm. Ins. (incl. BCBS)." This reference is an abbreviation for commercial insurance (Blue Cross Blue Shield). Item 44, patient birth date, uses the abbreviation "MMYYYY." This abbreviation should be "MMDDYY." Proposed Rule 10N-6.006 refers to "Primary Diagnosis Code" and "Secondary Diagnosis Code." The Rule should refer to Primary and Secondary "Procedure" Code. The mistakes identified in findings of fact 38-40 are not significant enough to characterize the rule as vague. Nor are these mistakes sufficient enough to otherwise conclude that the Proposed Rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Economic Impact. The Economic Impact Statement (hereinafter referred to as the "EIS"), issued with the Proposed Rules provided the following concerning the economic impact of the Proposed Rules on the Board: ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF IMPLEMENTATION: The agency will be affected by the costs of rule promulgation and by the demands placed upon staff time to assure compliance with the rules and to analyze the data collected. Costs for these activities are estimated to be approximately $85,000 per year. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that this portion of the Board's EIS is unreasonable. The EIS provided the following concerning the economic impact of the Proposed Rules on persons affected by the Proposed Rules: ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF IMPLEMENTATION: Implementation by affected facilities will cost approximately $2.9 to $3.1 million. These funds will be used to develop the programs necessary to collect and submit the data required. On-going compliance will have a much less significant impact. . . . . ESTIMATE OF COST TO ALL PERSONS DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE RULE: The initial cost to Florida hospitals and freestanding ambulatory surgery centers (ASC) would be from approximately $2.9 to $3.1 million to develop the reporting system necessary to generate the necessary data elements. On-going annual cost to the hospitals and free standing ASCs would be substantially less after the first year's start-up procedures are adopted. . . . . The EIS is insufficient because it does not adequately discuss the costs (implementation and ongoing costs) to affected persons or the impact of the Proposed Rules on small business. The weight of the evidence proved that the Proposed Rules will have an economic impact on affected persons. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Board did not fully consider the asserted economic factors and impact of the implementation cost affected persons can be expected to incur as a result of the Proposed Rules. As indicated in the EIS, the Board's determination of the estimate of the economic impact on affected persons was based upon surveys the Board distributed to licensed ambulatory surgery centers, an estimate of costs that hospitals incurred in implementing the Board's detailed patient data collection rule, the Board staff's experience with computer costs (including the collection and entry of data) and consultation with a computer expert familiar with the Proposed Rules. The surveys relied upon by the Board were distributed to all licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers. A total of 91 surveys were distributed. The Board requested that the surveys be returned within one week. Forty-one responses to the surveys were received by the Board from licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers. The responses constitute hearsay. Findings of fact concerning whether the information contained in the responses is correct, therefore, have not been made. The responses to the surveys have, however, been relied upon to make findings of fact concerning what information the Board based its EIS on. The Board received the following pertinent responses to the surveys from licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers: (1) 26 of the responders use computers, 12 have no computer capacity and 3 have some computer capacity; 17 or 18 different software programs are in use; and, (3) the costs to implement the proposed collection of data ranged from $0 to $50,000.00. Twenty- six responders indicated that they did not know how long it would take for them to implement the proposed collection of data. The Board determined that the average implementation cost for licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers reported in the responses to its survey was $18,975.00 and that the average implementation time was 13 weeks. The Board rounded up the average cost reported to it in the surveys and estimated that the cost of implementing the Proposed Rules at licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers would be $20,000.00. Based upon the existence of 85 licensed facilities, the Board estimated the total implementation cost for licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers to be $1,700,000.00 ($20,000.00 x 85). The Board estimated that the maximum cost of implementing the Proposed Rules at affected hospitals would be $2.00 per patient record. This estimate was based upon the Board's estimate of the cost of hospital compliance with the Board's detailed patient discharge data rule. Based upon an estimate of 600,000 patient records a year which will have to processed as a result of the Proposed Rules, the Board estimated the total cost of implementation in affected hospitals to be $1,200,000.00. The Board concluded that the total minimum cost of implementing the Proposed Rules will be $2,900,000.00 ($1,700,000.00 cost for freestanding ambulatory surgery centers plus $1,200,000.00 cost for affected hospitals). The Board discussed the cost of implementing the Proposed Rules with J. Thomas Solano, an expert in computers. Mr. Solano estimated that the cost of modifying an existing computer system (small to mid-range computer) to comply with the Proposed Rules would be $4,000.00 to $10,000.00. The Board used the highest estimate, $10,000.00, and multiplied this cost by the number of affected persons (85 freestanding ambulatory surgery centers and 220 hospitals x $10,000.00). This resulted in a rounded-up estimated implementation cost of $3,100,000.00. The Board concluded that the total maximum cost of implementing the Proposed Rules will be $3,100,000.00. Some of the data to be collected and reported pursuant to the Proposed Rules is already being collected by affected persons. Therefore, the primary cost of complying with the Proposed Rules will be associated with modifying existing computer software and/or hardware. The cost of modifying an existing computer system can fluctuate widely. As a general rule, computer users with existing software must rely upon their existing software provider to make modifications. The cost of modifying software can, therefore, be much higher than Mr. Solano estimated. As an alternative to modifying existing systems, affected persons can acquire a freestanding personal computer and software which can be used to comply with the Proposed Rules. The cost of such an acquisition should be approximately $2,500.00 to $5,600.00. Intervenor, T.S.D.S., Inc., d/b/a Tallahassee Single Day Surgery Center, estimated that it will have to spend approximately $14,000.00 to $20,000.00 to implement the Proposed Rules. This estimate is based upon a letter purportedly from the Intervenor's computer company. The information contained in the letter is hearsay. The estimated implementation costs are, therefore, not supported by admissible evidence. The estimate, even if supported by competent substantial evidence, is within the Board's estimated implementation costs and, therefore, fail to prove that the Board's EIS is unreasonable or that the Board failed to fully consider the economic factors or impact. Intervenor, Cataract Surgery Center, estimated implementation costs of $1,900.00. This amount is limited to additional maintenance fees, supplies and personnel costs. Cataract Surgery Center believes there will no charge from its computer vendor to modify its software. Cataract's estimated costs are reasonable and within the Board's estimates. Ambulatory Surgical Center of Lake County (hereinafter referred to as "Lake"), does not own a computer. It uses the computer system of its physician owners. Lake considered more than one method of complying with the Proposed Rules. It considered buying a personal computer and estimated it would cost $5,000.00. This cost is consistent with the estimates of the Board. Lake also considered purchasing an integrated hardware and software package. It estimated that such a system would cost $40,000.00 to $50,000.00. The estimate is based upon hearsay. Even if the evidence concerning the cost of an integrated system is accepted as correct, the evidence fails to prove that such costs are necessary to comply with the Proposed Rules. The estimate for this system is based upon Lake's decision that it would perform other functions with the computer system, including storing management information and performing billing functions. These functions are not required in order to comply with the Proposed Rules. Lake currently treats approximately only 300 patients annually. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Proposed Rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority because of the implementation cost which will be incurred by affected persons. The weight of the evidence also failed to prove that the inadequate treatment of implementation costs in the EIS was fully considered by the Board. Therefore, the treatment of implementation costs in the EIS constitutes harmless error. Although the primary costs to affected persons caused by the Proposed Rules will be associated with implementation of the Proposed Rules, there will also be certain costs associated with ongoing compliance with the Proposed Rules. There will be ongoing costs for the collection of data, entry of the data into a computer and reporting data to the Board. Ongoing costs caused by the Proposed Rules will be greater if an affected person with an existing computer system acquires a freestanding computer system instead of using the existing system. The Board's statement in the EIS concerning ongoing costs was not based upon information from affected persons. The statement concerning ongoing costs does not indicate what the ongoing costs of compliance with the Proposed Rules will be. It only indicates that it will be less than the initial implementation costs associated with the Proposed Rules. Although the weight of the evidence did not prove the estimated total amount of ongoing costs to affected persons from the Proposed Rules, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that ongoing costs will be greater than the estimated total amount of implementation costs. T.S.D.S., Inc., d/b/a Tallahassee Single Day Surgery Center, estimated that it would incur ongoing costs of approximately $6,000.00. This estimate is reasonable. Cataract Surgery Center estimated that it would incur ongoing costs of $41,600.00, or $20.00 per case, to comply with the Proposed Rules. Cataract Surgery Center's estimated costs include the following costs: reel purchase; handling; reel preparation; collection of billing data; process of sending information to the Board; clarification of errors; additional record production; and response to public inquiries. Cataract Surgery Center's estimated costs are not reasonable. The estimated time to comply with the Proposed Rules is excessive and some of the tasks, i.e., collection of billing data, are not required by the Proposed Rules. Cataract Surgery Center's conclusion that it may have an increase in maintenance fees is reasonable. