Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Annette J. Ruffin, held real estate broker license number 0076385 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. When the events herein occurred, respondent was owner and broker for Century 21 A Little Bit Country at 915 Lithia Pinecrest Road, Brandon, Florida. She is presently employed by U. S. Homes Corporation in Tampa, Florida. James and Shirley Yaksic wished to sell their residence at 3512 Plainview Drive in Brandon, Florida. They listed their property with Century 21 Solid Gold Properties II, Inc. in Brandon in December, 1983. Deborah Cassidy was a salesman at respondent's office, and knew her parents, J. R. and Helen Anderson, were in the market for a new home. With Cassidy's assistance, the Andersons executed a contract on February 16, 1984, to purchase the Yaksics' residence. The contract called for a purchase price of $65,000 with a down payment of $10,000, including a $500.00 cash deposit which was given to respondent's firm several days after the contract was executed. The deposit was placed in Ruffin's escrow account on February 28, 1984. The Andersons were also required to seek VA financing on the balance owed. After the contract was accepted by the Yaksics on February 17, Helen Anderson made application on February 23 for a $55,000 VA loan with Norwest Mortgage, Inc., a lending institution in Tampa. Florida. Since her husband was in New York State, only Helen signed the loan application agreeing to allow verification of all representations made in the application. While filling out the loan application at Norwest, Helen Anderson learned that the Veterans Administration allowed applicants to apply for loans equal to 100% of the value of the property. Since the Andersons preferred to make no down payment, Helen Anderson wrote Norwest in early March requesting that their loan application be increased from $55,000 to $65,000. She also noted that she did not sign the "disclosure statement" on behalf of her husband since "it would be incorrect." In response to this Letter, Norwest wrote the Andersons in early April requesting a number of items needed to process the application as well as an amendment to the contract reflecting that the sellers agreed to 100% financing by the buyers. The Andersons did not respond to this inquiry. In addition, they never, advised the sellers that they had changed their loan application to 100% financing, and that the sellers would be required to pay more discount points at closing. Because no amendment to the contract was ever filed, Norwest processed the application for a $55,000 loan. Due to insufficient income and excessive obligations, the application was denied. The Andersons were so notified by letter dated May 3, 1984. After Helen Anderson received the denial letter she telephoned respondent's office manager on several occasions to seek a refund of her deposit. This information was apparently conveyed to Ruffin by the office manager. About the same time the sellers were advised by the listing salesman that the Andersons did not intend to close. On May 5, the sellers wrote a letter to Solid Gold requesting that it notify the selling broker to not "release the binder to the buyers as we are entitled to this money." For some reason, a copy of this letter was not mailed to respondent until May 31, and she received it in early June. Even though Ruffin may have been orally advised in early May of the Yaksics' intended claim by the listing office, she had no concrete evidence of this intention until she received their letter in early June. On June 29, 1984, Helen Anderson wrote respondent's office manager a letter requesting a return of her deposit no later than July 9. She also indicated the letter was being sent pursuant to instructions received from petitioner. On July 2, Ruffin replied by letter stating that "we cannot release your deposit as the house was off the market for such a long time," and that Norwest had advised her that the Andersons "did not bring in a lot of the information until it was too late." After Helen Anderson filed a complaint with the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR), DPR wrote respondent a letter dated July 19, 1984, stating in part that Anderson had been refused her deposit and that its records did not show that respondent had notified DPR of conflicting demands for that money. On July 30, 1984, respondent replied to DPR's inquiry and gave her version of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. After receiving no reply to this letter, she wrote a second letter in late December, 1984 to the Division of Real Estate (Division) requesting advice on the deposit matter. The Division sent a her form for requesting an escrow disbursement order on January 4, 1985 which was returned by respondent within a few weeks. An escrow disbursement order was eventually issued by the Division on April 19, 1985 directing her to refund the deposit to the Andersons. She did so on May 5, 1985. In conjunction with its investigation, DPR obtained copies of respondent's escrow account bank statements during the period when the Andersons' deposit was retained by Ruffin. Although the $500.00 deposit should have been maintained in that account from February, 1984 until disbursement in May, 1985, her account dropped below $500.00 on sixteen separate days during this period of time, and continuously from February 28 through April 30, 1985. Respondent, who has been a broker since 1977, maintained a record of all escrow deposits and expenditures in a ledger book which reflected when the Anderson money was deposited and when it was paid out. Although she inferred the problem may have been attributable to her bookkeeper, no adequate explanation was given as to why her bank balances dropped below $500.00 on a number of occasions. She acknowledged that she learned of the conflicting demands in May, 1984, but felt that she could still "solve" the credit problem of the Andersons. She stated that she intended to give notice to the Division of the conflicting claims on the deposit and needed no encouragement from the Division to do so. There is no evidence that respondent has ever been disciplined on any other occasion since first receiving her salesman license around twelve years ago.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty as set forth in the Conclusions of Law portion of this order. All other charges should be DISMISSED. It is recommended that respondent's broker license be suspended for ninety days and that she be fined $500.00. DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of September, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Bearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, I make the following: The Defendant, Leroy Wilson, is a registered real estate broker with the Commission and during January 1, 1975 to November 5, 1975, Defendant was registered as trading as Overpass Real Estate. On April 27, 1975, Defendant was the owner of residential property located at 291 N.W. 29th Terrace, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. On April 28, 2/ Robert English and his wife Mazie English in response to a "for sale" sign posted at 291 N.W. 29th Terrace, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, went to the real estate brokerage office maintained by the Defendant at room 201 Romark Building, 3521 West Broward Boulevard, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. Defendant and Mr. and Mrs. English discussed and negotiated a deposit receipt contract dated April 28, 1975, between the Englishes as purchasers and Defendant as seller for the purchase and sale of property owned by Defendant located at 291 N.W. 29th Terrace. Mrs. English testified that they put up an earnest money deposit of $300 acknowledged by Defendant, however, Defendant executed the deposit receipt contract reflecting an earnest money deposit of $600. (See FREC Exhibit number 2). Mrs. English testified that part of the terms of the contract was that she would apply for a mortgage loan but when it was determined that her daughter who was to participate with her in the purchase, was not able to stay with her, she and her husband decided not to apply for a mortgage loan. She explained to Defendant and he agreed to return the $300 deposit that she had submitted along with the deposit receipt contract. When the Englishes demanded the return of their deposit, Defendant advised them that "it was the law that the deposit must be kept for 6 weeks, and thereafter, he would have to keep the deposit another ten days." After the expiration of the six week period, the Englishes called the Defendant's office and was advised that he no longer lived there and other efforts by the Englishes to contact the Defendant were fruitless. Thereafter on or about August 20, 1975, the Englishes filed a complaint with the Commission. Approximately two days after the Commission initiated its investigation, the Defendant returned the $300 deposit to the Englishes. (See FREC Exhibit number 3). N.B. Wolf an employee of Gulf Atlantic Mortgage Brokers testified that she was familiar with the document received into evidence as Exhibit number 2 which is the deposit receipt contract entered into by the Defendant and the Englishes. She testified that she did not recall ever having taken a credit application for the Englishes to apply for a mortgage loan. Roy E. Conner, the operations officer for Plantation First National Bank testified that he caused to be gathered the bank records as they relate to the escrow account maintained by the Defendant at that bank. An examination of those bank records revealed that the Defendant's escrow bank account maintained at Plantation First National Bank had a shortage of $5 as of September 16 and that on August 14, his escrow bank account showed a balance of $65 when it should have reflected a balance of $300 in earnest money deposits. See FREC Exhibit number 4 received into evidence. Pruyn investigated Defendant's brokerage office on September 16, at 2951 N.W. Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. Based on an official inspection, Pruyn noted a number of inadequacies in that there were no letterheads, no desks, no chairs, no business mail, no diary of witnesses or any official sign as required and set forth in Commission Rule 21V-10.07 and 10.09, Florida Administrative Code and Section 475.22, Florida Statutes. See FREC Exhibit number 5 received into evidence. As previously stated, the Defendant did not appear at the hearing nor did he have a representative present to present any defense to the charges made by the Commission in the administrative complaint.
