The Issue Whether Respondent's registration as a general contractor should be suspended or revoked, or the respondent otherwise disciplined, for alleged violations of Sections 468.112 (2)(a), (2)(g), and (2)(h), Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Phillip H. Bare, Ocala, Florida, is registered with Respondent as a general contractor under the provisions of Chapter 468, Florida Statutes, and was so registered throughout the year of 1977. He operates under the name of American General Corporation of Florida, but that firm has not been qualified to engage in the contracting business in Florida, pursuant to Section 468.107, Florida Statutes. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 2, Stipulation, Testimony of Cherry) On August 15, 1977, Respondent, as president of American General Corporation of Florida, entered into a Home Improvement Installment Contract and Note with Joe Wheeler and wife, who reside at Route 2, Box 63, Live Oak, Florida. The contract provided that for a price of $4,250 Respondent would make the following property improvements on the Wheeler residence: Build 12 X 20 Room Addition and finish with paneling, ceiling tile, & all trim. Build 6 X 14 porch with top. Replace all Rotten sills. Replace all Rotten siding. Paint house with latex paint. Repair floor joist. The Wheelers made a down payment of $350 leaving an unpaid balance of $3,900. The promissory note provided for a total financed cost of $6,629.28 payable in monthly payments over a period of seven years. On August 29, 1977, the parties entered into another such contract for additional work to the residence for the price of $1,600 as follows: Install ceiling tile in (2) bed rooms and bathroom complete with trim. Install paneling in (2) bed rooms complete. Install paneling and tile board in bath. Remove old shingles and install new 235lb asphalt shingles. Install 54" kitchen sink complete and hook to water. The Wheelers paid $100 as a down payment on the work and financed the remainder with a total deferred price of $2,100 payable in 48 consecutive monthly installments. (Petitioner's Exhibits 5, 6, Testimony of E. Wheeler, J. Wheeler) Respondent subcontracted the work on the Wheeler residence to one John Compton. Respondent did not secure a Suwannee County Building Permit for the work, nor was he licensed in that county to act in the capacity of a contractor. (Testimony of Respondent, Wilson) On September 12, 1977, Mr. Wheeler signed a Customer's Completion Certificate" wherein he acknowledged that the contract work had been satisfactorily completed. Although Respondent testified that he explained the contents of the document to Wheeler at the time it was executed, Wheeler denied the same and testified that he had not read its contents prior to signing it. (Testimony of Respondent, J. Wheeler, Respondent's Exhibit 1) Prior to completion of the work, the Wheelers noted that certain deficiencies in the work existed, including a floor that "shaked" in the new addition, looseness of wall paneling, failure to replace rotten siding and lower sills, and failure to install ceiling tile in one bedroom. They spoke to workmen on the job who said that they would return and finish the work. However, nothing further was done in spite of the fact that Respondent told Mrs. Wheeler in a telephone conversation that he would be back to complete the job. As a result, Mrs. Wheeler made a complaint to Derl W. Wilson, the building official for Suwannee County. (Testimony of E. Wheeler, J. Wheeler, Wilson) Pursuant to Mrs. Wheeler's complaint, Wilson inspected the premises at some time during the month of September, 1977, and observed that the accomplished work was of a substandard nature involving various violations of the Southern Standard Building Code which had been adopted by Suwannee County in 1975. These violations, which Respondent acknowledged at the hearing to have been committed, included the following: concrete foundation blocks improperly aligned and unsupported by required concrete pad; improper spacing of floor joists at 24 inch rather required 16 inch intervals; use of one-ply instead of two-ply flooring material; failure to extend vent stack for plumbing system in kitchen to a height of 6 inches above the roof line; failure to provide a shutoff valve for cold water line under kitchen sink; failure to cover and protect splices in wiring of ceiling light fixture; failure to install ridge board for support of roof rafters; improperly installing two inch by four inch wood braces in attic; failure to connect sewer line to septic tank. Additionally, Wilson observed various instances of poor workmanship in installation of an electric wall receptacle and connection of the roof of the new addition to the existing building. Further, he noted that due to the improper spacing of floor joists, the substandard plywood flooring was not firm and constituted a safety hazard. (Testimony of Wilson, Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3) After his inspection, Wilson wrote a letter to Respondent, dated October 18, 1977, pointing out the deficiencies in construction and advising that a complaint would be filed against him unless a building permit was obtained within ten days and the necessary corrections of deficiencies were made. Although Wilson testified that he did not hear from Respondent as a result of the letter, Respondent made several telephone calls to Wilson's office and was informed that he was on vacation. (Testimony of Wilson, Respondent, Respondent's Exhibit 7) On June 14, 1978, Respondent entered a plea of guilty in the County Court of Suwannee County, Florida to a charge of improper construction arising out of the Wheeler contract, and the Court withheld adjudication of guilt in the matter. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9) Respondent was previously convicted in the County Court of Putnam County, Florida, on August 13, 1974 of engaging in the business or acting in capacity of a contractor without being duly registered in the county pursuant to Section 468.105(2), Florida Statutes. On June 16, 1975, Respondent pleaded nolo contendere in the County Court of Alachua County, Florida to a charge arising out of his activities as a home improvement contractor. The Court withheld adjudication of guilt and placed the Respondent on probation for a period of six months and required that he "make necessary repairs to home of victim to satisfaction of Consumer Protection Section of State Attorney's Office, Eighth Judicial Circuit." (Petitioner's Exhibits 7-9) Petitioner has been a building contractor for twelve years. He testified that his subcontractor for the Wheeler job had been competent in the past and he relied on this fact in not closely inspecting the work under the Wheeler contracts. For this reason, he was unaware that the building code violations had occurred until after he had sold the Wheeler contracts and mortgages to a third party who was contacted by the Wheelers regarding the deficiencies. Respondent denied that he abandoned the work because he thought it had been completed until subsequent notification of the Wheeler complaint. He has since made attempts through Counsel to resolve the complaint by having the work performed by a contractor licensed in Suwannee County or by means of a monetary settlement. He further testified that he had inquired of Petitioner's office as to the necessity for obtaining a Suwannee County license prior to commencing the Wheeler contracts and was informed that his registration was valid for work in that county. He acknowledged that he made a "mistake" in not obtaining a building permit and in failing to supervise his subcontractor properly, but stated that the licensing rules in the various counties were "confusing." As to his prior difficulties in Putnam and Alachua Counties, Respondent testified that the Alachua matter involved a complaint raised four or five years after construction regarding quality of workmanship and that he had taken care of the matter. As to the Putnam County case, he testified that he was unaware that a building permit was necessary at the time he did the work for which he was subsequently prosecuted. It is found that Respondent's exculpatory testimony regarding his failure to obtain a building permit or county licensing, and lack of knowledge of code violations with respect to the work performed at the Wheeler residence is not credible. (Testimony of Respondent, Respondent's Exhibits 2-6)
Recommendation That Respondent's registration as a general contractor be suspended for a period of one year and that an administrative penalty in the amount of $500 be imposed, for violation of Section 468.112(2)(a), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Barry Sinoff, Esquire 2400 Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32202 C. Valentine Bates, Esquire 726 NW 8th Avenue - Suite B Gainesville, Florida J. K. Linnan, Executive Director Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 8621
The Issue The issue to be determined by this Order is whether the Petition for Formal Proceedings filed with the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) on February 4, 2009, was timely 1/ and, if so, whether Petitioners have standing to challenge the DEP?s issuance of the Minor Modification to FDEP Operation Permit 171331-002-UO for IW-1 under 171331-003-UC (the Permit Modification).
