The Issue The issues in the case are whether the Respondent erred in 2006 when a life insurance program applicable to retired state employees was amended to provide for two levels of benefits with separate premiums, and, if so, whether the beneficiary of a retired, now deceased, state employee should receive a different life insurance benefit than was paid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Service, Division of Group State Insurance, enter a final order determining that the life insurance benefit for James W. Black is $2,500.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sonja P. Mathews, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Gregory D. Swartwood, Esquire The Nation Law Firm 570 Crown Oak Centre Drive Longwood, Florida 32750 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive survivor benefits from a joint and survivor annuity, under Option 3 of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) defined benefit plan, following the death of her spouse, Anne M. Birch, who, as an FRS member, elected Option 1 in 2012 when Florida law would not allow Ms. Birch to elect Option 3 or 4 and designate the joint annuitant as Petitioner, whom she lawfully married after electing Option 1.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Birch, who was born on September 12, 1950, and Petitioner, who was born on August 26, 1956, fell in love and began to live together in 1992. They jointly owned all significant property, including their primary residence, with a right of survivorship and were jointly liable for household expenses and debt, including the mortgage note on their primary residence. On January 31, 2001, Ms. Birch executed a will that left any remaining property to Petitioner and named her as the personal representative of the estate.1/ Ms. Birch designated Petitioner as her primary beneficiary for employee benefits that authorized such designations. On October 11, 2002, Ms. Birch and Petitioner signed an Amended Declaration of Domestic Partnership, pursuant to the Broward County Domestic Partnership Act of 1999, to register themselves as domestic partners under Broward County Ordinance 1999-18. Fully vested and having accrued substantial benefits from having worked for Broward County in an FRS-covered position for nearly 30 years, on October 23, 2012, Ms. Birch entered DROP, effective October 1, 2012. At that time, Ms. Birch elected Option 1 for the payment of her benefits, checking the "no" box in response to the question of whether she was married. As described in the Conclusions of Law, Option 1 is the maximum benefit and is payable for the life of the retiree. Ms. Birch's monthly Option 1 benefit was $3039.25. The monthly Option 3 benefit, which, as described below, is payable until the latter death of the FRS member or her surviving spouse,2/ would have been nearly $1000 less than the monthly Option 1 benefit.3/ Respondent implemented Ms. Birch's election by paying Ms. Birch's Option 1 benefits into her DROP account. In August 2013, Ms. Birch became ill with cancer. She eventually had to quit working and terminated DROP, at which point Respondent paid Ms. Birch her Option 1 benefits directly. On June 16, 2014, Ms. Birch and Petitioner were lawfully married in Massachusetts. Almost two years later, on May 24, 2016, Ms. Birch died, at which time all payments under Option 1 ended. When Ms. Birch and Petitioner registered as domestic partners in Broward County, no state allowed or recognized same- sex marriage, often pursuant to a "Defense of Marriage Act" (DOMA). Continuously since 1997, Florida law banned the allowance and recognition of same-sex marriage, even if performed in a jurisdiction where such a marriage were legal, and restricted "marriage" to a legal union between a man and a woman and "spouse" to a member of such a union. § 741.212(1) and (3); Ch. 97-268, § 1, at 4957, Laws of Fla. (Florida DOMA).4/ Massachusetts was the first state to allow and recognize same-sex marriage, effective in 2004. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (decision stayed 180 days to allow legislature to enact law consistent with the court's ruling). Three or four years after Goodridge, Ms. Birch and Petitioner visited Massachusetts, but did not exercise their right to enter into a lawful marriage at that time. A series of court decisions invalidated the federal and state DOMAs, including the Florida DOMA. On June 26, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), held that the federal DOMA, as applied to federal tax law, was unconstitutional. By order entered August 21, 2014, in Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (Brenner I), Respondent was enjoined from enforcing or applying the Florida DOMA, although the court stayed its injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court lifted the stay,5/ as reported by the district court in Brenner v. Scott¸ 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91969 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (Brenner II), in which, on March 30, 2016, the court issued a summary judgment on its injunction in Brenner I. Between Brenner I and Brenner II, on June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state DOMAs were unconstitutional in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Petitioner testified that she and Ms. Birch would have been lawfully married by October 2012, when Ms. Birch retired, but for the Florida DOMA. This testimony is credited. Long prior to 2012, Ms. Birch and Petitioner organized their financial affairs as though they were lawfully married, sharing assets and liabilities equally. Petitioner testified credibly that she and Ms. Birch always "played by the rules": thus, Ms. Birch and Petitioner would have been deterred from getting married prior to Ms. Birch's retirement, such as when they were visiting Massachusetts in 2007, due to the legal futility of attempting to obtain recognition in Florida of a marriage lawfully performed elsewhere. Less persuasive is Petitioner's testimony that, in October 2012, Ms. Birch would have elected Option 3, if this option had been available to her, and it is impossible to find on this record that she would have done so. There is no evidence that Ms. Birch and Petitioner rearranged their financial affairs to achieve, to the extent possible, an Option 3 election. Household income was $1000 per month greater under Option 1 than Option 3, so life insurance on Ms. Birch or an annuity for Petitioner could have mitigated Ms. Birch's inability to choose Option 3 when she retired. Prior to retiring, Ms. Birch did not attempt to elect Option 3 in writing or orally. Even after retiring, as noted below, Ms. Birch displayed ambivalence about whether she wanted to change her election. As a named defendant in Brenner I, on April 14, 2015, Respondent responded to the injunction against its enforcement or application of the Florida DOMA by issuing Information Release #2015-184 (Release). Sent to FRS members who retired prior to January 2, 2015, and elected Option 1 or 2, the Release states: . . . FRS retirees and . . . DROP participants who were in legally-recognized same-sex marriages at the time they retired or began DROP participation and chose Option 1 or Option 2 will have an opportunity to change benefit payment options in light of . . . Brennan. These retirees will be able to change their retirement payment option from their current selection to Option 3 or Option 4 to provide a continuing monthly benefit to their spouse. The retirees impacted by this change have an effective retirement date or DROP begin date on or before January 1, 2015. The Release provides that an eligible retiree interested in a second election must contact Respondent in writing, identify the retiree's spouse, and certify that the retiree and spouse were married in a state or country that allowed same-sex marriage when the FRS member retired. The Release states that Respondent will respond with an estimate of the new benefit payment under the option that the retiree intends to select and provide the retiree with the paperwork necessary to make the second election. Available on Respondent's website,6/ the Release provides the opportunity of a second election of Option 3 or 4 to any FRS member7/ who retired prior to January 2, 2015; chose Option 1 or 2 when she retired; and was in a same-sex marriage when she retired. The Release places no limit on how far in the past the retirement took place.8/ The thrust of Petitioner's case is directed toward backdating her lawful marriage to Ms. Birch to a point prior to Ms. Birch's retirement. As noted above, the timing of the lawful marriage is a problem under the Release, which requires a lawful marriage at the time of retirement, but another problem under the Release is the fact that the Release provides to the FRS retiree, not her surviving spouse, the opportunity for a second election, nor, as discussed immediately below, is this a technical requirement that can be overcome by Petitioner's serving as a representative of Ms. Birch--the second election is extended only to living FRS retirees. The virtue of the Release for Petitioner is that it confers the opportunity of a second election without any proof that, at the time of the first election, the FRS member would have elected Option 3 or 4. If