The Issue The ultimate issue for determination at the formal hearing was whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's real estate broker's license for failing to obey a lawful order of the Florida Real Estate Commission.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida. A Final Judgment was entered against Richard B. Abel, P.A., in the case of Mark Freeman v. Richard B. Abel, P.A., Case No 85-5678CA-JRT, on August 17, 1986, in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, Lee County, Florida. The Final Judgment was for an amount of $6,839 representing real estate commissions owed by Richard B. Abel, P.A. to Mark Freeman, plus interest and attorney's fees. A two count Administrative Complaint was filed by the Florida Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, against Respondent on June 27, 1988. The Complaint alleged inter alia that Respondent: (a) failed to satisfy a Final Judgment in Circuit Court for the payment of a real estate commission; and (b) failed to maintain trust funds in his real estate brokerage trust account or some other proper depository until disbursement in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d), (k), Florida Statutes. A Final Order was entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission (the "Commission") on December 6, 1988, accepting a Stipulation between Respondent and the Commission in settlement of the Administrative Complaint filed on June 27, 1988 (the "Final Order"). The terms of the Final Order provided that: Richard B. Abel, P.A., was reprimanded for failing to pay the Final Judgment entered against it in Circuit Court and was required to pay the amount due Mark Freeman within 45 days from the entry of the Final Order; Respondent, in his individual capacity, personally guaranteed the amount owed by Richard B. Abel, P.A., to Mark Freeman, and further agreed not to violate any provision of Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes; and Respondent waived his right to contest the validity and enforcement of either the Final Order or Stipulation accepted in the Final Order. Neither Richard B. Abel, P.A., nor Respondent has paid the sums due pursuant to the terms of the Final Order entered by the Commission on December 6, 1988. The evidence submitted by Petitioner was uncontroverted. Respondent admitted that he placed the monies owed by Richard B. Abel, P.A., to Mark Freeman in the escrow account of Richard B. Abel, P.A., and disbursed the funds to himself, the sole owner, operator, director and officer. Respondent stated that he fully intended to pay Mr. Freeman when Respondent was able to do so. Respondent's sole defense was that the original debt was that of a corporation rather than a personal debt of Respondent. Respondent is in violation of the Final Order of the Comission entered on December 6, 1988.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of failing to obey a lawful order of the Florida Real Estate Commission in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, fined $1,000, and placed on probation for a period not to exceed 5 years. The conditions of probation may include any of those prescribe in Florida Administrative Code Rule 21V-24.001(2)(a) except those prescribing re-examination or being placed on broker-salesman status. In the event Respondent fails to pay in full any fine imposed on Respondent or to complete the terms of any probation imposed on Respondent, it is recommended that Respondent's license be suspended for 8 years. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-3727 Petitioner has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Respondent did not submit proposed findings of fact. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection Included in Finding 1 Included in Finding 2 Included in Finding 4 Included in Finding 5 5-6 Included in Finding 6 7-8 Included in Finding 7 9 Included in Finding 9 COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Departmen of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Mr. Richard B. Abel 2478 Inagua Avenue Miami, Florida 33133
The Issue Whether Respondent violated provisions of chapter 475, Florida Statutes (2016),1/ regulating real estate sales brokers, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what sanctions are appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of real estate pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Ms. Murata is a licensed real estate broker in Florida, having been issued license numbers BK 3266198, 3326041, 3330594, 3334183, 3338731, 3345773, 3346456, 3346845, 3350300, 3364670, 3366527, 3366441, 3368235, 3369788, 3372663 and 3378303. Ms. Murata is under the jurisdiction of Petitioner and subject to applicable statutes and rules. Ms. Murata is the owner of the Florida Qualifying Broker of Record Service and maintains the Internet website, http://floridabrokerofrecord.com, which states its business model to be an opportunity for Florida real estate sales associates to run their own real estate companies without having to share their commissions with the broker of record. Friendly International Realty, LLC ("Friendly"), was formed in June 2011. From March 3, 2016, to June 7, 2016, Ms. Murata was the qualifying real estate broker for Friendly. Ms. Murata agreed to receive a monthly fee of $289.00 in exchange for being the qualifying broker of record for Friendly. Ms. Murata did not physically visit the license location of Friendly, at 937 Northeast 125th Street, North Miami, Florida, 33161, during the time that she was the qualifying broker. Ms. Murata was not a signatory on any escrow account used by Friendly. Ms. Murata did not keep any of Friendly's brokerage records. From March 4, 2016, to November 21, 2016, Jean Berthelot was a registered real estate sales associate with Friendly. He acted as an independent contractor. Ms. Murata was aware that Mr. Berthelot was doing business on the Multiple Listing Service ("MLS"). After she became the broker for Friendly, Ms. Murata activated one sales associate to help Mr. Berthelot. Joan Feloney is the owner of the subject property. Audrey Flanders is a real estate broker acting on behalf of Ms. Feloney in her efforts to lease the subject property. Ms. Flanders received a contract to enter into a lease from Tamara Stanton, a real estate sales associate at Friendly, on behalf of Paul Allicock. Ms. Feloney accepted the offer. Mr. Allicock paid $2,350.00 to Friendly toward lease of the subject property in the form of signed money orders dated March 6 and March 18, 2016. The money was placed in a Friendly escrow account. These money orders were paid to engage the services of Friendly and Ms. Murata as broker in the rental of the subject property. Pursuant to a written statement signed by Ms. Feloney, $550.00 of this amount was to be paid to Friendly, and $1,650.00 was to be paid to Ms. Feloney. A lease agreement between Mr. Allicock as tenant and Ms. Feloney as landlord and owner of the subject property was executed on March 21, 2016. Mr. Berthelot wrote a check from the Friendly escrow account to Ms. Feloney for $1,650.00 on the same date. Ms. Feloney attempted to deposit the check, but on April 14, 2016, the check was returned to her marked "NSF," indicating that insufficient funds were in the account. She was charged a $15.00 return item fee. Under the agreement between Ms. Murata and Friendly, Mr. Berthelot was not authorized to have an escrow account or otherwise hold funds or assets on behalf of a third party. As for brokerage transactions, he was supposed to e-mail transactional records to Ms. Murata or place them in a dropbox. Neither Ms. Stanton nor Mr. Berthelot ever placed documents in the dropbox. But, as Ms. Murata told Investigator Percylla Kennedy, she did learn that Friendly was doing business on the MLS. Ms. Murata became aware of the Friendly escrow account on April 26, 2016, in connection with a complaint about a transaction unrelated to this Administrative Complaint. She discussed the escrow account with Mr. Berthelot on April 27, 2016. Ms. Murata requested that Mr. Berthelot close the escrow account, submit proof that he had closed the account, and turn over all contracts between Mr. Berthelot and current clients. Ms. Murata did not want to perform a reconciliation of the escrow account. As she testified in deposition: Q: When you learned that there were third party funds being held by Friendly International Realty, did you demand the records of that account so you could perform a reconciliation? A: No, because [sic] was to be closed, because I did not want to manage an escrow account. So when I discovered what he was doing, the agreement was that he was going to close it immediately. I was not going to manage an escrow account for him, so I demanded, what I demanded was proof that the account was closed and proof that he had engaged in a written agreement with a title company for all escrow funds. Q: Approximately when did you make that demand? A: The moment that Jessica Schuller came up and he confessed that he had kept the account from his previous broker. That he had not told me because he was going to close it. I threatened I was going to resign once he paid those funds to Jessica. But then I agreed to continue if he closed that account immediately. On May 10, 2016, a complaint