Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Respondent was licensed as a medical doctor in Florida and was under contract with the Hillsborough Community Mental Health Center, Inc. to provide psychiatric services to the mental health center 20 hours per week. (Exhibits 1 and 14.) On October 2, 1986, Michael Burton, a Hillsborough County Deputy Sheriff received a call regarding an emergency in an isolated area on the I-75 north of Tampa. Upon his arrival he found M.H., a 21-year old white male handcuffed in the back seat of a game warden's car. A pick-up truck belonging to M.H. had a flexible hose connected to the exhaust to lead into the cab, several suicide notes and a girl's photograph were in the cab of the pick-up. Burton was told by the game warden that while conducting a routine check of the area, he had come upon M.H. attaching the flexible hose to the exhaust of the pick-up, and he arrested M.H. and called for law enforcement personnel. M.H. was transferred to Burton's car and, realizing M.H. was suicidal and consequently a danger to himself, Burton concluded M.H. should be committed and he called for a wrecker to tow away M.H.'s vehicle. M.H. did not agree to voluntary commitment and he was held for involuntary commitment. Due to the isolated location the wrecker took more than an hour to arrive on the scene. During this period Burton talked to M.H. who told Burton he was from South Dakota, he had come to Florida looking to work without success, that he hadn't bathed or eaten for a week, that he had been placed on parole in South Dakota for burglary and that in leaving the state he had violated his parole, and that life was no longer worth living. He also told Burton that although he had been stopped this time (from suicide) he wouldn't be stopped the next time. While awaiting the arrival of the wrecker Burton prepared some of HRS- MH Form 3052A (BA-52) (Exhibit 2) which is the report of law enforcement officer to justify the involuntary presentment of a client for examination to insure the client is not a danger to himself or to others. This is the procedure generally followed for patients presented by law enforcement officers pursuant to the Baker Act. Burton completed this form when he delivered M.H. to the CSU. Upon arrival of the wrecker Burton departed with M.H. who had no opportunity to speak to the driver of the wrecker. Enroute to the crisis center Burton stopped at a McDonald's restaurant where he bought a hamburger, fries and a coke for M.H. Upon arrival at the crisis center Burton delivered M.H. to the receptionist, had copies made of the suicide notes which he left with the BA-52 containing Burton's opinions regarding M.H. being a danger to himself and the observations supporting that opinion. Those observations recited: [M.H.] was found hooking a hose up to the exhaust system of his vehicle and had written suicide notes to his girl friend and mother. [M.] advised he came to Tampa from N. Dakota seeking work and has not been able to find anything. He stated he has not eaten or bathed in one week and has nothing to live for. Seemed very depressed and stated that death was the answer. [M.] has had mental health counselling in North Dakota at "Northwest Mental Health Center" involving his girlfriend committing suicide several years ago. He is also on criminal probation in N. Dakota for burglary and has violated his probation in leaving that state. Found in his possession was an article called "Near Death Experiences" that he had been reading, in which he copied an "epitaph" from. The Intake Sheet at the mental health center classified M.H. as a Baker Act patient and the Sheriff's report with suicide notes were attached to the Intake Sheet and presented to the crisis center counsellor to interview the patient and prepare the evaluation. The crisis center counsellor who interviewed M.H. and prepared the summary in exhibit 5, Kris Millrose, holds a master's degree in counselling and worked two nights per week at the crisis center. His normal procedure is to interview the client and make notes. He had available the information prepared by Deputy Sheriff Burton when he interviewed M.H. He made no effort to verify conflicts in what M.H. told him and what was contained in the Sheriff's report. He does not recall what he told Respondent during the telephone call, but he deemed it important to share with the doctor that patient had been brought in suicidal and the reasons given on the Baker Act form. He does not recall Respondent questioning him about the suicide notes but believed their existence would have been relayed to the doctor. Respondent concurred with Millrose's evaluation of M.H. and ordered him released. Millrose's evaluation recites: Pt to CSU as a 21-year old white male, unemployed, single and at large. Pt is on BA-52 via HCSO who found pt parked on state property. Pt states he had been sitting for a long time in this spot drinking beer thinking about his girlfriend in South Dakota and feeling sad over not having job and no place to live. Pt states his main concern was having very little money and no job. Patient was not aware he could go to the Salvation Army. Pt was thinking about suicide this afternoon, but adamantly denies being suicidal at present. Pt states the man who towed his truck today at the request of HCSO offered pt a job and possibly a place to stay. Pt states there is no work in South Dakota and his girlfriend just started college. Pt had been to Tampa one year ago when he decided to come back here. Pt denies trying to hook up a hose to his exhaust pipe. Pt states HCSO found him sitting in the back of his pick-up truck drinking beer. Pt states loving life and knows there is hope regardless of the notes he wrote to his mother and girlfriend. Pt does not appear a danger to himself or others at this time. He is planning on getting a job here or going back to Atlanta where he spent a day on his way to Tampa. Pt states having a little money left as he spent some last night staying in a motel. Pt requested something to eat and was given something. Following his release around 10:00 p.m., M.H. telephoned the wrecker company to see if he could pick up his vehicle and was told he would need a release from the Sheriff. M.H. then made his way across town to the lot where his truck was impounded, climbed the fence, entered his vehicle and drove it through the locked gate around 11:00 p.m. The Sheriff's office called the crisis center to obtain the name of the counsellor and doctor who authorized the release of M.H. Two days later M.H. partially decomposed body was discovered in north Pasco County in the cab of his vehicle with a hose connected to the exhaust leading to the cab. Crisis counsellors report several patients to the doctor during one telephone call. Millrose doesn't recall any specific details of his conversation except that after M.H. had been ordered released and he received the call from the Sheriff's office he again called Respondent to report the incident regarding the truck and Respondent stated patient had an antisocial personality disorder and should be put in jail. Millrose advised the Sheriff's office that M.H. should be arrested. Following four suicides by patients released from the crisis center in 1986 and 1987 it came to the attention of the public through newspaper articles and to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services that several individuals referred to crisis centers under Baker Act procedures had been released without adequate evaluation and had committed suicide. As a result of these inquiries Respondent's attention was recalled to the incident involving M.H. more than one year after October 2, 1986. It was at this time he first reviewed the file and actions that had been taken. This time frame is significant in evaluating Respondent's testimony. Contrary to Millrose's recollection of the specifics of his evaluation of M.H., Respondent testified that he recalls Millrose advising him that M.H. had been brought to the crisis center by a deputy sheriff when M.H. was found attempting to hook up a hose to his exhaust, but that M.H. denied that ever happened. He recalls being told by Millrose that M.H. stated he had been offered a job by the man driving the wrecker, that M.H. was neat in appearance, was not suicidal and exhibited no psychotic symptoms, that patient had some money and a supportive girlfriend. He recalls being told by Millrose that M.H. was picked up on State property drinking beer in his truck, that he had contemplated suicide earlier but was now no longer suicidal. He further testified Millrose didn't tell him about the suicide notes, didn't tell him M.H. had come from South Dakota and was out of work, but that he (Respondent) had discussed the status of the patient and whether M.H. was a danger to himself. Respondent's testimony that he learned of the suicide of M.H. over a year after the incident and first reviewed the records after that, coupled with Millrose's testimony that several cases would be discussed with the psychiatrist during each phone call, renders Respondent's detailed recollection of the telephone conversation with Millrose totally lacking in credibility. Petitioner's expert witness opined that the evidence of lethality contained in the BA-52 and the suicide notes was overwhelming. These included the age and sex of M.H., the fact that he was a long way from home and the availability of supportive services, that he had been drinking alcohol, that he had no job and little money, that he was apprehended in the process of committing suicide, the suicide notes, and the article he had been reading "Near Death Experiences." All expert witnesses who testified in these proceedings agreed that the evidence accompanying the BA-52 clearly indicated M.H. was a danger to himself and should not have been released. Petitioner's and Respondent's experts disagreed only in whether Respondent's actions were in accordance with acceptable medical standards if he was told only what was contained in the narrative prepared by Millrose in exhibit 5. In any case Respondent prepared no records other than those prepared by Millrose to justify overturning the recommendation for further evaluation on the BA-52. Those records are inadequate to justify M.H.'s release especially without face-to-face consultation with a psychiatrist or other health professional qualified to make such a determination. The policy of the Hillsborough Community Health Center at this time was that during hours no psychiatrist was on duty at the crisis center patients who were Baker Acted were interviewed by one of the crisis counsellors who made an assessment based upon the BA-52 and the interview, then called the psychiatrist on call to relay the information obtained from the BA-52 and the interview to the doctor who had the final authority to determine whether the patient should be released forthwith or held until face-to-face interview with a qualified health professional was completed. Once a law enforcement officer has presented an involuntary patient to the crisis center for evaluation, it is incumbent on the psychiatrist on duty (on call) to inquire into the facts giving rise to the reasons for the law enforcement officer to conclude the patient is a danger to himself or to others, and to fully inquire into the facts upon which the crisis counsellor concludes to the contrary. Regardless of what Respondent was told by Millrose it is clear that he did not make such inquiries. In failing to fully inquire into the facts upon which Millrose concluded M.H. was not a danger to himself, Respondent delegated the determination that was his alone to make to Millrose and thereby failed to practice medicine with the requisite standard of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. In failing to document any facts upon which he determined that M.H. was not a danger to himself despite the information contained in the BA-52 and in failing to document reasons for concluded that M.H. suffered from an antisocial personality disorder, Respondent failed to keep medical records justifying the actions taken. Despite the practice at the crisis center to the contrary, Rule 10E- 5.47, Florida Administrative Code, which was in effect on October 2, 1986 and Section 493.463, Florida Statutes (1985), provides that a person for whom an involuntary examination has been initiated by filing a BA-52 shall not be released by the receiving facility or its contractor without the documented approval of a person who is qualified under the provisions of this chapter to initiate an involuntary examination, i.e., a physician, psychologist licensed pursuant to Chapter 490, psychiatric nurse or clinical worker. The practice of releasing involuntary Baker Acted clients after a telephone report to the psychiatrist conflicts with the intent of this section of the statutes. However, it was the practice at the Hillsborough County Mental Health Center for intake counsellors to evaluate patients brought in during evening hours when no psychiatrist was on duty, telephone the on-call psychiatrist and apprise him of the information contained in the BA-52 and of the counsellor's evaluation of the patient, at which time the psychiatrist would order the patient held for further evaluation or released. Respondent's expert witnesses, who opined that Respondent did not fail to practice medicine with the requisite standards of care, all based their opinions on hypothetical questions which assumed that Respondent was not made aware of the suicide notes; was not aware of the epitaph found with the suicide notes; was not aware that M.H. had previously received mental health counselling when his girlfriend committed suicide a few years ago; was not aware that M.H. had not eaten or bathed for a week; was not aware patient had stated death was the answer; and was not aware M.H. was in possession of a article entitled "Near Death Experiences", when apprehended; but was told that M.H.'s main concern was having little money, however he had been offered a job and possibly a place to stay by the driver of the wrecker who had picked up his truck; that M.H. appeared relieved when told he could find a room for the night at the Salvation Army; that M.H. did not appear to be a danger to himself, was in good spirits, his mental status was within normal limits, he was cooperative, and his memory and judgment was intact; and that M.H. denied any present intent to commit suicide. In answer to the question regarding his general recollection of the contents of the telephone call between Millrose and Respondent on October 2, 1986, Respondent testified that he was told that the BA-52 stated M.H. had been trying to hook up a hose to his exhaust, that patient had expressed feeling suicidal; that after being picked up by the police he (M.H.) was with the driver of the wrecker who offered him a job and possibly a place to stay; that the patient appeared properly attired and neat in appearance; that he did not present any psychiatric symptoms; that patient had money for a overnight stay in a motel and was now looking forward to obtaining a job; and also that patient had a supportive girlfriend in the environment. According to Respondent, Millrose concluded M.H. should be given a chance to go ahead, and made this recommendation to Respondent following a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with depressed moods. In this regard it is noted that M.H.'s girlfriend was in South Dakota and could hardly provide support. No explanation was offered for the failure of Millrose or Respondent to resolve the conflict in the statement M.H. gave to Millrose that he spent last night in a motel and M.H.'s statement to the deputy sheriff that he hadn't eaten or bathed in one week. All expert witnesses concurred that the narrative contained in the BA- 52 supporting the officer's conclusions that M.H. was a danger to himself, fully supported this conclusion and described an individual with a very high suicide potential, i.e., a highly lethal patient. Millrose acknowledged that he would have considered the suicide notes significant information to pass on to the psychiatrist before the patient was ordered released, but Respondent denies ever being made aware of the suicide notes or of any of the information contained in the BA-52 narrative indicating the lethality of M.H.'s actions prior to and after he was picked up by the deputy sheriff and brought to the crisis center. As noted above, Respondent's testimony in this regard is not credible.
Recommendation It is recommended that Hussain be assessed an administrative fine of $10,000.00 and placed on probation for two years under such terms and conditions as the Board of Medicine deems appropriate. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-4699 Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner are accepted except for: 10. The portion of the first sentence "including all of the above relevant observations which supported his opinion." The BA-52 narrative did not contain all of the facts referred to in proposed findings 8. See HO #10. Although Deputy Burton briefed the "intake person" no evidence was presented that she passed any such additional information on to Millrose. 14. No evidence was presented that a Suicide Rating Scale was available to the crisis counsellors at the CSU. Certainly no such scale was used in this case. 37. M.H. was released from the CSU following a telephone call to Respondent who authorized the release of M.H. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent are accepted except for: 6. Rejected in part. No credible evidence was presented regarding the scope of the annual survey of the CSU by HRS personnel. 29. Rejected in part. Millrose testified that while he does not recall specific details of his interview with M.H. some 5 years ago, he would normally read all of the information presented with the BA-52. 33. Rejected in part. Millrose did not recall the specific detail that the call regarding M.H. was combined with calls about other clients. Rejected as fact. Accepted as testimony of Respondent. Rejected insofar as inconsistent with HO #12. The summary prepared by Millrose was substantially relayed to Respondent during this telephone call. Rejected. Second sentence rejected. 41. Accepted only insofar as Millrose was convinced M.H. did not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment. Rejected that this was common practice. Accepted that this practice was prevalent. Rejected. Rejected. 47. Second sentence rejected. The requirement for record keeping is that the records be adequate to justify the treatment given. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary B. Radkins, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Rodney W. Morgan, Esquire Galloway Executive Center, Suite 110 3333 Henderson Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Florida Board of Medicine Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Conclusions THE PARTIES resolved all disputed issues and executed a Settlement Agreement. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the attached settlement agreement. Based on the foregoing, this file is CLOSED. DONE and ORDERED on this the ----3_ day of J--+Ni 1_c..y....,....,_-..._.{_· , 2014, m Tallahassee, Florida. /\ /' f ' .' C \ ).;'-(/ '((l /r- ELIZABETH DUDEK, SECRETARY (Agency for Health Care Admforstration A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. (OPPOSING COUNSEL) Peter A Lewis, Esquire 302 North Shannon Lakes Drive Suitel0l Tallahassee, Florida 32309 (Via U.S. Mail) Bureau of Health Quality Assurance 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 9 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Stuart Williams, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Shena Grantham, Chief Medicaid FFS Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Karen Chang, Bureau Chief Medicaid Program Analysis 2727 Mahan Drive Building 2, Mail Station 21 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Agency for Health Care Administration Bureau of Finance and Accounting 2727 Mahan Drive Building 2, Mail Station 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Zainab Day, Medicaid Audit Services Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 21 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Kristin M. Bigham Office of the Attorney General The Capitol PL - 01 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 (Via US Mail) State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (Via U.S. Mail) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by U.S. Mail on this the of -;,;;-D, 2014. Richard Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue Whether there is a need for an additional 31 short-term psychiatric beds for Broward County?
