The Issue Whether the Education Practices Commission should revoke or suspend Respondent's teaching certificate, or impose any other penalty provided by law, for the reasons cited in the Administrative Complaint filed July 12, 1994.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds Florida Educator's Certificate No. 182469, covering the areas of business education and vocational education. It is valid through June 30, 1997. Respondent filed an application for the renewal of her certificate. Respondent was formerly employed by the Brevard County School District. She retired from her employment with the school district in March 1994. In the case of United States of America v. Marguerite Y. Smith, Case Number 93-185-CR-Orl-18, the Respondent was charged by the Federal Grand Jury with the following: Marguerite Y. Smith knowingly and intentionally executed and attempted to execute the scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money and funds by means of false pretenses and representations, in that Marguerite Y. Smith, forged the signature of Jerry Bellomy on Check Nos. 001081 and 001071, presented those checks to Southeast Bank, N.A. for payment, and then used the proceeds of those checks for her own purposes. All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344. In the case of United States of America v. Marguerite Y. Smith, Case No. 93-198-CR-Orl-18, the Respondent was charged by the Federal Grand Jury with the following: On or about September 13, 1993, in Brevard County, Florida, in the Middle District of Florida, Marguerite A. Smith, the defendant herein, in a matter within the jurisdiction of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States, knowingly and willfully made a false, fictitious and fraudulent material statement and representation, in that the defendant certified that she had not, within a three year period preceding September 13, 1993, been convicted of commission of fraud or a criminal offense in connection with obtaining, attempting to obtain, or performing a public contract or subcontract, or with commission of theft, or with making false statements, whereas, as Marguerite A. Smith then and there well knew, on September 20, 1991, in the case of United States v. Marguerite A. Smith, Case No. 910166-CR-Orl- 19, Marguerite A. Smith was convicted of a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 665(A) theft from employment and training funds, arising from the submission of a false claim to obtain funds administered by a federal agency pursuant to the Job Training Partnership Act. All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001. Respondent plead not guilty to the charges and following a trial by jury was found guilty of both charges. On April 20, 1994, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of Bank Fraud and making a False Statement to an Agency of the United States. She was sentenced to be imprisoned for a term of fifteen months, followed by supervised release for a term of three years during which Respondent must pay $22,953.28 in restitution. Respondent was arrested on the above charges at Rockledge High School, where she was employed, during a school day on November 15, 1993. Two FBI agents went to the principal's office and told the principal that they came there to arrest Respondent. The principal went to Respondent's classroom and asked her to come with him to his office, whereupon she was arrested and taken to detention by the FBI agents. The principal was contacted by the local radio station and one of the major news networks sent a television crew to the school for an on-campus interview. There was television and radio coverage of the fact that Respondent was arrested. There was widespread knowledge of her arrest among the students at the school, their parents and the community at large. Respondent's arrest and conviction was the subject of newspaper articles in Florida Today on January 5, 1994, and The Orlando Sentinel on November 16, 1993. Respondent is not eligible for rehire by the Brevard County School District because she had been found guilty of a felony and that Respondent's effectiveness as a teacher has been damaged. In a prior case, an Administrative Complaint was filed against Respondent on May 12, 1993, alleging that Respondent submitted a fraudulent claim to receive federal funds and that she pled guilty to the charge of Obtaining Federal Funds by Fraud, Betty Castor v. Marguerite Smith, Case No. 93-067-RT, EPC Index No. 93-197-FOI. As a result of that administrative proceeding, Respondent was disciplined by the Education Practices Commission (EPC) in a Final Order issued on December 24, 1993. Respondent was placed on four years probation and was issued a letter of reprimand by the EPC.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission issue a Final Order finding Marguerite Smith guilty of violating the provisions of Sections 231.28(1)(c)(e)(f) and (2), Florida Statutes. It is further RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued revoking Respondent's teaching certificate for a period of seven years. