The Issue Whether Respondent, The Citrus Store, a citrus fruit dealer, owes Petitioner, Hutchinson Groves, Inc., a grower of Florida citrus products, a sum of money for citrus fruit harvested from Petitioner's groves. SUMMARY DISPOSITION On or about December 16, 2003, Petitioner, Hutchinson Groves, Inc., filed a complaint with the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (the "Department"), alleging that Respondent, The Citrus Store, owes Petitioner the sum of $27,117.59, for oranges harvested from Petitioner's groves by Respondent pursuant to a written contract. Respondent conceded that it owed some lesser amount to the owner of the groves in question. However, the matter was complicated by the fact that, subsequent to the execution of the contract with Respondent, Petitioner had sold those groves to a third party who also asserted a claim to the proceeds from the sale of the fruit to Respondent. The matter was the subject of litigation in the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Highlands County (Case No. GC-02-587), which caused the Department to delay forwarding the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings until December 2, 2005. The case was assigned to the undersigned and set for hearing on February 2, 2006. The hearing was convened as scheduled. Prior to the taking of testimony, the parties discussed settlement of the matter. At the conclusion of their discussions, the parties stipulated: that the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over this matter and the parties thereto pursuant to Section 120.569 and Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2005); that, at all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was a "producer" pursuant to Subsection 601.03(29), Florida Statutes; that, at all times relevant to this proceeding, The Citrus Store was a "citrus fruit dealer" pursuant to Subsection 601.03(8), Florida Statutes; that Respondent owes Petitioner $27,117.59 for the oranges harvested from Petitioner's groves; and that no interest would be sought or assessed against Respondent on the principal amount owing to Petitioner. Based on the foregoing stipulations, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered requiring Respondent, The Citrus Store, to pay to Petitioner, Hutchinson Groves, Inc., the principal sum of $27,117.59, without interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Alves Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland Post Office Box 87 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 William Hutchinson Hutchinson Groves, Inc. 1323 Edgewater Point Drive Sebring, Florida 33870 Clifford R. Rhoades, Esquire Clifford R. Rhoades, P.A. 227 North Ridgewood Drive Sebring, Florida 33870 Anthony W. Surber, Esquire Harbsmeier, DeZayas, Harden & DeBari, L.L.P. 5116 South Lakeland Drive Lakeland, Florida 33813 Chris Green, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Division of Marketing 407 South Calhoun Street, Mail Station 38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Has Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc. (Respondent) paid Petitioner, Chastain- Bishop Farms (Petitioner) in full for watermelons represented by Respondent's load numbers 3002 and 3004 purchased from Petitioner during the 1995 watermelon season?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a "producer" of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. Watermelons come within the definition of "agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent was issued license number 8887 by the Department which is supported by Bond Number 137743741 in the amount of $75,000 written by Respondent Continental Casualty Company (Continental), as surety, with an inception date of January 1, 1995, and an expiration date of December 31, 1995. The Complaint was timely filed by Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes. Sometime during the week prior to Monday, May 8, 1995, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a verbal agreement which contained the following terms: (a) Petitioner would sell Respondent a semi-trailer load of medium size melons of good quality to be harvested and loaded by Petitioner onto a semi-trailer furnished by Respondent; (b) Respondent would have the right and opportunity to inspect the melons before or during loading; (c) Respondent would pay Petitioner fifteen cents ($0.15) per pound for the melons loaded onto the trailer; (d) upon delivery at Petitioner's farm, the melons became Respondent's property and Petitioner had no further obligation to Respondent concerning the melons; and (e) settlement was to be made by Respondent within a reasonable time. Subsequent to the above agreement, Petitioner sold and Respondent bought, a second semi-trailer load of melons to be delivered under the same terms and conditions as agreed in the above verbal agreement. On Friday, May 5, 1995, Respondent's agent, Robert Allen and T. J. Chastain, a partner in Chastain-Bishop Farms, had a disagreement concerning Eddie Idlette, Respondent's inspector, being on the Petitioner's farm. Because of an incident in the past involving Idlette and Petitioner, Chastain did not want Idlette on Petitioner's farm and made this known to Allen. As result of this disagreement, Idlette left the Petitioner's farm and was not present on Monday or Tuesday, May 8 & 9, 1995, to inspect the two loads of melons. Allen testified that Chastain also excluded him from Petitioner's farm at this time, and that Chastain told him that neither he nor Idlette needed to be present during the loading of the melons because Chastain "would stand behind the loads". However, the more credible evidence shows that Chastain did not prevent Allen from inspecting the melons on Monday or Tuesday, May 8 & 9, 1995, or tell Allen that he "would stand behind the loads". Furthermore, there is credible evidence to show that Allen was present at Petitioner's farm on Monday and Tuesday, May 8 & 9, 1995, and he either inspected, or had the opportunity to inspect, the two loads of melons, notwithstanding Allen's testimony or Respondent's exhibit 6 to the contrary. Petitioner did not advise Respondent, at any time pertinent to the sale of the melons, that Petitioner would give Respondent "full market protection" on the melons. Furthermore, Petitioner did not agree, at any time pertinent to the sale of the melons, for Respondent to handle the melons "on account" for Petitioner. The more credible evidence supports Petitioner's contention that the melons were purchased by Respondent with title to the melons passing to Respondent upon delivery at Petitioner's farm, subject to inspection or the opportunity to inspect before loading and delivery. On Monday, May 8, 1995, Petitioner loaded Respondent's first semi- trailer with a State of Georgia tag number CX9379, with 2,280 medium size Sangria melons of good quality weighing 46,800 pounds and identified as Respondent's load number 3002. Respondent accepted load 3002 for shipment to its customer. Using the agreed upon price of fifteen cents ($0.15) per pound times 46,800 pounds, the Respondent owed Petitioner $7,020.00 for load number 3002. On Tuesday, May 9, 1995, Petitioner loaded Respondent's second semi- trailer with a State of New Jersey tag number TAB4020, with 2,331 medium size Sangria melons of good quality weighing 46,620 pounds and identified as Respondent's load number 3004. Respondent accepted load 3004 for shipment to its customer. Using the agreed upon price of fifteen cents ($0.15) per pound times 46,620 pounds, the Respondent owed Petitioner $6,9993.00 for load number 3004. The combined total amount owed to Petitioner by Respondent for load numbers 3002 and 3004 was $14,013.00. Respondent shipped load 3002 to E. W. Kean Co, Inc. (Kean). Upon receiving load 3002, Kean allegedly found problems with the melons. Respondent allowed Kean to handled the melons on account for Respondent. Kean sold the melons for $6,804.05 or 14.5 cents per pound. After Kean's deduction for handling, Kean paid Respondent $6,112.05 or 13.02 cents per pound. In accounting to Petitioner, Respondent made