Findings Of Fact I. General. History of Case. In June of 1984, the Petitioner filed an application with the Respondent for a certificate of need to add 31 short- term psychiatric beds to its existing facility. The certificate of need sought by the Petitioner was assigned certificate of need #3372 by the Respondent. The Respondent denied the Petitioner's application for certificate of need #3372. On October 25, 1984, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing with the Respondent challenging its proposed denial of the Petitioner's application. The Petition was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Respondent and was assigned case number 84-4037. Biscayne, Memorial and Charter were granted leave to intervene by Orders dated January 28, 1985, April 26, 1985 and July 9, 1985, respectively. The final hearing was held on November 19 and 21, 1985 in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida and February 24 and 25, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. The Petitioner's Proposal. The Petitioner originally sought to add 31 short-term psychiatric beds to its existing facility. If approved, the additional beds would have increased its current licensed beds from 334 to 365 beds. The Petitioner proposed to meet projected need for short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County for 1989. In its original application, the Petitioner proposed to provide services to children, adolescents, adults and the elderly. No distinct psychiatric units were proposed. The total cost of the original proposal was estimated to be $209,368.00. At the final hearing, the Petitioner proposed to relinquish 31 medical/surgical beds and to add 31 short-term psychiatric beds to meet projected need for short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County for 1989. The Petitioner will end up with a total of 334 licensed beds, the same number it now has, if its application is approved. The total cost of the proposal presented at the final hearing was $337,169.00, which is accurate and reasonable. The 31 proposed beds will be divided into a 15-bed dedicated adolescent unit and a 16-bed dedicated geropsychiatric unit. Adults will generally not be treated by the Petitioner. Involuntary admissions will be treated by the Petitioner, although there was some evidence to the contrary. The sixth floor of the Petitioner's existing facility will be converted into space for the new psychiatric units. The Petitioner changed the estimated staffing for its proposal between the time it filed its original application and the final hearing. The changes were not significant. During the 1985 legislative session, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 394.4785(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985). This,, Section requires that most adolescents be separated from other patients for purposes of psychiatric treatment. Some of the modifications of the Petitioner's application which were made at the final hearing were made in order to conform with this Section. The changes in the Petitioner's proposal which were made between the time it filed its original application with the Respondent and the time of the final hearing are not substantial enough to require that the Petitioner's application, as modified, be remanded to the Respondent for further consideration. The Parties; Standing. The Petitioner is a 334-bed, for-profit, general acute-care hospital. The Petitioner is a full service hospital providing general medical services. The Petitioner has a medical staff of more than 400 physicians, including a department of psychiatry. The Petitioner is owned by National Medical Enterprises, one of the largest health care providers in the country. The Petitioner is located in Hollywood, Florida, which is located in the southern portion of Broward County, Florida. Broward County is the only County in the Respondent's service district 10. The Petitioner's primary service area consist of the southern portion of Broward County from State Road 84 in the North to the Broward-Dade County line in the South. Memorial is a not-for-profit general acute care hospital located in southern Broward County. Memorial holds License #1737, issued on June 1, 1985, which authorizes Memorial to operate 74 short-term psychiatric beds. This license is valid for the period June 1, 1985 to May 31, 1987. Memorial was also authorized to operate 74 short-term psychiatric beds in its license issued for the 2-year period prior to June 1, 1985. Memorial is located a short distance from where the Petitioner is located in southern Broward County. Memorial and the Petitioner share the same general primary service area. Most of the physicians on the staff at Memorial are also on the Petitioner's staff. Memorial is subsidized by tax revenues for providing indigent care for southern Broward County. About 17 percent of Memorial's revenue is attributable to bad debt and indigent care. If the Petitioner's application is approved it is likely that the Petitioner will take patients from Memorial. It is also likely that the patients taken from Memorial will be other than indigent patients. If the Petitioner were to achieve a 75 percent occupancy rate and 50 percent of its patients come from Memorial, Memorial would lose a little over $1,000,000.00 in terms of 1985 dollars. It is unlikely, however, that the Petitioner will achieve an occupancy rate of 75 percent and, more importantly, it is unlikely that 50 percent of the Petitioner's patients will come from Memorial. The loss of patients from Memorial which would be caused by approval of the Petitioner's application will, however, result in a financial loss to Memorial which may effect its ability to provide quality care. Additionally, the loss in paying patients could increase the percentage of indigent patients at Memorial and, because a portion of the cost of caring for indigents is covered by paying patients at Memorial, could result in a further loss in revenue and an increase in tax support. The public may have difficulty accepting a public hospital, such as Memorial, as a high-quality hospital if the public hospital is perceived to be a charity hospital. It is therefore important for a public hospital to attract a significant number of paying patients to its facility to avoid such an image. It is unlikely that the number of patients which may be lost to the Petitioner by Memorial is sufficient to cause the public to perceive that Memorial is a charity hospital. Biscayne is a 458-bed, general acute-care hospital located on U.S. 1 in northern Dade County, Florida, just south of the Broward County line. Biscayne's facility is located within about 5 miles of the Petitioner's facility. Biscayne is about a 5 to 10 minute drive from the Petitioner. Dade County is not in service district 10. It is in service district 11. Of the 458 licensed beds at Biscayne, 24 are licensed as short-term psychiatric beds and 24 are licensed as substance abuse beds. The rest are licensed as medical/surgical beds. Ten of the medical/surgical beds at Biscayne are used as a dedicated 10-bed eating disorder (anoxeria nervosa and bulimirexia) unit. These 10 beds are not licensed for such use. A separate support staff is used for the 10-bed eating disorder unit. Approximately 60 percent of Biscayne's medical staff of approximately 400 physicians are residents of Broward County. Most of these physicians are also on the medical staff of other hospitals, principally the Petitioner, Memorial and Parkway Regional Medical Center, which is located in northern Dade County. Most of its staff have their business offices in southern Broward County. Biscayne's service area includes southern Broward County and northern Dade County. Approximately 60 percent of Biscayne's patients are residents of southern Broward County. Biscayne markets its services in southern Broward County. Eighty percent of Biscayne's psychiatric patients are elderly. Many types of psychotic and psychiatric disorders are treated at Biscayne. Biscayne offers psycho-diagnostic services, crisis stabilization services, shock therapy services, individual therapy services and group therapy services. Biscayne has had difficulty in recruiting qualified staff for its psychiatric unit. Biscayne currently has 4 vacancies for registered nurses, 4 vacancies for mental health assistants and 1 vacancy for an occupational therapist in its psychiatric unit. Biscayne recruits nurses who are certified in mental health nursing. They have not always been successful in finding such nurses. Therefore, Biscayne provides educational programs to help train its nursing staff. These programs are necessary because of the unavailability of experienced nurses for its psychiatric unit. The Petitioner has projected that most of its patients for its proposed psychiatric units will come from southern Broward County, where Biscayne gets approximately 60 percent of its patients. The Petitioner plans to try to convince psychiatrists currently using existing providers, except Hollywood Pavilion, to refer their patients to the proposed psychiatric units. Since Biscayne and the Petitioner share some of the same physicians, it is likely that many of the patients cared-for by the Petitioner will come form Biscayne and other providers in southern Broward County, including Memorial. The loss of patients at Biscayne, if the Petitioner's proposal is approved, will result in a loss of revenue to Biscayne which may affect its ability to provide quality care. Charter was an applicant for a certificate of need to construct a free-standing psychiatric facility in Broward County. In its application Charter sought approval of long-term and short-term psychiatric beds. Charter's application was filed with the Respondent in August of 1983. It was filed for review by the Respondent in a batching cycle which preceded the batching cycle in which the Petitioner's application was filed. In December of 1983, the Respondent proposed to approve Charter's application and authorize a project consisting of 16 short-term adolescent psychiatric beds, 16 long-term adolescent psychiatric beds, 16 long-term substance abuse beds and 12 long-term children's psychiatric beds. The Respondent's proposed approval of Charter's application was challenged. Following an administrative hearing, it was recommended that Charter's application be denied. Final agency action had not been taken as of the commencement of the hearing in this case. Subsequent to the date on which the final hearing of this case commenced, the Respondent issued a Final Order denying Charter's certificate of need application. This Final Order is presently pending on appeal to the First District Court of Appeal. Charter does not have an existing facility offering services similar to those proposed by the Petitioner in Broward County or anywhere near the Petitioner's facility. When the Orders allowing Memorial, Biscayne and Charter to intervene were issued by Hearing Officer Sherrill, Mr. Sherrill determined that if the Intervenor's could prove the facts alleged in their Petition to Intervene they would have standing to participate in this case. Memorial and Biscayne have in fact proved the allegations contained in their Petitions to Intervene. Based upon all of the evidence, it is therefore concluded that Memorial and Biscayne have standing to participate in this proceeding. Both Memorial and Biscayne will probably lose patients to the Petitioner if its proposal is approved resulting in a loss of revenue. This loss could affect quality of care at Memorial and Biscayne. Also, it is possible that both would lose some of their specialized nursing personnel to ;the Petitioner to staff its proposed psychiatric units. Charter has failed to establish that it has standing to participate in this proceeding. The potential injury to Charter is too speculative. II. Rule 10-5.11(25), F.A.C. A. General. Whether a certificate of need for short-term psychiatric beds should be approved for Broward County is to be determined under the provisions of Section 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes (1985), and the Respondent's rules promulgated thereunder. In particular, Rule 10-5.11(25), F.A.C., governs this case. Under Rule 10-5.11(25)(c), F.A.C., a favorable determination will "not normally" be given on applications for short-term psychiatric care facilities unless bed need exists under Rule 10-5.11(25)(d), F.A.C. B. Rule 10-5.11(25)(d) , F.A.C. Pursuant to Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)3, F.A.C., bed need is determined 5 years into the future. In this case, the Petitioner filed its application with the Respondent in 1984, seeking approval of additional short-term psychiatric beds for 1989. The Petitioner did not change this position prior to or during the final hearing. Therefore, the planning horizon for purposes of this case is 1989. Under Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)3, F.A.C., bed need is determined by subtracting the number of "existing and approved" beds in the service district from the number of beds for the planning year based upon a ratio of .35 beds per 1,000 population projected for the planning year in the service district. The population projection is to be based on the latest mid-range projections published by the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Florida. Bed need is determined under the Respondent's rules on a district-wide basis unless the service district has been sub- divided by the Respondent. District 10 has not been subdivided by the Respondent. Therefore, bed need for purposes of this case under Rule 10-5.11(25)(d), F.A.C., is to be determined based upon the population projections for all of Broward County for 1989. The projected population for Broward County for 1989 is 1,228,334 people. Based upon the projected population for Broward County for 1989, there will be a need for 430 short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County in 1989. The evidence at the final hearing proved that there are currently 427 licensed short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County. During the portion of the final hearing held in November of 1985, evidence was offered that proved that there were also 16 approved short-term psychiatric beds for Broward County. These short-term beds were part of the application for the certificate of need sought by Charter. Subsequently, however, a Final Order was issued by the Respondent denying Charter's application. Therefore, the 16 short-term psychiatric beds sought by Charter do not constitute "existing and approved" short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County for purposes of this case. Subsequent to the conclusion of the final hearing in this case, the First District Court of Appeal reversed a Final Order of the Respondent denying an application for a certificate of need for a free-standing 10 -bed psychiatric facility, including 80 additional short-term psychiatric beds, for Broward County. Balsam v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, So.2d (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). As indicated in Finding of Fact 23, Memorial is licensed to operate 74 short-term psychiatric beds. Memorial is in fact operating all 74 of these licensed beds. Memorial filed an application with the Respondent for certificate of need #1953 in October of 1981 in which Memorial indicated that it planned to reduce the number of short-term psychiatric beds it had available by 24 beds. Memorial's certificate of need application involved an expenditure of capital and did not specifically involve an application for a change in bed inventory at Memorial. Memorial also represented that it would reduce the number of its available short-term psychiatric beds by 24 in a bond prospectus it issued in September of 1983. The Respondent approved Memorial's certificate of need application. Despite Memorial's representations that it would reduce its short-term psychiatric bed inventory, the beds are still in use in Broward County. Memorial has no plans to close any beds and the Respondent does not plan to take any action against Memorial to require it to stop using 24 of its short-term psychiatric beds. Hollywood Pavilion is licensed to operate 46 short- term psychiatric beds in Broward County. In 1985, 475 patients were admitted to Hollywood Pavilion and its occupancy rate was 62.3 percent. In fact, Hollywood Pavilion had more admissions than Florida Medical Center had to its psychiatric unit. It therefore appears that other physicians find Hollywood Pavilion acceptable. Hollywood Pavilion is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. The Petitioner presented the testimony of a few physicians who questioned the quality of care at Hollywood Pavilion. These physicians indicated that they did not use Hollywood Pavilion. At least one of the physicians indicated, however, that he did refer patients to other physicians whom he knew admitted patients to Hollywood Pavilion despite his feeling that the quality of care at Hollywood Pavilion was poor. This action is inconsistent with that physician's opinion as to the lack of quality of care at Hollywood Pavilion. His opinion is therefore rejected. The other physicians' opinions are also rejected because very little evidence was offered in support of their opinions and because of the contrary evidence. Based upon a consideration of all of the evidence concerning the quality of care at Hollywood Pavilion, it is concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the 46 short-term psychiatric beds licensed for use and available for use at Hollywood Pavilion should not be counted as existing short- term psychiatric beds in Broward County. Coral Ridge Hospital is licensed to operate 74 short- term psychiatric beds in Broward County. The average length of stay at Coral Ridge Hospital during 1984 and 1985 was almost 80 days. The average length of stay at Coral Ridge Hospital has been in excess of 40 days since 1980 and in excess of 60 days since 1983. The average length of stay at Coral Ridge Hospital is in excess of the average length of stay for which short-term psychiatric beds are to be used under the Respondent's rules. Rule 10-5.11(25)(a), F.A.C., provides that short-term beds are those used for an average length of stay of 30 days or less for adults and 60 days or less for children and adolescents under 18 years of age. Rule 10-5.11(26)(a), F.A.C., provides that long-term beds are those used for an average length of stay of 90 days or more. The psychiatric beds at Coral Ridge Hospital, based upon an average length of stay for all of its beds, falls between the average length of stay for short-term beds and long-term beds. The occupancy rate at Coral Ridge Hospital for 1985 was between 40 percent and 50 percent. Therefore, it is possible that a few patients at Coral Ridge Hospital with a very long length of stay could cause the overall average length of stay of the facility to be as long as it is. Coral Ridge Hospital will probably take short-term psychiatric patients because of its low occupancy rate. Therefore, there are at least 29 to 37 short-term psychiatric beds available for use as short-term psychiatric beds at Coral Ridge Hospital. The Petitioner failed to prove how many of the licensed short-term psychiatric beds at Coral Ridge Hospital are not being used for, and are not available for use by, short-term psychiatric patients in Broward County. It cannot, therefore, be determined how many, if any, of the licensed short-term beds at Coral Ridge Hospital should not be treated as existing short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County. Based upon the foregoing, the 427 licensed short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County should be treated as "existing" beds for purposes of determining the need for short- term psychiatric beds under Rule 10-5.11(25)(d), F.A.C. There is a net need for short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County for 1989 of only 3 additional beds under Rule 10- 5.11(25)(d)3, F.A.C. If the 80 short-term psychiatric beds approved by the First District Court of Appeal in Balsam are taken into account, there will be a surplus of 77 short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County for 1989 under Rule 10- 5.11(25)(d)3, F.A.C. Based upon an application of Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)3, F.A.C., there is no need for the additional 31 short-term psychiatric beds sought by the Petitioner. Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)1, F.A.C., provides that a minimum of .15 beds per 1,000 population should be located in hospitals holding a general license to ensure access to needed services for persons with multiple health problems. Some patients who need psychiatric care also need other medical services which can better be obtained in an acute care hospital. This fact is taken into account by the requirement of Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)1, F.A.C. Based upon the projected population for Broward County in 1989, there should be a minimum of 184-short-term psychiatric beds in hospitals holding a general license in Broward County. There are currently 243 short-term psychiatric beds in hospitals holding a general license in Broward County. Therefore, the standard of Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)1, F.A.C., has been met without approval of the Petitioner's proposal. There is no need for additional short-term psychiatric beds in general hospitals in Broward County for 1989. Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)4, F.A.C., provides that applicants for short-term psychiatric beds must be able to project an occupancy rate of 70 percent for its adult psychiatric beds and 60 percent for its adolescent and children's psychiatric beds in the second year of operation. For the third year of operation, the applicant must be able to project an 80 percent adult occupancy rate and a 70 percent adolescent and children's occupancy rate. The beds sought by the Petitioner will be managed by a professional psychiatric management company: Psychiatric Management Services (hereinafter referred to as "PMS"). PMS is owned by Psychiatric Institutes of America, a subsidiary of National Medical Enterprises. Because of the lack of need for additional short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County, it is doubtful that the Petitioner can achieve its projected occupancy rates as required by Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)4, F.A.C. Rules 10-5.11(25)(d)5 and 6, F.A.C., require that certain occupancy rates normally must have been met in the preceding 12 months before additional short-term psychiatric beds will be approved. The facts do not prove whether the occupancy rates provided by Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)5, F.A.C., have been met because the statistics necessary to make such a determination are not available. The evidence failed to prove that the occupancy rates of Rule 10- 5.11(25)(d)6, F.A.C. have been met. The average occupancy rate for short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County for 1985 was between 64.8 percent and 68.4 percent. Occupancy rates in Broward County for short-term psychiatric beds have not reached 71 percent since 1982. These rates are well below the 75 percent occupancy rate provided for in Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)6, F.A.C. This finding is not refuted by the fact that Florida Medical Center added 59 beds in 1984 and the fact that occupancy rates at most general hospitals exceeded 75 percent in 1985. Based upon the average occupancy rate in Broward County for 1985, there were approximately 100 empty short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County on any day. Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)7, F.A.C. requires that short-term psychiatric services provided at an inpatient psychiatric hospital should have at least 15 designated beds in order to assure specialized staff and services at a reasonable cost. The Petitioner's proposal to add 31 short-term psychiatric beds meets this requirement of the rule. C. Rule 10-5.11(25)(e), F.A.C. Rule 1O-5.11(25)(e)1, F.A.C., requires that an applicant prove that its proposal is consistent with the needs in the community as set out in the Local Health Council plans, local Mental Health District Board plans, State Mental Health Plan and needs assessment data. The Petitioner has failed to meet this requirement. The Petitioner's proposal is inconsistent with the District 10 Local Health Plan, the Florida State Health Plan and State and Local Mental Health Plans. In particular, the Petitioner's proposal is inconsistent with the following: The District 10 Local Health Plan's recommendation that applications not be approved if approval would result in an excess number of beds under the Respondent's bed need methodology; The District 10 Local Health Plan's recommendation concerning occupancy standards for the district (75 percent during the past 12 months); The position of the Florida State Health Plan that inpatient psychiatric services are a setting of last resort; The recommendation of the District 10 Mental Health Plan that alternatives to hospitalization for psychiatric services should be encouraged; and The recommendation of the Florida State Mental Health Plan that less restrictive treatment alternatives should be encouraged. Rule 10-5.11(25)(e)3, F.A.C., requires that applicants indicate the amount of care to be provided to underserved groups. The Petitioner's representations concerning its plans to provide indigent care contained in its application are misleading, in that the Petitioner represented that it would not turn away indigents. At the final hearing, the Petitioner indicated that it will generally provide care to indigents only on an emergency basis. Patients who need indigent care on a non-emergency basis will be referred to Memorial. Also, once an indigent patient who needs emergency care has stabilized, that patient will be transferred to Memorial for care. The Petitioner accepts few Medicaid and indigent patients. During 1985, the Petitioner treated 21 Medicaid patients out of a total of 6,800 patients. Only 1.5 percent of its total revenue was for uncompensated care. During 1984, the Petitioner treated 22 Medicaid patients out of a total of 7,321 patients. Only 1.2 percent of its total gross revenue was for uncompensated care. Memorial is subsidized by tax revenues for providing indigent care, or southern Broward County. Because Memorial provides indigent care, indigent patients are usually referred to Memorial if they do not need emergency care or are transferred to Memorial after they stabilize if they do need emergency care. There are other hospitals in northern Broward County which provide similar indigent care. It is therefore common practice to refer patients to those hospitals. Rule 10-5.11(25)(e)5, F.A.C., provides that development of new short- term psychiatric beds should be through the conversion of underutilized beds in other hospital services. The Petitioner's proposal to convert 31 medical/surgical beds for use as short-term psychiatric beds meets this provision. Rule 10-5.11(25)(e)7, F.A.C., provides that short- term psychiatric services should be available within a maximum travel time of 45 minutes under average travel conditions for at least 90 percent of the service area's population. There is no geographic access problem in Broward County. At least 90 percent of the population of Broward County is within a maximum of 45 minutes driving time under average driving conditions to existing short-term psychiatric services in Broward County. The Petitioner's proposal will not significantly enhance geographic access in Broward County. III. Statutory Criteria. Need for Services. The Respondent has approved two certificates of need authorizing the addition of a total of 135 long-term psychiatric beds for Broward County. The addition of 135 long-term beds probably means that additional short-term beds in Broward County which have been used for patients requiring longer treatment will be available. If the additional long-term beds free up short-term beds, the occupancy rate of short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County would be even less than it has been during the past 12 months, if other things remain equal. Both Memorial and Florida Medical Center have been using short-term psychiatric beds for the care of long-term patients. Once the new long-term psychiatric beds are operational, more short-term psychiatric beds will be available in Broward County. Existing Providers. In addition to the short-term psychiatric beds available at Coral Ridge Hospital and Hollywood Pavilion, short- term psychiatric beds are available at the following existing facilities in the service district: Ft. Lauderdale Hospital: 64 beds Florida Medical Center: 74 beds Imperial Point: 47 beds Broward General Medical Center: 48 beds There is no geographic distribution problem in district 10. Generally, the Petitioner did not prove that existing short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County are not available, efficient, appropriate, accessible, adequate or providing quality of care. The Petitioner also did not prove that existing facilities are over-utilized. No new services are proposed by the Petitioner. The evidence did prove that there is usually a waiting list for short-term psychiatric beds at Memorial and that physicians have resorted to various devices to get their patients into short-term psychiatric beds at Memorial. Specialized adolescent psychiatric services are available in the service district at Ft. Lauderdale Hospital and at Florida Medical Center. Ft. Lauderdale Hospital has 24 short- term psychiatric beds dedicated to the treatment of adolescents. Florida Medical Center has 20 short-term psychiatric beds dedicated to the treatment of adolescents. Broward General Medical Center and Imperial Point also provide children/adolescent services. Treatment for eating disorders is provided and available at Imperial Point and Florida Medical Center. Florida Medical Center solicits patients from all parts of the service district. Geropsychiatric short-term psychiatric beds are available in the service district at Hollywood Pavilion, Imperial Point and Ft. Lauderdale Hospital. Florida Medical Center has a closed adult psychiatric unit and often treats persons over 60 years of age. It also has a 26-bed adult short-term psychiatric unit with 2 specialized treatment programs: one for eating disorders and the other for stress and pain management. The Petitioner has proposed to provide a dedicated geropsychiatric unit to meet the needs of geriatric patients which are different from those of adults generally. Although there are no such dedicated geropsychiatric units in the service district, the Petitioner failed to prove that geriatrics are not receiving adequate care from existing providers. Quality of Care. The Petitioner is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. The Petitioner has established adequate quality control procedures, including educational programs and a quality assurance department. These quality control procedures will also be used to insure quality of care in the proposed psychiatric units. The psychiatric units will be managed by PMS. PMS specializes in the management of psychiatric units in acute care hospitals. PMS has programs for adolescents and geriatrics. These programs will be available for use in the proposed psychiatric units. PMS also has a large variety of programs, services and specialists available to establish and maintain quality of care at the Petitioner. The Petitioner will be able to provide quality of care. Alternatives. The Petitioner did not prove that available and adequate facilities which may serve as an alternative to the services it is proposing do not exist in Broward County. Economies of Scale. The Petitioner's parent corporation, National Medical Enterprises has purchasing contracts available for use by the Petitioner in purchasing items needed for the proposed psychiatric units. These contracts can result in a reduction of costs for the proposed project. Staff Resources. PMS will help in recruiting staff for the proposed psychiatric units. Recruiting will be done locally but the Petitioner also has the ability to recruit specialized staff on a broader geographic scale. There is a shortage of nursing personnel for psychiatric services in southern Broward County and northern Dade County. Since the Petitioner plans to recruit locally, this could cause existing providers to lose specialized nursing personnel to the Petitioner. If the Petitioner causes vacancies at existing facilities, this could adversely affect quality of care. Financial Feasibility. The total projected cost of the project ($337,169.00) can easily be provided by National Medical Enterprises, the parent corporation of the Petitioner. The Petitioner's financial projections are unrealistic to the extent of the projected utilization and revenue for the proposed psychiatric units. Based upon the projected need of only 3 short-term psychiatric beds (or possibly a surplus of 77 beds) for 1989, the Petitioner's projected utilization and revenue for its proposal is rejected. The Petitioner has proved immediate financial feasibility but has failed to prove the proposal is financially feasible in the long-term. Impact of Proposal. The Petitioner's proposal could adversely effect the costs of providing health services in Broward County. This is especially true in light of the lack of need for additional short-term psychiatric beds in Broward County. Because of the high quality of the services the Petitioner proposes to provide, competition in Broward County could be enhanced and ultimately benefit consumers, if there was a need for the proposed additional beds. If a hospital has an image of being a charity hospital serving the needs of underserved groups, the hospital can experience difficulty in attracting paying patients and have difficulty in getting consumers to accept the high quality of the services of the hospital. Although it is likely that the Petitioner will take paying patients away from Memorial, it is unlikely that the number of patients lost could substantially affect the public's image of Memorial. The effect the Petitioner's proposal will have on Memorial is limited by the fact that the Petitioner is only seeking 31 beds and they are only short-term psychiatric beds. Memorial provides a variety of services and psychiatric services are only a small part of those services. I. Construction. It the Petitioner's proposal is approved, 11,500 square feet on the sixth floor of the Petitioner's hospital will be renovated and converted for use for the two proposed psychiatric units. The renovations can be made quickly. There will be space for 16 beds in a geropsychiatric unit and 15 beds in an adolescent unit. There will be a separate lobby for the psychiatric units and the elevators to the lobby will be strictly controlled. The two units will be separated and adequate security precautions will be taken to keep the two units separate. The ceilings in both units will be modified to insure security. Nurse stations will be provided for both units. Visibility from the nurse stations will be fair. Space is provided for a dayroom for each unit and there will be a class room and four rooms for therapy. These spaces will barely be adequate to meet the various needs of patients. With adequate planning and coordination, patients' needs can be met. There is inadequate space in the proposed facility for physical activities for patients.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the certificate of need application filed by the Petitioner for certificate of need #3372 should be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of May, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Glazer, Esquire AUSLEY, McMULLEN, McGEHEE, CAROTHERS & PROCTOR Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Lesley Mendelson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Building One, Suite 407 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James C. Hauser, Esquire MESSER, VICHERS, CAPARELLO, FRENCH & MADSEN Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Kenneth G. Oertel, Esquire Eleanor A. Joseph, Esquire OERTEL & HOFFMAN, P.A. Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32313-6507 Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Esquire CARLTON, FIELDS, WARD, EMMANUEL SMITH & CUTLER, P.A. Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. William Page, Jr. Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether or not, on or about January 13, 1977, the Respondent, while undergoing an employment physical at the request of her employer, at St. Vincent's Medical Center of Jacksonville, Florida ,was observed by the examining physician to have between 50 and 75 puncture wounds in her arms overlying her veins, which puncture wounds were consistent with those made by a hypodermic needle. Whether or not the Respondent was obtaining oral Codeine, Dilaudid and Demerol tablets, controlled substances, by prescription, and subsequently dissolving the drugs and injecting them into her veins. Whether or not, on or about January, 1977, the Respondent was counseled by a member of St. Vincent's Medical Center Community Mental Health Department, and was offered the services of the Department which offer was declined by the licensee. Further, whether or not the Respondent informed Shirley Trawick, Assistant Administrator of the Mental Health Department, that she had been using controlled drugs in her younger years, stopped using them for a while and was once again using controlled drugs, including Demerol. Whether or not, on or about February 18, 1977, the Respondent uttered a forged prescription at Soutel Pharmacy, Jacksonville, Florida for a controlled drug to wit: Demerol, and was arrested by an officer of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office for the felony of uttering or making a forged prescription. Further, whether or not at the time of the arrest a search of the licensee's purse revealed 20 more prescription blanks contained therein. Whether or not, on or about February 10, 1977, while confined to the Duval County Jail, licensee admitted to the jail nurse, L. Harris, that she had been abusing drugs (Demerol). Whether or not, on or about January 18, 1977, the Respondent uttered a forged prescription for a narcotic to wit: Demerol at Walgreen's Regency Pharmacy, 9501 Arlington Expressway. Whether or not, on or about January 27, 1977, the Respondent uttered a forged prescription at Revco Pharmacy, 5220 Firestone Road, for a narcotic drug, to wit: Demerol. Whether or not, on or about February 4, 1977, the Respondent forged a prescription for a narcotic drug, to wit: Demerol, which was passed at Revco Pharmacy, 5220 Firestone Road, Jacksonville, Florida by an individual, Lewis William Bergman. Whether or not the above allegations, if proven, would establish that the Respondent is guilty of unprofessional conduct and in violation of 464.21(1)(b), F.S., 464.21(c), F.S., 464.21(d), F.S., 464.21(f), F.S., and 464.21(g) F.S.