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of December, 1997, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara J. Staros, Esquire Post Office Box 3444 Tallahassee, Florida 32315 Lorene C. Powell, Esquire Chief Trial Counsel FEA/United 118 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1700 Kathleen Richards, Executive Director Professional Practices Services 224-E Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Program Director Professional Practices Services 351 Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation of Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes, alleged in the Administrative Complaint? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is a Florida-licensed real estate salesperson, and derives a substantial portion of his income from real estate-related activities. Respondent holds License No. 0648469. He received his license after passing the real estate salesperson licensure examination on March 17, 1998. Initially, his license was inactive. Since April 3, 1997, however, it has been in active status. During this period of time, Respondent has been associated with L. B. Slater and Company, Inc., an owner/developer headquartered in Hollywood, Florida. In the 1970's and 1980's, prior to obtaining his real estate salesperson license, Respondent was a defendant in several criminal proceedings. His legal problems stemmed from his use of alcohol and drugs. On or about October 12, 1976, in Broward County Circuit Court Case No. 75-5275CF, Respondent entered a plea of no contest to one count of threatening to destroy property, a lesser included offense of the crime with which he had been originally charged: discharging a destructive device. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Respondent was placed on probation for three years. On or about April 5, 1984, in Broward County Circuit Court Case No. 84-1108CF, Respondent entered a plea of no contest to one count of possession of cocaine. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Respondent was placed on probation for two and a half years. On or about May 19, 1985, in Broward County Circuit Court Case No. 84-11197CF, Respondent entered a plea of no contest to two counts of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Respondent was placed in a community control program for 18 months. On or about June 26, 1985, in Broward County Circuit Court Case No. 84-1108CF, Respondent entered a plea of guilty to a charge that he had violated his probation. Respondent's probation was revoked, and he was placed in a community control program for a period of 18 months. In or about 1986, Respondent decided that he needed "to turn [his] life around." He began attending Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous meetings, 1/ and was successful in his efforts to end his reliance upon alcohol and drugs. He has not used drugs or alcohol since July 28, 1986. During this period of sobriety, Respondent has been a productive and law abiding member of society. Having fully rehabilitated himself, Respondent, on or about January 28, 1997, filed with the Department an application for licensure as a real estate salesperson, which contained the following signed and notarized "Affidavit of Applicant": The above named, and undersigned, applicant for licensure as a real estate salesperson under the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as amended, upon being duly sworn, deposes and says that (s)(he) is the person so applying, that (s)(he) has carefully read the application, answers and the attached statements, if any, and that all statements are true and correct, and are as complete as his/her knowledge, information and records permit, without any evasions or mental reservations whatsoever; that (s)(he) knows of no reason why this application should be denied; and (s)(he) further extends this affidavit to cover all amendments to this application or further statements to the Division or its representatives, by him/her in response to inquiries concerning his/her qualifications. Item 9 on the Department form that Respondent used to apply for licensure read as follows: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty , or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendre (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. If you intend to answer "NO" because you believe those records have been expunged or sealed by court order pursuant to Section 943.058, Florida Statutes, or applicable law of another state, you are responsible for verifying the expungement or sealing prior to answering "NO." 2/ If you answered "Yes," attach the details including dates and outcome, including any sentence and conditions imposed, in full on a separate sheet of paper. Your answer to this question will be checked against local, state and federal records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure . If you do not fully understand this question, consult with an attorney or the Division of Real Estate. In response to the question asked in item 9, Respondent knowingly and intentionally checked the box marked "No," notwithstanding