Petitioner does not rely on the Release, she must also prove that Ms. Birch would have elected Option 3 or 4, which, as noted above, she has failed to prove. By limiting the second election to the FRS retiree, the Release limits the potential of adverse selection in allowing a second election, possibly years after the first election.9/ There are three possibilities at the time of the second election: both spouses are alive, only the FRS retiree is alive, and only the surviving spouse is alive. The Release's restriction of the right to make the second election to the FRS retiree means that the second and third possibilities do not result in second elections: respectively the FRS retiree would not reduce her payment to provide an annuity to a spouse who is already deceased10/ and a surviving spouse has no right to make an election under the Release. The couple may gain a minor financial advantage by the opportunity to revisit the payment option several years after the retirement of the FRS member, so that they may be better informed of the health of each of them. But the surviving spouse would gain a significant financial advantage by the opportunity to revisit the payment option after the death of the FRS member. Shortly after Respondent issued the Release, Ms. Birch filed with Respondent a Spousal Acknowledgement Form that she had signed on May 8, 2015. This form indicates that Ms. Birch is married, but nothing else. At about the same time, though, Ms. Birch contacted Respondent by telephone to discuss the Release and any choices that she may now have under the Release. By letter dated May 26, 2015, Respondent calculated monthly benefit amounts under Options 1 through 4, but the letter warns: "Your benefit option will not be changed unless you complete and return the required forms noted in this letter" and indicate a choice of repaying in a single payment or installments the excess benefits of Option 1 over the smaller benefits paid under Option 3 or 4. The May 26 letter requires further action on Ms. Birch's part and predicates any right to a second election upon a lawful marriage at the time of retirement. The record provides no basis for finding that any of Respondent's representatives misstated the lawful-marriage condition. To the contrary, in at least one conversation with Ms. Birch, Respondent's representative insisted on verification of a lawful marriage as of October 2012. Additionally, Ms. Birch was not requesting a right to make a second election; at most, she was gathering information to prepare to decide whether to ask to change her election. By June 26, 2015, pursuant to a note documenting a telephone conversation between Ms. Birch and a representative of Respondent, Ms. Birch decided to keep Option 1 rather than make a second election of Option 3.11/ In May 2016, Ms. Birch finally made a clear attempt to change her election to Option 3. By letter dated May 12, 2016, Ms. Birch stated that she was lawfully married to Petitioner on June 12, 2012, and asked for "the change in beneficiary for my pension, due to the one time option given" in the Release. Even at this late date, Ms. Birch was not yet ready to elect Option 3 because the letter concludes: "I would like to see the breakdown of monetary options to make an informed decision." However, on May 20, 2016, during a telephone call with a representative of Respondent, Ms. Birch provided the date of birth of Petitioner and asked Respondent to expedite her request because she did not have long to live. On the same date, Ms. Birch signed an Option Selection form electing Option 3. By letter dated July 18, 2016, Respondent acknowledged the death of Ms. Birch and informed Petitioner that all pension benefits ended at that time. By letter dated September 22, 2016, Petitioner asked for reconsideration and supplied copies of various documents, the relevant provisions of which have been referenced above. By letter dated October 20, 2016, Respondent denied the request for reconsideration.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for benefits under Option 3 from Ms. Birch's FRS account and dismissing Petitioner's Request for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2018.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, John Hasko ("Petitioner"), is entitled, pursuant to the City of Dania Beach Code of Ordinances ("Code") section 18-49(4), to be paid retirement pension benefits under the City of Dania Beach Police and Firefighters Retirement System's ("Respondent" or "System") "100 Percent Joint and Last Survivor Annuity" ("Last Survivor Annuity") or the "Modified Cash Refund Annuity" ("Life Annuity").
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a retired police officer who was employed by the City of Dania Beach Police Department ("Police Department") and who has qualified for, and is receiving, retirement pension benefits under the System. Pursuant to chapter 18, article IV of the Code, Respondent is the retirement pension system provided for the benefit of firefighters and police officers, including Petitioner, who are or previously were employed by the City of Dania Beach. Evidence Adduced at Final Hearing Background Petitioner was hired by the Police Department on December 18, 1980, and, upon being employed, began accruing credit toward a pension under the System. Petitioner was employed by the Police Department for 20 years. On October 1, 1988, the City of Dania Beach Police Department merged with the Broward County Sheriff's Office ("BCSO"). At that time, Petitioner was given the option whether to remain in the System or to retrieve his contributions and become enrolled in the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"), which was and is the retirement program in which BSCO employees are eligible to enroll. At that time, Petitioner elected to remain enrolled in the System rather than enrolling in the FRS. On August 28, 2000, Petitioner executed a retirement benefits election form to select the type of pension under which he would receive pension benefits from the System starting on January 1, 2001. Petitioner retired from the Police Department effective December 31, 2000. In April 2001, Petitioner began receiving monthly pension payments under the System, and also received back payments for January through March 2001. Immediately upon retiring from the Police Department, Petitioner began working with the BCSO. At that time, he enrolled in the FRS and began accruing credit under a life annuity plan provided through the FRS. Petitioner was employed by the BCSO for slightly over 14 years. As the result of a series of work-related injuries, attendant surgeries, and permanent restrictions on his activities, Petitioner retired from the BCSO on April 14, 2014. In the 2006-to-2007 timeframe, Petitioner was diagnosed with a cardiac condition that ultimately necessitated placement of a stent in 2012. Petitioner remains under the regular care of a cardiologist and is on medication to treat his cardiac condition. He credibly testified that since 2012, his condition has remained stable. In June 2014, Petitioner applied for pension benefits under the FRS. Petitioner testified, credibly, that he had four options from which to choose,1/ and that he selected the Ten Year Certain option. Under this plan, Petitioner receives monthly payments for the rest of his life. If Petitioner were to predecease his beneficiary——in this case, his wife——before the 120-month period ends, she would continue to receive payments through the end of the 120-month period; however, if Petitioner were to predecease his wife after the end of the 120-month period, she would not receive any further payments. Petitioner testified that, based on his belief that he had enrolled in the Last Survivor Annuity under the System, he selected the FRS Ten- Year Certain Option so that if he predeceased his wife, she would receive benefits payments from two sources for the remainder of her life——the Last Survivor Annuity and Social Security. Petitioner receives benefit payments through the FRS to date. Petitioner has received monthly retirement benefit payments through the System since April 2001, including back payments for January through March 2001. He continues to receive monthly retirement benefit payments from the System to date. Evidence Regarding Petitioner's Election of Benefits Under the System The City of Dania Beach Police and Firefighters Retirement System Summary Plan Description ("SPD") summarizes the System's available pension plan options. The section titled "Forms of Benefits Payment," on page 16 of the SPD, states under the "Normal Form of Benefit Payment" subsection: "[u]nless you elect otherwise before your retirement, your pension is payable as a Single Life Annuity with a guaranteed refund of your contributions. This is a series of monthly payments for your life." This provision effectively makes the "Normal Form" the "default" form of benefits payments if the employee does not elect another form of benefit payments before retiring. The "Election of Optional Forms of Benefit Payments" subsection of the SPD states: "You have the right at any time before your retirement date to elect not to have your retirement benefit paid in the Normal Form." This subsection identifies other forms of benefit payments available that the employee may choose