The Issue Whether State Farm Fire and Casualty Company and State Farm General Insurance Company ("State Farm") made a material misrepresentation or material error in connection with the rate filing that is the subject of this proceeding. For the purpose of this proceeding, a misrepresentation or error would be material if it resulted in the Department approving "ex-wind" (meaning without windstorm coverage) homeowners insurance rates that are excessive for policyholders whose wind coverage is being non-renewed in Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties.
Findings Of Fact The parties in this proceeding have stipulated to the following findings of fact. Based upon a review of the record in this case, these stipulated facts appear to be accurate and are adopted. In December 1995, State Farm submitted a homeowners insurance rate filing effective April 1, 1996, for new business, and May 1, 1996, for renewal business. With regard to the December 1995, homeowners rate filing, the Department of Insurance approved a 13.8 percent statewide rate increase on February 12, 1996. On February 18, 1996, State Farm formally announced that it would non- renew over three years the wind coverage for 62,000 policies in Dade, Broward, and Pinellas Counties in Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association eligible areas. On February 22, 1996, the Department issued a Notice of Withdrawal of Rate Approval ("Notice") to State Farm with regard to homeowner rates approved for Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties. Subsequent to the issuance of the Notice, the Department requested that State Farm submit to the Department actuarial information giving further consideration to the proposed non-renewal of wind coverage to policyholders in Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties. The evidence adduced in this matter consisted of an affidavit of Douglas S. Haseltine, a Department actuary, on behalf of the Department, and of pre-filed testimony of Mark Brannon, a State Farm actuary, and of the rate filing that is the subject of this litigation and of certain actuarial information that had been provided by State Farm to the Department pursuant to the request described in paragraph 5 above. The record in this matter otherwise includes the Request For Formal Proceedings filed in this matter by State Farm, with attachments, which include the Notice, and the stipulation filed by the parties on May 31, 1996. The Haseltine affidavit provides in pertinent part that: "For policyholder whose wind coverage is non-renewed, their remaining premium for coverage ex-wind is not excessive." The Brannon testimony and the attachments to it establish the methodology by which State Farm establishes rates for policyholders in different territories throughout Florida for homeowners insurance, including both homeowners insurance policies that included wind coverage and policies that excluded wind coverage (hereinafter "ex-wind policies"). The Brannon testimony also provided that the rate filing did not reflect the distributional changes that would result from the non-renewal plan that was subsequently announced on February 20, 1996. Mr. Brannon further testified that, in his expert opinion, the failure to point out this non-renewal program did not constitute a material error or material misrepresentation because when the filing was made the decision to initiate these non-renewals had not been made, and because: Even if the non-renewal program had been announced prior to December 15, 1995, it would not have changed the rate request. State Farm's original rate request was a 24 percent increase. The approved rate request included a 40 percent wind or hail exclusion discount. This discount applied to the FWUA eligible areas of Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties. The amount of this discount was not changed by the non-renewal program. Thus, the non-renewal program would not have had a material effect on the filing, even if I had known of the program at the time the filing was made. Mr. Brannon further testified that the rates proposed in the filing are not excessive or unfairly discriminatory, stating: Q: Are the rates you have proposed in this filing excessive or unfairly discriminatory? A: It is my expert opinion that the proposed rates are reasonable and are not excessive or unfairly discriminatory. Specifically, the proposed rates for both those policies which exclude windstorm or hail coverage, and the rates for those policies which include wind- storm or hail coverage, meet the statutory requirements and are not excessive or unfairly discriminatory. It appears that there is no misrepresentation or error in the rate filing itself, because the decision that the Department contends should have been disclosed had, as a matter of fact, not yet been made at the time of the filing. Moreover, if State Farm had an obligation to disclose this decision to the Department prior to the Department's approval of the rate filing, any misrepresentation or error flowing from the failure to disclose would not be material to the filing because the data subsequently provided to the Department and other evidence in this matter show that: Policyholders whose wind coverage will be non-renewed will receive a discount that is actuarially sound and commensurate with the reduction in coverage: and hence, Policyholders whose coverage will be renewed "ex-wind" will not be charged rates that are excessive.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered: (1) finding that there was not a material misrepresentation or material error made by the insurer or contained in the rate filing; and (2) dismissing the Notice. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES W. YORK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Vincent J. Rio, III, Esquire TAYLOR, DAY & RIO Suite 206 311 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1807 Daniel Y. Sumner, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issues are whether (a) respondent, Medardo G. Soto, should have a $1,500 civil penalty imposed for allegedly violating Sections 450.33(5) and and 450.35, Florida Statutes (1989), and (b) whether respondent, Martin G. Soto, should have a $250 civil penalty imposed for allegedly violating Section 450.30, Florida Statutes (1989).
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This controversy arose on the morning of January 29, 1990, when Larry Coker, a compliance officer with petitioner, Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Labor, Employment, and Training (Division), made an inspection of a citrus harvesting crew working in an orange grove on the Black Bay Citrus and Cattle Company on County Road 763 in DeSoto County, Florida. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the crew and its supervising contractor were in compliance with state regulations. Upon entering the premises, Coker observed a crew of eighteen workers harvesting fruit in a citrus grove. Respondent, Martin G. Soto (Martin), was operating a high lift at the work site. Coker approached Martin and asked him who was the farm labor contractor for the crew. Martin responded that his brother, Medardo G. Soto (Medardo), who is also a respondent in this cause, was the licensed farm labor contractor but he (Medardo) was in Immokalee. Martin acknowledged that he (Martin) was supervising the crew for his bother and was being paid $50 per day to do so. Division records reflect that Martin is not licensed by the State to perform that activity. Accordingly, it has been established through Martin's admissions and Coker's observations that Martin was acting as a farm labor contractor without a license. Martin was issued a citation that day which he read and signed. At the bottom of the citation Martin acknowledged that the charges contained therein were true. By allowing his brother to supervise a crew without a proper license, Medardo used an unregistered farm labor contractor in contravention of the law. Martin further acknowledged that he had driven the workers to the field that day in Medardo's 1986 Ford van. A search of Division records revealed that the 1986 Ford van did not have the required vehicle inspection or proof of liability insurance on file with Division offices. Agency rules require that evidence of such inspection and insurance be filed with the Division. Accordingly, it is found that Medardo operated a vehicle used to transport workers without furnishing the Division proof of the necessary vehicle inspection and insurance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that respondent Medardo G. Soto has violated Sections 450.33(5) and (9) and 450.35, Florida Statutes (1989) and that respondent Martin G. Soto has violated Subsection 450.30(1), Florida Statutes (1989). It is further recommended that Medardo and Martin Soto be fined $1,500 and $250, respectively, such fines to be paid within thirty days from date of the final order entered by the Division. DONE and ENTERED this 29th of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administraive Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Francisco R. Rivera, Esquire 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S. E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0658 Mr. Medardo G. Soto 1013 North 19th Street Immokalee, FL 33934 Mr. Martin Soto 1013 North 19th Street Immokalee, FL 33934 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Dept. of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S. E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0658 Stephen D. Barron, Esquire 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0658
The Issue Whether respondents owe petitioner money on account of watermelon sales?