that he had previously pled no contest to criminal charges in Broward County Circuit Court Case Nos. 75- 5275CF, 84-1108CF, and 84-11197CF. In answering the question in the negative, Respondent did not intend to mislead or deceive those who would be reviewing his application about his past, nor did he act with reckless disregard for the truth. At the time he answered the question, Respondent had not forgotten that he had entered pleas of no contest in Broward County Circuit Court Case Nos. 75-5275CF, 84-1108CF, and 84- 11197CF; however, he thought, based upon what he had been told by his criminal defense attorney approximately 11 years earlier, that the records of these criminal proceedings had been sealed and that therefore he could lawfully respond to the question in the negative. Had he known that he was required to disclose the pleas he had entered in Broward County Circuit Court Case Nos. 75-5275CF, 84-1108CF, and 84-11197CF, he would have done so. It was not unreasonable for Respondent to believe that, in responding to this question, he was not obligated to make such disclosure, particularly in light of the language in item 9 clearly suggesting that an applicant could "answer 'NO' because . . . the records [of the criminal prosecution of the applicant] ha[d] been expunged or sealed by court order." Respondent had already been told by an attorney that the records in Broward County Circuit Court Case Nos. 75-5275CF, 84-1108CF, and 84-11197CF had been sealed, and he saw no need to, and therefore did not, obtain any further verification of the "sealing." He assumed that the Department would conduct the "check" of "local, state and federal records" it indicated, in item 9, it would perform and that, if such a "check" revealed that his attorney had provided him with erroneous information concerning the "sealing" of the records in Broward County Circuit Court Case Nos. 75-5275CF, 84-1108CF, and 84-11197CF, the Department would bring the matter to his attention before acting on his application. Respondent did not receive any pre-licensure correspondence from the Department advising him that there was any problem with his application. As noted above, the Department, on March 17, 1998, issued him a real estate salesperson license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1998.
Findings Of Fact By agreement with the prosecution Dr. Brown had sought to delay consideration of his procedural motion to dismiss DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076, pertaining to the patients J.C., D.R., T.E. and K.J. The parties to that action anticipated considering the motion at the final hearing as part of the case on the merits. The hearing officer was persuaded that the procedural motion to dismiss had to be examined separate and apart from the consideration of the case on the merits as to those four patients. Consequently the motion to dismiss was entertained concerning its evidential and legal basis prior to a hearing on the merits. This led to the decision on June 9, 1992, to dismiss the action pertaining to treatment of the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E., with leave to refile at some future date. The decision to dismiss was based upon the pertinent facts and law when examined in accordance with Section 455.255(1), Florida Statutes. The motion to dismiss the action concerning treatment of the patient K.J. was denied. The reason for the dismissal was announced in the record on June 9, 1992, and memorialized in the transcript of the proceedings. It was concluded that there was not an adequate basis to institute an investigation concerning the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E.; that the Department of Professional Regulation, now the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, did not furnish Dr. Brown or his attorney with a copy of the complaint or the document that resulted in the initiation of the investigation pertaining to the three patients; and, that Dr. Brown did not have the statutorily mandated opportunity to respond to the accusations made against him related to the care that he provided those three patients. Therefore, the procedural requirements under Section 455.225(1), Florida Statutes, had not been met and the case as it pertained to the three patients was dismissed with leave to refile. The procedural requirements related to the patient K.J. had been met and it was appropriate to present the K.J. case to the Probable Cause Panel for its deliberation, unlike the circumstance with the other three patients. It was determined that the quality of consideration by the Probable Cause Panel when voting to prosecute Dr. Brown for his treatment of K.J. was adequate. Based upon the ruling directed to the treatment of patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. the Department of Professional Regulation was not allowed to proceed against Dr. Brown for the care rendered those patients. A subsequent recommended order addressed in substance the prosecutions associated with DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076 pertaining to the