as an alternative to the Normal Form. These forms are the Joint and Last Survivor Annuity, the Ten Year Certain and Life Thereafter Annuity, and another optional form actuarially equivalent to the Normal Form. Petitioner decided to retire from City of Dania Beach Police Department at the end of 2000. On August 28, 2000, he met with Sonia Brown, then the plan administrator for the System, to fill out an application for retirement benefits. He completed a form titled "City of Dania Beach Police and Firefighters' Retirement System Application for Benefits" ("Application Form"). Section 1 of the Application Form, titled "For Retirement or DROP Benefits," contained a section to identify the beneficiary for the Joint and Survivor and Ten Year Certain options. Petitioner completed this portion of the form, naming his wife as his beneficiary and providing pertinent information about her. He also completed section 4 of the form, designating his wife as his beneficiary for all purposes under the System. He signed and dated the Application Form. Petitioner testified that he met with Brown again in early December 2000, to finalize his election of his benefits that he would be paid under the System. According to Petitioner, at that time, he told Brown that he chose the Last Survivor Annuity option. He testified that Brown gave him paperwork to fill out, that he completed the paperwork, and that she told him that he would receive benefit payments of between $2,400 and $2,500 per month based on his chosen option. Petitioner testified that Brown did not give him the "City of Dania Beach Police and Firefighters Retirement System Notification of Benefits Payable as a Result of Retirement" form ("Notification of Benefits Form") to complete at the December 2000 meeting. Petitioner testified that he did not specifically remember what documents he completed that day, and that he did not receive a copy of those documents. Respondent's file regarding Petitioner's benefits election does not contain either the original or a copy of the documents that Petitioner claims he signed in December 2000. In short, there is no physical evidence substantiating the existence of these documents. Petitioner testified that based on the December 2000 meeting with Brown, he believed he had selected the Last Survivor Annuity and that the payments under that option would start in January 2001. After Petitioner retired from the Police Department, he did not receive his benefit payments under the System for January, February, and March 2001. He testified that he assumed that this delay was due to the time involved in processing the paperwork he claims to have completed in December 2000. On January 23, 2001, Brown sent correspondence to the System's actuarial services firm requesting that Petitioner's early retirement benefit be calculated according to the various benefits options available to police plan participants who are eligible for early retirement with 20 years of service. Petitioner is shown as having been copied on this letter, and he acknowledges having received the letter. By letter dated February 19, 2001, Respondent sent Petitioner "several forms to be completed by you and returned to this office for further processing of your early retirement benefit." The letter identified these forms as the Notification of Benefits Form, a W-4P form for specifying the amount to be withheld from the benefit payments for federal income tax, and a form to authorize direct deposit of the benefit payments into Petitioner's bank account. Petitioner claims that he did not receive this letter. Petitioner testified that in March 2001, Brown contacted him to complete a "verification of beneficiary form." On March 8, 2001, Petitioner went to Brown's office, where she presented him with what he characterized as a "verification of beneficiary form." According to Petitioner, Brown "asked him to make sure my beneficiary information was correct" and to sign and date the form where she had placed check marks. The "verification of beneficiary form" Petitioner signed actually consists of the second page of the Notification of Benefits Form. The second page of the Notification of Benefits Form that Petitioner executed contains a table that identifies Petitioner's wife (whose name is redacted) as his beneficiary. Portions of the table consist of spaces in which to state information regarding the amount of the nontaxable portion of monthly benefits for the various annuity options, which are identified by number and listed on the first page of the form. There are no amounts listed in those spaces on the form that Petitioner signed; those spaces have been left blank. A paragraph below the table states: "[t]he Survivor Annuity benefit amounts shown above are based on the beneficiary named above and are payable only to this beneficiary. Should you wish to change your beneficiary before your payments begin, new amounts have to be calculated."2/ Near the bottom of the form is the sentence "I accept the terms above, including my choice of annuity form, and confirm the information shown above to be correct."3/ Immediately below the above-referenced sentence is a "Participant's Signature" line. Petitioner signed the form on this line and dated it "3/08/01." Petitioner testified that at the time he signed this form, the spaces for the signature by the Board of Trustees representative and the date of signature were blank. The form subsequently was executed by the Board of Trustees, through Eugene H. Jewell, on March 13, 2001. Petitioner testified that in November 2015, he became aware, through checking his various beneficiary designations as the result of a bank error,4/ that the System was paying his retirement benefits pursuant to the Life Annuity rather than the Last Survivor Annuity. Petitioner testified that on November 6, 2015, he went to the System office to verify that his wife was correctly designated as his retirement pension beneficiary. He met with Cathy David,5/ the current system plan administrator, to review the documents in his retirement pension file. Petitioner testified that, he saw, for the first time, the first page of the Notification of Benefits Form contained in his file. This page had a check mark next to the "Modified Cash Refund"——i.e., the Life Annuity——option. He testified that he did not make the check mark next to the "Modified Cash Refund" option on the form. Petitioner obtained documents contained in the Salem Trust ("Salem")6/ file regarding his retirement pension. Among these documents was a letter dated March 13, 2001, from Brown to Livia Nixon, with Petitioner shown as copied, transmitting the completed forms to enable Salem to process Petitioner's retirement pension, and requesting that Salem expeditiously issue retroactive checks to Petitioner for January through March 2001. Petitioner testified that he had not previously received a copy of the March 13, 2001, letter or the attached forms, and that he did not see them until he obtained the documents in the Salem file. Petitioner also testified that he did not receive a December 6, 2001, letter from Respondent notifying him that the System's auditors, S. Davis & Associates, P.A. ("SDA"), were conducting an annual audit of Respondent's financial statements.7/ This letter contained information regarding Petitioner's pension ——including information expressly identifying the type of benefit Petitioner was receiving as the "Life Annuity." The letter requested that Petitioner review the information contained in the letter and correct any errors by providing the correct information to SDA. Petitioner testified that he first saw this letter during his November 6, 2015, review of the documents in the System's file, so he did not respond to SDA in 2001. In sum, Petitioner claims that at a December 2000 meeting with Brown, he selected the Last Survivor Annuity as the form in which he would be paid retirement pension benefits under the System. He claims that he did not select the Life Annuity, and that he did not make the check mark by the "Modified Cash Refund" option on the first page of the Notification of Benefits form that was contained in the System file. In sum, Petitioner also claims that he did not receive or otherwise was not provided the following documents: (1) the unidentified "paperwork" that he claims he completed at a meeting with Brown in December 2000, at which he selected the Last Survivor Annuity; (2) the letter dated February 19, 2001, from Brown to Petitioner, transmitting forms——including the entire Notification of Benefits Form——that Petitioner needed to complete to enable processing of his early retirement benefit; (3) the first page of the Notification of Benefits Form on March 8, 2001, when he completed the second page of that form confirming his wife as his beneficiary; (4) the March 13, 2001, letter from Brown to Livia Nixon of Salem, transmitting Petitioner's retirement pension forms completed on March 8, 2001, to Salem for processing; and (5) the December 6, 2001, letter to Petitioner from Respondent's outside auditor, SDA, requesting him to verify the accuracy of the information regarding his pension and to correct any errors in that information. Petitioner acknowledges that he did receive a letter from Cathy David dated July 1, 2012, regarding a change in Florida law that could