further deductions for handling and freight, and offered Petitioner $3,641.24 or 7.8 cents per pound for the melons on load 3002. Respondent shipped load 3004 to Mada Fruit Sales (Mada). Upon receiving load 3004, Mada allegedly found problems with the melons. By letter dated June 8, 1995 (Respondent's exhibit 4), Mada grudgingly agreed to pay the freight plus 10 cents per pound for the melons. Mada paid Respondent $4,662.00 for load 3004, and after Respondent deducted its commission of $466.20, offered Petitioner $4,195.80 or nine cents per pound for the melons on load 3004. By check number 18922 dated May 28, 1995, Respondent paid Petitioner $7,760.08. Respondent contends that this amount was offered to Kye Bishop in full settlement for loads 3002 and 3004, and that after Bishop consulted with Chastain, Bishop on behalf of Petitioner, accepted this amount in full settlement for loads 3002 and 3004. Bishop contends that he turned down the $7,760.08 as settlement in full but took the $7,760.08 as partial payment and proceeded to file a complaint with the Department against Respondent's bond for the difference. There is nothing written on the check to indicate that by accepting and cashing the check Petitioner acknowledged that it was payment in full for load numbers 3002 and 3004. The more credible evidence shows that Bishop did not accept the check in the amount of $7,760.08 as payment in full for loads 3002 and 3004 but only as partial payment, notwithstanding the testimony of Allen to the contrary. There was an assessment charge of $62.72 which Petitioner agrees that it owes and should be deducted from any monies owed to Petitioner by Respondent. Initially, Respondent owed Petitioner $14,013.00. However, substracting the partial payment of $7,760.08 and the assessment of $62.72 from the $14,013.00 leaves a balance owed Petitioner by Respondent of $6,190.20
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order granting the Petitioner relief by ordering Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc. to pay Petitioner the sum of $6,190.20. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of May, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4226A The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed findings of fact 1(a) through 1(i) are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 16. Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed finding of fact 1 is covered in the Conclusion of Law. Proposed finding of fact 2 is adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 16. Proposed finding of fact 3, 6, 7 and 8 10, are not supported by evidence in the record. As to proposed finding of fact 4, Petitioner and Respondent VBJ Packing, Inc. agreed that Petitioner would sell and Respondent would pay $0.15 per pound for medium size melons. Otherwise proposed finding of fact is not supported by evidence in the record. See Findings of Fact 4, 7 and 8. As to proposed finding of fact 5, Respondent sold the loads. Otherwise proposed finding of fact 5 is not supported by evidence in the record. Respondent Continental elected not to file any proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Lakeland, Florida 32399-0800 David K. Oaks, Esquire David Oaks, P.A. 252 W. Marion Avenue Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Mark A. Sessums, Esquire Frost, O'Toole & Saunders, P.A. Post Office Box 2188 Bartow, Florida 33831-2188
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent citrus dealer owes Petitioner citrus producer a sum of money for grapefruits that Respondent harvested from Petitioner’s grove.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. Sunrise Citrus Groves, Inc. (“Sunrise”) is a producer of citrus, meaning that it grows citrus in this state for market. It is also a Florida-licensed citrus fruit dealer operating within the Department’s regulatory jurisdiction. Tuxedo Fruit Company (“Tuxedo”) is a Florida-licensed citrus fruit dealer. On or about October 18, 2000, Sunrise and Tuxedo entered into a contract under which Tuxedo agreed to harvest “flame” grapefruits from Sunrise’s grove known as “Gulfstream.” are a variety of grapefruit; the varieties are distinguished by the color of the fruit’s meat, e.g. red, ruby, pink.) Tuxedo agreed to pay $4.00 per box of fruit harvested at the Gulfstream grove. Between October 16, 2000 and March 14, 2001, Tuxedo harvested 5,808 boxes of flame grapefruits pursuant to its contract with Sunrise. Accordingly, Tuxedo was obligated to pay Sunrise $23,232 for the fruit. Tuxedo did not pay for the grapefruits harvested from the Gulfstream grove. On October 11, 2001, Sunrise sent Tuxedo an invoice for the past due amount of $23,232. Tuxedo did not object to this statement of account. At hearing, Tuxedo admitted the above facts. Tuxedo’s position was that Sunrise had breached a separate contract relating to red grapefruits which Tuxedo had agreed to harvest from a grove called “Sun Rock.” As a result of this alleged breach, Tuxedo claimed to have suffered damages exceeding the amount sought by Sunrise. It is not necessary to make detailed findings of fact concerning the Sun Rock transaction, however, because the undersigned has concluded that the alleged breach of contract action that Tuxedo attempted to prove is not properly before the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”). Ultimate Factual Determination Tuxedo failed to pay for the citrus fruit harvested from the Gulfstream grove that was the subject of a contract between Sunrise and Tuxedo. Sunrise performed all of its duties under that contract and is not in breach thereof. Tuxedo, therefore, is indebted to Sunrise in the amount of $23,232. CONSLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Chapter 601, Florida Statutes, is known as "The Florida Citrus Code of 1949." Section 601.01, Florida Statutes. "Citrus fruit" is defined in Section 601.03(7), Florida Statutes, as all varieties and regulated hybrids of citrus fruit and also means processed citrus products containing 20 percent or more citrus fruit or citrus fruit juice, but, for the purposes of this chapter, shall not mean limes, lemons, marmalade, jellies, preserves, candies, or citrus hybrids for which no specific standards have been established by the Department of Citrus. Additionally, the term “grapefruit” is defined to mean “the fruit Citrus paradisi Macf., commonly called grapefruit and shall include white, red, and pink meated varieties[.]” Section 601.03(22), Florida Statutes. A "citrus fruit dealer" is defined in Section 601.03(8), Florida Statutes, as any consignor, commission merchant, consignment shipper, cash buyer, broker, association, cooperative association, express or gift fruit shipper, or person who in any manner makes or attempts to make money or other thing of value on citrus fruit in any manner whatsoever, other than of growing or producing citrus fruit, but the term shall not include retail establishments whose sales are direct to consumers and not for resale or persons or firms trading solely in citrus futures contracts on a regulated commodity exchange. Both Sunrise and Tuxedo are citrus fruit dealers under this definition. Sunrise also falls within the definition of “producer.” See Section 601.03(29), Florida Statutes (defining the term as “any person growing or producing citrus in this state for market”). Citrus fruit dealers are required to be licensed by the Department in order to transact business in Florida. Section 601.55(1), Florida Statutes. As a condition of obtaining a license, such dealers are required to provide a cash bond or a certificate of deposit or a surety bond in an amount to be determined by the Department "for the use and benefit of every producer and of every citrus fruit dealer with whom the dealer deals in the purchase, handling, sale, and accounting of purchases and sales of citrus fruit." Section 601.61(3), Florida Statutes. Section 601.65, Florida Statutes, provides that "[i]f any licensed citrus fruit dealer violates any provision of this chapter, such dealer shall be liable to the person allegedly injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of