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Board did not fully consider the asserted economic factors and impact of the ongoing costs affected persons can be expected to incur as a result of the Proposed Rules. Therefore, the treatment of ongoing costs in the EIS was harmless error. The weight of the evidence also failed to prove that the Proposed Rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority because of the ongoing cost which will be incurred by affected persons. The EIS contains a statement that the Proposed Rules should have no economic impact on small business. In reaching this conclusion the Board failed to take into account the legal definition of "small business" contained in Florida Statutes. The Board did, however, actually consider the impact the Proposed Rules would likely have on small ambulatory surgery centers subject to the Proposed Rules. The Board attempted to reduce the economic impact on small ambulatory surgery centers by allowing affected persons to file data on computer tape or on diskette. By allowing the use of diskettes for reporting data, the Board made it possible for affected persons to use personal computers to comply with the Proposed Rules. Delayed submission of some data elements was also allowed in order to reduce the impact on small facilities. It is unlikely that the Board would have made further modifications of the Proposed Rules had the legal definition of "small business" been considered. The weight of the evidence failed to prove what, if any, reasonable modifications should have been taken by the Board to accommodate any economic impact on small business. The weight of the evidence failed to prove whether any of the entities that participated in the proceeding were small businesses. Those entities, although meeting the definition of small business with regard to the number of employees they have and their net worth, failed to prove whether they are "independently owned and operated." See Section 288.703(1), Florida Statutes (1989). The weight of the evidence failed to prove if any person affected by the Proposed Rules is a small business. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Board did not fully consider the asserted economic factors and impact of small business which can be expected to incur as a result of the Proposed Rules. Therefore, the treatment of the impact on small business in the EIS was harmless error. The weight of the evidence also failed to prove that the Proposed Rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because of the impact on small business. The Petitioners and Intervenors presented evidence concerning a number of actions which the Board did not take during its consideration of the economic impact and factors of the Proposed Rules and its preparation of the EIS. This evidence proved only that there were other steps which the Board could have taken during its preparation of the EIS. The Petitioners and Intervenors failed to prove, however, that the steps which the Board did take were not sufficient. The Petitioners and Intervenors therefore failed to prove that the steps which the Board did not take were required or necessary.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a hospital licensed by the State of Florida and is located in Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent, the affected state agency, as defined in Subsection 120.52(1), Florida Statutes, is responsible for the regulation of health care facilities, to include Petitioner. The Department also considers the question of provision of additional health care in the community through its certificate of need program. Intervenor has made application to provide ambulatory surgery in Duval County, Florida, through a freestanding surgery center. Jacksonville, Florida, is in Duval County. This case is part of a consolidated hearing process and is the companion matter to Saint Vincent's Medical Center, Petitioner v. State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and Ambulatory Care - Duval Development Corp., d/b/a Jacksonville Surgical Center - Ambulatory Surgical Center, Respondents, D.O.A.H. Case No. 83-337 and Riverside Hospital, Petitioner v. State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and Ambulatory Care - Duval Development Corp. d/b/a Jacksonville Surgical Center - Ambulatory Surgical Center, Respondents, D.O.A.H. Case No. 83-482. The first three days of the hearing were conducted on the dates alluded to in this order. That presentation was transcribed. In addition, deposition testimony was presented and accepted as part of the record in this matter. The campanion cases concern the propriety of the grant of a certificate of need to the Intervenor in this cause to allow construction and operation of a freestanding ambulatory surgery center which would be used for performing outpatient surgeries. At all times relevant to this case, Saint Vincent's had a department in which outpatient surgical procedures were performed and are expected to be performed in the future. With the advent of the establishment of the Intervenor's facility, that health care unit will be in competition with Petitioner in the realm of providing surgical procedures. As recently as 1975, Respondent knew that ambulatory surgery centers, such as that proposed by the Intervenor, would need permission to construct such a facility. This permission relates to the need to apply and receive a certificate of need from the Department. The authority for such regulation was pursuant to applicable provisions of Chapter 381, Florida Statutes. Notwithstanding this regulatory role to be fulfilled, Respondent did not undertake a program for enacting rules to consider the question of need for ambulatory surgical centers. This lack of rulemaking was primarily due to inactivity of applicants seeking ambulatory surgical center certificates of need. This circumstance changed in late 1982. In December, 1982, Respondent received approximately thirteen applications for ambulatory surgical center certificates of need, as contrasted with approximately ten applications over the prior three years. At the same time Respondent was in the throes of having to revamp its certificate of need review process related to the overall health industry, brought about by statutory changes which abolished health system agencies and created local health councils. In 1983, at the time of the hearings, Respondent had received 27 applications for ambulatory surgery centers. This glut of applications by would-be ambulatory surgical centers and the 1982 applications were examined without formal rules defining the need question, related to expected numbers of surgical procedures that might be conducted on an outpatient or ambulatory basis. The determination of this ratio of outpatient surgical procedures to inpatient surgical procedures is a vital part of the need question. 1/ Absent promulgated rules, Department officials began their attempt to ascertain the percentage comparison between outpatient and inpatient surgeries, as that item was involved in the establishment of a methodology for considering the need question. Based upon information provided by applicants for ambulatory surgery centers and its own research, Respondent concluded that anywhere from 18 to 40 percent of total surgeries could be expected to be outpatient surgeries. Having utilized a median projection related to population expectations in the certificate of need process, the Department decided to use a median projection for the expected percentage of outpatient surgery. Thus, 29 percent was selected as the percentage of outpatient surgeries in the total number of surgical procedures and that percentage was utilized in the computation of the number of expected outpatient surgical procedures. Utilization of this 29 percent factor in the computation of the number of procedures to be expected on an outpatient basis may be seen in Petitioner's Exhibit 2 and Respondent's Exhibit 1, application reviews. Once the Department decided to employ the 29 percent factor, it has consistently, on a statewide basis, utilized that factor in evaluating the question of the grant of certificates of need for ambulatory surgical center applicants. This has been done in more than one batch or cycle and was done in the instance of Intervenor's application which is at issue. Although the 29 percent factor is not the only determining element of the certificate of need process, it is an integral part of that process and can affect the outcome of the grant of the certificate, as has been the case in two instances alluded to in the course of the hearing. This policy choice by the agency is not emerging. It is not one of a series of approaches that have been experimented with in trying to arrive at a concluding agency position, prior to the formal adoption of a rule. This percentage factor has been the only number utilized in the review of all ambulatory surgery center applications commencing late 1982 to the time of final hearing in this action. This choice has not stood the test or scrutiny of the rulemaking process set forth in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. Notwithstanding the stated willingness of the agency to modify its position when presented with a more credible method, that contingency or eventuality has not occurred and every applicant for ambulatory surgery center certificate of need has had its application measured against the 29 percent factor commencing December 1982, to the exclusion of other techniques suggested by applicants. In the face of the facts reported above and the record considered, and recognizing that the agency should be afforded an opportunity to establish a record basis for the utilization of the 29 percent factor, even if it were found to be an invalid rule, a decision was reached at the time of hearing on the question of the utilization of the 29 percent factor and whether it was a rule not duly promulgated. It was found that the 29 percent factor is an unpromulgated rule and could not stand as law without first being subject to an assessment of the quality of the record basis for the agency's policy choice. The argument related to this case may be found at pages 798 through 829 of the transcript. The ruling is announced at pages 829 through 832. Respondent subsequently presented additional evidence in support of its policy choice and that may be found in succeeding sections within the transcript. This written order memorializes the ruling announced at hearing.
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether the Respondent, the Department of Professional Regulation, should pay the Petitioner, Kirk A. Woodson, M.D., attorney fees and costs under Section 57.011, Fla. Stat. (1989), the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. As reflected in the Preliminary Statement, the parties stipulate that the Petitioner is a "prevailing small business party" and that reasonable fees and costs exceed $15,000, the statutory cap. The only remaining issue under the statute is whether the Respondent was "substantially justified" in filing the Administrative Complaint in Case No. 90- 5986 against the Petitioner. 1/
