Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was certified by the State of Florida, acting through Petitioner, as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida. Respondent was issued certificate number 02-7330 on March 30, 1973. There was no evidence that Respondent's certification had been the subject of any other disciplinary proceeding. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a police officer by the City of Bal Harbour, which is a municipality located in Dade County, Florida. The following events occurred in Bal Harbour, Florida, on January 14, 1989, while Respondent was on duty as a police officer: A few minutes past 7:00 a.m., Respondent encountered a 1975 Plymouth that had broken down on Collins Avenue near its intersection with 102 Street. Respondent observed a young male (who he later learned was 17 year old Haroon Nabee) pushing this disabled car by himself trying to get the car off the street and into an adjacent parking lot. Mr. Nabee was pushing the car with one hand and steering it with his other. Respondent assisted Mr. Nabee by pushing the disabled car from the rear with his patrol car. After the disabled car and Respondent's patrol car were in the parking lot, Respondent asked Mr. Nabee his name and asked to see his registration and his drivers license. Mr. Nabee identified himself as Nevin Maharaj and showed Respondent a registration certificate that reflected that the car was registered in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Stein. Respondent later learned that Mrs. Stein was Mr. Nabee's sister. While Mr. Nabee looked through his wallet for his drivers license, Respondent observed two credit cards in the name of John J. Mendoza. When asked about the credit cards, Mr. Nabee reported that he had found them. Respondent became suspicious and requested a backup. In response to that request Officer Pamela Robinson Adlet (at the formal hearing, Officer Adlet had reverted to the use of Robinson as her last name) appeared on the scene at 7:20 a.m. After Officer Adlet arrived on the scene, Respondent placed Mr. Nabee under arrest, handcuffed his hands behind his back, searched him, and placed him in the back seat of Respondent's caged patrol car. Respondent then called for a tow truck and requested that Officer Adlet assist him in conducting an inventory of the automobile. The officers inventoried the interior of the automobile, but they could not gain access to the trunk. Because the rear seat was loose, Officer Adlet could observe objects in the trunk, but she was unable to inventory those objects because of her limited access. While waiting for the tow truck, Respondent returned to his patrol car, which was parked immediately behind the disabled vehicle, and began making out the arrest form using the false name Mr. Nabee had given him. Respondent had partially completed the arrest form when the tow truck arrived. Because his patrol car was blocking the tow truck's access to the disabled vehicle, Respondent drove the patrol car to a spot approximately thirty feet from the disabled vehicle. Respondent then walked from his patrol car towards the tow truck and he and Officer Adlet engaged in a brief conversation with the tow truck driver. Officer Adlet told the driver that she and Respondent wanted to get into the trunk of the disabled vehicle and asked if he had a screwdriver they could use for that purpose. 1/ Respondent decided to look into the glove box of the disabled vehicle for the second time because his earlier search of the vehicle had been interrupted by his efforts to help Officer Adlet gain access to the trunk. Respondent found in the glove box a passport which reflected Mr. Nabee's true name and which contained Mr. Nabee's photograph. Respondent showed the passport to Officer Adlet, who confirmed that the passport photograph appeared to be of Mr. Nabee. Respondent returned to his patrol car and began addressing Mr. Nabee in loud, profane language and accused Mr. Nabee of lying to him. Respondent opened the rear door of the patrol car on the driver's side and, while holding the passport in his clenched right hand, made three punching motions with his right hand in the direction of Mr. Nabee. With the first of these three blows the back of Respondent's right hand made contact with the right side of Mr. Nabee's face. (The right side of Mr. Nabee's face was struck because Mr. Nabee had turned towards Respondent when Respondent opened the door of the patrol car.) In reaction to that blow, Mr. Nabee stretched out on the back seat of the patrol car, and, consequently, the other two blows did not make contact with Mr. Nabee. Thereafter, Respondent transported Mr. Nabee to the Bal Harbour police station where Mr. Nabee complained to another officer about Respondent's acts. Mr. Nabee was not injured by Respondent. There was no evidence that he suffered any cut or bruise as a result of the contact with Respondent. Respondent was angry with Mr. Nabee because he had lied about his name, which caused Respondent to have to redraft his arrest form. Respondent contends that the contact was accidental and was a result of his gesticulating in an angry fashion after learning that Mr. Nabee had lied to him. This contention is rejected. Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was angry with Mr. Nabee and that Respondent intentionally struck Mr. Nabee in retaliation for Mr. Nabee's lying to him.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which finds that Respondent committed a battery upon the person of Haroon Nabee on January 14, 1989, which determines, pursuant to Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, that Respondent failed to maintain good moral character, and which suspends his certification as a law enforcement for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of July, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1991.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified law enforcement officer, failed to maintain good moral character as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified by the Petitioner on April 2, 1982, and was issued Law Enforcement and Instructor Certificate Number 124699. Respondent was employed by the Miami Dade Police Department from April 2, 1982, until his employment was terminated as a result of the incident at issue in this proceeding. Respondent had a good record while working for the Miami Dade Police Department. He earned several commendations and received performance evaluations of satisfactory or above. Respondent is the biological father of Shannon Delano, a female born March 10, 1973. Shannon's parents divorced when she was four, and her mother was awarded primary custody of Shannon and of Shannon's twin sister. In 1981, Respondent moved to Florida. As a consequence of the divorce and of Respondent's move to Florida, Shannon seldom saw her father while she was growing up. Shannon maintained periodic telephone contact with him over the years and visited him in Florida in 1992, while she was on Spring break. They had a pleasant visit on that occasion. After he moved to Florida, Respondent married for the second time to a woman named