such violation." This liability may be adjudicated in an administrative action brought before the Department or in a "judicial suit at law in a court of competent jurisdiction." Id. Section 601.64(4), Florida Statutes, defines as an "unlawful act" by a citrus fruit dealer the failure to pay promptly and fully, as promised, for any citrus fruit which is the subject of a transaction relating to the purchase and sale of such goods. Any person may file a complaint with the Department alleging a violation of the provisions of Chapter 601, Florida Statutes, by a citrus fruit dealer. Section 601.66(1), Florida Statutes. The Department is charged with the responsibilities of determining whether the allegations of the complaint have been established and adjudicating the amount of indebtedness or damages owed by the citrus fruit dealer. Section 601.66(5), Florida Statutes. If the complaining party proves its case, the Department shall "fix a reasonable time within which said indebtedness shall be paid by the [citrus fruit] dealer." Thereafter, if the dealer does not pay within the time specified by the Department, the Department shall obtain payment of the damages from the dealer's surety company, up to the amount of the bond. Section 601.66(5) and (6), Florida Statutes. Sunrise bore the burden of proving the allegations in its Complaint against Tuxedo by a preponderance of the evidence. See Florida Department of Transportation v. J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396 So. 2d 778, 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Career Service Commission, 289 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Section 120.57(1)(j), Florida Statutes. Sunrise carried its burden of proving that Tuxedo has failed and refused to pay, as agreed, for citrus fruit that Tuxedo harvested from Sunrise’s Gulfstream grove. Tuxedo’s allegation that Sunrise breached a contract unrelated to the one upon which Sunrise has based its demand for payment constitutes an independent cause of action and claim for relief. See Storchwerke, GMBH v. Mr. Thiessen’s Wallpapering Supplies, Inc., 538 So. 2d 1382, 1383 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). In the parlance of civil litigation, Tuxedo’s contentions would be called a counterclaim. See Haven Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Kirian, 579 So. 2d 730, 733 (Fla. 1991)(“A counterclaim is a cause of action that seeks affirmative relief[.]”). Had Sunrise elected to pursue its claim in circuit court pursuant to Section 601.65, Florida Statutes, rather than before the Department, then Tuxedo properly might have sought leave to bring its claim relating to the Sun Rock transaction as a permissive counterclaim. See Rule 1.170(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. But this is an administrative proceeding, and there exists no procedural vehicle through which Tuxedo may assert a permissive counterclaim for breach of contract. The question whether Tuxedo’s claim of breach is properly before DOAH is not merely procedural, but touches the fundamental consideration of subject matter jurisdiction. To be entitled to administrative remedies for Sunrise’s alleged breach of contract, Tuxedo must file a complaint with the agency having jurisdiction in the matter; it cannot directly initiate proceedings before DOAH. See Section 601.66, Florida Statutes. DOAH’s jurisdiction does not attach until the agency refers the dispute to this tribunal for adjudication. Tuxedo has not filed a complaint against Sunrise with the Department, and thus (obviously) the Department has not referred the matter to DOAH. Therefore, DOAH does not have jurisdiction to entertain Tuxedo’s claim for relief based on the alleged Sun Rock transaction. In the alternative, Tuxedo’s allegations arguably might be regarded——and reached——as an affirmative defense. See Kirian, 579 So. 2d at 733 (“[A]n affirmative defense defeats the plaintiff’s cause of action by a denial or confession and avoidance.”). Specifically, Tuxedo’s allegations, if established, might provide the basis for a set off, which is a recognized affirmative defense. See Kellogg v. Fowler, White, Burnett, Hurley, Banick & Strickroot, P.A., 807 So. 2d 669, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D2811, 2001 WL 1504231, *4 n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA Nov. 28, 2001)(“A set-off is an affirmative defense arising out of a transaction extrinsic to a plaintiff’s cause of action.”). It is concluded, however, that because DOAH does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Tuxedo’s allegations as a counterclaim for breach of contract, the same allegations cannot simply be treated as an affirmative defense and adjudicated on that basis. To be heard, the defense of set off must be within the tribunal’s jurisdiction. See Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of New York v. Walker, 9 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 1942). A contrary ruling would permit Tuxedo to bring in through the back door a claim that was turned away at the front. Even if Tuxedo’s claim were cognizable as an affirmative defense, notwithstanding Tuxedo’s failure properly to initiate such claim pursuant to Section 601.66, Florida Statutes, the issue could not be reached for an independent reason: implied waiver. In the context of a civil suit, a party’s failure to allege an affirmative defense in its responsive pleading effects a waiver thereof. See Gause v. First Bank of Marianna, 457 So. 2d 582, 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)(“Affirmative defenses must be raised in the pleadings or they are waived.”). Since a dealer who disputes the allegations of a complaint filed with the Department under Section 601.66 is required by that statute to submit an answer in writing, it is concluded that a dealer-respondent, like a defendant in a civil lawsuit, waives any affirmative defenses not raised in his responsive pleading. Otherwise, a dealer-respondent could sandbag the claimant at final hearing. Having failed to plead the Sun Rock matter in its response to Sunrise’s complaint, Tuxedo waived the affirmative defense of set off.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order awarding Sunrise the sum of $23,232. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: John Scarborough, General Manager Sunrise Citrus Groves, Inc. 2410 Southeast Bridge Road Hobe Sound, Florida 33455 John A. Scotto, President Tuxedo Fruit Company 1110 North 2nd Street Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Sharon Sergeant Continental Casualty Company CNA Plaza Floor 13-South Chicago, Illinois 60685 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 500 Third Street Northwest Post Office Box 1072 Winter Haven, Florida 33882-1072
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent Clark's Country Farmers Market, Inc. owes Petitioner a sum of money for shipments of citrus fruit.