Findings Of Fact The Parties Gleason Brothers and Company (Gleason), as stipulated, is a small business party within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. Gleason owns real property in Brevard County, Florida, specifically described as Sections 28 and 33, Township 27 South, Range 36 East. The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) is a state agency with jurisdiction to issue wetland resource permits and management and storage of surface water (MSSW) permits pursuant to Chapters 373 and 403, Florida Statutes. The Permit Proceeding On June 18, 1993, the Brevard County Solid Waste Management Department (Brevard County) applied to DEP for wet land resource and MSSW permits required for the county's landfill expansion and new construction. Part of the landfill project consisted in a proposal for off-site mitigation which was required to offset wetland impacts by the landfill expansion. The off-site mitigation property is several miles from the landfill site and is described as west of Interstate 95, north of State Road 500, Sections 27 and 34 Township 27 South, Range 36 East. The off-site mitigation property lies adjacent to, and east of, the subject Gleason property. Both Gleason's and the off-site mitigation property are east of the St. John's River, with Gleason's property lying between the river and the off-site mitigation property. In its 1993 application, Brevard County proposed to restore the historic natural grade of the mitigation property by removing certain dikes or berms and by filling some ditches, which berms and ditches were created many years ago by the former owners, the Platts, to improve the property for agricultural use. Some of those ditches and berms run along the property line between the Gleason and mitigation property. In August and September 1993, Brevard County requested Gleason's permission to enter its land to install two piezometers as part of a scope of work to monitor impacts of the proposed off-site mitigation project. The county provided a copy of the scope of work and a map to Gleason's attorney, Robert Riggio. On October 21, 1993, Riggio responded, by letter to Richard Rabon, Director, Brevard County Solid Waste Management Department, that Gleason would not allow permission to enter its land for hydrological monitoring. Furthermore, Riggio stated, Gleason was concerned about the effects of potential flooding and an artificial increase in the area's water table which could "upset the value and continued usability of its land". On November 15, 1993, Riggio wrote to DEP staff person, Ann Wonnacott (now, Ann Ertman) requesting notice of intended agency action on the county's landfill permits, and expressing Gleason's concern that the proposed project, including filling of ditches and removing berms, would artificially raise water levels, flood and devalue Gleason property. On February 11, 1994, Riggio sent DEP a map of Gleason's property and a legal description. On November 18, 1994, Riggio again wrote to Ann Wonnacott and objected to the landfill project on Gleason's behalf. Again, Riggio stated that the off- site mitigation plan included filling ditches which provided a flow of water in which Gleason asserted "legally recognizable rights". In the meantime, in response to Gleason's concerns, in November 1993, DEP asked Brevard County to provide reasonable assurance that the off-site mitigation project would not flood surrounding property. Brevard County's licensed professional engineers then undertook a groundwater modeling analysis and gathered information and performed testing for a stormwater modeling analysis. In reports provided in April 1994 the engineers concluded that the project would not increase flooding on Gleason's land. DEP's expert in surface water management reviewed the engineering reports, data and reports on the area from the St. Johns River Water Management District, USGS quadrangle maps and aerial photographs, and he agreed that the project would not increase flooding on Gleason's land. DEP staff review of the Brevard County applications revealed that the applications met relevant rule and statutory criteria, and on February 7, 1995 DEP issued its Notice of Intent (NOI) to issue a wetland resource permit for the onsite and off-site parts of the project, and an MSSW permit for the onsite part of the project only. The draft permit provided that no work could commence prior to issuance of the MSSW permit for the off-site mitigation work. DEP staff considered the off-site mitigation MSSW permit the "linchpin" of the entire project: without it, no work on any part of the project could commence. Gleason, though its attorney, Robert Riggio, timely filed a Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes petition for formal administrative hearing challenging DEP's intent to issue permits to Brevard County. The petition was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Gleason's petition raised several material issues: that the removal of the berms and filling of the ditches (called "drainage canals" by Gleason) would alter the "natural and historic hydroperiod" of Gleason's property, increasing water levels and enhancing the growth of weeds and other noxious vegetation; that it appeared that some of the ditches to be filled were actually within the boundaries of Gleason's property; and that DEP failed to adequately assess the effect of the proposed permitted action on the property of others. Discovery commenced and Gleason continued to object to Brevard County's requests to enter Gleason's land for inspections and testing. From Brevard County's perspective, the main function of filling in the ditches was to obtain additional mitigation credits for the area of the ditches. Relying on its engineers, the county did not consider that the ditches performed a significant hydrological function. At some point in time after Gleason's petition was filed, Brevard County agreed to not fill the ditches and submitted a modified application to DEP. In July 1995, Brevard County submitted to DEP its application for the MSSW permit for the off-site mitigation project (the "linchpin" permit). The application included removing the berms but did not propose filling in the ditches. In August 1995, DEP issued notices of intent to grant the revised permit and the off-site mitigation MSSW permit. Gleason, Brevard County and DEP signed a joint stipulation and motion to relinquish jurisdiction in the Division of Administrative Hearings case on December 21, 1995, The motion was granted, and Division of Administrative Hearing's files were closed. On January 3, 1996 DEP entered its final order and issued the permits, as revised. "Prevailing Party" From the time when it was first informed of the project, Gleason's primary concern was the county's proposal to fill the ditches. Whether this concern was misguided or whether it was legitimate, it was not until the petition was filed, and some time thereafter, that the county changed its application. Gleason's February 22, 1995 petition specifically requested the alternative relief of an order modifying the subject permits by leaving the "drainage canals" intact. When it obtained its relief by settlement prior to an evidentiary hearing, Gleason became a "prevailing party". A Reasonable Basis in Law and Fact Ann Wonnacott Ertman reviewed Brevard County's permit application, including the off-site mitigation project and she visited the mitigation site. By walking along the ditch between the site and the Gleason property she was able to view both properties, although obviously not the entire two sections owned by Gleason. The Gleason property viewed by Ms. Ertman was flat, and predominately dominated by wetland vegetation. She saw some cattle grazing, but no other uses or improvements to the property. As understood by Ms. Ertman, the purpose of the off-site mitigation project was to reestablish the hydrology which existed prior to the Platts' construction of the berms and ditches. Those berms prevented some flood waters from the St. Johns River and Lake Washington from flowing onto the Platt property. Removal of the ditches and berms would therefore allow the flood waters collecting on Gleason's property to sheet flow into the mitigation site. Both the Platt property and Gleason property are considered to be within the mean annual and ten-year floodplain of the St. Johns River. As viewed by DEP and Brevard County, the off-site mitigation project would reduce, not increase water, on the Gleason property. On the other hand, Gleason and its consultant conjectured that stormwater runoff flowing from the slightly higher elevations on the Platt property would flow unimpeded onto the lower Gleason property if the ditches were removed. This conjecture was based on an assumption that the ditches served a significant hydrological function by draining water off the property and transporting it away somewhere. When Gleason, through its attorney, made its concerns known to DEP, Brevard County was required to respond and its consultants were required to perform further studies and tests. Based on their studies and tests and computer modeling, Brevard County's consultants concluded that removing the ditches would not increase, but would rather slightly decrease, the amount of impervious surface area at the mitigation site and there would be a slight decrease in the volume of stormwater runoff flowing from that land to Gleason's land. Brevard County's consultants also determined that, notwithstanding the size of the ditches, the soil types in the area acted as a barrier to the water and the ditch could not exert a significant drawdown effect. All of the information available to the DEP staff who reviewed the application competently supported the conclusion that filling the ditches would have no negative effect on Gleason's adjacent property. This information included observations from staff site visits, detailed information from Brevard County's consultants, U.S.G.S. quadrangle maps, aerial photographs, and uniquely relevant documents published by the St. Johns River Water Management District. This information properly outweighed the unsupported conjectures expressed by Gleason and its consultant, and after finding the application otherwise met the statutory and regulatory criteria, DEP had a reasonable basis to issue its intent to grant the permit. DEP was never apprised of Gleason's claim that some part of the ditches were on its property until Gleason's petition was filed in response to the notice of intent to issue the permit. In its initial application Brevard County represented to DEP that it was the record owner of the land where the project was proposed. DEP does not require a detailed land survey with the application, as that is an expense that would be unnecessary if the project were ultimately disapproved. Instead, the survey is a condition of the permit; that is, it must be accomplished prior to commencement of an approved project. DEP does not authorize trespass on property not belonging to an applicant. Nor did Brevard County intentionally include Gleason-owned ditches in its project. There was no incentive for it to do so, as no mitigation credit would be allowed for such extraterritorial works. Nominal Party or Special Circumstances As the agency responsible for reviewing and acting on the applications at issue, DEP was more than a "nominal party" in this proceeding. However, in this instance, it was in the peculiar position of not being entirely in control of the outcome of the proceeding. The applicant, and not DEP, determined the project for which the permit was sought. Brevard County, and not DEP, initially chose to fill ditches, and Brevard County chose to delete that work from its amended application and from the "linchpin" application, the off-site mitigation MSSW permit. In either case, with and without the ditch filling work, DEP determined the applications met relevant criteria and merited approval. Reasonable Fees As stipulated, the fees and costs of $13,193.50 incurred by the Gleasons in the underlying action are reasonable.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was an employee of the Respondent at a boys' detention center in Hillsborough County when he was accused by a resident thereof of having physically abused him. The matter was reported to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services' Abuse Register and, thereafter, Petitioner requested a hearing under Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, on the Department's denial of his request to amend or expunge the report of abuse. A formal hearing was thereafter held on the matter before the undersigned who, on January 10, 1994, entered a Recommended Order to the effect that the abuse report be amended and closed without classification, since the evidence presented at the hearing did not establish that Petitioner has abused the resident. This Recommended was subsequently sustained by the Secretary who, in his Final Order dated July 7, 1994, so ordered. Thereafter, Respondent's counsel sought reimbursement for the attorney's fees and costs expended by Respondent under the provisions of Section 111.07, Florida Statutes. In response, the Hillsborough County Attorney concluded that Petitioner was not a permanent County employee but a relief employee, and, thereby, was not entitled to reimbursement. By Petition dated September 28, 1994, a copy of which was not forwarded to a representative of the Board of County Commissioners or any representative of Hillsborough County, Petitioner now seeks reimbursement in the amount of $1,500.00 for attorney's fees and such other relief as the "Court" may deem fit and proper. By Order to Show Cause dated November 28, 1994, the undersigned directed counsel for Petitioner to advise the undersigned in writing by December 10, 1994, of the jurisdictional basis for its claim against the Board of County Commissioners before the Division. No response has been forthcoming.