Findings Of Fact Last spring, her first working on behalf of respondent McKay & Associates, Inc., Pat Harper nee ' Maddox accompanied Randy Finch, the company president, to Florida to help buy and ship produce. Because petitioner Bubba Hurst had sold watermelons to Ms. Harper season before last, she sought him out again. On Tuesday night, May 28, 1991, Ms. Harper orally agreed on behalf of McKay & Associates, Inc. (after Ruth Neuman, the company's secretary-treasurer, had been consulted by telephone) to pay Mr. Hurst 12 cents a pound for two truckloads of watermelons "as is." (Earlier she had seen the watermelons piled in the smaller trucks in which petitioner's crew had brought them from the fields to the melon yard, after harvesting them that day.) With Wednesday morning came a truck and driver (engaged by Ms. Harper or Mr. Finch) to haul the watermelons from petitioner's melon yard to truck scales some ten miles away, then to a farm in Denton, Georgia, for crating and transshipment to their ultimate intended destinations in Maryland and Pennsylvania. After the first truck left at 4:58 that afternoon, loaded with watermelons aggregating 43,280 pounds, Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, a second truck and driver arrived. Mr. Finch had agreed to pay Mr. Hurst cash for the watermelons, but a complication arose before they could settle that night: Only after the crew had gone home was it discovered that the second truck was overloaded by some 9,000 pounds; and the driver refused to risk the fines he might incur by hauling an overload. As a result, it was not clear exactly how many watermelons McKay & Associates, Inc. would owe petitioner for. After some discussion, Mr. Finch wrote and signed a check in petitioner's favor but left blank the amount; petitioner then endorsed and returned the check. The plan was, once the exact amount was known, for Mr. Finch to complete the check, cash it, and give Mr. Hurst the proceeds. Afterwards it occurred to Mr. Hurst that if the check were made out for more than what he was to be paid for the watermelons, he could have problems with the Internal Revenue Service. Apprehensive, he asked Mr. Finch to void the check, which he did, by writing "VOID" across it. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Later somebody filled in an amount ($5,193.60, which corresponds to the first load, 43,280 pounds at 12 cents per) and wrote "melons no good," perhaps in anticipation of a formal administrative proceeding like the present one. The check was never negotiated. On Thursday, May 30, 1991, while watermelons were being unloaded from the second truck, two men with a brief case full of cash expressed an interest in the lightening truckload. When Ms. Harper told Mr. Hurst, he said the watermelons were hers to do with as she pleased. She then sold the load to the two men for 12 cents a pound cash, and handed the money over to petitioner. The excess watermelons on the second truck had been offloaded onto a third truck. Of like capacity as the first, the third truck was empty when it accompanied the overloaded truck to the melon yard on Thursday morning. With the departure of the second truck, Ms. Harper and Mr. Finch told Mr. Hurst to fill the third truck up and agreed to buy that truckload. For a while, Mr. Finch was actually "in the line" handing some watermelons along for loading in the third truck, and rejecting others. They weighed 20 pounds each on average. Meanwhile, when Ms. Neuman saw the first truckload, after its arrival in Denton, Georgia, on Thursday morning, she exclaimed, "My God! These are sun scald[ed]!" At hearing, she testified she was incredulous Florida would let such watermelons leave the state. Ms. Neuman telephoned Mr. Finch and told him she was sending the first load back, but that she would take the other load if it "meets federal." She also called the trucking company (then reportedly owned by the late Sam Walton), however, and told the trucker not to load any more watermelons. When Evelyn Hurst, Bubba's mother, answered the telephone at the melon yard lunchtime Thursday, she was asked to tell the driver of the third truck to call home because there was an emergency. The driver made a telephone call, after which he told Mrs. Hurst nothing was wrong at his home. Then he made a second telephone call. After that call, he ordered a stop to the loading then in progress. Bubba Hurst was eating when his mother called with word that no more watermelons were being loaded onto the third truck. He then telephoned the motel where Mr. Finch was staying, and inquired. Mr. Finch told him to finish loading the third truck; and later went to the melon yard and told the driver that loading should go forward. Loading resumed. Later Mr. Finch raised with the driver the possibility of taking the load to New York, but the driver declined the suggestion. Around four o'clock Thursday, the renewed efforts to fill the third truck with watermelons came to an abrupt end, about 250 melons shy of a full load, and the driver, who had ordered the halt, drove away. Mr. Hurst called the motel, and spoke to Ms. Harper, in hope of obtaining the cash he had been promised for his watermelons, but to no avail. The next day the first truck returned from Georgia with the watermelons whose presence on the other side of the state line had so surprised Ms. Neuman; and a federal agricultural inspector, a friend of Mr. Hurst's father, arrived at petitioner's melon yard to inspect them. Mr. Hurst told the inspector (who had been called by Ms. Neuman) that he was welcome to inspect but that the whole load had been sold "as is" and that he - Mr. Hurst - would not be paying for the inspection. Hearing this, the inspector left. Disinterested testimony established that inspections by USDA- certified inspectors are routinely called for by shippers when produce is refused by buyers claiming that produce spoiled before reaching them; but that, at least in the environs of Wildwood, Florida, it is not customary to call for a federal inspection at the point from which watermelons are shipped (unless the shipment is to the Government itself.) Of course, these particular watermelons had already been to Georgia and back. After the inspector left, the driver of the first truck asked that the watermelons be removed from his truck. When Mr. Hurst told him he was trespassing and asked him to leave the melon yard, the driver (or Ms. Neuman by long distance telephone call) summoned a Sumter County deputy sheriff. But the deputy sheriff, informed upon his arrival that the melon yard was a good quarter mile on the Marion County side of the county line, left to perform other duties. Still loaded, the first truck eventually left the melon yard a second time.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That DACS order McKay & Associates, Inc. to pay petitioner nine thousand seven hundred eighty seven dollars and twenty cents ($9,787.20) within fifteen (15) days of the final order. That, in the event McKay & Associates, Inc. fails to pay petitioner nine thousand seven hundred eighty seven dollars and twenty cents ($9,787.20) within fifteen (15) days of the final order, DACS order payment by State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., to the extent necessary to satisfy the requirements of Section 604.21(8), Florida Statutes (1991), for disbursal to petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 6, see findings of fact Nos. 5 and 6. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, petitioner said the load may have been as many as 250 melons light. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 11, the value of the second load established by the evidence is $4,591.60, representing 38,280 pounds at 12 cents a pound. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 1 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 2 and 3, Ms. Neuman's testimony that she directed her agents to procure federal inspection before the first truck left has not been credited, but she did try to arrange one later. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 4, the second truck load was never rejected. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 5 is rejected. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 6, see paragraphs 5 and 6 of the findings of fact. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 7 is immaterial. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 8, Mr. Finch agreed to buy the third truckload and ordered that loading go forward even after Ms. Neuman registered her dissatisfaction with the first load. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agricultural and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agricultural and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Julian E. Harrison, Esquire 324 West Dade Avenue Bushnell, Florida 33513 John Sowa, Esquire Robert L. Rehberger, Esquire 5025 North Henry Boulevard Stockbridge, Georgia 30281
