The Issue The issue is whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over an alleged unlawful employment practice which occurred on the premises of a federal enclave.
Findings Of Fact Respondent asserts that Petitioner's allegations arose during her employment at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Respondent also asserts that Petitioner never worked for it in Florida at a site other than Eglin Air Force Base. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief do not refute these assertions. It is uncontested that Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, is a federal enclave. The land on which the base is located was ceded by the State of Florida to the United States on April 26, 1937. At that time, the federal government was given exclusive jurisdiction over the land. The cession deed was recorded on April 27, 1937, and states as follows in pertinent part: I Fred P. Cone, Governor of the State of Florida, in the name and by the authority of said State and pursuant to the statutes of said State in such cases made and provided, do hereby cede to the United States of America, exclusive jurisdiction over said lands so acquired. Secretary of State (Florida), Deeds, Book A, pages 349-352.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order determining that the Division of Administrative Hearings does not have jurisdiction over the issues raised in the instant Petition for Relief and dismissing said petition with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Cynthia K. Faulconer 145 Wright Circle Niceville, Florida 32578 Edmund J. McKenna, Esquire Ford and Harrison, LLP Suite 900 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On August 14, 1980, respondent Warwick G. Cahill applied to the Board of Pilot Commissioners for certification to take the examination to become a deputy pilot. To the questions on the application "Have you ever been a party in a criminal proceeding?" and "Have you ever been arrested?," respondent answered "No." On April 16, 1975, respondent was arrested and charged with "driving under the influence" in violation of Section 316.028, Florida Statutes. He was convicted of the misdemeanor charge, his driver's license was suspended for ninety days, he was fined $150.00 and he was placed on probation for six months. Respondent's record shows no prior or subsequent involvement in any criminal or traffic court proceedings. On November 24, 1976, respondent applied for tug employment with the St. Phillip Towing Company. On that application, the following responses were made to the question: "Have you ever been arrested?": Yes, one time, on charges of DWI. On August 4, 1980, Rickie Wayne Baggett applied to the Board of Pilot Commissioners to take the same pilot's examination for which the respondent had applied. To the question, "Have you ever been arrested?," Mr. Baggett answered "Yes," explaining that he had been arrested for driving while intoxicated and his license had been suspended for one year. In the space provided for him to state his driver's license number, Mr. Baggett noted that it had been suspended for one year. At a meeting held on September 5, 1980, the Board of Pilot Commissioners considered the applications of respondent and Mr. Baggett, along with others, to take the October 17, 1980, examination for certificated deputy pilot. The Board unanimously approved a motion to give conditional approval to the applicants Baggett and Cahill pending the receipt of information confirming their maritime background. At a later date, both Baggett and respondent were certified as eligible to take the October 17, 1980 pilot's examination. An investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation who has routinely investigated matters pertaining to licensed pilots since March of 1980 has never been requested to investigate any pilot for a DWI-related offense. The respondent's DWI offense was discovered during an investigation concerning an unrelated matter. While fully aware of the fact that he had been arrested for a driving while intoxicated charge, respondent Cahill claims to have forgotten about the arrest at the time he made application for examination and did not realize that such was a criminal proceeding. Mr. Cahill was born in Australia, came to the United States in 1972 and is a naturalized citizen.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed on November 9, 1981, as amended on March 16, 1982, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 21st day of July, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: W. B. Ewers, Esquire Suite 204 2170 S. E. 17th Street Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33316 C. Steven Yerrid, Esquire Holland & Knight Post Office Box 1288 Tampa, Florida 33601 Jane Raker, Executive Director Board of Pilot Commissioners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, Milos, illegally terminated Petitioner based on her race (Black), in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act ("FCRA"), section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2018).