Findings Of Fact On or about June 7, 1988, a complaint was filed against the license of the Petitioner, Kirk A. Woodson, M.D., subsequent to closure of a professional malpractice liability claim against him without payment of indemnity. The substance of the complaint was that, on January 1, 1986, Woodson saw and performed a hysterectomy on a patient who had presented at the emergency room at University Community Hospital in Tampa, Florida, with heavy and continuous vaginal bleeding. The complaint stated that post-surgery the patient developed Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS) and died. The complaint questioned whether Woodson failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. By letter dated June 30, 1988, the Department of Professional Regulation (the Department or DPR) notified Woodson that it had received the complaint and that it was initiating an investigation. DPR subpoenaed the hospital records which revealed that the patient arrived at the UCH emergency room at 5:28 a.m. on January 1, 1986, with at least a three-day history of vaginal hemorraging. An emergency room physician saw the patient, gave her two units of packed blood cells, and admitted her to Woodson's service. Woodson was called at approximately 8:30 a.m. and saw the patient later that morning. The patient's admission to surgery to determine the cause of the bleeding and perform necessary procedures was delayed until at least approximately 2:00 p.m. because the patient refused to consent to a dilation and curettage (D and C); she was insisting on a hysterectomy only. She finally consented to a D and C to be followed by a hysterectomy if Woodson found it to be medically necessary. During this delay, the patient continued to bleed and was transfused with two more units of packed blood cells at approximately 1:45 p.m. After the consent was given, there was a further delay, not explained by the records, until approximately 6:00 p.m. in getting the patient to surgery. The patient continued to bleed. Surgery took almost five hours. During surgery, the patient's bleeding got worse, and she was transfused with four more units of whole blood during the surgery. The DPR investigator was unable to ascertain from the hospital records the reason for the length of the surgery. The DPR investigator attempted to arrange an interview with Dr. Woodson and his attorney on or about February 28, 1989. The appointment was cancelled. When the DPR investigator contacted Woodson to reschedule the interview, Dr. Woodson questioned why DPR was pursuing the complaint when the malpractice claim was closed without payment of indemnity. Dr. Woodson agreed to be interviewed but expressed his preference that the investigator first review the "extensive depositions" taken in the malpractice litigation. 4/ Having already determined to request an expert evaluation of the case, the investigator decided to postpone the interview with Dr. Woodson. On July 10, 1989, the DPR asked a probable cause panel of the Board of Medicine to authorize the retention of an expert in gynecology to review the information obtained through investigation to that point in time to assist in the determination whether Woodson's treatment of the patient fell below that level of care, skill and treatment which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. On July 22, 1989, the probable cause met and authorized the expert review. On or about November 2, 1989, the DPR requested an expert review by Doris N. Carson, M.D., a Board-certified gynecologist with extensive surgical experience, including emergency room experience. Dr. Carson reviewed the hospital records supplied by DPR, some of which were difficult to read. By letter dated November 20, 1989, Dr. Carson reported her impressions. Dr. Carson believed the records supported Dr. Woodson's diagnosis and ultimate course of treatment. In the patient's condition, the proper course of treatment was to attempt to stop the vaginal bleeding by doing a D and C; a hysterectomy only should have been attempted if the D and C did not stop the bleeding. However, Dr. Carson perceived other problems that were not explained to her satisfaction by the hospital records. First, Dr. Carson did not see anything in the records to justify the length of the surgical procedures performed by Dr. Woodson. She reported: Careful review indicated that the subject attempted to remove the fibroids vaginally, and when this only increased the bleeding, then decided to do a laparotomy. The uterus, although enlarged, was not huge and the procedure as described seemed to move along without difficulty. When, however, the time is reviewed five hours would indicate very serious problems of technique or what seems more likely a lot if indecision about how to proceed. Evidently there was no physician surgical assistant, and the subject proceeded alone. In retrospect better operationg room help should have been available. Second, Dr. Carson felt that the patient received too much whole blood replacement during the course of the day and the surgery. Her reading of the hospital records indicated to her that five units of whole blood were given to the patient in addition to four units of packed cells. She felt: "Packed cells altogether would have been a better choice in light of the volume given to the patient." Her concern was that "volume overload," rather than ARDS, may have resulted ultimately in the death of the patient. However, she disclaimed the necessary expertise to render a conclusive opinion on the question and recommended that, if the DPR wanted a conclusive opinion on the cause of death, it should have a specialist in intensive care or a respiratory expert review the records. Dr. Carson had some difficulty with the delay in getting the patient to the operating room. The records indicated that at least some of the delay was caused by the patient's unwillingness to give consent to the recommended D and C. But Dr. Carson nonetheless had concerns that the delay added to the amount of blood transfused. Dr. Carson closed her letter with this remark: "In conclusion: A poorly done sugical proceeding below the recognized normal level of care." For reasons not apparent from the evidence presented, DPR did not interview Dr. Woodson before asking the probable cause panel to find probable cause and file a draft Administrative Complaint against Dr. Woodson based on Dr. Carson's expert review and the rest of the investigative report, including the hospital records. The draft Administrative Complaint, drawn in two counts, sought to discipline Dr. Woodson under Count I for failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances, in two respects: first, for allegedly causing volume overload in the patient by ordering units of whole blood, instead of packed blood, to replace the patient's blood loss; and, second, for allegedly taking too long, without justification, to perform the necessary surgery. Count II alleged that Woodson failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, specifically with respect to ordering whole blood instead of packed units and with respect to the length of the surgical procedures. The probable cause panel considered the matter at its meeting on June 22, 1990. Counsel for the panel pointed out that the "extensive depositions" Woodson had indicated he wanted the DPR investigator to read before Woodson was interviewed were not in the packet of materials reviewed by the panel. 5/ But members of the panel indicated that they had reviewed the material that was in the packet and that they thought the information contained in it was adequate to make a probable cause determination. One of the doctors on the panel called it a "horrendous case." She felt that Woodson had "swamped out the patient" and had performed "inappropriate types of fluid therapy and blood therapy." The other member mentioned the "five-hour operating time . . . without any real explanation." The panel's attorney pointed out the part of the report of investigation that referenced the patient's refusal to consent to Dr. Woodson's proposed surgery and asked whether it constituted "any semblance of an explanation for a delay?" It is not clear from the transcript of the probable cause proceeding how the panel resolved the attorney's question, but the panel voted to find probable cause notwithstanding the question. 6/ There is information in the materials reviewed by Dr. Carson, and by the probable cause panel, which tends to explain some of the time it took for Dr. Woodson to perform surgery on the patient. Some of this partially exculpatory information was difficult to read and decipher in the records. Some of the partially exculpatory information was acknowledged by Dr. Carson and may also have been taken into account independently by the panel. Notwithstanding this partially exculpatory information in the record, the finding of probable cause was substantially justified.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's request for authorization for the autologous chondrocyte implantation procedure should be approved pursuant to worker's compensation laws and rules.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's Injury At all times, the Petitioner has been employed as a Ladies Wear Department Manager for K-Mart Corporation. On July 21, 1998, Petitioner, while in the course and scope of her employment, was injured when she fell on a metal ladder as she attempted to hang clothes on a rail. Her left knee struck a metal bar on the second step of the ladder, causing immediate pain. On August 26, 1998, Petitioner consulted Dr. Jeffery Friedman, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, who specializes in knee and shoulder surgery. Dr. Friedman was recognized as an expert in the field of orthopedic surgery. On or about September 4, 1998, Petitioner underwent arthroscopic surgery performed by Dr. Friedman to remove a loose body from the knee. Dr. Friedman found grade III chondromalacia and debrided the area using an arthroscopic shaver. He also found loose articular cartilage at the patella. Dr. Friedman's records describe the area of grade III chondromalacia as "fairly large" and involving " the apex of the patella." However, neither the size nor the shape of the injury is disclosed. Dr. Friedman also debrided flake of articular cartilage from the tibial plateau and removed a calcific loose body from the posteromedial compartment. His post-operative diagnosis was left knee loose body, chrondromalacia, and intracruciate ligament strain. Petitioner returned to work with K-Mart after the arthroscopic surgery, and was placed on light duty. While performing her duties, Petitioner is required to stand most of the time, and is unable to sit. Prior to her injury, Petitioner worked 40 hours per week. After her injury, due to her physical limitations resulting from the accident, Petitioner is only able to work 24 hours per week. Petitioner's pain limits her ability to work 40 hours per week. Petitioner cannot put her full weight down on the left knee while going up steps or a ladder or it causes sharp shooting pains. In addition, continuous walking results in continuous aching pain. The reduction in Petitioner's work hours was due to her injury. Petitioner is now unable to perform all of the duties that were required of her before the injury. Dr. Friedman found Petitioner to have reached maximum medical improvement in December 1998. In early 1999, Petitioner sought treatment for continued pain. An MRI was performed on or about March 5, 1999, which suggested a small defect in the articular cartilage, thinning of the patellar cartilage, and narrowing of the medical femoral tibial joint consistent with the early stages of osteoarthritis. In June, 1999, Petitioner underwent steroid injections for continued pain. In September, 1999, Petitioner returned to Dr, Friedman because of continued pain. Dr. Friedman reviewed a video tape that he had made of the arthroscopic surgery and fount that the Petitioner had a fairly large chondral defect of the patella. Dr. Friedman determined that Petitioner was a candidate for ACI, also known as the Genzyme Carticel Procedure (Genzyme Procedure). Dr. Friedman believed that the ACI procedure would benefit Petitioner by providing long-term symptomatic relief with joint pain and mechanical disturbances and improved joint motion function, eliminating the complaints of grinding and catching, and furthering the goal of returning the patient to regular and even strenuous activity. Petitioner then requested authorization for the ACI procedure. The Employer/Carrier denied the request and referred it to the Agency for Health Care Administration for review in accordance with Florida law. The Agency consulted with the University of Florida Faculty Practice Group, and Dr. B. Hudson Berrey, Chair of the Department of Orthopaedics and Rehabilitation, rendered an opinion that the procedure is investigative within the meaning of Rule 59B-11.002(5), Florida Administrative Code. Dr. Berrey further opined that there was not reliable evidence that ACI would provide significant benefit to the recovery and well-being of the injured employee within the meaning of Rule 59B-11.004(3), Florida Administrative Code. The documents and information forwarded to Dr. Berrey by Respondent included Petitioner's medical records provided by Intervenor, K-Mart carrier. Dr. Berrey did not review any actual MRI films, did not review any films taken at the time of the arthroscopic procedure, and in fact only reviewed certain documentation that was supplied to him by the agency. Petitioner was denied her right to present information to Dr. Berrey prior to his forming his opinion for the agency. This was a violation of Rule 59B-11.003, Florida Administrative Code. The agency rendered a decision based upon Dr. Berrey's opinion, declining to order the Employer/Carrier to provide ACI to Petitioner. Autologous Chondrocyte Implantation The ACI procedure was initially developed in Sweden by Dr. Lars Peterson. ACI is a surgical procedure whereby a sample of