The Issue The issues in each case are whether, pursuant to Sections 489.141 and 489.143, Florida Statutes (2003), a claimant is entitled to payment from the Construction Industries Recovery Fund, and, if so, whether, pursuant to Section 489.143(7), Florida Statutes (2003), Respondent may automatically suspend the residential contractor's license of Petitioner until Petitioner reimburses Respondent for the paid claim.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is licensed as a certified residential contractor, holding license number CRC 013599. Respondent first issued a residential contractor's license to Petitioner in 1978, and Petitioner has been continually licensed since that time. Petitioner has never been disciplined by Respondent or any local governmental agency. On January 29, 2004, Respondent transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings seven files containing administrative complaints alleging disciplinary breaches against Petitioner for many of the transactions covered in the nine subject cases. These seven new cases have not yet been heard, and Respondent has not yet entered any restitution orders against Petitioner. In the past, Petitioner has placed his residential contractor's license with various corporations to qualify them to perform residential construction. In February 1999, Petitioner met with Lori Thomson, president of Thomson Homes, Inc., to discuss placing his license with her residential construction company. Now inactive, Thomson Homes, Inc., had been in the residential construction business since at least 1994, operating out of an office in Palm Beach County, which is also the location of all but one of the residential construction jobs that are the subject of these cases. Since 1994, Thomson Homes, Inc., had used the general contractor's license of Ms. Thomson's husband, Steven Thomson, to qualify to perform residential construction. During the time that his license qualified Thomson Homes, Inc., Mr. Thomson believed that he and his wife owned the corporation equally and that she served as the president and he served as the vice-president. In the summer of 1998, Mr. Thomson filed for divorce from Ms. Thomson. In February 1999, Ms. Thomson fired Mr. Thomson from Thomson Homes, Inc. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Thomson learned that Ms. Thomson had caused all of the stock to be issued to her when the corporation was formed, and that she had assumed all of the officer and director positions. In early March 1999, Mr. Thomson cancelled all of the building permits that he had obtained on behalf of Thomson Homes, Inc., and withdrew his general contractor's license from Ms. Thomson's corporation, effective March 20, 1999. When Mr. Thomson withdrew his license from Thomson Homes, Inc., it was in the process of building or preparing to build about ten homes. At no time during Petitioner's discussions with Ms. Thomson was he aware that Thomson Homes, Inc., was actively involved in construction. Eventually, Ms. Thomson and Petitioner agreed that Petitioner would place his residential contractor's license with Thomson Homes, Inc., and would supervise the corporation's construction activities. In return, Thomson Homes, Inc., would pay Petitioner $500 weekly and 35 percent of the profits. After filing the necessary documentation in April 1999, Petitioner qualified Thomson Homes, Inc. effective April 22 or 26, 1999. Petitioner advised Ms. Thomson that he had other work to do for another month, so he could not start with Thomson Homes, Inc. immediately. Ms. Thomson told him that she had to get financing arranged for several signed contracts and did not have any construction taking place at the time. The record is unclear whether this delay took place after the initial agreement between Petitioner and Ms. Thomson or after Petitioner formally placed his license with Thomson Homes, Inc. However, in either event, from the date that Petitioner formally placed his license with Thomson Homes, Inc., he never had a substantive conversation with Ms. Thomson about any construction activities of Thomson Homes, Inc. Not hearing from Ms. Thomson, Petitioner eventually called her to learn when he would start work. At first, Ms. Thomson took Petitioner's calls and kept explaining that the financing paperwork had been delayed. She promised to call Petitioner when construction was ready to proceed. However, Ms. Thomson never contacted Petitioner, and she later stopped taking or returning Petitioner's calls. In early August 1999, Petitioner called Thomson Homes, Inc., and learned that its telephone had been disconnected. He visited the office of Thomson Homes, Inc., but found it closed and the premises vacated. In fact, Thomson Homes, Inc., discontinued business on or about August 1, 1999. Between the date that Petitioner had qualified Thomson Homes and the point at which Thomson Homes ceased doing business, Thomson Homes, Inc., had entered into construction contracts, taken deposits and draws on construction loans, and performed residential construction--all unknown to Petitioner. Also unknown to Petitioner was the fact that Thomson Homes, Inc., had failed to perform its obligations under many, if not all, of its construction contracts during that period. The record is unclear when Petitioner withdrew his license from Thomson Homes, Inc. Petitioner sent Respondent a letter on August 30, 1999, advising of the withdrawal of his license from Thomson Homes, Inc. Later advised that he needed to file another form to effect the withdrawal, Petitioner did so in March 2000. The difference is not important in these cases. At no time did Petitioner receive any money from Thomson Homes, Inc., or any of the claimants who contracted with Thomson Homes, Inc. At no time did Petitioner enter into any contracts with any of the claimants. Only after Thomson Homes, Inc., had taken the claimants' money and abandoned work or failed to commence work did Petitioner learn that Thomson Homes, Inc., had done construction business under his license. DOAH Case No. 03-3540 involves the claim of Sandra Harvey. Ms. Harvey entered into a construction agreement with Thomson Homes, Inc., on September 9, 1998. Pursuant to the agreement, Ms. Harvey agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $25,500 for a lot and $115,260 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. After pouring the slab, constructing the shell, and completing the rough plumbing, air conditioning, and electrical, Thomson Homes, Inc., stopped work on Ms. Harvey's home in early 1999. Ms. Harvey learned of the problem when Mr. Thomson called her in early 1999 and said that he could not finish the home because Ms. Thomson had taken over the business. This call probably took place no later than late March 1999, when Mr. Thomas withdrew as the qualifier for Thomson Homes, Inc. The record does not reveal the extent of payments from Ms. Harvey or her lender or the extent of completed work at the time that Thomson Homes, Inc., abandoned the job. Although the complaint is not part of this record, Ms. Harvey commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. She obtained a default final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on March 30, 2001, for a total sum of $46,267.32, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, Defendant breached its contract by accepting Plaintiff's deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen for their labor, services and material provided. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiff was compelled to retain a new contractor to complete her home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiff has been forced to borrow additional funds from the construction lender. On May 3, 2001, Ms. Harvey filed a claim with the Construction Industries Recovery Fund (Recovery Fund). In response to a question asking if she had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, Ms. Harvey answered "yes," explaining she had "filed lawsuit." Ms. Harvey probably filed her claim within two years of when Thomson Homes, Inc., abandoned her job. By the end of March 1999, Mr. Thomson informed Ms. Harvey that his wife had fired him, so he could not work on her home anymore. A change in qualifier does not mean that Thomson Homes, Inc., would necessarily abandon the job, but, as noted in the Conclusions of Law, abandonment presumptively arises upon the expiration of 90 days without work. No work took place on Ms. Harvey's home after Mr. Thomson withdrew as qualifier, so presumptive abandonment took place by the end of June 1999--after May 3, 1999, which is two years prior to the date on which Ms. Harvey filed her claim. By letter dated June 5, 2001, from James Brogan of WEI Consulting Group to Ms. Harvey, Mr. Brogan states that he had investigated the assets of Thomson Homes, Inc. Mr. Brogan found no bankruptcy filing by Thomson Homes, Inc., in Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of Florida. Thomson Homes, Inc., was a party to 282 legal actions and owed tangible personal property taxes on furniture in a model home, but the furniture was no longer available. On February 28, 2003, Respondent issued an Order approving Ms. Harvey's claim of $25,000 against the Recovery Fund and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that Ms. Harvey is the Petitioner, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On March 17, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on Ms. Harvey and Respondent, contests the payment to Ms. Harvey and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of Ms. Harvey's claim because she had made insufficient efforts to satisfy the judgment; she had failed to submit all required exhibits with her claim; her judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; her judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Additionally, the petition contests the automatic suspension because the payment to Ms. Harvey is not authorized, her claim is incomplete, and her judgment is not against Petitioner. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3541 involves the claim of John and Kathleen Whitesides. The Whitesides, who lived at the time in Juno Beach, Florida, entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on February 7, 1999. Pursuant to the agreement, the Whitesides agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $154,094 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. After the Whitesides paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $5000 and secured a construction loan, Thomson Homes, Inc., never commenced construction. In a complaint filed April 3, 2000, the Whitesides commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to any construction," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction. The Whitesides obtained a default final judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on December 21, 2000, for a total sum of $20,146.67, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: "Defendant is in breach of the Contract dated February 7, 1999, and has received unjust enrichment from Defendant's failure to fulfill the terms of the Contract to build a home for Plaintiffs." On August 9, 2001, David Tassell, the Whitesides' attorney in the circuit court action against Thomson Homes, Inc., stated, in an acknowledged statement, that he had performed "numerous" real property searches in Palm Beach and Martin counties' public records and determined that Thomas Homes, Inc., "owns no real property in Martin County." The omission of Palm Beach County in the statement is unexplained. Mr. Tassell's statement adds that he has retained a private investigator, who confirmed that Thomson Homes, Inc., owns no boats, planes, or automobiles. On August 10, 2001, the Whitesides filed a claim with the Recovery Fund. In response to a question asking if they had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, the Whitesides answered "yes," but did not supply an explanation in the following blank. The completed questionnaire accompanying the claim states that the Whitesides discovered the violation in September 1999 and that it occurred in July to August 1999. On September 17, 2002, Respondent issued an Order approving the Whitesides' claim of $18,526.67 against the Recovery Fund and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that the Whitesides are