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of material and relevant fact: Petitioner is a Black female who worked for Milos as a line cook. Respondent is a Greek restaurant located in Miami, Florida. On January 12, 2016, Respondent hired Petitioner for a line cook position. Petitioner was interviewed and hired by Arsan. Arsan supervises all back-of-the-house staff and was Petitioner's supervisor throughout her entire 20-month period of employment. On May 30, 2016, approximately four and a half months after Petitioner's hire at Milos, Arsan gave Petitioner a raise in pay because he felt that she was performing well. Many of the employees Arsan supervises at Milos are Black. PETITIONER'S PERFORMANCE ISSUES AT MILOS On September 23, 2016, Petitioner was suspended for insubordination and violating company policies and procedures. Resp. Ex. 7 and 8. More specifically, Arsan was notified by the sous chef that there had been an argument between Petitioner and a coworker. Arsan attempted to investigate the dispute and found Petitioner to be very emotional and aggressive during the investigation. She was asked to leave but refused. Eventually, she left the premises. This incident came on the heels of another similar incident involving a verbal argument with a coworker, which occurred on September 17, 2016. Subsequently, on April 28, 2017, Petitioner was involved in another workplace argument with an employee named Rosa Salazar ("Salazar"). Resp. Ex. 10. The manager on duty intervened and attempted to resolve the dispute and calm the parties down. After he did so, Petitioner left work without permission and left early the following day as well. On June 27, 2017, a third employee named Ishay (a.k.a., Ayse Akbulut) complained that she could not work with Petitioner at their assigned station because Petitioner was "being rude and territorial." Resp. Ex. 11. Arsan spoke to Petitioner and resolved the matter between the two employees. However, he documented the incident as other employees had previously complained about Petitioner creating a hostile working environment. On June 30, 2017, Petitioner reportedly was involved in yet another workplace incident with Sonya Cabret ("Cabret"). Cabret complained that Petitioner made racially charged and demeaning comments to her based on Cabret's Haitian national origin. More specifically, Cabret complained that Petitioner called her an "ignorant Haitian," a "f ing Haitian," and stated that Cabret does not know how to speak English and that Cabret could not find a job anywhere else. Two months prior, Salazar had also complained that Petitioner made derogatory remarks to her based on Salazar's Latin ethnicity. Resp. Ex. 12 and 13. Salazar recounted that Petitioner had called her a "f ing Latino." Arsan disciplined Petitioner by counseling her and sending her home for the day. Each of the above incidents occurred prior to Hurricane Irma in September 2017. The undersigned finds that these incidents, and their related warnings and discipline, are relevant to the ultimate decision to discharge Petitioner and have some bearing on the propriety and necessity for termination. PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO RETURN TO WORK AFTER HURRICANE IRMA At some point in time on Wednesday, September 6, 2017, Arsan informed all employees that Milos would be closed at the end of the work day due to the approaching landfall of Hurricane Irma. Petitioner had been scheduled to report to work on September 6, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., but she did not do so. At 12:40 p.m. on September 6, 2017, Petitioner texted Arsan that she could not report to work because she was evacuating to Georgia due to Hurricane Irma. However, she hoped to return to work the following Tuesday (September 12, 2017). Resp. Ex. 14. After the hurricane had passed, on September 10, 2017, Arsan sent a group text message to all back-of-the-house staff alerting them that the restaurant was "closed for Monday" (September 11, 2017) and "we will be probably open for Tuesday" (September 12, 2017). Resp. Ex. 15. Petitioner received this text message. Petitioner never informed Arsan that she would not be back from Georgia by September 12, 2017, as she mentioned in her text message on September 6, 2017. Believing Petitioner would be back in Miami on September 12, 2017, Arsan scheduled Petitioner to work Wednesday, September 13, 2017. Resp. Ex. 16. On September 13, 2017, Petitioner did not call in or report for work. That same day, Arsan called Petitioner to find out why she did not report to work. Petitioner did not answer or return Arsan's call. On September 14, 2017, Petitioner again failed to call in or report for work. Arsan again attempted to reach Petitioner by telephone, but she did not answer. Arsan then sent Petitioner a text message notifying her that she was scheduled to be at work. Petitioner responded to Arsan's text messages on September 14, 2017, and the following discussion ensued: Arsan: "Denise you are scheduled to work today[.]" Petitioner: "Nobody called me and told me anything I cannot get out until Tuesday or Wednesday I'll [sic] area was hit bad and the bus is [sic] down here start running Wednesday[.]" Arsan: "Denise everybody is at work except you. How the bus starting [sic] on wednesday, [sic] half of staff is