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearings the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1983). However, since the pallets were not an agricultural product produced by Petitioner and were not considered in the price of the bahia sod but were exchanged back and forth between Petitioner and his customer, including Respondent American, they are not considered to be an agricultural product in this case and are excluded from any consideration for payment under Section 604.15-604.30, Florida Statutes. The amount charged Respondent American for these pallets was $1,188.00. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent American was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), issued license No. 3774 by the Department, and bonded by Respondent Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless) in the sum of $15,000 - Bond No. SK-2 87 38. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Peerless was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1983). During the month of January, 1985 Respondent American purchased numerous pallets of bahia grass sod from Petitioner paying $16.00 per pallet but has refused to pay for 240 pallets at $16.00 per flat for a total amount of $3,840.00 picked up by Respondent American's employees and billed by Petitioner between January 16, 1985 and January 26, 1985. Respondent American did not contest having received 204 pallets of bahia grass sod represented by invoice number. 6774- for 18 pallets on 1/16/85; 6783, 6785, and 6788 for 18 pallets each on 1/17/85; 6791, 6793, 6794, 6795, and 6800 for 16 pallets each on 1/18/85 and 6799 for 18 pallets on 1/18/85, 6831 for 18 pallets on 1/28/85; and 6834 for 16 pallets on 1/30/85 but contested invoice numbers 6835 and 6836 for 18 pallets each on 1/26/85. Gary L. Curtis stipulated at the hearing that Respondent American had received the 36 pallets of bahia grass sod represented by invoice numbers 6835 and 6836 which left only the matter of Respondent American's contention that it was owed credit for 20 pallets of bahia sod received in December, 1984 that was of poor quality and fell apart and had to be replaced because it could not be used. The evidence was insufficient to prove that any of the sod purchased by Respondent American from Petitioner fell apart or was of poor quality and as a result could not he utilized by Respondent American.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent American be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $3,840.00. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent American fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered then Respondent Peerless be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983). Respectfully submitted and entered this 10th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Doyle Conner, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Chastain, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ron Weaver, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joe W. Kight, Chief License and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary L. Curtis, President American Sod Company, Inc. Post Office Box 1370 Longwood, Florida 32750 Mid Florida Sod Company 4141 Canoe Creek Road St. Cloud, Florida 32769 Peerless Insurance Company 611 Aymore Road/Suite 202 Winter Park, Florida 32789 Raymond E. Cramer Esquire Post Office Box 607 St. Cloud, Florida 32769
The Issue Whether Respondent Five Brothers Produce Inc. is indebted to Petitioner for agricultural products and, if so, in what amount?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner grows tomatoes on its farm in Dade County. Jack Wishart is in charge of the farm's operations. Five Brothers Produce, Inc., is a dealer in agricultural products. At all times material hereto, Pete Johnson was responsible for buying and selling produce for Five Brothers. He was assisted by Robert Barbare. On Friday, January 19, 1990, Johnson met with Wishart at Petitioner's farm. During their meeting, they discussed the possibility of Five Brothers purchasing all of Petitioner's 6x7 tomatoes. They ultimately entered into a verbal agreement concerning the matter. Under the terms of the agreement, Five Brothers agreed to purchase from Petitioner, and Petitioner agreed to sell to Five Brothers, Petitioner's supply of 6x7 tomatoes, which consisted of 293 packages, for $26.00 a package. At the time, tomatoes were in scarce supply because of the damage that had been done to the South Florida tomato crop by the freeze of the prior month. As a result, the market price for U.S.#1 grade 6x7 tomatoes was $32.00 a package. Wishhart agreed to a lower price for Petitioner's 6x7 tomatoes because they were U.S.#2 grade. The 293 packages of tomatoes were delivered to Five Brothers on the following day, Saturday, January 20, 1990. Johnson had purchased the tomatoes for Five Brothers to resell to a customer in Atlanta, Georgia. Upon inspecting the tomatoes after their arrival at Five Brothers' loading dock in Florida City, Johnson determined that they did not meet the needs of this particular customer because, in Johnson's opinion, they were too ripe to be shipped out of state. Johnson thereupon telephoned Wishart to tell him that the tomatoes were not suitable for his Atlanta customer. Later that same day, January 20, 1990, pursuant to Johnson's instructions, Barbare, Five Brothers' "late night clerk," contacted Wishart and advised him that Five Brothers wanted to return the tomatoes to Petitioner. The gates of Petitioner's farm were closed, and Wishart so informed Barbare. He then asked Barbare to store the tomatoes in Five Brothers' cooler until they could be returned to Petitioner's farm. Barbare agreed to do so. Approximately a day or two later, Barbare again telephoned Wishart. He told Wishart that Five Brothers had found a customer to whom it could sell the tomatoes, which were still in Five Brothers' cooler. Wishart, in response, stated that Petitioner would lower its sale price and "take $20.00," instead of $26.00 as previously agreed, for the tomatoes. 1/ On Monday, January 22, 1990, Five Brothers consummated a deal with Leo Genecco & Sons, Inc., (Genecco) of Rochester, New York, which agreed to purchase the tomatoes from Five Brothers. 2/ The tomatoes were priced "open," that is, the price of the tomatoes was to be established after the sale. Five Brothers ultimately received $3,149.75 ($10.75 a package) for the 293 packages of 6x7 tomatoes it had sold to Genecco. It thereupon sent a check in that amount to Petitioner as payment for these tomatoes. In the transaction at issue in the instant case, Five Brothers was not acting as a broker or agent for Petitioner. It purchased the tomatoes from Petitioner. The sales price was initially $26.00 a package and was later reduced to $20.00 a package. Accordingly, for the 293 packages of tomatoes Petitioner sold Five Brothers, it should have received from Five Bothers $5,860.00, $2,710.25 more than it was paid.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order (1) finding that Five Brothers is indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $2,710.25, (2) directing Five Brothers to make payment to Petitioner in the amount of $2,710.25 within 15 days following the issuance of the order, and (3) announcing that, if such payment is not timely made, the Department will seek recovery from the Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., Five Brother's surety. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of March, 1991. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Wishart Pine Islands Farms, Inc. Post Office Box 247 Goulds, Florida 33170 Pete Johnson Five Brothers Produce, Inc. Post Office Box 3592 Florida City, Florida 33034 Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. 5700 Southwest 34th Street Gainesville, Florida 32608 Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearings the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceedings Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1985) At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Pent was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1985), issued license no. 3531 by the Department, and bonded by Respondent Transamerica Insurance Company (Transamerica) in the sum of $4,750.00 - Bond No. 51825769. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Transamerica was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1985). On June 12, 1985 Respondent sold and delivered to Respondent Pent but invoiced through J & W Nursery- fifty (50) Texas sage plants at $2.00 per plant, twenty five (25) Pittosporum plants $4.75 per plant and four (4) red maple trees at $15.00 per plant for a total amount of $278.75 which Respondent Pent has refused to pay. At all times pertinent to these proceedings, J. & W. Nursery was owned by Respondent Pent, d/b/a Pent Landscaping Company. Respondent Pent has not denied receiving the nursery stock nor did she complain about their quality or condition upon delivery.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent Pent be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $278.75. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent Pent fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered, then Respondent Transamerica be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1985) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1985). Respectfully submitted and entered this 23rd day of May, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Doyle Conner, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Chastain, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ron Weaver, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Joe W. Kight, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Transamerica Insurance Company 1150 S. Olive Street Los Angeles, CA 90015 Mrs. Dean Pent Pent Landscape Company 1660 Emerson Street Jacksonville, Florida 32207 William D. Reese Greenbriar Nurseries, Inc. 2025 N.E. 70th Street Ocala Florida 32670
Findings Of Fact Respondent Charles W. Crowell, a State Farm agent under the terms of an agency agreement declaring him an independent contractor, has never employed 15 or more employees at any one time. During the 20 weeks next before petitioner Donna Clark left his employ, he had no more than three full-time and two part- time employees. As a State Farm agent, Mr. Crowell is contractually bound not to represent other insurance companies. State Farm, which has employed more than 15 persons at all pertinent times, prescribes policy forms, premiums, fees and charges for insurance, and prescribes underwriting rules its agents (and so their employees) must follow. Most premiums reach State Farm in the form of checks drawn by insured persons. But, as required by state law and his agreement with State Farm alike, Mr. Crowell maintains a separate premium fund account, into which customers' cash premium payments are deposited. Moneys are disbursed directly from this account to State Farm, which has the right to audit the account. State Farm determines Crowell's compensation based on the amount of premiums it receives on policies he has written, and writes him checks accordingly. At year's end, State Farm reports these payments to the IRS on a form 1099, not on a W-2 form. Mr. Crowell receives no compensation directly from the premium fund account. When an agent retires and in certain other instances, State Farm allocates policies among remaining agents, while honoring preferences policyholders express for particular agents. But it does not restrict agents to a particular territory or otherwise dictate where its agents conduct business. State Farm reserves the right to approve any advertising by an agency using State Farm's name or logo. But certain business cards bearing the logo are "pre-approved," except for the name of the agent or other employee in the agent's office which is to appear on the card. Mr. Crowell sets his own hours and it was he who decided the office would open at nine and close at five. Some days he does not open his office for business, even though State Farm offices are open. If he closes his office on days State Farm is closed, it may well be because he cannot do business with State Farm. But he is free to keep office hours on such days if he chooses. His compensation does not depend directly on the amount of time his office is open, or on the amount of time he spends at work. Mr. Crowell, not State Farm, decides whom to employ in his office, and sets hours, salaries and benefits for these employees. He, not State Farm, personally pays wages and benefits (if any), along with employment taxes for which employers are liable on account of their employees. But, on unemployment compensation tax forms, gives as the employer's name "CHARLES W. CROWELL STATE FARM INSURANCE COS" and signs as Charles W. Crowell Agent." Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. Mr. Crowell drew salary checks in favor of Ms. Clark and other employees in his office on his own business checking account, which is not subject to audit by State Farm. These salary checks did not bear State Farm's name or logo. The parties have stipulated, as follows: "5. Crowell's office is located at 908 Michigan Avenue in Pensacola, Florida, and he personally owns the property and building where his office is located. State Farm has no interest or property rights in this facility. The only forms, manuals, and other documents located in Crowell's office which are the property of State Farm are insurance product information, including names of policyholders. The equipment, furniture and other supplies located at or used in Crowell's office are owned or leased by Crowell, and not State Farm. Crowell personally hired Donna M. Clark, and State Farm took no part in, exercised no control over, and had no input regarding Crowell's decision to hire Ms. Clark. Crowell sets the work hours, wages and benefits of his employees, including the number of employees employed by his business, without consultation with or the approval of State Farm. Crowell personally pays the salaries or wages and employment taxes, including Florida Workers' Compensation, Unemployment Compensation, Social Security (FICA) and federal tax withholding, on all of his employees, including Ms. Clark, and State Farm pays no salaries to or taxes on behalf of any of Crowell's employees. State Farm provides no benefits to the employees of its State Farm agents, and Crowell decides whether employment benefits such as health or life insurance are provided to Crowell's employees, including whether there is any cost to the employee. Such policies can be purchased by the State Farm Agent from State Farm, if he chooses to do so. Crowell, not State Farm, maintains all personnel records on his employees, including Ms. Clark. State Farm does not have any personnel records as to petitioner Donna Clark. Crowell's business is to sell State Farm policies and service State Farm policyholders. State Farm prescribes policy forms, premiums, fees and charges for insurance, and prescribes underwriting rules pertaining to writing State Farm insurance. Employees of State Farm Agents such as Mr. Crowell are not required to attend State Farm meetings or training sessions. State Farm offers training on topics selected by State Farm Agents, to which the State Farm Agents, such as Mr. Crowell, may choose to send their employees, for a fee payable to State Farm. State Farm requires Crowell to maintain a premium fund account, which is a trust account for the deposit of insurance premiums which are the property of State Farm. All cash premiums from policyholders are deposited to the premium fund account, and premium funds are promptly forwarded to State Farm. Premiums paid by check are sent directly to State Farm, and the large majority of premiums received by Crowell are by check. The premium fund account is subject to auditing by State Farm. As part of the audit of the premium fund account, State Farm develops a profit and loss statement which compares the claims experience of policies serviced by the Agent to the premiums generated by those policies and thus reflects the profit or loss to State Farm. Such profit and loss statement is for State Farm's own use in determining its own profitability and does not show or indicate the success of Mr. Crowell in his personal business as an insurance agent. Crowell maintains separate accounts for his personal and business funds which are not subject to any auditing by State Farm. Crowell is not paid for his sales activities out of the premium fund account, but is paid on a commission basis after all premium funds have been deposited with State Farm. Crowell personally directed Clark to attend certain training courses conducted by the local district manager of State Farm on underwriting insurance and product knowledge only. State farm does not require State Farm Agents to send their employees to training courses