Patrice. Respondent and Patrice had a son named Sean. Shannon joined the United States Air Force on October 15, 1992. Her permanent assignment was as a member of the military police at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. In 1993, she was temporarily assigned to duty in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a support person for Desert Storm. While in the UAE, Shannon talked to Respondent occasionally by telephone. While she was in the UAE, Shannon and Respondent agreed that she would visit Respondent and Sean when she returned to the United States from the UAE. Respondent and Patrice had divorced by that time and Respondent was living alone in a two-bedroom apartment in Broward County, Florida. Their visit began on January 8, 1994. Respondent paid for Shannon's roundtrip airline ticket from Virginia to Florida. The visit was uneventful until the evening of January 12, 1994. Respondent worked his usual hours on January 12, 1994, and thereafter returned to the two-bedroom apartment at approximately 6:00 p.m. Respondent and Shannon had made plans to go out to eat dinner and then go to a comedy club that night. Respondent and Shannon were alone in the apartment. Respondent and Shannon engaged in a conversation in the living room area of the apartment. Because Shannon thought Respondent was despondent about his child custody fight over his son and his relationship with Shannon's twin sister, she hugged him and began to rub his back. There is a conflict in the evidence as to what happened next. The record establishes clearly and convincingly that Respondent thereafter preformed oral sex on Shannon, that he placed his mouth and tongue in her vaginal area, that he penetrated her vagina with his finger, and that he penetrated her anus with his finger. The conflict is whether Shannon was a willing participant in this sexual encounter. According to her testimony, Respondent forced her to the floor using a police take-down technique; he forcibly removed her clothing, and he held her down with his body and with one arm while he performed the sexual acts on her. She testified that she asked him to stop, but that she was too stunned to physically fight him. Respondent testified that Shannon was a willing participant and that the sexual encounter was consensual. Shannon and her father went to the comedy club that night, she subsequently rode with him on patrol where she met several of his colleagues, and she stayed with him at his apartment until her scheduled return flight to Virginia. Shannon returned to active duty in Langley, Virginia, as scheduled without reporting the incident. Approximately two weeks after the incident, she reported the incident to her superiors. She thereafter contacted the Broward County Sheriff's office, who assigned Detective Deborah Cox to conduct an investigation. As part of her investigation, Detective Cox had Shannon engage in a telephone conversation with Respondent that Detective Cox monitored and taped. Detective Cox also had Patrice engage in a telephone conversation with Respondent that Detective Cox monitored and taped. In his telephone conversation with Patrice, Respondent categorically denied that he touched Shannon and lamented that he was being falsely accused. Although there are statements made by Respondent contained in his telephone conversation with Shannon that substantiate his position that the sexual encounter was consensual,2 the following excerpts establish that Respondent did what he thought Shannon wanted him to do, not what she consented for him to do: Shannon: I guess I just need to understand why you felt the need to touch me that way. Respondent: I find, to be perfectly honest, I thought you had the need for it, believe me it's nothing I wanted, it's nothing I ever thought about, it's not something I consider to be normal thing between a father and a daughter. Shannon: I mean if I had the need to have that touch, why did it have to come from you, I mean - Respondent: It's something I thought you asked for, or it's something you wanted, believe me it's not something I want to do, it's not something I thought about, something that I looked forward to or thought about afterwards as being something good. Do you think you've had sleepless night over it, I had from that day forward. It's bothered me, it's upset me, it's bothered me a lot since then. I never would have believed that I could have done that , all I've ever tried to be is what you needed at the time. Obviously what you needed or what I thought you needed wasn't what you think you need now. Whether it was or it wasn't then, I really can't tell you. I, from what you said, from what you did, from the way you acted, felt, truly believed that's what you wanted and what you felt you needed. . . . The conflict in the testimony is resolved by finding that while she did not physically resist the sexual encounter, she did not implicitly or explicitly consent to the sexual encounter. Detective Cox turned over the results of her investigation to the State Attorney's office, who prosecuted Respondent on felony charges of sexual battery and on misdemeanor charges of committing Unnatural or Lascivious Acts. Based on the sexual encounter of January 12, 1994, Respondent was convicted of five misdemeanor counts of committing Unnatural or Lascivious Acts. He was acquitted of the felony sexual battery charges.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein; finds Respondent guilty of failing to maintain good moral character; and revokes his certification as a Law Enforcement Officer and Instructor (Certificate Number 124699). DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1999
The Issue Whether the disciplinary action taken against Arthur Ray Campbell was for good cause.
Findings Of Fact Arthur Ray Campbell is a Career Service Employee of the State of Florida employed by the Division of Law Enforcement, Department of Natural Resources. He was suspended for a period of eleven (11) working days for using the blue light on a Marine Patrol vehicle to run a red traffic signal in Cross City. Campbell filed a timely appeal of his suspension with the Career Service Commission. On February 10, 1976, the Florida Marine Patrol was ordered by the Office of the Governor of the State of Florida to provide personnel for a special assignment in Pensacola, Florida. These personnel were to assist local law enforcement authorities in controlling a civil disturbance in that city which had resulted from racial tensions in one of the high schools. Pursuant to those orders, Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Brown of the Florida Marine Patrol directed Major Louis Shelfer, the staff officer in charge of the Marine Patrol Emergency Squad, to notify the District Offices of the Florida Marine Patrol to dispatch Marine Patrol Emergency Squad personnel to Pensacola. Major Shelfer was ordered by Colonel Brown to make certain that all supportive personnel understood that in their movement to Pensacola blue lights and sirens would not be used. Colonel Brown further instructed Major Shelfer to advise the various district offices that personnel were to move as quickly as possible to