The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award for attorney's fees and costs under the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, or some other provision of Florida law.
Findings Of Fact On July 31, 1996, this Administrative Law Judge issued a Recommended Order granting Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification as a caretaker, in a position of special trust, under the provisions of Section 39.076(1), Florida Statutes (1994). The Recommended Order was adopted by the Respondent in a Final Order, issued August 13, 1996. Petitioner was the prevailing party in the administrative proceeding before DOAH. On September 30, 1996, in a separate case, the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) found that Petitioner was a permanent status employee at the time of his dismissal by Respondent. PERC found that at no time during Petitioner’s employment with Respondent was Petitioner informed that he was anything other than a probationary and permanent status employee. It was not until Petitioner’s dismissal on June 14, 1995, that Respondent informed him that he was a “substitute” employee. Respondent did not inform Petitioner of any right to appeal he might have had to PERC at the time of his dismissal or at any time thereafter. Petitioner was informed by Respondent that as a substitute employee his only rights of administrative appeal were with the Respondent and DOAH. PERC found no evidence of a mistake or error in the hire of Petitioner; it found that Respondent intended to hire the Petitioner as a probationary employee, not as a substitute. PERC found that Petitioner achieved permanent status by default when Respondent failed to remove him during the probationary period. Petitioner became aware that he may have been a permanent status employee with rights of appeal to PERC on the day of the DOAH hearing. Petitioner would not have brought the DOAH action, had he been apprised of his rights of appeal to PERC at or about the time of his termination. Kenneth W. Williams, Esquire of the Law Office of Douglas-Bailey and Williams represented Petitioner through all stages of the administrative process, and Petitioner agreed to pay a reasonable fee for his services. The Petition for Costs and Attorneys' Fees was filed on January 14, 1997. The parties were unable to reach a stipulation regarding the entitlement to or the amount of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded.
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this order closing file is entitled to Judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the Agency Clerk of the Department of Management Services, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950, and a second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that this Order Closing File was filed in the official records of the Department of Management Services and copies were furnished to: Larry D. Scott, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Management Services, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950; Jane M. Letwin, Esquire, 5426 SW 25" Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312, and Judge Claude B. Arrington, Division of Administrative Hearings, the DeSoto net Building, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060, this | a day of Quis, Us? ‘ , 2009. Debbie Shoup Clerk Department of Management Services (850) 487-1082 2 of 2 Jul 11 2009 11:41 a7/11/2889° 12:23 9549617454 PACK-SHIP&BEYOND PAGE 91/03 STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS GLORIA MARSHALL, Petitioner CASE NO: 08-3716 JUDGE ARRINGTON v. DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT. Respondent. / PETITIONER’S AMENDED NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE PETITIONER, GLORIA MARSHALL, through undersigned counsel, hereby files this AMENDED PETITIONER’S NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE, on the following grounds: 1. Petitioner Marshall is not working for the employer since June of 2008, when she retired after a long career as an employee of the Broward County School Board. Most of the documents to be used in this petition are already in possession of Respondent and the attorney for Petitioner. 2. Petitioner patiently and conscientiously worked as an adult ed teacher from 1981 through 2005, a period of some twenty four years. EXHIBIT att Jul 11 2009 11:41 @7/11/2889 12:23 9549617454 PACK-SHIP&BEYOND PAGE 62/83 3. In view of the relationship between the Repondent and Petitioner, who has been enrolled several times in the FRS, Petitioner contends that the Respondent exercise its fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the member by not opposing this dismissal without prejudice. 4. Petitioner contends that no prejudice to Respondent will result. 5. No expenses have been incurred thus far other than the transmission of employment records by the Respondent to undersigned counsel, and those will not change. If a plan has been proposed for the case by Respondent, that plan can be laid aside and will serve the same purpose in the future. 6. In light of the circumstances which prevail, to insist on the prosecution of this petition at this time will not serve the interests of justice. 7. Petitioner has indicated that she is unable to assist in this petition until the month of December 2009. 8, In addition, the goal sought in these proceedings is a very precious one, that is, a pension and social security fund which will influence the comfort or lack thereof of this petitioner’s last years, and is worthy of the Court’s indulgence in acknowledging this dismissal without prejudice. BASED ON THE FOREGOING recitation of facts, Petitioner files this ‘ Amended Notice of Voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Jul 11 2009 11:42 97/11/2009 12:23 9549617454 PACK-SHIP&BEYOND PAGE 43/03 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been fax-filed with the Department of Administrative Hearings and e-mailed to 850 922 6312, to Larry Dz. Scott, Esq., Asst. General counsel to DMS, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Eleventh day of July, 2009. LAW OFFICE OF JANE M. LETWIN Attorney for Petitioner: Florida Bar Number 990329 5426 SW 25" Avenue, Fort Lauderdale Fl 33312 Phone: 954 245 8495: Fax: 954 301 8401 E-mail; Janeletwintv@aol.com By * ou Jane M. Letwin
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a manager of real estate specializing in condominiums. It was incorporated in Florida on August 30, 1978, as Property Management, Inc. at the address of its attorney and registered agent, Mr. Michael L. Hyman, Suite 400, 28 W. Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 33130. The corporation was involuntarily dissolved by the Secretary of State on December 5, 1979, for failure to file its annual report and pay its annual report filing fee. Petitioner admits that it was delinquent in submitting its annual report and filing fee, but contends that it was entitled to notice of delinquency prior to involuntary dissolution and reissuance of its corporate name. Through testimony of Petitioner's president and corporate counsel's secretary, who opens and distributes incoming mail, Petitioner established that it had not received any of the three notices discussed below. Rather, Petitioner learned of the dissolution in February, 1980, when it sought telephone service. It then submitted the annual report and filing fee which were received by the Secretary of State on March 17, 1980. By that time the name Property Management, Inc. had been issued to another corporation and was not available. Petitioner was therefore reinstated as Property Management of South Florida, Inc. The following notices relevant to this proceeding were prepared by the Secretary of State: January, 1979: Notices to all Florida corporations that annual reports and filing fees were due by July 1, 1979. September 1, 1979: Reminder notices to delinquent corporations that dissolution would follow if annual reports and filing fees were not submitted within 90 days. December 5, 1979: Certificates of dissolution issued to corporations which failed to submit the reports and filing fees. The above notices were prepared from computer data and were transmitted by ordinary mail. Respondent produced a computer printout with Petitioner's correct name and address showing dissolution on December 5, 1979. However, no evidence was adduced to establish that this notice or either of the preceding notices were actually mailed to Petitioner.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's request for return of the name Property Management, Inc. be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Michael L. Hyman, Esquire Suite 400 Roberts Building 28 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 William J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Office of the Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners, Judith C. Cleary and Charles B. Houck (Petitioners or Ms. Cleary and Mr. Houck), are entitled to an award of attorney's fees against Respondent, Department of Financial Services (Respondent or the Department), pursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2009).1/