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Rebecca Lee Brunson, is a Registered Nurse who holds license no. 89605-2, held with the Florida State Board of Nursing. This case is brought for consideration upon the amended administrative complaint of the Petitioner, Florida State Board of Nursing, which is dated for mailing on May 25, 1977. This complaint arises from the sworn complaint letter of April 25, 1977, propounded by Geraldine B. Johnson, R.N., Investigation and Licensing Coordinator for the Florida State Board of Nursing. This letter of complaint can be found as Petitioner's Exhibit #2 admitted into evidence. On January 13, 1977, the Respondent was seen by Dr. C. O. Plyler for purposes of an employment physical examination. At that time the Respondent was employed by St. Vincent's Medical Center of Jacksonville, Florida. The examination conducted by Dr. Plyler revealed many wounds on the arms of the Respondent, by Dr. Plyler's estimate, 50 to 75. These wounds appeared to be puncture wounds and followed a pattern on the visible blood vessels in the area between the wrists and elbows. These wounds were of a type, believed by Dr. Plyler to have possibly been caused by a hypodermic needle. When confronted with the need to make an explanation of these wounds, the Respondent replied by saying that the wounds had been inflicted by a cat. After further inquiry by Dr. Plyler, the Respondent stated that she was injecting her veins with narcotics. The specific method of this infection was to take oral narcotics, to wit: Codeine and Demerol, and dissolve these tablets and then inject them into herself. On this same occasion Kathleen Maher, the Director of the Nursing Service, St. Vincent's Medical Center, was called in to consult with the Respondent. Mrs. Maher knew Rebecca Brunson through Brunson's employment in the nursing staff at St. Vincent's Medical Center. A discussion was entered into between Mrs. Maher and the Respondent in which the Respondent was offered the opportunity to attend the St. Vincent's Medical Center Community Mental Health Program, but declined that opportunity. This opportunity was also offered by Shirley Trawick, the Assistant Director of the St. Vincent's Medical Center Community Mental Health Program. This conversation took place on the same date as the examination by Dr. Plyler. Mrs. Trawick also offered an alternative suggestion for treatment for the problem with narcotics. That alternative was placement in the Jacksonville Drug Abuse Program. The Respondent declined Mrs. Trawick's offer for assistance in any efforts to be detoxed. Another element of the conversation between Brunson and Trawick concerned the question of addiction. The Respondent told Trawick that she had been addicted to drugs as an adolescent and was currently taking the drug Demerol. On the same day as the discovery by Dr. Plyler and the admission by the Respondent, the St. Vincent's Medical Center suspended the Respondent because they felt that she was not physically capable of continuing as a registered nurse in their service. The Respondent was ultimately terminated from her position with St. Vincent's Medical Center. On February 18, 1977, the Respondent went to Soutel Pharmacy, Jacksonville, Florida and tendered a prescription to be filled. The contents of the face of the prescription may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit #1, admitted into evidence. (This exhibit is a copy of the original document which was tendered.) She presented the prescription by inquiring if the Soutel Pharmacy had the prescription, because, "Scotties on Lem Turner could not fill the prescription." There is no Scotties on Lem Turner in Duval County, Florida. Additionally, the signature on the prescription showed the signature of Dr. Millard F. Jones. Dr. Jones, when contacted by the pharmacist, Joel Bressler, indicated that he had not signed such a prescription. The Respondent exited the Soutel Pharmacy while Joel Bressler, the pharmacist was calling Dr. Jones. Bressler then called the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office and an officer was dispatched to investigate the case. Officer Robert E. Sanders, Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, arrived at the Soutel Pharmacy and placed the Respondent under arrest for uttering a forged prescription. In the course of the arrest an envelope with a number of other prescription forms was found in the Respondent's purse. Later, in an interview setting between the Respondent and Detective John Farmer, Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, held in the Detective Bureau, the Respondent, after being advised of her rights under the Miranda Case, admitted having written the prescriptions in her purse and having, on numerous other occasions, passed or attempted to pass forged prescriptions. She particularly made mention of three cases that were under investigation by Detective Farmer, two involving Revco Pharmacy on Firestone Road, and one involving Walgreens Pharmacy in Arlington. The Respondent also indicated that she was addicted to drugs. During the course of a routine crisis intervention interview by Ms. Lynn Harris, now Mrs. Lynn Timmons, which occurred on February 18, 1977 at the Duval County Jail, the Respondent admitted abusing drugs. She specifically referred to the drug Demerol. The Respondent, at that time, denied any addiction to the drug Demerol. The substances identified as Codeine and Demerol are controlled substances as set forth in 893, F.S. Based upon the facts as shown the Respondent is guilty of unprofessional conduct within the meaning of 464.21(1)(b), F.S., by reason of her abuse of and addiction to the substances Codeine and Demerol and by reason of forgeries and uttering and attempting to utter forged prescriptions. The Respondent is also guilty of habitual intemperance or addiction to the use of controlled substances as set forth in 893, F.S., in addition to engaging in the possession of controlled substances within the meaning of the aforementioned 893, F.S., causing a violation of 464.21(1)(c)(d), F.S. The response by the licensee, Rebecca Lee Brunson, to the offer for assistance for her problem with drug abuse and addiction and her general physical condition exhibits behavior which the Nursing Board has regarded and may regard as creating an undue risk that the licensee as a nursing practitioner could cause harm to other persons in violation of 464.21(1)(f), F.S. Finally the Respondent has wilfully and repeatedly violated the provisions of 464, F.S. and the provisions of 893, F.S., thereby violating 464.21(1)(g), F.S.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Florida State Board of Nursing, revoke the license of Rebecca Lee Brunson, R.N., license no. 89605-2. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Julius Finegold, Esquire 1005 Blackstone Building Jacksonville, Florida 32201 William J. Sheppard, Esquire 215 Washington Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Geraldine B. Johnson, R.N. Investigation and Licensing Coordinator Board of Nursing 6501 Arlington Expressway, Building "B" Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Rebecca Lee Brunson, R.N. 1529 McDuff Avenue South Apartment #2 Jacksonville, Florida
The Issue Whether the certificate of need application to convert 30 acute care beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General Medical Center meets the statutory and rule criteria for approval.
Findings Of Fact The North Broward Hospital District (NBHD) is a special taxing district established by the Florida Legislature in 1951 to provide health care services to residents of the northern two-thirds of Broward County. NBHD owns and operates four acute care hospitals: Coral Springs Medical Center, North Broward Medical Center, Imperial Point Medical Center (Imperial Point), and Broward General Medical Center (Broward General). NBHD also owns and/or operates primary care clinics, school clinics, urgent care centers, and a home health agency. FMC Hospital, Ltd., d/b/a Florida Medical Center (FMC) is a 459-bed hospital with 74 inpatient psychiatric beds, 51 for adults separated into a 25-bed adult unit and a 26-bed geriatric psychiatric unit, and 23 child/adolescent psychiatric beds. FMC is a public Baker Act receiving facility for children and adolescents and operates a mental health crisis stabilization unit (CSU) for children and adolescents. FMC also operates separately located facilities which include a partial hospitalization program, an adult day treatment program, and a community mental health center. At Florida Medical Center South, FMC operates another day treatment program and partial hospitalization program. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) is the state agency which administers the certificate of need (CON) program for health care services and facilities in Florida. The NBHD applied for CON Number 8425 to convert 30 acute care beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General. Broward General operates approximately 550 of its total 744 licensed beds. It is a state Level II adult and pediatric trauma center and the tertiary referral center for the NBHD, offering Level II and III neonatal intensive care, pediatric intensive care, cardiac catheterization and open heart surgery services. Broward General has 68 adult psychiatric beds and is a public Baker Act receiving facility for adults. Public Baker Act receiving facilities have state contracts and receive state funds to hold involuntarily committed mental patients, regardless of their ability to pay, for psychiatric evaluation and short-term treatment. See Subsections 394.455(25) and (26), Florida Statutes. Although they serve different age groups, both FMC and Broward General are, by virtue of contracts with the state, public Baker Act facilities. When a Baker Act patient who is an indigent child or adolescent arrives at Broward General, the patient is transferred to FMC. FMC also typically transfers indigent Baker Act adults to Broward General. At Broward General, psychiatric patients are screened in a separate section of the emergency room by a staff which has significant experience with indigent mental health patients. If hospitalization is appropriate, depending on the patient's physical and mental condition, inpatient psychiatric services are provided in either a 38-bed unit on the sixth floor or a 30- bed unit on the fourth floor of Broward General. In July 1995, Broward General also started operating a 20-bed mental health CSU located on Northwest 19th Street in Fort Lauderdale. Prior to 1995, the County operated the 19th Street CSU and 60 CSU beds on the grounds of the South Florida State Hospital (SFSH), a state mental hospital. Following an investigation of mental health services in the County, a grand jury recommended closing the 60 CSU beds at SFSH because of "deplorable conditions." In addition, the grand jury recommended that the County transfer CSU operations to the NBHD and the South Broward Hospital District (SBHD). As a result, the SBHD assumed the responsibility for up to 20 CSU inpatients a day within its existing 100 adult psychiatric beds at Memorial Regional Hospital. The NBHD assumed the responsibility for up to 40 CSU inpatients a day, including 20 at the 19th Street location. The additional 20 were to be redirected to either the 68 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General or the 47 adult psychiatric beds at Imperial Point. CSU services for adult Medicaid and indigent patients in the NBHD service area were transferred pursuant to contracts between the NBHD and Broward County, and the NBHD and the State of Florida, Department of Children and Family Services (formerly, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services). Based on the agreements, the County leases the 19th Street building in which Broward General operates the CSU. The County also pays a flat rate of $1.6 million a year in monthly installments for the salaries of the staff which was transferred from the County mental health division to the NBHD. The County's contract with the NBHD lasts for five years, from December 1995 to September 2000. Either party may terminate the contract, without cause, upon 30 days notice. The State contract, unlike that of Broward County, does not provide a flat rate, but sets a per diem reimbursement rate of approximately $260 per patient per day offset by projected Medicaid revenues. The State contract is renewable annually, but last expired on June 30, 1997. The contract was being re-negotiated at the time of the hearing in November 1997. Based on actual experience with declining average lengths of stay for psychiatric inpatients, the contract was being re-negotiated to fund an average of 30, not a maximum of 40 patients a day. If CON 8425 is approved, NBHD intends to use the additional 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General to meet the requirements of the State and County contracts, while closing the 19th Street CSU and consolidating mental health screening and stabilization services at Broward General. NBHD proposes to condition the CON on the provision of 70 percent charity and 30 percent Medicaid patient days in the 30 new beds. By comparison, the condition applicable to the existing 68 beds requires the provision of 3 percent charity and 25 percent Medicaid. When averaged for a total of 98 beds, the overall condition would be 23.5 percent charity and 26.5 percent Medicaid, or a total of 51 or 52 percent. The proposed project will require the renovation of 10,297 gross square feet on the fourth floor of Broward General at a cost of approximately $450,000. The space is currently an unused section of Broward General which contains 42 medical/surgical beds. Twelve beds will be relocated to other areas of the hospital. The renovated space will include seclusion, group therapy, and social rooms, as well as 15 semi- private rooms. Twelve of the rooms will not have separate bathing/showering facilities, and seven of those will also not have toilets within the patients' rooms. Need in Relation to State and District Health Plans - Subsection 408.035(1)(a), Florida Statutes The District 10 allocation factors include a requirement that a CON applicant demonstrate continuously high levels of utilization. The applicant is given the following evidentiary guidelines: patients are routinely waiting for admissions to inpatient units; the facility provides significant services to indigent and Medicaid individuals; the facility arranges transfer for patients to other appropriate facilities; and the facility provides other medical services, if needed. Broward General does not demonstrate continuously high utilization by having patients routinely waiting for admission. Broward General does meet the other criteria required by allocation factor one. The second District 10 allocation factor, like criterion (b) of the first, favors an applicant who commits to serving State funded and indigent patients. Broward General is a disproportionate share Medicaid provider with a history of providing, and commitment to continue providing, significant services to Medicaid and indigent patients. In fact, the NBHD provides over 50 percent of both indigent and Medicaid services in District 10. See also Subsection 408.035(1)(n), Florida Statutes. Allocation factor three for substance abuse facilities is inapplicable to Broward General which does not have substance abuse inpatient services. Allocation factor 4 for an applicant with a full continuum of acute medical services is met by Broward General. See also Rule 59C-1.040(3)(h), Florida Administrative Code. Broward General complies with allocation factor 5 by participating in data collection activities of the regional health planning council. The state health plan includes preferences for (1) converting excess acute care beds; (2) serving the most seriously mentally ill patients; (3) serving indigent and Baker Act patients; (4) proposing to establish a continuum of mental health care; (5) serving Medicaid-eligible patients; and (6) providing a disproportionate share of Medicaid and charity care. Broward General meets the six state health plan preferences. See also Rule 59C-1.040(4)(e)2., Florida Administrative Code, and Subsection 408.035(1)(n), Florida Statutes. Broward General does not meet the preference for acute care hospitals if fewer than .15 psychiatric beds per 1000 people in the District are located in acute care hospitals. The current ratio in the District is .19 beds per 1,000 people. Rule 59C-1.040(4)(3)3, Florida Administrative Code, also requires that 40 percent of the psychiatric beds needed in a district should be allocated to general hospitals. Currently, approximately 51 percent, 266 of 517 licensed District 10 adult inpatient psychiatric beds are located in general acute care hospitals. On balance, the NBHD and Broward General meet the factors and preferences of the health plans which support the approval of the CON application. See also Rule 59C- 1.040(4)(e)1. and Rule 59C-1.030, Florida Administrative Code. Numeric Need The parties stipulated that the published fixed need pool indicated no numeric need for additional adult inpatient psychiatric hospital beds. In fact, the numeric need calculation shows a need for 434 beds in District 10, which has 517 beds, or 83 more than the projected numeric need. In 1994- 1995, the District utilization rate was approximately 58 percent. The NBHD asserts that the need arises from "not normal" circumstances, specifically certain benefits from closing the 19th Street CSU, especially the provision of better consolidated care in hospital-based psychiatric beds, and the establishment of a County mental health court. The NBHD acknowledges that AHCA does not regulate CSU beds through the CON program and that CSU beds are not intended to be included in the calculation of numeric need for adult psychiatric beds. However, due to the substantial similarity of services provided, NBHD contends that CSU beds are de facto inpatient psychiatric beds which affect the need for CON- regulated psychiatric beds. Therefore, according to the NBHD, the elimination of beds at SFSH and at the 19th Street CSU require an increase in the supply of adult psychiatric beds. The NBHD also notes that approval of its CON application will increase the total number of adult psychiatric hospital beds in Broward County, but will not affect the total number of adult mental health beds when CSU and adult psychiatric beds are combined. After the CSU beds at SFSH closed, the total number of adult mental health beds in the County has, in fact, been reduced. NBHD projected a need to add 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General by combining the 1995 average daily census (ADC) of 48 patients with its assumption that it can add up to 10, increasing the ADC to 58 patients a day in the existing 68 beds. Based on its contractual obligation to care for up to 40 CSU inpatients a day, the NBHD projects a need for an additional 30 beds. The projection assumed that the level of utilization of adult inpatient psychiatric services at Broward General would remain relatively constant. With 40 occupied beds added to the 48 ADC, NBHD predicted an ADC of 88 in the new total of 98 beds, or 90 percent occupancy. The assumption that the ADC would remain fairly constant is generally supported by the actual experience with ADCs of 48.1, 51.5, and 45.8 patients, respectively, in 1995, 1996, and the first seven months of 1997. NBHD's second assumption, that an ADC of 40 CSU patients will be added is not supported by the actual experience. Based on the terms of the State and County contracts, up to 20 CSU patients have already been absorbed into the existing beds at the Imperial Point or Broward General, which is one explanation for the temporary increase in ADC in 1996, while up