affect retirees. That letter expressly stated "[y]ou chose the life annuity when you retired on January 1, 2001." Petitioner claims that he did not read this letter in its entirety, so he did not see the statement in the letter regarding having chosen the life annuity. Findings of Ultimate Fact Upon careful consideration of the evidence in the record, it is determined that Petitioner did not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he selected the Last Survivor Annuity, rather than the Life Annuity, so that, pursuant to section 18-49(4) of the Code, he should be reclassified as being enrolled in the Last Survivor Annuity. First, the undersigned finds implausible Petitioner's testimony that he signed unspecified "paperwork" selecting the Last Survivor Annuity——clearly, a very important decision on his part——but that he does not "remember specifically" what that paperwork was and that he did not receive a copy of that paperwork. Compounding that implausibility is that neither the original nor any copies of that "paperwork" were found in Respondent's file or in Salem's file. Simply stated, there is no physical evidence establishing the existence of this "paperwork" ——which Petitioner claims is the instrument through which he elected the Last Survivor Annuity.8/ Second, the first page of the Notification of Benefits Form that was contained in Respondent's file on Petitioner's retirement pension shows the "Modified Cash Annuity" option—— i.e., the Life Option——as having been selected by the placement of a check mark next to that option. It is undisputed that Petitioner executed the second page of the form. This complete Notification of Benefits Form contained in Respondent's file constitutes the complete, most credible evidence in the record that Petitioner selected the Life Annuity when he executed the form on March 8, 2001. To this point, Petitioner offered no credible evidence to support his assertion that someone——unknown to him and having unknown motives——must have placed the first page of the Notification of Benefits Form, having the check mark next to the "Modified Cash Refund" option, in Respondent's file without his knowledge. The undersigned does not find credible or persuasive Petitioner's testimony that he was not given the first page of the Notification of Benefits Form on March 8, 2001,9/ and that based on the language in the paragraph below the table, quoted in paragraph 29 above, he reasonably believed that the second page of that form constituted a "verification of beneficiary" that simply confirmed his beneficiary for his previous selection of the "survivor annuity." However, in order for the clause "the Survivor Annuity benefit amounts shown above" in that paragraph to make sense, it must be read in conjunction with the table above the paragraph. As discussed above, in the table on page 2 of the Notification of Benefits Form that was executed by Petitioner, no amounts of nontaxable portion of monthly benefit for any of the survivor annuity options have been filled in, even though the paragraph below the table expressly refers to the "Survivor Annuity benefit amounts shown above." The absence in the table of any "Survivor Annuity benefit amounts shown above" is inconsistent with Petitioner having chosen a survivor annuity option. Thus, the paragraph below the table can only be reasonably read to mean that to the extent the employee has selected one of the different survivor annuity options on the first page of the form, the survivor annuity benefits amounts shown in the table apply to the particular beneficiary identified in the table. Accordingly, if no survivor annuity benefit amounts are "shown above"——i.e., set forth in the table ——that would indicate, and only be consistent with, the selection of a retirement option other than a survivor annuity. The undersigned also does not find plausible Petitioner's testimony that he did not receive or otherwise was not given copies of five crucial retirement-related documents—— four of which clearly informed him that he was enrolled in the life annuity——so that he was not timely informed of the need to correct a mistake in his retirement pension enrollment. That these documents were transmitted by different senders—— Respondent, Salem, and SDA——compounds that implausibility.10/ For these reasons, it is determined that Petitioner has not sustained his burden in this proceeding to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he has been erroneously classified as being enrolled in the Life Annuity, and that, pursuant to section 18-49(4) of the Code, he should be reclassified as being enrolled in the Last Survivor Annuity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for reclassification of pension enrollment from Life Annuity to Last Survivor Annuity. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 2018.
The Issue The issue is whether, pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, Respondent has forfeited his rights and benefits under the City of Tampa General Employees Retirement Plan (Fund).
Findings Of Fact The Fund is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law and is charged with administering and managing a pension fund for employees of the City. Respondent was employed by the City from February 2, 2000, until April 18, 2012, when he was terminated. He worked in various positions, most recently as Acting Lead Specialty Equipment Operator in the Solid Waste and Environmental Program Management/Quality Control program. By reason of his employment with the City, Respondent was enrolled in the pension plan administered by the Fund and was a vested participant. On April 18, 2012, the City terminated Respondent based on a violation of three items in the City's Personnel Manual: neglect of duty by using a City vehicle for an unauthorized purpose; moral turpitude involving the violation of the City Code relating to use of public property; and moral turpitude by engaging in an illegal enterprise. The events leading to his termination are described below. On July 11, 2011, City of Tampa Detective DeGagne was investigating environmental crimes (illegal dumping) in the East Tampa area. After being alerted that illegal dumping had occurred on a vacant lot in the Highland Pines neighborhood, and the debris was immediately picked up by a City vehicle, Detective DeGagne located the City truck involved. Because the truck was under the supervision of Respondent, Detective DeGagne spoke to Respondent who initially explained that code enforcement had told him to pick up the debris. Because Respondent could not identify anyone in code enforcement who gave him that instruction, he was arrested. During a recorded interview with Detective DeGagne later that day, Respondent admitted that on at least two occasions, he was paid $40.00 to pick up the illegally-dumped debris as a favor to a friend. This conduct is a violation of section 838.016(1), which makes it unlawful for a public employee to receive compensation for performing an illicit act. Based on his admission of guilt, the City terminated Respondent effective April 18, 2012.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the City of Tampa General Employees Retirement Fund enter a final order determining that Respondent has forfeited his rights and benefits in the pension fund. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Luis A. Santos, Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP Suite 900 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602-5133 (eServed) Natasha Wiederholt, CPA, GE Pension Plan Supervisor General Employees Retirement Fund City of Tampa 7th Floor East 306 East Jackson Street Tampa, Florida 33602-5208 Dwight Rivera 3324 West Kathleen Street Tampa, Florida 33607-1840
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on marital status in determining his monthly retirement benefits in violation of the provisions of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Kenneth Fritz (Petitioner or Mr. Fritz) has been a firefighter with the City of Pembroke Pines (Respondent or the City) since 1991. His date of birth is June 6, 1948, and he entered the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) on December 1, 2006, at age 58.5 years old. As Respondent's employee, Mr. Fritz participated in the City's Pension Plan for Firefighters and Police Officers (the Plan). The DROP option that Mr. Fritz chose allowed him to name a joint annuitant and contingent survivors. Mr. Fritz, who has been divorced since 1986, chose his daughter who on December 1, 2006, was 32.25 years old, and his son who was 29.333 years old, as his surviving beneficiaries. Each will receive a 50 percent share of the retirement income upon his death payable for the remainder of their lives. Mr. Fritz alleged that the pension fund benefit system discriminates against him based on marital status. There is no factual dispute that his benefits, with a 32-year-old daughter are $3,938.12 a month, as compared to $4,366.59 a month if he had a 32-year-old wife. The benefits are not affected by his having named his son as an additional beneficiary. Mr. Fritz brought his concerns to the attention of Patricia Shoemaker, the Benefits Administrator for Municipal Police Officers' and Firefighters' Retirement Funds for the State of Florida Department of Management