Findings Of Fact The underlying proceedings were initiated by Respondent on February 22, 2010, by the issuance of substantively identical Administrative Complaints against Petitioners. Petitioners timely requested administrative hearings to contest the charges against them, and the cases were forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings where they were consolidated for hearing. Count 1 of each Administrative Complaint charged Petitioners with willfully misrepresenting and or omitting material information in order to induce Mr. and Mrs. Nagle to cash in another annuity they held in order to purchase an annuity sold by Petitioners. Included in the alleged misrepresentations or material omissions were: misrepresenting that there would be no surrender charges to withdraw the entire amount of the new annuity after one year, when in fact there would be a 15 percent surrender charge; falsely representing that the annuity would earn the Nagles ten to 20 percent returns; and (3) misrepresenting the suitability of the Nagles to purchase the annuity by misrepresenting the Nagles' net worth and by misrepresenting the Nagles' investment objective as long-term, in a form Petitioners submitted to the insurance company issuing the annuity. Count 2 of each Administrative Complaint charged Petitioners with similar conduct in order to induce the Nagles' son, Robert, to purchase an annuity. Included in the alleged misrepresentations or material omissions were: misrepresenting that there would be no surrender charges to withdraw the entire amount of the new annuity after one year, when, in fact, there would be a 15 percent surrender charge; and falsely representing that the annuity would earn Robert Nagle ten to 20 percent annual returns. Petitioners do not dispute that if the allegations charged in the Administrative Complaint had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, then Respondent would have established the statutory violations alleged as the predicate for taking disciplinary action against Petitioners' insurance agent licenses. Petitioners also acknowledge that Respondent initiated the disciplinary actions against them on the basis of two complaint letters received by Mrs. Phyllis Nagle, the attestation of Mrs. Nagle to the material allegations in an affidavit, and a corroborating complaint letter by Mrs. Nagle's son, Robert Nagle. After a full evidentiary hearing, a Recommended Order issued in the underlying disciplinary actions determined that the more credible evidence failed to establish the allegations in the Administrative Complaints. In particular, the undersigned weighed the credibility of testimony by Robert Nagle and by Petitioners at the final hearing, as well as deposition testimony by both Mr. and Mrs. Nagle. The question posed in this case, however, is not whether credibility judgments caused the Department to ultimately not prevail in its charges against Petitioners. Instead, the question here is whether Respondent had a reasonable basis, in law and in fact, at the time it initiated the underlying disciplinary actions. In this regard, Petitioners contend that the Department's investigation file contained documents from the insurance company issuing the annuities that contradict the allegations in the Administrative Complaints. Petitioners point to three documents in particular. The first document was a customer survey response submitted by Mrs. Nagle to the insurance company after she purchased the annuity from Petitioners. Her completion of the survey form indicated that she knew that "[s]urrender charges are imposed on premature full withdrawal"; that she considered the "annuity to be a long-term investment"; that she did "not intend to use these funds to meet current expenses"; and that Petitioners reviewed her "financial status . . . and other pertinent information to determine whether this annuity purchase" was suitable to her. The other document claimed to contradict the allegations in the Administrative Complaints was the Nagles' annual statement showing a yield of 5.66 percent, which was different than the 2.6 percent yield claimed by Mrs. Nagle in her complaint letters or affidavit. Finally, Petitioners point to statements of understanding signed by the Nagles, showing the surrender charges that would be imposed for early withdrawals. None of these documents conclusively refute the charges in the Administrative Complaint. For example, with respect to surrender charges, the Nagles' complaints assert that Petitioners represented that there would be no surrender charges for a withdrawal after one year. Mrs. Nagle's survey form only acknowledged that there would be surrender charges for "premature" withdrawal. It certainly would have been possible to reconcile these two concepts in that Mrs. Nagle may have been thinking that "premature" withdrawal, as used in the survey form, was a withdrawal in less than one year. The response in the survey form to the "surrender charge" question does not conclusively contradict Mrs. Nagle's complaint and affidavit, nor does it conclusively contradict the allegations in the Administrative Complaint. Similarly, the responses in the survey form about suitability do not conclusively contradict the allegations in the Administrative Complaint. The annual statement likewise does not conclusively contradict the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, even though the yield shown is somewhat different from the yield Mrs. Nagle referred to in her complaint. Whether the yield was actually 2.6 percent or 5.66 percent, the material allegations in the Administrative Complaint were that Petitioners misrepresented that the yield would be 10 to 20 percent per year. These allegations and the complaints on which they were based, were not so plainly lacking in credibility that no reasonable agency would have proceeded with charges. Finally, the signed statements of understanding showing that surrender charges would be imposed for early withdrawals do not contradict the Nagles' complaints or the allegations in the Administrative Complaint. Although the undersigned ultimately found against the credibility of the Nagles' complaints, those complaints were that Petitioners made oral representations assuring the Nagles that there would be no surrender charges after one year, even though the policy forms themselves said otherwise. The ultimate lack of credibility of the complaining witnesses' testimony was not so clear that no reasonable agency would have prosecuted the claims. In short, Respondent had a reasonable basis in law and in fact, following a reasonable investigation, to make the allegations and to charge the statutory violations it did in the Administrative Complaints. The documentation gathered in the investigation did not conclusively contradict the factual allegations, and the credibility of the complainants was not so obviously lacking that no reasonable agency would have made the allegations in the Administrative Complaints. And it is beyond dispute that if those factual allegations had been proven, the charged statutory violations would have been established. Thus, it cannot be said that Respondent's action in initiating the disciplinary proceedings against Petitioners was unreasonable governmental action.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Sections 440.10 and 440.38, Florida Statutes (1997), by not securing workers' compensation insurance for its Florida employees; and if so, whether Petitioner properly issued a Stop Work Order and assessed civil penalties pursuant to Sections 440.107(5) and 440.107(7), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency that is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the statutory requirements for employers to provide their employees with workers' compensation coverage. Respondent is a business, located in Savannah, Georgia, that supplies workers on a temporary basis to client businesses. The services that Respondent provides to its client businesses include the payment of payroll, taxes, and workers' compensation insurance for the temporary employees. American Interstate Insurance Company (AIIC) provided Eastern Personnel Services II, Federal Employers Identification Number (FEIN) 58-2340211, with workers' compensation insurance from November 18, 1997, through November 18, 1998, in the state of Georgia. AIIC's policy number 97WAGA1109996 did not provide coverage for any of Respondent's workers in Florida. AIIC is not authorized in Florida to write insurance for an employer with Respondent's assigned risk classification. Safeco Insurance Company of America (SICA) provided Respondent, FEIN 58-2340211, with workers' compensation insurance from December 29, 1998, through December 29, 1999, in the states of Georgia and South Carolina only. SICA's policy number WC7260735 as originally drafted, and as it existed on March 2, 1999, did not provide coverage for any workers in Florida. Paul Day is Respondent's president and sole officer and shareholder. He is also the owner of Eastern Personnel Services II, a sole proprietorship. According to AIIC's and SICA's insurance policies, both entities have the same FEIN. The record here indicates that there is no substantive difference between Respondent and Eastern Personnel Services II. Respondent's testimony to the contrary is not persuasive. 1/ For all practical purposes, Respondent and Eastern Personnel Services II were under the exclusive management and control of Mr. Day at all relevant times. Beginning as early as August 28, 1997 and continuing through March 2, 1999, Respondent provided employees to Foley & Associates Construction Co., Inc. (Foley) at one or more work sites on Amelia Island, Florida. Respondent did not secure workers' compensation insurance for these workers. Stanley Benner was one of the first of Respondent's employees to begin working at Foley's Amelia Island job site. On November 9, 1998, Mr. Benner was injured while working for Respondent. Mr. Benner filed a workers' compensation claim against Respondent and AIIC seeking compensation for his injuries. He subsequently learned that AIIC did not provide workers' compensation insurance for Respondent in Florida. Mr. Benner has received no compensation from Respondent or any insurance carrier for his work-related injury. On March 2, 1999, Mr. Benner's attorney filed a complaint with Petitioner regarding Respondent's lack of workers' compensation coverage. Robert Lambert, Petitioner's investigator immediately went to Foley's job site to investigate the complaint. Upon his arrival at the construction site, Mr. Lambert learned that Respondent had 21 employees performing general contract labor for Foley that day. Foley's office manager informed Mr. Lambert that Respondent had provided Foley with between 15 and 20 laborers per day for one year. Next, Mr. Lambert called Mr. Day who provided a certificate of insurance from SICA by facsimile transmission. However, the certificate listed Saxon and Associates, a business located in Georgia, as the certificate holder. It did not reference coverage for employees provided to Foley in Florida. Mr. Lambert then called Linda Burtchett of HGI, Inc. She is an insurance agent and the authorized representative of SICA. HGI, Inc. is the producer of SICA's policy number WC7260735. Ms. Burtchett informed Mr. Lambert that SICA's policy number WC7260735 did not cover Respondent's employees in the state of Florida. To her knowledge, Respondent had never reported any wages on a Florida payroll. Mr. Lambert issued a Stop Work Order dated March 2, 1999. The Stop Work Order required Respondent to immediately cease all work at the Foley construction site. It