cartilage is harvested from another area of the joint. The harvesting of the cartilage is performed during an arthroscopic surgical operation. The sample is sent to Boston to the laboratory of Genzyme Tissue Repair, Inc. ("Genzyme"), the owner of the process. Genzyme uses its proprietary process to culture the cells into an estimated 12 million chondrocytes over a period of approximately two months. Genzyme then returns the cultured chondrocytes to the surgeon. The surgeon then performs an open surgical operation. The surgeon creates a periosteal flap. In addition, the injury is debrided and the chondrocytes are implanted on the wounded cartilage and covered with the periosteal flap. The ACI procedure thus requires two surgical operations, one arthroscopic procedure and one open procedure. The claimed benefit of ACI is that the cartilage that is generated and implanted onto the knee will be hyaline cartilage or hyaline-like cartilage rather than fibrocartilage. Hyaline cartilage is composed both of the cartilage cells of an extra-cellular matrix. It has greater ability than fibrocartilage to withstand compression and shearing forces. ACI has been shown to produce "hyaline-like" cartilage in some patients. However, it does not reproduce the extra- cellular matrix in which the chondrocytes are found in naturally occurring hyaline cartilage. Alternative Treatments Other available treatments for a defect in articular cartilage of the knees include abrasion chondroplasty, arthroscopic microfracture, and arthroscopic drilling. Many patients get relief with one or more of these alternative procedures and do not need another operation. In addition, a surgical procedure to elevate the tibial tubercle and remove some of the weight from the patella might also alleviate the Petitioner's pain and improve her functioning. Dr. Friedman performed an abrasion chondroplasty during the arthroscopic surgery of September 4, 1998. Dr. Friedman did not offer Petitioner either the microfracture or the drilling procedures. Dr. Friedman had considered performing a tibial tubercle elevation but has not recommended that the Petitioner undergo that procedure either before the ACI is approved or independently of the ACI. Dr. Friedman views the primary purpose of this procedure as assuring the best possible results from the ACI. Dr. Friedman indicated there were no appropriate alternative medical procedures, other then the ACI procedure, available for Petitioner's injury. Dr. Friedman opined that the only viable option of putting back normal articular cartilage underneath the kneecap would be with the ACI procedure. In this opinion, the alternative procedures are not appropriate for and would not benefit Petitioner, as they were merely temporary procedures. Moreover, he emphatically stated that the ACI procedure is the procedure which is appropriate for an would benefit Petitioner. The Evidence That ACI Remains Investigative The Agency for Health Care Administration has not promulgated, endorsed, or approved any particular treatment for injuries to the articular cartilage of the knee in accordance with Sections 440.13(15) or 408.02, Florida Statutes; therefore, there was no Agency-approved protocol for Dr. Berrey to consider in rendering his opinion. Dr. Berrey testified that he could find no articles or publications describing controlled studies in which the effectiveness of ACI compared to any other procedure. Dr. Berrey further testified that he could find no articles about the ACI procedure in peer-reviewed journals in which the authors used objective measures of outcome which compared the patients' condition before and after treatment. The use of blinded or controlled studies is important so that possible confounding factors or variables can be controlled or accounted for and the results measured objectively. Dr. Berrey found that the publications cited by the proponents of the procedure discussed research which was funded by Genzyme, the owner of the process by which the chondrocytes were cultured. The funding of the research by the owner of the process was an additional factor in his determination that the evidence supporting the efficacy of the procedure was not reliable. The Cartilage Repair Registry and the results reported therein do not constitute reliable evidence of the benefits of ACI when compared to other available procedures for two reasons. First, the potentially confounding variables are neither controlled nor accounted for. Second, each surgeon evaluates his or her own work, so that there is no objective, independent measurement or assessment of the condition of each patient before and after surgery. Although the premise on which ACI is based is that the patient's implant will consist of hyaline cartilage rather than fibrocartilage, the available data does not indicate that the results are comprised only, or even primarily, of genuine hyaline cartilage. Rather, the evidence is that some patients develop "hyaline-like" cartilage, or cartilage composed partly of hyaline tissue. It cannot be determined whether hyaline or hyaline- like cartilage has filled a patient's defect without performing a biopsy and a histological evaluation of the tissue. The published reports described in the testimony contain discussions of post-surgical histological performed on very small numbers of patients. The published reports concerning the use of ACI to treat defects of the patella show that the results are not as favorable as those claimed for treatment of the femoral condyle. After the proponents of the procedure began to perform other procedures with the ACI to assure that any defects in the alignment of the patella are repaired, improved results were reported. Dr, Friedman testified about the published results of histological evaluations of 37 patients. Of those, seven underwent ACI to treat defects of the patella. Only one of the seven showed the development of hyaline-like tissue. Further, only two of the seven patella patients reported surgical results classified as good or better. Dr. Friedman opined that the histological data resulting from treatment of defects of the patella had improved since the study described in the preceding paragraph. However, he could not give any reference to the basis for his opinion. Dr. Friedman further testified that the more recent articles discussed the results of patients who had been followed from nine to 15 years. However, the articles and presentations from 1997 to 2000 report on follow-up of the first hundred patients between two and nine years after their surgery. Dr. Billings testified that Dr. Peterson's presentation discussed follow-ups of ACI patients occurring as long as 15 years after surgery. Yet, the March 2000 presentation to the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons focused on 40 patients who had been evaluated three or more years after their surgery. The FDA granted an accelerated approval of the Carticel product in 1997. The original accelerated FDA approval was granted for defects of the femoral condyle, the trochlear groove, and the patella. The terms of the approval require that controlled studies be conducted which compare the procedure to other procedures available for the treatment of focal chondral defects, specifically, microfracture and the creation of a periosteal flap without the injection of the cultured chondrocytes. None of the expert witnesses had found in their literature search any published reports of the progress of the controlled studies required under the terms of the accelerated FDA approval. In February, 2000, the FDA approval was modified. Genzyme is no longer permitted to market the ACI procedure or its Carticel product for treatment of defects to the patella. The requirements of Rule 59B-11.004, Florida Administrative Code, differ significantly from those of the accelerated FDA approval process, so that the granting of accelerated approval does not determine the answer to the question whether a treatment is investigative under that rule. The FDA's inquiry addresses the issues of safety and efficacy. However, the accelerated FDA approval process does not address the issues of whether a particular product is more effective than currently existing treatments or is equally cost-effective. Based upon all the evidence, the performance of the ACI procedure on the defects located in the patella is investigative within the meaning of Rule 59B-11.002(5), Florida Administrative Code. The Probability That ACI Would be of Significant Benefit in Returning Petitioner to Work Both of Petitioner's expert witnesses testified that if she does not undergo ACI, it is likely that she will need a total knee replacement. However, neither witness testified that Petitioner currently requires a total knee replacement. No testimony was presented as to when Petitioner might require a total knee replacement. Despite the testimony that ACI has been studied for 20 years, the published reports follow patients only for nine years after surgery. From the current state of the research, it is not possible to conclude that patients who undergo ACI avoid the need for subsequent surgery in ten or more years. The published studies of the results of ACI going out nine years from the date of surgery do not state the number of procedures performed on the patella. No witnesses testified regarding any published studies of the effectiveness of ACI that addressed the extent to which patients had been able to return to work as a result of the procedure. There is insufficient evidence from which to conclude that the ACI is more likely to enable the Petitioner to return to her duties that other available procedures. The Likelihood That the Benefits of ACI Would Outweigh the Risks and the Costs The testimony compared the cost and benefit of ACI with chondroplasty, microfracture or drilling, and, to some extent, a Macquet procedure or tibial tubercle elevation. Each of the other procedures requires only one surgical operation. ACI requires an arthroscopic surgical procedure to harvest cartilage, culturing of the chondrocytes at the Genzyme laboratory in Boston, and followed by an open surgical procedure to create a periosteal flap and to implant the chondrocytes. Petitioner's expert testified that the cost of culturing the chondrocytes alone was between $8,000 and $10,000, in addition to the two surgical procedures. Petitioner's expert compared the cost of ACI to that of a total knee replacement. However, that comparison is not appropriate under the rule because there is no evidence that Petitioner currently needs a knee replacement or that a knee replacement is the treatment generally used to treat her current condition. The cost of the abrasion chondroplasty, the microfracture or drilling procedure would approximate the cost of the first stage of ACI, approximately $2,300. Dr. Billings testified that the cost of the second stage of ACI was greater than that of the first stage. The second stage is an open surgical operation rather than an arthroscopic one. The total cost of the ACI procedure, including therapy, is probably close to the $30,000 required for a total knee replacement, including the therapy required for the total knee replacement. Dr. Berrey testified that published reports of the cost of ACI are as high as $37,000. The ACI requires extensive physical therapy; Petitioner presented no evidence as to the extent to which the cost of this aspect of treatment was included in the total cost of ACI. ACI has been established to be safe, so that the benefits of the procedure outweigh the risks. However, there is insufficient evidence from which to conclude that the benefits of ACI outweigh the additional costs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order denying approval of the autologous chondrocyte implantation for Petitioner Rebecca Crane. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffrey J. Bordulis, Esquire 570 Crown Oak Centre Drive Longwood, Florida 32750 Lisa J. Hurley, Esquire Pyle, Jones, Hurley & Hand, P.A. 1069 West Morse Boulevard Winter Park, Florida 32789 Michelle L. Oxman, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Ruben J. King-Shaw, Jr., Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Julie Gallagher, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown, is a graduate of the University of Queensland Medical School in Brisbane, Australia. He holds the degrees of Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery. Doctorates of Medicine, under the British system, are reserved for specialists. Nonetheless, the medical training Petitioner received equates to that leading up to the award of the degree of Doctor of Medicine in the United States, and he is a physician and licensed as such in several states. He has completed residencies in general and thoracic surgery in Australia and the United States and has taken advanced training in cardiovascular and thoracic surgery at Emory University. Immediately before coming to the University of South Florida, (USF), Dr. McKeown was an Assistant Professor of Surgery at the University of Washington. In mid to late 1988, Dr. McKeown responded to an advertisement USF had placed in the Journal of the American Medical Association seeking applicants qualified for appointment at the Associate Professor level "... to join the Department of Surgery at the University of South Florida College of Medicine as the Chief of Cardiothoracic Surgery." He was selected for the position and joined the faculty effective May 1, 1989. All the correspondence leading up to Petitioner's joining the University faculty referred not only to his appointment as Associate Professor but also his assignment as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Only the actual state employment contract described his employment exclusively as Associate Professor and made no mention of the Chief position. Under these circumstances, Petitioner did not gain any proprietory interest in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Dr. McKeown held the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division until April, 1994, when, as a result of a decision made by the Chairman of the school's Department of Surgery, he was replaced as Chief and that position was filled, on a temporary basis, by the Department Chair. Petitioner claims that when he arrived at USF to assume the directorship, an administrative position, he saw an opportunity to develop the position into something significant. He contends he would not have come to USF unless he was to be the Chief of the Division as there was no appeal to him in a position as a general faculty member. He wanted an opportunity to budget, hire people, and develop plans and programs, and in order to advance in academic medicine, one must, at some point, hold an administrative position. Apparently the Department of Surgery had experienced a rapid turnover in faculty. It is not clear whether this caused or was the result of a dispute with administrators and medical staff at Tampa General Hospital, (TGH), where much of the clinical medical school activity is carried on. However, the program was recognized as being weak in cardiothoracic surgery, and this condition offered Petitioner the challenge he wanted. In his five years as Chief, Petitioner increased both the number and quality of personnel and revenues considerably. He developed affiliations with several foreign universities and recruited qualified people, built up the laboratory, secured more grants, developed a program of continuing medical education and raised the examination scores of the school's graduates. He opened new clinical programs and built up both billings and collections to the point where the program revenues were increased at least 2 to 5 times. By 1992- 1993, the Division was making money and generating a surplus and still used clinic funds to support research. During his tenure as Chief of the Division, Petitioner served under two Department of Surgery chairmen. The first was Dr. Connar, the individual who recruited him; and the incumbent is Dr. Carey, the individual who removed him. Petitioner asserts that at no time during his tenure in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division was he ever told, by either Department Chairman, that his performance was unsatisfactory. All Division heads within the Department were, from time to time, counseled about personnel costs, and Petitioner admits he had some differences with Dr. Carey about that subject and some other financial aspects of the job, but nothing different than anywhere else in academia. Petitioner was removed by Dr. Carey based in part upon his alleged inability to get along with people. Though he claims this is not true, he admits to three areas of conflict. The first related to his objection to transplants being accomplished by unqualified surgeons which, he alleges, Dr. Carey permitted to further his own ends. The second related to the pediatric heart transplant program for which Petitioner supported one candidate as chair and Dr. Carey supported another. The third related to Petitioner's reluctance to hire a physician whom Dr. Carey wanted to hire but to whom Petitioner purportedly objected. Of the three areas of dispute, only the first two came before his removal, but he contends at no time was he advised his position was a problem for the Department. By the same token, none of Petitioner's annual performance ratings reflected any University dissatisfaction with his performance. At no time was he ever rated unsatisfactory in any performance area; and prior to his removal, he had no indication his position as Chief of the Division was in jeopardy. Dr. Carey indicates he did counsel with Petitioner often regarding his attitude but did not rate him down because he hoped the situation would improve. Dr. McKeown was called to meet with Dr. Carey in his office on April 12, 1994. At that meeting, Dr. Carey was very agitated. He brought up the "Norman" incident and indicated he was going to remove Petitioner as Chief of the Division. Dr. McKeown admits to having made an inappropriate comment regarding Dr. Norman, another physician, to a resident in the operating room while performing an operation. He also admits that it was wrong to do this and apologized to Dr. Norman both orally and in writing shortly thereafter. Dr. Norman accepted his apology and Petitioner asserts that after his removal, Dr. Norman called him and assured him he, Norman, had not prompted the removal action. Dr. Norman did not testify at the hearing. Dr. Carey removed Petitioner from his position as Chief because of the comments he had made regarding Dr. Norman. Almost immediately after the meeting was concluded, Dr. Carey announced in writing his assumption of the Chief's position, in which position he remained until he hired Dr. Robinson as Chief in April, 1995. Petitioner found out that Carey's threat to remove him had been carried out the following day when his nurse told him his removal had been announced at the Moffett Cancer Center. He thereafter heard other reports of his removal from other sources, and based on what had happened, concluded his removal was intended to be and constituted a disciplinary action for his comment regarding Dr. Norman. He was not advised in advance of Carey's intention to impose discipline nor given an opportunity to defend himself before the action was taken. He claims he was not given any reason for his removal before or at the time of his dismissal. It is found, however, that the removal was not disciplinary action but an administrative change in Division leadership. Dr. McKeown at first did nothing about his removal, believing it would blow over. However, after he heard his removal had been publicized, he called several University officials, including a Vice-President, the General Counsel and the Provost, to see how the matter could be handled. He claims he either got no response to his inquiries or was told it was a Medical College problem. He then met with the Dean of the College of Medicine who indicated he could do nothing. After he was removed as Division Chief, Petitioner's salary remained the same as did his supplement from his practice. He claims, however, his removal has had an adverse effect on his reputation in the medical and academic communities. It is his belief that people now feel something is wrong with him. Dr. Carey's blunt announcement of his assumption of the Chief's position, without any reasons being given for that move or credit being given to Petitioner for his past accomplishments has had an impact on his ability to work effectively. After his removal, he received calls from all over the world from people wanting to know what had happened. The removal has, he claims, also made it more difficult for him to get grants and has, thereby, adversely impacted his ability to do productive research. In addition, his removal made it difficult for him to carry out his academic duties. His specialty is still presented in student rotations, only in a different place in the medical curriculum. Dr. McKeown has sought reinstatement to the administrative position of Chief of the Division. He is of the opinion that Dr. Carey's action in removing him from his position as Division Chief was capricious and damaging to the University as well as to his career. Petitioner admits he could have been less confrontational in the performance of his duties as Division Chief, but he knows of no complaints about him from TGH, All Children's Hospital or the VA Hospital. There are, however, letters in the files of the Department Chairman which indicate some dissatisfaction with Petitioner's relationships in some quarters and, as seen below, there were signs of dissatisfaction from both TGH and All Children's Hospitals. Petitioner admits he may have been somewhat overbearing or abrasive, but neither his alleged inability to properly steward finances nor his alleged inability to get along with people were mentioned to him at the time of dismissal or before. After Dr. Carey assumed the Chairmanship of the Department of Surgery in July, 1990, he saw Dr. McKeown frequently on an official basis at first. A Chief, as Petitioner was, has many and varied functions such as administration, teaching, fiscal, research, clinic administration and the like. People skills are important because of the necessary interface with colleagues, faculty, administrators and the public. When Dr. Carey came to USF, Dr. McKeown had not been in place very long, and the Division of Cardiothoracic Surgery was not doing well financially. There were contract negotiations going on with the VA Hospital which were not going well, at least partly because, Dr. Carey asserts, Dr. McKeown had made some major unacceptable demands. As a result, Dr. Carey stepped in, along with Dr. Benke, who was very effective in dealing with the VA, and as a result, an agreement was reached which resulted in somewhere between $275,000 and $300,000 per year coming in which put the Division in the black. Dr. Carey recalls other instances indicating Dr. McKeown's inability to get along with others. One related to the relationship with TGH previously mentioned. TGH had made a decision to use a particular physician as head of its transplant program because, allegedly, Dr. McKeown had so angered private heart patients they would not let him be appointed even though Dr. McKeown was Dr. Carey's choice. As it turned out, Dr. Carey convinced the TGH Director and another physician to agree to a plan whereby Dr. McKeown would be head of the program 50 percent of the time. This would have been good for the University, but Dr. McKeown refused indicating that if he could not be in charge all of the time, he would not be in charge at all. Another incident relates to All Children's Hospital. That institution wanted to initiate a pediatric heart transplant program and a meeting was set up to which Dr. McKeown was invited. Petitioner so infuriated the community surgeons attending that meeting they would not work with him, and without his, Carey's, efforts, Dr. Carey claims the program was doomed to failure. As a result, Carey asked Dr. Nevitsky to help get the program started. This gave the USF an opportunity to participate in the program, but when Nevitsky left, they lost it. Still another example, according to Dr. Carey, is the fact that some surgeons on staff have called to complain about Dr. McKeown's attitude and unwillingness to compromise and negotiate and about his demands for service and staff, all of which creates friction among the hospital staff. A few days before Dr. Carey removed Petitioner as Chief, he