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Conservation Alliance is a Florida not-for-profit corporation in good-standing, with its corporate offices currently located at 5608 Eagle Drive, Fort Pierce, Florida. The Conservation Alliance has approximately 200 members. Elaine Romano is a resident of St. Lucie County, Florida. The DEP is an agency of the State of Florida having jurisdiction for permitting UIC facilities and the waste-streams being discharged to such facilities, pursuant to chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. Pursuant to that authority, the DEP issued the Permit Modification that is the subject of this proceeding. FPUA provides utility service to the City of Fort Pierce, Florida. FPUA owns and operates a Class I industrial injection well (IW-1), discharges to which are the subject of the Permit Modification. Allied owns and operates a chlorine bleach manufacturing facility which produces a brine waste-stream that is proposed for disposal to IW-1. Issuance of the Permit Modification On December 19, 2008, the DEP issued a Notice of Permit, Permit Number 171331-002-UO (FPUA operation permit), which authorized the operation of IW-1 at the Gahn wastewater treatment plant. The Gahn wastewater treatment plant and IW-1 are owned and operated by the FPUA. The FPUA operation permit authorized the disposal of concentrate and water treatment by- product from FPUA?s reverse-osmosis water facility at a permitted rate of 2.8 million gallons per day. FPUA also owns and operates water production wells that serve the City of Fort Pierce potable water supply system. IW-1 was constructed within 500 feet of three of the FPUA production wells, which required FPUA to obtain a variance from setback requirements. On July 17, 2008, prior to the issuance of the FPUA operation permit, Allied submitted an application for a major modification of the FPUA operation permit. The application proposed the disposal to IW-1 of up to 21,600 gallons per day of a brine waste-stream that is a by-product of the production of chlorine bleach. The application cover letter provides that “[w]hile we have been notified that this project is only a Minor Permit Modification, we feel by submitting for a Major Permit Modification that the Department will have the ability to review the application and downgrade the application to a Minor Permit Modification, if needed.” On December 30, 2008, the DEP issued the Permit Modification as a minor modification of the FPUA operation permit. The Permit Modification allowed a maximum of 21,600 gallons of brine to be received at the FPUA facility and disposed of in IW-1. Notice of the Permit Modification On or about September 12, 2008, a paralegal for Ruden McClosky, Lucinda Sparkman, requested information from the DEP regarding the procedure for receiving notification of permit applications and DEP action thereon. Her request was subsequently refined to request notice regarding two permits, those being “injection Well Construction, application #171331- 003,” and the other being “Water-Industrial Wastewater, application #FLA017460-004.” DEP File No. 171331-003 is that pertaining to the Permit Modification. At the time of the request, Ruden McClosky represented Odyssey Manufacturing Company (Odyssey), an economic competitor of Allied.3/ On September 24, 2008, Ms. Sparkman asked to be “put on the distribution list for the URIC permit for Fort Pierce.” From September 24, 2008 through December 15, 2008, Ms. Sparkman made periodic requests for information, and received periodic updates from the DEP. On December 19, 2008, the DEP sent Ms. Sparkman an e- mail indicating that the FPUA operation permit had been issued, and later that same day sent Ms. Sparkman an electronic copy of the permit. On December 19, 2008, Ruden McClosky made a public records request to FPUA for, among other items, records pertaining to the disposal of brine to the Gahn Water Plant underground injection well, and any agreements between FPUA and Allied regarding the disposal of brine. The request was made on behalf of Florida Tire Recycling, Inc. (Florida Tire). On December 22, the DEP sent Ms. Sparkman a copy of the notice of intent for the FPUA operation permit. There is no record evidence of further communication or inquiry between Ruden McClosky and the DEP from December 22, 2008 to January 14, 2009. On January 9, 2009, notice of the Permit Modification was published in the Fort Pierce Tribune. The notice was prepared and publication arranged by counsel for Allied. The published notice provides the information required by rule 62-110.106(7)(d), and stated that any challenge to the Permit Modification was required to be received by DEP within 14 days of publication or, for persons that requested actual notice, within 14 days of receipt of such actual notice. On January 14, 2009, Ms. Sparkman called her contact person at the DEP to inquire about the Permit Modification. That call was not returned. On January 21, 2009, Ms. Sparkman again called the DEP to inquire about the Permit Modification. In response to Ms. Sparkman?s inquiry, the DEP sent Ms. Sparkman an electronic copy of the Permit Modification. Ms. Sparkman made further inquiry on January 21, 2009, as to whether the notice of the Permit Modification had been published in a newspaper. On January 22, 2009, the DEP replied that “[e]verything was noticed as required.” On January 22, 2009, the Fort Pierce Tribune prepared an affidavit of publication of the notice. The affidavit of publication was received by counsel for Allied on January 28, 2009, who sent the affidavit to the DEP by certified mail on January 29, 2009. Alleged Defects in the Notice of Permit Modification Petitioners have alleged a number of procedural defects that they contend render the published notice ineffective to establish a deadline of 14 days from the date of the notice to file a challenge to the Permit Modification. Late Proof of Publication Petitioners allege that Allied filed the proof of publication with the DEP more than seven days from the date of publication, and that delay made such publication ineffective to establish a deadline for filing the petition. Although the proof of publication was provided to the DEP on or shortly after January 29, 2009, the evidence demonstrates that Allied provided the proof of publication to the DEP immediately upon receipt from the Fort Pierce Tribune newspaper. The delay in filing was not within the control of Allied, or anyone else associated with the Permit Modification. As established by rule 62-110.106(9), proof of publication is required by the DEP to provide assurance to the DEP that required notice has, in fact, been published, with the sanction being the delay or denial of the permit. The rule does not suggest that a delay in providing proof of publication to the DEP serves to alter or extend the time for filing a petition. There is little case law construing the effect of a delay in providing proof of publication on the petition rights of a person challenging the proposed agency action. However, the undersigned agrees with, and adopts, the following analysis of the issue provided by Administrative Law Judge P. Michael Ruff: . . . the purpose of requiring an applicant to publish notice of agency action is to give substantially affected persons an opportunity to participate in an administrative proceeding. See Section 403.815, Florida Statutes, and Rule 17- 103.150(4), Florida Administrative Code. Consequently, the crucial element in the Department's publication requirement is that the notice be published to trigger the commencement of the time for affected persons to request a hearing. The requirement that proof of publication be provided to the Department does nothing to affect the rights of third parties, but merely is a technical requirement which allows the Department to determine whether a third party has timely exercised its rights to contest a published notice of intended agency action. If an applicant publishes notice of intended agency action, but fails to timely provide the Department with proof of that publication, the deficiency is one which is easily cured. No harm will occur because the permit will not be issued until proof of publication is received by the Department, in any event, because of Rule 17-103.510(4), Florida Administrative Code. Bio-Tech Tracking Systems, Inc. v. Dep?t of Envtl. Reg., Case No. 90-7760, ¶32 (Fla. DOAH Apr. 3, 1991; Fla. DER May 17, 1991). The filing of the notice beyond the seven-day period in rule 62-110.106(5) was, at most, harmless error, did not adversely affect any rights or remedies available to Petitioners, and does not affect the fairness of this proceeding. Notice Prepared by Counsel Petitioners allege that the notice was prepared by Allied?s counsel, rather than the DEP, and that the notice was therefore ineffective to establish a deadline for filing the petition. Publication of the notice of the Permit Modification was not required, since it was a minor modification. Thus, publication was at Allied?s option. Rule 62-110.106(10)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that: Any applicant or person benefiting from the Department?s action may elect to publish notice of the Department?s intended or proposed action . . . in the manner provided by subsection (7) or (8) above. Upon presentation of proof of publication to the Department before final agency action, any person who has elected to publish such notice shall be entitled to the same benefits under this rule as a person who is required to publish notice. The most logical construction of rule 62-110.106 is that the DEP is responsible for preparing required notices pursuant to rule 62-110.106(7)(c), but that non-required notices may be prepared and published at the applicant?s or beneficiary?s option without direct DEP involvement. In this case, the notice was prepared by an authorized agent of the corporate “person” that benefitted from the Permit Modification. The more salient point regarding the preparation of the notice is whether it contained all of the information required by rule. The evidence demonstrates that it did, and that the notice was sufficient to provide a meaningful and complete point of entry to the public of the Permit Modification and the rights attendant thereto. The fact that the notice was prepared by Allied?s counsel was, at most, harmless error, did not adversely affect any rights or remedies available to Petitioners, and does not affect the fairness of this proceeding. Lack of Actual Notice Petitioners allege error in the notice process because actual notice of the Permit Modification was not provided to Petitioners. The basis for the alleged deficiency was that Mr. Stinnette had, in 2003, asked to be placed on the DEP?s UIC mailing list, but did not receive the notice of the Permit Modification. Rule 62-110.106(2) provides that published notice establishes the point of entry for the public to challenge proposed agency action “except for persons entitled to written notice personally or by mail under Section 120.60(3), Florida Statutes, or any other statute.” Section 120.60(3) provides that a notice of proposed agency action shall be mailed “to each person who has made a written request for notice of agency action.” The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Stinnette