using the bus and they are here, The buses working [sic] fine." Petitioner: "When you come to my family I don't care about no job [sic] that's not my life we had an emergency down here we don't have any lights some of the buses is not running my house got water in it I am coming from Georgia so I might not be back until Thursday I have a lot of stuff to take care of in my house[.]" Arsan: "Please help let [sic] me understand your situation are you in Miami? or Georgia? Petitioner: I will be in Miami tonight I still have a lot of stuff to do at my. . . . Resp. Ex. 14. Arsan and Petitioner did not have any further communications after this text message exchange. Further, Petitioner did not initiate or attempt to send any more text messages to Arsan after the September 14, 2017, exchange. Petitioner did not report for work scheduled on September 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, or 20. Petitioner testified that she did not report to work from September 13, 2017, to September 20, 2017, because she was attending to damage to her home caused by the hurricane. Based on Petitioner's text message that she does not "care about no job [sic]," Arsan, after consulting with Milos' outside contracted human resource company, removed Petitioner from the schedule for the week of Monday, September 18, 2017, to Sunday, September 24, 2017. On September 21, 2017, Petitioner showed up at Milos to work. Arsan believed Petitioner had abandoned her job and did not expect her to report to work again. After she arrived, Arsan directed Petitioner to speak to Faundez, Milos' outside human resource representative at Eleva Solutions. Contrary to what Petitioner told Arsan (i.e., that she missed work because she was attending to damage in her home from the hurricane), Petitioner gave Faundez three different reasons for her failure to call in or show up for work the preceding week: she did not know that she was supposed to be at work; there was no bus transportation; and (c) Petitioner had to be evacuated. Faundez concluded that Petitioner's reasons for failing to appear for work were inconsistent and conflicted with each other. She also did not believe that Petitioner had provided a definitive or plausible answer explaining why she had not returned to work. After consultation, Faundez and Arsan decided together to terminate Petitioner's employment. Arsan was not the sole decision-maker with respect to Petitioner's termination. Prior to her termination and despite having received Respondent's antidiscrimination policy and complaint procedures, Petitioner never complained that Arsan was discriminating against her because of her race. During the course of the hearing, Petitioner was unable to identify any employee(s) outside of her protected class who engaged in the same conduct and were not terminated from employment. Specifically, on cross-examination, Petitioner admitted that she was unable to identify a single non-Black employee who failed to show up for work following the hurricane and who was not terminated from employment. The evidence Petitioner offered to support her race discrimination claim was vague, unpersuasive, and included only conclusory and general allegations by her that Arsan "was a racist" and is a "nasty human being." There were no emails, texts, documents, or other direct evidence from Petitioner or Arsan supporting her claim that she was fired by Milos because of her race. Likewise, Petitioner called no witnesses to offer any compelling facts or circumstances to support her claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief with prejudice and find in Respondent's favor. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 2018.
The Issue Whether the demotion of the Petitioner by the Respondent from an Airplane Pilot I to an Engineering Technician II position was supported by competent substantial evidence and complied with the Florida Statutes and rules and regulations.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner John Clarkson was demoted by Respondent Department of Agriculture, Division of Forestry, after Petitioner failed to receive a satisfactory rating after having received ratings of "conditional" for a period of six months. The ratings were discussed and signed by the Petitioner. By certified letter, return receipt requested, dated April 15, 1976, the Petitioner was formally advised that the Commissioner of the Florida Department of Agriculture had approved his Division Director's recommendation that Respondent be demoted. Petitioner filed his appeal of the Respondent's action on May 6, 1976. On May 18, 1976, the Petitioner was notified by the Career Service Commission that his appeal had been accepted. Petitioner twice requested a continuation of the requested administrative hearing and subsequently filed a Motion for Default and Directed Verdict or Judgment on the pleadings. A response was filed and thereafter, the Motion was withdrawn by Petitioner. Petitioner is a 30-year State employee and has served more than twenty (20) years with the Department of Agriculture. He currently is employed by Respondent as an Engineering Technician II. The Petitioner admits that the demotion of Aircraft Pilot I to