conducted by State Farm. State Farm does not allow employees of State Farm Agents to attend training courses concerning financial management or conduct of the agency, and Clark did not attend any such courses." Although not stipulated by the parties, evidence showed that, at one of the training courses Ms. Clark attended, a speaker told employees in attendance that they comprised State Farm's "front line." State Farm decides, with input from its agents, which courses and seminars to offer, but it is up to individual agents to decide who, if anybody, attends from their offices. State Farm employees known as agency managers coordinate operations of agents in their assigned area. When the agency manager decides another agent is needed, he recruits a trainee, who works for State Farm for two years or so (unless discharged earlier.) After this period of training, State Farm offers most trainees the opportunity to terminate employment and become agents. With State Farm's permission, an agent may incorporate. Even as independent contractors, agents receive contributions from State Farm toward personal insurance premiums, which are treated as part of the agents' income. The State Farm manager for the Pensacola area while Ms. Clark worked in Mr. Crowell's office offered bonuses to agents' employees who won contests, although this violated company policy. Ms. Clark did not, however, participate in any contest or receive a bonus. A number of unlicensed people in Mr. Crowell's office sign policies when he is unavailable. Because this practice is widespread, Insurance Commissioner Gallagher has insisted that insurance agents see that more office staff are licensed. Accordingly, State Farm's agency manager has asked State Farm agents to identify office personnel for licensure. Employees of a State Farm agency must be approved by State Farm, in order to obtain licenses. After an agent identifies an employee and the employee sits for an examination, State Farm does a background check and makes its decision about sponsorship. Ms. Clark did not seek licensure as an insurance agent, although she was among those who signed policies. In the course or her work, she spoke directly with underwriting personnel in Jacksonville, on Mr. Crowell's behalf or with his acquiescance.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the petition. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Realtions 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Karen Lessard, Esquire 15 West LaRua Street Pensacola, FL 32501 Kathryn Errington, Esquire HARRELL, WILTSHIRE, SWEARINGEN, WILSON & HARRELL, P.A. 201 East Government Street P.O. Drawer 1832 Pensacola, FL 32501 Mary Jarrett, Esquire 2065 Herschel Street P.O. Box 40089 Jacksonville, FL 32203
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto Respondent, Randolph Roundtree (Roundtree), held a Florida farm labor contractor certificate of registration. By complaint filed on behalf of thirteen seasonal agricultural workers in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (District Court), hearing Case No. 84-8235-CIV-JAG, damages were sought against Roundtree for violation of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSAWPA) under the provisions of 28 USC Sections 1331 and 1337. On November 20, 1985, an order by default was entered against Roundtree which found that he had intentionally violated the MSAWPA in that he had: Failed to post in a conspicuous place at the work site a notice setting forth the rights and protections afforded the workers ... Failed to keep payroll records for each weekly pay period showing as to each Plaintiff his total earnings, all withholding from earnings, net earnings, hours worked, wages per hour, the number of units of work performed and the rate per unit ... Failed to provide each Plaintiff at the end of each weekly pay period with a statement of all sums paid to them on account of the labor of each Plaintiff, an itemized statement of the amount withheld from such payments and the purpose for each withholding * * * Failed to pay the Plaintiffs their wages when due Violated, without justification, the terms of the working agreement made with the Plaintiffs... On November 20, 1985, a final judgment in the sum of 3,000 per plaintiff was entered against Roundtree, and that judgment remains unsatisfied. By certified letter dated April 21, 1987, Petitioner, Department of Labor and Employment Security (Department), advised Roundtree that his failure to comply with the MSAWPA, as demonstrated by the District Court action, likewise constituted a violation of the provisions of Chapter 450, Part III, Florida Statutes, and that the Department intended to revoke his certificate of registration. Roundtree filed a timely request for formal hearing. At hearing, the proof established that, as to the plaintiffs in the District Court action, Roundtree violated the provisions of Chapter 450, Part III, Florida Statutes, by: Failing to display prominently at the site where the work was performed by the farmworkers, and in all vehicles used by him for the transportation of farmworkers, a copy of his application for a certificate of registration, and a written statement showing the rate of compensation he received from the grower and the rate of compensation he was paying the farmworkers. Failing to keep a payroll slip for each weekly pay period showing as to each farmworker his total earnings, all withholdings from earnings, net earnings, hours worked, wages per hour, number of units of work performed, and the rate per unit. Failing to provide each farmworker at the end of each weekly pay period with a statement of all sums paid to them on account of labor of each worker, and an itemized statement of the amount withheld from such payments and the proofs for each withholding. Failing to pay the farmworkers their wages when due. Violating, without justification, the terms of the working agreement he made with the farmworkers.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Roundtree's Florida farm labor contractor certificate of registration be REVOKED. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Moses E. Williams, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Montgomery Building, Suite 117 2562 Executive Center Circle Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0658 Randolph Roundtree Post Office Box 118 South Bay, Florida 33493 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Kenneth Hart, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 131 Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Santos Samarrippas, Sr., a farm labor contractor and holder of a certificate of registration issued by Petitioner at all times pertinent to these proceedings. Respondent's current certificate of registration was issued April 26, 1988. Respondent has renewed his certificate of registration on an annual basis since 1984. As of January 9, 1989, Respondent was indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $5,195.27. This sum represents unpaid unemployment compensation taxes, along with interest and penalties for nonpayment from 1984 to through 1988. In April of 1985, Respondent was informed of his liability for unpaid unemployment compensation taxes in 1984. He completed, after consultation with Petitioner's representative, requisite forms for tax reporting purposes, but neglected to pay the delinquent taxes. Respondent continued his failure to completely pay the required taxes in 1986 and 1987. He made only "pittance" payments. In 1988, Respondent and Petitioner's representative agreed upon a payment plan whereby Respondent agreed to pay the delinquent taxes, penalties and interest at a rate of $100 per week until the total amount owed by him was paid. Respondent made those payments from February 21, 1988 until April 5, 1988. He then ceased to make further payments. The proof establishes that Respondent, after subtraction of the minor payments he made, owed Petitioner a total sum for delinquent taxes, interest, and filing fees for each of the following years in the amounts shown: AMOUNT YEAR $2039 1984 $ 504 1985 $1468.09 1986 $1183.56 1988 Respondent made two timely quarterly tax reports to Petitioner out of a total of 14 required in the period 1984-88, but never made timely payments of the amounts of unemployment compensation taxes owed to Petitioner Also, Respondent never made full payments of the amount of taxes owed. As a result of Respondent's nonpayment of unemployment compensation taxes, Petitioner notified Respondent by letter dated November 17, 1988, of intent to revoke Respondent's Florida Farm Labor Contractor Certificate of Registration for his failure to comply with applicable rules of the United States or the State of Florida relating to unemployment compensation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered revoking Respondent's certificate of registration as a farm labor contractor. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Joel Chawk, Esquire Post Office Drawer 8209 Lakeland, Florida 33802-8209 Santos Samarrippas, Sr. 3501 Avenue K Northwest Winter Haven, Florida 33881 Moses E. Williams, Esquire Suite 117 Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0658 Hugo Menendez, Secretary 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Stephen Barron, Esquire 131 Montgomery Building 2563 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the acts alleged in Petitioner’s ten-count Second Amended Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what penalty, if any, should be imposed upon Robert Gordon DeWald’s (Respondent) insurance agent licenses.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently licensed in Florida as a resident Life Including Variable Annuity (2-14), Life Including Variable Annuity & Health (2-15), Life (2016), and Life & Health (2-18) insurance agent. At all times pertinent to the dates and occurrences referred to herein, Respondent was licensed in this state as an insurance agent and has been a licensed insurance agent in Florida for over 21 years. Prior to being licensed in Florida, Respondent was a licensed insurance agent in the state of New York. Petitioner has jurisdiction over Respondent’s insurance agent licenses and appointments, pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2008).1 National Foundation of America The National Foundation of America (NFOA) is a registered Tennessee corporation that was formed on January 27, 2006, and headquartered in Franklin, Tennessee. NFOA Corporate Resolution, dated April 19, 2006, provides for the corporate authority to “liquidate stocks, bonds, and annuities . . . in connection with charitable contributions or transactions. ” This same resolution also provides for the corporate ability to “enter into and execute planned giving or charitable contribution transactions with donors, including executing any and all documentation related to the acceptance or acquisition of a donation, . . . given in exchange for a charitable gift annuity. ” On September 18, 2006, the State of Washington Office of Insurance Commissioner issued an Order to Cease and Desist: In the Matter of: National Foundation of America, Richard K. Olive, and Susan L. Olive, Order No. D06-245. The Order, among other things, was based on NFOA doing business in the state and not having been granted a certificate of authority as an insurer in the state of Washington and not having been granted tax exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC. On April 13, 2007, the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (OIR) issued an Immediate Final Order (IFO) In the Matter of: National Foundation of America, Richard K. Olive, Susan L. Olive, Breanna McIntyre, and Robert G. DeWald, Case No. 89911-07, finding that the activities of NFOA, et al., constituted an immediate danger to the public health, safety or welfare of Florida consumers. OIR further found that, in concert, NFOA, et al., were “soliciting, misleading, coercing and enticing elderly Florida consumers to transfer and convey legitimate income tax deferred annuities for the benefit of themselves and their heirs to NFOA in exchange for charitable term-certain annuities”; and that NFOA, et al., had violated provisions of the Florida Insurance Code, including Sections 624.401 and 626.901, Florida Statutes. NFOA has never held a license or Certificate of Authority to transact insurance or annuity contracts in Florida, nor has NFOA ever been registered, pursuant to Section 627.481, Florida Statutes, for purposes of donor annuity agreements. NFOA was never a registered corporation with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations. On May 11, 2007, NFOA appealed OIR’s IFO to the First District Court of Appeal of Florida (1st DCA). The 1st DCA dismissed NFOA’s appeal on July 24, 2007. Therefore, NFOA operated an as unauthorized insurer in Florida. On May 17, 2007, the IRS sent a letter to the Texas Department of Insurance stating that NFOA was not classified as an organization exempt from Federal Income Tax as an organization described in Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC. On May 23, 2007, the DCI filed a Verified Petition for Appointment of Receiver for Purposes of Liquidation of National Foundation of America; Immediate and Permanent Injunctive Relief; Request for Expedited Hearing, in the matter of Newman v. National Foundation of America, Richard K. Olive, Susan L. Olive, Breanna McIntyre, Kenny M. Marks, and Hunter Daniel, Chancery Court of the State of Tennessee (Chancery Court), Twentieth Judicial District, Davidson County, Case No. 07-1163-IV. The Verified Petition states, at paragraph 30: NFOA’s contracts reflect an express written term that is recognized by the IRS as a charitable non-profit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (Prosser, attachment 4), and the NFOA represents in multiple statements and materials that the contract will entitle the customers to potential generous tax deductions related to that status. The IRS states that it has granted NFOA no such designation. The deceptive underpinning related to NFOA’s supposed tax favored treatment of its contracts permeates its entire business model and sales pitch. This misrepresentation has materially and irreparably harmed and has the potential to harm financially all its customers and the intended beneficiaries of the contracts. These harms are as varied in nature and degree as the circumstances of all those individual’s tax conditions, the assets turned into NFOA, and the extent to which they have entrusted their money and keyed their tax status and consequences to reliance on such an organization. On August 2, 2007, the Commissioner for the Tennessee DCI, having determined that NFOA was insolvent with a financial deficiency of at least $4,300,000, filed a Verified Petition to Convert Rehabilitation by Entry of Final Order of Liquidation, Finding of Insolvency, and Injunction, in the matter of Newman v. National Foundation of America, et al. On September 11, 2007, pursuant to a Final Order of Liquidation and Injunction entered in the matter of Newman v. National Foundation of America et al., the Chancery Court placed NFOA into receivership after finding that the continued rehabilitation of NFOA would be hazardous, financially and otherwise, and would present increased risk of loss to the company’s creditors, policy holders, and the general public. On February 6, 2008, the IRS sent a letter to the court appointed Tennessee DCI Receiver (Receiver) for NFOA stating that NFOA does not qualify for exemption from Federal income tax as an organization described in Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC. The IRS, in determining that NFOA did not qualify for tax exempt status, stated that the sale of NFOA annuity plans has a “distinctive commercial hue”, and concluded that NFOA was primarily involved in the sale of annuity plans that “constitute a trade or business without a charitable program commensurate in scope with the business of selling these plans.” The IRS letter also provides that consumers may not take deductions on their income tax returns for contributions made to NFOA. Insurance Agent’s Duties An insurance agent has a fiduciary duty to his clients to ensure that an insurer is authorized or otherwise approved as an insurer in Florida by OIR prior to the insurance agent selling the insurer’s product to his clients. There are several methods by which an insurance agent could verify whether or not an insurer was authorized or otherwise approved (hereinafter: “authorized”) as an insurer in Florida by OIR. It is insufficient for an insurance agent to depend on the assurances of his insurance business peers as to whether an insurer needs to be authorized in Florida. Due to the importance of income tax considerations in a consumer’s decision making process as to whether or not to purchase an insurance product, an insurance agent has a fiduciary duty to his clients to verify the validity of any representations that an insurer’s product has an IRS 501(c)(3) tax exempt status, prior to the insurance agent selling the product to his clients. There are several methods by which an insurance agent could verify whether or not an insurer has an IRS 501(c)(3) tax exempt status. Respondent admitted, in his