the Petitioners, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. The Whitesides probably filed their claim within two years of when they reasonably should have discovered that Thomson Homes, Inc., had wrongfully failed to commence construction, as is required for reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law. As noted in the Conclusions of Law, presumptive abandonment arose when Thomson Homes, Inc., after entering the contract, performed no work for 90 days. Six months elapsed from the signing of the contract to the date that is two years prior to the filing of the claim. Although the record is not well-developed on the point, it is more likely than not that due diligence did not require that the Whitesides discover the abandonment within the first 90 days after it had presumptively arisen. The Whitesides' judgment is probably based on a violation of Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes, as is required for reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law. Although the record is not well-developed on this point either, it is more likely than not that the judgment is based on Thomson Homes' abandonment after entering into the contract. The judgment does not state this basis explicitly, but the complaint, on which the judgment is based, alleges abandonment. On December 23, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on Respondent and the Whitesides' attorney in the circuit court action against Thomson Homes, Inc., contests the payment to the Whitesides and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the Whitesides' claim because they did not file certified copies of the final judgment and levy and execution documents and their judgment did not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes. Additionally, the petition contests the automatic suspension because Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes; Petitioner received no notice of the hearing that resulted in the Order to pay the Whitesides and suspend Petitioner's license; the Whitesides' claim is incomplete; and the Whitesides' judgment is not against Petitioner. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3542 involves the claim of Richard and Kathleen Beltz. The Beltzes entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on July 13, 1999. Pursuant to the agreement, the Beltzes agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $35,500 for a lot and $140,500 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. After the Beltzes paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $17,283.70, Thomson Homes, Inc., never appeared at the closing, which had been scheduled for August 10, 1999. Nor did Thomson Homes, Inc., ever commence construction. The record does not disclose the extent, if any, to which Thomson Homes, Inc., completed construction. The Beltzes' discovery of Thomson Homes' failure to commence construction was hampered by the fact that they resided in California at the time. However, the Beltzes had obviously discovered the wrongful acts and omissions of Thomson Homes, Inc., by September 29, 1999, when they sent a letter to Petitioner demanding that he return the money that they had paid Thomson Homes, Inc. On October 19, 1999, the Beltzes signed a claim under the Recovery Fund, but the record contains no indication when the claim was filed. The completed questionnaire attached to the claim does not ask if the claimants had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor. For reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law, a claim must follow a judgment, so, the Beltzes could not file a valid claim until they had obtained a judgment. Two years from September 29, 1999, at which point the Beltzes obviously knew of a violation, requires that they file the claim, on an already- secured judgment, prior to September 29, 2001. In a complaint filed February 4, 2002, the Beltzes commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to any construction" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiffs [sic] residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. The Beltzes obtained a default final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on May 22, 2002, for a total sum of $23,280.20, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, Defendant performed some work on the project. However, Defendant breached its contract by accepting deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and materialmen for their labor, services and material provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay Lienors who provided labor, service and materials to Plaintiffs [sic] real property, Construction Liens were recorded against same, which Plaintiffs had to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay Lienors, the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement, Plaintiffs were forced to borrow additional funds from their construction lender. By unacknowledged statement dated August 23, 2002, Ms. Beltz declared that someone at the Florida Department of State advised her that Thomson Homes, Inc., was administratively dissolved on September 24, 1999. She also declared that she had found on the internet two pieces of real property owned by Thomson Homes, Inc., but they had been transferred within the past year. Ms. Beltz stated that she searched the database of the "Department of Motor Vehicles in Palm Beach County" in May 2000 and found no vehicles or boats registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. Lastly, she reported that she contacted the "Federal Aviation Association" at an unspecified time and found no "airplanes" registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. On November 26, 2002, Respondent issued an Order approving the Beltzes' claim of $17,222.78 against the Recovery Fund and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that the Beltzes are the Petitioners, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On December 27, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on the Beltzes and Respondent, contests the payment to the Beltzes and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the Beltzes' claim because they did not submit all of the necessary exhibits with their claim; their judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; and their judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes. Additionally, the petition contests the automatic suspension because Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes; the Beltzes' claim is incomplete; and the Beltzes' judgment is not against Petitioner. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3543 involves the claim of Keith and Karen Deyo. The Deyos entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on October 31, 1998. Pursuant to the agreement, the Deyos agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $25,500 for a lot and $123,400 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. Although the Deyos clearly suffered damages from the acts and omissions of Thomson Homes, Inc., the record does not disclose how much they paid the company, how much they had to pay unpaid suppliers and laborers, and how much construction the company completed before abandoning the job. Thomson Homes, Inc., began construction on the Deyos' home about 30-45 days after the parties signed the contract, but all work stopped in July 1999. In an undated complaint, the Deyos commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment] of the project prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiffs [sic] residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. The Deyos obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on March 15, 2000, for a total sum of $55,458.64, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, Defendant partially performed work under the Contract. However, it breached its contract by accepting deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and materialmen for their labor, services and material provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay lienors who provided labor, services and materials to Plaintiffs [sic] residence, construction liens were recorded against same, which Plaintiffs had to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay lienor's [sic], the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiffs have been forced to borrow additional funds from their construction lender. On April 27, 2000, the Deyos signed a claim under the Recovery Fund, but the record contains no indication when the claim was filed. A cover letter dated May 8, 2000, suggests that the Deyos mailed their claim a couple of weeks after signing it, so it was probably filed in mid-May 2000, although their questionnaire bears a revision date of November 2001, which would be beyond two years after the violation. In the questionnaire, the Deyos did not respond to the question asking if they had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor. By an undated and unacknowledged statement, Mr. Deyo declared that someone at the Florida Department of State advised him that Thomson Homes, Inc., was administratively dissolved on September 24, 1999. He also declared that he had found on the internet two pieces of real property owned by Thomson Homes, Inc., but they had been transferred within the past year. Mr. Deyo stated that he searched the database of the "department of motor vehicles in Palm Beach County" in on April 14, 2000, and found no motor vehicles or boats registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. Lastly, he reported that he contacted the "Federal Aviation Association" on April 21, 2000, and found no "airplanes" registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. On January 22, 2003, Respondent issued an Order acknowledging the Deyos' claim of $55,458.64, approving the payment of the statutory limit of $25,000 against the Recovery Fund, and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that Mr. Deyo is the Petitioner, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On February 3, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on Respondent and the Deyos' attorney who represented them in the action against Thomson Homes, Inc., contests the payment to the Deyos and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the Deyos' claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because Petitioner did not receive notice of the hearing at which Respondent entered the Order; the Deyos did not satisfy all requirements for payment from the Recovery Fund; their claim was not accompanied by certified copies of the levy and execution documents; their judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; their judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3544 involves the claim of Sylvia Reinhardt. Ms. Reinhardt entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on October 14, 1998. Pursuant to the agreement, Ms. Reinhardt agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $45,000 for a lot and $147,150 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. After Ms. Reinhardt paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $144,769, directly and indirectly, by way of her construction lender, the house was little more than half complete when Thomson Homes, Inc., abandoned the job. Thomson Homes also failed to pay various suppliers that filed liens, so Ms. Reinhardt had to pay $8550.41 to RTS Roofing, $882 to Palm Beach Garage Door, and $3421.32 to Woodworks, Inc. In an undated complaint filed in 1999 (actual date illegible), Ms. Reinhardt commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiff's residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. Ms. Reinhardt obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on March 28, 2000, for a total sum of $61,471.15, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, Defendant performed work under the Contract. However, it breached its contract by accepting deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and materialmen for their labor, services and materials provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay lienors who provided labor, services and materials for the construction of Plaintiff's residence, construction liens were recorded against same, which Plaintiff had to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiff was compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their [sic] home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay lienor's [sic], the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiff has been forced to borrow additional funds from her construction lender. On April 17, 2000, Ms. Reinhardt filed a claim with the Recovery Fund. In response to a question asking if she had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, Ms. Reinhardt answered "yes" and explained: "Telephone calls were unanswered. Certified mail requesting response were [sic] never answered. Our attorney made written and personal contact with the owner and there was no intention to pay." The claim states that the violation took place in July 1999. By acknowledged statement dated July 21, 2000, Ms. Reinhardt declared that she had completed