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Parties and Their Problem Spyke's Grove and Clark's are "citrus fruit dealers" operating within the Department's regulatory jurisdiction. As a wholesale shipper, Spyke's Grove packages and arranges for delivery of citrus products pursuant to purchase orders that retail sellers such as Clark's submit. The packages typically are labeled with the retail seller's name, and thus the retail buyer (and the recipient, if the citrus is purchased as a gift) usually will not be aware of Spyke's Grove's involvement. The instant case involves a series of orders that Clark's placed with Spyke's Grove between October and December 1999 for packages of gift fruit. Under a number of informal, largely unwritten contracts, Spyke's Grove agreed, each time it received an order from Clark's, to ship a gift fruit box or basket to the donee designated by Clark's' retail customer, for which fruit shipment Clark's agreed to pay Spyke's Grove. Spyke's Grove alleges that Clark's failed to pay in full for all of the gift fruit packages that Clark's ordered and Spyke's Grove duly shipped. Clark's contends (though not precisely in these terms) that Spyke's Grove materially breached the contracts, thereby discharging Clark's from further performance thereunder. The Transactions From mid-October 1999 until around December 12, 1999, Clark's faxed or e-mailed to Spyke's Grove approximately 350 individual orders for gift fruit packages. Among other information, each order consisted of a shipping label that identified the product (e.g. the type of gift box or basket), the intended recipient, and the destination. Spyke's Grove manifested its intent to fill these orders by faxing statements of acknowledgment to Clark's, by telephoning Clark's, or both. Although the many contracts that arose from these transactions were thus documented, the writings left much unsaid. For example, the parties did not explicitly agree in writing that Spyke's Grove would deliver the subject gift baskets to the donees before Christmas, nor did they make any express oral agreements to this effect.1 Further, the parties did not specifically agree that Spyke's Grove would be obligated to deliver the gift fruit into the hands of the donees and bear the risk of loss until such tender of delivery. Rather, the contracts between Spyke's Grove and Clark's were ordinary shipment contracts that required Spyke's Grove to put the goods into the possession of carriers (such as the U.S. Postal Service or United Parcel Service) who in due course would deliver the packages to the donees. For many weeks, until early December 1999, Clark's placed orders, and Spyke's Grove filled them, under the arrangement just described. The relationship was not completely trouble-free, for the parties had some problems with duplicate orders. Most, if not all, of these difficulties stemmed from the implementation of a computerized ordering system which allowed Clark's to "export" orders directly to Spyke's Grove's electronic database. The parties recognized at the time that errors were occurring, and they attempted contemporaneously to identify and purge unintended duplicates. Pursuant to the course of dealing between these parties, Spyke's Grove filled orders that were not affirmatively identified as errors prior to the scheduled shipment date. The Fire On the night of Sunday, December 12, 1999, a devastating fire at Spyke's Grove's premises caused substantial damage, temporarily disrupting its citrus packing and shipping operations at the peak of the holiday season. Working through and around the loss, Spyke's Grove soon recovered sufficiently to reopen for business. By around noon on Tuesday, December 14, 1999, its telephone service had been restored, and activities relating to shipping resumed on Friday, December 17, 1999. The Aftermath Meantime, Clark's contends, customers had begun calling Clark's on December 10, 1999, to complain that gift fruit packages were not being received as promised. None of the customers testified at hearing, however, and therefore no competent, non-hearsay evidence establishes the contents of their alleged out-of-court statements. On December 14, 1999, following several unsuccessful attempts to communicate with Spyke's Grove shortly after the fire (about which Clark's remained unaware), Denise Clark, acting on behalf of Clark's, reached Robert Spiece, a representative of Spyke's Grove, on his cell phone. At hearing, Ms. Clark and Mr. Spiece gave conflicting accounts as to the substance of their December 14, 1999, telephone conversation. Neither disputed, however, that during this conversation Ms. Clark and Mr. Spiece agreed, at Ms. Clark's request, that all orders of Clark's not yet shipped by Spyke's Grove would be canceled, effective immediately, as a result of the fire. Although Ms. Clark claimed that Mr. Spiece further informed her that Spyke's Grove could not identify which orders had been shipped, the factfinder does not believe that Mr. Spiece made such a sweeping negative statement. Rather, as Mr. Spiece explained at hearing, Ms. Clark probably was told that information regarding the filled orders would not be available that day. Without waiting for further information from Spyke's Grove, Clark's began calling its retail customers to ascertain whether they had received packages that were supposed to have been shipped by Spyke's Grove. Employees of Clark's who had participated in this process——which took four to five days—— testified at hearing about conversations between themselves and various customers. As uncorroborated hearsay, however, the out- of-court statements attributed to these customers were not competent substantial evidence upon which a relevant finding of fact, e.g. that any particular customer or customers had not received their gift fruit, could be based. Moreover, this hearsay evidence, even if competent, would still have been too anecdotal to establish persuasively any widespread failure on the part of the carriers to deliver the packages shipped by Spyke's Grove. On December 15, 1999, Spyke's Grove prepared three draft invoices for the gift fruit packages that Clark's had ordered and which Spyke's Grove had shipped before December 12, 1999. Numbered 1999113001, 1999121101, and 1999121201, the invoices sought payment of $688.72, $2,415.48, and $298.66, respectively. On the first page of Invoice #1999121201, Barbara Spiece, the President of Spyke's Grove, wrote: Some of these were lost in the fire. "A" day left in the morning. "Springfield" was on the floor to go out that night. I realize there are many duplicates in these shipped reports. We tried to watch for them but with different order numbers it was very difficult. Just cross them out [and] you will not be charged for them. I apologize for all of the problems we have had this season [illegible] wish you luck. These bills were faxed to, and received by, Clark's on December 16, 1999. Clark's did not pay the invoices, or dispute them, or cross out the unintended duplicate orders (as it had been invited to do) to effect a reduction in the outstanding balance. Instead, Clark's ignored Spyke's Grove's requests for payment. Not only that, in disregard of its existing contractual obligations and with no advance notice to Spyke's Grove, Clark's proceeded on its own to fill all of the orders that it had placed with Spyke's Grove before December 12, 1999——including those orders that Spyke's Grove, through its draft invoices, claimed to have shipped. Even after the fact, Clark's failed to inform Spyke's Grove that it had, in effect, repudiated its contractual promises to pay Spyke's Grove for the gift fruit packages already shipped as of December 12, 1999 (i.e. the orders not canceled on December 14, 1999). The Inevitable Dispute Having heard nothing from Clark's in response to its December 16, 1999, fax, Spyke's Grove sent its invoices out again, in final form, on January 25, 2000.2 This time, Ms. Spiece did not inscribe any instructions to cross out duplicates for a discount. Numbered 11063001 ($688.72), 11063002 ($2,449.14), and 11063003 ($195.52), these bills totaled $3,333.38. Each of these invoices contained the following boilerplate "terms": Net 14 days prompt payment is expected and appreciated. A 1 ½% monthly service charge (A.P.R. 18% per annum) may be charged on all past due accounts. Customer agrees to pay all costs of collection, including attorneys [sic] fees and court costs, should collection efforts ever become necessary. Clark's did not remit payment or otherwise respond to Spyke's Grove's statements. Accordingly, on June 20, 2000, Spyke's Grove sent a letter to the Department requesting assistance. Clark's was provided a copy of this letter. Shortly thereafter, Spyke's Grove filed a Complaint with the Department, initiating the instant proceeding. Ultimate Factual Determinations Clark's refusal to pay for the goods ordered from and shipped by Spyke's Grove constituted a breach of the contracts between the parties. Spyke's Grove did not materially breach the agreements. Further, Clark's did not object, within a reasonable period of time, to the statements of account that Spyke's Grove rendered preliminarily on December 16, 1999, and finally on January 25, 2000. Accordingly, these invoices amount to an account stated concerning the transactions between the parties. Clark's failed to overcome the presumption of correctness that attaches to an account stated, either by proving fraud, mistake, or error. Spyke's Grove has suffered an injury as a result of Clark's' breach. Spyke's Grove's damages consist of the principal amount of the debt together with pre-award interest at the statutory rate. Accordingly, Spyke's Grove is entitled to recover the following amounts from Clark's: Principal Due Date Statutory Interest $3,333.38 2/08/99 $ 298.66 (2/08/00 - 12/31/00) $ 335.56 (1/01/01 - 11/30/01) $3,333.38 $ 634.22 Interest will continue to accrue on the outstanding balance of $3,333.38 in the amount of $1.00 per day from December 1, 2001, until the date of the final order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order awarding Spyke's Grove the sum of $3,333.38, together with pre- award interest in the amount of $634.22 (through November 30, 2001), plus additional interest from December 1, 2001, until the date of the final order, which will accrue in the amount of $1.00 per day. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 2001.