spoke with the Dean of the College of Medicine, a Vice-president of the University, and others who would be impacted, about his concern regarding the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division and, in fact, he had had discussions with other officials even before that time. Long before making his decision to remove Petitioner, Carey spoke of his consideration of possibly shifting the emphasis within the Division to non-cardiac thoracic surgery in place of the cardiac program which Dr. Carey felt was not very successful. He believed the program did not do enough procedures to support the medical school affiliation. Dr. Carey chose to dismiss Dr. McKeown as Chief of the Division on April 12, 1994, after learning of McKeown's destructive attack on another surgeon before a junior physician in a public place, an operating room, (the Norman incident). He notes that over the years there was a building concern regarding Dr. McKeown's abilities as an administrator, and this incident with Dr. Norman was the last straw. Dr. Carey had received complaints about Petitioner from other physicians, all of which he discussed with Dr. McKeown. Finally, with the Norman incident, it became abundantly clear that Dr. McKeown's capabilities as a leader had diminished to the point where a change was necessary. Before he dismissed Petitioner, and during the investigation which led up to the dismissal, Dr. Carey admits, he did not give Dr. McKeown any opportunity to give any input to the decision. By the time Carey met with McKeown on April 12, 1994, his mind was made up. The Norman incident was demonstrative of what Carey perceived as McKeown's lack of supervisory ability, and it was that factor which led Carey to the ultimate decision to remove McKeown. He felt it necessary to act then and not leave Dr. McKeown in place during the search for a replacement. Petitioner cites alleged comments made by Carey to others that he would have relieved anyone for doing what Petitioner did in the Norman incident. Dr. Carey cannot recall having made such a statement. He claims he considered disciplinary action against Petitioner for the Norman comments but decided against it. However, it was the last in a series of incidents which caused him to question the propriety of McKeown's placement in the Chief's position, and which ultimately cemented his decision to replace him. Dr. Carey met with Dr. McKeown several times before the dismissal and counseled him about administrative deficiencies in his performance, but he never told Dr. McKeown that unless he improved, he would be dismissed. This is consistent with Petitioner's testimony that he was not warned of his shortcomings or of the administration's dissatisfaction with his performance. Disagreements in conversations between superior and subordinate, meant by the former to be corrective in nature, are not always taken as such by the latter. Dr. Carey did not document any of this in Dr. McKeown's personnel files but put some of the information he received by way of communications from others in the files. These are the letters submitted by the University, pursuant to agreement of the parties, subsequent to the hearing. They contributed to Carey's increasing concern about Dr. McKeown's ability to lead the Division. At no time, however, though he questioned Dr. McKeown's leadership, did Dr. Carey ever question his good faith and sincerity, nor does he do so now. When he finally decided action was necessary, on April 12, 1994, Dr. Carey wrote a memorandum to the Medical College faculty concerning his assumption of the position as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. He also advised Dr. McKeown of his removal. Dr. Carey remained in the Chief's position, holding that title in an administrative capacity and not from a clinical standpoint, for approximately one year, intending to stay in the position only until he could find a fully qualified thoracic surgeon to take the job. After Carey removed Petitioner, he was contacted by the Medical College Dean who asked that he get with McKeown and try to work something out. He thereafter offered Dr. McKeown the position of Chief of the cardiac section of the Division but McKeown declined. Dr. Carey also, on April 26, 1994, wrote to TGH recommending that Dr. McKeown be allowed to have more impact on the hospital's transplant program, pointing out that the change in McKeown's position at the University was occasioned by a need for a change in leadership. According to Dr. Tennyson J. Wright, Associate Provost of the University, disciplinary action against nonunion faculty members is governed by Rule 6C4-10.009, F.A.C., and requires notice of proposed action be given before such disciplinary action is taken. The contract which Dr. McKeown holds and has held since the inception of his tenure at the University, is a standard USF/State University System contract. It reflects Petitioner was hired as an Associate Professor, which is one of the three types of personnel classifications used within the system. These are faculty, administration and support. Petitioner's contract does not refer to his holding the Division Chief position and it is not supposed to. Such a position is an administrative appointment within a Department and a working title used to define the holder's duties, and service in such a position is at the pleasure of the Department Chair. Appointment to or removal from a Chief position is an administrative assignment. The position of Department Chairperson, on the other hand is a separate position and subclassification within the University classification system and is different.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown's, grievance against the University of South Florida School of Medicine arising from his removal as Chief, Cardiothoracic Surgery Division in the Department of Surgery be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 95-1832 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Though the documents in question refer to appointment, in actuality the personnel action was an appointment to the faculty with an administrative assignment to the position of Director of the Division. & 10. Accepted. 11. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 19. Accepted and incorporate herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. & 27. Accepted. & 29. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. 32. - 34. First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. 35. - 37. Accepted. 38. Rejected as argument. 39. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Benjamin H. Hill, III, Esquire William C. Guerrant, Jr., Esquire Danelle Dykes, Esquire Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A. Post Office Box 2231 Tampa, Florida 33601 Thomas M. Gonzalez, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez 109 North Brush Street, Suite 200 Post Office Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33601 Olga J. Joanow, Esquire University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620 Noreen Segrest, Esquire General Counsel University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620-6250
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed July 7, 2006, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for the investigation and prosecution of complaints involving physicians licensed to practice medicine in Florida. See § 455.225, Fla. Stat. (2006). The Board is the entity responsible for regulating the practice of medicine in Florida and for imposing penalties on physicians found to have violated the provisions of Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes. See § 458.331(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). Dr. Edison is, and was at the times material to this matter, a physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida, having been issued license number ME 44240. Dr. Edison received his medical degree from the University of Massachusetts; did his residency in general surgery at the Kaiser Foundation in Los Angeles, California; and did a residency in plastic surgery, with specialties in reconstructive surgery and cosmetic surgery. Dr. Edison is certified in plastic surgery by the American Board of Plastic Surgery and is a lifetime diplomate of that Board. Dr. Edison was also certified in Advanced Cardiac Life Support ("ACLS") at the times material to this proceeding. Dr. Edison has been practicing plastic surgery in Florida for 22 years. Prior to the time material to this proceeding, Dr. Edison performed approximately 150-to-200 breast augmentation surgeries each year and approximately 100-to-150 liposuction procedures each year. Dr. Edison practices at the Cosmetic Surgery Center, which is an office that contains two operating rooms, a recovery room, and an overnight recovery facility that is staffed by an ACLS-certified nurse for patients who undergo procedures such as stomach tucks or facelifts. Dr. Edison's surgical practice is limited to Level II office surgery, which is defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009, Standard of Care for Office Surgery, in pertinent part as follows: Level II Office Surgery. Scope Level II Office Surgery is that in which peri-operative medication and sedation are used intravenously, intramuscularly, or rectally, this making intra and post- operative monitoring necessary. . . . Level II Office Surgery includes any surgery in which the patient is placed in a state which allows the patient to tolerate unpleasant procedures while maintaining adequate cardiorespiratory function and the ability to respond purposefully to verbal command and/or tactile stimulation. Patients whose only response is reflex withdrawal from a painful stimulus are sedated to a greater degree than encompassed by this definition. Standards for Level II Office Surgery. * * * 4. Assistance of Other Personnel Required. The surgeon must be assisted by a qualified anesthesia provider as follows: An Anesthesiologist, Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist, or Physician Assistant qualified as set forth in subparagraph 64B8- 30.012(2)(b)6., F.A.C., or a registered nurse may be utilized to assist with the anesthesia, if the surgeon is ACLS certified. An assisting anesthesia provider cannot function in any other capacity during the procedure. If additional assistance is required by the specific procedure or patient circumstances, such assistance must be provided by a physician, osteopathic physician, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, or operating room technician. . . . The level of pain and anxiety management achieved under Level II sedation is determined by the type of drugs administered and the dosages in which they are administered. Dr. Edison was ACLS certified and was, therefore, authorized to use the services of a registered nurse to administer the drugs that bring patients to Level II sedation. He does not use the services of an anesthesiologist or of a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist in his surgical facility. Patient P.L. P.L. first consulted with Dr. Edison on July 5, 2005. P.L. filled out a portion of a Patient Information form, and Dr. Edison took a general medical history from P.L., but he did not weigh P.L. during this initial visit, and the Patient Information form does not include her blood pressure, height, or weight. Dr. Edison found P.L. to be a healthy 29-year-old female, the mother of three children, who had no known allergy or adverse reaction to any medication. P.L. wanted breast implants, and, upon examination, Dr. Edison found that P.L. would be a good candidate, anatomically, for the surgery. Dr. Edison spent the majority of time during this initial consultation talking with P.L. and her husband, A.A., about the various breast implant options. He also discussed with them the risks and possible complications of the surgery. After her visit to Dr. Edison's office on July 5, 2005, P.L. notified Dr. Edison's office that she had decided to have the surgery. Dr. Edison had a cancellation on July 7, 2005, and P.L. was scheduled for surgery for 8:00 a.m. on that date. P.L. returned to Dr. Edison's office on July 6, 2005, for a pre-operative examination. At that time, Dr. Edison did an examination during which he checked P.L.'s heart, lungs, blood pressure, and