Pensacola and that he wanted the Emergency Squad in Pensacola the morning of February 11, 1976. Just prior to 5:00 p.m. on February 10, 1976 Major Louis Shelfer called each of the district offices from which Emergency Squad personnel were being dispatched to Pensacola and advised the officer in charge or the dispatcher that the personnel on the Emergency Squad, who were already on standby for movement, were to be dispatched to Pensacola. Major Shelfer further directed that these personnel were to move to Pensacola as soon as possible but were not to run blue lights or sirens. He further advised that there was no emergency existing in Pensacola at the time. Major Shelfer did not give a time by which personnel would report in Pensacola. It was, however, the understanding of Colonel Brown and Major Shelfer that all personnel would be in Pensacola by 6:00 a.m. on February 11, 1976. In District 7, Major Shelfer spoke with Mrs. Patricia Morgan, secretary/dispatcher. Mrs. Patricia Morgan, who is also the wife of Captain H. C. Morgan, Jr., the District Supervisor of District Seven, received Major Shelfer's first alert call for the movement of the Emergency Squad personnel of District 7 to Pensacola at 4:45 p.m. on February 10, 1976. Shortly thereafter, she received the second call from Major Shelfer directing that the Emergency Squad personnel would proceed to Pensacola. Upon receiving the second call Mrs. Morgan contacted Officers Malcolm and Johnson on the communications radio and advised them that they were to proceed to Pensacola as quickly as possible but not "1018" by which she meant it was not an emergency. Mrs. Morgan further instructed these Marine Patrol Officers not to run red lights while proceeding to Pensacola. She specifically instructed Officer Malcolm that he would pick up Officer Campbell who would ride with him to Pensacola. While Officer Malcolm remembered Mrs. Morgan's reference to red lights, neither Officer Malcolm nor Officer Schumaker, who monitored their conversations, remembered any information passed on by Mrs. Morgan that the trip was not a "1018" run or not an emergency run. Mrs. Morgan was initially unable to contact Officer Campbell by radio and therefore called Officer Campbell's home and spoke with his wife giving her the information that she had given Officers Malcolm and Johnson. However, while speaking with Officer Campbell's wife, Officer Campbell called District 7 on his radio and asked Mrs. Morgan if she had any information for him. She advised Officer Campbell at that time that he would be going to Pensacola and would ride with Officer Malcolm. Mrs. Morgan did not remember giving Officer Campbell any information on the use of lights during the trip, but said that she did remember telling him it was not a "1018" run. Officer Campbell states that the information he received ordered him to return to his home and get ready to be picked up by Officer Campbell and that the information he needed had been passed on to his wife and Officer Malcolm. At approximately 7:30 p.m. on February 10, 1976, having secured from Water Patrol, gone to his home and packed, picked up Officer Campbell at his home, Officer Malcolm left Daytona for Pensacola. Officer Malcolm drove to Ocala using blue lights, where the men purchased hamburgers for their meal. Officer Malcolm ate while Officer Campbell continued to drive and the two officers changed over when they stopped to get gasoline. Officer Campbell then drove from the vicinity of Ocala to Cross City. As they approached Cross City, Officer Malcolm advised Officer Campbell to turn on the blue light because they were slightly over the local speed limit entering Cross City. As they approached the second traffic light in town which was red, Officer Campbell stopped or came almost to a complete stop at the light. As he started to proceed forward, having made certain the intersection was clear, the traffic light turned green. Malcolm and Campbell continued on through Cross City using the blue light until they reached the open highway on the north side of the city. Officer Malcolm's car does not have a siren but is equipped with blue light only. On the evening of February 10, 1976 Trooper J. R. Touchton was proceeding south on U.S. 19 in Cross City at approximately 9:00 or 9:30 p.m. He observed a northbound automobile, which shortly after he initially saw it, turn on its emergency blue lights. Trooper Touchton, not immediately identifying the type of vehicle he had passed, called his dispatcher to determine if another Florida Highway Patrol vehicle was operating in the area because the car which he had passed was a marked state law enforcement car similar to those of the Florida Highway Patrol. Touchton thought that the car which he had passed was in the process of stopping a truck immediately ahead of him. Touchton executed a "U" turn and proceeded north but shortly after Touchton turned, the truck which Touchton had thought the other patrol car was stopping turned left off the highway and the patrol car in front of him proceeded north out of Cross City still using its blue lights. Touchton saw the patrol vehicle ahead of him slow down or stop at the second traffic light but did not observe whether the second traffic light was red or green when the vehicle proceeded through it. In response to Officer Touchton's call the Highway Patrol Dispatcher advised Touchton that the vehicle which he had observed was probably a Marine Patrol vehicle being dispatched to Pensacola. Sergeant J. D. Peacock was following Officer Touchton south on U.S. 19 in Cross City and first observed that later he identified as a Marine Patrol vehicle approaching the second traffic light in Cross City. At that time the Marine Patrol had its blue lights and emergency flashers on; however, it did not have its siren on. Sergeant Peacock observed the Marine Patrol vehicle slow or stop at the traffic light and then proceed through the traffic light headed north on U.S. 19. Both Highway Patrol Officers indicated that the Marine Patrol vehicle was driving within the posted speed limit. On March 5, 1976 personnel in the Cross City, Florida Marine Patrol Office brought to Colonel J. J. Brown's attention the fact that a Marine Patrol car had passed through Cross City on February 10, 1976 using blue lights. This had been brought to the attention of the Cross City Marine Patrol by the Florida Highway Patrol Supervisor in that area, Sergeant J. D. Peacock. Colonel Brown directed Major Shelfer to conduct an investigation into the matter. Major Shelfer contacted all of the district supervisors who had sent personnel to Pensacola and requested that they provide him with the times and routes of travel of personnel which had been sent to Pensacola. From an analysis of this data, Major Shelfer determined that only personnel sent from District 7 in Daytona to Pensacola would have passed through Cross City enroute to Pensacola at the hour in question. Having determined this Major Shelfer directed Captain Morgan, Supervisor of District 7, to have the personnel from District 7 who were sent to Pensacola prepare written reports on their trips to Pensacola. Officers Campbell and Malcolm prepared and submitted written reports to Captain Morgan which were received into evidence at the formal hearing as Exhibits 5 and 6 respectively. Based upon the investigation conducted by Major Shelfer, Officer Campbell was suspended. Employee evaluations were introduced that indicate that Officer Campbell's efficiency for the period of time involved here was downgraded as a result of the conduct for which he was suspended.