The Issue Does Respondent Sanford Produce Exchange, Incorporated (Sanford), owe Petitioner for agricultural products purchased by Sanford from Petitioner between April 1, 1997, and April 25, 1997?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was in the business of growing and selling "agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes, and was a "producer" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Sanford was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Sanford was issued license number 9434 by the Department, which is supported by bond number 957712 20250566 in the amount of $31,000, written by Auto Owners, as surety, with an inception date of October 25, 1996, and an expiration date of October 24, 1997. The Complaint was timely filed by Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes. Beginning April 1, 1997, and ending on April 25, 1997, Sanford ordered and agreed to pay for the following agricultural products from Petitioner, which Petitioner shipped by truck to Sanford: Date Item Quantity Price Total 4/1/97 Green Cabbage 100 $ 4.50 $ 450.00 4/1/97 Green Cabbage Bags 325 $ 3.50 $1,137.50 4/2/97 Green Cabbage 125 $ 4.50 $ 562.50 4/2/97 Green Cabbage Bags 100 $ 3.50 $ 350.00 4/17/97 Green Cabbage Bags 226 $ 3.00 $ 678.00 4/17/97 Medium Green Squash 77 $12.35 $ 950.95 4/18/97 Yellow Crookneck Squash 40 $ 5.00 $ 200.00 Fancy Yellow Squash 110 $ 8.35 $ 918.50 Medium Yellow Squash 40 $ 6.35 $ 254.00 Fancy Zucchini 79 $12.35 $ 975.65 Medium Zucchini 40 $10.35 $ 414.00 4/25/97 Yellow Crookneck Squash 40 $ 8.35 $ 334.00 Number 1 Yellow Crookneck Squash 120 $ 5.35 $ 642.00 Number 2 Fancy Zucchini 80 $ 6.35 $ 508.00 Medium Zucchini 50 $ 4.35 $ 217.50 4/25/97 Fancy Zucchini 92 $ 6.35 $ 584.20 Total $9,176.80 The above shipments are represented by invoice numbers 07987, 07991, 07772, 07773, 07785, 07896, and 07802, respectively. Petitioner has billed Sanford for the amount of $9,176.80, which Sanford has failed to pay. The cabbage, squash, and zucchini shipped to Sanford between April 1, 1997, and April 25, 1997, by Petitioner was of the quality purchased by Sanford and was in good condition when shipped.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a final order finding that Sanford Produce Exchange, Incorporated, owes Fresh Pride Sales, Incorporated, the sum of $9,176.80. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32299-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Troy Cobb Qualified Representative Fresh Pride Sales, Incorporated Post Office Box 577 Wauchula, Florida 33873 Anthony L. Thomas, President Sanford Produce Exchange, Incorporated 6060 Hensel Road Port Orange, Florida 32119 F. J. Manuel, Jr., Esquire Sears and Manuel, P.A. 511 North Ferncreek Avenue Orlando, Florida 32803
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Deerfield Groves Company (Deerfield), is a licensed citrus fruit dealer under Chapter 601, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 20-34, Florida Administrative Code. As a licensee, Deerfield is subject to administrative and criminal prosecution for violation of the statutes and rules governing licensed citrus fruit dealers and was under administrative prosecution for alleged violations of Section 601.33, Florida Statutes, and Rule 20-34.11, Florida Administrative Code, at the time of the final hearing. Deerfield has legal standing as a party petitioner in this case. Respondent, Department Of Citrus (DOC), promulgated Rule 20-34.11, Florida Administrative Code, under the authority of Section 601.10, Florida Statutes. Rule 20-34.11 is designed to implement Section 601.33, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Department Of Agriculture And Consumer Services, (DACS), is the agency charged with the duty to enforce Section 601.33, Florida Statutes, and Rule 20- 34.11, Florida Administrative Code. Personnel of DACS' Division Of Fruit And Vegetable Inspection also are responsible for testing fresh citrus for maturity under Chapter 20-34, Florida Administrative Code. Licensees such as Deerfield furnish a testing room for DACS inspectors to perform maturity tests and certify fresh citrus, as required for marketing fresh fruit. DACS leases an extractor, used for squeezing juice from fruit samples, and subleases the extractor to the licensee. Under the sublease, the extractor is kept in the testing room for use by DACS inspectors and, when not being used by DACS inspectors, for use by the licensee in performing its own tests. Typically, the licensee furnishes the testing room with a table for two and a chair or two. When DACS inspectors perform maturity tests at the beginning of the early harvest, they bring most of the things they need for testing. The licensee provides the bins in which the fruit samples are carried into the testing room. The inspectors bring either a DACS slicing knife or their own. The licensee provides buckets it owns for use by the inspector during the test to collect juice extracted from fruit samples. The DACS inspectors also bring: a sizer to measure the fruit samples; a 2000 c.c. graduated cylinder to measure juice quantities; a 500 c.c. graduated cylinder to hold juice being tested for solids content and for temperature; aluminum pans to hold the graduated cylinders; a combination hydrometer for measuring juice solids content and temperature; a 25 m.1. pipet for transferring a measured amount of juice into a flask; the flask; a bottle of phenothaline with eyedropper top used for adding measured amounts of phenothaline to the flask of measured juice; a bottle of alkaline solution; and a burette for adding a measured amount of the alkaline solution to the flask of measured juice. During the harvest season, DACS leaves its equipment, instruments and solutions referred to in the preceding paragraph in the testing room. They are kept separate from the licensee's property and are not supposed to be used by the licensee. However, DACS allows the licensee to use its own bins and buckets and the extractor to conduct its own tests in the testing room when DACS inspectors are not using it. 1/ Some DACS inspectors request or allow licensees to assist during testing or to handle the fruit samples. 2/ Some allow licensees to attempt to influence the inspector's judgment by questioning the validity of the test or the accuracy of the inspector's observations or by comparing the inspector's results with the results of its own tests. Sometimes, this results in correction of an error the inspector otherwise would have made. It was not proved, however that there is an agency policy of requesting or allowing licensees to conduct themselves in those ways during testing. DACS has a policy to allow only one licensee representative in the testing room with the DACS inspector during testing. Violation of this policy is viewed as a violation of Section 601.33, Florida Statutes (1983). However, not all DACS inspectors strictly enforce this policy. Some allow more than one licensee representative in the testing room.