was acting solely as an agent of Indian Riverkeeper when he requested to be placed on the UIC mailing list. He was not requesting notices in his personal capacity, or as an agent of the Conservation Alliance or Ms. Romano. Thus, Indian Riverkeeper was entitled to notice of the Permit Modification. Indian Riverkeeper is not a party to this proceeding. The undersigned is not willing to attribute a request for actual notice to any person other than the person requesting such notice. The DEP?s failure to provide written notice of the Permit Modification to Indian Riverkeeper did not adversely affect any rights or remedies available to the Conservation Alliance or Ms. Romano, and does not affect the fairness of this proceeding. Lack of Information Pursuant to Rule 62-528.315(7) Finally, Petitioners argue that the published notice was ineffective because it did not include the name, address, and telephone number of a DEP contact person, citing rule 62- 528.315(7)(d). The provision cited by Petitioners involves DEP notices that are required when the DEP has prepared a draft permit, draft consent order, or has scheduled a public meeting as identified in rule 62-528.315(1). The notice requirement in rule 62-528.315(7) does not apply to a notice of proposed agency action, which is governed by rule 62-528.315(10), and which provides that: “[a]fter the conclusion of the public comment period described in Rule 62-528.321, F.A.C., and after the conclusion of a public meeting (if any) described in Rule 62- 528.325, F.A.C., the applicant shall publish public notice of the proposed agency action including the availability of an administrative hearing under Sections 120.569 and 120.57, F.S. This public notice shall follow the procedure described in subsection 62-110.106(7), F.A.C. (emphasis added). The published notice of the Permit Modification was consistent with the notice described in rule 62-110.106(7), and therefore complied with rule 62-528.315(10). For the reasons set forth herein, there were no defects in the published notice of proposed agency action that serve to minimize the effect of that published notice on the time for filing a petition challenging the Permit Modification, that adversely affect any rights or remedies available to the Conservation Alliance or Ms. Romano, or that affect the fairness of this proceeding. Representation of Petitioners by Ruden McClosky Petitioners were not represented by Ruden McClosky at the time Ruden McClosky requested actual notice of any DEP agency action regarding FPUA. Petitioners were not represented by Ruden McClosky at the time Ruden McClosky requested actual notice of any DEP agency action regarding Allied. The parties stipulated that an attorney-client relationship was formed between the Petitioners and Ruden McClosky on or after January 1, 2009. No further specificity was stipulated. On February 3, 2009, Ruden McClosky sent an engagement letter to the Conservation Alliance regarding governmental and administrative challenges to the Permit Modification. The engagement was accepted by Mr. Stinnette on behalf of the Conservation Alliance on February 4, 2009. The Petition for Formal Proceedings, which named the Conservation Alliance as a party, was filed with the DEP on February 4, 2009. On February 10, 2009, Ruden McClosky sent an engagement letter to Ms. Romano regarding governmental and administrative challenges to the Permit Modification. There is no evidence that the engagement was accepted by Ms. Romano. Ms. Romano testified that she has never spoken or corresponded with anyone from Ruden McClosky, and had no knowledge that she was being represented by Ruden McClosky. Ms. Romano had no input in drafting any of the petitions filed on her behalf, and had no recollection of having ever read the petitions. The Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings, which named Ms. Romano as a party, was filed with the DEP on February 12, 2009. Both of the Ruden McClosky engagement letters reference an “Other Client” that had an interest in challenging the Permit Modification, which “Other Client” would be responsible for paying all fees and costs, and would be involved in the approval of all work performed by Ruden McClosky. The parties stipulated that the “Other Client” was Odyssey. The date of an engagement letter is not dispositive as to the date on which an attorney-client relationship is established. It is, however, evidence that can be assessed with other evidence to draw a conclusion as to the date that the relationship commenced. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that requests for notice made prior to January 21, 2009, regarding the FPUA operation permit and the Permit Modification that is the subject of this proceeding were made on behalf of Odyssey or Florida Tire, existing clients of Ruden McClosky. The preponderance of the evidence leads the undersigned to find that Ruden McCloskey commenced its representation of the Conservation Alliance with regard to the instant case no earlier than January 21, 2009, the date on which Ruden McClosky received notice that the Permit Modification had been issued. The preponderance of the evidence leads the undersigned to find that Ruden McCloskey commenced its representation of Ms. Romano with regard to the instant case after January 21, 2009, if at all. Filing of the Petitions The 14th day after publication of the notice of the Permit Modification fell on January 23, 2009. On February 4, 2009, the initial Petition for Formal Proceedings was filed challenging the DEP issuance of the Permit Modification. The Petition named the Conservation Alliance as a party. On February 12, 2009, an Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings was filed that, among other things, added Ms. Romano as a party. Allegations of Standing - Conservation Alliance The Conservation Alliance is a non-profit, Florida corporation incorporated in 1985. It has at least 100 members that reside in St. Lucie County. It was formed for the general purpose of protecting the “water, soil, air, native flora and fauna,” and thus the environment of St. Lucie County. In the Petition for Formal Proceedings, as it has been amended, the Conservation Alliance made specific allegations as to how the issuance of the Permit Modification may affect its substantial interests. Those allegations are related, first, to the effect of the Permit Modification on the FPUA public water supply that serves members of the Conservation Alliance and, second, to the effect of the Permit Modification on the ability of the members to recreate and enjoy the waters of St. Lucie County. FPUA Water Service In its Second Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings, the Conservation Alliance alleged that “[m]embers of the Alliance own real property or otherwise reside within the service area of FPUA, and are, in fact, serviced by FPUA.” As a result, the members “will be adversely affected by the injection of the Allied waste stream into IW-1, which is located within 500 feet of three potable water supply sources, from which . . . Romano and the Alliance?s members are provided with potable water,” resulting in “a potential for those contaminants and hazardous materials to get into Petitioners? source of potable water.” Mr. Brady, the Conservation Alliance?s president, does not receive water service from the FPUA. Mr. Brady did not know how many members of the Conservation Alliance received water service from the FPUA. Persons living in unincorporated areas of Fort Pierce do not receive potable water from the FPUA. A mailing address of “Fort Pierce” does not mean that the person lives in the incorporated City of Fort Pierce. Mr. Brady “assumed” many of the members lived in the City of Fort Pierce, but offered no admissible, non-hearsay evidence of any kind to support that assumption. Mr. Stinnette testified that he was “confident that we have members that receive water from [FPUA]” but was not able to quantify the number of said members. As with Mr. Brady, Mr. Stinnette offered no admissible, non-hearsay evidence of any kind to support his belief. Recreational and Environmental Interests In its Second Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings, the Conservation Alliance alleged that “. . . Romano and the Alliance?s members utilize and protect the waters of St. Lucie County. Petitioners? recreational and environmental interests will be adversely affected if the Allied waste stream leaves the injection well area and flows into the rivers, streams, and or ocean.” Mr. Brady understood that one member of the Conservation Alliance, George Jones, fished in the C-24 canal, although Mr. Brady had not personally fished there for 25 years. Mr. Brady otherwise provided no evidence of the extent to which members used or enjoyed the waters in or around St. Lucie County. Mr. Stinnette has recreated in various water bodies that are tributaries of the Indian River Lagoon system. He indicated that he had engaged in recreational activities in and on the waters of St. Lucie County with “dozens” of people over the past 16 years, some of whom were members of the Conservation Alliance. There was no evidence offered as to how many of those persons were members of the Conservation Alliance, as opposed to members of other organizations or of no organization at all, or whether they were current members during the period relevant to this proceeding. Mr. Stinnette testified that the previously mentioned Mr. Jones said that he kayaked in the waters of St. Lucie County but, as to the recreational activities of other members, testified that “I don't know, I don't keep up with their day-to-day activities to that extent.” Although Mr. Jones testified at the hearing, he provided no information as to the nature or extent of his recreational uses of the waters of St. Lucie County. The only evidence of Mr. Jones? use of the waters of St. Lucie County is hearsay. Thus, the only finding that can be made as to the recreational use of the waters of St. Lucie County by current members of the Conservation Alliance is limited to the recreational use by a single member, Mr. Stinnette. Petitioner, Elaine Romano Ms. Romano is a member of the Conservation Alliance. The allegations regarding Ms. Romano?s substantial interests in this proceeding were the same as those of the Conservation Alliance as set forth above. FPUA Water Service Ms. Romano has her primary residence at 3436 Roselawn Boulevard, Fort Pierce, Florida. Her residence is not served by FPUA. Ms. Romano is the executor of the estate of her mother, Marion Scherer. The estate owns a residence at 1903 Royal Palm Drive, Fort Pierce, Florida that is currently vacant. That residence is served by FPUA. The estate is not a party to this proceeding. Recreational and Environmental Interests Ms. Romano attends certain meetings and functions of the Conservation Alliance, but offered no testimony of her use or enjoyment of any natural resources that could be affected by the Permit Modification. In that regard, her interest in this case was precipitated by a desire to support her mother?s interest in ecology.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection, enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Formal Proceeding as amended. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2013.