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer finds that substantial and competent evidence does not exist to show that the agency had good cause to suspend Officer Arthur Ray Campbell for insubordination. The Hearing Officer recommends that the suspension be set aside and further, that the Career Service Commission consider whether remedial action is necessary to clear his employee evaluation for the period in question. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Kent A. Zaiser, Esquire Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Department of Natural Resources Appeals Coordinator 202 Blount Street Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Melvin R. Horne, Esquire 800 Barnett Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a Community Association Manager by Examination should be granted.
Findings Of Fact When Petitioner was 20 years old, he and a group of other young adults stole approximately $15 worth of chrome off of a car in a used car lot. Petitioner was arrested on November 11, 1983, by the Deland, Florida, Police Department. On February 1, 1984, Petitioner appeared in Volusia County Court and pled guilty to "Petit Theft" under Section 812.014(3)(a), Florida Statutes. This offense is a second degree misdemeanor punishable as provided in Sections 775.082 or 775.083, Florida Statutes. The court withheld adjudication of guilt, placed Petitioner on six months' probation and assessed Petitioner $75 in costs. Petitioner was again arrested on March 12, 1993, by the Daytona Beach Shores, Florida, Police Department. Petitioner was charged with "Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol." Section 316.193, Florida Statutes, does not equate "Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol" with either a felony or a misdemeanor until the fourth conviction. Petitioner appeared in Volusia County Court on May 11, 1993, and pled nolo contendere to the lesser charge of "reckless driving," under Section 316.192, Florida Statutes. Florida Department of Law Enforcement documents created at the time list this charge as a first degree misdemeanor. In actuality, the offense of "reckless driving" is grouped under the "State Uniform Traffic Control" statutory Chapter. Without specifying whether or not "reckless driving" constitutes a felony or misdemeanor, Subsection 316.192(2)(a) provides that upon a first conviction of reckless driving the offender shall be punished by imprisonment for a period of not more than 90 days or by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $500, or by both. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty of "reckless driving" and assessed $300 in fines and costs. Petitioner's sentence fits the statutory category of a "first conviction," so it is concluded that this was his first reckless driving offense. There also is no evidence of any other traffic offenses committed by Petitioner. The statutory trail of "reckless driving" runs through Sections 316.192, 322.291, 318.17, and 921.0012, and the undersigned has been unable to determine that a first offense under Section 316.192 constitutes either a misdemeanor or a felony. Sections 775.04 and 775.08(2), Florida Statutes, suggest that a first offense of "reckless driving" is neither a crime nor a misdemeanor. From this information, it is concluded that there is no affirmative proof that Petitioner was convicted of a first degree misdemeanor. It is further concluded that there is no presumption created by his plea of nolo contendere to the reckless driving charge that Petitioner lost his civil rights. On February 10, 1997, Petitioner submitted an application for licensure by examination to become a Community Association Manager. Prior to his application for licensure, Petitioner had been the subject of an investigation by the Respondent Department for the unlicensed practice of community association management. As a trusted maintenance man for the same employer for over nine years, Petitioner had been trusted with money, with purchasing supplies and with doing maintenance work. He had acquitted himself honestly and honorably. Petitioner and his employer believe that the investigation arose out of a complaint that Petitioner also was giving instructions to other maintenance personnel or advising tenants, which arguably constitutes an element of the practice of Community Association Managment. They believe that the complaint was made by a rival condominium owner and/or by a resident manager whom the employer terminated. The investigation has been abated pending the instant application licensure proceeding. The application submitted by Petitioner contained the following question regarding the applicant's criminal history: Have you ever been convicted or found guilty of a felony or misdemeanor, entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony or misdemeanor? Yes ( ) No ( ). This question applies to any violation of the laws of any state, territory, or country without regard to whether the matter is under appeal or you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, were paroled or pardoned. If you answer "NO" and it is later determined that the records have not been sealed or expunged, it will be considered that you knowingly provided inaccurate information on this application. Petitioner marked the space for "No," and submitted no history of his offenses and pleas with his application. On March 12, 1997, the Agency notified Petitioner that his application was deficient because the 1983 and 1993 arrests and case dispositions were not fully disclosed and documented on his application. He was given 60 days in which to submit the required information, which he did. On May 28, 1997, Respondent sent Petitioner its Intent to Deny Community Association Manager's Application for Licensure by Examination for failure to establish good moral character as required by Section 468.433, Florida Statutes. Petitioner explained that he thought the withholding of adjudication on the second degree misdemeanor guilty plea charge meant it was erased and need not be revealed. Although Petitioner conceded that no one told him adjudication was withheld on his 1993 reckless driving charge, he first testified that somehow he initially assumed that adjudication had been withheld. The remainder of his testimony, together with Petitioner's Exhibit 1, are construed to prove that, prior to Petitioner's completion and submission of his application for licensure in January of 1997, Petitioner had been informed that adjudication of guilt had not been withheld on his 1993 plea of nolo contendere to the charge of reckless driving, because the charge and conviction had shown up in a computer check when he tried to insure a new car prior to his professional