Engineering Technician II was procedurally correct and the essence of his argument against the demotion is that the Respondent concentrated on finding "little picky things" about the employee and used these to fortress his demotion. Petitioner contends: That matters in the Petitioner's personal record before 1975 should not be considered. That the major allegations of Respondent were related to his non- flying duties and that the demotion concerned his duties as an Airplane Pilot I. That the charges of tardiness, wasting time, inability to perform non-flying duties were, even if supported by competent and substantial evidence, immaterial to the issue. That Petitioner's actions in relation to a ferrying plane trip to California in 1975 did not endanger the life of colleagues or aircraft; that Petitioner was justified in his takeoff from an airport on a hot day and on his leaving the group on its return to Tallahassee on the said trip. That inaccuracies in reporting; fires, which was a major part of his duties, were not confined to Petitioner and that he considered it better to be "safe than sorry" than save a little money when reporting fires, and that further, he "called them as he saw them." That the supervisors and superiors failed to meet with Petitioner as required and were more intent on building up Petitioner's deficiencies than in trying to help him. Respondent contends: That Petitioner failed to follow instructions of his supervisors. Petitioner failed to adequately perform duties as fire control spotter pilot, which resulted in crews being dispatched unnecessarily. That Petitioner's ratings, letters of reprimand, memorandums, throughout his career showed he failed to follow instructions in performing his job adequately. The Hearing Officer further finds: Petitioner presented evidence and testimony relative to his employment prior to 1975. Contrary to the contentions of the Petitioner, the position of Airplane Pilot I includes not only flying duties and responsibilities of the fire patrol, it includes much paper work such as drawing and tracing and revising plans, revising maps, making maps, handling orders, disseminating fire weather forecasts to field offices, and the coordination of related incoming reports. Work with others is an integral part of the employment. An examination of the voluminous records submitted and entered into evidence at the hearing show that the Petitioner has had an employment history of conflict with his employer for a number of years and the same type of criticism continued from year to year up to the date of Petitioner's demotion. The Respondent presented evidence to show that Petitioner had been sent memorandums calling his attention to numerous complaints about the quality of his work and relationship with other people including many other employees of Respondent. Evidence was submitted to show Petitioner's repeated failure to follow instructions of his superiors. Evidence was submitted showing that during the years of Petitioner's employment there were some "conditional" ratings; some ratings below satisfactory; one previous demotion; memorandums citing Petitioner for failure to perform duties adequately; complaints from passengers, which ultimately resulted in the revision of Petitioner's duties so that he did not carry passengers. Taken as a whole, the various memorandums concerning Petitioner show that contrary to the contention of Petitioner, the supervisors and superiors endeavored to work with Petitioner and were consistently trying to fit him into the work organization so that he could work within his capacities. Other employees were moved within the Division to fill in where the Petitioner was deficient. The charges of tardiness, wasting time, poor work product, go directly to the employment of the Petitioner and no competent evidence was submitted to show that these charges were inaccurate. It was not conclusively shown that Petitioner actually endangered the lives of colleagues or aircraft on a September, 1975 flight to California from Florida during his ferrying duties, however Petitioner failed to follow prior instructions and caused confusion among the other members of the group on that trip. On one occasion he left the group without permission of the designated leader and the group was forced to change its plans and land at a different location. Petitioner failed to follow instructions, left the group and teak off and had to be called back. On the return trip to Tallahassee he left the group and returned to Tallahassee before the others contrary to flight plans that the group remain together. A hot day and eagerness to return home from a trip is insufficient reason to disobey instructions of supervisors. The fire logs show that Petitioner made relatively more errors in reporting fires than the other reporters and evidence was shown that errors wasted money and caused loss of needed services elsewhere. The report of fires was a central part of Petitioner's employment duties. Petitioner is an experienced and evidentally, good pilot, but the evidence shows he fails to follow closely the instructions of his supervisors in relation to his duties and is deficient in his non-flying work. He fails to work well with other employees.