Services. On January 29, 2008, March 17, 2008, July 9, 2008, and September 25, 2008, Ms. Shoemaker sent letters to Mr. Anthony Napolitano, Chairman of the Pembroke Pines Firefighter's Pension Plan, requesting an explanation of the apparent violation of the following statutory provisions: § 175.333. Discrimination in benefit formula prohibited; restrictions regarding designation of joint annuitants. For any municipality, special fire control district, chapter plan, local law municipality, local law special fire control district, or local law plan under this chapter: and (1) No plan shall discriminate in its benefit formula based on color, national origin, sex, or marital status. § 175.071(2) Any and all acts and decisions shall be effectuated by vote of a majority of the members of the board; however, no trustee shall take part in any action in connection with the trustee's own participation in the fund, and no unfair discrimination shall be shown to any individual firefighter participating in the fund. (Emphasis added.) In her letter of September 25, 2008, Ms. Shoemaker noted that she had received no responses to her previous letters and that "[W]hile state premium tax moneys were released this year based on our understanding that the Board was researching this matter, future state tax moneys will not be released unless the plan is determined to be in compliance with Chapters (sic) 175, F.S." On October 15, 2008, Deputy City Attorney Julie F. Klahr finally responded to Ms. Shoemaker as follows: Your letter to the Pembroke Pines Police and Fire Retirement Plan has been referred to this office for reply. The issue is whether a spouse only benefit is discriminatory on the basis of marital status. For the reasons which follow, the benefit is fully in compliance with Florida law. Section 175.333(2)(a), Florida Statutes, clearly recognizes the propriety of a plan offering a spouse only survivorship benefit that alone should resolve this issue. The benefit at issue in Pembroke Pines is a spouse-only benefit, which not only exceeds the minimums required by Chapter 175, but also pre-dates the enactment of Ch. 99-1, Laws of Florida (1999). The complaining employee sought to designate a child as a beneficiary but without an age appropriate actuarial reduction. Nothing in Chapter 175, or any other law, mandates a retirement plan to provide a costly, generation skipping benefit without providing for actuarial equivalence. To the extent that your view is that the plan provision must be altered, it is a "minimum benefit" which is required, only if unencumbered Chapter 175 insurance premium tax rebates are present to pay the full cost as provided in §175.351. The City does not concede this is a correct interpretation, nor does any such Chapter money exist. Any required action to the contrary is an improper unfunded mandate. Moreover, the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and corresponding regulations of the Department of the Treasury mandated the use of the actuarial factors at issue. Nothing in Chapter 175, Florida Statutes, directs a plan to violate tax provisions necessary to maintain qualification. It is the City's position that according a benefit to a spouse of a deceased member, provided the plan otherwise exceeds minimum benefits under Chapter 175, is a matter reserved to the City under its home rule powers in the Florida Constitution and Chapter 166, Florida Statutes. If any member feels aggrieved by the structure of the Ordinance Code, that person may seek remedies under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. It should be observed, however, that the status at issue is that of the purported survivor and not the member. As a result, no violation of Florida's civil rights law is presented. See, Donato v. AT & T, 767 So.2d 1146 (Fla. 2000). Further §760.10(8)(b), Florida Statutes, exempts bona fide retirement plans from coverage under this law. The first provision cited as support for the City's position is as follows: § 175.333(2)(a) If a plan offers a joint annuitant option and the member selects such option, or if a plan specifies that the member's spouse is to receive the benefits that continue to be payable upon the death of the member, then, in both of these cases, after retirement benefits have commenced, a retired member may change his or her designation of joint annuitant or beneficiary only twice. Although the Deputy City Attorney asserted that this section alone should resolve the matter, Mr. Fritz observed the subsection does not authorize discrimination based on marital status but only limits the number of times that a joint annuitant or beneficiary may be changed. The City also relied on the fact that the Plan predates Chapter 99-1, Laws of Florida, but the statement of legislative intent indicates that the law is applicable to existing plans, and reads as follows: Legislative declaration. It is hereby declared by the Legislature that firefighters, as hereinafter defined, perform state and municipal functions; . . . and that their activities are vital to the public safety. It is further declared that firefighters employed by special fire control districts serve under the same circumstances and perform the same duties as firefighters employed by municipalities and should therefore be entitled to the benefits available under this chapter. Therefore, the Legislature declares that it is a proper and legitimate state purpose to provide a uniform retirement system for the benefit of firefighters as hereinafter defined and intends, in implementing the provisions of s. 14, Art. X of the State Constitution as they relate to municipal and special district firefighters' pension trust fund systems and plans, that such retirement systems or plans be managed, administered, operated, and funded in such manner as to maximize the protection of the firefighters' pension trust funds . . . This chapter hereby establishes, for all municipal and special district pension plans existing now or hereafter under this chapter, including chapter plans and local law plans, minimum benefits and minimum standards for the operation and funding of such plans, hereinafter referred to as firefighters' pension trust funds. The minimum benefits and minimum standards set forth in this chapter may not be diminished by local charter, ordinance, or resolution or by special act of the Legislature, nor may the minimum benefits or minimum standards be reduced or offset by any other local, state, or federal law that may include firefighters in its operation, except as provided under s. 112.65. (Emphasis added.) The City claimed, but Ms. Shoemaker's reference in her letter to the release of state premium tax moneys appears to contradict its claim, that it does not have to pay minimum benefits required by Chapter 175, although not conceding its applicability, because it has no unencumbered insurance premium tax money, a prerequisite the imposition of the following requirement: § 175.351. Municipalities and special fire control districts having their own pension plans for firefighters. For any municipality, special fire control district, local law municipality, local law special fire control district, or local law plan under this chapter, in order for municipalities and special fire control districts with their own pension plans for firefighters, or for firefighters and police officers, where included, to participate in the distribution of the tax fund established pursuant to s. 175.101, local law plans must meet the minimum benefits and minimum standards set forth in this chapter. * * * However, local law plans in effect on October 1, 1998, shall be required to comply with the minimum benefit provisions of this chapter only to the extent that additional premium tax revenues become available to incrementally fund the cost of such compliance as provided in s. 175.162(2)(a). (Emphasis added.) Apparently, not satisfied with the answer, on January 20, 2009, Ms. Shoemaker wrote again, this time to Ms Klahr, as follows: Dear Ms. Klahr This is to acknowledge receipt of your October 15, 2008 letter in response to my July 9, 2008 letter to the Board of the Firefighters' Pension Plan. While we appreciate your response regarding the propriety of a plan offering a spousal benefit and the appropriateness of an age appropriate actuarial reduction, our question for the Board was a different one relating to the plan's compliance with the provisions of ss. 175.333(1) and 175.071(2), F. S. as they relate to discrimination based on marital status. Based on our understanding of the issue relating to the calculation of the member's benefits, Mr. Fritz does not have a spouse, but wishes to designate his daughter as his beneficiary. He understands and agrees that it is appropriate to actuarialty [sic] adjust his benefit based on the age of his daughter. The actuary provided two calculations, one based on a spouse that was his daughter's age and one based on a beneficiary that was his daughter's age. His benefit when calculated with a young age spouse was greater than his benefit when calculated with the same young age beneficiary. It appears that the only difference in the two calculations is the marital status of the member and not the age of the joint annuitant. If our understanding of the facts relating to this issue are incorrect, please