licensure application. While testifying at formal hearing, Petitioner initially stated that he had not fully read the application question concerning any criminal record. Then, he represented that he had not fully comprehended it. Finally, he said he thought the 1993 conviction constituted a traffic offense and was not a misdemeanor. Based on the difficulty of determining the classification of the 1993 conviction, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner did not willfully withhold that information, and need not have disclosed it as the application question was drafted. The question is ambiguous in first requesting information about nolo contendere pleas to felonies or misdemeanors and then adding "violation of the laws" as an afterthought. Petitioner has not had any criminal charges or traffic offenses lodged against his record since 1993. Petitioner has never been the subject of any civil law suit involving fraud, dishonesty, misrepresentation, or concealment of material facts. Petitioner is highly respected by his direct supervisor and one of the owners of the buildings he maintains, both of whom testified to Petitioner's veracity, trustworthiness, and good moral character spanning 1988 through the date of formal hearing.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a Final Order permitting Petitioner to sit for the examination. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward D. Broyles, Executive Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Professions Regulatory Council of Community Association Managers Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Lynda Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 R. Michael Kennedy, Esquire Kennedy & Pyle 687 Beeville Road, Suite A South Daytona, Florida 32119 Thomas G. Thomas Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact By application filed with Respondent on August 20, 1980, Petitioner requested that he be licensed as a real estate salesman. Question number six on the application was answered as follows: 6. Have you ever been arrested for, or charged with, the commission of an offense against the laws of any municipality, state or nation including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether convicted, sentenced, pardoned or paroled? Yes If yes, state details including the outcome in full: Possession of Marijuana in Vero (Approx Aug '74) Fined $102. The application form included the instruction that if an answer to question six was in the affirmative, the applicant should attach his complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were had or are pending. Petitioner attached to his application a statement reading as follows: Approximately August of 1974 I was found guilty of possession of marijuana. The outcome was a fine of $102. I haven't had any dealings with this sort of thing since. (Exhibit 1) By letter of October 31, 1980, Respondent's legal adviser informed Petitioner that the Board of Real Estate had denied his application for licensure based on his answer to question six of the application and his criminal record. (Exhibit 4) On April 20, 1975, Petitioner was arrested by the Vero Beach Police Department on charges of driving while intoxicated and possession of less than five grams of marijuana. On April 22, 1975, Petitioner was convicted of the charges and was fined $302.00 for driving while intoxicated, and his driver's license was suspended for four months. He was fined $102.00 on the charge of possession of marijuana. (Exhibit 2) On February 24, 1979, Petitioner was cited by the Florida State Highway Patrol for having no valid driver's license. (Exhibit 3) The application form filed by Petitioner captions that the applicant must answer every question without evasion and recites the applicant's acknowledgment that every answer to the questions therein "states the truth and full truth concerning the inquiry, so far as known or can be ascertained." The affidavit of the applicant to the application includes the statement that all answers and statements therein are true and correct, "and are as complete as h knowledge, information and records permit, without any evasions or mental reservations whatsoever." (Exhibit 1) Petitioner testified at the hearing and admitted the fact of his 1975 arrest and conviction in Vero Beach, Florida. He also admitted being cited for not having a valid driver's license in 1979, but claimed that this charge was dismissed when he subsequently produced his driver's license to law enforcement authorities. During the course of his testimony, Petitioner also admitted being convicted of driving while intoxicated while in Michigan in 1968 or 1969 for which he was fined $175.00 and received a suspension of his driver's license for a period of six months. He testified that he did not list the DWI convictions on his application form because he believed that they constituted traffic offenses which need not be disclosed. His testimony is not deemed credible in this respect. (Testimony of Respondent)
Recommendation That Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesman pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 10 day of March, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Jeffrey Miller, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Board of Real Estate The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Philip Chandler Post Office Box 406 2000 Baird Street Roseland, Florida 32957 Department of Professional Regulation Board of Real Estate 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a certified law enforcement officer, holding certificate number 08-90-002-02, which was issued December 7, 1990. Respondent was born June 12, 1966. He was raised in the Harlem area of Clewiston. Everyone knows each other in the Harlem area, which contains a predominantly black population of 3000-4000 persons. Since he was six years old, Respondent's best friend was John Gowdy. They are the same age and grew up in the same neighborhood. Together, they went to school, worked, and played sports. Respondent was a well-known football player when younger. Respondent and John entered the military at about the same time. Once he finished high school, Respondent realized that there was not enough money for him and his sisters to go to college, so he joined the Air Force. He served for nearly six years without any problems and received an honorable discharge. He immediately entered the Florida Highway Patrol academy. In the meantime, John Gowdy had entered the banking profession and moved to the Miami area. Respondent successfully completed the academy on December 7, 1990. He was immediately assigned to the Florida Highway Patrol post in Ft. Myers and began the required one-year probationary period. On August 14, 1991, about eight months after joining the Florida Highway Patrol, Respondent's sister told him that their mother was ill with heart trouble. Respondent had been working evenings, so, after work, he drove from Ft. Myers to Clewiston, arriving at his mother's house in the morning. After taking her to the doctor's office and getting her medicine, Respondent was at home with her when Shelton Gowdy drove up and asked