was filed with the Department against Ms. Murata, as broker of Friendly, regarding the lease transaction involving the subject property. After Ms. Murata became aware that Friendly owed money to Ms. Feloney, she maintained regular contact with her brokerage in an attempt to ensure that the money owed to Ms. Feloney was paid. Ms. Murata cooperated with the Department's investigation. Ms. Feloney, through Audrey Flanders, requested on June 2, 2016, that the $1,650.00 and an additional service charge of $82.00 be paid within 15 days or a case would be filed with the state attorney's office. The parties stipulated that on June 7, 2016, Ms. Murata resigned from her position as broker of record for Friendly. She testified that she resigned because she had not received the documents or actions that she had requested of Mr. Berthelot. Ms. Murata did not write a check to Ms. Feloney to pay the amount Friendly owed her because, with an investigation underway, Ms. Murata did not want it to be construed as an admission that she had personally collected funds from Mr. Allicock. She also evidently believed that since she had resigned, she was not professionally responsible for obligations that arose during the time that she had been the broker. Ms. Murata convincingly testified that in another, unrelated, situation, she became involved as the broker to resolve a potential dispute by ensuring that the party entitled to funds was paid. On June 25, 2016, a Bad Check Crime Report was filed with the Broward County State Attorney's Office. By letter dated June 8, 2016, the Department requested that Ms. Murata provide copies of monthly reconciliation statements; bank statements and records; and sales, listing, and property management files of Friendly. As Ms. Kennedy testified, Ms. Murata never provided those accounts and records to the Department, saying she did not have them. While Ms. Murata insists that any failure was only because Mr. Berthelot actively kept information from her, the parties stipulated that Ms. Murata failed to maintain control of, and have reasonable access to, some of the documents associated with the rental of the subject property. Mr. Trafton, an experienced real estate broker and expert in real estate brokerages, reviewed chapter 475; Florida Administrative Code Rule Title 61J; the deposit paperwork of Mr. Allicock; the Bad Check Crime Report; the investigative report; and the Administrative Complaint. He prepared an expert report to the Department. As Mr. Trafton testified, the usual and customary standard applicable to brokers is that they must promptly deliver funds in possession of the brokerage that belong to other parties. Mr. Trafton also testified that the standard of care applicable to a broker in supervising sales associates requires active supervision. He also testified that a broker must maintain the records of the brokerage. Mr. Trafton testified that in his opinion, Ms. Murata failed to meet these standards. Ms. Murata failed to promptly deliver funds to Ms. Feloney that were in possession of the brokerage. Ms. Murata failed to manage, direct, and control Real Estate Sales Associate Berthelot to the standard expected of a broker of record. She did not actively supervise him, instead relying completely on Mr. Berthelot and other associates to provide her any information she needed to know. Ms. Murata failed to preserve accounts and records relating to the rental or lease agreement of the subject property. Petitioner did not clearly show that Respondent was guilty of either "culpable negligence" or "breach of trust." As Investigator Kennedy testified, and as corroborated by cost summary reports maintained by the Department, from the start of the investigation of this complaint through September 14, 2017, costs incurred by the Department were $1,443.75, not including costs associated with an attorney's time.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission: Finding Maria Camila Murata in violation of sections 475.25(1)(d)1., 475.25(1)(u), and 475.25(1)(e) as charged in the Administrative Complaint; imposing an administrative fine of $2,250.00; imposing license suspension for a period of two months; and imposing costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the case. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January, 2018.
The Issue The issues in this case include whether Respondent is guilty of having committed culpable negligence in a business transaction or failed to maintain trust funds in a proper account until disbursement was authorized and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida since 1983 and holds license number 0405933. His most current license was as a broker trading as Realty Trend. Respondent started Realty Trend in 1985 for the primary purpose of managing rental properties. Although he had little or no training or experience in accounting, Respondent retained considerable responsibility for the day-to- day bookkeeping associated with his business, though at times he employed a bookkeeper. Respondent maintained one account for sales transactions, in which he participated as the broker, and one account for property management activity. Respondent participated in few sales transactions and is phasing out of that part of the business. All escrow monies held by Respondent were kept in interest-bearing accounts. Although Respondent retained the interest, he disclosed this fact to the parties through the sales contract. Within about 18 months, Respondent had acquired about 100 properties to manage. Respondent decided to automate the bookkeeping and purchased a computer program that would write checks, track income and expenses, generate reports, and generally handle all aspects of bookkeeping. The program was designed to assist in property management operations. Emphasizing service to property owners, Respondent had always tried to send his checks for rent collected the past month between the tenth and fifteenth of each month. By August, 1989, Respondent had been warned by Petitioner that he had to allow two or three weeks for tenant's checks to clear and determine what emergency maintenance expenses might be incurred. Through a combination of ignorance about bookkeeping, his responsibilities as a broker holding escrow monies, and the property management computer program, Respondent mishandled his trust account. His repeated bookkeeping errors and failure to take corrective action allowed a sizable shortage to accumulate by the time Petitioner conducted a routine office audit on November 17, 1989. Respondent cooperated fully with the audit and promptly provided Petitioner's investigator with a box full of bank statements. His account was reaudited on January 8, 1990. Poor bookkeeping prevents a precise determination of the shortage, but it exceeds $10,000. It is difficult to understand how Respondent's books became so confused as to become nearly worthless. There was no evidence of fraudulent intent. It appears as likely that Respondent overpaid property owners as that he overpaid himself. Respondent's ongoing ignorance of his serious trust account shortages or, in the alternative, repeated failure to solve recognized trust account shortages represents culpable negligence. Even by the time of hearing, Respondent candidly admitted that he could not provide an accurate figure for the shortage and had not yet been able to repay the deficiency, although he intended to do so.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order reprimanding Respondent; imposing an administrative fine of $500; requiring Respondent to complete an approved 60-hour course; suspending his license for a period of six months, commencing retroactive to the date on which Respondent cease operations due to the emergency suspension; and placing his license on probation for a period of three years following the conclusion of the suspension, during which time Respondent shall file escrow account reports with the Commission or other person designated by the Commission at such intervals as the Commission requires. DONE and ORDERED this 8 day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8 day of October, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801 Attorney Steven W. Johnson Division of Real Estate Florida Real Estate Commission 400 W. Robinson St. Orlando, FL 32801-1772 Thomas I. McIntosh 13542 N. Florida Ave. Tampa, FL 33613 Attorney Neil F. Garfield Envirwood Executive Plaza, Suite 200 5950 West Oakland Park Blvd. Lauderhill, FL 33313 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by committing fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, etc., or by violating a duty imposed upon him by law or by the terms of a listing contract and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty; Whether Respondent violated section 475.25(1)(d)1., by failing to timely account or deliver to any person any personal property such as money, funds, deposit, check draft, etc. and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty; and Whether Respondent, a sales associate, registered as an officer, director of a brokerage corporation, or general partner of a brokerage partnership is in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-5.016 and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of real estate pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. DOAH has jurisdiction, pursuant to section 120.574, to render a decision in this matter, which shall be final agency action subject to judicial review under section 120.68. Mr. Rivas is a licensed real estate sales associate, holding license number 3385508, issued by the State of Florida. Structure of the Brokerage Corporation On or about April 7, 2015, Respondent registered GREH with the State of Florida, Division of Corporations ("Division of Corporations"), identifying himself as the registered agent and manager of GREH. Respondent filed documents on behalf of GREH with the Division of Corporations on the following dates and