advised Respondent that a civil penalty in the amount of $100 would be assessed for each day that it failed to provide the required workers' compensation coverage. Later on March 2, 1999, Respondent requested HGI, Inc. to provide coverage for its Florida employees working at the Foley job site under SICA's policy number WC7260735. HGI, Inc. complied with Respondent's request. Accordingly, Petitioner correctly assessed Respondent with a civil penalty in the amount of $100 in conjunction with the Stop Work Order. Mr. Day testified that the endorsement to the SICA policy provided coverage for Respondent's Florida employees retroactive to September 29, 1998. He also testified that another of Respondent's Florida employees was injured at the Foley construction site on January 18, 1999, and received compensation under the SICA policy. Mr. Day's testimony is not credited in light of Ms. Burtchett's testimony. On March 2, 1999, Petitioner informally requested Respondent to provide business records to establish the value of its Florida payroll during the three years before Petitioner issued the Stop Work Order. Respondent refused to provide Petitioner with any payroll records. Petitioner obtained records maintained by Foley regarding Respondent's employment activities at the Amelia Island job site. Foley's records showed the number of employees that Respondent employed, the number of hours worked by each employee, and their hourly rate of pay. Respondent admitted and Foley's records confirmed that Respondent's payroll at the Foley construction site was $209,249.86 between January 5, 1998 and March 1, 1999. The National Council of Compensation Insurance (NCCI) classifies Respondent as a temporary labor service. According to the NCCI, the employment activities conducted by Respondent's employees at the Foley construction site have an assigned insurance premium rate in the conservative amount of $22.34 for each $100 of payroll. Therefore, Respondent's evaded insurance premium on a payroll of $209,249.86 is $46,746. The administrative penalty is twice the evaded premium of $46,746 or $93,492. On March 31, Petitioner properly issued a Notice and Penalty Assessment Order requiring Respondent to pay an administrative penalty in the amount of $93,492. Respondent's untimely discovery responses indicated that its Florida payroll was $196,701.62 in 1998 and $65,165.36 in 1999. Petitioner could have assessed Respondent with an administrative penalty in the amount of $115,743.26.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order affirming the Stop Work Order and Notice and Penalty Assessment Order with their associated penalties, plus any lawful interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1999.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for attorney's fees and costs should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In these cases, Petitioner, Couch Construction, L.P., seeks to impose sanctions against Respondents, Darel Holland (Holland) and Diane Lowery (Lowery), on the ground that they allegedly filed petitions for an improper purpose challenging the issuance of a permit by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). In responsive papers filed by Respondents, both deny that the actions were initiated for an improper purpose. The facts in the underlying DEP case involving Holland (OGC Case No. 98-3015) show that on October 30, 1998, Petitioner published a copy of DEP's Notice of Intent to Issue Permit to Petitioner authorizing the construction of a hot mix asphalt concrete plant at 2780 North Highway 95-A, Cantonment, Florida, with potential emissions of up to 29 tons per year of particulate matter. After learning of the proposed action, various citizens in the Cantonment area signed a petition opposing the project. In addition, a local attorney, John T. Reading, Jr., Esquire (Reading), offered to provide them with pro bono assistance as a "community service." Among other things, Reading prepared a form petition challenging the issuance of the permit and requesting a formal hearing. That form was apparently made available to the local citizens so that they could sign and file it, if they chose to do so. Holland says that he did, and it is fair to infer that this form was the source of Lowery's petition as well. Holland lives only 9 blocks from the proposed plant and suffers from a lung disease which has left him with only 58 percent of his lung capacity. Because of his legitimate concerns about the projected amount of particulate emissions and their potential effect on his respiratory system, on November 12, 1998, he filed in proper person a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing challenging the proposed issuance of the permit. Holland's petition alleged that he was a property owner in the area where the plant would be constructed; that "due to respiratory problems," he would be "substantially affected by the permitted 29 tons of particulate emissions"; that his property "may be substantially reduced in value and peaceful enjoyment" as a result of the permit being issued; and that the petition was not "being interposed merely for the purposes of delay, or any other improper purpose as listed in F.S. 120.57(1)(b)(5)." There was no showing that the petition was filed for an improper purpose or that Holland's concerns were not genuine. Holland's petition also requested an extension of time "to determine which rules or statutes require reversal or modification of the Department's action" and "to obtain counsel" to assist him in his action. On December 21, 1998, DEP entered an order dismissing Holland's petition on the ground that he failed to allege the information required by Rule 28-106.201(2)(e), Florida Administrative Code. It also determined that no good cause had been shown to warrant an extension of time for Holland to determine if any rules or statutes supported his position. He was, however, granted leave to file an amended petition within 15 days from the date of service of DEP's dismissal order (December 23, 1998). This meant that an amended petition had to be filed with DEP no later than January 7, 1999. After learning that his petition had been dismissed, Holland had a brief conversation with Reading about the dismissal and was left with a somewhat vague understanding that Reading "would get an extension" from DEP. Thereafter, on January 12, 1999, or 5 days after the due date, Reading filed with DEP an Amended Petition of Darel Holland for Administrative Hearing. The petition was signed by Reading, and it represented that a copy of the petition had been served on Petitioner's counsel on January 5, 1999. On January 14, 1999, Reading also filed with DEP on behalf of Holland a paper styled Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge Time in which Reading claimed that "due to circumstances not known," the amended petition had not been timely filed. Reading accordingly requested that DEP authorize the untimely filing. By order dated January 28, 1999, DEP denied the Motion to Enlarge Time and dismissed the amended petition, with prejudice, as being untimely. No appeal from that final agency action was taken. Lowery did not attend the final hearing. However, according to Holland, Lowery lives only 500 feet from the proposed cement plant. She boards horses on her property and frequently has children visit the property to ride their horses. The papers filed in her underlying case (OGC Case No. 98-2932) reflect that the facts in that case are essentially the same as those involving Holland. On November 12, 1998, Lowery filed in proper person a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing which was virtually identical to the petition filed by Holland. As an additional ground, however, she alleged that the October 30, 1998, notice published by Petitioner was defective, and she requested that DEP require Petitioner to re-advertise the matter. There was no evidence that this petition was filed for an improper purpose or that Lowery's concerns were not genuine. On December 21, 1998, Lowery's petition was dismissed by DEP because she had failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 28-106.201(4), Florida Administrative Code. Like Holland, she was given until January 5, 1999, in which to file an amended petition. In papers filed by Lowery after this sanction proceeding arose, she denies that she had any knowledge that any further papers in the permit case would be filed on her behalf after the DEP dismissal order was entered. In any event, on January 12, 1999, or five days after the due date, Reading filed on Lowery's behalf with DEP an Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing which was identical to that filed on behalf of Holland. Also, on January 14, 1999, Reading filed a Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge Time seeking to excuse his tardiness in filing the amended petition. Both papers were served on Petitioner's counsel. On January 28, 1999, DEP entered its Final Order Denying Motion to Enlarge Time and dismissing Lowery's amended petition, with prejudice. No appeal from that final order was taken. Because no appeal was taken by either Respondent, DEP's intent to issue a permit became final, and it is fair to infer that a permit has been issued to Petitioner. On January 7, 1999, or prior to DEP's final order of dismissal, Petitioner's counsel noticed both Respondents for a deposition in Pensacola, Florida, on January 14, 1999. Because Reading had signed the amended petitions, Petitioner's counsel logically served the notices by Federal Express on Reading. However, Reading failed to notify Respondents, and neither he nor Respondents appeared at the deposition or advised counsel prior to the depositions that they would not appear. As a result, Petitioner incurred the costs and fees for having its counsel travel to Pensacola. In addition, Petitioner presumably incurred the cost of a court reporter's appearance fee. Assuming that Petitioner's claim is meritorious, those costs would be the responsibility of Reading, and not Respondents. At the hearing, it was represented that Reading is no longer a member of the Florida Bar. This is because in an unpublished order dated January 7, 1999, the Florida Supreme Court revoked his license to practice law effective 30 days thereafter, or on February 7, 1999. His current address is unknown. Petitioner has asserted that in defending against Respondents' petitions, "the bulk" of its costs and fees are related to the deposition and that a few other undisclosed fees and costs have been incurred. At the final hearing, Petitioner did not specify the amount of fees and costs that it seeks or provide any breakdown of those amounts; rather, it opted to provide an affidavit detailing those costs after this final order is rendered, assuming it prevails in this action.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent had sufficient or complete workers' compensation coverage for his employees pursuant to Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2006).1