if he could service the transmission on Respondent's car. Shelton was John's younger brother. Shelton has twice served time in prison. Though they were not friends, Respondent allowed Shelton to earn some money by working on Respondent's car whenever he was in Clewiston visiting his mother or the mother and family of Shelton and John Gowdy. Respondent told Shelton he could take Respondent's car and service the transmission. Shelton drove the car to his mother's house to work on the car. Later in the day, Respondent went to the home of Shelton's mother and checked on his car. Shelton said that he needed a light bulb to fix a parking light, so Respondent allowed Shelton to drive the car downtown to get the bulb. In the meantime, Respondent talked to Shelton's mother and sister, with whom Respondent has remained close over the years. Respondent watched television with them and was not particularly concerned that Shelton was gone several hours with the car. While driving Respondent's car, Shelton picked up Norman Banks and, while cruising, noticed a white couple driving a pickup truck in the Harlem area, near the home of Respondent's mother. Respondent, Shelton, and Mr. Banks are black. The white couple were undercover deputies of the Hendry and Collier County Sheriff Departments. The pickup truck and Respondent's car pulled over to the side of the road, side by side. Respondent's car was mostly still in the road. The two vehicles were about three or four feet apart. The driver of the truck remained in his seat, which was considerable higher than the seats of the passenger car. The driver of the truck was closest to the car's front passenger window. Shelton got out of the driver's side of the car, walked behind the car, and approached the driver of the truck. Quickly, they negotiated the sale of crack cocaine from Shelton to the undercover deputy. Just as quickly, the transaction ended and the deputy drove away. The deputy driving the truck later identified Respondent as the passenger in the car driven by Shelton. The deputy on the passenger side of the truck could not see Shelton's passenger. The lighting was poor. The deputy driving the truck could not closely scrutinize the passenger because he had to remain alert to possible trouble from the approaching driver, as well as possible unseen assailants elsewhere in the vicinity. The deputy who identified Respondent did not seem credible as a witness. He seemed ill at ease and nervous while testifying. He originally identified Respondent in a photo lineup. When shown a photocopy of the same photo lineup during his deposition, the deputy declined to identify Respondent, though he claimed that the quality of the photocopy did not prevent him from identifying Respondent. Even after being assured by Respondent's counsel that Respondent would not hold the deputy liable for a misidentification, the deputy continued to refuse to make the identification and insist on the original photographs, despite claiming that he recognized the passenger from the photocopies of the photographs. Although the deputy who identified Respondent denies seeing a baseball cap on the passenger, someone besides Respondent mentioned a cap to the Florida Highway Patrol internal investigator who later conducted the internal investigation. He recalls that someone said that the passenger wore a baseball cap, possibly turned around backwards. Mr. Banks typically wears a baseball cap backwards. The internal investigator reports reliably that Respondent was very nervous during an interview. However, Respondent was still on probation and aware that he was under investigation for some offense, but he was unsure of the nature of the offense. The internal investigator reports less reliably that Respondent was evasive during the interview. In fact, Respondent's inability to recall what he was doing on August 14 was because he had not been previously told of the specific allegations, including the date of the alleged offense. The important facts of the case are that the passenger in the car with Shelton was very dark skinned. Respondent is very dark skinned. The identification by the white deputy, in poor lighting, is further undermined by the different heights of the vehicles, the brevity of the transaction, and the urgency of remaining alert to possible dangers from any direction. The identification by the deputy is also undermined by his refusal to identify Respondent in a photocopy of the photo lineup, despite saying that he could do so. The uneasiness of the deputy during testimony could be due to any of a number of factors, such as growing concern over the accuracy of the identification. Respondent's testimony was straightforward and honest. His alibi witnesses were obviously biased in his favor and may have supplied facts that they never knew or no longer recall. For instance, they both testified that Shelton returned before 9:00 pm when the transaction likely did not take place until shortly after 10:00 pm. Petitioner's case is not aided by the general circumstances. Respondent does not appear to have gotten into much trouble during his life, including for nearly six years under close supervision in the Air Force. To the contrary, by all indications, he appears to have been an honest, hard-working, and purposeful young man. Yet, Petitioner suggests that Respondent, having recently become a Florida Highway Patrolman, would sit as a passenger in his own car, allowing a twice-convicted person to drive in search of a drug deal. Moreover, Petitioner suggests that Respondent, with his side window open, would accompany Shelton on his criminal errand in the neighborhood where Respondent's mother lives and where Respondent is known to most of the residents. Petitioner never deals with the incongruity of this proposed behavior by a person of Respondent's apparent character. A person so stupid or disturbed as to attempt what Petitioner suggests almost surely would have stumbled much earlier in life.
Recommendation It is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. ENTERED on April 21, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on April 21, 1995. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-2: adopted or adopted in substance. 3-5: rejected as subordinate. 6-7 (except last sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. (last sentence): rejected as irrelevant as this fact was not known to Respondent. (except last sentence): rejected as recitation of evidence. 8 (last sentence)-12: adopted or adopted in substance. 13: rejected as subordinate. 14 (first sentence and first clause of second sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 14 (remainder)-15: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 16: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence, subordinate, and recitation of testimony. 17: adopted or adopted in substance. 18-23: rejected as subordinate. 24: adopted or adopted in substance. 25: rejected as subordinate. 26: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 27: rejected as subordinate and recitation of testimony. 28: adopted or adopted in substance. 29-34: rejected as recitation of evidence. 35-36: rejected as subordinate. 