patient K.J.; DPR Case Nos. 011343 and 011344/DOAH Case No. 91-5325 and DPR Case Nos. 8901804, 0111385 and 0111353/DOAH Case No. 91-6358, traced the history of those cases in the preliminary statement to the recommended order and identified the prior ruling dismissing the actions pertaining to the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. That recommended order was not an invitation to the Board of Medicine to respond to a recommendation of dismissal. The recommended order in the cases pertaining to patients other than J.C., D.R., and T.E. was entered on December 30, 1992, based upon the formal hearing conducted pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, on various dates in June and July, 1992, and concluded on July 10, 1992, before the present hearing officer. On February 26, 1993, the Board entered its final order in the above- referenced cases and commented to the effect that it had approved the recommended dismissal by the hearing officer concerning the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. with leave to refile. Neither party appealed the hearing officer's decision dismissing those counts within DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076 directed to the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. On March 8, 1993, Dr. Brown took an appeal from the final order of the Board of Medicine entered on February 26, 1993, which included the comment approving the actions by the hearing officer in dismissing the counts pertaining to the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E., but without prejudice to bring those actions again following compliance with Section 455.225, Florida Statutes. Robert C. Brown, Jr., M.D., is a licensed physician practicing in the state of Florida. He has held a license entitling him to practice in that state at all times relevant to the inquiry. At relevant times Dr. Brown has practiced medicine at 4519 Brentwood Avenue, Jacksonville, Florida, 32206. He is the sole medical practitioner of an incorporated professional practice. He has had less than 25 employees and his net worth has been not more than 2 million dollars. Dr. Brown is the only share holder in his incorporated professional association. No one else has ownership interest in the incorporated professional association. At times Dr. Brown has drawn a salary from the professional association as an employee of the professional association. His request for attorney's fees and costs are directed to the actions of the Department of Professional Regulation for its procedural noncompliance with Section 455.225, Florida Statutes, and the subsequent decision of the Board of Medicine to find probable cause and to have the Department of Professional Regulation proceed against Dr. Brown for care rendered the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. The action to recover attorney's fees and costs not to exceed $15,000 was filed on April 27, 1993. The petition for attorney's fees and costs of April 27, 1993, was amended on July 15, 1993. Dr. Brown retained the law firm of Stowell, Anton and Kraemer to represent him in the aforementioned cases pertaining to the administrative prosecutions. His present attorney, Julie Gallagher, was principal counsel in those cases. No issue has been taken with the notion that $165.00 is a reasonable hourly rate for her services in defending Dr. Brown in the administrative prosecutions. Dr. Brown has paid all fees and costs charged by his lawyer in preparation for and participating in the proceedings related to the administrative prosecutions. To challenge the alleged procedural infirmities associated with the right to investigate, notice to the accused, opportunity for the accused to respond to the accusations and deliberations by the Probable Cause Panel contemplated by Section 455.225, Florida Statutes, it was not necessary for Dr. Brown to fully develop his defense on the merits of the accusations pertaining to patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. Dr. Brown's counsel in the exhibit associated with claims for attorney's fees and costs has highlighted the exhibit through color-codes in an attempt to assist the hearing officer in understanding the meaning of that exhibit. This color-code system attempts to identify those instances in which Dr. Brown claims that the work done on his behalf is associated only with patients with J.C., D.R. and T.E. and other occasions where a percentage is set forth in relation to work done in the entire DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076, to include K.J. and in the other cases referenced before. The code is described in the August 16, 1993 cover letter from counsel for Dr. Brown. No attempt is made through the coding system to differentiate between those actions taken in moving to dismiss DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076 pertaining to the patients J.C., D.R. and T.E. from other activities related to defending the accusations about those patients on the merits. The right to recover, if at all, is limited to those attorney's fees and costs associated