identified himself with the following titles with GREH: On April 13, 2016, March 14, 2017, and April 17, 2018, Respondent identified himself as the registered agent, managing member, and president; On November 22, 2017, and April 17, 2018, Respondent identified himself as an authorized member; On April 22, 2019, Respondent identified himself as a registered agent, an authorized member, and managing member; On October 23, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent and member; On November 27, 2019, Respondent identified himself as a registered agent, member, and manager; On December 6, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent and shareholder; and On December 10, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent. On March 23, 2017, GREH registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission") as a real estate corporation in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CQ 1053189. At no time was Respondent registered with the Commission as a real estate broker in the State of Florida. From November 27, 2017, to October 3, 2019, Mr. Avila, who at that time was a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number BK 3401612, was the qualifying broker of GREH. From October 3, 2019, to October 15, 2019, and from November 25, 2019, to December 9, 2019, GREH's license was invalidated due to it not having a qualifying broker. From October 15, 2019, to November 25, 2019, Gamila Murata was the qualifying broker for GREH. From December 9, 2019, to July 29, 2020, Mr. Henson was the qualifying broker for GREH. On August 22, 2019, without the authority of the qualifying broker for GREH, Respondent filed a civil action on behalf of GREH against Arnauld and Annelyn Sylvain (collectively, the "Sylvains") in the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in case number 502019CA008774XXXXMB, seeking, among other things, to recover real estate commissions allegedly claimed due by GREH and Respondent. Respondent subsequently retained attorney Monica Woodard to represent GREH in the civil proceedings, and GREH's complaint was dismissed. On or about November 19, 2019, the Sylvains filed a separate civil action against GREH in the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in case number 502019CC015230XXXXMB, seeking to recover a $10,000.00 escrow deposit. Respondent failed to inform the qualifying broker of record for GREH, Mr. Henson, who assumed that position shortly after the filing of the civil action, of the pending lawsuit. Respondent opened bank accounts on behalf of GREH, including an account called an "Escrow Account," which was controlled by Respondent and at no time was controlled by a qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent deposited escrow funds into the Escrow Account for GREH, without the authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent closed the Escrow Account held in the name of GREH and removed funds that were to be held in trust from the account without authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent controlled all communications regarding certain real estate transactions on behalf of GREH, without the knowledge or authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Contract 1 On or about March 4, 2019, an "AS IS" Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase ("Contract 1") was entered into between the Sylvains, as buyers, and Frederick F. Breault and Evelyn Breault (the "Breaults"), as sellers, for property located at 16595 93rd Road North, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 ("Subject Property 1"). Respondent facilitated Contract 1 on behalf of the Sylvains. Pursuant to the requirements of Contract 1, the Sylvains deposited $10,000.00 with GREH, to be held in escrow as the initial deposit. The escrow funds were delivered to Respondent in the form of a certified check drawn from SunTrust Bank in the amount of $10,000.00 and purchased by Mr. Sylvain on March 4, 2019 ("SunTrust Certified Check"). The $10,000.00 escrow funds were deposited into a bank account held in the name of GREH. The SunTrust Certified Check was deposited into a bank account over which Respondent had sole control. The GREH account in which the SunTrust Certified Check was deposited was at no relevant time controlled by a Florida licensed real estate broker. Contract 1 provided that the Sylvains had 20 days from the effective date to obtain loan approval ("Loan Approval Period"). Paragraph 18(F) of the Contract provided as follows: TIME: Calendar days shall be used in computing time periods. Time is of the essence in this Contract. Other than time for acceptance and Effective Date as set forth in Paragraph 3, any time periods provided for or dates specified in this Contract, whether preprinted, handwritten, typewritten or inserted herein, which shall end or occur on a Saturday, Sunday, or a national legal holiday (see 5 U.S.C. 6103) shall extend to 5.[:]00 p.m. (where the Property is located) of the next business day. Because 20 days from the effective date fell on a Sunday, the Loan Approval Period expired on Monday, March 25, 2019. Paragraph 8(b)(i) of Contract 1 provided that: "Buyer [the Sylvains] shall ... use good faith and diligent effort to obtain approval of a loan meeting the Financing terms ('Loan Approval') and thereafter to close this Contract." Paragraph 8(b)(v) of the Contract further provided that if neither party timely cancelled the Contract pursuant to paragraph 8, the financing contingency would "be deemed waived." Paragraph 8(b)(vii) finally provided that "[i]f Loan Approval has been obtained, or deemed to have been obtained, as provided above, and Buyer fails to close this Contract, then the Deposit shall be paid to Seller … ." The parties agreed to close Contract 1 by April 10, 2019. The Sylvains did not obtain final loan approval ("clear to close") within the Loan Approval Period. The loan was not denied for any of the exceptions set forth in paragraph 8(b)(vii), to release of the escrow deposit to the seller. The Sylvains did not terminate the contract within the Loan Approval Period. After the Loan Approval Period expired, the Sylvains sought to extend Contract 1, without consideration for the extension. The Breaults countered the Sylvains' request to extend with an offer that an extension would be granted for consideration that the Sylvains agree to forfeit the earnest money deposit. The parties never reached an agreement to extend Contract 1 and Contract 1 failed to close. On or about May 2, 2019, the Sylvains's loan application for Contract 1 was denied. On May 8, 2019, the Breaults executed a Release and Cancellation of Contract demanding release of the $10,000.00 escrow deposit on Contract 1, which Respondent received by email on that date from Betty Khan, the sales associate representing the Breaults. The Sylvains also executed a Release and Cancellation of Contract seeking return of the $10,000.00 escrow deposit on Contract 1, which Respondent communicated to Ms. Khan on May 8, 2019. Also, on May 8, 2019, Respondent informed the Sylvains of the Breaults's claim on the earnest money deposit. Despite knowing that there were conflicting demands for the escrowed funds, Respondent failed to inform Mr. Avila, the qualifying broker for GREH at the time, or the Department, of the escrow dispute. The Breaults were never informed of any escrow dispute filed with the Department, were never sued in relation to the escrow deposit, and never went to mediation or arbitration with regard to the escrow deposit, despite making a demand for the escrow deposit. Respondent claimed that he applied the $10,000.00 escrow funds to another contract under which the Sylvains were buyers. Respondent closed the GREH Escrow Account, removing the $10,000.00 from the account, without consent of either the Sylvains or the Breaults. Contract 2 On or about May 2, 2019, an "AS IS" Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase (Contract 2) between the Sylvains, as buyers, and the Mossuccos, as sellers, for property located at 7584 Apache Boulevard, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 ("Subject Property 2"). Respondent facilitated Contract 2 on behalf of the Sylvains. In relation to Contract 2, specifically paragraph 2(a), which required an earnest money deposit in the amount of $10,000.00, Respondent requested that the Sylvains provide him a check in the amount of $10,000.00 to show the Mossuccos. On or about May 6, 2019, the Sylvains then drew a check from a business account held with TD Bank in the amount of $10,000.00 and payable to Global Business Financial Investment ("TD Bank Check"), which the Sylvains delivered to Respondent. Respondent took a photograph of the check and promised the Sylvains that the check would not be cashed or deposited. On or about May 6, 2019, Miledy Garcia, now known as Miledy Rivas, Respondent's spouse, a Florida licensed real estate sales associate, having been issued license number SL 3383271, issued an escrow deposit receipt for $10,000.00 for Contract 2 on a GREH form ("May 6, 2019, GREH Receipt"). The TD Bank Check was never deposited or cashed by Respondent; rather, the Sylvains immediately issued a stop payment order on the check to TD Bank. Despite having never deposited the TD Bank Check, Respondent communicated the May 6, 2019, GREH Receipt and a photo of the TD Bank Check to Mrs. Mossucco and Ms. Weintraub. The $10,000.00 escrow funds from Contract 1 were the escrow funds represented on Contract 2. Respondent represented that the $10,000.00 escrow funds were applied to Contract 2, prior to cancellation of Contract 1, and continued to represent the same, even after Respondent knew the Breaults were making a claim against the funds. Contract 2 failed to close. After Contract 2 failed to close, the Mossuccos and Sylvains agreed to cancel Contract 2 and release each other from liability under the terms of Contract 2, and further agreed that any earnest money deposit could be returned