The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for a variance to permit an onsite treatment and disposal system should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The lot of land for which the Bank seeks a variance for an onsite sewage treatment and disposal system is located at 341 Compass Lake Drive in Jackson County, Florida. The lot is approximately 40 feet wide and 300 feet deep, with approximately 40 feet of frontage on Compass Lake. Prior to its severance in 2010, the lot was part of a larger parcel of land with an address of 343 Compass Drive in Jackson County. The larger parcel was owned by Charles Paulk and had substantial improvements consisting of a house, boathouse, and dock. In 2004, Mr. Paulk borrowed money from the Bank and gave the Bank a mortgage lien on the entire larger parcel to secure the loan. At some point, a survey was prepared which subdivided the larger parcel into two lots -- the first containing the substantial improvements, and the other consisting of the approximately 40-foot by 300-foot lot at issue, which is .28 acres in size, with no improvements. There is no indication that the survey was ever recorded in the public records. Later, in 2010, Mr. Paulk decided to sell the lot with the substantial improvements for $330,000. Because the Bank had a lien on the entire larger parcel, Mr. Paulk requested that the Bank release its lien on the lot with the substantial improvements. The Bank agreed to release its lien on the lot with substantial improvements and, after receiving what the Bank felt was a “sufficient pay-down” on the loan, shifted its lien to the smaller, unimproved lot that is at issue in this case. The sale and release of lien transaction “substantially reduced the loan versus the collateral value” that the Bank previously had. According to the Bank’s Senior Vice President, James Goodson, after the sale transaction, there was “not a lot of money left on the loan ” Mr. Goodson testified that, at the time that the Bank agreed to release its lien on the substantially improved lot and shift its lien to the remaining unimproved lot, it was unaware that a variance would be required for an onsite sewage treatment and disposal system (septic tank) on the unimproved lot. The facts as outlined above, however, demonstrate that the Bank was an active participant and beneficiary of the transaction that ultimately resulted in the creation of the two lots, one of which was the approximately 40-foot by 300-foot unimproved lot at issue in this case. In 2012, Mr. Paulk experienced financial problems and was having difficulty paying back the loan to the Bank secured by the unimproved lot. Because it was easier than foreclosure, the Bank agreed to take a deed to the unimproved lot in lieu of foreclosure.1/ At the time of the Bank’s release of lien in 2010, as well as at the time of the deed in lieu of foreclosure, the 40- foot by 300-foot lot size of the unimproved lot was too small to meet the statutory requirements for a septic permit. Mr. Goodson testified that, at the time that the Bank accepted the deed in lieu of foreclosure, the Bank was aware that the lot was too small and would need a variance for a septic tank. He did not explain, however, why the Bank had earlier been unaware of the need for a variance when it agreed to release its lien on the substantially improved lot in 2010. After the Bank acquired title to the unimproved lot, a third party offered to purchase it on the condition that the Bank could obtain a permit. The Bank went to Jackson County to request a permit, knowing that its request would be denied because the lot size was insufficient for a septic tank without a variance. Nevertheless, the Bank believed that it would qualify for a variance on hardship grounds because it did not “intentionally” create the hardship. The Bank commenced the permitting process by submitting an application with the Jackson County Health Department on October 4, 2012. The County denied the application on the grounds that the lot was deficient in width and total area. Next, the Bank submitted a request to the Department for a variance. The request was considered by the Department’s Variance Review and Advisory Committee (Committee) on December 6, 2012. The Committee has only recommending authority to the State Health Officer. In a four to three vote, the Committee recommended approval of a variance. The members voting against a recommendation for approval were representatives of the State Health Office, the Department of Environmental Protection, and the County Health Department. Eight objections from adjacent property owners were provided to the Committee’s review and consideration. After considering the facts, including the decision of the County Health Department, objections filed by adjacent property owners, actions taken by the Bank, and the recommendations of all the members of the Committee, Gerald Briggs, Bureau Chief for Onsite Sewage Programs for the Department of Health, made the Department’s preliminary decision that the Bank’s variance request should be denied, concluding, among other things, that “[a]ny perceived hardship that [the Bank] might experience as a result of the obligation to meet established standards comes about as a direct result of your own proposed action.” Likewise, considering the facts and evidence as presented in this case, the undersigned finds, as a matter of fact, that the Bank intentionally participated in and benefitted from the transaction that resulted in the hardship posed by the small lot size that it now owns and for which it seeks a variance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a Final Order denying SunSouth Bank’s application for a variance. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2014.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Falconer is authorized to keep finger piers, a wooden deck and an enclosed walkway, which were constructed without permits within the landward extent of Elligraw Bayou, a Class 3 waterbody located in Sarasota County, upon the payment of a $3600 penalty. Specifically, the issue is whether the piers, deck and covered walkway, as built, would have been permitted by the Department if properly applied for, and whether Falconer has provided reasonable assurances that these structures, and the alteration of mangroves in connection therewith, will not violate state water quality standards, and will not be contrary to the public interest as provided in Section 403.918(2), Florida Statutes. POSITION OF PARTIES This controversy between the parties arises out of the entry of a Consent Order between the Department and Falconer, to which the County objects. It is the County's position that the Department abused its discretion by attempting to authorize unpermitted activities without requiring compliance with permitting criteria and standards. Specifically, the County contends that Falconer has failed to provide, and the Department has not required, reasonable assurances based on plans, test results or other information that the structures in or over Elligraw Bayou, as well as Falconer's alteration of mangroves, will not violate state water quality standards, and will not be contrary to the public interest. The Department and Falconer contend this is strictly an enforcement case which settles claims of violations the Department had against Falconer, and that this is not a case involving a permit application. The Department urges that it exercised prosecutorial discretion in the procedure that it followed in settling this enforcement matter.