a "reasonable search and inquiry" and had not found any property or assets against which to satisfy her judgment. Ms. Reinhardt stated that someone at the Florida Department of State advised her that Thomson Homes, Inc., was administratively dissolved on September 24, 1999. She also declared that she had found one parcel of property owned by Thomson Homes, Inc., and valued at $115,387, but this had been sold to "Joan Thomson" on February 1, 2000. Ms. Reinhardt stated that she had found tangible personal property worth $5000. She added that she had not found any motor vehicles registered with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, nor had she found anything registered with the "FAA." On November 26, 2002, Respondent issued an Order acknowledging Ms. Reinhardt's claim of $58,661.44, approving the payment of the statutory limit of $25,000 against the Recovery Fund, and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that Ms. Reinhardt is the Petitioner, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On December 24, 2002, Petitioner served a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on Ms. Reinhardt and Respondent, contests the payment to Ms. Reinhardt and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of Ms. Reinhardt's claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because Ms. Reinhardt did not submit certified copies of the levy and execution documents; her judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; her judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3545 involves the claim of Louis and Ann Mahoney. The Mahoneys entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on June 28, 1999, for the construction of a home in Martin County. Pursuant to the agreement, the Mahoneys agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $32,000 for a lot and $149,000 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 150 days from the date of slab pour. After the Mahoneys paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $14,500, directly and indirectly, by way of their construction lender, they suffered damages due to the acts and omissions of Thomson Homes, Inc., although, again, the record does not describe specifically how Thomson Homes caused them damage. In an undated complaint that bears no filing date, the Mahoneys commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiffs [sic] residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. The Mahoneys obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on April 13, 2000, for a total sum of $43,084.49, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, Defendant breached its contract by accepting Plaintiffs' deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen for their labor, and/or services provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay lienor's [sic] who provided labor, services and materials for the construction of Plaintiffs [sic] residence, a construction lien was recorded against Plaintiffs' property, which Plaintiffs will have to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay lienor's [sic], the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiffs have been forced to borrow additional funds from their construction lender. On April 30, 2000, the Mahoneys signed a claim under the Recovery Fund. Although the claim form bears no filing date, the completed questionnaire attached to the claim was filed on May 3, 2000, so that is the likely filing date of the claim. In response to a question asking if they had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, the Mahoneys answered "yes" and explained: "This is explained in General Allegations, enclosed with this paperwork." Evidently, the reference is to a copy of the circuit court complaint. By acknowledged statement dated April 8, 2002, Mr. Mahoney declared that he had completed a "reasonable search and inquiry" and had not found any property or assets against which to satisfy his judgment. Mr. Mahoney stated that someone at the Florida Department of State advised him that Thomson Homes, Inc., was administratively dissolved on September 24, 1999. He also declared that an internet search had disclosed no property owned by Thomson Homes, Inc. Mr. Mahoney stated that the "department of motor vehicles in Palm Beach County" found no motor vehicles or boats registered to Thomson Homes, Inc., and that the "FAA" had found nothing registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. On February 28, 2003, Respondent issued an Order acknowledging the Mahoneys' claim of $38,185, approving the payment of the statutory limit of $25,000 against the Recovery Fund, and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that the Mr. Mahoney is the Petitioner, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On March 17, 2003, Petitioner served a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on the Mahoneys and Respondent, contests the payment to the Mahoneys and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the Mahoneys' claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because they did not submit all of the required exhibits; their judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; their judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3546 involves the claim of Dennis and Carolyn DeStefanis. The DeStefanises entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on April 7, 1999. Pursuant to the agreement, the DeStefanises agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $137,455 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 150 days from the date of slab pour. After the DeStefanises paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $15,765, directly and indirectly, by way of their construction lender, Thomson Homes, Inc. never did any work, except to contract with a surveyor, who, unpaid, filed a claim of lien against the DeStefanises's lot. In an undated complaint bearing no filing date, the DeStefanises commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiffs [sic] residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. The DeStefanises obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on March 15, 2000, for a total sum of $36,701.87, including attorneys' fees and costs. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering . . . into the above referenced contract, Defendant, [sic] breached its contract by accepting Plaintiffs [sic] deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project. [sic] As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiffs have been forced to borrow additional funds from their construction lender. On April 19, 2000, the DeStefanises filed a claim with the Recovery Fund. In response to a question asking if they had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, the DeStefanises answered "yes" and explained: "Went to DBPR Investigative Services, hired Attorney Barry W. Taylor [attorney in circuit court action], got Final Summary Judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc." On March 20, 2003, Respondent issued an Order acknowledging the DeStefanises' claim of $34,965.52, approving the payment of $15,765 against the Recovery Fund, and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that the DeStefanises are the Petitioners, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On April 7, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on the DeStefanises and Respondent, contests the payment to the DeStefanises and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the DeStefanises' claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because they did not submit all of the required exhibits; their judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; their judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. The petition contests the suspension of Petitioner's license on the additional ground that he was not the qualifier for Thomson Homes, Inc., when it and the DeStefanises entered into the construction contract. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3547 involves the claim of James and Donna Barr. The Barrs entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on September 12, 1998. Pursuant to the agreement, the Barrs agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $30,000 for a lot and $140,900 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. The Barrs paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $8500 in the form of a down payment. They or their construction lender paid Thomson Homes, Inc., considerably more money and suffered the imposition of claims of lien by unpaid subcontractors and suppliers, but, after negotiating with the bank, emerged from the transaction having lost only the $8500 down payment. Thomson Homes, Inc., obtained permits in April 1999 and started construction in May 1999. Before abandoning the job, Thomson Homes, Inc., worked on the home in May, June, and July of 1999. The Barrs and their lender did not make additional payments after the Barrs found the Thomson Homes, Inc., office empty on August 1, 1999. In a complaint filed October 6, 1999, the Barrs commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiffs [sic] residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. The Barrs obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on May 8, 2000, for a total sum of $45,435.62, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, partially performed work under the Contract. However, Defendant breached the contract by accepting Plaintiffs [sic] deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen for their labor services and materials provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay lienors who provided labor, services and materials for the construction of Plaintiffs [sic] residence, construction liens were recorded against same, which Plaintiffs will have to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiffs will be compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay lienors, the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiffs will be forced to borrow additional funds from their construction lender. On June 2, 2000, the Barrs filed a claim under the Recovery Fund. In response to a question asking if they had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, the Barrs answered "yes" and explained: "I have looked into the assets of Thomson Homes Inc. and they do not have any. My affidavit is attached." The completed questionnaire states that the Barrs discovered the violation on August 11, 1999. They therefore failed to file their claim within two years of the discovery of the violation. By acknowledged statement dated May 23, 2000, Ms. Barr declared that she had completed a "reasonable search and inquiry" and had not found any property or assets against which to satisfy her judgment. Ms. Barr stated that someone at the Florida Department of State advised her that Thomson Homes, Inc., was administratively dissolved on September 24, 1999. She also declared she had found no property owned by Thomson Homes, Inc., in Palm Beach County. Ms. Barr stated that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles found no motor vehicles or boats registered to Thomson Homes, Inc., and that the internet site of the "FAA" had revealed nothing registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. On November 26, 2002, Respondent issued an Order approving the payment of the Barrs' claim of $8500 against the Recovery Fund and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that the Barrs are the Petitioners, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On December 27, 2002, Petitioner served a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on the Barrs and Respondent, contests the payment to the Barrs and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the Barrs' claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because they did not submit a certified copy of the levy and execution documents; their judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; their judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3633 involves the Joanne Myers. Ms. Myers entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on February 7, 1999. Pursuant to the agreement, Ms. Myers agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $29,500 for a lot and $125,400 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. Ms. Myers directly or indirectly paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $12,840. According to Ms. Myers' claim, Thomson Homes, Inc., never commenced construction before going out of business in August 1999. In an undated complaint bearing no filing date, Ms. Myers commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiff's residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. Ms. Myers obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on May 31, 2000, for a total sum of $28,307.77, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering . . . into the above referenced contract, Defendant breached the contract by accepting Plaintiff's deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen for their labor services and materials provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay lienor's [sic] who provided labor, services and/or materials for the construction of Plaintiff's residence, construction liens were recorded against same, which Plaintiff will have to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiff will be compelled to retain a new contractor to complete her home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay lienor's [sic], the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiff will be forced to borrow additional funds from her construction lender. On September 18, 2000, Ms. Myers filed a claim with the Recovery Fund. In response to a question asking if she had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, Ms. Myers answered "yes" and explained: "Contractor closed corporate office--would not answer telephone calls." By letter dated November 30, 2000, from James Brogan of WEI Consulting Group to Ms. Myers, Mr. Brogan states that he had investigated the assets of Thomson Homes, Inc. Mr. Brogan found no bankruptcy filing by Thomson Homes, Inc., in the Southern District of Florida. Thomson Homes, Inc., was a party to 282 legal actions and owed tangible personal property taxes on furniture in a model home. On February 28, 2003, Respondent issued an Order approving the payment of Ms. Myers' claim of $14,080.66 against the Recovery Fund and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that Ms. Myers is the Petitioner, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On March 17, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on Ms. Myers and Respondent, contests the payment to Ms. Myers and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of Ms. Myers' claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because she did not submit evidence of a diligent search for assets; she did not submit all of the required exhibits; her judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; her judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. On January 4, 2004, Ms. Myers died. However, the probate court of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, issued letters testamentary on her estate to James W. Myers III, in whose name Ms. Myers' claim is now being prosecuted. At the hearing, Petitioner contended that most, if not all, of the claims failed because the claimants had not exercised reasonable diligence in searching for assets, although Petitioner has dropped this contention in its proposed recommended order. In his petitions for hearing, Petitioner raised this contention only as to Ms. Myers. Ms. Myers, as well as the remainder of the claimants, made or caused to be made a reasonable search and inquiry for the assets of Thomson Homes, Inc. It is obvious that Thomson Homes, Inc., had no assets by the first letter from Mr. Brogan, dated November 30, 2000, nor did it have assets when Mr. Brogan issued his later letter on June 5, 2001, or when the attorney issued his affidavit on August 9, 2001. What is reasonable, in terms of a search, is dictated here by the fact that Thomson Homes, Inc., had no discoverable assets against which it could be made to answer for the considerable fraud that it perpetrated against these nine claimants. Respondent provided all of the parties, including Petitioner, with notice of its hearings at which it entered Recovery Fund orders. The petitions contend that Petitioner received no such notice in the Whitesides and Deyos cases. Although not litigated at the hearing, the presumption of notice, pursuant to the recitations set forth in each of Respondent's orders, results in a finding that Petitioner received timely notice in all cases.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order dismissing the claims against the Recovery Fund of the Beltzes and Barrs; paying the claims against the Recovery Fund of the remaining claimants, pursuant to the provisions of the orders of Respondent already issued in these cases and pursuant to the provisions of Section 489.143(1)-(6), Florida Statutes; and dismissing Respondent's request for the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license, pursuant to Section 489.143(7), Florida Statutes, without prejudice to any separate disciplinary proceedings that Respondent has commenced or may commence against Petitioner or others for the acts and omissions involved in these nine cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce G. Kaleita Law Office of Bruce G. Kaleita, P.A. 1615 Forum Place, Suite 500 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Adrienne C. Rodgers Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1023 Tim Vaccaro, Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Nancy Campiglia, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue Whether Respondents committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaints.
Findings Of Fact Respondent William Negron holds a Class "E" Recovery Agent License (number E91-00022) and a Class "C" Private Investigator License (number C93-00478). Respondent Collateral Services of America, Inc. (CSA) holds a Class "R" Recovery Agency License (Number R91-00085). On October 2, 1998, Respondents repossessed an auto carrier from a debtor pursuant to a subcontract from MDL & Associates, which is a recovery agency owned by Mark and Debbie Lasik. This auto carrier was loaded with motor vehicles. Respondents regularly employ Jose Castellanos to perform services on a piecework basis. Mr. Castellanos and one of his associates were hired by Respondents to unload the motor vehicles that were on the auto carrier. Respondents paid Mr. Castellanos and his associate the sum of $200.00 to unload the autos from the auto carrier. There was no evidence that this sum was unreasonable. Respondent Negron timely reported the repossession of the auto carrier to the Miami Springs Police Department, the police department with jurisdiction of the area in which the repossession occurred. Mr. Negron testified, credibly, that he told the police officer to whom he made the report who he was and that he had repossessed the auto carrier pursuant to a subcontract with Mark Lasik, a principal of MDL & Associates. The police report reflected that the recovery was made by MDL & Associates and that the contact person at MDL & Associates was Mark Lasik. The police officer who took the report from Respondent did not testify at the formal hearing. On or about January 23, 1998, Respondent Negron repossessed a 1997 BMW automobile. Respondent Negron, in completing a condition report 1/ for the BMW, reported that the mileage was 13,000 miles. The BMW had a digital readout, so that the mileage could not be read without the car being turned on. Respondent Negron testified that his company had the key and that one of his employees read the mileage and reported the same on the condition report. 2/ The BMW was stolen from Respondents' storage facility and subsequently recovered by law enforcement. Gold Coast Towing towed the stolen BMW for law enforcement and completed a report reflecting that the mileage was 12,499. There was no evidence as to whether Gold Coast Towing estimated the mileage or whether it had a key to the car and actually read the mileage. Adrian Lopez was employed as a Recovery Agent Intern on or about January 13, 1998. Respondent Negron was Mr. Lopez's sponsor as a Recovery Agent Intern. On January 11, 1999, Mr. Lopez filed a complaint with Mr. Wood against Respondents because he had been unable to get credit from Petitioner for the time he had worked for Respondents as an intern. Petitioner admitted into evidence the licensure file of Mr. Lopez. This file contains an Intern Biannual Progress Report for the period January 23, 1998 to July 23, 1998. This form was signed and notarized on July 24, 1998, by Mr. Negron as sponsor for Mr. Lopez. The form was not time-stamped when received by Petitioner. The copy of the form submitted into evidence by Petitioner contains a fax footprint reflecting that the copy was faxed by CSA on January 13, 1999. Whether it was faxed directly to Mr. Wood was not established. There is no allegation that this report was not timely. Also on January 13, 1999, Respondents faxed to Petitioner a form reflecting that Mr. Lopez's employment had been terminated. This termination notice was dated January 11, 1999. There was no allegation that this notice was not timely. Respondents did not submit a biannual report for the internship of Mr. Lopez for the period July 24, 1998 through January 13, 1999. Because that report was not filed, Mr. Lopez had difficulty establishing the amount of internship credit to which he was entitled. Mr. Wood, after reviewing Respondents' records, determined that Mr. Lopez was entitled to seven months of credit. Mr. Lopez receives disability income benefits from the Department of Labor. After Mr. Lopez filed his complaint, Mr. Negron telephoned him and threatened to report to the Department of Labor that Mr. Lopez received much more money than he actually was paid. This was an attempt to coerce Mr. Lopez into withdrawing the complaint since such a report would jeopardize Mr. Lopez's disability benefits. There was no evidence that Mr. Negron made any type of report with the Department of Labor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing the allegations contained in DOAH Case No. 99-2759 and those in Counts II and III of DOAH Case No. 99-3022. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order find Respondents guilty of the violations alleged in Count I and Count IV of DOAH Case No. 99-3022, and that it impose an administrative fine against Respondents in the amount of $150.00 for each violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 2000.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, L.B. King, Jr., violated certain rules relating to petroleum contamination site cleanup criteria promulgated by Petitioner, Department of Environmental Protection (Department), whether he should be required to pay an administrative fine and investigative costs and expenses incurred by the Department, and whether he should take corrective action, as described in the Department's Notice of Violation, Orders for Corrective Action, and Administrative Penalty Assessment (Notice of Violation) issued on June 15, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record presented by the parties, and those allegations in the Notice of Violation which are undisputed, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent is the owner and operator of non-residential property (doing business as King Oil and Tire) located at 16776 Southeast U.S. Highway 19 (at Main Street and Ward Street) in Cross City, Florida. He has owned the property since June 30, 1982. Since July 1978, eight regulated petroleum storage tanks were situated on the property. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62- 761.200(20), (45), (53), and (65). The Department has assigned facility identification number 15/8839661 to the site. During the intervening time period since Respondent assumed ownership, six of the tanks and their associated piping have been closed or removed, including tank 4 in August 1997 and tanks 5 and 6 in March 2004. Tank 4 was a 1,000 gallon diesel underground storage tank system (UST) originally installed in July 1982, tank 5 was a kerosene UST installed in July 1978, while tank 6 was a waste oil UST installed in July 1978. Only tanks 7 and 8 still remain in service. After tank 4 and the associated piping were closed in August 1997, Respondent conducted a closure assessment in the area of tank 4 and performed soil and groundwater analytical sampling in the area of its former piping run. He then filed a Tank Closure Assessment Report (TCAR) with the Department on August 19, 2003. The TCAR revealed groundwater contaminants above the Department's Cleanup Target Levels (CTLs) for Methylnapthalene in two respects and for Naphthalene. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-777.170(1)(a), Table I. Because of the presence of contamination on the site, on September 3, 2003, the Department sent Respondent a letter requesting that he submit a Discharge Report Form (DRF) and initiate a site assessment, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600, and that he file a completed site assessment report by July 10, 2004.3 Subsection (1) of that rule requires that "[w]ithin 30 days of discovery of contamination, the responsible party shall initiate a site assessment." On September 29, 2003, the Department received the requested DRF. During a tank closure inspection of tanks 5 and 6 performed on March 4, 2004, the Levy County Health Department, acting on behalf of the Department, discovered stained soils in the fill area of tank 6. On May 18, 2004, the Department received a TCAR dated May 7, 2004, for the closure of tanks 5 and 6. The TCAR documented the results of laboratory analytical tests on groundwater samples, which revealed groundwater contaminants above the Department's CTLs for Methylnapthalene in two respects. On May 24, 2004, the Department received from Respondent a copy of a DRF (dated March 9, 2004, as amended on April 9, 2004) for the contamination related to tanks 5 and 6. The DRF was the last report filed by Respondent concerning tanks 5 and 6. On the same date, the Department sent Respondent a letter requesting that he initiate site assessment activities for the discharge related to tanks 5 and 6, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(1). On July 14, 2004, the Department sent Respondent another letter requesting (a) completion of a site assessment and (b) the submission of a Site Assessment Report (SAR) for the discharge from tank 4 (SAR-97), which complied with the requirements of Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(8). (The SAR-97 was originally due on July 10, 2004, but had not yet been filed.) In order to be deemed complete, a SAR must contain all of the information detailed in subsection (8). Also, the letter requested that a SAR for the 2004 discharge (SAR-04) be completed no later than August 1, 2004, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(7). That subsection requires in relevant part that "[w]ithin 270 days of discovery of contamination, the responsible party shall submit to the Department or to the FDEP local program for review two copies of a [SAR] " On July 15, 2004, or the day after the above letter was mailed, the Department received a copy of the SAR-97 from Respondent. The report was then referred to the Department's Petroleum Cleanup Section for its review. By letter dated August 27, 2004, the Department advised Respondent that SAR-97 was under review. The letter also changed the due date for the SAR-04 from August 1, 2004, to November 9, 2004. On September 15, 2004, the Department received correspondence from Respondent requesting an extension of time in which to submit his SAR-04. On December 10, 2004, the Department approved the request and authorized Respondent to file a SAR-04 no later than March 1, 2005. On April 12, 2005, Respondent filed with the Department a Site Assessment Report Addendum (SARA) for the 1997 discharge (SARA-97). The report was dated March 1, 2005. On May 25, 2005, the Department sent Respondent a letter requesting that he file two copies of a supplement to the SARA-97 no later than July 5, 2005, to address certain deficiencies noted in that report, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770-600(11). That subsection provides that "[i]f the [SAR] is incomplete in any respect, or is insufficient to satisfy the objectives of subsection 62- 770.600(3), F.A.C., the Department or the FDEP local program shall inform the responsible party pursuant to paragraph 62- 770.600(9)(b), F.A.C., and the responsible party shall submit to the Department or to the FDEP local program for review two copies of a [SARA] that addresses the deficiencies within 60 days after receipt of the notice." The same letter also requested that a disposal manifest be provided for the tank and piping closures. On July 11, 2005, the Department received a second SARA-97 from Respondent's consultant. On July 14, 2005, it also received the disposal manifest documentation for the closure of tank 4 and its piping. These were the last reports filed by Respondent. On October 4, 2005, the Department sent Respondent a letter requesting that he provide two copies of a third SARA for the 1997 discharge to address deficiencies noted by the Department in the second SARA. The letter indicated that the third SARA was to be filed no later than November 23, 2005. The Department also requested that he provide a completed financial affidavit to justify Respondent's claim that he was financially unable to complete the remaining required cleanup corrective actions at his property. On November 29, 2005, Respondent requested an extension of time to complete the third SARA-97. (The reason for the requested extension was that Respondent's insurance carrier would not give authorization for the work.) On January 12, 2006, the Department advised Respondent by letter that his request had been denied and that he must submit either the third SARA or a financial affidavit, as previously requested, no later than February 15, 2006. In its response, the Department indicated that it did not "consider generic delays by contractors or insurance carriers as good cause for an extension." To date, neither filing has been made. By failing to file the requested third SARA for the 1997 discharge, Respondent has contravened the requirements of Florida Administrative Code Rules 62-770.600(11) and 62- 770.800(3), which require that within 60 days after notice, a responsible party submit a SARA to address deficiencies noted in a SAR. Respondent's conduct also implicates Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.800(5), which makes it a violation of two Florida Statutes for a responsible party to not submit requested information within the time frame specified. Since March 1, 2005, which was the due date on which a report was to be filed, Respondent has failed to submit an approved SAR for the 2004 discharge, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(7), which in turn contravenes Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.800(3) and (5). To date, Respondent has failed to complete site assessment activities for both the 1997 and 2004 discharges, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-770.600(10). That provision states that "[s]ite assessment activities shall not be deemed complete until such time as a [SAR] is approved." To date, Respondent has failed to timely and completely assess and remediate the contamination at his property, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 62-770. That chapter contains the criteria which apply to the cleanup of a site contaminated with petroleum products. During the course of its investigation of this matter, the Department has incurred expenses "in the amount of not less than $500.00." As mitigating evidence, Respondent offered into evidence Respondent's Exhibits 2-15, the majority of which pertain to his insurance policy and the pending litigation with his carrier, Mid-Continent Casualty Company (MCC), or the priority score funding process, which is the process by which contaminated properties are scored or rated for purposes of determining eligibility to receive state cleanup funds when the responsible party is financially unable to do so. Although evidence regarding the insurance policy and pending litigation was deemed to be immaterial to the issues of establishing Respondent's liability for the violations and responsibility for undertaking the corrective actions necessary to satisfy the violations, the undersigned ruled that it could be used by Respondent as mitigating evidence, if relevant, for the purpose of seeking to reduce the administrative penalty. Respondent's Exhibits 8, 9, and 11 indicate that after he reported the 2003 discharge to MCC, in 2003 the carrier denied coverage for that discharge (on the ground "any 'confirmed release' must commence after the retroactive date of the policy (4/3/98)"). However, MCC initially accepted coverage for the 2004 discharge and authorized Respondent's environmental consultants to conduct a site assessment. The documents further show that in December 2005, or before the 2004 site assessment had been completed and a SAR prepared, MCC reversed its position and denied coverage for the 2004 discharge on the ground there was no "Confirmed Release," as defined by the policy. Respondent then filed his lawsuit seeking a determination that the carrier was responsible for cleanup costs. Respondent asserts that he has expended more than $50,000.00 in pursuing the lawsuit, which is much more than the administrative penalty being assessed by the Department. Respondent points out that prior to the time MCC reversed its position as to coverage for the 2004 discharge in December 2005, he had filed a DFR, TCAR, disposal manifest, SAR- 97, and two SARAs for the 1997 discharge, and a TCAR and DFR for the 2004 discharge, all of which indicate a good faith effort on his part to comply with the assessment requirements. As noted above, the final reports prepared by Respondent's consultant were a second SARA-97 and a disposal manifest for the 1997 discharge, which were filed with the Department in July 2005, and a TCAR and DRF for the 2004 discharge filed in May 2004. Respondent's Exhibit 10A recites language in Coverage B of the insurance policy, which provides in part that MCC "will pay Clean-up Costs by an Insured for environmental damage that an Insured is legally obligated to pay . . . ." Respondent argues that if he acknowledges by affidavit or other proof that he does not have the ability to pay for cleanup costs, he fears that under the above language, MCC would not be "legally obligated to pay." This is because Section 376.3071(7)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that when a responsible party does not have the ability to pay for all of the cleanup costs, the Department "may" enter into an agreement with the responsible party to undertake all or part of the site rehabilitation after "taking into consideration the party's net worth and the economic impact on the party." Respondent contends that if he files an affidavit under this statute, MCC would then be relieved of any responsibility under the policy, and his rights in the lawsuit would be jeopardized. Respondent further points out that several other provisions in the insurance policy prohibit him from completing the assessment until the litigation is concluded. For example, one provision (Section II.B) provides that "No Clean-up Costs, charges, and expenses shall be incurred without the Company's consent," while another (Section II.C) provides that "An Insured shall not admit or assume any liabilities or settle any Claim(s) without the Company's consent." Respondent asserts that these provisions prevent his consultant from conducting any further work on the site without MCC's consent, and if he does so, he will lose the right to reimbursement under the policy. Finally, Exhibits 3 through 6 show that Respondent's property has been assigned a site ranking score of ten points, and that the Department is currently funding sites that are eligible for state restoration funding only if they have scores of 37 points and higher. Thus, Respondent argues that a delay in remediation of the site is not unreasonable. Except for the two discharges at issue in this case, there is no evidence that Respondent has a history of non- compliance or that he gained any direct economic benefit by virtue of the discharges. Although no reports have been filed since July 2005, through counsel, Respondent has kept the Department abreast of his efforts to establish liability on the part of MCC so that the site assessments can resume.
Findings Of Fact The Department is an agency of the State of Florida designated, pursuant to Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, to regulate solid waste management in Florida. BFI is a corporation which is engaged in the business of solid waste collection and disposal in Florida, and operates at least one curbside recyclable materials collection program in Florida. In 1988, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 403.706(2), Florida Statutes (1989), as part of the comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act. This section requires counties to institute recyclable materials programs. Counties and cities are urged to form cooperative arrangements for implementing recycling programs. The Solid Waste Management Act requires that, at a minimum, "a majority of the newspaper, aluminum cans, glass and plastic bottles must be separated from the solid waste stream prior to final disposal at a solid waste disposal facility and must be offered for recycling" by the end of 1994. Section 403.706(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989). To implement the requirements of the Solid Waste Management Act, both Alachua County and the City of Gainesville have instituted curbside recycling programs. BFI has entered into contracts with both of these local governments to implement their curbside recycling programs. These programs include a number of elements, such as: the separation of specified recyclable materials by the homeowner and the placement of these materials in bins; the collection of these recyclable materials from bins at curbside; the further separation of these materials and placement in separate compartments in specially-designed recycling vehicles; the transportation of the materials to a central recycling facility; the further separation and processing of these materials at the central facility; and the transportation of these processed materials to other facilities where they are returned to use in the form of raw materials. Each home in the area served by the curbside recycling programs is provided with a blue recycling bin. The bin comes with a set of instructions that provides information concerning the types of recyclable materials that may be placed in the bin, as well as the day of the week on which the recycling bin is to be placed at the curbside for collection. Recyclable materials to be separated from other solid waste and placed in the recycling bin include plastics, newsprint, three colors of glass, and metals including