The Issue Whether the respondent is indebted to the complainant for the sale of Florida-grown agricultural products, and, if so, the amount of the indebtedness.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Mr. Rose has a grove of lychee trees on his property; each year he harvests the lychee nuts for sale, but the sale of agricultural products is not his sole source of income. In mid-June, 1996, Mr. Rose heard that the Growers Association was offering $3.50 per pound for lychees, the highest price of which he was aware. Mr. Rose took his fruit to the Growers Association on June 18, 1996. Mr. Rose had not done business with the Growers Association previously but had sold his fruit to another company. Mr. Rose received a grower's receipt showing that, on June 18, 1996, he had brought in 298 pounds of fruit, that 14 pounds were culls, and that the Growers Association had packed 27.9 ten- pound boxes of fruit. The Growers Association packed only marketable fruit. Ninety-nine percent of the tropical fruit grown in Florida is handled in pools.1 According to industry practice, the "handler" does not purchase the fruit outright but is responsible for packing, storing, selling, and shipping the fruit and for accounting for and remitting the proceeds of sale, minus expenses, to the members of the pool on a pro rata basis. The pools are composed of all growers whose fruit is packed during a designated period of time. Prices initially quoted to growers participating in a pooling arrangement are not guaranteed because the actual sales price may vary, depending on market conditions. It was the practice of the Growers Association to handle lychees under a pooling arrangement, and the receipt Mr. Rose received from the Growers Association contained the notation "P- 407LY," which designated the pool to which Mr. Rose's fruit was assigned. The Lychee P-407LY pool to which Mr. Rose's fruit was assigned consisted of fruit packed by the Growers Association between June 15 and 21, 1996. Mr. Rose was told on several occasions by employees of the Growers Association that he would receive $920.70 after expenses for the sale of his lychees. This amount was reflected in a Pool Price Report generated by the Growers Association on July 10, 1997, which also showed that a total of 107.6 pounds of fruit was included in the pool and that the Growers Association anticipated receiving a total of $4,088.65 for the sale of the fruit in the pool. The Growers Association maintained in its files a work order showing that 83 ten-pound boxes of lychees were sold to Produce Services of America, Inc., at a price of $38.00 per box and that the fruit was shipped on June 21, 1996. According to the July 10 report, the Growers Association had received payment of $932.90 for 24.55 ten-pound boxes of lychees sold to "L & V" on June 21, 1996, at $38.00 per box, but there is no indication in the report that the anticipated payment of $3,154.00 had been received from Produce Services of America. Mr. Rose repeatedly called the Growers Association during July and August to inquire about when he would receive payment for his fruit. In accordance with the information he had consistently been given by employees of the Growers Association, he expected to receive $920.70. When he received a check from the Growers Association dated August 29, 1996, in the amount of $367.48, he called the Growers Association for an explanation of why he had received that amount rather than the $920.70 he was expecting. Ultimately, he spoke with Mr. Kendall in early September, who told him that the $367.48 was all he was going to receive as his pro rata share of the pool because Produce Services of American had not paid in full for the 83 boxes of fruit it purchased. As reflected in the Pool Price Report dated September 19, 1996, the Growers Association received a total payment of only $1,847.42 for the fruit in the pool, rather than the $4,088.65 shown in the July 10, 1996, report. After the Growers Association's expenses were deducted, a total of $1,417.25 was distributed to the five growers in the pool. Although a copy of this final price report for the P-407LY pool should have accompanied Mr. Rose’s check, it did not. According to the information contained in the September 19 Pool Price Report, the shortfall in the amount received for the sale of the fruit in the pool is attributable to the Growers Association's receiving only $913.00, or $11.00 per box, for the sale of the 83 boxes of lychees to Produce Services of America, instead of the anticipated $3,154.00. The $913.00 was paid to the Growers Association by check dated August 19, 1996. Mr. Rose did not present sufficient evidence to establish that he had a contract for the outright sale of 27.9 ten-pound boxes of lychees to the Growers Association. Rather, the evidence establishes that Mr. Rose's fruit was handled by the Growers Association under a pooling arrangement and that, consistent with the practice in the tropical fruit industry, the Growers Association assumed responsibility for packing, storing, selling, and shipping the fruit. The Growers Association failed to offer any credible evidence to explain why Produce Services of America paid only $11.00 per box for the 83 boxes of fruit shipped from the pool, notwithstanding that the agreed sales price was $38.00 per box.2 Even if the fruit was damaged or in poor condition when it was delivered to Produce Services of America, the Growers Association packed 27.9 ten-pound boxes of marketable fruit on Mr. Rose’s account, and, once packed, it had complete control of the fruit in the pool. The Growers Association failed to offer any evidence to establish that it acted with reasonable care in fulfilling its responsibilities under the pool arrangement. Consequently, it bears the risk of loss rather than Mr. Rose and is indebted to him for $553.22, which is the difference between the $920.70 Mr. Rose would have received as his pro rata share of the pool had Produce Services of America paid the agreed-upon sales price of $38.00 per box and the $367.48 which the Growers Association paid to Mr. Rose by check dated August 29, 1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order finding that the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., is indebted to Mike Rose for the sale of agricultural products and ordering the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., to pay Mike Rose $553.22 within fifteen (15) days of the date its order becomes final. The Final Order should also provide that, in the event that the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., fails to pay Mike Rose $533.22 within the time specified, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, as surety for the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., must provide payment under the conditions and provisions of its bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 1997.