with the motion to dismiss counts pertaining to the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E., together with the attorney's fees and costs associated with the present case. No other efforts by Dr. Brown's attorneys may be the proper subject for recovery. Not only was it not necessary to know information concerning the merits of the administrative complaint pertaining to patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. to pursue the motion to dismiss on procedural grounds, the decision that was made did not resolve the merits set forth in the administrative complaints directed to Dr. Brown's treatment of J.C., D.R., and T.E. The possibility exists that Dr. Brown could be called upon to defend against similar accusations to those set forth in the DPR Case No. 91-06883/DOAH Case No. 92-1076 at which time he could prepare himself to defend the merits and if successful that would be the appropriate moment to seek attorney's fees and costs for that aspect of the case. The arrangement by stipulation between the parties in the prior prosecution to delay consideration of the motion to dismiss until the place at which prosecution of the cases involving J.C., D.R., and T.E. were being examined on their merits was not appropriate. Consequently, Dr. Brown may not assert that he was required to prepare his motion to dismiss on procedural grounds simultaneously with his defense on the merits of the administrative complaint directed to the patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. Within this context, taking into account a lack of opposition to the $165.00 hourly rate charged by Dr. Brown's counsel, the following amounts are found to be associated with the pursuit of the motion to dismiss those counts related to patients J.C., D.R., and T.E. and claims under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, to recover attorney's fees and costs: 3/11/92-$165.00; 3/14/92-$165.00; 3/16/92-$125.00; 3/31/92-$100.00; 4/2/92-$247.50; 4/6/92- $62.50; 4/6/92-$198.00; 4/10/92-$50.00; 4/16/92-$10.00; 4/17/92-$50.00; related to the motion to dismiss and 4/27/93-$165.00; 5/3/93-$33.00; 5/12/93-$15.00; 5/17/93-$82.50; 6/14/93-$165.00; related to the prosecution of the petition for attorney's fees and costs. No proof was offered concerning any special circumstances that point to any injustice in awarding attorney's fees and costs in the amount identified.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto Respondent was a licensed dentist in Florida holding license number DN 0001025. Respondent graduated from Emory University Dental School in 1945, thereafter served two years apprenticeship with a practicing orthodontist before opening his own office in Coral Gables, Florida, where he practiced orthodontics for some 25 years before selling his practice and moving to the Tampa Bay area. Respondent is eligible for board certification. In November 1981 Respondent was working as an orthodontist at the Sheppard Dental Clinic in Seminole, Florida. On November 23, 1981, Valarie Rosenfeld went to Respondent to discuss orthodontic treatment to correct a deep overbite and severe overjet. At the time of this visit Miss Rosenfeld was 17 years old and had a severe Class II skeletal discrepancy with a 9.5 degree discrepancy between upper and lower jaws and an overjet of 12 mm. Respondent took some seven photographs of Miss Rosenfeld (Exhibit 2) showing generally the condition of her teeth and her facial profile. Be also took a cephalometric x-ray (Exhibit 3) and a panoramic x-ray (Exhibit 4) of Miss Rosenfeld. Respondent advised Miss Rosenfeld that it would be necessary to extract one tooth in her upper jaw and maybe a second tooth in order to improve her appearance. The purpose of this extraction was to make room in which to move the upper teeth to reduce the overjet. Respondent did not discuss surgery with Rosenfeld or fully explain to her the options available and the probable consequences of each of the options she may elect. Miss Rosenfeld has a thin maxillary bone which does not show up very well on the cephalometric x-ray taken due to a burnout in this x-ray at the location this fact could be determined. Absent adequate bone in which to move teeth it becomes very difficult to obtain much movement. In accordance with orders issued by Respondent Miss Rosenfeld's tooth number 12 was extracted by another dentist at a subsequent visit to the clinic. Respondent next saw Rosenfeld on December 16, 1981, when he put separators between her teeth to make room for bonds. Respondent intended first to install light wire braces to better level the teeth before this was replaced by heavier wire which would be tightened from time to time to move the upper teeth back and the lower teeth forward. Although he testified he planned to reduce the malocclusion using intrusion mechanics Respondent did not discuss with Miss Rosenfeld the headgear which she would have to wear at night during this process or fully explain the procedure to her. Following her December 16 visit, Rosenfeld was seen by a Dr. Bryant, an orthodontist who was replacing Respondent