aluminum and bi-metal cans. On the specified weekday, BFI personnel collect recyclable materials from the bins that have been placed at the curbside. The driver of the recycling vehicle picks up the bin, places it on a specially-designed hook on the side of the vehicle, and transfers each type of recyclable material into one of six compartments on the side of the vehicle. For example, newspapers are taken from the recycling bin and placed in the side compartment for newspapers, and the same process is repeated for plastics, metal, and each of the three colors of glass. When the bin has been emptied, the driver returns the bin to the curbside for future use. When these side compartments are filled, they are dumped over the side and into the body of the truck. The side compartments and the interior walls of the truck are designed so that the materials remain segregated. The side compartment and walls also are designed so that they may be adjusted to accommodate the relative quantity of recyclable materials that will be collected on a particular route. This design thus provides for the efficient collection and transportation of recyclable materials. The side compartments and interior walls are designed to insure that the recyclable materials remain segregated so that mixing of the recyclable materials is prevented. This is important since recyclable materials that are contaminated with other materials may not be suitable for recycling. For example, newspaper mixed with glass or aluminum will be rejected by a paper mill. Similarly, colors of glass cannot be mixed, since there is no market for mixed glass. The dumping of the side compartments over the side and into the interior of the truck results in the breakage of the glass and effects a volume reduction. When the driver and recycling truck have serviced all of the recycling bins on a route, they return to BFI's central recycling facility in Gainesville. The truck is weighed, and then the first (or rear) interior compartment is opened, the truck is hoisted (or tilted) and the contents are emptied into a separate concrete bunker. For example, the compartment containing newspapers is emptied into the bunker containing newspapers. This weighing and emptying process is repeated for each of the six interior compartments, with each compartment being emptied into a separate concrete bunker. The emptying of the three compartments containing glass results in the further breakage of the glass. A front-end loader is used to transfer the materials from each of the concrete bunkers. The newspaper is transferred from its bunker and placed into a roll-off container. Periodically, the roll-off container is transported to Southeast Paper, where the newspaper is returned to use as a raw material for the manufacture of newsprint. The plastics are transferred from a concrete bunker to a piece of equipment that compacts the plastics into bales of approximately 1,000 pounds each. Periodically, these bales of plastic are transported to Wellman Plastics, where the plastic is returned to use as a raw material for the manufacture of new plastics. The three types (or colors) of glass are transferred from their respective concrete bunkers to heavy-duty cardboard containers that hold approximately 3,000 pounds of glass. Periodically, these containers are transported to Owens- Illinois, where the glass is returned to use as a raw material for making new glass. The dropping of the glass into and from the recycling vehicle breaks the glass into small pieces. For this reason, BFI has not had to purchase and install glass crushing equipment. The bi-metal cans and the aluminum cans are transferred from a concrete bunker to equipment that is used to separate the bi-metal cans from the aluminum cans. The aluminum cans are crushed and blown (or separated) into a trailer. Periodically, these aluminum cans are transported to Anheuser-Busch, where they are returned to use as a raw material for making new aluminum cans. After the bi-metal cans are separated from the aluminum cans, they are crushed and transported to a metal can company, F. Joseph and Company, where they are returned to use as a raw material for metal cans or other types of metal products. BFI's curbside recycling programs constitute a process by which solid waste, or materials which would otherwise become solid waste -- i.e., newspaper, plastics, three types of glass and metals -- are collected, separated, processed and returned to use in the form of raw materials. The curbside recycling programs also constitute a process by which these same materials are recovered from solid waste. The recycling vehicles are specially-designed in accordance with the contracts with the City of Gainesville and Alachua County. The vehicles are used exclusively in the curbside recycling programs. The recycling vehicles are integral to the curbside recycling programs because the programs require the use of vehicles to transport recyclable materials from the "curbside" to a central recycling facility. The recycling vehicles also are integral to the actual process of recovering materials from solid waste because, as a result of the convenience they provide the homeowner, they effect a substantial increase in the recovery of materials from solid waste. Each month, the curbside recycling programs in Alachua County and the City of Gainesville collect and process approximately 500 tons of recyclable materials that otherwise would (and previously did) go into a local landfill. Now these materials are returned to use in the form of raw materials. BFI has purchased and paid sales or use tax on the recycling vehicles and bins that are used in the curbside recycling programs described above. "Resource recovery equipment" that is "owned and operated by or on behalf of any county or municipality, and certified by the Department of Environmental Regulation under the provision of Section 403.715," is exempt from the sales and use tax. Section 212.08(7)(p), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 403.715, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 17-704, Florida Administrative Code, DER certifies to the Department of Revenue (DOR) that certain equipment is "resource recovery equipment." DOR then determines whether that equipment is "owned and operated by or on behalf of any county or municipality." DOR's determination is not at issue in this case. Rule 17-704.420 set out the criteria for the examination and certification of resource recovery equipment. Presently, paragraph (1)(c) of Rule 17-704.420, provides in pertinent part, as follows: equipment (1) Resource recovery equipment includes all or machinery exclusively and integrally used in the actual process of recovering material or energy resources from solid waste, [and which is purchased after July 1, 1989.] Resource recovery equipment does not include: * * * (c) Equipment used to transport materials or energy resources from solid waste <<to or>> from the site where the recovery process takes place. (Emphasis added.) The existing rule prohibits only the certification of equipment used to transport materials or energy resources that already have been recovered from solid waste from the site where the recovery process takes place. For example, DER previously has refused to certify equipment used to take ash residue from a resource recovery facility off site for disposal since the recovery process already had been completed. The proposed amendment would amend paragraph (1)(c) of Rule 17-704.420 as follows: equipment Resource recovery equipment includes all or machinery exclusively and integrally used in the actual process of recovering material or energy resources from solid waste, and which is purchased after July 1, 1989. Resource recovery equipment does not include: * * * Equipment used to transport materials or energy resources recovered from solid waste to or from the site where the recovery process takes place. [Additions are underscored and deletions are stricken.] On its face, the proposed rule amendment prohibits the certification of equipment used to transport materials or energy resources recovered from solid waste to the site where the recovery process takes place. Expert witness, Jan Clark, agreed that this language "doesn't make sense," and she testified that she interprets this provision to prohibit the certification of equipment used to transport recovered materials or energy resources to a place where further resource recovery takes place. In summary, paragraph (1)(c) of Rule 17-704.420 presently does not expressly prohibit certification of equipment that is used to transport recovered materials to the site where further resource recovery takes place. According to DER, the proposed amendment to paragraph (1)(c) would change this by expressly prohibiting the certification of such equipment. DER's position is that the proposed amendment is intended to codify existing policy that equipment used for transportation of recovered materials does not qualify for certification as resource recovery equipment unless the equipment is used solely "on site" or at a "fixed location." This policy is unwritten and is not explained in other documents. In addition, this policy has never been applied to a curbside recycling program. DER's witness was unaware of any statute that expressly authorizes this "on site" or "fixed location" requirement. DER relies on the requirement that resource recovery equipment be "integrally used" in the actual process of recovering material from solid waste. DER in turn interprets the "integrally used" equipment to require that the equipment be located "on site" or at a "fixed location" based on its understanding of the "integrated plant theory" espoused by the Department of Revenue in the so-called JEA case. 1/ DER's witness Clark had little familiarity with the "integrated plant theory" and the rationale for the holding of the JEA case. DER's position is that the requirement that resource recovery equipment be "integrally used" in the actual "process" of "recovering" materials from solid waste authorizes DER to refuse to certify equipment that simply transports materials to a place where further resource recovery takes place. Expert Clark, in reference to the definition of "processing" in Section 403.703(36), suggested that transportation equipment is not used in the actual "process" because it does not result in any physical change in the materials being transported. However, DER has previously certified equipment, the sole function of which is the transportation of materials to a place where further resource recovery takes place. For example, DER previously has certified front-end loaders, conveyor belts, refuse cranes and similar equipment that performs solely a transportation function. In addition, DER has proposed to amend Rule 17-704.600(3) to create a presumption that similar materials handling equipment will be routinely certified. DER's witness Clark admits that this equipment would not result in any physical change in the material and therefore would not meet the definition of "processing" in Section 403.703(36). Moreover, BFI's recycling vehicles do change the physical characteristics of the materials being processed. For example, the vehicles do break, and thereby change the physical character of the recovered glass so as to reduce its volume and render it amenable to recycling. BFI has submitted applications to DER for the final examination and certification of the recycling vehicles and bins purchased and used in these curbside recycling programs. DER has not yet taken final action on these applications. (Composite Exhibit No. 1.) DER interprets the proposed amendment to require the denial of BFI's applications for certification of the recycling vehicles because they are "equipment used to transfer materials recovered from solid waste to ... the site where" further resource recovery takes place. If the certification is denied, BFI will not be eligible for a refund of the sales or use tax paid on these vehicles. BFI therefore will be substantially affected by the adoption of the proposed amendment to Rule 17- 704.420(1)(c).