let me know. We have asked that the Board review the plan provisions with their plan attorney and actuary and provide an explanation as to how the plan meets the statutory provisions, specifically ss. 175.333(1) and 175.071 (2), F. S. Mr. Fritz pointed out that, in addition to the statutory provisions cited in Ms. Shoemaker's letter and various others that he cited, the City's Employee Handbook also includes a statement that the City does not discriminate based on marital status. The City's actuary noted that, however outdated, the additional benefit is based on the assumption that a firefighter's spouse is more dependent on the employee's income and pension then any other adult relative. In addition, the deputy city attorney testified that the Plan was adopted in the firefighters' collective bargaining agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order finding that Respondent did not commit an unlawful employment practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Cherof, Esquire Goren, Cherof, Doody & Ezrol, P.A. 3099 East Commercial Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Kenneth R. Fritz 16389 Malibu Drive Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33326 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether the Petitioner, Thelma H. Dampier, is entitled to consideration of her second application for disability retirement benefits based on the submission of new medical information.
Findings Of Fact Thelma H. Dampier was a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS), Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and had more than ten years of creditable service. She terminated her employment in August, 1988. In October, 1988, Ms. Dampier applied for in-line-of-duty disability retirement under FRS. By its final action letter received by Ms. Dampier on July 27, 1989, the Division denied her application for disability benefits. Under the applicable procedural rules, Ms. Dampier had 21 days to file a petition for an administrative hearing before the State Retirement Commission. She failed to request a hearing on the denial of benefits and her right to a hearing ceased. On September 8, 1990, Ms. Dampier filed a second application for in- line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. The application included medical records from Doctors Evans, Andrews, Barrow, and Chance. The medical records of Doctors Evans and Andrews had been submitted with and considered in connection to the first application. The medical records of Doctors Chance and Barrow were submitted for the first time with the second application. The report of Dr. Barrow opines that Ms. Dampier is permanently and totally disabled, but it does not reflect her condition at the time she terminated employment or any connection between her condition and her employment. The report of Dr. Chance, a chiropractic physician, relates to neck, shoulder and lower back pain. The report does not state that Ms. Dampier is totally and permanently disabled. Instead, it states that Ms. Dampier suffers only mild degenerative changes. It also does not relate that opinion to the date on which her employment terminated. The Division has a policy set forth in a Memorandum for Record dated July 17, 1990, regarding handling of reapplications for disability benefits. The policy specifies that reapplications will be considered "only when the member presents information of the existence of a medical condition that existed prior to termination of employment--unknown at the time of the initial application." This policy is reasonable and consistent with the Chapter 121.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that The Division of Retirement enter a Final Order denying consideration of Thelma H. Dampier's second application for in-line-of-duty disability benefits. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division ofAdministrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Division of Retirement Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3(3); and 4(4). Proposed findings of fact 5 and 6 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed finding of fact 7 is repetitive and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Thelma H. Dampier Post Office Box 342 Melrose, FL 32666 Stanley M. Danek Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Building C Tallahassee, FL 32399 A. J. McMullian III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Building C Tallahassee, FL 32399 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, as a surviving spouse, is entitled to a continuing benefit from the Florida Retirement System (FRS) based on the retirement account of her deceased husband, George S. Bohler. More specifically, it must be determined whether the forgery of the spousal acknowledgement form renders the member's election of the "Option 1" retirement benefit payment, which precludes a survivor's benefit for his spouse, invalid and void.
Findings Of Fact George Bohler, the FRS member at issue, was employed, at times pertinent, as a Professor of Economics at Florida Community College in Jacksonville. The College is an FRS employer and Mr. Bohler was a member of the FRS retirement system. The Division of Retirement is an administrative agency charged with regulation and operation of the Florida retirement system, including calculation of and determination of entitlement to retirement benefits, under various options and member circumstances. On March 22, 1999, Mr. Bohler filed a completed Florida Retirement System Application for service retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). This was accomplished through his filing of "Form DP-11." The Form provides a retiree with information pertaining to four options by which his retirement benefits may be paid. One full page of that form provides an explanation of each option. Mr. Bohler selected Option 1, a retirement benefit pay-out plan which provides the highest monthly benefit. The Option 1 selection provides that this highest monthly benefit is payable for the lifetime of the retiree only. Upon his death, the benefit would stop and his beneficiary, here his spouse, the Petitioner, would receive only a refund of any contributions the member might have paid into the FRS which exceeds the amount he had received in benefits. Option 1 provides no continuing or survivor benefit to a beneficiary or surviving spouse. The DP-11 Form filed with the retirement application contained an apparent spousal acknowledgement purportedly signed by Deborah T. Bohler, the spouse of member George Bohler. It appears to acknowledge that the member had elected either Option 1 or Option 2, which provide no survivor/spouse benefit. The DP-11 Form indicated to the Division that the member was married. The parties have stipulated, however, that the Petitioner's signature on the FRS application for service retirement and the DROP program was actually forged. George Bohler, the member, was an FRS member from August 19, 1968, to March 31, 2005. He received FRS retirement benefits based upon the above-referenced application from the Division from April 1, 2000, to October 31, 2007. The Form DP-11 contained a statement to the effect that the retiree member understood that he could not add additional service, change options, or change his type of retirement once his retirement became final. Mr. Bohler began participation in the DROP program on April 1, 2000. Thereafter, his last date of employment was March 31, 2005, and he passed away on October 18, 2007. He received FRS benefits from April 1, 2000, until October 31, 2007. For 28 years, until his death on that date, Mr. Bohler was legally married to the Petitioner, Deborah Bohler, during which time they were never separated or divorced. On March 10, 1999, Mr. Bohler executed the FRS Application for Service Retirement and the DROP program. He had his signature notarized as required for that form. Joint Exhibit 1, in evidence. Mr. Bohler designated the Petitioner as his primary beneficiary on the DROP Application. He elected to begin participation in the DROP program as of April 1, 2000, and to retire from state employment effective March 31, 2005, which he did. There are four options which an FRS member may select for his or her retirement benefits to be paid to the member or to the survivors/beneficiaries. Mr. Bohler selected "Option 1" on his DROP Application form. This results in a significantly higher retirement monthly benefit than does Options 3 or 4, which have survivorship rights. The acknowledgement section on the DROP Application form requires that a member's spouse be notified and must acknowledge a member's selection of Option 1 or Option 2 by signing that DROP Application form, so that the FRS is thus informed that the spouse made a knowing, intelligent waiver of survivorship rights to benefits. The spousal acknowledgement provision or section does not require that the member's spouse's signature be notarized. The form also does not require a member to swear under oath that the spouse was notified. The parties have stipulated that the Petitioner's apparent signature shown on Mr. Bohler's retirement application form was forged. The Petitioner had no knowledge that her name had been placed on the form by some other person, nor did she have any knowledge that Mr. Bohler had selected