at the Sheppard Dental Clinic. Bryant saw Rosenfeld on December 22, 1981, when he fitted and cemented bonds on the teeth and put in the flexwire to level the teeth. She was next seen at the clinic on January 23 when Bryant religated the flexwire. The next visit on February 15, 1981, Bryant again religated the braces. Rosenfeld was last seen by Respondent on March 20, 1982, when he religated upper arch and observed lower arch. Rosenfeld was seen on April 24, 1982, by Bryant who advised her that three additional extractions would be required to correct the malocclusion. Rosenfeld then decided to obtain a second opinion before losing anymore teeth and went to see another orthodontist, John Harrison. When Dr. Harrison examined Rosenfeld he explained the three options available to her to wit: (1) do nothing, (2) attempt some movement of the teeth to reduce the overjet and overbite and (3) surgery. Dr. Harrison took additional x-rays and attempted to obtain the dental records from Sheppard's Dental Clinic but without much success. By this time Respondent no longer worked at Sheppard's and Harrison became quite frustrated by the lack of cooperation he got in attempting to obtain Rosenfeld's records. He received only the panoramic x-ray. Harrison made models of Rosenfeld's mouth, took cephalometric x-rays, made intra and extra-oral photographs and did quite a number of tracings from the cephalometric x-rays to better ascertain the misalignment of the upper and lower jaws. He discussed the various options with Rosenfeld and, at her request, commenced the mechanical intrusion needed to move the upper teeth back and the lower teeth forward. Harrison would not have extracted tooth number 12 because there is insufficient maxillary bone to allow much movement of the upper teeth or to fill the void created by the extraction. Harrison further opined that the orthodontic problem faced by Rosenfeld is wholly in the lower jaw and this can be fully corrected only by risky and expensive surgery. Attempting to correct the problem by retracting the upper teeth is, in his opinion, the wrong approach. He considers the entire problem is in the lower arch and retracting the upper teeth, which are satisfactory, to obtain a better alignment between the upper and lower teeth, simply creates another problem, viz. changing the existing good profile of the upper lip. Furthermore the thin maxillary bone in which the upper teeth are being moved is not adequate to accomplish much movement of the teeth and when the bonds are removed the upper teeth will likely return to their original position or close thereto. The cephalometric x-ray taken by Respondent on November 23, 1981, was overexposed in the part of the x-ray which would best show Rosenfeld's maxillary bone and thereby alert Respondent to the problem of moving the upper teeth. Dr. Harrison formed his opinion that Respondent's diagnosis and treatment of Rosenfeld was below minimum acceptable standards on his initial assumption (from the records he obtained from Sheppard's Dental Clinic) that the diagnosis and course of treatment were made with panoramic x-rays only. When he learned the day before the hearing that Respondent also had the benefit of the cephalometric x-ray, Harrison hedged his opinion and ultimately concluded that Respondent's diagnosis and course of treatment did reach minimal acceptable standards. Petitioner also called Dr. DeDominico, an orthodontist, who, at the request of Petitioner, examined Rosenfeld and her dental records. DeDominico concurred with Harrison that extraction of tooth number 12 was not indicated and it is unlikely the space vacated by the removal of that tooth can be closed by the movement of the other teeth on the upper jaw. DeDominico further opined that and adequate diagnosis could not be made from the x-rays taken by Respondent due to the "burnout" in this critical area of the cephalometric x-ray which concealed the thinness of Rosenfeld's maxillary bone. Failure to retake this x-ray before embarking on a plan of treatment that required an adequate maxillary bone for success, and that included an unnecessary extraction was, in his opinion, below the minimal acceptable standards for the dental profession. Respondent testified that his more than 20 years experience in orthodontics qualified him to properly diagnose Rosenfeld's problem without doing tracings from the cephalometric x-ray, and that he considered the cephalometric x-ray adequate for the diagnosis that was made. Further, extraction of tooth number 12 was necessary to provide space into which the upper could be moved to accomplish the retraction of the upper teeth desired. He did not explain the available options to Rosenfeld and never considered surgery as a viable option for the orthodontic problem presented by Rosenfeld. He also failed to apprise her of the full implications of the treatment he planned, such as headgear, for the mechanical intrusion or of the limited success to be expected from this procedure. Respondent's expert witnesses, whose depositions were received into evidence as Exhibits 9 and 10, both opined that the diagnosis and treatment of Rosenfeld by Respondent met minimum acceptable standards of the dental profession. One of these witness' credibility is somewhat tarnished by his testimony that the mandible can be induced to grow in an adult. Not only was this testimony deemed incredible by other expert witnesses but also even a layman generally understands that the skeletal structure does not continue to grow after maturity.