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and operates a business engaged in the practice of installing flooring, including carpets, tile, hardwood, etc. He is a sole proprietor with no one else on his payroll. His work is performed by subcontractors whom he hires for each individual job. Respondent has been involved in the construction industry for many years and is generally aware of the concept of workers' compensation coverage. He has always operated under the assumption that an employer is only responsible for providing workers' compensation coverage for persons who are directly employed, i.e., that contracted employees (subcontractors) were exempt or had to pay their own coverage. Respondent did not make workers' compensation contributions for the subcontractors who did work for him. He acted on a good faith belief that such coverage was not his responsibility. On April 7, 2006, an investigator for Petitioner conducted a compliance investigation at Pegasus Point apartments in Orlando, Florida, pursuant to a public request. In Apartment J of the complex, the investigator observed a man (later identified as Jeff Menendez), who stated he was installing carpet. When asked about workers' compensation coverage, he replied that he was a subcontractor and did not believe he needed coverage. He said he got this job from "Allied" (the Petitioner in this case). As a result of this encounter, Petitioner contacted Respondent and asked for certain records in order to determine whether appropriate coverage was in place for its employees. When the requested records were not forthcoming, Petitioner entered a Stop Work Order. This prompted another request for business records so that Petitioner could calculate the appropriate penalty. Once it received the necessary records from Respondent, Petitioner determined there were several employees (as that term is defined in statute) working for Respondent for whom workers' compensation coverage had not been paid for the period of May 3, 2003, through May 3, 2006. When those workers were checked against Petitioner's data base--called the Coverage & Compliance Automated System, or CCAS--no coverage was found for Respondent or the identified employees for that period of time. One or more of the named employees had exemptions in place for a portion of the time they did work for Respondent. After taking that into consideration, Petitioner calculated a penalty of $28,619.97 against Respondent. The penalty was calculated using the Scopes Manual, a tool promulgated by rule. Respondent's business was identified in the Scopes Manual as Code 5478: carpet or flooring installation. The assigned rate for this code was then compared to the designated insurance rate. Once the amount was determined, it was multiplied by 1.5 to ascertain the penalty amount. The Stop Work Order was lifted by Petitioner after Respondent signed a "Payment Agreement Schedule for Periodic Payment of Penalty" on June 1, 2006. At that time, Respondent made a down payment of $2,867.19 and agreed to pay the sum of $403.08 per month for 60 months. Upon reaching agreement with Petitioner to pay the fine, Respondent also terminated all "employees" doing subcontract work for him at that time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services upholding the Penalty assessed against Respondent for failure to provide workers' compensation coverage for employees. Inasmuch as the parties have already agreed to a payment plan, it is RECOMMENDED that the plan remain in effect until the penalty has been paid. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 2007.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Sheila A. Cunningham, was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Florida Credit Union, on account of her race or due to retaliation for her opposition to an unlawful employment practice in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, who was at all times relevant to this matter an employee of Respondent, is African-American. There was no direct testimony as to the number of persons employed by Respondent. However, given the testimony describing a large financial institution with multiple departments, including a data scanning department and a call center, there is sufficient competent, substantial evidence to establish an inference that Respondent employs more than 15 full-time employees at any given time. Petitioner was first hired by Respondent on November 20, 2007. On February 2, 2008, she was transferred to the position of Courtesy Pay Credit Advisor (CPCA), a position held until her termination on March 21, 2014. From 2012 through the time of her termination, Jennifer Perez was Petitioner’s direct supervisor. Ms. Perez reported to Mr. Colson, who supervised the credit advisor department. Over the years, Petitioner received a number of certificates and awards for good performance in her position. CPCAs are responsible for collections on delinquent accounts of members by bringing the account to a positive balance within 60 days of delinquency. If a credit union member’s account is delinquent for more than 60 days, it must be written off, resulting in a loss to Respondent. Failure to timely write-off a negative account can subject Respondent to fines and negative audit ratings. A common way of bringing an account current is to arrange a loan with Respondent to pay the delinquent balance. Loan types include a “bounce-free” loan and a “work-out loan.” Both are designed to allow for payment of the negative account in installment payments. The bounce-free loan has only the negative account balance involved, while the work-out loan combines the negative balance with another existing loan. CPCAs receive additional compensation for such loans, known as “incentives,” of $10 to $15, though the record suggests that a dispute over an incentive of $40 was a triggering cause of the adverse employment action in this case. CPCAs are also responsible for “packing” loans, which includes taking the loan paperwork to the optical department to input and image the documents into Respondent’s system. The optical department periodically provides reports on loans for which documentation has not been submitted for input and imaging. Petitioner testified credibly that the optical department would occasionally neglect to scan loans that were submitted. However, there was no evidence to suggest that to be a frequent or pervasive problem. Respondent routinely employs one or two CPCAs at any given time. The CPCAs are assigned a “queue,” which is an alphabetical assignment of member accounts. The evidence suggests that Petitioner served as the CPCA for all delinquent member accounts for a period of almost one year, a practice that ended when Vikki Martello was hired as a CPCA on February 27, 2012. Upon her hiring, Ms. Martello was assigned the accounts of members with last names beginning with the letters A through K, and Petitioner was assigned the accounts of members with last names beginning with the letters L through Z. Ms. Martello was transferred to another position on July 11, 2013. Jennifer Munyan was hired as a CPCA on May 20, 2013, and was assigned the A through K queue. Since Petitioner’s termination, Ms. Munyan has handled all delinquent accounts. Petitioner mentioned several incidents over the course of her employment that she believed to be evidence of her poor treatment by Respondent. These incidents appear to have occurred more than one year before Petitioner filed her employment complaint of discrimination. They are cited here for purposes of background. Petitioner testified that starting in 2010 or 2011, Respondent began to hire younger credit advisors on the basis of their friendship with management. The new employees engaged in childish activities such as throwing paper clips and blowing bubbles. Petitioner indicated that they were “written up” for those activities. There was no suggestion that either the hiring or the write-ups were based on race. For a period of time, Petitioner was assigned what she believed to be a disproportionate share of holiday weekend shifts. Mr. Colson “corrected that and then that was okay.” There was no suggestion that the issues with scheduling were based on race. Shortly after Ms. Martello was hired on February 27, 2012, she was asked to accompany Mr. Colson and Ms. Perez to a branch office to train employees. Petitioner felt “that was not right,” and that she was being excluded from performing certain job tasks. She testified that Respondent’s assignment of training and other duties to persons other than herself led to a sympathetic nick-name of “invisible credit advisor.” Petitioner admitted that, in her opinion, Ms. Martello was an excellent employee. Mr. Colson testified credibly that Petitioner was not asked to assist in the new hire training since she was already behind on managing her accounts, and that “[t]here’s no compensation or award or anything for training another employee, it's just additional work.” There was no suggestion that the decision to have Ms. Martello assist with training was based on race. Petitioner alleged that despite her requests, she was not allowed to shadow other employees, particularly in the call center, so that she could learn the responsibilities of the member service representative position. She testified that in response to her requests, Ms. Perez would say “okay, we'll see about it, but nothing never happened. And I asked like three or four times and it was always we'll see about it.” Petitioner did not claim in her testimony that she was denied these opportunities because of her race. Petitioner generally claimed she was denied promotional opportunities because she was not allowed to train as a back-up. However, she failed to present any evidence of an open and available position for which