Findings Of Fact The following findings of fact are based upon the stipulation of the parties: The Department is the administrative agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to protect Florida's air and water resources, and to administer and enforce Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and the regulations promulgated thereunder contained in Chapter 17, Florida Administrative Code. Falconer is the record owner of real property at the northwest corner of the intersection of Southpointe Drive and U.S. Highway 41 in Sarasota County, being in Section 21, Township 37 South, Range 18 East. Sarasota County is a chartered political subdivision of the State of Florida with all powers provided by law. Sarasota County has standing to bring this action. In May of 1963, Sarasota County acquired from Falconer's predecessor in title a perpetual nonexclusive easement over certain lands upon the property described in Finding of Fact 2. In July of 1973, Falconer acquired title to the property described in Finding of Fact 2, subject to the easement described in Finding of Fact 4. Falconer's property is located within the landward extent of Elligraw Bayou, which is a Class 3 state water as defined in the Florida Administrative Code, but the water does not bear the designation of Outstanding Florida Water as defined in the Florida Administrative Code. Unless exempt, a permit from the Department is required to dredge or fill within the landward extent of Elligraw Bayou, pursuant to applicable law and rules. Falconer received Permit No. DF58-32115-3E, dated March 3, 1981, to construct a commercial floating dock covering approximately 1,856 square feet on Elligraw Bayou. He did not build the floating dock to the size and configuration approved in the permit described in Finding of Fact 7. Falconer caused or allowed the installation of twelve stationary finger piers and one wooden deck within the landward extent of Elligraw Bayou between June 1981 and November 1982. However, he did not have a permit from the Department to construct these twelve finger piers and the wooden deck within the landward extent of state waters and Elligraw Bayou. Falconer caused or allowed the construction of an enclosed walkway over a drainage easement within the landward extent of Elligraw Bayou, and parts of the poured cement base foundation of the walkway are also within the landward extent of Elligraw Bayou. The cement was poured around the base of two mangroves, and a total of four mangroves were altered during construction. He did not have a permit from the Department for any dredging and/or filling within the landward extent of Elligraw Bayou in connection with the construction of the enclosed walkway described in Finding of Fact 11. Falconer did not have a permit to alter mangroves. The Department did not require, and Falconer did not submit any plans, test results or other information regarding the impact of the twelve finger piers, wooden deck, the enclosed walkway or the altered mangroves upon the water quality of Elligraw Bayou. Additionally, the Department did not require, and Falconer did not submit a hydrographic study demonstrating the flow of water within Elligraw Bayou, predicting the effect of dredging and/or filling on the flow of water, or predicting areas of erosion or shoaling. On June 3, 1986, the Department and Falconer entered into a Consent Order regarding the unpermitted activities described in Findings of Fact 8 through 13, above. The County timely filed a Petition for Formal Hearing challenging the entry of the above-referenced Consent Order. Respondent Falconer has complied with the requirements of the Consent Order. The County did not file a petition challenging the original Department permit referred to in Finding of Fact 7. The following findings of fact are based upon the evidence presented at hearing, as well as the demeanor and credibility of witnesses: On February 5, 1986, Eva Bailey of the Department's enforcement section inspected Falconer's property, and she again inspected the site on November 12, 1986. Regarding the finger piers, Bailey observed that there had been no adverse impact on the littoral zone, and no water quality or other environmental damage as a result of their construction. She similarly found that alteration of mangroves during the construction process did not result in any observed environmental damage. Only the columns associated with the walkway encroach upon the Department's jurisdiction, and Bailey found no significant adverse impact on the littoral zone resulting from the walkway construction. In fact, she found that the walkway support columns are providing a habitat for water species. According to Bailey, there has been no shoaling or erosion as a result of Falconer's construction, there has been no adverse affect on fish or wildlife, navigation has not been impeded, and there has been no damage to the public health, safety or welfare. Bailey recommended that the Department enter into an agreement with Falconer after discussing the matter with James R. Brice, a supervisor with the Department at the time. He had inspected the area in April 1985, and concluded that it was permittable. Brice confirmed Bailey's testimony that Falconer's construction has not resulted in erosion, shoaling, damage to the public health, safety or welfare, damage to fish or wildlife, a degradation of water quality, or any impairment to navigation. At the time of his inspection in April 1985, Brice referred the matter to the enforcement section because the walkway footings had been built in state waters without a permit. Neither a violation warning notice, or a formal notice of violation, were ever issued by the Department to Falconer regarding this construction, according to Craig McArthur, Bailey's supervisor in early 1986 when she conducted her inspection and recommended the issuance of the Consent Order. Thus, enforcement proceedings were never formally initiated by the Department against Falconer. Rather, Brice visited the site in April 1985 in response to complaints, and requested the inspection which Bailey conducted in February 1986. Since both Bailey and Brice found conditions which lead the Department to conclude that the construction was permittable, an agreement with Falconer was pursued by the Department which then lead to the Consent Order. Under the terms of the Consent Order, Falconer would be authorized to retain the finger piers and walkway without any modifications, in return for payment of $3600. McArthur testified that the permittability of construction is an essential factor in, and precondition for, any Consent Order which does not require modifications. Falconer's property is located at the enclosed end of Elligraw Bayou. A restaurant, shopping area, and spaces for associated parking are located on the upland portion of the property. Falconer has leased the finger piers, as well as the area surrounding certain floating docks not at issue in this case, to a sailboat sales company for use as a marina. There are no fuel facilities for boats and live-aboard boats are not permitted on the leased premises. Due to the controversy and uncertainty concerning the continued use of the finger piers, the sailboat sales company will not renew its current lease, but Falconer testified he intends to lease the facility to another sailboat sales company. The cost to construct the finger piers was approximately $11,000, and construction costs associated with the enclosed walkway were approximately $75,000. The walkway connects the restaurant with the piers, floating docks and parking area, and was constructed, in part, over the County's drainage easement pursuant to County building permit 114-U in late 1984 and early 1985. Elligraw Bayou was deeply dredged by the County in 1979. Its banks are vertical without any natural sloping. It serves as the receiving body for a 660 acre drainage basin for water flowing from highway culverts and upland drainage ditches. The water in the Bayou is murky and one cannot see the bottom due to runoff from U.S. 41 and surrounding uplands which flows into Elligraw Bayou through an open drainage ditch. During a ten year storm event, 150 to 160 cubic feet per second of runoff would be expected to flow into the Bayou. According to Charles Goode, Sarasota County Engineer and Director of Transportation, the covered walkway which Falconer has constructed will inhibit the County's future maintenance dredging of Elligraw Bayou and the drainage ditch leading to the Bayou. The use of a drag-line for maintenance dredging of the Bayou will no longer be possible, as it was in 1979. Regular maintenance of drainage ditches is essential to maintain the natural flow of runoff and prevent upland flooding. The County will no longer be able to use track mounted equipment to maintain the ditch leading into Elligraw Bayou, but other, more labor intensive, methods are available. The County does not regularly maintain this ditch. Manatees have been sited in the general vicinity of Elligraw Bayou, although there is no evidence of any sitings in the Bayou itself. In approximately 1982, the Department required Falconer to place signs in the Bayou to warn boaters about manatees, and Falconer complied. The manatee is an endangered species and is attracted to fresh water, such as exists in the Bayou. Increased motor boat traffic is a danger to manatees, but there is no evidence of any increase in such traffic due to Falconer's construction. The Director of Natural Resources Management for Sarasota County, Jack Merriam, testified that he has not heard of any reports of navigation problems in Elligraw Bayou, or seen any evidence of accidents since Falconer completed the construction here at issue, despite the fact that there is only a thirty foot width available for navigation in the Bayou at one point. However, as an expert in the impact on navigation of coastal structures, Merriam testified that a thirty foot area would not be a safe area in which to navigate under certain conditions, and that the finger piers present significant-navigational problems. No study has been made of boating traffic in Elligraw Bayou, however, to determine if unsafe conditions actually exist in this Bayou. Falconer cooperated fully with the Department throughout these proceedings in seeking its authorization for the construction here at issue.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department issue a Final Order approving the Consent Order which it has previously executed with Ronald W. Falconer. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd of January 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January 1987. APPENDIX (DOAH Case No. 86-2462) Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact filed by Sarasota County: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 5 Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11, 24. 13-14 Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Rejected since this is a conclusion of law. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 15 Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. 21-22 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. Rejected as irrelevant and otherwise addressed in Finding of Fact 22. 25-34 Adopted in Findings of Fact 14, 21 but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 35 Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. 36-37 Rejected as irrelevant and otherwise simply a summation of testimony. 35 Adopted in Finding of Fact 7, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 41-43 Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. 44-46 Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. 47 Adopted in Finding of Fact 25 but otherwise rejected as cumulative and not based on competent substantial evidence. 45-50 Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. 51-56 Adopted in Finding of Fact 27, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact filed on behalf of the Department of Environmental Regulation: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7-9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 10-13. Adopted in Findings of Fact 14, 15. 5 Adopted in Findings of Fact 16-19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. 11-12 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Findings of Fact 20, 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. 16-17 Adopted in Finding of Fact 27, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Findings of Fact 20, 21, 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Findings of Fact 20-22. Adopted in Findings of Fact 22, 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Findings of Fact 23, 27. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact filed on behalf of Ronald W. Falconer: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2, 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 11, 24, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 12-13 Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 29, but otherwise rejected as Irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 14-16, but otherwise rejected in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Findings of Fact 14-16. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15, 20-22, 29. 15-20 Adopted in Findings of Fact 20, 21. Adopted in Findings of Fact 20, 21, 25. Adopted in Findings of Fact 20, 21. Adopted in Findings of Fact 20, 21, 25. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 24, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. 27-25 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 29-31 Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 23, 25, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Wallace L. Storey, Esquire David M. Levin, Esquire P. O. Box 5 Sarasota, FL 33575 David K. Thulman, Esquire Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 William M. Hereford, Esquire 1299 South Tamiami Trail, #1233 Sarasota, FL 33579 Dale Twachtmann Secretary Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Bay North Corporation should be issued a permit to construct a domestic wastewater treatment and disposal system at Camp Weed, Franklin County, Florida, pursuant to Chapter 403, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On February 27, 1978, Lomax Smith, a builder and developer in Tallahassee, Florida, entered into an agreement with the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Florida to purchase some 42 acres of real property and the improvements thereon known as "Camp Weed" which is located in Franklin County, Florida. The purchase price of the property was $725,000, with an earnest money deposit of $20,000, and closing of the transaction to be on or before July 1, 1978. At the time of purchase, eight dormitory and several accessory buildings were located on the property which utilized septic tanks for sewage disposal. An existing deep well is in the northwest portion of the property for a water supply. Smith proposed to develop the property by the sale of lots, remodel some of the existing buildings, and construct new housing units. He employed the engineering firm of Broward Davis and Associates, Inc., Tallahassee, Florida, to prepare the necessary design plans and a state environmental permit application for a proposed domestic wastewater treatment plant to be located on the site. (Testimony of L. Smith, N. Smith, Exhibits 12, 13) On September 6, 1978, Smith filed an application with Respondent Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) for a permit to construct the sewage treatment plant (STP) at Camp Weed. He signed the application as owner of the property although he had not closed the purchase transaction nor acquired legal title at that time. The application and supporting plans were reviewed in the Northwest District Office of the Department of Environmental Regulation after site investigation, and it was determined that construction of the facility would be in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. A construction permit was issued to Smith for the STP on October 10, 1978, subject to certain specified conditions attached to the permit. Notification of the permit issuance was not preceded by a notice of intent to grant the permit, nor were any third parties advised of its issuance. Petitioners St. Teresa Dock Association, Inc. (then St. Teresa Dock Association) and H.S. Oven first learned of the permit issuance when their counsel was informed by Smith's counsel on November 3, 1978, that the permit had been issued. Petitioners thereafter on November 17 filed a petition for hearing with DER. (Testimony of L. Smith, Huff, Exhibits 1, 4-5, 8) Camp Weed is bounded on the north by U.S. Highway 98 and on the south by the Gulf of Mexico. The planned site for the STP is in the northeast corner of the tract which is some twelve feet above mean sea level and approximately 950 feet from the shoreline. The elevation of the property on the northwestern side is about 24 feet and is five feet in the middle. The land slopes generally toward the middle area and drains in a southerly direction to the gulf. The subdivision of St. Teresa where Petitioners' members own summer homes is located immediately west of Camp Weed. The members of the St. Teresa Dock Association, Inc., and Petitioner Hamilton S. Oven use the beach and gulf waters for boating, fishing, and other recreational purposes. About a dozen shallow wells in the St. Teresa subdivision provide drinking water for the residents. They are located over 1700 feet southwest from the site of the proposed STP. There are two ponds north of the St. Teresa area adjacent to U.S. Highway 98. An artesian well is located in the gulf about 25 feet south of the Camp Weed property. (Testimony of Huff, N. Smith, Oven, Sensabaugh, Exhibits 2,7, 9-11, 22, 24) The proposed plant is designed to provide sewage treatment for 132 housing units containing an estimated population of 3 persons per unit. A gravity flow collection system to a pumping station will produce a peak influent rate of 29,700 gallons per day with an estimated biological oxygen demand (BOD) loading of 49.6 pounds per day. A basket strainer on the influent line will remove trash. Plant operation will involve the use of aeration tanks, clarifier, chlorination, sand filter and clear well for discharge to a percolation pond. A polishing pond was originally planned, but was deleted at the suggestion of the DER because it performs the same function as the proposed sand filter. Two percolation ponds for alternate use will be construed so that the pond bottom is twelve feet above sea level. A soil test revealed that a sand layer extends under the shallow surface top soil to a depth of approximately 10 feet before reaching the shallow ground water table and that the effluent will percolate through the sand at the rate of one inch per minute. A five foot soil boring by DER failed to encounter ground water at that level and show that rate of percolation through the sand would be acceptable. The ground water table is subject to an unknown variance indepth during the wet and dry seasons of the year depending on the amount of rainfall. Although tide fluctuations may also have some effect on depth of the ground water table, the tide most likely will be of minimum influence due to the distance of the plant site from the gulf. Percolation of at least three feet through sand before reaching ground water is sufficient to meet DER policy requirements. (Testimony of Huff, N. Smith, Bishop, Exhibits 1, 3, 16-17). Based on the design of the STP, it is predicted by applicant's design engineer that there will be at least 90 percent removal of pollutants after chlorination and prior to passage of the effluent through the sand filter. The engineer predicts that after such filtration, there will be approximately 95 percent removal prior to percolation and that the effluent will then be pure enough to use as drinking water. Further purification will take place during the percolation process. The DER District Supervisor of Domestic Wastewater Permitting, who also is a professional engineer, substantially agrees with those predictions. Actual results of the treatment process can be determined, however, only after tests from monitoring wells are made during actual trial operations of the plant. It is further agreed by those experts that the average chlorine residual content in the effluent will be 0.5 parts per million. The DER supervisor therefore is of the opinion that, if the STP is properly operated, the processed effluent will not degrade ground waters, not adversely affect the wells in the St. Teresa Community or the waters of the gulf. After percolation, there is further dilution and ultimately the ground water which reaches the gulf in eight to ten days will be in a purer form than prior to introduction of the effluent. Although a twenty-year storm criterion was applied in the design of the percolation ponds, a catastrophic storm such as a hurricane was not taken into consideration since it would not be economically feasible to design for such an effect and, in any event, super dilution caused by such a storm would negate the possibility of water quality degradation. (Testimony of Huff, N. Smith, Exhibit 1) The buildup of sludge in the plant's holding tank will require removal about once a year when the plant is in full operation. The applicant will employ a certified individual to operate the plant and to remove sludge periodically to an appropriate place for disposal in an authorized manner. DER regards sludge disposal to be a matter for determination at the time application is made for an operating permit. (Testimony of Huff, L. Smith, McNeill, N. Smith, Exhibit 1) The applicant estimates that the construction of the plant and collection system will cost approximately $1,000 per housing unit for a total of $132,000. It is planned to recover this cost on the sale of lots. A condition of such purchases will be that the sewage system and treatment plant will be operated by a home owners association which is to be activated in the near future. Maintenance cost