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to hear this cause, alleging that Respondent Employer has committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Following a July 28, 2003, "Notice of Determination: No Jurisdiction," by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief as more fully described below. On or about September 3, 2003, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. It appearing on the face of the referral package that Respondent did not regularly employ 15 persons and that therefore Respondent did not qualify as an "employer" under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, a September 12, 2003, Order was entered scheduling a telephonic hearing for October 1, 2003, and permitting the filing of any documents in support of the parties' respective positions. Respondent's "Submission of Materials in Support of Dismissal of Petition and Supporting Memorandum of Law" was served by United States Mail on September 25, 2003. It contained a prayer for dismissal. Pursuant to Rule 28-106.204, Florida Administrative Code, Petitioner was entitled to respond in writing by October 6, 2003. Petitioner did not respond. Respondent's "Supplemental Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction" was served upon Petitioner by hand-delivery, by United States Mail, and by "e-mail" on September 26, 2003. Per Rule, Petitioner was entitled to file a written response by October 8, 2003. Petitioner did not respond. A Corrected Order entered September 26, 2003, permitted the parties until October 7, 2003, to submit any documents tending to support or refute jurisdiction by the Division of Administrative Hearings over this cause. This Order also rescheduled the telephonic hearing for October 9, 2003. Petitioner filed nothing in response to either the September 12, 2003, Order or the September 26, 2003, Corrected Order. At the October 9, 2003, telephonic conference call, Respondent appeared through counsel. The opening of hearing was delayed five minutes, but Petitioner did not appear. Thereafter, oral argument upon all Motions proceeded without Petitioner. Petitioner still had not called in to the meet-me telephone number after 15 minutes, and the telephonic hearing was concluded. In an abundance of caution, an Order to Show Cause was entered on October 10, 2003, giving Petitioner 10 days in which to show cause, in writing, filed with the Division, why this cause should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner has filed nothing. Therefore, Respondent's documentation, including but not limited to: Respondent's accountants’ affidavits and its payroll journals, unemployment tax returns, and a payroll schedule, may be presumed true and accurate. All the documentation supports a finding that Respondent never employed more than 14 people for any one week in the year 2001 and employed 15 or more employees for only one week (December 21-28, 2002) in the year 2002.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing this cause for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Truman Jeffery Mayfield 902 Phillips Street Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Robert G. Riegel, Jr., Esquire Ryan R. Fuller, Esquire Coffman, Coleman, Andrews & Grogan, P.A. Post Office Box 40089 Jacksonville, Florida 32203
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings retains jurisdiction to conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if the Charge of Discrimination has not been filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations within 180 days of the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60Y-5.001(a), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a white male, who was 58 years of age at the relevant time, and is a former associate professor in the School of Communications at the University of Central Florida. In 1988-89, Petitioner was an untenured professor, with tenure decisions pending the following year. Petitioner alleges that the director of his department began practicing a pattern of discriminatory conduct by placing false information in his evaluation file which ultimately affected his rating and with the intent to deny him tenure. On October 8, 1990, Petitioner discovered that the ratings for 1989-90 had been changed by the director of the department. As a result of this action, Petitioner filed a grievance with the United Faculty of Florida (UFF). Petitioner did not file a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) as a result of this event. On May 16, 1991, Petitioner acknowledged receipt of an evaluation by the Chair of the department which Petitioner alleges was inaccurate