The Issue The ultimate issue for determination is whether Respondent owes Petitioner payment for approximately 728 crates of green cabbages. This requires a determination of whether Respondent acted properly in consigning the load to Tampa Bay Produce rather than returning the cabbages to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a grower doing business at his farm at Route 1, Box 1 in Hastings, St. Johns County, Florida. Respondent, Battaglia Produce, Inc., is a produce broker with an office in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Its President, Tony Battaglia, has been a produce broker for thirty-five years. Respondent, South Carolina Insurance Company, is the bonding agent for Battaglia pursuant to Section 604.20, Florida Statutes. On May 19, 1988, Burrell sold a load of 791 crates of cabbages to Battaglia for and on the account of Publix Supermarkets, Inc. It is uncontroverted that at the time the cabbages left the field they were of good quality. The load was rejected by Publix in Lakeland on May 20, 1988. A sample of 30 crates out of the load revealed 27 crates were under the industry standard weight of fifty pounds. Battaglia learned that freight for the load back to Hastings would be expensive, so he consigned the load to Tampa Bay Produce, Inc., in Tampa, Florida for the purpose of sale. The subsequent consignment to Tampa Bay Produce was without the prior consent of Burrell. Battaglia has had an ongoing good business relationship with Burrell. Burrell's loads have been rejected at times in the past and Battaglia has never had problems obtaining Burrell's prior permission for disposing of the loads. Battaglia handles a total of approximately 1000 loads of cabbage a season and approximately 15% get rejected. He typically tries to resell the load to get the best advantage for the grower. Tampa Bay had some delay in selling the load. Some cabbages spoiled, and on May 31, 1988, 420 crates were dumped. The remainder sold for $606.00. Tampa Bay Produce deducted its 15% handling charge and paid Battaglia $515.00 for the load. In his accounting to Charles Burrell dated June 22, 1988, Battaglia deducted freight from Hastings to Lakeland and from Lakeland to Tampa and a pre- cooling charge in Tampa. He showed a net loss of $153.15 for the load. Battaglia did not claim a brokerage fee. Battaglia deducted the $153.15 from other funds it owed Burrell for other cabbage loads and paid Burrell the balance appearing on an accounting of this and eight other loads of cabbage, dated June 23, 1988. At the hearing the Burrells amended their request for payment to add the $153.15 deducted for the load. Burrell computed an average underweight based on the 30-crate sample from Publix and adjusted his invoice to Battaglia to reflect an 8% reduction. The invoice is dated June 27, 1988. Burrell claims that the 791 crates were sold for $4.60 per crate, for a total of $3,638.60. The 30 crates weighed an average of 46.14 pounds or eight percent less than the 50-lb. industry standard. An eight percent adjustment in the cost yields a total of $3,347.51. Burrell does not contest the underweight findings by Publix. He insists that he should have been informed immediately and given a change to bring the shipment back, repack the cabbages and sell them again. Instead, someone from Battaglia called Barbara Burrell on May 21st to tell her the load was turned down by Publix and was shipped to Tampa. She called Battaglla several times to get details on the short weight so that she could adjust their bill, but she was unable to get any information until the latter part of June, and by then Battaglia's position was that the load was a net loss. She obtained the weight information eventually from Publix. Battaglia claims that he acted professionally in handling the load and that he owes no additional funds to Burrell.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered requiring that Respondent pay to Petitioner the sum of $3500.66 and informing Respondent that failure to make such payment within fifteen (15) days will result in recovery from its surety, as provided in Subsection 604.21(8), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles R. Burrell Charles R. Burrell Farms Route 1, Box 1 Hastings, Florida 32045 Ralph V. Hadley, III, Esquire Hadley and Asma Post Office Box 1340 Winter Garden, Florida 32787 South Carolina Insurance Company Post Office Box 1 Columbia, South Carolina 29202 Ben H. Pridgeon, Jr., Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 418 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Ingram Grove Services, Inc., (Ingram), was a commercial grower of citrus fruit and a licensed citrus fruit dealer in Florida. Mark Fetzer, Inc. (Fetzer), was also a grower and a licensed citrus fruit dealer in Florida. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company was an insurance company authorized to write surety bonds in this state during the 1991-1992 citrus shipping season and was the underwriter of Fetzer's bond for the transaction in issue herein. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company was an insurance company authorized to write surety bonds in this state during the 1991-1992 citrus shipping season and was the underwriter of Ingram's bond for the transaction herein. By contract number 518, dated January 14, 1992, and drafted on the letterhead of Mark Fetzer, Inc., Ingram, the grower, sold and conveyed to Fetzer, the buyer, approximately 20,000 boxes of valencia oranges at a price of $10.50 per box, with a moving date of April 30, 1992. This description was intended to cover all valencia oranges grown by Ingram and contained in Suncrest #11 field in Sebring, Florida and included transportation to Polk County. Ingram was authorized to, and did, request a deposit of $1.00 per box, and by check dated April 27, 1992, Fetzer paid Ingram the sum of $20,000. The oranges were to be delivered by Ingram to the Commercial Carriers Cold Storage, (CCCS), facility in Auburndale, Florida. The entire crop of fruit covered by this contract was to be paid for within 30 days of delivery to CCCS. The contract did not prohibit Fetzer from re-selling the fruit covered thereby. Ingram and Fetzer had done business together for several years, since 1985. In every case, each had paid what was owed to the other, but it is admitted that on occasion, such payment was delayed for a short time. Neither had ever failed to ultimately pay what was owed the other, however. Sometime after delivery of the fruit to CCCS by Ingram, Fetzer sold 3,000 of the boxes to Vero Beach Groves, Inc., (VB), a producer of commercial orange juice for commercial sales. At that time, and at all times pertinent to the issues herein, VB was having financial difficulties. Evidence of record indicates that at the time, VB owed approximately $32,000 to Fetzer, somewhat more than $60,000 to Ingram, and over $600,000 to Florida Growers, another entity not pertinent to the issues herein. The terms of Fetzer's sale to VB called for a payment of $13.65 per box. This included $11.65 per box for the oranges then delivered, including 15 brokerage, and $2.00 per box to satisfy VB's antecedent debt to Fetzer. If all the Ingram fruit were resold by Fetzer to VB, this procedure would have paid off VB's debt to Fetzer before all the Ingram fruit was pulled out of storage. When the antecedent debt was