of the sewage plant will be shared by the individual members. Approximately twenty or twenty-five members are required for economical operation of the plant. (Testimony of N. Smith, L. Smith) The county zoning classification for the Camp Weed area is currently the subject of litigation by the applicant in the Franklin County Circuit Court and the result of that litigation as to permitted density of housing will determine the amount of units to be constructed by the applicant. In any event, if the applicant does not secure a county building permit, any DER construction permit would expire at the termination of the time granted therefor. (Testimony of L. Smith, Huff, Exhibit 24) At the time Intervenor Lomax Smith signed the permit application, Bay North Corporation had not been formed. It was incorporated in November, 1978, in order that Smith could obtain financing to complete the property purchase. The transaction was closed November 6, 1978, and a warranty deed to the property was issued to Bay North Corporation by the Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Florida, Inc. The deed was recorded in the public records of Franklin County on November 7, 1978. Lomax Smith is the president and principal stockholder of Bay North Corporation. Promissory notes secured by mortgages to the Southern Bank of Tallahassee and the Episcopal Diocese of Florida in the amounts of $350,000 and $362,500 respectively, were executed by Bay North Corporation on the same date. Pursuant to a request to DER from Lomax Smith on May 15, 1979, the Northwest District DER Office, on June 29, 1979, purported to transfer the permit to Bay North Corporation and extend the expiration date to September 30, 1980. (Testimony of L. Smith, Huff, Exhibits 6, 14-15, 21) The construction permit issued in October, 1978, was subject to standard and special conditions, including the requirement that the permit holder comply with county and municipal regulations prior to construction. They provided that monthly reports be furnished to the DER prior to issuance of an operation permit setting forth wastewater characteristics during a trial period of plant operation. They also required that the facility meet the treatment requirements contained in Chapter 17-3, F.A.C., including a 90 percent reduction in BOD and suspended solids based on concentration of the influent entering the plant. The conditions further provide that at the time of application for an operation permit, it must be shown that a certified operator under Chapter 17- 16, F.A.C., is retained, together with a copy of any contract for contract operation of the facility. Additionally, the conditions require that two monitoring wells be established upstream and downstream of the ponds and that quarterly ground water samples be analyzed and reported to DER. A further condition provides that a three-foot buffer zone must be maintained between the bottom of the percolation ponds and the maximum elevation of the ground water. (Exhibit 8)
Recommendation That the Department of Environmental Regulation issue the requested permit to Bay North Corporation, subject to the conditions attached to the permit issued on October 10, 1978. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of November, 1979. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: George E. Lewis, II, Esq. 316 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32303 William L. Hyde, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32301 Ben H. Wilkinson, Esq. Pennington, Wilkinson, Gary and Dunlap Post Office Box 3875 Tallahassee, FL 32303 Alfred O. Shuler, Esq. Post Office Box 850 Apalachicola, FL 32320
The Issue Whether petitioner should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reason alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Respondent acknowledges the accuracy of the allegations in the first seven paragraphs of the administrative complaint, including the allegation that he holds a certified residential contractor's license, No. CR C027268. He has been licensed in Florida continuously since October of 1983. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. On August 14, 1986, respondent Stratton, doing business as Stratton Construction Company, executed a written contract with Aaron Lee and Valerie Patrice Cobb to renovate their home at 5017 Pearl Street in Jacksonville, Florida. He had actually begun work nine days earlier. The contract contemplated installation of a pier under an unsupported sill end, replacement of 17 windows and two doors, hanging a screen door and a storm door, shortening and capping the chimney, adding a roof over the front stoop, reshingling the entire roof, painting the outside of the house, and putting hose bibbs in the front and the rear of the house. In addition, the contract called for extensive work inside the house, replacement of sheetrock, installation of insulation, congoleum, carpeting, paneling, cabinets, new kitchen and bedroom appliances, a new central heating system, and numerous other improvements and repairs. The contract price totalled $18,600, including $2,071 for a utility room. ("Remove back porch and drop flooring to allow enough height to construct 8 foot by 8 foot utility room ... inside walls unfinished ...") Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. Exclusive of plumbing, electrical, heating, and the utility room, the value of the repairs and renovations exceeded $200.00. As "Stratton Const." respondent contracted with Williams Plumbing Co., Inc. (Williams) on September 8, 1986, to re-pipe, install a working machine drain and furnish a water closet. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. Respondent or Williams on his behalf obtained a plumbing permit from the City of Jacksonville, No. 25997, at or about the time Williams began work, but Williams "left town" (T.43) before the project was inspected by the City. On October 2, 1986, respondent contracted with Wayne Conn Plumbing (Conn) to do additional plumbing work. In order to obtain a plumbing permit for the additional work, respondent cancelled the first permit. (T.34) The same day he signed the contract with Conn, respondent obtained a second plumbing permit, No. 28215. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Conn finished the plumbing work, and it passed inspection by the City. Earlier, on September 5, 1986, respondent or a subcontractor obtained a City permit authorizing electrical work at 5017 Pearl Street. On October 8, 1986, respondent or a subcontractor obtained a mechanical permit for the house's new heating system. In due course, the work authorized by these permits passed City inspections. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Before he began work on the Cobb's house, Mr. Stratton had only built new homes in Florida. He was unaware of any requirement to obtain a permit to effect repairs to the interior of a house other than those he did in fact obtain. He was aware, however, of the need to secure a building permit for construction of the utility room, involving, as it did, alterations to the foundation. Nevertheless, he only applied for this permit on June 11, 1987, long after the work had been completed, and after he had become embroiled in a dispute with the Cobbs. Jacksonville's Building Code, Part 4, makes it unlawful to begin work to contract, enlarge, alter, repair, move, remove or demolish a building or structure, or a part thereof ... without having first filed an application with and obtained a permit therefor from the Building official, except that, for general maintenance or repairs, not involving replacement of components specifically requiring permits, which do not change the occupancy or affect the electrical, plumbing or mechanical systems, the value of which does not exceed two hundred dollars ... no permit shall be required ... Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, p. 5. In beginning work without a permit to remove the back porch or to replace it with a utility room or to effect general repairs the value of which exceeded two hundred dollars, respondent violated applicable provisions of a local building code. The evidence suggested that the requirement that contractors obtain permits to effect general repairs with a value in excess of two hundred dollars is more honored in the breach than in the observance. In fact, respondent testified that somebody told him no permit is needed "if you don't change the size of the building," (T.46) i.e., alter the foundation. The Building Code also calls for mandatory inspections of foundations and framing as they are completed, but a building inspector testified that inspection of pre-formed concrete piers like those on which the utility room stands would have been foregone. Because the addition stood on (new) piers and because its interior walls remained unfinished, it was possible for the City to inspect both the foundation and the framing, even after the work was finished. John Carlton Sturdevant, a field inspector for Jacksonville's Building and Zoning Department, saw nothing wrong with the framing, nor was there evidence of any problem with the foundation.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Glenn Singer (Petitioner or Singer) is entitled to attorney's fees and costs from the Complainant/Respondent, Robert Nieman (Respondent or Nieman), pursuant to Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact On June 10, 2002, the Respondent executed a Complaint that was filed with the Ethics Commission against the Petitioner. At the time of the filing, the Respondent was on paid administrative leave or suspension from the Police Department of the Town of Golden Beach (Town). Nevertheless, the Respondent remained employed by the Town and at the time of hearing in this cause the Respondent was employed as a police sergeant. Immediately prior to filing the Complaint against the Petitioner the Respondent served as the interim police chief for the Town. At all times material to this case the Petitioner was a councilman serving on the Town’s governing council. As such, the Petitioner was subject to the ethics provisions governed by the Ethics Commission. The Petitioner and the Respondent have known one another since childhood. Prior to the incidents complained of herein the two had considered themselves cordial acquaintances. The Respondent’s Complaint itemized four concerns that he believed demonstrated violations of ethics provisions. The specifics of the Complaint are set forth in Petitioner’s Exhibit 1. In general, the Respondent believed that the Petitioner had used his position as a Town councilman to obtain a building permit at a lesser value than should have been reported. He based this assertion on information told to him by persons working within the Town who overheard comments made by the Petitioner and a building official. The Respondent believed that Linda Epperson, who has 20-plus years of experience in the construction business, had opined that the value of the work to be performed at the Petitioner’s home greatly exceeded the value set forth