Recommendation Affirm the action of the Agency in demoting Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Walter Kelly, Esquire Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Department of Legal Affairs Appeals Coordinator The Capitol Building Department of Administration Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Esquire DUVALL & COULTER Mr. Jerry Gullo 118 S. Gadsden Street Department of Agriculture Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Just 1 More Bar and Grill (hereinafter the "Bar"), discriminated against Petitioner, Mildred R. Smith, by refusing her entry into the Bar due to her race, African-American.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American woman. The Bar is a Florida sole proprietorship which operates as an establishment selling alcohol for consumption on the premises. Despite its name, there is no grill or food service at the Bar. The Bar is owned by Kerry Winkler, a Caucasian male. On or about May 8, 2011, Petitioner was going to meet a male friend at an establishment across the street from the Bar. Petitioner could not remember the exact date, but thought it was in April or May. Petitioner was accompanied by a female friend. Petitioner and her female friend had just left church, and it was approximately three or four o'clock on a Sunday afternoon. Upon arrival at the male friend's establishment, no one was there. Petitioner decided to go into the Bar to have a beer while she waited. Her companion did not join her. Petitioner recounts that as she started to enter the Bar, a man stood in the doorway, held out his hand, and said, "You can't come in here." Nothing more was said. The man was a large white man and wearing a "biker's jacket" with a rag on his head. He had a large mustache. Petitioner says that she could see into the Bar and that all the patrons in the Bar were white. She turned around and walked back to her car. As she crossed the parking lot, a man sitting on a motorcycle said, "Man, that was quick." Petitioner concluded that she had been discriminated against because of her race. She believed she had been denied admission to the Bar because she is African-American. She filed a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations about the incident. In her verified complaint, Petitioner said that she "was met by a white female (Kerry Winkler) who told me I could not enter the building and that I was not welcome there." Under oath at the final hearing, Petitioner said that she could not explain her verified statement to the Commission, because she remembers being met by a large white male, not a woman. She did not know why the name Kerry Winkler was in her signed statement. Kerry Winkler, the owner of the Bar, is, in fact, a Caucasian male. At the final hearing, Petitioner was introduced to Kerry Winkler; she said he was not the man who met her at the door of the Bar. No one associated with the Bar knows who the man was that Petitioner met at the front door. There are no employees fitting his description and neither the owner, nor patrons at the Bar, recognized the person Petitioner described. Several regular patrons of the Bar testified at final hearing. Each of them was an African-American male. Each affirmed the Bar's open policy of allowing all people to come into the Bar. None of them had ever witnessed any discriminatory behavior at the Bar, especially by the owner who they all knew and respected. Neither the owner, nor his wife (who was likely operating the Bar on the day in question), could identify the person that Petitioner described. No one by that description is an employee or otherwise affiliated with the Bar. Neither the owner, nor his wife, was aware that Petitioner had allegedly been denied admission into the Bar until several months after the fact. They received notice of the allegation from the Commission well after the fact. Petitioner did not contact the Bar after the fact to make a complaint or report the alleged incident.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Mildred R. Smith in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mildred R. Smith Post Office Box 4158 Lake Wales, Florida 33859 Robert H. Grizzard, II, Esquire Robert H. Grizzard, II, P.A. Post Office Box 992 Lakeland, Florida 33802-0992
The Issue Whether the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) correctly determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim of unlawful employment discrimination because the complaint was received more than 365 days after the date of the alleged violation?