and incorrect. As a result of this action, Petitioner filed a grievance with the union and with the President's office on June 7, 1991. A Settlement of the grievance was signed on September 6, 1991. On January 8, 1992, Petitioner discovered that the settlement had not been implemented by the university. On July 19, 1991, Petitioner was denied tenure and offered a terminal contract, which indicated that it would not be renewed beyond the indicated date. On August 26, 1991, Petitioner accepted the contract. On March 30, 1992, Petitioner filed with the FCHR a Charge of Discrimination. Petitioner alleged that UCF committed age discrimination against him by filing improper evaluations of his teaching performance in 1990 and again in 1991, and that as a result of that unlawful employment practice he was improperly denied tenure and placed on a terminal contract.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner in FCHR Case No. 92-3504 and DOAH Case No. 93-6414 for failure to timely file his original Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott Silzer, Esquire University of Central Florida P. O. Box 160015 Orlando, Florida 32816-0015 Mr. Guy McCann 1510 Mizell Avenue Winter Park, Florida 32789 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Suite 240 Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Suite 240 Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Rodney G. Green and Charter Realty, Inc. (petitioners) are both small business parties within the meaning of Subsection 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1984). This is not disputed by respondent. They are licensed real estate brokers actively engaged in the real estate business in Oveido, Florida. On February 1, 1985 respondent, Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate (Division), filed an administrative complaint against petitioners alleging that they had violated certain provisions within Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, in connection with a real estate transaction that occurred in 1984. After hearing a Recommended Order was entered by the undersigned on July 3, 1985 dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The Recommended Order was adopted as a Final Order by the Division on August 20, 1985. There is no judicial review of that order. By adopting the Recommended Order, respondent's Final Order sustains petitioners' position that no impropriety or unlawful conduct occurred. The petition for attorney's fees and costs was filed on October 7, 1985 and is therefore timely. With leave of the undersigned an amended petition was later filed on October 25, 1985. Respondent filed its response on November 15, 1985. To defend against the Division's action, petitioners engaged the services of an attorney. According to an affidavit attached to the amended petition; petitioners have incurred $399.50 in costs and $2,287.50 in legal fees. These costs are found to be reasonable since respondent has not filed a counter-affidavit questioning their reasonableness. According to petitioners' affidavit, the disciplinary action in Case NO. 85-0735 was substantially unjustified because of the following reasons: The actions of the state agency in bringing this proceeding and prosecuting it through formal hearing were not substantially justi- fied and under the circumstances it would be just to award attorney's fees and costs to Respondents pursuant to Subsection 57.111, Florida Statutes. Respondent's affidavit responds in the following manner: The Petitioner acted within the scope of its judicatory responsibilities as prescribed in Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, when it initiated and advocated that administrative disciplinary action be taken against the licensees of Respondent's Rodney G. Green and Charter Realty, Inc. In accordance with the pre-existing statutory and regulatory re- quirements, petitioner's actions in this matter conformed to and were consistent with the aforementioned delegated authority. At all times relevant, the Petitioner's acts were "substantially justified" in that there was a reasonable basis in law and fact that the Respondents had violated Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The administrative complaint in Case NO. 85-0735 generally alleged that petitioners had solicited and obtained a sales contract from certain prospective purchasers of property, that the purchasers had given respondents a $20,000.00 cash deposit to be held in escrow, and that when the transaction did not close petitioners failed to return the deposit to the purchasers until they complained to the Division. The complaint also charges petitioners with having failed to properly place the deposit in their escrow account, and with having failed to notify the Division when conflicting demands for the deposit were made. In an attempt to substantiate the charges, the agency presented the testimony of the principal purchaser and offered into evidence certain documentation concerning the transaction. The charges were ultimately determined to be without merit, and the complaint was dismissed.