testimony, that he had depended on the assurances of others and assumed that NFOA did not need to be authorized as an insurer in Florida. Respondent testified it was his understanding that only insurance companies sell annuities; that NFOA was not an insurer; and therefore, NFOA did not need to be licensed as a Florida insurer. Respondent did not inquire of the Florida OIR whether or not NFOA was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. However, Respondent admitted that the NOFA product he sold “mirrored” an annuity product. Respondent testified that he had verified (by phone, in writing, and the Internet) with the IRS that NFOA had applied for 501(c)(3) tax exempt status. However, Respondent was aware that the tax exempt status had not been granted to NFOA. Respondent knew income tax considerations were materially important to his clients. However, none of the NFOA materials or any Florida consumer contracts signed by Respondent and his clients contain any disclaimer language informing consumers that the 501(c)(3) tax exempt status had been applied for but had yet to be granted by the IRS. Respondent testified that he made use of the Internet to obtain information. However, Respondent failed to use the Internet to find out that the State of Washington Office of Insurance Commissioner entered an Order of Cease and Desist on September 18, 2006, against NFOA based on NFOA not having a certificate of authority as an insurer and because NFOA did not have a 501(c)(3) tax exemption. As is noted below, the filing date of the Washington Order to Cease and Desist, preceded in time all but two of Respondent’s NFOA sales to Florida consumers. Respondent received commissions totaling $171,328.18 for selling NFOA annuities to Florida consumers. Respondent failed to disgorge any of these commissions to the Receiver for NFOA in the state of Tennessee. Re: Count I: Consumer – Yvette Potvin On November 30, 2006, Respondent solicited and induced Yvette Potvin of Casselberry, Florida, then age 81, to transfer or otherwise surrender ownership of her existing annuity contract with Allianz Life Insurance Company in return for an NFOA annuity. The NFOA agreement that the consumer entered into, and which was signed by Respondent, is dated subsequent to the State of Washington Order to Cease and Desist that was filed against NFOA. Respondent knew or reasonably should have known that NFOA was not an authorized insurer in Florida. Respondent, by use of the NFOA installment plan agreement, knowingly misrepresented to Ms. Potvin that NFOA was a charitable non-profit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC, even though Respondent knew that NFOA had not been approved for tax exempt status by the IRS. Based upon Respondent’s transaction of insurance, Ms. Potvin transferred to NFOA and is anticipated to lose approximately $10,410.42. This amount includes a surrender penalty incurred for transferring her original Allianz annuity to NFOA, and after receiving partial refunds by the Receiver. Based upon Respondent’s transaction of insurance with Ms. Potvin, Respondent was paid a commission of $3,682.89 by NFOA. Re: Count II: Consumer – Edna Bishop On January 18, 2007, Respondent solicited and induced Edna Bishop of Orlando, Florida, then aged 89, to transfer or otherwise surrender ownership of her existing annuity contract with American Equity Investment Life Insurance Company in return for an NFOA annuity. The NFOA agreement that the consumer entered into, and which was signed by Respondent, is dated subsequent to the State of Washington Order to Cease and Desist that was filed against NFOA. Ultimately, this transaction did not close. Respondent knew or reasonably should have known that NFOA was not an authorized insurer in Florida. Respondent, by use of the NFOA installment plan agreement, knowingly misrepresented to Ms. Bishop that NFOA was a charitable non-profit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC, even though Respondent knew or should have known that NFOA was not a tax exempt corporation. Based upon Respondent’s transaction of insurance with Ms. Bishop, Respondent was paid a commission of $8,185.35 by NFOA, even though the transaction was not completed. Re: Count III: Consumer – Genevieve McCann On December 14, 2006, Respondent solicited and induced Genevieve McCann of Fern Park, Florida, then aged 85, to transfer or otherwise surrender ownership of her existing annuity contract with American Equity Investment Life Insurance Company in return for an NFOA annuity. The NFOA agreement that the consumer entered into, and which was signed by Respondent, is dated subsequent to the State of Washington Order to Cease and Desist that was filed against NFOA. Respondent knew or reasonably should have known that NFOA was not an authorized insurer in Florida. Respondent, by use of the NFOA installment plan agreement, knowingly misrepresented to Ms. McCann that NFOA was a charitable non-profit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC, even though Respondent knew or should have known that NFOA was not a tax exempt corporation. Based upon Respondent’s transaction of insurance, Ms. McCann is anticipated to lose approximately $6,100.23. The loss consists of $20,933.04, the amount transferred to NFOA, less $1,742.85 (installment payments made by NFOA to Ms. McCann); $12,473.62 (the first payment sent by Receiver); and $2,686.63 (the second payment sent by Receiver). Ms. McCann lost $2,070.29 through surrender charges incurred for transferring her original American Equity annuity to NFOA. If the surrender penalty is excluded from the calculation, Ms. McCann’s loss is $4,029.94. Based upon Respondent’s transaction of insurance with Ms. McCann, Respondent was paid a commission of $1,879.52 by NFOA. Re: Count IV: Consumer – Lenora Bricker On or about November 30, 2006, Respondent solicited and induced Lenora Bricker of Winter Haven, Florida, then aged 87, to transfer or otherwise surrender ownership of her existing annuity contract with American Equity Investment Life Insurance Company in return for an NFOA annuity. The NFOA agreement that the consumer entered into, and which was signed by Respondent, is dated subsequent to the State of Washington Order to Cease and Desist that was filed against NFOA. Ultimately, this transaction did not close. Respondent knew or reasonably should have known that NFOA was not an authorized insurer in Florida. Respondent, by use of the NFOA installment plan agreement, knowingly misrepresented to Ms. Bricker that NFOA was a charitable non-profit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC, even though Respondent knew or should have known that NFOA was not a tax exempt corporation. Based upon Respondent’s transaction of insurance with Ms. Bricker, Respondent was paid a commission of $1,085.17 by NFOA, even though the transaction was not completed. Re: Count V: Consumer – Louise Blevins On or about November 30, 2006, Respondent solicited and induced Louise Blevins of Longwood, Florida, then aged 81, to transfer or otherwise surrender ownership of her existing annuity contract with American Equity Investment Life Insurance Company in return for an NFOA annuity. The NFOA agreement that the consumer entered into, and which was signed by Respondent, is dated subsequent to the State of Washington Order to Cease and Desist that was filed against NFOA. Ultimately, this transaction did not close. Respondent knew or reasonably should have known that NFOA was not an authorized insurer in Florida. Respondent, by use of the NFOA installment plan agreement, knowingly misrepresented to Ms. Blevins that NFOA was a charitable non-profit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC, even though Respondent knew or should have known that NFOA was not a tax exempt corporation. Based upon Respondent’s transaction of insurance with Ms. Bricker, Respondent was paid a commission of $5,469.09 by NFOA, even though the transaction did not close. Re: Count VI: Consumer – Audrey Piel On December 14, 2006, Respondent solicited and induced Audrey Piel of Maitland, Florida, then aged 81, to transfer or otherwise surrender ownership of her existing annuity contract with American Equity Investment Life Insurance Company in return for an NFOA annuity. The NFOA agreement that the consumer entered into, and which was signed by Respondent, is dated subsequent to the State of Washington Order to Cease and Desist that was filed against NFOA. Respondent knew or reasonably should have known that NFOA was not an authorized insurer in Florida. Respondent, by use of the NFOA installment plan agreement, knowingly misrepresented to