to the Sylvains. Respondent failed to deliver the escrow funds to the Sylvains. Rather, Respondent believed that the funds belonged to him (or one of his companies) and that he was entitled to remove the escrow funds and use them as he (or his company) saw fit. Respondent testified that he submitted a notice of escrow dispute, dated "9-30-2019," to the Department, identifying the parties to the transaction as the Mossuccos and the Sylvains, and the subject property as 7584 Apache Boulevard, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470. Respondent gave conflicting testimony, including, for example: First testifying that he believed the $10,000.00 escrow funds belonged to him (or his company) to be spent as he saw fit; then, after a break in the proceedings and on re-direct by his counsel, changing his story by saying that counsel for Petitioner put words in his mouth and that he meant only that there was a "dispute on the funds." First testifying that Mr. Avila was a signatory on the GREH "Escrow Account," then admitting that Mr. Avila was not a signatory on the account. There was also conflicting testimony between Respondent and several of the witnesses; however, where there were inconsistencies, Petitioner's witnesses' testimony was substantially consistent and supported by the documentary evidence presented. Parts of Respondent's testimony were inconsistent with documentary evidence admitted into evidence by stipulation of the parties. Facts Concerning Aggravation or Mitigation of Penalties Respondent collected escrow funds and deposited them into an account that he, only a licensed real estate sales associate, controlled, rather than one that was controlled by the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent admittedly removed escrow funds in the amount of $10,000.00 from the bank account in which they were deposited, without all parties having a claim to the escrow funds executing a release. Respondent testified that he believed the escrow funds belonged to him (or one of his companies) and that he had a right to do with the funds as he (or he through one of his companies) saw fit. Respondent used vulgar language, threats, and demeaning language toward his clients, other real estate professionals, and title agents to attempt to coerce those individuals into submitting to his demands. Respondent failed and refused to comply with the direction of the qualifying broker with supervisory responsibility over Respondent and GREH. Respondent failed to keep the qualifying broker of GREH apprised of the real estate transactions in which Respondent was involved. There was significant testimony establishing that Respondent was performing tasks that are only allowed to be performed by a licensed real estate broker, not a real estate sales associate, mortgage broker, or mortgage loan originator. Additional Facts Raised by Respondent In his proposed conclusions of law, Respondent raises, as a matter of fact, that the "Department failed to plead sufficient facts underpinning its argument" regarding the handling of escrow funds. In paragraph 25 of his Proposed Final Order, Respondent states: Nowhere in the administrative complaint does the Department allege that Mr. Rivas falsely represented that GREH received the TD Bank Check as earnest money for Contract 2, or that he falsely represented to the Sylvains that the Breaults did not have a legitimate claim against the $10,000.00 escrow funds deposited by the Sylvains toward Contract 1, or that he misrepresented to the Sylvains that the $10,000.00 funds from the SunTrust Certified Check could be and were applied to Contract 2. Respondent further argued that none of the "facts relevant to aggravation or mitigation" set forth in the Department's Proposed Final Order were pled in the A.C., in violation of Respondent's due process rights. Both of these arguments are rejected as set forth in paragraphs 108 and109 below. Additional Facts Concerning Department Costs The Department presented competent evidence that it incurred investigative costs in the amount of $1,551.00.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Respondent's licenses as a real estate broker should be disciplined because of the matters set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations of misconduct in the Administrative Complaint, the Petitioner, Division of Real Estate, was the state agency charged with the responsibility for the licensing and regulation of the real estate profession in this state. The Respondent, Richard L. Bohner, was licensed as a real estate broker in Florida operating, with his wife, Kirsten, Bohner Real Estate, located at 205 E. Osceola Street in Stuart, Florida. On October 1, 1989, Mr. Bohner as owner/lessor, entered into separate rental agreements with Trudy Dohm and Thelma Reynolds, with Bohner Real Estate identified as agent, for the lease for 12 months each of apartments number 105 and 204, respectively, at 1674 S.E. St. Lucie Blvd. in Stuart, Florida, for a monthly rental of $350.00 each. Each lease provided for the placement of a security deposit and last month's rental in advance; those sums, according to the terms of the lease, to be held by the agent, Bohner Real Estate, in a non- interest bearing escrow account at the Florida National Bank in Stuart. In actuality, the sums above-mentioned were, in each case, deposited into an account at the First National Bank and Trust Company in Stuart. This account, number 8000030400, was held in the name of Richard L. Bohner or Kirsten L. Bohner, Trust account. This account was an interest bearing account and, over the time in question, also received several large deposits of funds by or on behalf of the Respondent, Richard L. Bohner which were his personal funds and not funds received as a part of or in conjunction with his activities as a real estate broker or those of Bohner Real Estate. For the most part, the funds placed in that account were Bohner's personal funds and security deposits and last month's rent on apartments in the building owned as a personal investment by Mr. and Mrs. Bohner. On February 20, 1990, Sharon Thayer, an investigator for the Department, in the normal course of business, went to the Respondent's real estate office, unannounced as was her prerogative, and asked to speak with Mr. Bohner. He was not present at the time and she asked Mrs. Bohner, who was present, to produce the Respondent's books for the brokerage's escrow account, which she did. In the course of their conversation, Mrs. Bohner identified herself as being in partnership with the Respondent and admitted to assisting him in the maintenance of the escrow account. When Ms. Thayer asked for the backup documents for the escrow account, these were produced. Ms. Bohner also provided Ms. Thayer with copies of the bank account she maintained. On inquiry, Mrs. Bohner said the deposits thereon were, in the main, representative of rental and security deposits from tenants on leases which Bohner Real Estate managed. Ms. Thayer asked about the large deposits made on May 3, June 7, and July 7, 1989. These were for $104,542.50, $50,000.00, and $4.600.00 respectively. In response, Mrs. Bohner indicated these were personal monies which came from personal sources and funds which had been put in that account because that's where they would get the most interest. They were not escrow funds related to the real estate brokerage. Ms. Thayer made an appointment to return to the brokerage office on February 23, 1990 to speak with Respondent. When she did so, Mr. Bohner accounted for the trust liability of $6,885.00 which existed on that date. This sum was verified with the bank by phone. The trust account had an overage of somewhat more than $881.00 which Respondent explained as accrued interest not removed from the account. Mr. Bohner admitted at hearing that he earned interest on the security and rental deposits he held in that account and used that earned interest to offset the low rentals he charged his tenants. He asserted, and there was no evidence to rebut this assertion, that the only security and rental deposits placed in that account were from tenants in the apartment building he and his wife owned personally. Neither he nor Bohner Real Estate managed or served as rental agent for any rental properties owned by others. It is so found. Ms. Thayer pointed out, and it is accepted as fact, that a broker is required to reconcile his trust account on a monthly basis and file a monthly reconciliation form which accounts for overages and shortages. Respondent admits he had not completed or filed these reconciliations because neither he nor Bohner Real Estate has a trust or escrow account into which client funds are deposited. He manages no property from which rents would be collected other than his own, and when he takes a deposit on a sale or transfer, a separate trust account is opened for that particular transaction with any interest earned going to the buyer. Petitioner showed, through the testimony of Ms. Casale, the bank records custodian, that the largest deposit in issue, that one in excess of $100,000.00, was the result of the maturity of a certificate of deposit that was transferred to the account in question. Respondent did not endorse the check for deposit or sign any deposit document. He submitted a letter from the bank chairman to support his thesis that he was not a party to the transfer, but the letter, admitted over objection by counsel for Petitioner, indicates the deposit was made by the bank's investment counselor who handled the transaction consistent with telephone instructions given her by the Respondent. This is a collateral matter, however. When Ms. Thayer completed her audit, she prepared and filed a report on which she indicated, inter alia, that the office met inspection standards and that the property management escrow/trust account was satisfactory. She noted an overage of $889.31 in the account and that it was an interest bearing account although the leases state it would be non-interest bearing. No deadline was given for the correction of this item. Mrs. Bohner admits that when she gave the apartment security escrow account to Ms. Thayer at her request and described it as a trust account, she was not thinking. In fact, and it is so found, neither Respondent nor Bohner Real Estate have a trust account for the business and have not had one for several years. She reiterates Mr. Bohner's assertion that the only money usually kept in the account referenced by Ms. Casale and referred to by Ms. Thayer, is money received as security deposits and last month's rental from tenants in their own building. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is so found.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered in this case dismissing all allegations of misconduct by Respondents as outlined in the Administrative Complaint filed herein. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 1st day of April, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: - 3. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence accepted and incorporated herein,. Balance is not Finding of Fact but lore legal conclusion. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENTS: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore Gay, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 401 NW Second Avenue, Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Richard L. Bohner Bohner Teal Estate 205 East Osceola Street Stuart, Florida 34994 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 - 1900
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent violated Sections 475.25(1)(b), (d), and (e), Florida Statutes, 1/ through culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction; by failing to account or deliver trust funds; and by failing to timely notify the Florida Real Estate Commission of a deposit dispute or to implement remedial action; and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate and for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent is a licensed real estate broker under license number 0037920. The last license issued to Respondent was issued as a broker at Heath Realty, 4864 S. Orange Avenue, Orlando, Florida. On May 18, 1993, Mr. Anthony Rodgers and Ms. Jill Rodgers (the "buyers") entered into a contract to purchase real property from Ms. Norma A. Cash (the "seller"). The buyers entrusted Respondent with a total earnest money deposit of $1,000. The transaction failed to close. On July 8, 1993, Respondent timely notified Petitioner in writing that there were conflicting demands for the earnest money deposit and a good faith doubt regarding the deposit. However, Respondent failed to institute one of the settlement procedures described in Section 475.25(1)(d)1. until legal proceedings between the buyer and seller were amicably settled approximately seven months later. Respondent failed to institute a prescribed settlement procedure in a timely manner even though Petitioner advised Respondent in letters dated July 26, 1993, and September 9, 1993, of the action Respondent should take. On February 9, 1994, Respondent finally requested an escrow disbursement order in accordance with Section 475.25(10(d)1. The escrow deposit was paid to the seller pursuant to the agreement of the parties.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b), 475.25(1)(d)1., but guilty of violating Section 475.42(1)(e) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-10.032. It is further recommended that the Final Order place Respondent on probation for a period of one year and, during the period of probation, require Respondent to complete courses in broker management not to exceed eight credit hours. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February 1995.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was, at the time of the hearing and at all times material to this proceeding, registered with the Real Estate Commission as a real estate broker. During the period of the transactions involved in this proceeding the Respondent was operating and registered as an active broker and President of Fortiner Realty Company, which was a corporate real estate broker registered with the Commission. In Count One of the Complaint, the Respondent is charged with failing to maintain a security deposit in his trust account in connection with a real estate transaction involving Phillip E. Andrews and Betsy K. Andrews, as sellers, and Joseph T. Lyons and Marion C. Lyons, as purchasers. In Count Two of the Complaint the Respondent is charged with converting the deposit in the Andrews-Lyons transaction to his own use. During March, 1976, Claude I. Allen was employed at the Respondent's real estate office as a salesman. Allen negotiated a transaction between the Andrewses and the Lyonses. On March 17, 1976, the Lyonses made an offer to purchase the Andrews property and submitted a $1,000.00 deposit to Allen. On March 18, 1976 the $1,000.00 was deposited in the Respondent's trust account at the Palmer Bank of Ft. Myers. On March 22, 1976 the Andrewses accepted the offer and the Lyonses provided an additional $2,000.00 deposit to Allen. On that same date the $2,000.00 was deposited in the Respondent's trust account. The transaction closed on May 11, 1976. It was a smooth transaction. On May 110, 1976 $3,000.00 was withdrawn from the Respondent's trust account as a part of the transaction. During the entire time from March 17 through May 11, 1976, the monies deposited by the Lyonses remained on deposit in the Respondent's trust account. There is no evidence to support a finding either that the Respondent failed to maintain the $4,000.00 in the trust account, or that he converted any part of the deposit for his own use. In Count Three of the Complaint the Respondent is charged with failing to maintain a deposit in his trust account in connection with real estate transactions between Mac-Nel Ltd. and M & N Ltd. as sellers, and Stanley G. Courtney, as purchaser. In Count Four the Respondent is charged with converting all or part of the security deposit to his own use. The Respondent was one of several partners in Mac-Nel Ltd. and M & N Ltd. On august 28, 1976, Stanley G. Courtney entered into separate contracts to purchase all of the property owned by the two partnerships. Through six separate checks Courtney made a deposit of $13,500.00 to the Respondent to be placed in the Respondent's trust account. The evidence is unclear as to when or in what manner the deposit was placed in the trust account, or whether all of it was in fact placed in the trust account. The bank records reflect that $17,600.00 was placed in the Respondent's trust account on August 30, 1976, and it is possible that the Courtney checks formed a part of that deposit. During August and September, 1976, the Respondent's financial condition became grave. He had apparently defaulter on several notes to the Palmer Bank in which he had his trust account. The bank sued on the notes, and put a hold on the Respondent's accounts. In order to allow the Courtney transactions to close, the Respondent was able to withdraw allow a portion of the deposits made by Courtney form his trust account. He transferred his interest in the property to a Mr. Blankenship, so that Mr. Blankenship could close the transaction unfettered by the Respondent's financial plight. After he withdrew the money from his trust account, and forwarded it to Blankenship, the Respondent took no further part in the Courtney transaction either as a party to the transaction or as a broker. The closing of the transaction was delayed due in part to the Respondent's bankruptcy, however, it did close on October 29, 1976. Courtney was credited with the full amount that he had deposited with the Respondent. It is clear that the Respondent did not maintain all of the monies deposited by Courtney in the trust account. His reason for failing to do that was to permit the transaction to close even though the Respondent had gone bankrupt. The evidence would not support a finding that the Respondent converted any portion of the Courtney deposit to his own use. In Count Five of the Complaint the Respondent is charged with failing to maintain a deposit in his trust account in connection with a transaction involving Charles and Margaret Lathrop as sellers, and William and Jeannette Whitacre as purchasers. In Count Six the Respondent is charged with converting all or part of the deposit in that transaction to his own use. On or about June 29, 1976, the Whitacres entered into a contract to purchase property from the Lathrops. The transaction was negotiated by Mary E. Bishop, a saleswoman who was employed by the Respondent in his real estate company. The Whitacres delivered a $6,500.00 check to Mrs. Bishop as a deposit on the transaction. The bank records received into evidence do not clearly reveal when or in what manner the Whitacre's deposit was placed in the Respondent's trust account. The bank statements do show a $7,000.00 deposit made into the Respondent's trust account at the Palmer Bank of Ft. Myers on July 1, 1976, and it is possible that the Whitacre's check was a part of that deposit. Bank records from other trust accounts maintained by the Respondent such as that at the Cape Coral Bank do not reveal any deposit that could have been the Whitacre's check. The Lathrop/Whitacre transaction closed successfully on August 18, 1976, and the Whitacres were credited with the $6,500.00 that they had submitted to the Respondent's firm. It is apparent from the bank records that $6,500.00 was not on deposit at all times in the Respondent's trust account between July 1 and August 18, 1976. During most of that period the Respondent's balance in his trust account was less than $6,500.00. No evidence was offered from which it could be concluded that the Respondent made any specific use of the money deposited by the Whitacres. It is apparent, however, that the money was not used as intended, i.e., it