Findings Of Fact The applicant/Petitioner, Orange County (county) maintains a facility at the Orange County Courthouse at 65 Central Avenue, Orlando, Florida. In May 1992 the county removed from the facility two steel diesel fuel tanks, 12,000 gallons and 1,000 gallon capacity. These underground storage tanks had been used until approximately 1987 for the hot water and heating system at the courthouse. Groundwater contamination was detected during removal and DER was appropriately informed. Approximately one week after removal, a new tank and piping system was installed at the same site for an entirely different purpose: storage of diesel fuel for the facility's emergency generator. The standby emergency generator is required by various city, state and county codes for emergency power to the fire pump and for emergency lighting for the courthouse. On or about June 23, 1992 the county filed its ATRP application requesting financial assistance with regard to cleanup of the groundwater contamination from the prior storage tanks. The application was denied based on DER's determination that maintenance of the new tanks precluded the county's eligibility under rules governing the program.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the agency enter its Final Order denying Orange County's application for financial assistance through the Abandoned Tank Restoration Program. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 9th day of August, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul H. Chipok Assistant County Attorney Orange County Attorney's Office Orange County Administration Center Post Office Box 1393 Orlando, Florida 32802-1393 W. Douglas Beason Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Kenneth Plante, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence presented at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: In 1984, the citizens of Pasco County approved a "straw ballot" proposal providing for the establishment of a resource recovery facility financed with non-ad valorem revenue bonds for the purpose of disposing of the County's solid waste in lieu of utilizing sanitary landfills as a primary disposal method. The Board of County Commissioners of Pasco County thereafter commissioned the consulting engineering firm of Camp Dresser and McKee (CDM) to perform a resource recovery feasibility study and to identify a site for the facility. CDM concluded that a resource recovery facility was an economically feasible approach to solid waste management for Pasco County. After evaluating seven sites for such a facility, CDM recommended a 751-acre site on Hays Road in western Pasco County. The County purchased the site at a cost of approximately three million dollars. In 1987, the Legislature adopted a Special Act, Chapter 87-441, Laws of Florida, establishing a solid waste disposal and resource recovery system within Pasco County and giving the County exclusive control over the collection and disposal of solid waste generated or brought within the area affected by the Act. The solid waste disposal and resource recovery system proposed by the County will convert solid waste into electrical power through a process of combustion, utilizing a mass-burn technology, followed by landfilling of the ash residue. Initially, the "waste-to-energy" facility will have three combustion/steam generation units, which will dispose of 900 tons of refuse each day and produce approximately 22 megawatts of electricity. A fourth combustion unit may be added in the future, thus allowing the facility to dispose of 1,200 tons of refuse each day and produce 29 megawatts of electricity. The resource recovery facility and landfill/ashfill is designed with the purpose of complying will all applicable environmental regulations. Best available control technology will be utilized to minimize the emissions of air pollutants. The facility will use a baghouse with fabric filters to control particulate emissions and a dry scrubber to control acid gas emissions. The landfill will have two synthetic liner systems and two leachate collection systems to maximize the protection of groundwater resources. Stormwater on the site will be treated in retention/detention basins, and there will be no discharges of wastewater on the site. Ferrous metals in the solid waste will be recovered and recycled. The undeveloped 751 acre parcel of land owned by the County is located in an unincorporated area of northwest Pasco County. It is approximately two and a half miles north of Highway 52 and about four to five miles west of Route The site is accessible by Hays Road, which forms its southern and western boundaries. Shady Hills Road runs to the east of the site and Blue Bird Lane runs along the northern perimeter. The parcel is bisected by Florida Power Corporation power lines, which run in a north/south direction. All development on the site relating to the proposed resource recovery facility will be east of the power lines. The site primarily consists of grasslands and wooded areas. Most of the areas near the site boundaries are wooded. An access road from Hays Road would be constructed to lead to the resource recovery facility, and the site would also contain a landfill/ashfill and several stormwater retention ponds. The resource recovery facility will be located on the southeastern portion of the site, approximately 4,600 feet from the site's northern boundary. The facility will be approximately 2,400 feet from the nearest residence, which is located on Hays Road. There will be at least 250 feet of buffer area between the resource recovery facility and the property boundaries. There will be at least 700 feet of buffer area between the landfill and the northern boundary of the site. The ashfill portion of the project would be developed over a 25 to 35 year period. The areas surrounding the site consist of agricultural and very low density residential developments. The areas to the east, southeast, and southwest are very sparsely populated. There is scattered low density residential development to the north, northeast and northwest, and some scattered residences south and southwest of the site. The subject parcel of land lies within the Pasco County Zoning Code's A-C Agricultural District. According to the Pasco County Zoning Code, Ordinance No. 75-21, the purpose of the A-C Agricultural District is to preserve the rural and open character of various lands within Pasco County. The principal permitted uses within this District include agriculture, general farming and horticulture; single family dwellings; duplexes; home occupations; public and private parks and playgrounds; mineral extraction activities; and residential treatment and care facilities. Accessory uses include private garages and parking areas, private swimming pools and cabanas, and signs. Special exemption uses within the A-C Agricultural District include country club and golf course, aircraft landing fields, cemeteries, animal hospitals, sanitary landfills and public buildings and public utility facilities which do not cause an undue nuisance or adversely affect existing structures, uses and residents. Ordinance Number 82-04, Section 2, amended the Pasco County Zoning Code to exempt from its provisions "development and other activities conducted by Pasco County." (Exhibit No. 3) It was the opinion of Pasco County's Zoning Administrator that the proposed resource recovery facility and landfill/ashfill were exempt from the County's Zoning Code. The County's present Planning Director concurred with this opinion. It was further the opinion of the Zoning Administrator that even if the project were subject to the requirements of the Zoning Code, it could be built as a special exemption use in the A-C Agricultural District. Pasco County has an ordinance, known as the New Development Fair Share Contribution for Road Improvements Ordinance, which requires developers to pay impact fees for transportation purposes. According to the County Planning Director, this ordinance expressly excludes County projects from its provisions. It was the opinion of the County's land use planning and zoning experts that the use of the site for a resource recovery facility would be compatible with surrounding land uses. The project will be designed so as to be barely visible from surrounding areas and to give as pleasing an aesthetic appearance as possible to the site. When a detailed site plan for the facility is prepared, the project will be evaluated by the Pasco County Development Review Committee, composed of County employees from various departments, to ensure that the project is consistent with existing regulations and compatible with surrounding land uses. The Pasco County comprehensive land use plan was adopted in 1982 and is currently being revised. It is a policy document containing various planning elements, with goals, objectives, policies and recommendations. It does not currently include a land use map that specifically identifies the permissible land uses for the site of the proposed resource recovery facility. In the process of updating its comprehensive plan, the County will adopt a future land use map. The Chief Planner for the Pasco County Planning Department testified that the land use map to be submitted for future adoption will designate the proposed site as a resource recovery site. The County's comprehensive plan contains a solid waste and resource recovery element. The plan recognizes waste disposal as a crucial concern, and the goal of this element is to dispose of the County's domestic and industrial waste in the safest and least expensive manner. From an engineering perspective, the project will be designed to comply with applicable state and federal requirements pertaining to air and water pollution. The economic feasibility of a resource recovery facility has been studied, with positive results. Other elements of the Pasco County comprehensive plan relevant to the proposed resource recovery facility include the traffic circulation element, the water element, the conservation/coastal zone protection element, the drainage element and the utilities element. A traffic analysis demonstrated that current levels of service on State Road 52 and on Hays Road will not be diminished as a result of project operations. The use of reclaimed water will promote the objective of water conservation. The proposed site has not been designated for preservation or conservation and the project will have minimal impact on wetland areas. The stormwater management system will be designed so that runoff will not be channelized into any natural surface water body. The retention basins will be of sufficient size to allow adequate settling of suspended solids collected with the stormwater. By producing electrical power as a by-product of solid waste disposal, the project will further the objective of the comprehensive plan's utility element of encouraging the conservation of limited resources in the operations of utility systems. On December 31, 1987, notice of the land use hearing was published in the Pasco Times newspaper, a daily newspaper of general circulation which has been continuously published at Port Richey in Pasco County, Florida, each day for a period in excess of one year preceding the publication of notice in this case. In addition, notice of the land use hearing was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 13, Number 53, on December 31, 1987. The Department of Environmental Regulation issued a news release concerning the land use hearing on December 24, 1987. By letters dated December 28, 1987, notice was given by certified mail to the Executive Director of the Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council, the Pasco County Planning Department and the Pasco County Zoning Administrator. Notice of the land use hearing was also posted at the project site. Eight persons, all of whom resided or owned property near the proposed site, testified at the land use hearing as members of the general public. All opposed the construction and operation of a resource recovery facility and landfill/ashfill at that site. Though none of the witnesses claimed to have expertise concerning the subject matter of their testimony, their concerns included the impacts of the proposed project upon the environment; the value and use of their land, homes and businesses; the recreational value of surrounding properties and the general agricultural character and nature of the surrounding land. Concerns were also expressed over the safety features and costs involved in the operation of the facility. These citizens of Pasco County did not believe it was proper for the County to exempt itself from the County's zoning laws and impact fees.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Siting Board, enter a Final Order finding that the use of the site chosen by Pasco County for the location of its proposed solid waste and resource recovery facility is consistent with and in compliance with the applicable land use plans and zoning ordinances. Respectfully submitted and entered this 25th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1988. APPENDIX "A" TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-5337 Pasco County's proposed findings of fact have been fully considered and are accepted and incorporated in this Recommended Order, with the following exceptions: 16, second sentence: Rejected as speculative. See Finding of Fact Number 10. 22, last sentence: Rejected as improper factual finding, but addressed in the Conclusions of Law. 23, last sentence: Rejected as argumentative and improper factual finding, but addressed in Conclusions of Law. COPIES FURNISHED: David S. Dee Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Richard T. Donelan, Jr. Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 C. Lawrence Keesey Rhyne Building 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Edward B. Helvenston 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34609-6899 Mike Twomey Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Bob Martinez Governor The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Bob Butterworth Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399