Option 1 prior to his death. The Petitioner first learned that her husband had selected Option 1 when she contacted the Respondent, after his death, to request that his retirement benefits now be paid to her. She believed that she was entitled to survivorship benefits. Her husband never informed her that he had selected a retirement option which would not pay her survivorship benefits, nor had they discussed the matter before or since his retirement. In their marital and family relationship, the Bohlers had divided certain duties in such a way that Mr. Bohler, the FRS member at issue, handled all financial matters himself. The Petitioner, Mrs. Bohler, dealt with any tax issues or filings the couple was required to make during the years of their marriage. The Petitioner is a certified public accountant. The Petitioner was simply aware that her husband received retirement benefits, and knew the amount of them, but did not know that they represented benefits for Option 1 rather than Option 3 or 4. The Petitioner's signature on the spousal acknowledgment section of the DROP Application form is stipulated to have been forged. The fact of the forgery, and the Petitioner's un-refuted testimony, establishes that she was never notified, nor did she ever acknowledge that her husband had selected Option 1. She was not aware that an attempt to waive or extinguish her survivor's benefits had been made. She believed, during his lifetime, that she was to be accorded survivor benefits. Testimony presented by the Respondent shows that the Respondent Division will not accept a retirement application form, or process it, if a member fails to complete the spousal acknowledgement section or, alternatively, to submit a signed statement explaining why that section is left blank, or the signature of the spouse has not been obtained. The fact that the Division will not accept a retirement or DROP Application form or process the related benefits if the acknowledgement section is unsigned or blank establishes the mandatory nature of the requirement that a spouse acknowledge a member's election to receive benefits under an option which would preclude a spouse's survivorship benefits. The acknowledgement is thus not an optional requirement. In fact, the legislature clearly placed that requirement in the statute, Section 121.091(6)(a), Florida Statutes, as a mandatory requirement so a spouse would know of any such attempt to waive the spouse's survivorship rights and benefits. It is an acknowledgement that the spouse has a vested or property right in such benefits, which must be knowingly and intelligently waived. The Statute says, in fact, that the spouse of any member "shall be notified of and shall acknowledge any such election." Therefore, obtaining a spouse's signature is not the only desired result set forth by the legislature (and under the rule adopted pursuant thereto) because it requires actual notification of the spouse, not merely the obtaining of a spouse's signature, whether genuine or forged. Actual notification is what must be accomplished. The required notification and indeed the obtaining of the Petitioner's signature was not accomplished in the facts of this case. In light of these facts, the act of declaring and accomplishing retired status, and selection of the related benefit option, was never completed. The Option selection was obviously a nullity and void ab initio because the mandatory condition precedent never was accomplished by the member.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the State of Florida, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, awarding the Petitioner retirement benefits based upon her status as a surviving spouse and joint annuitant, in the manner described above, adjusted to reflect re-calculation and recoupment of overpayment based upon the amount of benefits already paid from the subject retirement account pursuant to Option 1. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth Regina Stevens, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32327 T. A. Delegal, Esquire Delegal Law Offices, P.A. 424 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether the Division properly denied Petitioner's request to change Petitioner's retirement in the Florida Retirement System from an early retirement service benefit to disability retirement.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). Royal worked for the Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT") over 28 years. As a prior employee of DOT, Royal is a member of the FRS. Royal was injured on his job on July 16, 2002. After being informed by the Social Security Administration that he was disabled, Royal started applying for line-of-duty disability retirement with the FRS. Since Royal's injury, Royal has gotten his neighbor, Levern Speights, to prepare his retirement applications and write letters to the Division on his behalf. Royal signs every submission. Royal first applied for disability retirement on December 19, 2003. About three months later, Royal applied for early service retirement benefits on or about March 9, 2004. Directly above Royal's signature, the application stated: I understand I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add additional service, change options, or change my type of retirement (Regular, Disability, and Early) once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. While the two applications were pending, Royal contacted the Division to check on the status of his disability retirement application. During the call, Royal found out that he could obtain retirement monies immediately if he wrote a letter requesting early retirement. On or about April 12, 2004, Royal submitted a letter to the Division that stated he "wish[ed] to apply for early service retirement." Upon receipt of the April 12, 2004, letter, the Division switched Royal's application from a disability application to early retirement application and Royal went on the Florida Retirement System payroll effective March 1, 2004. Royal has been receiving early service retirement checks and cashing or depositing them since March 2004. However, Royal still believes he is entitled to disability retirement benefits since he is disabled. Throughout the years, Royal has continuously contacted the Division periodically in an effort to still try and get disability retirement benefits. In January, April, and May 2006, the Division received three letters from Royal questioning his receipt of early service retirement benefits and requesting to apply for in-line- of-duty disability retirement benefits. On May 16, 2006, Royal applied for disability benefits again. On June 3, 2006, the Division responded to Royal's request by letter stating: The Division of Retirement has received your letter requesting that you receive disability benefits. Our records indicated you are receiving a service retirement benefit. According to Chapter 60S-4.002(4), Florida Administrative Code, you cannot change your option selection, purchase additional service, or change your type of retirement after you have cashed or deposited any benefit payment. Therefore the Division is unable to honor your request.[2] On December 24, 2008, Royal wrote the Division and requested that his "retirement be changed to disability retirement to reflect my current condition."3 On January 21, 2009, the Division informed Royal again by letter that "Florida law does not have provisions that allow the Division of Retirement to change a member's retirement type from service retirement to disability retirement. Therefore, your service retirement benefit is final and cannot be changed to disability retirement." Royal contacted the Division on several more occasions trying to get disability benefits. On or about June 25, 2011, Royal requested a hearing regarding the issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's request to change his early service retirement benefit to disability retirement. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2011.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Albert F. Cook, had a relationship with the Department of Corrections (DOC) at any time during the month of April, 1993, and if so, whether he was eligible to receive a retirement benefit for that month, as well.