was not maintained in the Respondent's trust account. In Count Seven of the Complaint the Respondent is charged with fraud, misrepresentation, and dishonest dealing in connection with his handling of the business of a partnership known as 27 Oaks Ltd. The Respondent was the general partner in 27 Oaks Ltd. He was responsible for carrying on the business of the partnership for the benefit of eight limited partners. The partnership owned property which it was seeking to develop and sell in small parcels. On November 19, 1975, a mortgage payment in the amount of $21,300.00 was due from the partnership. In accordance with the partnership agreement, the Respondent solicited funds from the limited partners so that the mortgage payment could be made by letter dated October 15, 1975. The evidence does not reveal whether the Respondent received sufficient contributions from the limited partners to pay the mortgage payment. The evidence reveals only that he received $9,997.00 from the limited partners in response to his solicitation. The Respondent did not make the mortgage payment when it was due, but instead received a ninety-day extension. The new date was February 19. The principal payment on the mortgage was not made on that date, but instead, the Respondent made payments on the interest due. Ultimately the payment was made in a manner satisfactory to the mortgagee by early June, 1976. The Real Estate Commission has charged that the Respondent received funds sufficient to make the mortgage payment in November, 1975, but that he applied the money to some other purpose. This contention is not supported by the evidence. The evidence does not reveal that the Respondent received sufficient money to make the mortgage payment. The bank records reveal that there was sufficient money in the 27 Oaks Ltd account to make the mortgage payment in November, and that the Respondent withdrew most of that money. The evidence does not establish that the Respondent improperly withdrew the money, or that the Respondent improperly withdrew the money, or that he put it to any but a valid partnership purpose. The Commission has also contended that the Respondent failed to maintain the monies he received from the limited partners in a trust account. Nothing in the partnership agreement requires that such monies be kept in a trust account, and the Respondent's failure to do so could not, therefore, constitute fraud or misrepresentation. Even if the contract were construed arguably to require that funds be placed in a trust account, certainly there are equally valid arguments that is does not. In Count Eight of the Complaint the Respondent is charged with fraud, misrepresentation, and dishonest dealing in connection with his handling of the affairs of a Florida limited partnership know as Randag Properties Ltd. During 1976 the Respondent was the sole general partner of Randag Properties Ltd. The partnership owned property which it was seeking to develop into apartments. The Respondent was responsible for carrying on the partnership business. The property consisted of more than 40 acres on a river and a navigable canal. Part of the property was a small appendage which contributed little to the development potential of the property. In order to raise money to prepare the property for development, the Respondent sold the appendage to an ajoining property owner. That transaction closed on or about May 28, 1976. The Respondent had contributed more than $30,000 of his own money to the partnership in order to prepare the property for development. These expenditures included attorneys fees that he had incurred; a boundary survey, a high tide location survey, and a topographical survey; fees to the Florida Secretary of State's office; real estate taxes; land clearing expenses; and various miscellaneous expenditures. The Respondent had also made an advance to one of the limited partners. The Respondent applied most of the proceeds from the sale of the appendage to compensate himself for the expenditures that he had incurred. The Respondent had a disagreement with one of the limited partners, Mr. Swartz, as to whether the proceeds of the sale should be applied to compensate the limited partners for their initial investment or the Respondent for his expenditures. The Respondent's applying the proceeds to compensate himself does not appear to be contrary to the partnership agreement and it does appear that he had validly incurred expenses on behalf of the partnership to which he was entitled to be compensated. The Respondent ultimately resigned as the general partner on October 12, 1976, in order to save the partnership from the consequences of his bankruptcy, and was replaced by Swartz. Early in October, 1976, the Respondent issued a promissory note to the partnership, but there was no showing that this promissory note was the consequence of any fraud, but rather that it was for the purpose of placing the partnership in a favorable position in relation to the Respondent's bankruptcy. The Respondent ended up losing money through his participation in the partnership while the limited partners ended by making a substantial profit. All of the limited partners were advised of the sale of the appendage either prior to the sale or shortly after. There is no requirement in the partnership agreement that they be advised in advance of the sale, or that they assent to it. The Respondent is charged in Count Nine of the Complaint with fraud, misrepresentation, and dishonest dealing in connection with a business transaction that he had with William K. Gamble and Dorothy V. Gamble. The allegations in essence are that the Respondent received loans from the Gambles, and that he pledged certain property as security for the loans. He was required under the terms of the promissory notes and the collateral assignment that accompanied them to provide other adequate security in the event that he sold any of the property that served as collateral for the loans. It is alleged that the Respondent sold the property, did not advise the Gambles, and did not substitute any other property as security for the promissory notes. The only testimony offered to establish that the property that served as collateral was sold was the testimony of Mrs. Dorothy V. Gamble. Mrs. Gamble had no direct knowledge that the property was in fact sold. It is apparent from the evidence that the Respondent has defaulted on the promissory notes. In Count Ten of the Complaint it is alleged that the Respondent failed to maintain a deposit in his trust account in connection with a real estate transaction involving Herbert J. Haase and Katherine M. Haase, as trustees, the sellers, and Loyal H. Tingley as purchaser. In Count Eleven it is alleged that the Respondent converted all or part of the deposit to his own use. On or about August 6, 1976, Tingley entered into a contract to purchase property from the Haases. Herbert Haase was a real estate salesman employed in the Respondent's real estate firm, and he held title to the subject property in trust. The Respondent was the actual owner. Tom Carpenter, another salesman employed in the Respondent's firm, was the sales man in the transaction. Tingley delivered a $5,000 check to Carpenter as a deposit on the transaction. Another real estate broker, a Mr. Himmelrick, had negotiated mortgage modifications in connection with the sale. He and the mortgage bank insisted that the deposit be placed in Himmelrick's trust account. Accordingly, the Respondent deposited the $5,000 check from Tingley into his trust account, and delivered a $5,000 check from his trust account to Himmelrick. Carpenter advised Tingley that Himmelrick and the bank insisted upon having the $5,000 deposited in Himmelrick's trust account prior to the time that the check was forwarded from the Respondent's trust account to Himmelrick. Tingley consented to that arrangement. While it is true that the Respondent did not keep the $5,000 deposit in his trust account, his failure to do so was with the consent of the purchaser, and resulted only in the deposit being placed in the trust account of a participating realtor. The evidence would not sustain a finding that the Respondent converted any part of the deposit to his own use. In Count Twelve of the Complaint it is alleged that the Respondent issued over 22 checks drawn on his trust account wherein said checks were not honored for payment for the reason of insufficient funds; that the Respondent placed funds in his trust account that did not come from valid trust account sources; and that the Respondent caused his account to have a negative closing balance on May 13, 1876. The evidence would not sustain any finding that the Respondent issued checks which were not honored for payment. It is apparent from the bank records that several checks issued by the Respondent drawn on his trust account were not covered by the balance in the trust account. Bank records indicated a "OC" next to such withdrawals on the ledger sheets. The bank witnesses testified, however, that frequently such entries are honored by the bank and are not returned due to the insufficient funds. The evidence would not sustain a finding that the Respondent placed money in his trust account that came from sources there were not proper for placing in a trust account. Nothing in the bank records offered into evidence demonstrates which deposits may not have been valid trust account deposits. The deposit slips merely show the payor of the checks. The bank records do reveal that the Respondent's trust account balance in the Palmer Bank of Ft. Myers on May 13, 1976 was a negative balance of $732.60. On September 29, 1978, the Florida Real Estate Commission entered its final order finding the Respondent guilty of a of a violation of the Real Estate License Law. The Respondent's registration as a real estate broker was suspended for a period of ninety days. The Real Estate Commission Case Number was Progress Docket Number 3130. All of the events