to 20 more may receive services at the 19th Street location. In 1996 and 1997, the ADC in the 19th Street CSU beds was 15.3 and 14.2, respectively, with monthly ranges in 1997 from a high of 17 in April to a low of 12 in June. The relatively constant annual ADCs in psychiatric and CSU beds are a reflection of increasing admissions but declining average lengths of stay for psychiatric services. The NBHD also projects that it will receive referrals from the Broward County Mental Health Court, established in June 1997. The Court is intended to divert mentally ill defendants with minor criminal charges from the criminal justice system to the mental health system. Actual experience for only three months of operations showed 7 or 8 admissions a month with widely varying average lengths of stay, from 6 to 95 days. The effect of court referrals on the ADC at Broward General was statistically insignificant into the fall of 1997. Newspaper reports of the number of inmates with serious mental illnesses do not provide a reliable basis for projecting the effect of the mental health court on psychiatric admissions to Broward General, since it is not equipped to handle violent felons. One of Broward General's experts also compared national hospital discharge data to that of Broward County. The results indicate a lower use rate in Broward County in 1995 and a higher one in 1996. That finding was consistent with the expert's finding of a growth in admissions and bed turnover rate which measures the demand for each bed. The expert also considered the prevalence of mental illness and hospitalization rates. The data reflecting expected increases in admissions, however, was not compared to available capacity in the County nor correlated with declining lengths of stay. The District X: Comprehensive Health Plan 1994 includes an estimate of the need for 10 CSU beds per 100,000 people, or a total of 133 CSU beds needed for the District. FMC argues that the calculation is incorrect because only the adult population should be included. Using only adults, FMC determined that 116 CSU beds are needed which, when added to 434 adult psychiatric beds needed in the February 1996 projection, gives a bed need for all mental health beds of 550. That total is less than the actual combined total number of 567 mental health beds, 517 adult psychiatric beds plus 50 CSU beds in 1995. Whatever population group is appropriate, the projection of the need for CSU beds is not reliable based on the evidence that, since the end of 1995, CSU services have been and, according to NBHD, should continue to be absorbed into hospital- based adult psychiatric units. For the same reason, the increase in adult psychiatric bed admissions from 1995 to 1996 does not establish a trend towards increasing psychiatric utilization, but is more likely attributable to the closing of CSU beds at SFSH. FMC's expert's comparison of data from three selected months in two successive years is also not sufficient to establish a downward trend in utilization at the 19th Street CSU, neither is the evidence of a decline in ADC by one patient in one year. Utilization is relatively static based on ADCs in existing Broward County adult psychiatric beds and in CSU beds. FMC established Broward General's potential to decrease average lengths of stay by developing alternative non-inpatient services as FMC has done and Broward General proposes to do. See Finding of Fact 37. Based on local health council reports, FMC's data reflects a rise in the ADC at Broward General to 52.7 in 1996, and a return to 46 in the first seven months of 1997. Using a 14.2 ADC for the 19th Street CSU, FMC projects that Broward General will reach an ADC of approximately 60 in the first year of operations if the CON is approved, not 88 as projected. Broward General acknowledged its capacity to add 10 more patients to the ADC without stress on the system. Having already absorbed 20 of up to 40 CSU patients at Imperial Point and Broward General in 1996 and 1997 resulting in an ADC of 48, and given the capacity to absorb 10 more, the NBHD has demonstrated a need to accommodate an ADC of 10 more adult psychiatric patients at Broward General, or a total ADC of 68 patients. The need to add capacity to accommodate an additional 10 patient ADC was not shown to equate to a need for 30 additional beds, which would result in an ADC of 68 patients in 98 beds, or 69 or 70 percent occupancy. Special Circumstances - Rule 59C-1.040(4)(d) The psychiatric bed rule provides for approval of additional beds in the absence of fixed numeric need. The "special circumstance" provision applies to a facility with an existing unit with 85 percent or greater occupancy. During the applicable period, the occupancy at Broward General was 74.15 percent. However, occupancy rates have exceeded 95 percent in the CSU beds on 19th Street. If up to 20 patients on 19th Street are added to the 48 ADC at Broward General, the result is that the existing 68 beds will be full. A full unit is operationally not efficient or desirable and allows no response to fluctuations in demand. Therefore, the state has established a desirable standard of 75 percent occupancy for psychiatric units, a range which supports the addition of 10 to 15 psychiatric beds at Broward General. Available Alternatives - Subsection 408.035(1)(b) and (d), Florida Statutes, and Rule 59C-1.040(4)(e)4., Florida Administrative Code The psychiatric bed rule provides that additional beds will "not normally" be added if the district occupancy rate is below 75 percent. For the twelve months preceding the application filing, the occupancy rate in 517 adult psychiatric beds in District 10 was approximately 58 percent. FMC's expert noted that each day an average of 200 adult psychiatric beds were available in District 10. Broward General argues that the occupancy rate is misleading. Five of the nine facilities with psychiatric beds are freestanding, private facilities, which are ineligible for Medicaid participation. Historically, the freestanding hospitals have also provided little charity care. One facility, University Pavilion, is full. Of the four acute care hospitals with adult psychiatric beds, Memorial Hospital in the SBHD, is not available to patients in the NBHD service area. Imperial Point, the only other NBHD facility with adult psychiatric beds, is not available based on its occupancy rate for the first seven months of 1997 of approximately 81 percent, which left an average of 9 available beds in a relatively small 47-bed unit. That leaves only Broward General and FMC to care for Medicaid and indigent adult psychiatric patients. FMC is the only possible alternative provider of services, but Broward General was recommended by the grand jury and was the only contract applicant. The occupancy rate in FMC's 51 adult beds was approximately 80 percent in 1995, 73 percent in 1996, and 77 percent for the first seven months in 1997. FMC has reduced average lengths of stay by having patients "step down" to partial hospitalization, day treatment and other outpatient services of varying intensities. The same decline in average lengths of stay is reasonably expected when Broward General implements these alternatives. Adult psychiatric services are also accessible in District 10 applying the psychiatric bed rule access standard. That is, ninety percent of the population of District 10 has access to the service within a maximum driving time of forty- five minutes. The CSU license cannot be transferred to Broward General. Broward County holds the license for CSU beds which, by rule, must be located on the first floor of a building. Although Broward General may not legally hold the CSU license and provide CSU services on the fourth floor of the hospital, there is no apparent legal impediment to providing CSU services in psychiatric beds. Quality of Care - Subsection 408.035(1)(c), Florida Statutes and Rule 1.040(7), Florida Administrative Code Broward General is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations. The parties stipulated that Broward General has a history of providing quality care. Broward General provides the services required by Rule 59C-1.040(3)(h), Florida Administrative Code. Services Not Accessible in Adjoining Areas; Research and Educational Facilities; Needs of HMOs; Services Provided to Individuals Beyond the District; Subsections 408.035(1)(f),(g),(j), and (k), Florida Statutes Broward General does not propose to provide services which are inaccessible in adjoining areas nor will it provide services to non-residents of the district. Broward General is not one of the six statutory teaching hospitals nor a health maintenance organization (HMO). Therefore, those criteria are of no value in determining whether this application should be approved. Economics and Improvements in Service from Joint Operation - Subsection 408.035(1)(e), Florida Statutes The consolidation of the psychiatric services at Broward General is reasonably expected to result in economies and improvements in the provision of coordinated services to the mentally ill indigent and Medicaid population. Broward General will eliminate the cost of meal deliveries and the transfer of medically ill patients, but that potential cost-saving was not quantified by Broward General. Staff and Other Resources - Subsection 408.035(1)(h), Florida Statutes The parties stipulated that NBHD has available the necessary resources, including health manpower, management personnel, and funds to implement the project. Financially Feasibility - Subsection 408.035(1)(h) and (i), Florida Statutes The parties stipulated that the proposed project is financially feasible in the immediate term. The estimated total project cost is $451,791, but NBHD has $500,000 in funds for capital improvements available from the County and $700,000 from the Florida Legislature. As stipulated by the parties, NBHD has sufficient cash on hand to fund the project. Regardless of the census, the County's contractual obligation to the NBHD remains fixed at $1.6 million. The State contract requires the prospective payment of costs offset by expected Medicaid dollars. If the number of Medicaid eligible patients decreases, then state funding increases proportionately. The state assumed that 20 percent of the patients would qualify for Medicaid, therefore it reimburses the per diem cost of care for 80 percent of the patients. One audit indicated that 30 percent of the patients qualified for Medicaid, so that State payments for that year were higher than needed. The State contract apparently makes no provision to recover excess payments. The application projects a net profit of $740,789 for the first year of operations, and a net profit of $664,489 for the second year. If the State contract with NBHD is renewed to contemplate an average of 30 patients per day as opposed to up to 40 patients per day, then annual revenue could be reduced up to $400,000. Projected net profit will, nevertheless, exceed expenses when variable expenses are reduced correspondingly. If 20 state funded patients are already in psychiatric beds, and 20 more could be transferred from 19th Street, the result is an ADC of 68. Based on the funding arrangements, there is no evidence that the operation of a total of 98 beds could not be profitable, even with an ADC of 68, although it would be wasteful to have 30 extra beds. Impact on Competition, Quality Assurance and Cost-Effectiveness - Subsection 408.035(1)(l), Florida Statutes With a maximum of 68 inpatients or more realistically, under the expected terms of a renegotiated State contract, 58 to 60 inpatients in 98 beds, Broward General will reasonably attempt to expand the demand for its inpatient psychiatric services. Within the NBHD's legal service area, one-third of adult psychiatric patients not admitted to Broward General are admitted to FMC. Assuming a proportionate impact on competitors, FMC's expert projected that one-third of approximately 30 unfilled beds at Broward General will be filled by patients who would otherwise have gone to FMC. The projection of a loss of 9 patients from the ADC of FMC is reasonably based on an analysis showing comparable patient severity in the most prevalent diagnostic category. Given the blended payor commitment of approximately 51 or 52 percent total for Medicaid and charity in 98 beds, Broward General will be able to take patients from every payor category accepted at FMC. The loss of 9 patients from its ADC can reduce revenues by $568,967 at FMC. The impact analysis is reasonably based on lost patient days since most payers use a per diem basis for compensating FMC. For example, although Medicare reimbursement is usually based on diagnosis regardless of length of stay, it is cost-based for the geriatric psychiatric unit. Net profit at FMC, for the year 1996-1997, was expected to be approximately $4.5 million. FMC will also experience increased costs in transporting indigent patients from FMC to Broward General for admission and treatment. Because of the additional distance, the cost to transfer indigent patients is $20 more per patient from FMC to Broward General than it is from FMC to the 19th Street CSU. FMC typically stabilizes indigent adult psychiatric inpatients, then transfers them to either the 19th Street CSU or Broward General. From March through September of 1997, FMC transported approximately 256 indigent patients from FMC to the 19th Street CSU. In terms of quality assurance, the consolidation of psychiatric services at Broward General will allow all patients better access to the full range of medical services available at Broward General. The NBHD's operation of the 19th Street CSU is profitable. Approval of the CON application should reasonably eliminate all costs associated with operation of the 19th Street facility, and shift more revenues from the State and County contracts to Broward General. Some savings are reasonably expected from not having meal deliveries to 19th Street or patient transfers for medical care. The NBHD did not quantify any expected savings. Costs and Methods of Construction - Subsection 408.035(1)(m), Florida Statutes Broward General will relocate 12 of 42 medical/surgical beds and convert 30 medical/surgical beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds on one wing of the fourth floor, which is currently unused. Fifteen semi-private medical/surgical patient rooms will be converted into semi-private adult psychiatric rooms. Existing wards will be converted to two social rooms, one noisy and one quiet. With the removal of the walls of some offices, the architect designed a group therapy room. An existing semi-private room will be used as a seclusion room. Of the fifteen semi-private rooms, twelve will not have bathing or showering facilities and seven will not have toilets within the patients' rooms. At the time the hospital was constructed, the state required only a lavatory/sink in each patient room. AHCA's architect agreed to allow Broward General to plan to use central bathing and toilet facilities to avoid additional costs and diminished patient room sizes. Because the plan intentionally avoids construction in the toilets, except to enlarge one to include a shower, there is no requirement to upgrade to Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) standards. Therefore, the $23,280 construction cost contingency for code compliance is adequate. Although the projected construction costs are reasonable and the applicable architectural code requirements are met, the design is not the most desirable in terms of current standards. Patient privacy is compromised by the lack of toilets for each patient room. Past and Proposed Provision of Services to Promote a Continuum of Care in a Multi-level System - Subsection 408.035(1)(o), Florida Statutes Broward General is a tertiary acute care facility which provides a broad continuum of care. Because it already operates the CSU and provides CSU services in adult psychiatric beds, the proposal to relocate patients maintains but does not further promote that continuum of care. Broward General's plan to establish more alternatives to inpatient psychiatric care does promote and enhance its continuum of care. Capital Expenditures for New Inpatient Services - Subsection 408.035(2), Florida Statutes Broward General is not proposing to establish a new health service for inpatients, rather it is seeking to relocate an existing service without new construction. The criteria in this Subsection are inapplicable. Factual Conclusions Broward General did not establish a "not normal" circumstance based on the grand jury's findings and recommendations. The grand jury did not recommend closing 19th Street facility. Broward General did generally establish not normal circumstances based on the desirability of consolidating mental health services at Broward General to provide a single point of entry and to improve the quality of care for the 19th Street facility patients. Broward General failed to establish the need to add 30 beds to accomplish the objective of closing the 19th Street facility. Although the existing beds at Broward General may reasonably be expected to be full as a result of the transfer of 19th Street patients, the addition of 30 beds without sufficient demand results in an occupancy rate of 69 or 70 percent, from an ADC of 68 patients in 98 beds. Broward General has requested approximately twice as many beds as it demonstrated it needs. Broward General's CON application on balance satisfies the local and state health plan preferences. In general, FMC is the only alternative facility in terms of available beds, but is not the tax-supported public facility which the grand jury favored to coordinate mental health services. Broward General meets the statutory criteria for quality of care, improvements from joint operations, financial feasibility, quality assurance, cost-effectiveness, and services to Medicaid and indigent patients. The proposal is not the most desirable architecturally considering current standards. More importantly, Broward General did not demonstrate that it can achieve its projected occupancy without an adverse impact on FMC. The NBHD proposal will add too many beds to meet the targeted state occupancy levels in relatively a static market. Broward General's application does not include a partial request for fewer additional beds which would have allowed the closing of 19th Street, while maintaining some empty beds for demand fluctuations and avoiding an adverse impact on FMC.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration deny the application of the North Broward Hospital District for Certificate of Need Number 8425 to convert 30 medical/surgical beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General Medical Center. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Paul Vazquez, Esquire Agency For Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire R. David Prescott, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 David C. Ashburn, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley, Valdes-Fauli & Stewart, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 830 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact In 1993, the US Health Care Financing Administration gave Respondent approval to design and implement a pilot program for the delivery of mental health services in part of Florida. The pilot program is limited to Medicaid Area 6, which consists of Hardee, Highlands, Hillsborough, Manatee, and Polk counties. The purpose of the pilot program is to change the way in which the State of Florida pays for mental health services under the Medicaid program. At present, the State makes "fee-for- service" payments based on predetermined fees for defined services. RFP, 1.1 KK. Under the new method, the State will make "capitation" payments consisting of a monthly fee paid in advance to the contractor for each enrolled Medicaid recipient, regardless whether the enrollee receives the services during the payment period. RFP, 1.1.H. On November 23, 1994, Respondent issued Request for Proposals 9501 (RFP). The purpose of RFP 9501 is to procure a contract with a "single, comprehensive mental health care provider on a prepaid, capitated basis, to provide mental health benefits to Medicaid recipients who are residents of Medicaid Area 6 . . .." RFP, 1.4. The second paragraph of RFP 1.4 identifies four goals of the procurement: that the procurement proceed in a timely manner, (2) that the . . . RFP . . . encourages free and open competition, (3) that the procurement effort and resulting new contract operations be completed in a timely manner without disruption of service to Medicaid clients, and (4) that the procure- ment result in a single contractor for Area 6 with sufficient resources to provide services to all AFDC related and SSI Without Medicare Medicaid eligibles in Area 6. Section 2.2 requires that the contractor provide "[i]npatient hospital care for psychiatric conditions," "[o]utpatient hospital care for psychiatric conditions," "[p]sychiatric physician services," "[c]ommunity mental health care," "Mental Health Targeted Case Management," and "Mental Health Intensive Case Management." Section 2.3 defines the six categories of services identified in the preceding paragraph. Referring to "Community mental health care" as "Community Mental Health Services," Section 2.3 states: Community Mental Health Services Community Mental Health Services are rehabil- itative services which are psychiatric in nature, rendered or recommended by a psychia- trist; or medical in nature, rendered or recommended by a psychiatrist or other physician. Such services must be provided in accordance with the policy and service provision specified in the Community Mental Health Services Provider Handbook. The term "Community Mental Health Services" is not intended to suggest that the following services must be provided by state funded "Community Mental Health Centers" or to preclude state funded "Community Mental Health Centers" from providing these services: There are eight categories of mental health care services provided under community mental health: Treatment planning and review; Evaluation and testing services; Counseling, therapy and treatment services provided by a psychiatrist or physician; Counseling, therapy and treatment services provided by a direct service mental health care provider; Rehabilitative services; Children's mental health services; Specialized therapeutic foster care, Level 1 and 2; and Day treatment programs. Community mental health services for children in specialized therapeutic foster care and resi- dential treatment will be provided by HRS District 6 Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Program Office to the same degree as in the past. Services are limited to those covered services provided by or under the recommendation of a psychiatrist or physician and related to a plan of care provided or authorized by a psychiatrist or physician, as appropriate, based on the patient's diagnosis. Targeted Case Management The contractor shall adhere to the requirements of the Medicaid Case Management Services Provider Handbook, but will not be required to seek certifications from the HRS Districts' Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Program Office in regard to clients, agency designation, or mental health care case manager qualifications. Case manager training materials will be made available through the agency for reproduction by the contractor. Intensive Case Management This is a new mandatory service which is intended to provide intensive, team case management to highly recidivistic persons who have severe and persistent mental illness. Section 2.5 requires that the contractor "adhere to the following minimum staffing, availability, and access standards": The contractor shall provide access to medically necessary mental health care (with the exceptions noted in section 2.4 B.) The contractor shall make available and accessible facilities, service locations, and service sites and personnel sufficient to provide the covered services (specifically, non-hospital outpatient, emergency and assessment services) throughout the geographic area, within thirty minutes typical travel time by public or private transportation of all enrolled recipients. (The typical travel time standard does not apply to waiting time for public transportation--it applies only to actual time in transit.) The contractor must allow enrollees to choose one of the capitated services, as provided in Section 5.1 F.1., when the plan offers another service, not reimbursed under the contract, as a downward substitution. The maximum amount of time between an enrollee's request for mental health services and the first point of service shall be as follows: For emergency mental health services as defined in section 1.1 BB., service shall be immediate. For persons initially perceived to need emergency mental health services, but upon assess- ment do not meet the criteria for emergency care, they are deemed to require crisis support and services must be provided within twenty-three hours. For routine outpatient intake, assessment shall be offered within seven calendar days. Follow-up service shall be offered within fourteen calendar days after assessment. Minimum staffing standards shall be as follows, and failure to adhere to these staffing standards, or the staffing standards indicated in the winning proposal, whichever are greater, may result in termination of the contract (if the contractor's "staff" person does not fill one of the "key staff" positions listed on page 81, the staff persons may be a subcontractor.): * * * The contractor's outpatient staff shall include at least one FTE direct service mental health care provider per 1,500 prepaid members. The Agency expects the contractor's staffing pattern for direct service providers to reflect the ethnic and racial composition of the community. The contractor's array of direct service mental health care providers for adults and children must include providers that are licensed or eligible for licensure, and demonstrate two years of clinical experience in the following specialty areas: Adoption, Separation and loss, Victims and perpetrators of sexual abuse, Victims and perpetrators of physical abuse, Court ordered evaluations, and Expert witness testimony. Mental health care case managers shall not be counted as direct service mental health care providers. The contractor shall provide Spanish speaking and Spanish literate direct service providers at each service location at which there are Spanish speaking enrollees. The contractor shall provide staff approp- riately trained and experienced to provide psychological testing. The contractor shall provide staff approp- riately trained and experienced to provide rehabilitation and support services to persons with severe and persistent mental illness. For all persons meeting the criteria for case management as specified in the Medicaid Case Management Provider Handbook, the contractor shall adhere to the staffing ratio of at least 1 FTE mental health care case manager per 20 children, and at least 1 FTE mental health care case manager per 40 adults. Direct service mental health care providers shall not be counted as mental health care case managers. * * * Section 2.10 provides, in part: The contractor shall be responsible for the coordination and management of mental health care and continuity of care for all enrolled Medicaid recipients through the following minimum functions: A. Minimizing disruption to the enrollee as a result of any change in service providers or mental health care case manager occurring as a result of the awarding of this contract. An offeror may not propose rates exceeding Medicaid's upper payment limit, which "is that amount which would have been paid, on an aggregate basis, by Medicaid under fee-for-service for the same services to a demographically similar population of recipients." 4.11. Section 1.1 TTT defines "Upper Payment Limit" similarly: "The maximum amount Medicaid will pay on a capitated basis for any group of services, based upon fee-for- service Medicaid expenditures for those same services." Section 4.11 sets the range of payment rates at 92-98 percent of the upper payment limit. Each offeror is required to propose a specific payment percentage within the range. Section 4.17 allows offerors to propose a risk corridor of up to 16 percentage points plus and minus the proposed range. The corridor must be equal above and below the capitation rate. The RFP illustrates the risk corridor by applying an 8 point corridor to a 95 percent capitation rate. In this case, the contractor absorbs any plan costs up to 4 percent over the actual payments made to the plan by Respondent or retains any excess plan payments up to 4 percent over the actual costs. Beyond the corridor, the contractor and Respondent share equally in the costs or savings, subject to Respondent's upper payment limit. In no event, however, shall the contractor be entitled to payment from Respondent for "start- up" or "phase-down" costs. Section 4.18 addresses subcontractors: The contractor is fully responsible for all work performed under the contract resulting from the RFP. The contractor may, with the consent of the agency, enter into written subcontract(s) for performance of certain of its functions under the contract. The contractor must have subcontracts with all administrative and service providers who are not salaried employees of the plan prior to the commencement of services under this contract. The contractor shall abide by the requirements of Section 1128A(b) of the Social Security Act prohibiting HMOs and other such providers from making payments directly or indirectly to a physician or other provider as an inducement to reduce or limit services provided to Medicaid enrollees. The contractor must submit signed subcontracts, for a complete provider network in order to obtain agency approval for operation in an area, within sixty days of the execution of this contract, for each proposed subcontracted service provider. Any additional subcontracts must be submitted to the agency twenty days prior to the subcontract effective date. Subcontracts must be approved in writing by the agency's Technical Project Manager prior to the effective date of any subcontract. No subcontract which the contractor enters into with respect to performance under the contract resulting from the RFP shall in any way relieve the contractor of any responsibility for performance of its duties. Amendments to subcontracts must be approved by the agency before taking effect. The contractor shall notify the agency in writing prior to termination of approved subcontracts. The contractor will agree to make payment to all subcontractors within 35 days of receipt of all invoices properly documented and submitted by the subcontractor to the plan. All subcontracts executed by the contractor under the resulting contract must meet the following requirements and be approved by the agency in advance of implementation. All subcontracts must adhere to the following requirements: Be in writing. Specify the functions of the subcontractor. Identify the population covered by the subcontract. Specify the amount, duration and scope of services to be provided by the subcontractor, including a requirement that the subcontractor continue to provide services through any post- insolvency period. Provide that the agency and DHHS may evaluate through inspection or other means the quality, appropriateness, and timeliness of services performed. Specify that the subcontractor has read and agreed to the subcontract and the service provision requirements under section 2 of RFP, for services to be provided under the subcontract, and to the contractor's admission and retention criteria for the services the subcontractor will provide as indicated in the subcontractor's response to section 5.1 F3.b,(5). Provide for inspections of any record pertinent to the contract by the agency and DHHS. Specify procedures and criteria for extension and renegotiation. Provide for prompt submission of information needed to make payment. Require an adequate record system be maintained for recording services, charges, dates and all other commonly accepted information elements for services rendered to recipients under the contract. Require that financial, administrative and medical records be maintained for a period of not less than five years from the close of the contract and retained further if the records are under review or audit until the review or audit is complete. Prior approval for the disposition of records must be requested and approved by the contractor if the subcontract is continuous. Require safeguarding of information about recipients according to 42 CFR, Part 431, Subpart F. Require an exculpatory clause, which survives the termination of the subcontract including breach of subcontract due to insolvency, that assures that recipients or the agency may not be held liable for any debts of the subcontractor. Provide for the monitoring of services rendered to recipients sponsored by the contractor. Specify the procedures, criteria and requirements for termination of the subcontract. Provide for the participation in any internal and external quality assurance, utilization review, peer review, and grievance procedures established by the contractor. Make full disclosure of the method and amount of compensation or other consideration to be received from the contractor. Provide for submission of all reports and clinical information required by the contractor. Make provisions for a waiver of terms of the subcontract, if appropriate. Contain no provision which provides incentive, monetary or otherwise, for the withholding of medically necessary care. Require adherence to the Medicaid policies expressed in applicable Medicaid provider handbooks. Require that the subcontractor secure and maintain during the life of the subcontract worker's compensation insurance for all of its employees connected with the work under this contract unless such employees are covered by the protection afforded by the provider. Such insurance shall comply with Florida's Workers' Compensation Law; and Contain a clause indemnifying, defending and holding the Agency and the plan members harmless from costs or expense, including court costs and reasonable attorney fees to the extent proximately caused by an negligent act or other wrongful conduct arising from the subcontract agreement. This clause must survive the termination of the subcontract, including breach due to insolvency. The contractor shall give the agency immediate notification in writing by certified mail of any action or suit filed and prompt notice of any claim made against the contractor by any subcontractor or vendor which in the opinion of the contractor may result in litigation related in any way to the contract with the agency. In the event of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy by or against a principal subcontractor or the insolvency of said subcontractor, the contractor shall immediately advise the agency. The contractor shall assure that all tasks related to the subcontract are performed in accordance with the terms of the contract. The contractor shall identify any aspect of service that may be further subcontracted by the subcon- tractor. Subcontractors shall not be considered agents of the agency. For evaluation purposes, the RFP divides proposals into two parts: technical and rate, including any rate corridor. The six categories under the technical part, with point values in parentheses, are: Management Summary (0 points), Organization and Corporate Capabilities (100 points), Proposed Staffing Pattern and Licensure of Staff and Facilities (250 points), Operational Functions (400 points), Mental Health Care Service Delivery (400 points), and Transition Workplan (100 points). RFP, 6.1. Section 5.1.C describes the 100-point Organization and Corporate Capabilities as follows: The proposer shall provide in this tab a descrip- tion of its organizational and corporate capabi- lities. The purpose of this section is to provide the agency with a basis for determining the contractor's, and its subcontractors', financial and technical capability for undertaking a project of this size. For the purpose of this tab, the term proposer shall refer to both the contractor and its major subcontractors. It does not refer to the plan's "parent company" unless specifically indicated. Section 5.1 D states the elements of the 250-point Proposed Staffing Pattern and Licensure of Staff and Facilities. Section 5.1 D.3 requires the offeror to disclose "actual and proposed" FTE professionals, including psychiatrists, case managers, psychologists, nurses, and social workers. Section 5.1D.4 requires the offeror to explain how the plan will allocate staff to meet various demands, such as for adoption, sexual and physical abuse counseling, and psychological testing of children. Section 5.1 D.5 requires the proposal to: Describe how the plan will ensure that it has the staff resources appropriately trained and experienced to provide rehabilitative and support services to low income adults with severe and persistent mental illness and, under separate heading, to children with severe and persistent mental illness. Denote the number and percent of total FTEs which will be filled by persons with this type of experience and who will be providing these types of services. Explain the contractor's rationale for the staffing levels indicated and provide a brief, one or two line, description of the training and exper- ience of such persons who will provide these services under the plan. Section 5.1.E describes the elements of the 400-point Operational Functions, in part, as follows: Within this tab, the proposer shall explicitly address its operational capacity to serve Medicaid recipients, and its previous history serving the Medicaid and other low income populations. Separately, the proposer shall address the member services the plan will offer, grievance procedures, quality assurance procedures, the contractor's proposed reporting systems, and the contractor's proposed handling of subcontracts. Service Area of Proposed Plan 42 CFR 434.36 Describe, for each county, how the proposer will meet throughout the lifetime of the contract the 30 minute typical travel time requirement specified in section 2.5 A.1. Describe, for each county, how the proposer will meet throughout the lifetime of the contract the 30 minute typical travel time requirement for child psychiatrists specified in Section 2.5 B.2. Describe, for each county, how the proposer will meet throughout the lifetime of the contract the 30 minute typical travel time requirement for adult psychiatrists specified in Section 2.5 B.1. * * * Section 5.1.F describes the 400-point Mental Health Care Service Delivery category. Section 5.1 F states, in relevant part: This section shall include a detailed discussion of the proposer's approach to providing mental health care. The proposer must be able to document a demonstrated ability to provide a comprehensive range of appropriate services for both children and adults who experience impairments ranging from mild to severe and persistent mental illness. Plans must provide services up to the limits specified by the RFP. They are encouraged to exceed these limits. However, in no instance may any