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was employed at times pertinent hereto by the Department of Corrections (DOC) at its Baker Correctional Institution facility. On February 19, 1993, he was notified of his transfer to the Florida State Prison, purportedly for disciplinary reasons. Upon learning of this eventuality, the Petitioner immediately went on sick leave. He maintains that it was duly- approved sick leave. No medical evidence to that effect was presented, but the Petitioner suggested that his illness might be of a psychiatric nature. He clearly was disgusted with the action taken by the DOC to transfer him. Subsequently thereto, he decided to apply for retirement, effective March 31, 1993. Shortly thereafter, he sought to have his retirement request rescinded or withdrawn; however, that request was denied. He was thereupon removed from the DOC payroll, effective March 31, 1993, essentially as a termination action. He received a retirement benefit check for the period of April 1-30, 1993 in the amount of $2,324.53 from the Division of Retirement. The Petitioner appealed the DOC employment action to the Public Employees Relations Commission and an administrative proceeding ensued. Ultimately, a settlement agreement was reached in that case which resulted in the Petitioner being allowed to resign, effective April 16, 1993, rather than suffer termination effective March 31, 1993. That agreement entered into by the parties in that case specifically stated that "the agency [DOC] will take whatever action is necessary to return the employee [Cook] to the payroll for the period between March 31, 1993 and April 16, 1993". The Division of Retirement was, of course, not a party to that agreement since it was not a party to the litigation involved. The agreement was incorporated into a Final Order issued by the Public Employees Relations Commission in Case No. CF-93-196, entered June 7, 1993. The Petitioner sent a letter to E.I. Perrin, the Superintendent of Florida State Prison, dated April 12, 1993, in which he stated "that if I am still on the payroll, I hereby resign my position with the Florida Department of Corrections effective April 16, 1993 . . .". According to attendance and leave reports signed by both the Petitioner and Marion Bronson, the Personnel Director of Florida State Prison, the Petitioner was on sick leave for the payroll period of March 26, 1993 through April 8, 1993. While the date of the Petitioner's signature on the relevant time sheet was April 8, 1993, the end of the pay period, the Petitioner testified that the time sheets had actually been submitted earlier. Attendance and leave reports for the following pay period indicated that the Petitioner continued on sick leave status through April 16, 1993. The time sheets for the latter period were not signed by the Petitioner but were signed by Marion Bronson. DOC ordered a manual payroll made up to record payment and to pay the Petitioner through April 16, 1993. He received a salary warrant for $1,234.43 for that period from April 1-16, 1993. That salary check and warrant reflects that retirement contributions were paid as to that April payroll period salary. Because he received additional retirement service credit and a new average final compensation as a result of being in a payroll status and being paid for the period of time in April 1993, the Petitioner's monthly retirement benefits actually now exceed what he would receive as retirement benefit payments had he not been compensated as an employee for his service through April 16, 1993. The Petitioner testified at hearing that he was terminated on March 31, 1993 and not re-hired. He further testified that he neither wanted nor expected payment from DOC for the period of March 31, 1993 through April 16, 1993 and that he "merely wanted to clear his name". Nevertheless, he entered into the settlement agreement which provided for him to be compensated and on payroll status through April 16, 1993, when he entered into the settlement with DOC in the proceeding before the Public Employees Relations Commission. He is presumed to have full knowledge of the content of that settlement agreement, and it reflects that he freely and voluntarily entered into it, as does his testimony. According to Mr. Bronson's testimony, during the relevant period from March 31, 1993 through April 16, 1993, the Petitioner was occupying an authorized and established employment position with DOC. His employment relationship continued with the Department, as a result of the settlement agreement, until April 16, 1993. Because Mr. Bronson and DOC are not parties to the present proceeding and have no financial interest in the outcome of this litigation, Mr. Bronson's testimony is deemed credible and is accepted insofar as it may differ from that of the Petitioner. The Respondent agency learned that a payroll had been prepared for the period of time in April of 1993 in question and that a salary warrant was issued on the basis of the settlement agreement extending the Petitioner's employment with DOC through April 16, 1993. The Division of Retirement thus temporarily reduced the Petitioner's retirement benefits to recover the amount of the resulting, unauthorized April retirement check. It was unauthorized because he remained employed for the period of time in April and was paid as though he were employed, as a result of the settlement agreement. Consequently, he was not entitled to retirement benefits for that period of time in April 1993 ending on April 16, 1993. Mr. Snuggs testified that every retirement applicant, such as the Petitioner, receives a form FRS-TAR, entitled "Retirement System Termination and Re-Employment". The Petitioner did not deny receiving that form (Respondent's Exhibit 4) which advises prospective retirees of their rights and obligations in terms of retirement and retirement benefits as it relates to re- employment.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, temporarily reducing the Petitioner's retirement benefits, in the manner already proposed by that agency, until such time as his April 1993 retirement benefit, paid to him previously, has been reimbursed to the agency. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-2292 Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-11. Accepted. The Petitioner filed no proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert F. Cook Post Office Box 782 Sneads, Florida 32460 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street, Bldg. C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A.J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street, Bldg. C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Ste. 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent failed to provide workers' compensation insurance coverage for employees and, if so, what penalty should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation ("Division") is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement within the state that employers cover employees with workers' compensation insurance. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. (2009). Respondent, Jurgenson Trading Corporation, is owned, in part, by Julio Raudsett, and operates a "Subway" sandwich restaurant franchise in Hialeah, Florida. It is a family-owned business with a total of five employees, three of whom are related. Cesar Tolentino, an investigator for the Division, conducted a field interview of Raudsett, who admitted that he did not carry workers' compensation insurance. Tolentino checked the database in the Coverage and Compliance Automated System ("CCAS"), and there were no records showing workers' compensation coverage for the Subway employees, nor any notices of applicable exemptions. Martha Aguilar, Tolentino's supervisor authorized the issuance of a Stop-Work Order that was personally served on Raudsett by Tolentino by hand-delivery on April 17, 2009. At the same time, Tolentino served a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation. Raudsett provided his business records, including payroll journals and unemployment tax returns. Based on Aguilar's review of the business records, the Division issued its Amended Order of Penalty Assessment ("Order") on June 8, 2009, with an assessed penalty of $19,873.79. Aguilar determined the amount of the penalty, using the following steps: (1) assigning each employee the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) class code that was applicable for restaurant workers; (2) determining how much the employee had been paid from April 2006 to April 2009 (the period of non-coverage); and (3) assigning the rate to the gross pay to calculate the insurance premium that should have been paid, then multiplying that by 1.5, as required by rule. The NCCI class codes for employees administrative staff as compared to restaurant workers are lower and, therefore, their workers' compensation insurance premiums would be lower. The business records available to Aguilar did not distinguish among employee's responsibilities. Absent that information, the penalty is, by law, calculated using the highest NCCI class code associated with that kind of business, and was correctly done in this case. Raudsett has entered into a payment plan with the Division. He objected only to that portion of the penalty that was based on his earnings, and those of his wife, Maribel Medina, who works part-time, and his father-in-law, Rolando Medina. He claims an exemption for the three of them as owners and managers of the corporation. Excluding their salaries and associated penalties, according to Joseph Cabanas, Respondent's accountant, would reduce the penalty by $10,267.67, to $9,606.12. Cabanas testified that Raudsett, an immigrant from Venezuela, was not aware of workers' compensation laws, and that was why the three owners/officers of the Respondent's corporation failed to file a Notice of Elections to be Exempt from coverage until after the Division's investigation began.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, that upholds the assessment of a penalty of $19,873.79. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 Benjamin Diamond, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Douglas D. Dolan, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Joseph Cabanas 10520 Northwest 26 Street, Suite C-201 Doral, Florida 33172