37: adopted except to the extent that she and Respondent were together during the time of the drug deal watching television. 38 (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 38 (remainder): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence, subordinate, and recitation of testimony. 39: rejected as recitation of evidence. 40: rejected as subordinate. 41-43: adopted or adopted in substance except that the evidence is that he was nervous but not evasive. The information received indirectly from Officer Gary was enough only to alert Respondent that he was in some sort of trouble, not enough to alert him to the specifics of the allegations so that he could have been prepared to rebut the charges. By this time, Respondent probably knew that Shelton had used Respondent's car for a drug transaction and thought that Respondent would be in trouble for that. 44-55: rejected as recitation of evidence and subordinate. 56: rejected as recitation of evidence and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 57-58: rejected as irrelevant. 59: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence and subordinate. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-9: adopted or adopted in substance. 10-11: rejected as subordinate and recitation of testimony. 12-15: adopted or adopted in substance. 16-17: rejected as subordinate. 18-19: rejected as recitation of evidence and subordinate. 20-22: adopted or adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: A. Leon Lowry, II Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Michael Ramage Acting General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Attorney Nancy C. Waller Regional Legal Advisor Florida Department of Law Enforcement 4211 North Lois Ave. Tampa, FL 33614-7774 Douglas L. Wilson The Wilson Law Firm 680 Sanctuary Rd. Naples, FL 33964-4837
The Issue The issue presented for decision is whether or not Respondent failed to maintain the qualifications of a law enforcement officer and, if so, what penalty would be appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on December 6, 1974, and was issued Certificate Number 02-12297. From at least June 1982 through August 29, 1986, Respondent was employed as a trooper with the Florida Highway Patrol. During late 1984, Respondent's performance came under scrutiny by Lt. Dun, who was Respondent's supervisor. Lt. Dunn performed an evaluation of Respondent's performance as a trooper on December 28, 1984. Lt. Dunn used a standard appraisal form which uses a numerical evaluation with a range of 1 through 40. The highest score denotes the highest level of performance. A rating of 18 or under denotes a conditional evaluation. On Respondent's 1984 evaluation by Lt. Dunn, he earned a performance rating of 19. Based on his marginal performance, he was given a special evaluation which noted, inter alia, that he had feigned sickness and thereby had misused sick time, by using 81 hours of sick leave while he appeared to be in good health and was late turning in his weekly reports of daily activities, and specifically that Respondent used 81 hours of sick time while he appeared to be in good health. Lt. Dunn gave Petitioner a special evaluation for the third time within 60 days of his 1984 annual evaluation and at that time Respondent received a numerical rating of 17. That rating is indicative of less than satisfactory performance. At that time, Respondent had not improved in the areas found deficient during the time period when he received his 1984 annual performance evaluation and the two succeeding special evaluations. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Sgt. David Johnson, the squad supervisor assigned to the Miami office since approximately November 1984, worked with Respondent and directly supervised him during January 1986. On January 9, 1986, Sgt. Johnson and Respondent worked the same shift. Respondent's car had been moved from a shopping mall where he left it unattended for several hours. The car was ordered moved by supervisory officers in the Miami office. Respondent lived near Sgt. Johnson and phoned him to get a ride to work since his car had been moved when he left it unattended at the shopping mall. Sgt. Johnson was aware that Respondent's car had been towed before he called him seeking a ride to work. While in route to work that morning, Respondent told Sgt. Johnson that he needed professional counseling and admitted that he was addicted to drugs and alcohol. Respondent was referred to the highest officer in authority at the Miami station, Cpt. Jack Hardin, for counseling. At approximately 2:45 p.m. on the afternoon of January 6, 1986, Respondent was interviewed by Cpt. Hardin. Respondent told Cpt. Hard in that he needed professional help due to his addiction to drugs and alcohol. Respondent advised Cpt. Hardin that this problem had persisted during the previous six years and that he wanted to save his job. Based on that admission, Cpt. Hardin reassigned Respondent to administrative duties. He also advised Respondent that it was necessary for him to notify Major Grayson, Unit Commander, inasmuch as use of a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine, was a felony. Based on Respondent's admission to use of a controlled substance and the other problems associated with drug addiction, Cpt. Hardin took possession of Respondent's firearm. Since April 1, 1982, Cpt. M. Leggett has been the commander of the subdistrict in Miami known as Troop "E." Respondent was assigned to Troop "E" during all times material to this case. On June 9, 1986, Cpt. Leggett summoned Respondent to his office for a disciplinary interview. Respondent was provided notice of the interview and was represented by legal counsel. Respondent provided a sworn oral statement after he was apprised of the purpose of the interview and the charges which had been filed against him, i.e., possession of a controlled substance in violation of the rules and regulations of law enforcement officers and a notice of the intended disciplinary action. During Respondent's sworn statement, he admitted that he had used cocaine and that use continued during the years 1982 through 1986. In mitigation, Respondent stated during his interview with Cpt. Leggett that his use was "occasional" and that he would only use a gram or two at any given time. At the time of his interview, Respondent appeared to be in control of his faculties. (Testimony of Respondent and Capt. Leggett).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a final order revoking Respondent's law enforcement Certificate Number 02-12297. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of September, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. Paul A. Lavery 5325 West 20th Lane Hialeah, Florida 33012 Rod Caswell, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 2302 Robert R. Dempsey Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact In May of 1977, petitioner filled out respondent's form DBR 710-L, with the help of Lee Brewer from whom petitioner proposed to buy a bar. Ms. Brewer typed answers to the questions on the form, which petitioner dictated. One of the questions on the form inquired "Have you ever been arrested?" Although petitioner told Ms. Brewer that he had been arrested for traffic offenses, they decided after some discussion to answer the question no. Petitioner signed the form in the place provided, right under the words, "I swear or affirm under penalty of perjury . . . that the foregoing information is true to the best of my knowledge Joint exhibit No. 3. On October 26, 1977, petitioner amended his answer to the question as to arrests by listing six arrests, two of which were for traffic offenses. Joint exhibit No. 2. No other evidence as to petitioner's moral character was adduced.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny petitioner's application for transfer of a beverage license. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Manuel W. James, Esquire 419 Fleming Street Key West, Florida 33040 Mr. Frances Bayley, Esquire The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the administrative complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: At all times material to the allegations of the administrative complaint, Respondent has been certified by the Commission as a law enforcement officer, certificate No. 02- 34512. In April, 1987, Respondent was employed by the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) in Dade County, Florida. On the morning of April 9, 1987, at approximately 7:00 a.m., while dressed in his FHP uniform, Respondent went to the home of his girl friend, Connie Hawkins. Unable to waken Ms. Hawkins by knocking at the door, Respondent went around to her bedroom, began to bang on the glass, and attempted to pry open the window. As a result, the window broke and Ms. Hawkins was awakened by the noise. Respondent then demanded that Ms. Hawkins open the door since he had cut his left arm on the broken window. When Ms. Hawkins opened the door, Respondent began to strike her about the face and arm. Apparently, Respondent was angry that Ms. Hawkins had not opened the door earlier and felt she had caused the injury to his arm. This injury, a two inch cut on the left arm, was bleeding rather badly. Respondent went to Ms. Hawkins' bathroom and wrapped a hand towel around the wound in order to apply pressure and stop the bleeding. Subsequently, Respondent left the Hawkins' home in his FHP vehicle. After she was sure Respondent was gone, Ms. Hawkins telephoned the Metro-Dade police to report the incident. She did not want to have the Respondent criminally prosecuted, but she did want to take measures to assure he would not attack her again. After giving a statement to the police, Ms. Hawkins went to an area hospital for examination and treatment of her swollen face and bruised arm. She was required to wear a sling on the injured arm for a couple of days. The Metro-Dade police notified the FHP that one of its employees, Respondent, had been named in connection with a domestic disturbance. The report of the incident was given to Lt. Miller, the FHP supervisor on duty the morning of April 9, 1987. Coincidentally, that same morning at approximately 7:30 am., Lt. Miller had observed a cut on Respondent's left arm and had ordered him to a hospital for stitches. According to the story Respondent gave Lt. Miller, the injury had been caused by the FHP car door when Respondent was entering it after a routine highway stop. A sharp piece of the window framing had allegedly snagged Respondent's arm causing the cut. According to the Respondent, the piece of metal framing may have fallen off the car since the area was later found to be smooth.- Following treatment for the cut, Respondent signed a Notice of Injury form which is required by the Division of Workers' Compensation for all work- related injuries. This form alleged the injury had been sustained as described in paragraph 8. Subsequently, an investigation conducted by the FHP raised questions regarding the incident with Ms. Hawkins and the "work-related" cut on Respondent's arm. Lt. Baker attempted to interview Respondent regarding this investigation. Respondent declined to be interviewed and resigned from the FHP. Later, Respondent obtained a job as a security officer with the Dade County School District. Prior to his resignation from the FHP, Respondent did not claim he had cut or injured both arms on the morning of April 9, 1987. Lt. Miller did not observe a cut on Respondent's right arm on April 9, 1987. Neither Lt. Miller nor Trooper Allen, a trained traffic homicide investigator, could discover any trace evidence on Respondent's FHP vehicle to substantiate Respondent's claim regarding the cut. There were no breaks in the metal or paint along Respondent's door in the area he identified as the point of injury. There were no rough or jagged edges. The Notice of Injury signed by Respondent contained information which was false or misleading.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice standards and Training Commission enter a final order revoking the certification for a law enforcement officer held by Respondent. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of January, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 1989. APPENDIX RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraphs 1-38 are accepted. Paragraph 39 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary to the findings made herein. Paragraph 40 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary to the findings made herein. Respondent's testimony and that of Mr. Black relating to the alleged wound to the right arm was not credible. Paragraph 41 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary to the findings made herein. See comment p. 3 above. Paragraph 42 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial, or unnecessary to the findings made herein. See comment p. 3 above. RULINGS ON RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraphs 1-5 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 6, to the extent that it relates Respondent's testimony it is correct, however, the fact it not. That is, it is found that Respondent injured his left arm at the Hawkins' home; consequently, Paragraph 6 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Respondent's account was not credible. Paragraph 7 is accepted to the extent that it relates the story given by Respondent; such story being deemed incredible and therefore, rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 8 is accepted to the extent that it relates the testimony of the troopers; however, the conclusion reached is speculative and unsupported by the record in this cause. Paragraph 9 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 10 is accepted; however the facts related in that form were false or misleading. Paragraph 11 is rejected as argument, or unsupported by the credible evidence in this cause. Paragraph 12 is rejected as argument, or unsupported by the credible evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Denis Dean, Esquire Dean & Hartman, P.A. 10680 N. W. 25 Street Suite 200 Miami, Florida 33172 Daryl McLaughlin Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice standards Training Commission P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