Ms. Piel that NFOA was a charitable non-profit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC, even though Respondent knew or should have known that NFOA was not a tax exempt corporation. Based upon Respondent’s transaction of insurance, Ms. Piel is anticipated to lose approximately $5,594.24. The loss consists of $21,089.17, the amount transferred to NFOA; less $996.35 (installment payments made by NFOA to Ms. Piel); $13.645.33 (the first payment sent by Receiver); and $2,938.99, (the second payment sent by Receiver). Ms. Piel lost $2,085.74 through surrender charges incurred for transferring her original American Equity annuity to NFOA. If the surrender penalty is excluded from the calculation, Ms. Piel’s loss is $3,508.50. Based upon Respondent’s transaction of insurance with Ms. Piel, Respondent was paid a commission of $1,839.54 by NFOA. Re: Count VII: Consumer – John Bartlett On February 13, 2007, Respondent solicited and induced John Bartlett of Orlando, Florida, then age 75, to transfer or otherwise surrender ownership of his existing annuity contract with American Equity Investment Life Insurance Company in return for an NFOA annuity. The NFOA agreement that the consumer entered into, and which was signed by Respondent, is dated subsequent to the State of Washington Order to Cease and Desist that was filed against NFOA. Ultimately, this transaction did not close. Respondent knew or reasonably should have known that NFOA was not an authorized insurer in Florida. Respondent, by use of the NFOA installment plan agreement, knowingly misrepresented to Mr. Bartlett that NFOA was a charitable non-profit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC, even though Respondent knew or should have known that NFOA was not a tax exempt corporation. Based upon Respondent’s transaction of insurance with Mr. Bartlett, Respondent was paid a commission of approximately $16,385.56 by NFOA, even though the transaction was not completed. Re: Count VIII: Consumer – Lilla Dama On January 18, Respondent solicited and induced Lilla Dama of Orlando, Florida, then aged 86, to transfer or otherwise surrender ownership of her existing annuity contract with American Equity Investment Life Insurance Company in return for an NFOA annuity. The NFOA agreement that the consumer entered into, and which was signed by Respondent, is dated subsequent to the State of Washington Order to Cease and Desist that was filed against NFOA. Ultimately, this transaction did not close. Respondent knew or reasonably should have known that NFOA was not an authorized insurer in Florida. Respondent, by use of the NFOA installment plan agreement, knowingly misrepresented to Ms. Dama that NFOA was a charitable non-profit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC, even though Respondent knew or should have known that NFOA was not a tax exempt corporation. Based upon Respondent’s transaction of insurance with Ms. Dama, Respondent was paid a commission of approximately $2,757.52 by NFOA, even though the transaction was not completed. Re: Count IX: Consumer – Agnes Burns On February 28, 2007, and April 2, 2007, Respondent solicited and induced Agnes Burns of Orlando, Florida, then aged 87, to transfer or otherwise surrender ownership of her existing annuity contract with American Equity Investment Life Insurance Company and New York Life Insurance and Annuity Company, respectively, in return for an NFOA annuity. The NFOA agreement that the consumer entered into, and which was signed by Respondent, is dated subsequent to the State of Washington Order to Cease and Desist that was filed against NFOA. Respondent knew or reasonably should have known that NFOA was not an authorized insurer in Florida. Respondent, by use of the NFOA installment plan agreement, knowingly misrepresented to Ms. Burns that NFOA was a charitable non-profit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC, even though Respondent knew or should have known that NFOA was not a tax exempt corporation. Based upon Respondent’s transaction of insurance, Ms. Burns is anticipated to lose approximately $77,509.17. The loss consists of $335,070.29, the amount transferred to NFOA; less $18,363.66 (installment payments sent by NFOA to Ms. Burns); $205,859.31 (the first payment sent by Receiver); and $44,338.93 (the second payment sent by Receiver). A surrender penalty of $11,000.78 was incurred by Ms Burns for transferring her original annuities to NFOA. If the surrender penalty is excluded from the calculation, Ms. Burns’ loss is $66,508.39. Based upon Respondent’s transaction of insurance with Ms. Burns, Respondent was paid a commission of $30,080.00 by NFOA. Re: Count X: Consumers – Ms. Buchanan; Ms. Golus, and Mr. Owens Respondent solicited and induced Elizabeth Buchanan, aged 42, of Bradenton, Florida; Nancy Golus, aged 59, of Palmetto, Florida; and Herbert Owens, aged 86, of St. Petersburg, Florida, to transfer or otherwise surrender ownership of their existing annuity contracts in return for an NFOA annuities. As to the the NFOA agreement that Mr. Owens entered into, and which was signed by Respondent, the date of the agreement is subsequent to the State of Washington Order to Cease and Desist that was filed against NFOA. The NFOA agreements that Ms. Buchanan and Ms. Golus entered into were dated prior to the State of Washington’s Order to Cease and Desist. Respondent knew or reasonably should have known that NFOA was not an authorized insurer in Florida. Based upon Respondent’s transactions of insurance, Ms. Buchanan is anticipated to lose approximately $89,031.12. The loss consists of $162,445.60, the amount transferred to NFOA; less $20,000.00 (installment payments sent by NFOA to Ms. Buchanan); $92,589.64 (the first payment sent by Receiver); and $19,942.38 (the second payment sent by Receiver). Ms. Buchanan suffered $59,117.54 in losses from surrender charges incurred. Even after partial refunds by the DCI Receiver and the surrender penalty are excluded from the calculation, Ms. Buchanan’s loss is still $29,913.58. Ms. Golus is anticipated to lose approximately $146,027.18, the amount transferred to NFOA. Ms. Golus received $94,917.67 (the first payment by Receiver) and $20,443.81 (the second payment by Receiver). However, Ms. Golus suffered $53,152.47 in surrender charges incurred. Even after partial refunds by the Receiver and the surrender penalty are excluded from the calculation, Ms. Golus’ loss is $30,665.67. Mr. Owens is anticipated to lose approximately $10,976.33. The loss consists of $54,743.52, the amount transferred to NFOA; less $5,108.40 (installment payments sent by NFOA to Mr. Owens); $32,262.83 (the first payment by Receiver); and, $6,948.92 (the second payment sent by Receiver). Mr. Owens incurred $552.96 in surrender charges. Even after partial refunds by the Receiver and the surrender penalty are excluded from the calculation, Mr. Owens’ loss is still $10,423.37. In each and every count, Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that: Respondent directly or indirectly represented or aided an unauthorized insurer to do business in Florida. Respondent knew or reasonably should have known that the annuity contracts he contracted with clients were with an unauthorized insurer. Respondent knowingly placed before the public a statement, assertion, or representation with respect to the business of insurance that was untrue, deceptive or misleading. Respondent knowingly caused to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, delivered, or placed before the public a false material statement. Respondent demonstrated a lack of fitness and trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. Respondent engaged in unfair and deceptive practices or showed himself to be a source of injury or loss to the public.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Chief Financial Officer enter a final order finding that: Respondent violated Subsections 626.901(1), 626.901(2), 626.9541(1)(b)4., 626.9541(1)(e)1.e., 626.611(7), 626.621(2), and 626.621(6), Florida Statutes, as charged in Counts I-X of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint; Revoking each and every one of Respondent’s licenses and appointments issued or granted under or pursuant to the Florida Insurance Code; and Providing that if Respondent, subsequent to revocation, makes application to Petitioner for any licensure, a new license will not be granted if Respondent fails to prove that he has otherwise satisfied the financial losses of his NFOA clients, or if Respondent otherwise fails to establish that he is eligible for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 2009.