she had applied, or for which she was denied. Furthermore, there was no suggestion that race played a role in any such denial. Respondent’s employees are informed of work performance issues in several ways, including informal discussions, e-mail communication, individual or group meetings, coaching reports, and annual evaluations. On March 19, 2012, Petitioner received her annual performance review. Although Respondent was complementary of Petitioner’s improvements in her work, and spoke favorably of her interpersonal relationships and work ethic, the review noted a number of “improvement opportunities and development areas” to be implemented over the course of the following year. Deficiencies in job performance included Petitioner’s practice of making initial contact with a delinquent member by letter, rather than the more effective practice of a phone call; the failure to provide sufficiently descriptive account notations; the failure to “charge off” loans correctly resulting in errors for others to correct; the failure to close checking accounts after workout options or loans were complete resulting in further delinquencies; and the failure to set up loan distributions correctly, resulting in unwarranted loan delinquencies and resultant customer complaints. The performance review also cited issues with Petitioner’s negative accounts extending beyond the required time frame, which was noted in Respondent’s quarterly audit report. The deficiencies noted in the performance review resulted in higher than normal charge-offs, and losses to Respondent. Petitioner improved her performance in some areas, but only for short periods of time. Mr. Colson did not issue Petitioner any coaching reports in 2012 because he believed that Petitioner’s mistakes were not intentional, that she had a positive attitude, that she had no attendance issues, and that “she seemed to like her job a lot.” It was Mr. Colson’s belief that with additional training and a cooperative approach, Petitioner’s performance issues could be corrected. On February 27, 2013, Petitioner received her next annual performance review. Petitioner was again complemented on her interaction with members, her teamwork, and her general positive work ethic. It was noted that Petitioner had responded well to coaching such that she rarely made mistakes in setting up automatic loan payments. The review noted, however, a number of areas for improvement, including some that had not been resolved from the previous year’s review. Of particular concern was the high number of missing loan packets, some of which were months past due; the failure to meet consecutive deadlines for submitting completed work; and the failure to begin work on accounts in an appropriate and timely manner. Petitioner was again instructed to make initial contact with delinquent members by phone or email, rather than by letter; and was advised of several of her accounts that were charged-off after missing the 60-day deadline. Finally, Petitioner was provided with a printout of the 142 overdrawn checking accounts in her queue, only 40 of which (28 percent), had been worked in the previous 60 days. Although some early-stage overdraft accounts carried a “high self-cure rate,” the low number of accounts worked was deemed unacceptably low. After receiving her 2013 performance review, Petitioner improved in some areas of her performance, but again only for a short period of time. Beginning on July 15, 2013, Petitioner, Ms. Martello (until she completed her transfer from the collections department), and Ms. Munyan (upon her assignment to the collections department) were provided with periodic email updates from Ms. Perez on the number of loan packets for which each was responsible that had not been submitted to the optical department. The updates and related correspondence between Petitioner and Ms. Perez revealed the following: July 15, 2013 Petitioner - 37 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 4 missing loan packets July 19, 2013 Petitioner - 36 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 6 missing loan packets July 30, 2013 Petitioner - 34 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 5 missing loan packets August 5, 2013 Petitioner - 29 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 2 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 1 missing loan packet August 14, 2013 Petitioner - 31 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 2 missing loan packets August 19, 2013 Petitioner - 38 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets August 27, 2013 Petitioner - 42 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 4 missing loan packets September 3, 2013 Petitioner - 38 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets September 10, 2013 Petitioner - 42 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets September 16, 2013 Petitioner - 32 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 4 missing loan packets On September 18, 2013, Ms. Perez sent an email to Petitioner and Ms. Munyan advising them that credit union auditors were scheduled to arrive on September 30, 2013. Thus, Petitioner and Ms. Munyan were instructed to “[m]ake sure all of your loan packets are up to date, so that no one comes to us requesting something that cannot be located.” October 1, 2013 (for loan packets through September 27) Petitioner - 38 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 3 missing loan packets The October 1, 2013, update further advised Petitioner and Ms. Munyan that “[t]he auditors are here for the next three weeks. If they review any of these loans, it will be a problem that we do not have them scanned yet and if we are missing documents. Please get these turned in this week!” On October 12, 2013, Petitioner sent Ms. Perez an email stating that “I worked on some loan packets on 10/12. Please don’t send email until I turn my loan packets in on 10/16.” October 25, 2013 Petitioner - 20 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 7 missing loan packets November 4, 2013 Petitioner - 28 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 4 missing loan packets November 12, 2013 Petitioner - 33 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets On November 15, 2013, Petitioner sent Ms. Perez an email stating that “Optical have some loan packets that were turned in today, please don’t send out list until after 11/18/13.” November 22, 2013 Petitioner - 35 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 7 missing loan packets December 11, 2013 Petitioner - 41 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 1 missing loan packet December 18, 2013 Petitioner - 32 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 2 missing loan packets On October 9, 2013, Mr. Colson met with Petitioner and Ms. Munyan to discuss the results of an attorney audit that was critical of several collections practices. In particular, too many accounts were not being worked until the later stage of delinquency; too much time was allowed to elapse between contacts with the members; and workflow notations were not properly completed. A spreadsheet provided during the October 9, 2013, meeting revealed that Petitioner had 92 accounts in her queue, 57 of which had never been worked. Ms. Munyan had 90 accounts in her queue, 25 of which had never been worked. In November of 2013, Petitioner spoke with Ms. Perez regarding an incident in which Petitioner alleged that Ms. Munyan claimed one of her incentive credits. Ms. Perez advised Petitioner to come back to her if it occurred again. Ms. Perez discussed the incentive issue with Mr. Colson. They determined that, due to a high volume of negative accounts anticipated over the upcoming holidays, and in recognition of the priority on not missing an opportunity to resolve negative accounts, a policy for incentives when a CPCA had to handle incoming calls and loan requests from members who were not in the CPCA’s queue was warranted. On November 19, 2013, Ms. Perez sent an e-mail to Petitioner and Ms. Munyan setting out the policy for handling calls when the other CPCA was not available. Outgoing calls and loan initiation were limited to customers within the CPCA’s queue. However, if a CPCA was not in the office or was unavailable to handle a customer request, the other CPCA was instructed to accept incoming calls from members not in their queue. The CPCA who first entered notes of a customer contact prior to a loan being booked was to receive the incentive. On December 9, 2013, Ms. Munyan received a communication from a member with a negative account, entered the first notes of contact with the member into the workflow history, and sent loan paperwork for a bounce-free loan to the member. On December 10, 2013, Petitioner spoke with the customer and took additional application information over the phone. Later that same day, Petitioner went to Mr. Colson to approve a refinance loan for the customer. Mr. Colson approved Petitioner to proceed with the refinance loan based on the customer’s income, but did not know at the time that Ms. Munyan had already started the loan process. Since Ms. Munyan made the first contact with the customer, the incentive was credited to Ms. Munyan. Petitioner proceeded to make several entries on the workflow history asserting her claim to the incentive. Petitioner apparently discussed the matter within the office, leading to her testimony that “[t]he department was upset about it because I showed it to them.” In December 2013, having been made aware of the workflow history comments regarding the disputed incentive; having received complaints regarding Petitioner from the manager of Respondent’s contact center; and having continuing issues with Petitioner’s failure to submit loan documents to the optical department, Mr. Colson prepared a series of coaching reports to individually address the issues. It was decided to issue separate coaching reports for each issue of concern, rather than a single lengthy report, in order to keep the issues separate. Respondent has previously issued multiple coaching reports to employees under comparable circumstances. On December 20, 2013, Petitioner was called into a meeting with Mr. Colson. She thought the meeting was to discuss the disputed incentive. Instead, she was presented with the coaching reports. The first coaching report was issued for Petitioner’s notations into the workflow system related to her intent