Findings Of Fact AAR Corp. (AAR) is an aviation support company which provides maintenance, repair, and overhaul services to air carriers at various facilities through the United States. AAR uses its own employees in addition to utilizing employees from its temporary staffing company, AMS. When AAR’s business increases, it increases its workforce by adding workers from AMS. When AAR experiences a downturn in business, it similarly reduces its workforce, typically, by reducing workers from AMS through layoffs. Business is usually slow for AAR and AMS during the peak airline travel times, including summer and the winter holidays. Business of AAR and AMS is also affected by AAR's contracts with major airline carriers for scheduled and non-scheduled maintenance to aircraft. Magri was hired by AMS on October 27, 2011, as a Sheet Metal mechanic at the AAR Miami International Airport facility. She began work January 16, 2012, and at all times material hereto, worked as an Interior Mechanic for AMS. Magri's last day physically working for AMS was October 10, 2013. In 2013, Pedro Estrada (Estrada) became Magri's immediate supervisor. According to Magri, Estrada frequently subjected Magri to sexual jokes, graphic comments about her body, and requests for sexual favors.2/ At the end of September or beginning of October 2013, Estrada came up behind Magri and placed his penis against her buttocks in a sexual manner. Shortly after making a sexual harassment complaint about her supervisor in September 2013, Magri was given a disciplinary memo for poor performance on October 4, 2013. Although there is no prior record of written discipline against Magri, this memo notified her that this was a "final warning" and any future violations could result in termination. On October 10, 2013, Magri was sent home by her then immediate supervisor, Plamen Ilonov (Ilonov), Manager of Interior, allegedly due to a lack of work. Approximately eight other AMS workers were laid off for the same reason on that date. AMS employees were aware of a likely work slowdown at that time because US Airways cancelled its contract with AAR in the fall of 2013 due to US Airways impending merger with American Airlines. However, neither Magri, nor her co-workers, were told by Human Resources or their supervisors, the anticipated duration of the layoff. In fact, it was common practice for AMS employees to be laid off and then returned to work within a week to a month due to the workflow fluctuations. This happened to Magri for a month in 2012. Laid off employees, including Magri, were directed to regularly call or text their supervisor to see when work was available. AMS had no system of notifying employees whether a layoff would be long or short term. When a layoff was anticipated to be long term, the AMS worker was removed from the Human Resources payroll system and internal paperwork was generated indicating termination, however, the employee was not notified of their status other than "lay off." At the time of an anticipated long-term layoff, the AMS Human Resources Department also deactivated the worker's security badge that would provide access to the facility. However, the employee was not asked to return the badge, nor was the employee advised that the badge was inactive. When she was sent home on October 10, Magri was instructed by Ilonov to check with him regarding when she might be returned to the work schedule. At this time she was not aware a decision was made that she would likely be laid off more than a month. For the next two weeks, Magri called and sent text messages to Ilonov looking for clarification as to when she might be returned to work. Magri sent a text message to Ilonov on October 11 asking "Why me." Ilonov responded that 10 people were affected, not just Magri. Magri asked, "Plamen do you think its [sic] layoff will take long time?" On October 12, after receiving no response, Magri texted Ilonov, "Good morning, Plamen, do you think I have to take out my tool box?" Ilonov replied, "Good morning, it is possible. I don't see much next 2-3 months." In a telephone conversation this same week, Ilonov indicated to Magri that work might be available October 21 if United Airlines planes arrived for service. Based on this, Magri had a legitimate expectation that she would be returned to the schedule. On October 20, Magri sent a text to Ilonov stating, "Do you don't [sic] know how long? I'm very scared without work." Ilonov did not reply. During this week, several employees were called to return to work. Ilonov did not return Magri to work because he only called back those he considered his "best" workers. On October 24, Magri sent several text messages to Ilonov seeking an explanation of when she might return to work or why she wasn't called back. Ilonov responded that he was calling whoever he thought he needed, and "We are really slowing down, and soon more changes." On October 25, Magri went to the facility to speak directly with Ilonov. During this meeting he made it clear to Magri for the first time that it was not his decision whether to put her back on the schedule, and that he did not think the "higher ups" wanted her to return. He told her he could not tell her anything further and that she would need to contact the Maintenance Manager, Luiz Gonzalez (Gonzalez). This was the first time Magri realized that this would not be a short-term layoff. At some point shortly thereafter, Magri spoke to Gonzalez by telephone, who told her she needed to look for alternative employment. Respondent maintains two conflicting factual assertions. Respondent contends the decision to terminate Magri's employment was made on October 10, 2013, as evidenced by its internal removal of Magri from the payroll system and the deactivation of her employee security badge (neither of which Magri