in the permit sought. Ms. Epperson’s comments regarding the permit issue were overheard by another Town employee, Rosemary Wascura. At hearing, Ms. Epperson denied making the comments. Ms. Epperson is still employed by the Town and would like to continue her employment until her retirement vests (another four years). Ms. Wascura (who is a personal friend of the Respondent’s) does not work for the Town any longer. Ms. Wascura’s testimony was credible and persuasive as to the incident regarding the conversation between the Petitioner and a building official. Although it is not concluded the Petitioner used his position to influence the building official and receive a reduced permit cost, it is found that the factual information upon which the Respondent relied in making such assertion was grounded in an eyewitness account of an incident and not mere speculation. The second allegation of the Complaint also dealt with a subcontractor who had performed services for the Petitioner at his home. That subcontractor was subsequently awarded a Town contract for brick pavers to be installed at the entrance to the Town. The basis for the Respondent’s concern regarding this allegation stemmed from unsealed bids that were submitted for the brick paver project. According to Ms. Wascura the subcontractor who had provided a favorable job for the Petitioner was to receive the bid on the Town job. Although wrongdoing on the Petitioner’s part was not substantiated, the basis for the Respondent’s assertion was supported by the information he received from Ms. Wascura. In as much as Ms. Wascura was privy to comments from the building officials at the time, it was reasonable for Respondent to believe that something untoward had occurred when the same subcontractor received the Town’s bid, especially when the bid amount was later changed to cover a shortfall on the construction cost (the increased amount would have resulted in the subcontractor not being the lowest bidder after all). As to the third assertion in the Complaint, the Respondent claimed that the Petitioner had physically assaulted a temporary security guard employed by the Town while the Police Guardhouse was being built. The Respondent based this claim on the personal observations he made when the security guard reported the incident, the pictures he took of the guard (depicting the damaged shirt), and the identification of the Petitioner as the perpetrator that the victim made from a photograph. Although the assault was never fully investigated (the security guard could not be located and the matter was dropped), the Respondent had a reasonable basis to believe some inappropriate act had occurred and that the Petitioner could be involved. Finally, the fourth claim set forth in the Respondent’s Complaint alleged that the Petitioner had changed a vote on a variance request after being called aside by someone known as “Vinnie” in this record. According to eyewitnesses to the incident, the Petitioner voted against Vinnie’s variance then changed his vote after Vinnie whispered something in the councilman’s ear, and the two left the room briefly. When the Petitioner returned to the council table, he changed his vote to favor Vinnie’s variance. Although it is not concluded the Petitioner did anything improper in changing his vote, or that the variance would not have received sufficient favorable votes to pass even without the Petitioner’s vote, it is clear that the Respondent thought the activity was highly unusual and suspect. The Town council meetings are videotaped. A videotape of the proceeding disproving the account of the witnesses was not provided. It is unusual to allow anyone to approach the council seats to privately discuss anything with a council member during a council session. As for why the Petitioner would change his vote, the Respondent believed it had to do with a boat mooring that the Petitioner sought. Although the Petitioner did not own a boat at the time, the gossip among Town workers had been that the Petitioner wanted to be able to moor his boat at a certain angle to avoid an impeded view of the waterway. In return, he allegedly supported Vinnie’s variance. Although the rumor was unfounded, when the story was viewed in light of the Petitioner’s actions with Vinnie at the council meeting, it formed a reasonable basis for Respondent’s concerns. On July 9, 2002, the staff attorney for the Ethics Commission sent Respondent a letter requesting additional information regarding the Complaint. The forms included with that letter constitute the Complaint Amendment that was executed by the Respondent on July 19, 2002. Sometime in August 2002 the Respondent was fired from his position with the Town. He filed an appeal of the termination and ultimately won his job back. At that time he desired to drop the entire matter against the Petitioner. To that end he executed and filed with the Ethics Commission a Request to Withdraw the Complaint. The Request to Withdraw was denied on December 9, 2003. Also on December 9, 2003, the Ethics Commission issued a Public Report that dismissed the Respondent’s complaint against the Petitioner. On January 4, 2004, the Petitioner filed a Fee Petition pursuant to Section 112.317(8), Florida Statutes. The Fee Petition asserts that the Respondent acted with a malicious intent to injure the reputation of the Petitioner. The Respondent’s intent was to bring to light the allegations against the Petitioner because he believed the information he had been given was accurate. It proved to be inaccurate. He did not investigate each of the claims before filing the Complaint and Complaint Amendment but believed his sources to be credible Town employees. In retrospect, the Respondent believes he could have avoided the professional pitfalls that befell his employment had he not filed the Complaint. Nevertheless, based on the information he had at the time from credible Town employees, the Respondent acted to cause some investigation of the Petitioner’s activities. The Respondent did not know that the comments from Town employees were false or not subject to confirmation. The Respondent personally observed Vinnie’s intervention at the council table. Had it not dovetailed with the rumor regarding the Petitioner’s proposed boat issue, the conversation would have still appeared unusual at best. Coupled with the other unverified information, it gave the appearance of impropriety warranting investigation. Similarly, none of the other allegations could be easily discredited. The Respondent relied on comments attributed to Ms. Wascura and Ms. Epperson. He had no reason to doubt the veracity of his friend. Further, he could not foresee that Ms. Epperson would not acknowledge making statements pertaining to the permit issue. The original documents pertaining to the permits pulled for the Petitioner’s property are in storage and were not available at the hearing. A computer-generated report was provided to the Ethic Commission’s investigator. That report does not contain the detail and dates that might have verified the account provided by Ms. Wascura. The Respondent’s efforts to obtain copies of public records were thwarted. The Petitioner’s efforts to paint Ms. Epperson as a gossip whose alleged statements should not have been credited is not supported by the weight of persuasive evidence. Ms. Epperson was an experienced person whose knowledge in the construction industry made her a credible source for information. She was employed in a position that made her privy to the activities of the building department. She now disavows making the comments that were the subject matter of the Complaint. Nevertheless, the Respondent believed the comments attributed to her and believed they were from a credible source. If attorney’s fees and costs are entered in this cause the beneficiary of an award will be the Town. The Petitioner has incurred no expenses or costs associated with the defense of the Complaint. The Town agreed to pay and has paid all attorney’s fees and costs associated with this case. The Petitioner presented several invoices from the Law Offices of Stuart R. Michelson that were alleged to pertain to the instant case. One invoice dated January 6, 2004, set forth 25.00 hours had been expended by Ilene L. Michelson (partner) at the rate of $200.00 per hour. The invoice also noted 5.50 hours had been expended by Stuart R. Michelson (senior partner) also at the rate of $200.00 per hour. The total of the first invoice including costs was $6,594.54. The second invoice, dated June 10, 2004, itemized time expended by James Birch (associate attorney) billed at the rate of $125.00 per hour; Michael Torres (law clerk) billed at the rate of $75.00 per hour; Robert J. Longchamps (law clerk 2) also billed at the rate of $75.00 per hour; and Stuart R. Michelson (senior partner) billed at the rate of $200.00 per hour. The total attorney’s fees for this second invoice equaled $3,232.50; with costs the second invoice was $3,772.38. A third invoice dated September 9, 2004 documented $1,187.50 in fees for time expended by James Birch, Michael Torres, Robert J. Longchamps, and Stuart R. Michelson. The total for fees and costs for the invoice were $4,308.85. The costs and fees claimed in this cause are set forth in detail in Petitioner’s Exhibit 8. However, bills attached to invoices identify other parties not related to the instant case. For example, an invoice from United Reporting, Inc., references the case James Vardalis v. Robert Neiman. The Petitioner’s case is not the same matter. Similarly, a second invoice from United Reporting, Inc. (dated June 16, 2004) references Michael Addicott v. Neiman. The Petitioner did not delineate which of the costs were solely attributable to this case. It is unclear whether the fees were also incurred for other cases related to this Respondent (but not the Petitioner herein). The Petitioner also presented testimony from an expert witness who was to be paid by the Town. That witness, an attorney, was to be paid $200.00 per hour for his efforts in this matter. In connection with his work in this matter and other cases the expert billed the Town a total of $8,050.00. Exactly what portion of that amount is attributable to solely this case is unknown (see page 77 of the transcript in this case). Although the Petitioner’s expert testified that the hourly rates for fees applied in this cause were reasonable, there was no evidence that the time was actually expended in connection with the instant case. There is no way to know if the services were performed for the defense of the Respondent’s Complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Fee Petition in this case. S DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: James J. Birch, Esquire Law Office of Stuart R. Michelson 200 Southeast 13th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33133 Robert Nieman 9731 Southwest 12th Street Pembroke Pines, Florida 33026 Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phillip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