service's limitations be more restrictive than those specified in the Florida Medicaid fee- for-service program. The plan cannot require payments from recipients for any mandatory services provided under this contract. Summary of Services * * * The following is a summary list of the services which may be provided . . . * * * Optional Services Crisis Stabilization Unit * * * z. Other Services (List) * * * Care Coordination 42 CFR 434.52; 10C-7.0524(16), F.A.C. Attach the plan's written protocol describing the plan's care coordination system, which should include the plan's approach to care coordination, utilization review, and assuring continuity of care, such as, verifying medical necessity, service planning, channeling to appropriate levels of treatment, and develop- ment of treatment alternatives when effective, less intensive services are unavailable. The protocol should also address the following questions: * * * 3. Indicate how the contractor will establish services in such a way as to minimize disruption of services, particularly to high risk populations currently served by the department, for children and, separately, for adults. * * * Section 6.3 describes the criteria for evaluating proposals. For Proposed Staffing Pattern and Licensure of Staff and Facilities, the evaluation criteria include, at 6.3 B.3.c: The ability of the proposer to ensure it has, and will continue to have, the resources necessary to provide mental health rehabilitation and support to children who are in the care and custody of the state or who have special needs, such as children who have been adopted or have been physically or sexually abused. About a year ago, Respondent issued RFP 9405, which also sought to procure mental health services on a capitated basis for Medicaid Area 6. Respondent received four proposals, which contained numerous deficiencies. Respondent later withdrew RFP 9405 for revisions to encourage more competition. Concerns over competition involve the role of Community Mental Health Centers (CMHC) in the procurement. CMHCs are publicly funded, not-for-profit entities that traditionally have provided five types of services: emergency, outpatient, day/night, inpatient, and prevention education. CMHCs now also operate crisis stabilization units and supply case management services, as well as specialized children's services, services for aged persons with severe and persistent mental illness, and services for persons with alcohol or drug dependencies. The RFP calls for a wide range of mental health care services, only part of which are community mental health services or other services presently provided by CMHCs. However, CMHCs constitute the only available network of existing providers of community mental health services to Medicaid clients in Medicaid Area 6. Medicaid payments account for about 30 percent of the revenue of Area 6 CMHCs. In late 1992, six CMHCs in Area 6 formed Florida Behavioral Health, Inc. in response to competition from one or more other provider networks, such as Charter. The competitive network of six CMHCs consisted of Manatee Glens Corp., Mental Health Care, Inc., Northside Mental Health Hospital, Peace River Center for Personal Development, Inc., Winter Haven Hospital, and Mental Health Services. Although the six CMHCs are not all of the CMHCs in Area 6, they provide nearly all of the community mental health services to Medicaid clients in Area 6. By early 1993, Florida Behavioral Health, Inc. formed Florida Health Partnership with Options Mental Health, Inc., which is a managed-care provider owned by First Hospital Corporation--a behavioral health management company. With the assistance of Florida Health Partnership, Options Mental Health, Inc. submitted a proposal in response to RFP 9405. An oral or written agreement between Florida Behavioral Health, Inc. and Options Mental Health, Inc. prohibited the six CMHCs from assisting any entity but Options Mental Health, Inc. in responding to RFP 9405. This agreement continues to prohibit the six CMHCs from assisting any entity but Options Mental Health, Inc. in responding to the RFP. The six CMHCs have shared with Options Mental Health, Inc. cost and utilization information. The importance of the unpublished cost information is unclear, and Petitioner has not yet made a public records request to obtain this information. The same is true of unpublished utilization information, which includes information on waiting lists for community mental health services. Any delay in providing community mental health services would have a bearing on the projected demand and thus the cost of a capitated plan. After withdrawing RFP 9405, Respondent revisited the requirement that offerors propose an existing network of providers. In an effort to encourage competition, Respondent deleted a requirement in RFP 9405 that proposals contain existing provider networks. Respondent substituted a requirement that proposals describe provider networks generally, without necessarily including names of subcontractors. Petitioner did not prove any fraudulent, illegal, arbitrary, or dishonest act by Respondent. The main thrust of Petitioner's case is that the effect of the RFP is illegal or arbitrary. Petitioner asserts that the RFP requires a sole source provider or, at minimum, precludes free and open competition. Petitioner argues that the RFP illegally and arbitrarily favors offerors of CMHCs, in partnership with CMHCs, or with subcontracts with CMHCs. Through testimony and argument, Petitioner asserts that various provisions of the RFP either exacerbate or fail to ameliorate the advantages enjoyed by CMHCs, especially due to RFP requirements of implementation of the new provider network in 60 days and with minimal disruption to Medicaid clients. RFP 1.4(2) encourages open and free competition. RFP 2.3 D disclaims any intent that only CMHCs may supply community mental health services. Petitioner's chief witness, Dr. Ronald Mihalick, testified that RFP 2.3 D favors CMHCs because state regulations have designated them the sole provider of community mental health services and government grants have funded their capital expenditures. Neither Dr. Mihalick, Petitioner's other witness, nor Petitioner's counsel has suggested a practical means by which to eliminate this advantage of CMHCs, which cannot, by executive or legislative fiat, be stripped of their buildings, equipment, or experienced staffs, nor of the advantages that may accrue to them by virtue of such assets. It would be counterproductive to eliminate CMHCs from direct or indirect participation in the subject procurement. Nor is Respondent required, if it were legally able, to assign to CMHCs the status of universal providers in order to eliminate illegality or arbitrariness from the RFP. The RFP seeks a broad range of mental health services, of which a substantial part are community mental health services. RFP 2.3 D represents a simple description of community mental health services and expressly negates the inference that only CMHCs may provide such services. RFP 2.3 E and F describes two of the five categories of mental health services: targeted case management and intensive case management, respectively. Intensive case management is a new service, and nothing suggests that Area 6 CMHCs have any direct experience that would give them an advantage in providing this new service, Targeted case management is an existing service provided by CMHCs. There is some doubt whether the RFP provides detailed cost information, including information about targeted case management. However, Petitioner has never made a public records request for such information from any of the CMHCs or Respondent. In any event, Petitioner has hardly presented sufficient evidence regarding targeted case management that the inclusion of such a service in the RFP is arbitrary or illegal. RFP 2.5 prescribes standards for minimum staffing, availability, and access. The minimum staffing standards do not require that existing service providers supply the specified services. For instance, "direct service mental health care providers" must be "licensed or eligible for licensure," as provided in RFP 2.5 B.3.a. Petitioner's objection is that the RFP expresses staffing standards in accordance with Medicaid guidelines, under which the CMHCs are already operating. This objection is puzzling because the procurement is for Medicaid services. In any event, the presence of such a provision does not render the RFP illegal or arbitrary for the reasons already stated. RFP 2.5 B.4 requires staffing ratios of one fulltime equivalency (FTE) per 20 mental health care case managers for children and one FTE per 40 mental health care case managers for adults. Again, though, the RFP does not require that such case managers must be currently employed by a CMHC or even currently providing such services. Petitioner legitimately objects to specifications expressed in terms of FTEs when applied to non-administrative services. The use of FTEs applies to fulltime employees, not to individual therapists who may see Medicaid clients on an occasional basis. The requirement that non-administrative services be expressed in FTEs unduly emphasizes process over product or outcome and is inconsistent with the spirit of the RFP. However, the use of FTEs in RFP 2.5 B.4 does not rise to the level of arbitrariness or illegality. As Respondent's chief witness, Marilyn Reeves, testified, an offeror may convert individual therapists to FTEs, even though the contractor may bear the risk of a faulty conversion formula. RFP 2.10 requires that the contractor implement the new capitated plan with minimal disruption to Medicaid clients, whose mental conditions may worsen from such disruption. Petitioner does not challenge this sensible provision. Petitioner instead argues that other pro-CMHC provisions preclude the implementation of a new plan with minimal disruption. Petitioner has failed to prove that the pro-CMHC provisions, except for 4.18 as discussed below, necessitate more than minimal disruption during the transition. RFP 4.17 provides that Respondent shall not pay the contractor's start-up or phase-down costs. Petitioner's objection is that government grants have paid for the capital expenditures of the CMHCs. For the reasons discussed in connection with RFP 2.3 D, Petitioner has failed to prove how this provision is arbitrary or illegal. RFP 5.1 D assigns 250 points for the proposed staffing pattern and requires the offeror to disclose "actual and proposed" FTE professionals, such as psychiatrists, case managers, and social workers. An offeror that has already identified its personnel may be able to provide a more detailed description and earn more points than another offeror that has yet to find its subcontractors. Likewise, RFP 5.1 D.5 requires a discussion of FTEs, although an offeror with as yet unidentified subcontractors probably can satisfy this section with a more generic discussion and not lose points. In any event, to the extent that the specification in terms of FTEs favors CMHCs, such a provision is not so onerous or unnecessary as to be arbitrary or illegal, as discussed in connection with 2.5 B.4. RFP 5.1 E assigns 400 points for operational functions and requires the offeror to "explicitly address its operational capacity to serve Medicaid recipients, and its previous history serving the Medicaid and other low income populations." Unlike RFP 5.1 C, which requires a proposal to address the contractor and its "major subcontractors," 5.1 E does not mention subcontractors, so this provision favors CMHCs even less than the other provisions of 5 and 6. Perhaps for this reason, neither Petitioner's witnesses nor Petitioner's proposed recommended order addressed RFP 5.1 E. RFP 5.1 F requires an offeror to provide a "detailed discussion," in which it shall "document a demonstrated ability to provide a comprehensive range of appropriate services . . .." An offeror with as yet unidentified subcontractors will likely be unable to supply nearly as much detail as an offeror with subcontractors already in place, but this provision would, if challenged, not be deemed arbitrary or illegal. However, Petitioner challenges only RFP 5.1 F.1 (Optional Services) and 5.1 F.4.a.3. Section 5.1 F.4.a.3 reiterates the requirement that the new capitated plan be implemented so as to "minimize disruption of services." As noted above, Petitioner of course does not object to this requirement, but uses it to show how other provisions are arbitrary or illegal. Petitioner objects to the portion of 5.1 F.1 identifying crisis stabilization units as an Optional Service. Although only CMHCs are licensed to operate crisis stabilization units, the same services are available from other sources, although often not as economically. Moreover, the crisis stabilization unit is only an Optional Service, which Respondent mentioned only for illustrative purposes. The last-cited option, "Other Services (List)," encourages offerors to devise creative options that may not involve such traditional providers as crisis stabilization units. RFP 6.3 B.3.c requires the offeror to ensure that "it has, and will continue to have, the resources necessary to provide mental health rehabilitation and support . . .." Satisfaction of the criteria of 6.3 B, like 5.1 C, D, and F, is easier for CMHCs and harder for contractors with as yet unidentified subcontractors. However, the advantage conferred upon CMHCs is not so great as to render 6.3 B arbitrary or illegal. To varying degrees, RFP 5.1 D.5, E.1, and F.1 (Optional Services) and 6.3 B.3.c prefer CMHCs or offerors affiliated with CMHCs. These provisions potentially conflict with the RFP provisions encouraging free and open competition and prohibiting more than minimal disruptions in service. The potential conflicts are partially attenuated by the ability of an offeror, prior to submitting a proposal, to identify subcontractors that may provide similar services to non-Medicaid clients or provide similar services to Medicaid clients in other areas of Florida or other states. RFP 5.1 D.5, E.1, and F.1 (Optional Services) and 6.3B impose qualitative standards upon the contractor and any subcontractors, whose employees have direct contact with the Medicaid clients. Non-CMHC offerors may nonetheless be able to identify, at the proposal stage, their subcontractors so as to earn the maximum points in these categories. For instance, offerors may find non-CMHC subcontractors providing community mental health services to non- Medicaid clients or to Medicaid clients elsewhere in Florida or the United States. With greater difficulty, non-CMHC offerors with as yet unidentified subcontractors may be able to project, at the proposal stage, features of their subcontractors. They may not be able to score as well as CMHCs and other offerors with already identified networks of community mental health service providers. However, to the extent that non-CMHCs are disadvantaged by these provisions, Petitioner has not shown that the inclusion of these provisions is arbitrary or illegal. These provisions ensure the delivery of quality mental health services. As likely as not, Petitioner has included these provisions after careful consideration of the benefits of further competitiveness and the costs of further limitations upon the participation of CMHCs. The final provision challenged by Petitioner is RFP 4.18, which acknowledges that the contractor may not itself provide the mental health services, but may contract with subcontractors for the provision of these services. Requiring that the contractor have subcontracts prior to the commencement of services under the new capitated plan, Section 4.18 adds that the contractor must submit for Respondent's written approval: signed subcontracts, for a complete provider network in order to obtain agency approval for operation in an area, within sixty days of the execution of this contract, for each proposed subcontracted service provider. Petitioner's challenge to RFP 2.3 D, E, and F; 2.5 A and B.3 and 4; and 4.17 fails because these provisions confer upon CMHCs an insignificant advantage, an advantage upon that could not be removed without eliminating CMHCs from the procurement, or an advantage while specifying an important substantive requirement. Petitioner's challenge to RFP 5.1 D.5, 5.1 E.1, 5.1F.1, and 6.3 B.3.c fails because these provisions, even if conferring significant advantages upon CMHCs, impose important qualitative requirements upon the delivery of mental health services to Medicaid clients. However, RFP 4.18 is different from these other provisions. It does not involve the actual delivery of mental health services to Medicaid clients. Section 4.18 dictates only how long after signing the contract with Respondent the contractor has to implement the new capitation contract. The advantage conferred by 4.18 upon CMHCs is neither trivial nor necessary. The federal waiver runs two years from the actual start-up date of the new capitation plan. Obviously, an inordinate delay in implementation might suggest that the contractor is unable to do the job, but nothing in the record suggests that 60 days marks the beginning of an inordinate delay. Respondent understandably wants to get the pilot project started quickly, presumably in anticipation of important cost savings. But these considerations do not rise to the importance of other provisions involving the actual delivery of mental health services to Medicaid clients. Non-CMHCs, especially offerors with as yet unidentified subcontractors, face a considerable task in plan implementation. For this procurement, only one offeror will have the assistance of the CMHCs, which gives that offeror a clear advantage in at least the community mental health and targeted case management categories. There is no good reason to increase this advantage by imposing an unrealistically short implementation timeframe on contractors. On the other hand, there are two reasons why the 60-day implementation timeframe is arbitrary and illegal: it conflicts with RFP provisions encouraging open competition and it conflicts with RFP provisions prohibiting more than a minimal disruption to clients. The new capitation plan represents a marked departure from past practice. The successful contractor is assuming considerable financial risks when it sets its fees and risk corridor, if any. This risk is spread over a wide geographic area containing some of Florida's most densely populated areas. Anticipated cost savings to the State may result in narrowed profit margins before the contractor can safely realize savings from reductions in the cost of mental health services provided to Medicaid clients. The success of the capitation plan is jeopardized if the contractor underestimates the revenue needed for the successful operation of the plan. The offeror without subcontractors at the time of submitting a proposal needs time to enlist the cooperation of CMHCs or other subcontractors. A witness of Respondent described a possible scenario in which CMHCs declined to cooperate with the contractor and were forced to terminate employees. Although these employees would be available to the contractor, they would not likely be available in a 60-day timeframe. A multitude of tasks confront the non-CMHC contractor, especially if the contractor does not have a subcontractor network in place when submitting the proposal. Not surprisingly, Respondent's witnesses did not offer a spirited defense of the 60-day implementation timeframe, as is partly illustrated by the following testimony of Respondent's chief witness: Q: Is there a reason that the language on Page 61 says "must have signed subcontract within 60 days?" A: No. What it is trying to get at there is that if you are going to start being operational within 60 days, you got to know that you got to get those subcontracts approved by us prior to being able to do that. Respondent's witness readily testified that the deadline would not be enforced, if the enforcement jeopardized the welfare of the Medicaid clients. Of course, given the vulnerability of the clients, Respondent would not require the implementation of an unfinished plan at the end of the contractual implementation timeframe, regardless of the duration of the implementation timeframe. But a rational deadline for implementation would not so readily invite discussions of waivers and extensions. The presence of an impractical deadline misleads offerors. Some offerors may obtain an unfair advantage by structuring their proposals without regard to the implementation timeframe, secure in the knowledge that it will not be enforced. Other offerors may limit Optional Services or avoid more creative delivery or administrative programs in order to ensure that their plans can be implemented within the arbitrarily short implementation timeframe. To eliminate arbitrary and illegal conflicts with other RFP provisions encouraging open competition and prohibiting more than minimal disruptions in service, the implementation timeframe of 60 days must be extended to at least 120 days.