involved in the instant proceeding occurred prior to the time that the final order was entered in Case Number 3130 and indeed prior to the time that the Complaint was issued in Case Number 3130. The Respondent has enjoyed a very good reputation in his community for fair dealing, truthfulness and competence. None of the acts which the Respondent committed that led to the instant proceedings show that the Respondent has engaged in a course of conduct or in practices which demonstrate that he is so incompetent, negligent, dishonest and untruthful that the money, property, transactions and rights of others may not safely be entrusted to him. The Administrative Complaint in Case Number 3130 before the Florida Real Estate Commission was issued on January 14, 1977. In included twenty-seven counts. All of the allegations related to the Respondent's dealings with various real estate salesman, and his alleged failure to share real estate commissions with the salesmen. In connection with the transactions involved, it was asserted in several counts that the Respondent failed to place deposits properly in his trust account. None of the charges in the first administrative complaint are grounded upon the facts alleged in the instant Administrative Complaint. The facts involved in the instant proceeding did, however, all occur at about the same time as the facts alleged in the first complaint, and all occurred prior to the date that the Administrative Complaint was filed in Case Number 3130. New facts came to the attention of the Commission due in part to comments made to one of the present real estate commissioners by a Ft. Myers resident. With diligent inquiry it is possible that the Commission could have discovered the facts which have resulted in the instant proceeding and included them as additional counts in the complaint in Case Number 3130. It has not, however, been shown that the Commission had reason to believe that it should make such diligent search and inquiry. B
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioners are entitled to recover against the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund and, if so, the priority of payment to be applied to their claim. A secondary issue is whether claimants who gave notice prior to Petitioners are entitled to payment or whether they have waived or abandoned their claims.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulations filed by the parties and the documentary evidence, I make the following findings of fact: The Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund (the "fund") was created in 1977 to provide recovery for any person who meets all of the conditions prescribed in Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. The Department is charged to disburse the fund according to Section 494.044, Florida Statutes. Section 494.043, Florida Statutes, (Supp.1986) provides: Any person who was a party to a mortgage financing transaction shall be eligible to seek recovery from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund if: The person has recorded a final judgment issued by a Florida court of competent jurisdiction in any action wherein the cause of action was based on s. 494.042(2); The person has caused to be issued a writ of execution upon such judgment and the officer executing the same has made a return showing that no personal or real property of the judgment debtor liable to be levied upon in satisfaction of the judgment can be found or that the amount realized on the sale of the judgment debtor's property pursuant to such execution was insufficient to satisfy the judgment; The person has made all reasonable searches and inquiries to ascertain whether the judgment debtor possesses real or personal property of other assets subject to being sold or applied in satisfaction of the judgment, and by his search he has discovered no property or assets or he has discovered property and assets and has taken all necessary action and proceedings for the application thereof to the judgment, but the amount thereby realized was insufficient to satisfy the judgment; The person has applied any amounts recovered from the judgment debtor, or from any other source, to the damages awarded by the court. The person, at the time the action was instituted, gave notice and provided a copy of the complaint to the division by certified mail; however, the requirement of a timely giving of notice may be waived by the department upon a showing of good cause; and The act for which recovery is sought occurred on or after September 1, 1977. Recovery of the increased benefits allowable pursuant to the amendments to s. 494.044 which are effective October 1, 1985, shall be based on a cause of action which arose on or after that date. The requirements of paragraphs (1)(a),(b),(c),(d), and (e) are not applicable if the licensee or registrant upon which the claim is sought has filed for bankruptcy or has been adjudicated bankruptcy; however, in such event the claimant shall file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings and shall notify the department by certified mail of the claim by enclosing a copy of the proof of claim and all supporting documents. Pertinent to this case, Section 494.044, Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1986) Provides: Any Person who meets all of the conditions Prescribed in s 494.043 may apply to the department for payment to be made to such person from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund in the amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of that person's judgment or judgments or $20,000, whichever is less, but only to the extent and amount reflected in the judgment as being actual or compensatory damages. As to claims against any one licensee or registrant, payments shall be made to all persons meeting the requirements of s. 494.043 upon the expiration of 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received by the department. Persons who give notice after 2 years from the date the first complete and valid notice is received and who otherwise comply with the conditions precedent to recovery may recovery from any remaining portion of the $100,000 aggregate, in an amount equal to the unsatisfied portion of that person's judgment or $20,000, whichever is less, but only to the extent and amount reflected in the judgment as being actual or compensatory damages, with claims being paid in the order notice is received until the $100,000 aggregate has been fully disbursed. * * * (3) Payments for claims shall be limited in the aggregate to $100,000, regardless of the number of claimants involved, against any one mortgage broker or registrant. If the total claims exceed the aggregate limit of $100,000, the department shall prorate the payment based on the ratio that the person's claim bears to the total claims filed. The first notice received by the Department alleging a claim against Barry Koltun or Oakland Mortgage Company was filed on August 13, 1984. This notice was filed on behalf of John and Mary Ahern. The Department utilized this notice in computing the two-year period addressed in Section 494.044(1), Florida Statutes. For purposes of recovery from the fund, the individual mortgage broker (Koltun) and the company qualified by the broker (Oakland) are treated as one. Petitioners filed an initial notice of their claim against the fund on October 16, 1985. This claim was asserted against Oakland Mortgage Company, Barry Koltun and Robert Tamarro. On January 23, 1987, the Department issued a "Notice of Intent to Grant or Deny Payment from the Mortgage Brokerage Guaranty Fund Re Oakland Mortgage Company." This notice outlined the status of some thirteen claims which had given notice of their civil actions against the licensee within the two year period. Two claimants, Kusich and Szafran, had provided all documentation required by Section 494.043, Florida Statutes; consequently, they were approved for payment. The Petitioner's claim was denied because they had allegedly failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes and had failed to do so prior to August 12, 1986 (the end of the two year period). The Petitioners timely filed a petition for formal Chapter 120 proceedings challenging the Department's denial of their claim for payment. Subsequent to January 23, 1987, Petitioners completed the conditions precedent for recovery and submitted all documentation required to satisfy the requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. On July 6, 1987, the Department received notice and a claim from the Intervenors. This claim satisfied the requirements of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes. Of the thirteen original claims filed, only two claimants (Kusich and Szafran) completed all conditions of Section 494.043, Florida Statutes, on or before August 12, 1986.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, enter a Final Order finding the claims of Rusich and Szafran eligible for payment, and that the claim of Petitioners be evaluated as part of the second class established in Section 494.044(1), Florida Statutes, DONE and RECOMMENDED this 1st day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul A. Zeigler, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A. Suite 1010, Monroe Park Tower 101 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul C. Stadler, Jr., Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Division of Finance Suite 1302 The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Joseph Degance, Esquire 1995 East Oakland Park Boulevard Suite 101 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Jack F. Weins, Esquire Boca Bank Building Suite 200 855 South Federal Highway Boca Raton, Florida 33432 Morey Udine, Esquire 3111 University Drive Suite 425 Coral Springs, Florida 32065-6930 Hon. Gerald Lewis Department of Banking and Finance Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 =================================================================