to claim the disputed incentive credit. Petitioner had previously received training on the information to be entered in the workflow system. During the training sessions, which were conducted periodically, and which included the distribution of printed materials, it was stressed that the workflow notes should not be editorial or contain side comments. Mr. Colson explained that, in the event of a legal dispute with a member regarding their account, the collection record, including the notations entered into the workflow system, would be made part of a court record. As applied to Petitioner’s notations, Mr. Colson was concerned about having to testify about notations in the collection record regarding incentives or commissions for working on a work-out request. Petitioner alleged that Ms. Martello and other unidentified credit advisors made similar notations in the workflow system without being written up, but provided no evidence to support her assertion. Mr. Colson knew of no other instance of a CPCA making notations in the workflow system related to an incentive dispute or other internal employee dispute. Mr. Colson believed that the notations made by Petitioner regarding the incentive dispute were not pertinent to the collection record, thus violating Respondent’s policy and warranting the issuance of the coaching report. Petitioner signed the first coaching report, with the comment that “I thought that I was doing the right thing on this acct.” The second coaching report addressed Petitioner’s act of taking a fee refund voucher to Respondent’s contact center department for approval. The contact center has staff on duty beyond Respondent’s normal 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. business hours. The fee refund had to be done on November 25, 2013, since that was the 60th day of the negative account, after which the account would have to be written off. The fee refund was for an amount that exceeded Petitioner’s approval authority. Despite the time frame involved, Petitioner did not get the fee refund voucher approved by the clerk of the collections department, which would be the normal course, before the 5:00 p.m. close of business. During the December 20, 2013, meeting, Mr. Colson discussed the practice of taking vouchers to the call center for processing after 5:00 p.m. Mr. Colson had been approached by the assistant vice president of the contact center regarding Petitioner’s multiple visits after 5:00 p.m. to his department “to have transactions done, fees refunded, things of that nature on members' accounts.” As a result, call center employees were being pulled away from their normal tasks to do transactions that were not a normal function of their job. Petitioner alleged that other credit advisors went to the call center to have such transactions processed, including Ms. Martello, Melonice Lindsey, and Howard Miller, but provided no evidence to support her assertion. Mr. Colson had no knowledge of other credit advisors who engaged in this activity, or any other improprieties regarding the processing of fee refunds. The second coaching report addressed additional issues related to the November 25, 2013, fee refund transaction, including the fact that Petitioner did not work on the sixty-day negative account when she arrived to work that morning, and that she did not enter any notation in the workflow history regarding the fee refund. Mr. Colson believed that the issues regarding the fee refund transaction warranted the issuance of the coaching report. Petitioner signed the second coaching report, with the comment that “I didn’t do this intentionally. I forgot to get voucher back from Katie to give to [Mr. Colson] to sign.” The third coaching report addressed the ongoing problem of Petitioner’s failure to provide loan documentation to the optical department for input and scanning, the details of which are set forth in paragraph 22 above. Petitioner signed the report with the comment that “[s]ome of these loans have been turned into optical. I will review this matter.” Petitioner alleged that other employees had fallen behind on submitting paperwork, but were not written up or terminated. Petitioner did not identify, by name or race, any of the allegedly comparable employees, or establish that they had a comparable history of failing to submit loan documentation. The only evidence adduced at the hearing established that Ms. Martello and Ms. Munyan were not comparable to Petitioner in the number or frequency of late-submitted loan packets. Petitioner stated that she had previously advised Ms. Perez of her intent to work on Saturday, December 21, 2013, to catch up on her loan paperwork. Mr. Colson was not aware of Petitioner’s intent to do so but, given the length of time that the problem continued to exist, would still have issued the coaching report to Petitioner. At some point after January 2, 2014, during Mr. Colson’s daily review of compliance reports, he noted an account that was over 60 days, requiring that it be written off. The account was assigned to Petitioner, and Mr. Colson saw from the workflow history that Petitioner did not begin work on the account until it was 58 days past due. Working her accounts earlier in the delinquency stage had been previously addressed with Petitioner. On January 6, 2014, Petitioner was given a coaching report and placed on a 60-day probation for deficient work performance related to the written-off account. Petitioner signed the January 6, 2014, coaching report with the comment that “voucher was paperclip to another voucher by mistake. I usually check these daily.” Petitioner testified that other employees failed to timely charge-off accounts but were not counseled, but provided no evidence to support her assertion. The only comparator for whom evidence was received was Khrissy Adams, a Caucasian woman, who was given a coaching report and placed on a 30-day probation for failing to timely write-off an account. There was no evidence of Ms. Adams having received previous coaching reports so as to warrant a lengthier period of probation, as was given to Petitioner. As part of the process established after the December 20, 2013, meeting and coaching reports, Petitioner was to submit her loan packets to either Ms. Perez or Mr. Colson for review before they were sent to be scanned. That review revealed that a large number of the loan packets contained significant errors in the consumer lending plan, which is the contract a member signs to obtain a loan. Many of the consumer lending plans had missing signatures, and some packets had no consumer lending plan at all. Furthermore, Petitioner indicated that some members elected to purchase loan insurance when the member had, in fact, declined insurance, resulting in unapproved charges to a member. The errors noted by Respondent were serious, potentially resulting in the loan contracts being invalid and unenforceable. The errors could have been violative of Regulation Z, which governs fair lending practices and, if there were a sufficient number of instances, resulted in a class action lawsuit against Respondent, exposing it to considerable cost. Due to the ongoing performance issues, as well as the severity of the issues related to Petitioner’s completed loan packets, the decision was made that termination of Petitioner’s employment was appropriate. Petitioner was thereafter terminated from employment on March 21, 2014. Petitioner identified no instance of any racially- disparaging comments directed at herself or any other employee by anyone affiliated with Respondent. There was no non-hearsay evidence of any employee outside of Petitioner’s protected class who engaged in conduct similar to that of Petitioner, but without consequence, upon which to support a finding that the employee was treated more favorably. Mr. Colson testified credibly that Petitioner’s race had no bearing on the decision to terminate her employment. Rather, Mr. Colson testified convincingly that the decision was based solely on Petitioner’s continuing and increasingly poor job performance. Mr. Colson felt Petitioner’s poor performance was not due to a lack of trying on Petitioner’s part; it was simply the result of a lack of ability on her part. Petitioner asserted that she was written up, placed on probation, and subsequently terminated from employment in retaliation for complaining that Ms. Munyan improperly claimed her incentive. In that regard, she testified that: I know that by me going to management . . . it really started all this, I think, because I’m thinking to myself, if I would have just kept my mouth shut, maybe I would have had my job, but other employees have went to Mr. Colson before with problems like that . . . . But my thing is, after I went to management I get written up out of retaliation. I got blind-sided. I didn’t know that was going to happen. And, to me, that’s retaliation. Petitioner does not claim that she was denied the incentive credit because or her race. Finally, Petitioner complained that some of her personal belonging were damaged or not returned to her after her employment was terminated, testifying that “[t]hey broke up all of my things and, to me, that was not right. To me, that was discriminative.” Even if there were some evidence that Petitioner’s belongings had been damaged on purpose -- which there was not -- there was no evidence that such damage was the result of racial animus. A review of the entire record of this proceeding reveals not a shred of evidence that any of the employment actions of which Petitioner complains were the result of racial bias or discrimination. The only testimony that can be reasonably read as suggesting some racial bias behind the employment actions at issue are Petitioner’s testimony as follows: and I know that discrimination do exist. I do know that’s a problem all across the board in America . . . [a]nd if I did not feel that I was discriminated against I would never have did all this . . . but my thing is I know there’s favorites at that credit union. I know that certain people get away with things. To me, I was discriminated against, I'm gonna say for the record, because of my race, because if I think that I know within my heart if the tables were turned, if I was white and went to management, I would still had a job because to me it just got blown out of proportion by me going to management. And as everyone can clearly see, it all started from there, because if it wasn't started from there, why would I have gotten written up in first place for my work that happened prior to, you know, that -- you know, that year? So, that's what started that. So my point is, is that if I wouldn't have never said anything, I would have probably still been working there. In the absence of some corroborative evidence, Petitioner’s statements alone cannot provide the support to sustain a charge of racial discrimination. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding that the decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made due to Petitioner’s race. Rather, the decision was based on Petitioner’s performance in her job as reflected in the employee coaching reports. Furthermore, there was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that persons who were not African-American were treated differently from Petitioner, or were subject to dissimilar personnel policies and practices. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding that the decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made in retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to an unlawful employment practice. Rather, to the extent there was some retaliation involved, it was for bringing an internal employee complaint over a disputed incentive to management, a complaint that had no implication of race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Florida Credit Union, did not commit any unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Sheila A. Cunningham, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014-00645. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Sheila Annette Cunningham 1835 Northwest 27th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34475 Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 R. Michelle Tatum, Esquire John E. Duvall, Esquire Ford and Harrison, LLP 225 Water Street, Suite 710 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Stop Work Order and Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment and if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact The Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation is the state agency charged with enforcement of workers' compensation compliance pursuant to Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Respondents Earl Marshall and Justin Marshall were partners in ownership of Marshall and Son Painting Company on June 16, 2006. Respondents were working in the construction industry at Lot 12, Oak Meadows III, Lake City, Florida 32615, on June 16, 2006, for which they received payment. On June 16, 2006, Respondents had not secured the payment of workers' compensation as that term is defined in Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Respondents do not dispute liability for failure to secure workers' compensation insurance. They contend that the calculation of the penalty to be imposed is inaccurate. Marshall and Son Painting Company came to the attention of the Division through a random site visit by one of its investigators. The Division's investigator, Katina Johnson, requested proof of workers' compensation coverage after observing Earl and Justin Marshall painting a new house. She was informed that Respondents previously held exemptions from workers' compensation coverage that had expired at the end of 2003. Ms. Johnson issued a Stop Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment on June 16, 2006. She also issued a request to Respondents for written business records, including bank statements for the business, federal tax returns, and copies of checks from their business ledger. Respondents supplied the requested records. On June 21, 2006, the Division issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment (Amended Order). The Amended Order imposed a penalty of $53,519.52. Respondents entered into a payment agreement whereby they paid 10 percent of the penalty assessment and agreed to pay the remainder over a 60-month period. Upon execution of the payment agreement, the Division issued an Order of Conditional Release from Stop Work Order. On October 3, 2006, the Division issued a Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, reducing the amount of the penalty assessment to $43,649.40. A second Payment Agreement Schedule for Periodic Payments was entered, reducing the amount of the monthly payments to be made by Respondents. Earl Marshall and Justin Marshall have dissolved Marshall and Son Painting Company and have formed a new limited liability company, Marshall and Son Painting, LLC. Each has obtained workers' compensation exemptions under the new business, and are considered to be in compliance with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Ms. Johnson's calculation for the penalty assessment was based upon the checks written to Earl Marshall and Justin Marshall (individually) for the period at issue. She did not go back a full three years, but began with January 1, 2004, the point in time that the Marshalls' previous exemptions from workers' compensation coverage expired. Ms. Johnson used the Scopes Manual published by the National Council on Compensation Insurance and assigned occupation code 5474, which is the appropriate code for painting within the construction industry. Ms. Johnson based her final calculations on the amount evidenced by canceled checks payable to Earl Marshall or Justin Marshall, and upon their admission that these amounts represented their salaries as partners in the business. Ms. Johnson multiplied one percent of the payments to Earl Marshall and Justin Marshall for the relevant period by the manual rate assigned to the class code for painting, giving the premium Marshall and Son Painting Company would have paid for workers' compensation insurance. This number was then multiplied by 1.5. The Respondents' dispute with the penalty calculation is that it includes all of the partnership's profits as wages for the purpose of determining the rate of pay for insurance coverage. They contend that the Division should, instead, base the calculations on an industry standard for painters in the Lake City area. While the Respondents believe that the penalty assessment should be based upon a $12 an hour industry standard for painters in the Lake City area, Earl Marshall described the checks paid to Respondents as salary checks. These checks are, quite simply, the only evidence of actual payroll presented to Ms. Johnson in response to her request for records or presented at hearing. The methodology used by Investigator Johnson is mandatory.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered approving the Stop Work Order and Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment that assessed a penalty of $43,649.40. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of November, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas D. Dolan Assistant General Counsel Division of Legal Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6502 Jimmy E. Hunt, Esquire 654 Southeast Baya Drive Post Office Box 3006 Lake City, Florida 32056-6800 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Mu?niz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment filed October 17, 2008, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement of Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, that employers in Florida secure workers' compensation insurance coverage for their employees. § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. Valou Enterprises is a Florida corporation located in Miami, Florida, which does business under the fictitious name of "Mr. Rooter Plumbing" ("Mr. Rooter"). Leslie McMillan is part- owner and the President of Valou Enterprises. Pedro Rolle is part-owner and the Treasurer of Valou Enterprises, and he is responsible for the business's day-to-day management. Welthial McMillan is part-owner and the Secretary of Valou Enterprises. Mr. Rooter is a franchise that engages in the business of providing plumbing services and repairs. According to franchise documents, among the services offered by Mr. Rooter are HydroScrubbing™ sewer lines to remove blockages; water heater installation; kitchen and bath installation and repairs, including faucets, sinks, tubs and toilets; and leak detection and water line repair and installation.2 On its website, Valou Enterprises advertises that Mr. Rooter provides full-service plumbing, including bath sinks, bathtubs and showers, drain pipes, faucets, floor drains, gas meters, gas vents, kitchen sinks, pipe repair, sewer lines, and water softeners.3 Mr. McMillan is a Florida-certified plumbing contractor, and he is the qualifier for Mr. Rooter. Mr. and Mrs. McMillan and Mr. Rolle, have elected, as officers of a corporation engaged in the construction industry, to be exempt from Florida's workers' compensation law, in accordance with the provisions of Sections 440.02(15)(b)2. and 440.05(3), Florida Statutes. Valou Enterprises hires plumbing technicians to provide plumbing services to Mr. Rooter's customers. These plumbing technicians are not licensed; rather, they work under Mr. McMillan's plumbing contractor's license. They do not receive a salary and do not have regular hours during which they must be at the Mr. Rooter office or at a jobsite. The plumbing technicians are paid commissions based on the work they perform, and they are required to supply their own tools. The plumbing technicians are on-call with Mr. Rooter at all times, but they only perform services for Mr. Rooter when actually dispatched to a job. When a plumbing technician is called and notified of a job, he is free either to accept or to reject the job. Mr. Rooter also dispatches plumbing helpers when a plumbing technician needs assistance. Valou Enterprises employs Catia Duque, who takes calls and dispatches plumbing technicians to Mr. Rooter jobs. Kenneth Mecure runs errands for Valou Enterprises part-time when needed, on a part-time basis. Late in the afternoon on Friday, June 27, 2008, a compliance investigator working for the Division of Workers' Compensation stopped at the Mr. Rooter office, which was located in a warehouse district. The visit was random, initiated when the investigator saw white vans parked in front of the office, with the name "Mr. Rooter Plumbing" and logo on the sides of the vans. When the investigator entered the office, she observed four men wearing shirts with the "Mr. Rooter Plumbing" logo. When