liquidated, the price per box would have been reduced to $11.65. Fetzer had not allowed VB's debt to it to grow very large, and the above practice, which had been followed for several years, had to this point, been successful. There was no dispute under the terms of the contract between Ingram and Fetzer until sometime in mid-May, 1992 when, prior to the delivery of any fruit, Mr. Ingram called Mr. Fetzer and asked for a meeting. At that meeting, Mr. Ingram told Mr. Fetzer that unless an agreement was made to get him, Ingram, a debt reduction procedure similar to Fetzer's, he would not make available to Fetzer the fruit called for under the contract. Mr. Ingram indicated at the hearing that when he heard Fetzer had contracted with VB, in light of VB's tenuous financial condition, he was concerned about being able to get paid and this caused him to seek the meeting with Fetzer. However, he did not communicate this to Fetzer nor did he ask Fetzer for payment in advance or some security for the obligation. In fact, according to Fetzer, he had the money available, in cash, to pay the entire amount owed Ingram if necessary. In addition, Fetzer told Ingram that even if VB could not take the fruit, there were at least 3 -5 other "juicers" to whom he could sell the fruit and pay Ingram. In point of fact, the fruit was subsequently sold, by Ingram, to other juice processors at a per box price which varied from $12.50 to $13.35. Nonetheless, Fetzer tried to work the situation out for all concerned with no consideration given him for any purported change to the contract. Faced with the potential for not being able to get the fruit for sale to VB, the contract with whom was worth in excess of $200,000 to him, Fetzer met with a representative of VB and reached an agreement with it whereby VB would pay an additional $3.35 over the $13.65 so that Ingram could be paid. At this meeting he was told by Mr. Kordick, VB's vice president, that VB would work something out with Ingram for the remaining fruit. Thereafter, VB agreed with Ingram to make additional payments to Ingram. It appears, however, that this agreement to pay the extra on Ingram's antecedent debt was more acquiescence to coercion than voluntary agreement. Fetzer then released the first shipment of oranges to VB. VB paid for the shipment of oranges when it came in.It also issued four checks in the amount of $1,680.00 each fdor payment on VB's antecedent debt to Ingram which were made payable to Ingram or Fetzer. These four checks were cashed by Fetzer and were dishonored. They were ultimately redeemed by VB after several weeks, but none of the funds were transmitted by Fetzer to Ingram. Fetzer kept them as compensation for the amount of profit he lost because of Ingram's refusal to release any more oranges after the first shipment. In addition, Fetzer did not pay Ingram for the first 3,000 box shipment. After the first shipment was delivered to VB, Mr. Fetzer was contacted by VB's representative, Mr. Kordick, who advised VB could not pay the amount asked for the fruit which included the "surcharge" to reimburse Ingram because the processed juice would not bring enough to cover it. Admittedly, Mr. Fetzer did not ask Mr. Ingram to rescind the requirement for the "surcharge" payment. Had he done so and had Ingram agreed, it is most likely that VB could have purchased all the oranges from the entire contract and paid for it. All Fetzer did was tell Ingram he should not place the extra burden on VB, and as it was, VB went out of business. Mr. Fetzer knew of the arrangements for the "surcharge" that Ingram wanted before the delivery of the one shipment to VB and requested that shipment knowing what was required. He decided to go along with Ingram to see what would happen even though he felt by then that Ingram had breached the contract. However, he did not put this in writing to Ingram. He felt he had no choice due to Mr. Ingram's representation to him at their May meeting that it would be Ingram's way or not at all. Fetzer went along with it because he saw it as the only way to potentially get the money owed him by VB. Considering the net amount paid by Fetzer as deposit, ($20,000 - $3,000 = $17,000); the amount of antecedent debt unrecoverable due to Ingram's actions, ($26,000) and the anticipated profit lost of the remaining boxes un- delivered by Ingram, ($14,950), Ingram owes Fetzer a gross total of $57,590. From this must be deducted the $6,720 which Fetzer collected from VB on Ingram's behalf but which was not delivered to Ingram, and the $31,500 unpaid for the 3,000 boxes delivered, leaving Ingram's net obligation to Fetzer as $19,730.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that A Final Order be issued by the Commissioner of Agriculture awarding the sum of $19730 to Mark Fetzer, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR FETZER: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a statement of the law. Not a Finding of Fact but a Conclusion of Law. Accepted as a restatement of the case history. - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein except that the debt of VB to Ingram was approximately $60,000. Accepted that no tripartite agreement was reached. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact. Accepted. Not a Finding of fact but a restatement of testimony. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted that Ingram resold to others the fruit not released to Fetzer. Not a Finding of Fact but a statement of law. Accepted and incorporated herein with amount stated. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR INGRAM: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence rejected in so far as it indicates a tri-party agreement. VB's participation was more a matter of acquiescence than agreement. Second sentence accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence rejected. Fetzer did not decline to take fruit as called for in the original contract. Second sentence accepted as it notes the sale to third parties but not "as a result" of Fetzer's failure to take the fruit. Not a Finding of Fact but a Conclusion of law. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Rejected. Not a proper Finding of Fact but more a comment on the state of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas A. Lockwood, III, Esquire Peterson, Myers, Craig, Crews, Brandon & Puterbaugh, P.A. P.O. Drawer 7608 Lake Region Plaza, Suite 300 141 5th Street, N.W. Winter Haven, Florida 33883-7608 C. Kennon Hendrix, Esquire Hendrix & Brennan P.O. Box 520- 2043 14th Avenue Vero Beach, Florida 32961-0520 Chester C. Payne Financial Examiner Analyst Office of Citrus Bond and License Division of Marketing Development Department of Agriculture P.O. Box 1072 500 Third Street, N.W. Winter Haven, Florida 33882-1072 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact Romulo Banos, officer, director, and sole stockholder of respondent was convicted, on his guilty plea, of a felony under federal law on August 27, 1980, viz., a violation of Title 21 USC 963, conspiracy to import marijuana.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner revoke respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis E. LaRosa, Esquire 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Captain John Harris 1350 Northwest 12 Avenue Miami, Florida 33136 Rene Valdes 1710 Northwest 17 Street Miami, Florida 33125