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order amending RFP 4.18 by inserting "120" days for "60" days in the second paragraph and making any necessary conforming changes elsewhere in the RFP, and, after making these changes, proceed with the subject procurement. ENTERED on January 31, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 31, 1995. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-4: (except that "poisonous" in paragraph 2 is rejected as melodramatic and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence): adopted or adopted in substance. 5: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence, except for 4.18. 6-7: adopted or adopted in substance, except that Petitioner did not challenge 5.1 E at the hearing or in the proposed recommended order. 8: rejected as irrelevant. 9-13: adopted or adopted in substance. 14: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. Petitioner did not prove that the actual information shared by the CMHCs was crucial--only that certain information could theoretically be crucial. 15: adopted or adopted in substance, although other CMHCs operate in Area 6, but do not possess much share of the community mental health services market. 16-17: rejected as irrelevant. 18: adopted or adopted in substance, except for the last sentence, which is rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence (except for 4.18). 19-20: adopted or adopted in substance. 21: rejected as repetitious. 22: adopted. 23-25: adopted or adopted in substance, except for last sentence of paragraph 25, which is rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 26-27: adopted or adopted in substance. 28: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 29-33: adopted or adopted in substance, except for last sentence of paragraph 33, which is rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 34: adopted or adopted in substance. 35-36: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 37-38: adopted or adopted in substance, although this was hypothetical testimony of one of Respondent's witness, not a formal statement of Respondent's "position." 39 (first sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 39 (second sentence): adopted. 40-44 (second sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 44 (third sentence): rejected as recitation of evidence. 45: adopted. 46-47: adopted or adopted in substance. 48: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 49: rejected as irrelevant and, except for 4.18, unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-5: adopted or adopted in substance. 6: adopted or adopted in substance, except for 4.18. 7: adopted or adopted in substance. 8: adopted or adopted in substance, at least to the extent that Petitioner failed to prove the contrary. 9 (except last sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 9 (last sentence): rejected as speculative. 10-16: adopted or adopted in substance, although the extent of Petitioner's ability to respond satisfactorily is questionable, as is the rationale for the use of FTEs for non-administrative positions. Additionally, all proposed findings that RFP provisions do not place non-CMHCs at a disadvantage, when such proposed findings conflict with findings in the recommended order, are rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, FL 32308 Harold D. Lewis, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303 Seann M. Frazier Mark A. Emanuele Panza Maurer P.A. 3081 East Commercial Blvd. Suite 200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33308 Paul J. Martin William H. Roberts Assistant Attorneys General Office of the Attorney General PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
Conclusions THIS CAUSE comes before the State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration. (the "Agency") regarding the approval of certificate of need ("CON") applications 10170 and 10171 filed by Oglethorpe or Orlando, Inc. (“Oglethorpe”). 1. Oglethorpe filed CON application No. 10170 to establish a 28-bed adult inpatient psychiatric hospital in Osceola County, Service District 7. The Agency approved Oglethorpe’s CON application 10170. 2. Oglethorpe also filed CON application 10171 to establish a 14-bed adult inpatient substance abuse hospital in Osceola County, Service District 7. The Agency approved 1 Filed October 21, 2013 3:45 PM Division of Administrative Hearings Oglethorpe’s CON application 10171. 3, University Behavioral, LLC, d/b/a University Behavioral Center (*UBC”) filed petitions for formal hearing challenging the Agency’s approval of both of Oglethorpe’s CON applications. 4, La Amistad Residential Treatment Center, LLC, d/b/a Central Florida Behavioral Hospital (“CFBH”) filed petitions to intervene contesting the Agency's approval of both of Oglethorpe’s CON applications. 5. The parties have since entered into the attached settlement agreement. (Ex. 1) IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 6. The parties’ settlement agreement is approved and the parties shall comply with the terms of the settlement agreement. 7. The approval of Oglethorpe’s CON application 10170 is UPHELD in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the parties’ settlement agreement. 8. The approval of Oglethorpe’s CON application 10171 is UPHELD in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the parties’ settlement agreement. ORDERED in Tallahassee, Florida on this wha day of Crfolee. 2013. Elizabeth Agency for Hpalth Care Administration
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this final order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing the original notice of appeal with the agency clerk of AHCA, and a copy along with the filing fec prescribed by law with the district court of appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Order has been furnished by U.S. Mail or electronic mail to the persons named below on this day of Cet OF er. 2013. Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (850) 412-3630 Janice Mills Facilities Intake Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) James McLemore, Supervisor Certificate of Need Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) W. David Watkins Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail) Lorraine M. Novak, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Ausley McMullen 123 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Counsel for Oglethorpe (U.S. Mail) Geoffrey D. Smith, Esquire Smith & Associates 2834 Remington Green Circle, Suite 201 Yallahassce, Florida 32308 Counsel for UBC and CFBH (U.S, Mail)
The Issue The issue presented herein is whether or not a CON to construct a 60-bed short-term psychiatric hospital in District XI should be issued to Florida Medical Center (FMC).
Findings Of Fact FMC seeks a CON for a 60-bed free-standing psychiatric facility to be located in the Key Largo area of Monroe County in HRS District XI. FMC intends to provide 6.25 percent of its patient days at no charge to indigent patients. It further intends to provide another 6.25 percent of its patient days to HRS' clients and Baker Act patients at 50 percent of its projected charge, or $200 per day. (FMC Exhibit 2, Table 7). FMC proposes to build this facility at a cost of $6,060,000. Dr. Richard Matthews, Ph.D., has been executive director of the Guidance Clinic of the Upper Keys since 1973 and is a clinical psychologist. He is responsible for the overall administration and supervision of mental health, alcohol, drug abuse and out-patient services provided under contract with HRS. Dr. Matthews was qualified as an expert in clinical psychology and the mental health delivery health system in Monroe County. (FMC Exhibit 13). There are three guidance clinics in Monroe County, one each for the upper, lower and middle Keys. HRS contracts through each of these clinics to provide mental health care for its clients. There are no community mental health centers in Monroe County and the clinics are the sole means of delivering mental health care on behalf of HRS' clients within the county. Currently, the guidance clinic of the upper Keys places its in- patients in Harbor View Hospital in Dade County at a cost of $236 per day. Neither Harbor View nor any other hospital provides free days to any of the guidance clinics for in-patient psychiatric care. (FMC Exhibit 13, P. 9) Jackson Memorial Hospital does not accept indigent or charity psychiatric patients from Monroe County. There have been occasions where patients without resources have been unable to be hospitalized although hospitalization was indicated. The middle Keys has a crisis hospitalization unit with a limited number of beds. Patients needing hospitalization longer than three days must be transferred to Harbor View or some other facility in the District. The 15 beds at Depoo Hospital in Key West are not readily accessible to residents of the upper Keys. Residents needing psychiatric services usually go to hospitals in Dade County. Coral Reef Hospital, the nearest psychiatric facility to Petitioner's proposed facility, has in the past refused to negotiate a discounted rate with the guidance clinic. Dr. Matthews, on one occasion, sent a patient to Coral Reef who was refused treatment. Currently, no psychiatrist practices in Key Largo because there are no psychiatric beds to which a psychiatrist could admit patients. The discounted rate of $200 per day quoted by FMC is some $36 per day less than the guidance clinic currently pays to providers for referrals of its patients for psychiatric care. Additionally, the 6.25 percent of free care that Petitioner proposes is greater than the free care which the guidance clinic currently receives from any facility since no facility presently gives any free care to the clinic. The guidance clinic supports Petitioner's CON application and will contract with Petitioner who provides services for in-patients. Grant Center is a long-term 140-bed psychiatric hospital specializing in the treatment of children and adolescents. It is the nearest facility to Petitioner's proposed facility. Grant Center has agreed to refer adult patients to Petitioner. Grant Center treats 2-3 adults a month who need psychiatric care. (FMC Exhibit 14). There is one hospital providing psychiatric care in Dade County which was surveyed by the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) in March, 1988. Currently, a third party insurance carrier no longer utilizes Grant Center because of price. If a facility has prices which carriers consider too expensive, utilization will go down. (FMC Exhibit 14, P. 7). Grant Center currently contracts with HRS to provide its clients care at a rate of approximately $350 per day, a rate one half of Grant Center's normal rate. Jackson Memorial is the only Dade County hospital which will treat an indigent psychiatric patient. Grant Center intends to assist Petitioner with staffing or programmatic needs. It has 80-100 professional staff, most of whom live in close proximity to Key Largo. Robert L. Newman, C.P.A., is the chief financial officer at FMC. He testified, by deposition, as an expert in hospital accounting and finance. Newman analyzed the Hospital Cost Containment Board (HCCB) reports for each hospital in District XI which provides psychiatric care. There is no free standing psychiatric hospital in the District which reports any indigent or uncompensated care. Among area acute care hospitals which have psychiatric units, Miami Jackson rendered 38.89 percent indigent care, Miami Children's rendered 6.5 percent indigent care, and no other facility reported that it rendered more than 1.75 percent indigent care. (FMC see Exhibit 11, disposition exhibit 1). Jackson provides no free care to Monroe County residents and Miami Children's care is limited to treating children while Petitioner is seeking adult beds. Jayne Coraggio testified (by deposition) as an expert in psychiatric staffing and hiring. She is currently Petitioner's director of behavioral sciences. The ideal patient to staff ratio is 4 to 5 patients per day per professional staff member. During the evening shift, the ideal patient ratio per professional staff member is 7 to 8 patients. (FMC Exhibit 12, PP. 6-7). Petitioner's facility is adequately staffed based on the above ratios. FMC is considered overstaffed in the psychiatric unit by some of the other area hospitals since they do not staff as heavily as does Petitioner. Lower staffing ratios can affect quality of care since patients and their families would not receive as much therapy. Family therapy is important because the family needs to know about changes in the patient in order to make corrective adjustments. The family that is required to travel in excess of 45 minutes or more one way is less likely to be involved in family therapy. Islara Souto was the HRS primary reviewer who prepared the state agency action report (SAAR) for Petitioner's CON application. (FMC Exhibit 15). District 11 has subdivided into five subdistricts for psychiatric beds. Florida is deinstitutionalizing patients from its mental hospitals. To the extent that private psychiatric hospitals do not accept nonpaying patients, their existence will not solve the problem of caring for such patients. Souto acknowledged that the local health councils conversion policy discriminates against subdistrict 5 because there are so few acute care beds in the subdistrict. In fact, the conversion policy actually exacerbates the maldistribution of beds in the district. (FMC 15, page 26). The psychiatric facility nearest the proposed site (Coral Reef), had an occupancy of 90.3 percent. Souto utilized a document entitled Florida Primary Health Care Need Indicators, February 1, 1986, and determined that Monroe County has not been designated as a health manpower shortage area, nor a medically underserved area. This information is relied upon by health planners to determine the availability of health manpower in an area. This report refers both to physicians and R.N.'s. The average adult per diem for free-standing hospitals in District 11 range from $430 at Charter to just over $500 at Harbor View. Although districts have established subdistricts for psychiatric beds, no psychiatric bed subdistrict in any district has been promulgated by HRS as a rule. The access standard that is relevant to this proceeding is a 45-minute travel standard contained in Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)5.G. That standard states: G. Access Standard. Short-term inpatient hospital psychiatric services should be available within a maximum travel time of 45 minutes under average travel conditions for at least 90 percent of this service area's population. Here, the standard refers to the service area which is determined to be an area different than a service district. Applying the travel time standard on a service area basis makes the most sense since the subdistrict is established by the local health council and not the applicant. Analyzing this access standard on a sub-district level, 90% of the sub-districts population is not within 45 minutes of any facility anywhere in sub-district V since the sub-district is more than two hours long by ordinary travel and the population is split two-thirds in lower Dade County and one-third in Monroe County, the bulk of which is in Key West. (FMC Exhibit 17). Therefore, a facility located on either end of this sub-district is not readily accessible by the applicable travel standards to citizens at the other end of the sub-district. This access standard must however be measured and considered with the needs for psychiatric services of the kind Petitioner is proposing to provide. Petitioner has not presented any access surveys or assessments of the caliber relied upon by the Department in the past. Petitioner's facility which would be located in the Key Largo area will no doubt provide better geographic accessibility to residents of District XI who live in the Key Largo area. HRS has in the past used a sub-district analysis to determine geographic accessibility for psychiatric beds even though it has not promulgated a rule for sub-districts for psychiatric beds. See, for example, Psychiatric Hospital of Florida vs. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and Pasco Psychiatric Center, DOAH Case No. 85-0780. Likewise, the Department has approved the conversion of acute-care beds to psychiatric beds even though it found that there was a surplus of psychiatric beds in the district. (Petitioner's Exhibit 7). The Department has in the past used a geographic access analysis to approve psychiatric beds in District XI and has used the sub- district analysis or a time travel analysis in its review of Cedars, Coral Reef, Depoo (for psychiatric beds) and the Glenbiegh case (for long term substance abuse). The bed need calculations for the January, 1992 planning horizon shows a surplus of 180 short-term in-patient psychiatric beds. (HRS Exhibit 2). The occupancy level for short-term psychiatric beds in the district is below 70%. (HRS Exhibit 2, pages 11-12). Additionally, the occupancy standards of the local and state health plan, of which the department is required to review CON applications, have not been met in this instance. (HRS Exhibit 2, Pages 6-7). Petitioner has not submitted any documentation to HRS regarding special circumstances need. Petitioner's proposal at final hearing for a staff referral agreement with another local hospital was not contained in the CON application filed with HRS. (FMC Exhibit 14, pages 11-12). Although Petitioner has alluded to some unspecified access problem for residents in the Florida Keys, Petitioner has not documented a real access problem and certainly not a demonstration of inaccessibility under the rule access standard. (Florida Administrative Code Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)5.g.)(HRS Exhibit 2, pages 14-15). Although the proposed project would increase availability and access for underserved groups in the district, the percentage of total patient days for "indigents" is not substantial and certainly not to the point to warrant deviation from the usual access criteria. 2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT: Petitioner's application for a Certificate of Need to build a 60-bed free- standing psychiatric hospital in District XI be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1989.