the investigator requested information about Valou Enterprises's workers' compensation insurance coverage, Mr. Rolle referred her to Ms. Duque. Ms. Duque told the investigator that she would send whatever information she had regarding workers' compensation insurance coverage by facsimile transmittal, but the investigator did not receive any information from Ms. Duque. After her visit on June 27, 2008, the compliance investigator conducted research through the Coverage and Compliance Automated System database, which provides information on workers' compensation insurance coverage and exemptions. The investigator's research revealed that Mr. McMillan, Mrs. McMillan, and Mr. Rolle had exemptions from the workers' compensation law as officers of a corporation engaged in the construction industry and that none of the persons she observed in the Mr. Rooter office on June 27, 2008, were covered by a workers' compensation insurance policy. The investigator confirmed the lack of workers' compensation insurance coverage by consulting the website for the National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. ("NCCI"). The compliance investigator returned to the Mr. Rooter office on Monday, July 1, 2008, and spoke with Mr. McMillan. Mr. McMillan was unable to provide her with proof that Valou Enterprises had workers' compensation insurance coverage. The investigator then prepared a Stop-Work Order and an Order of Penalty Assessment, which she hand-delivered to Mr. McMillan on July 2, 2008, and posted at the Mr. Rooter office. At the same time, the investigator served Mr. McMillan with a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculations. The Stop-Work Order required Valou Enterprises to "cease all business operations for all worksites in the state." An Order of Penalty Assessment was included in the Stop-Work Order, in which Valou Enterprises was advised that a penalty would be assessed in an amount [e]qual to 1.5 times the amount the employer would have paid in premium when applying approved manual rates to the employer's payroll during periods for which it failed to secure the payment of workers' compensation required by this chapter within the preceding 3-year period, or $1,000, whichever is greater. Section 440.107(7)(d), F.S. In addition, the Order of Penalty Assessment also advised Valou Enterprises that a penalty of "[u]p to $5,000 for each employee who the Employer misclassified as an independent contractor" would be imposed pursuant to Sections 440.10(1)(f) and 440.107(7)(f), Florida Statutes. On July 3, 2008, the compliance investigator returned to the Mr. Rooter office. The office was closed, but she observed a white van turning out of the office parking lot. The van had the "Mr. Rooter Plumbing" name and logo on the side, and it was driven by Michael Dassell, a plumbing technician the investigator had met during her visit to the Mr. Rooter office on July 27, 2008. The investigator questioned Mr. Dassell, who told her that he was on-call that day. Mr. Dassell had not been dispatched on a job or called into the office but had gone to the office to pick up a commission check. Mr. Dassell had not been told that the Mr. Rooter office was closed on July 3, 2008. Mr. McMillan provided the compliance investigator the payroll and other records requested in the business records request. Based on these records, the compliance investigator calculated the penalty to be imposed on Valou Enterprises for its failure to have workers' compensation insurance coverage in the amount of $59,652.93. The investigator also imposed a penalty of $1,000.00 for a one-day violation of the Stop-Work Order and a penalty of $35,000.00 for "misrepresenting the status of the employee(s) as an independent contractor(s)." The total penalty of $95,652.93 was set forth in an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment that the investigator hand-delivered the order to Mr. McMillan on July 9, 2008. Valou Enterprises obtained workers' compensation insurance coverage effective July 4, 2008, and, on July 9, 2008, Mr. McMillan entered into a Payment Agreement Schedule for Periodic Payment of Penalty, remitting at the time a down payment of 10 percent of the penalty, or $9,566.00. As a result, an Order of Conditional Release from Stop-Work Order was entered on July 9, 2008. The compliance investigator subsequently recalculated the penalty assessment and prepared a 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment dated October 17, 2008. The $35,000.00 penalty assessed for misclassifying employees as independent contractors was deleted for lack of evidence, and the final penalty assessment was in the amount of $60,652.93, which consisted of a $59,652.93 penalty for failure to secure workers' compensation insurance coverage for Valou Enterprises employees and a $1,000.00 penalty for violating the Stop-Work Order.4 The compliance investigator looked to the NCCI SCOPES Basic Manual of Classifications ("SCOPES Manual") for classification codes attributable to the various workplace operations of the persons working for Valou Enterprises. The classification code assigned by the compliance investigator to the plumbing technicians and plumbing helpers performing work for Valou Enterprises was Code 5183.5 According to the SCOPES Manual and to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021(1)(r), Code 5183 is a code applicable to the construction industry and covers "Plumbing NOC and Drivers." The description of the scope of Code 5183 is stated in the SCOPES Manual in pertinent part as follows: Applicable to gas, steam, hot water or other types of pipe fitting. Includes house connections and shop operations. * * * Code 5183 is applicable to plumbing operations provided that the work performed is "not otherwise classified" (NOC). Insureds contemplated by Code 5183 may install, remove, or repair equipment that is used to direct gas or water supplies to a destination. This equipment includes but is not limited to piping and related fixtures, appliances, and accessories. No limits have been established as to the size of the pipe being repaired or installed. The operations contemplated by Code 5183 also include "the cleaning of building sewer connections using portable equipment" and "the installation or service of domestic water softener systems." The approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2006, for Code 5183 was $10.04 per $100.00 of payroll; the approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2007, for Code 5183 was $8.13 per $100.00 of payroll; and the approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2008, for Code 5183 was $6.75 per $100.00 of payroll.6 The classification code found in the SCOPES Manual assigned to Ms. Duque and to Paul Anderson, who was a clerical worker in the Valou Enterprises office in 2006, was Code 8810. According to the SCOPES Manual, Code 8810 covers "Clerical Office Employees."7 The description of the scope of Code 8810 is stated in the SCOPES Manual in pertinent part as follows: "The duties of a clerical office employee include . . . telephone duties." The approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2006, for Code 8810 was $.58 per $100.00 of payroll; the approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2007, for Code 8810 was $.48 per $100.00 of payroll; and the approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2008, for Code 8810 was $.37 per $100.00 of payroll.8 The classification code assigned by the compliance investigator to Kevin Mecure, a part-time employee who ran errands for Valou Enterprises, was Code 7380.9 According to the SCOPES Manual, Code 7380 covers "Drivers, Chauffeurs & Their Helpers NOC - Commercial." The description of the scope of Code 7380 is stated in the SCOPES Manual in pertinent part as follows: "The term "drivers" refers to employees who engage in duties on or in connection with vehicles " The approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2006, for Code 7380 was $12.20 per $100.00 of payroll; the approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2007, for Code 7380 was $10.18 per $100.00 of payroll; and the approved NCCI Manual rate in Florida effective January 1, 2008, for Code 7380 was $8.74 per $100.00 of payroll.10 The compliance investigator calculated the total penalty attributable to Valou Enterprises's failure to provide workers' compensation insurance coverage for the plumbing technicians, clerical workers, and drivers using the Department's Penalty Worksheet. She obtained the names of each of the individuals included in her calculations and the amount of the gross payroll for each individual from the payroll information provided by Mr. McMillan in response to the business records request. The compliance investigator calculated the penalty as follows: She listed Valou Enterprises's employees on the Penalty Worksheet; assigned each employee a classification code based on the definitions of workplace operations that most closely described the work they performed for Valou Enterprises; set out the dates during which Valou Enterprises did not provide workers' compensation insurance coverage11; entered the annual or pro-rated gross payroll for each employee during the period of non-compliance; divided the gross payroll for each employee by 100; set out the approved manual rate for each employee during the period of non-compliance in accordance with his or her classification code; determined the premium that Valou Enterprises would have paid for workers' compensation insurance coverage for each employee during the period of non-compliance by multiplying the approved manual rate and one one-hundredth of the gross payroll for each employee; calculated the penalty attributable to each employee during the period of non- compliance by multiplying the premium for each employee by 1.5; and, finally, calculated the total penalty owed by Valou Enterprises attributable to its failure to secure workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding that Valou Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a/ Mr. Rooter Plumbing, failed to secure workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees in violation of Section 440.38(1), Florida Statutes, and imposing a penalty in the amount of $59,652.93 for the failure to provide the required workers' compensation insurance coverage. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 2009.