pulse rate, and he noted the results in his examination notes dated July 6, 2005. He found nothing abnormal and concluded that P.L. was a 29-year-old patient in perfect health, with no known allergy or adverse reaction to any medication. Dr. Edison also had blood drawn during the July 6, 2005, office visit, which was sent to a laboratory for testing. The laboratory report was completed at 8:21 a.m. on July 7, 2005, and showed nothing abnormal. P.L. presented herself at Dr. Edison's office on July 7, 2005, at approximately 8:00 a.m. She was examined by Dr. Edison at 8:10 a.m., and he stated in his office notes that she had decided on the 300 cubic centimeter implant. There were no notations of her vital signs in his office notes. Dr. Edison intended for P.L.'s breast augmentation surgery to be Level II office surgery, and he noted this on P.L.'s Immediate Pre-Op Evaluation, which he completed on July 7, 2005. He also decided to use the transaxillary technique, making incisions under the arms through which to insert the implants under the muscle in P.L.'s chest. Dr. Edison was assisted during surgery by Michelle Hoff, an Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner, who administered the sedatives and other drugs to P.L. under Dr. Edison's direction. Dr. Edison was also assisted by Liliana Gabor, a surgical technician. Ms. Hoff is not a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist, nor has she received any formal training in administering sedative drugs or anesthesia. She has a significant amount of experience administering drugs for pain and anxiety management. Her experience administering drugs to achieve Level II sedation consists of an externship with Dr. Edison while working on her master's degree in nursing and extensive on-the-job training while working in the operating room with Dr. Edison, which she has done every day since beginning to work with Dr. Edison full-time in November 2003. At some point immediately prior to surgery, Dr. Edison asked P.L. her weight, which she reported as 95 pounds, or 43 kilograms, on the morning of surgery. Dr. Edison needed to know P.L.'s weight in order to calculate the correct dosage of the drugs she would be given, and he wrote "95 lbs" on the outside of P.L.'s folder. Dr. Edison noted P.L.'s weight on the outside of the folder so it would be plainly visible to Ms. Hoff when she had the chart on the anesthesia stand.4 Dr. Edison did not enter P.L.'s weight in his examination notes, and the only other mention of P.L.'s weight in the medical records maintained by Dr. Edison is the notation "<100 lbs" on a sheet containing the contact numbers for P.L. and for her husband, who would be picking her up after surgery. At approximately 8:20 a.m. on July 7, 2005, P.L. walked to the operating room. Working under Dr. Edison's direction, Ms. Hoff hooked P.L. up to various monitoring devices, so that her heart, blood pressure, and oxygen saturation level could be monitored during surgery. Her vital signs were noted on the anesthesia chart by Ms. Hoff; at 8:20 a.m., P.L.'s heart rate was approximately 104. At 8:20 a.m., Ms. Hoff began to administer drugs to P.L. to achieve Level II sedation in accordance with directions from Dr. Edison; she documented the name of the drugs she administered, together with the time and dosage administered; she monitored and documented P.L.'s vital signs, including heart rate, blood pressure, and oxygen saturation level; and she maintained anesthesia notes. At 8:20 a.m., Ms. Hoff administered two milligrams of Valium; one gram of Ancef, and 0.2 milligrams of Robinol at Dr. Edison's direction. At 8:25 a.m., she administered 10 milligrams of Ketamine and 10 milligrams of Talwin and started the administration of Diprivan by microdrip at the rate of approximately 25 micrograms per kilogram of weight per minute. Ms. Hoff's notes do not indicate the manner in which she administered the Diprivan, nor the dosage or rate of administration. Ms. Hoff also administered nitrous oxide and oxygen at 8:25 a.m., and she noted that Dr. Edison also began administering local anesthetic by injection at 8:25 a.m. Ms. Hoff noted that P.L. was responding to verbal stimuli. Ms. Hoff was not involved with the preparation or administration of local anesthetic to P.L. Dr. Edison prepared a dilute solution of 70 cubic centimeters of 1% Lidocaine with epinephrine with 350 cubic centimeters of saline solution and 10 cubic centimeters of 1/2% marcaine. At approximately 8:25 a.m., Dr. Edison began injecting the Lidocaine solution, which totaled approximately 700 milligrams or approximately 14 milligrams of Lidocaine per kilogram of P.L.'s body weight and 50 milligrams of marcaine, into the tissue surrounding P.L.'s breasts. At 8:30 a.m., Ms. Hoff, at Dr. Edison's direction, administered another 10 milligrams of Talwin. At 8:35 a.m., P.L.'s heart rate was 112 beats per minute and her blood pressure was 142/102. At Dr. Edison's direction, Ms. Hoff administered 1/4 cubic centimeter of Labetalol to help control P.L.'s blood pressure. Ms. Hoff noted that P.L. tolerated the Labetalol well and was responsive to verbal stimuli. At 8:45 a.m., Ms. Hoff noticed a brief facial twitch on P.L.'s face, which is an indication of a possible seizure. At Dr. Edison's direction, she immediately stopped administering all sedatives, and the surgery was cancelled. At Dr. Edison's direction, Ms. Hoff administered 2.5 milligrams of Valium to keep P.L. sedated and to help control the seizure, together with three liters of oxygen by mask. At 8:55 a.m., Ms. Hoff administered another 2.5 milligrams of Valium at Dr. Edison's direction,5 and she noted that P.L.'s status was unchanged, by which Ms. Hoff meant that P.L.'s airway, breathing, and circulation were maintained, that her vital signs were stable, and that she remained responsive to verbal stimuli. Between 8:55 a.m. and 9:15 a.m., P.L.'s status was unchanged. According to Ms. Hoff's notes, P.L.'s airway, breathing, circulation, and vital signs were maintained at normal levels, and she responded well to the Valium and oxygen. Ms. Hoff observed during this time that P.L. was lethargic and appeared to be a little more deeply sedated than typical Level II sedation. P.L. continued breathing on her own and responding to verbal stimuli. During this interval, Dr. Edison was waiting for P.L. to come out of sedation, and he intended to send her home and recommend that she see her doctor about the twitch. Ms. Hoff noticed a second facial twitch between 9:15 a.m. and 9:20 a.m., and Dr. Edison directed Ms. Hoff to call Emergency Medical Services to transport P.L. to the hospital. Ms. Hoff continued to monitor P.L.'s airway, breathing, circulation and vital signs until the Emergency Medical Services team arrived at 9:30 a.m. During this time, Ms. Hoff noted that P.L. responded to verbal stimuli by moving her head a little bit and attempting to open her eyes. P.L.'s oxygen saturation rate was consistently maintained at 99% to 100% between 8:20 a.m. and 9:30 a.m., when Emergency Medical Services arrived. During this time, P.L. was breathing independently and did not need any assistance with her airway. Emergency Medical Services received the call from Dr. Edison's office at 9:21 a.m. and arrived at 9:26 a.m. At that time, P.L. was receiving oxygen, her airway was normal, and her perfusion was good. Her blood pressure was 102/68, her pulse was strong and regular at 120 beats per minute, her respiratory rate was 20, her respiratory effort was normal, and her breath sounds were clear. She was, however, non-responsive: She was not able to open her eyes, she had no motor response, and she was not able to give a verbal response. She appeared to be having seizure activity in the form of twitching on both sides of the jaw line. P.L. was transported to Memorial Regional Hospital at 9:31 a.m., and she arrived at the hospital at 9:36 a.m. A notation on the EMS Report for the incident states that a "[l]ist of sedation medication [was] given to ER staff." Dr. Todd Gardner was the emergency room physician who treated P.L. on her arrival at Memorial Regional Hospital. His diagnosis on admission was status epilepticus and hypoxia. Status epilepticus is seizures that are unrelenting to normal therapeutic intervention, and hypoxia is low oxygen level. Dr. Gardner did not attribute a cause to the status epilepticus. Dr. Gardner's intake notes reflect that, prior to presenting at the emergency room, P.L. had received Ketamine, Labetalol to lower her blood pressure, and Valium to relieve the seizures. Nothing on the intake sheet indicates that P.L. had received Lidocaine, and there is no list of the medications given by Dr. Edison in the hospital file. Dr. Gardner intubated P.L. at 10:02 a.m. and placed her on a ventilator in the emergency room because she was unable to breathe on her own. He also treated her with Valium, Dilantin, and Diprivan, which is used to sedate patients in the intensive care unit. Dr. Robert Alterbaum, an internist specializing in pulmonary medicine and critical care, provided care to P.L. in the intensive care unit of Memorial Regional Hospital. P.L.'s chest X-ray was abnormal and showed pneumonitis, or an inflammation of the lungs, caused by fluid being aspirated into the lungs. Based on the emergency room chart, Dr. Alterbaum diagnosed P.L. with status epilepticus, or seizures, related to the administration of Ketamine during the pre-operative procedure for breast augmentation surgery. There was no objective medical evidence to support Dr. Alterbaum's conclusion that Ketamine was the cause of the seizures; he reached this conclusion because Ketamine was the only medication noted on the chart as having been administered to P.L. Dr. Alterbaum was not aware that P.L. had also received Lidocaine; had he been aware of this, it might have been information he would have considered in reaching his conclusion regarding the cause of P.L.'s seizures.6 P.L. was discharged from Memorial Regional Hospital on July 12, 2005. She had difficulty walking at first, but has fully recovered except that she sometimes experiences a little memory loss. Drugs administered to P.L. Valium Valium is a benzodiazopene used to control anxiety, and the standard dosage ranges from two to 20 milligrams for conscious sedation. Valium is a controlled substance. Ancef Ancef is an antibiotic. Ketamine Ketamine is a disassociative non-barbiturate analgesic used for sedation and general anesthesia; the maximum dosage is 4.5 milligrams per kilogram of body weight. Ketamine causes a large amount of secretions, and its effects last only five to 10 minutes. Ketamine is a controlled substance. Robinol Robinol is an anticholinergic medication used to prevent bradycardia, a heart rate of less than 60 beats per minute, and to help dry out secretions in mucous membranes. Robinol is contraindicated for a patient with tachycardia, or a heart rate of more than 100 beats per minute, however, because it could make the patient's heart rate increase. In a healthy 29 year-old patient such as P.L., however, it was not a violation of the standard of care to administer 0.2 milligrams of Robinol to P.L. even though her heart rate was 104 beats per minute at the time it was administered; a healthy 29-year-old patient could easily sustain a heart rate of 140 beats per minute without ill effects. Dr. Edison administered Robinol to P.L. as a drying agent, to control secretions brought on by the use of Ketamine. Although other drugs can be used to control these secretions, Robinol is the best drug for this purpose and the one most commonly used. Dr. Edison had ample justification for using Robinol under the circumstances, and he did not violate the standard of care by ordering Ms. Hoff to administer the drug even though P.L.'s heart rate slightly exceeded 100 beats per minute. Talwin Talwin is an opiate analgesic that is used to control pain, and the standard dosage is 30 milligrams. Talwin is a controlled substance. Nitrous oxide Nitrous oxide is an anesthetic gas that is used for analgesia and sedation; it was administered to P.L. by nasal cannula, which delivers a relatively small amount of gas. Diprivan Diprivan is a sedative hypnotic medication used both for intravenous sedation and for general anesthesia; the package insert recommends a dosage from 100 to 150 micrograms per kilogram of body weight per minute. Diprivan's clinical effects wear off approximately three minutes after its administration is discontinued. The total dose of Diprivan administered to P.L., 25 milligrams, was included in Dr. Edison's medical records, but the manner of administering the Diprivan and the rate of infusion are not recorded. Diprivan, together with other sedative drugs, may be administered in Florida by a registered nurse at the direction and under the supervision of a surgeon during Level II office surgery.7 Dr. Edison did not deviate from the standard of care in Florida by delegating responsibility to Ms. Hoff, an Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner, for administering the various drugs to P.L., under his direction and supervision. Based on her training and experience, Ms. Hoff was qualified to administer these drugs to P.L. to achieve Level II sedation under Dr. Edison's direction and supervision. The combination of sedative drugs Dr. Edison ordered administered to P.L., specifically Diprivan, Ketamine, Talwin, Valium, and nitrous oxide, was appropriate to induce Level II sedation in P.L., and the dosage of each of the drugs administered to P.L. was well below the maximum dosage recommended for each of the drugs. These drugs work synergistically, however, and, depending on the patient and the circumstances, the same combination of sedative drugs could induce Level III sedation. Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.009 defines Level III office surgery and sets forth the standards that must be met, in pertinent part, as follows: Level III Office Surgery. Scope. Level III Office Surgery is that surgery which involves, or reasonable should require, the use of a general anesthesia or major conduction anesthesia and pre- operative sedation. This includes the use of: Intravenous sedation beyond that defined for Level II Office Surgery; General Anesthesia: loss of consciousness and loss of vital reflexes with probable requirement of external support of pulmonary or cardiac functions: or Major conduction anesthesia. * * * Standards for Level III Office Surgery. In addition to the standards for Level II Office Surgery, the surgeon must comply with the following: * * * 4. Assistance of Other Personnel Required. An Anesthesiologist, Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist, or Physician Assistant qualified as set forth in subparagraph 64B8- 30.012(2)(b)6., F.A.C., must administer the general or regional anesthesia and an M.D., D.O., Registered Nurse, Licensed Practical Nurse, Physician Assistant, or Operating Room Technician must assist with the surgery. . . . One difference between Level II and Level III sedation is the degree of alertness of the patient. At Level II sedation, the patient must be able to respond to verbal and/or tactile stimuli. If a patient's only response is a reflexive withdrawal from a pain stimulus, the patient is sedated beyond Level II. A primary indication that a patient has slipped from Level II to Level III sedation is the loss of the ability to breathe without assistance, and the patient's airway must be partially or totally managed. In Level II sedation, the need for management of the airway is minimal compared to that required at Level III sedation. P.L.'s blood pressure, pulse rate, oxygenation, and mental state were consistent with Level II sedation until P.L. had her first seizure and all medications, except for the one- half therapeutic dose of Valium, were discontinued. She remained responsive to verbal stimuli after the second 2.5 milligram dose of Valium was given to control the seizure activity, even though she was more lethargic than normal under Level II sedation. P.L. was non-responsive when examined by Emergency Medical Services personnel, but she was breathing independently and was not at Level III sedation. Her lack of response was more likely than not the result of the seizures, after which a patient can go into a postictal state, or a trance of sleepiness.8 Dr. Edison did not violate the standard of care for office surgery in ordering the amounts and combination of drugs used to sedate P.L. because P.L. did not reach Level III sedation. In accordance with the standard of care for Level II office surgery, Ms. Hoff, as a registered nurse, was qualified to administer anesthesia to P.L., including Diprivan, Ketamine, and the other sedative drugs used in P.L.'s surgery, at the direction and under the supervision of Dr. Edison. Dosage of Lidocaine As stated above, Dr. Edison injected a dilute solution of Lidocaine with epinephrine and marcaine into the tissue around P.L.'s breasts between 8:25 a.m. and 8:45 a.m., before P.L. had her first seizure at 8:45 a.m. Lidocaine is a local anesthetic used to numb nerves and tissue. In breast augmentation surgery Dr. Edison always uses Lidocaine with epinephrine because epinephrine is a vasoconstrictor that causes intense vasoconstriction, or closing of the small blood vessels, which slows the rate of absorption of the Lidocaine and virtually eliminates bleeding at the site of surgery. Marcaine is also a local anesthetic similar to Lidocaine, but it is slow to take effect and lasts four to six hours and helps control pain after surgery is completed. Marcaine is commonly used with Lidocaine. It is Dr. Edison's practice to perform breast augmentation surgery using the tumescent infiltration technique to infuse a relatively large volume of dilute Lidocaine solution into the breast area as a local anesthetic. Dr. Edison uses this tumescent infiltration technique in breast augmentation surgery because he can deliver a large volume of Lidocaine that is evenly distributed throughout the breast area, which results in more effective pain reduction. The injection technique Dr. Edison uses for tumescent infiltration in the breast area is very specific, and it takes between 20 and 30 minutes to complete the injections. The needle cannot penetrate close to the pectoral muscle, especially in a woman as small as P.L., because of the danger of puncturing a lung. Dr. Edison injects the solution under pressure into the subcutaneous tissue between the breast and the pectoral muscle. Lidocaine is absorbed faster in areas that are highly vascular. The tissue in the aerolar space between the breast and the pectoral muscle does not contain many blood vessels, so Lidocaine injected in this tissue is absorbed more slowly than it would be if injected into highly vascular tissue. In Dr. Edison's experience, because the epinephrine in the Lidocaine solution causes intense vasoconstriction in the tissue surrounding the injection sites, the Lidocaine stays in place and numbs the area in which the surgery is to be performed. The Lidocaine solution is absorbed slowly over approximately 24 hours, and the peak serum concentration of Lidocaine occurs approximately 10 to 12 hours after it is administered. In this case, Dr. Edison prepared approximately 400 cubic centimeters of solution, which contained 700 milligrams of Lidocaine and 50 milligrams of marcaine, together with a small, non-therapeutic dose of epinephrine. According to his surgical notes, Dr. Edison began the injections of Lidocaine at 8:25 a.m. and had completed the injections by the time P.L. had the first seizure at 8:45 a.m., although it is his recollection that he had not used all of the Lidocaine solution he had prepared. Dr. Edison did not, however, record in the medical records the amount of Lidocaine solution he injected, and any remaining solution was discarded without being measured, so he does not know the dosage of Lidocaine P.L. actually received. Had he injected all of the solution, P.L. would have received approximately 14 milligrams of Lidocaine per kilogram of body weight. According to the package insert that accompanies a bottle of Lidocaine, the maximum dosage of Lidocaine without epinephrine is five milligrams per kilogram of body weight, and the maximum dosage of Lidocaine with epinephrine is seven milligrams per kilogram of body weight. There is nothing in Dr. Edison's medical records to indicate that the Lidocaine he used in P.L.'s surgery included epinephrine or that he calculated the amount of Lidocaine to administer to P.L. based on her body weight Using the maximum dosage specified on the package insert, the maximum dosage of Lidocaine without epinephrine for P.L. would have been 215 milligrams, and the maximum dosage of Lidocaine with epinephrine would have been 301 milligrams, using the traditional method of administering the drug. Based on the standard established by the package insert, Dr. Edison exceeded the maximum dosage of Lidocaine with epinephrine injected into P.L. by approximately 400 milligrams, which constituted a toxic dose of Lidocaine when measured by the maximum dosage stated on the package insert. The maximum dosage of Lidocaine with epinephrine stated on the package insert is routinely exceeded by surgeons performing liposuction, which involves suctioning fatty tissue. The tumescent infiltration technique using Lidocaine with epinephrine in a dilute solution is commonly used with liposuction, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8- 9.009(2)(d), which sets out the standards of care for office surgery, specifically provides that a "maximum of fifty (50) mg/kg of Lidocaine can be injected for tumescent liposuction in the office setting." Large dosages of Lidocaine can be safely used in liposuction because Lidocaine is metabolized more slowly by fatty tissue than by muscle or skin, and approximately 20% of the Lidocaine solution is suctioned out of the body with the fat that is aspirated during liposuction. As a result, it is possible to administer what would otherwise be toxic doses of Lidocaine under the maximum dosages specified in the package insert. Dr. Edison has used the tumescent infiltration technique many times in performing breast augmentations without his patients' suffering any ill effects. There is, however, no rule in Florida equivalent to that relating to liposuction that permits the use of high dosages of Lidocaine as local anesthetic in breast augmentation surgery. Furthermore, Dr. Edison has failed to submit persuasive evidence of a standard of care in Florida among plastic surgeons that would permit the use of dosages of Lidocaine with epinephrine in excess of the seven milligrams per kilogram specified on the package insert for breast augmentation surgery.9 Dr. Edison violated the standard of care by injecting approximately of 700 milligrams of Lidocaine with epinephrine into the tissue surrounding P.L.'s breasts when the maximum allowable dosage, according to the insert packaged with the drug and based on P.L.'s weight, was approximately 300 milligrams. Dr. Edison's previous discipline10 Dr. Edison was charged in an Administrative Complaint dated February 21, 1995, with having committed medical malpractice in violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes. He executed a Consent Agreement in which he neither admitted nor denied the factual allegations in the complaint but agreed that, if proven, the facts would constitute a violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes. The Agency for Health Care Administration entered a Final Order dated August 20, 1995, adopting the Consent Agreement in relevant part. This Final Order does not establish that Dr. Edison committed a violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes. In a Final Order entered January 4, 2007, the Board adopted the recommended disposition in the Recommended Order in Department of Health, Board of Medicine v. Richard B. Edison, M.D., DOAH Case No. 06-0598PL (Recommended Order August 25, 2006), that Dr. Edison be found guilty of a single violation of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order Dismissing Counts Three and Four of the Administrative Complaint; Finding Dr. Edison guilty of a single violation of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, and of two violations of Section 458.331(1)(t)1., Florida Statutes; Suspending Dr. Edison's license for a period of 90 days, followed by four years' probation under such terms as shall be imposed by the Board; and Imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $15,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2007.