was aware). Alternatively, Respondent claims there was no decision to terminate Magri and that she remains eligible for rehire. Regardless of whether Magri's separation from employment was a termination or long-term layoff, the earliest Magri knew or should have known that she suffered adverse action was October 24, 2013, when she became aware that although some of her co-workers were being immediately called back to work, she was not. Accordingly, Magri's charge, filed on October 16, 2014, which is 357 days from the alleged violation, was timely with regard to her claim of sex discrimination and retaliation arising from her termination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations decline jurisdiction of Petitioner's charge of sexual harassment, which allegedly occurred prior to October 10, 2013, and take jurisdiction of Petitioner's charge of sex discrimination and retaliation arising from her separation from employment on October 24, 2013. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of February, 2016.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 10, 1989, Petitioner, Mark Cleveland, a male, applied through Job Service of Florida, for employment as a telemarketer with Respondent, Sears Roebuck and Company at the Sears store located in Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner had several years of sales experience with at least six months of experience in telemarketing. He also had a good speaking voice as evidenced by the fact that he is currently employed as a disc jockey at a local radio station. Clearly, Respondent was qualified for the telemarketing position. The telemarketer position would enable Petitioner to earn approximately $85.00 a week or $365.50 a month. The telemarketing section at the Pensacola Sears store consisted of virtually all women with perhaps three or four rare male telemarketers. Petitioner had two separate interviews with two different Sears employees responsible for filling the telemarketing positions. During the Petitioner's interviews with the two Sears employees, Petitioner was repeatedly questioned on whether he could work with all women or mostly all women and be supervised by women. Petitioner assured his interviewers that he could since he grew up with six sisters and in general liked working with women. Petitioner left the interview with the information that he would be hired after another supervisor reviewed the applications and that he would be called once the supervisor's review was complete. After several days, Petitioner, being excited about what he thought was going to be his new job, called one of the two women who interviewed him. He was informed that the telemarketing positions had been filled. Later that same day Petitioner discovered that the positions had, in fact, not been filled and that he had been told an untruth. The telemarketing positions were eventually filled by women. Petitioner remained out of work for approximately four months before he was hired as a telemarketer by the Pensacola News Journal. A Notice of Assignment and Order was issued on August 27, 1991, giving the parties an opportunity to provide the undersigned with suggested dates and a suggested place for the formal hearing. The information was to be provided within ten days of the date of the Notice. This Notice was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent did not respond to the Notice. On October 10, 1991, a Notice of Hearing was issued setting the formal hearing for 11:00 a.m., September 11, 1990. The location of the hearing was listed in the Notice. The Notice of Hearing was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent's address and acknowledgment of this litigation was confirmed when Respondent filed its answer to the Petition for Relief with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Even though Respondent received adequate notice of the hearing in this matter, the Respondent did not appear at the place set for the formal hearing at the date and time specified on the Notice of Hearing. The Petitioner was present at the hearing. The Respondent did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned that it would not be able to appear at the formal hearing. After waiting fifteen minutes for the Respondent to appear, the hearing was commenced. As a consequence of Respondent's failure to appear, no evidence rebutting Petitioner's facts were introduced into evidence at the hearing and specifically no evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose was introduced at the hearing. 1/ Petitioner has established a prima facie case of discrimination based on his sex, given the fact that Sears tried to mislead him into believing the telemarketing positions had been filled when they had not, the positions were all eventually filled by women and Sears' clear concern over Petitioner's ability to work with women. Such facts lead to the reasonable inference that Sears was engaging in an unlawful employment practice based on Respondent being a male, a protected class, in order to preserve a female work force in telemarketing. Such discrimination based on sex is prohibited under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and Petitioner is entitled to relief from that discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Petitioner was the subject of an illegal employment practice and awarding Petitioner $1,462.00 in backpay plus reasonable costs of $100.95 and an attorney's fee of $2,550.00. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1992.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice, discrimination based on age and/or national origin, and/or retaliation against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Findings of Fact1 Petitioner,[Victor Bracamonte (Petitioner or Mr. Bracamonte)] is an [Hispanic] Peruvian man. His date of birth is September 14, 1955. Petitioner began working for Respondent, [Commercial Interior Contractor Corp. [(Respondent or CIC)] in Spring 2006 [on April 6, 2006] as a Superintendent. Respondent, a Florida corporation, has been in business since 1984. The Company is an interior finishing contractor, assisting private corporations and governmental entities with refinishing, renovations, or other projects. Eloise Gonzalez (Cuban; d/o/b- 8/17/62) is the founder and owner of Respondent. Ms. Gonzalez and three individuals work at Company's corporate office, which is located at 2500 N.W. 39th Street, Suite 100, in Miami. The rest of the Company's employees work at a contract [site] at the Miami International Airport("MIA"). In 2006, Respondent signed a contract with Parsons Odebrecht Joint Venture ("POJV") to perform certain general site requirement work related to the construction of new terminals and concourses at MIA. POJV is the general contractor that MIA assigned the overall task of building the new terminals. Respondent employees have worked on this project from 2006 through the present, acting as a support team for POJV with tasks such as lifting equipment, operating forklifts, and cleaning. Respondent employees at the POJV project are divided into two teams, with each team responsible for a different work area (one team in areas from Terminal B to Terminal C, and the other team in areas from Terminal C to Terminal D). Each team consists of Carpenters and General Laborers and is headed by a Superintendent. CIC also employs Operators at the POJV project, who drive a sweeper machine around the entire worksite and remove debris. Respondent does not have any employees at MIA who supervise the Superintendents, nor does the Company have anyone at the worksite that instructs the teams what needs to be done each day. The specific work of each of Respondent's teams on the POJV project is directed by management personnel from POJV. Ms. Gonzalez works out of the Company's corporate offices, which are approximately seven miles from MIA, and so she is not there to direct and control the daily activities of personnel on the POJV project. Ms. Gonzalez seldom visits the actual worksite, and estimates that she is there perhaps once every month or so. Ms. Gonzalez visits with POJV corporate personnel two or three times per month at their offices at MIA (which are in trailers at the airport), but this is at a location separate from the actual worksite. The purpose of those visits is to discuss general business items with POJV. Ultimately, Ms. Gonzalez relies on her Superintendents to be her eyes and ears at the worksite, and, of course, on POJV personnel (since they are the client and are directly involved in overseeing the work). As a result, decisions by Ms. Gonzalez to discipline and/or terminate employees are typically based on the information, recommendations, and/or requests of her Superintendents and/or POJV personnel. Since the POJV project takes place at the airport, employees have to be given clearance to work on the private property of MIA. Each employee must have various badges to access the airport and the project. For example, employees need an MIA Customs Identification badge, which gives them clearance to pass through the security area (. . . a separate commercial security area for workers, airport personnel, and other individuals providing service(s) to the airport), and a North Terminal Development badge, which gives them clearance to access the project itself. A Superintendent also needs a driver's badge, to allow them to drive a vehicle on private airport property. Respondent does not make the decisions about whether to give and/or take away a badge to anyone. The badges are issued by MIA (specifically, the Miami-Dade Aviation Department) and/or U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Respondent's employees meet at the employee parking lot at MIA in the morning, and each team drives to the worksite in a separate Company van. There are only a few Company employees who are allowed to drive the van(s). The vans travel from the parking lot, to the security area, and then to the worksite. Anyone driving the van at any time on airport grounds or anywhere else is required to follow any and all driving rules, such as following speed limits. On January 22, 2010, Petitioner was arrested at MIA by the Miami-Dade County Police. Petitioner was accused of stealing gas. He signed a Complaint/Arrest Affidavit on that same date. Petitioner's airport work badges were taken away by MIA as a result of his arrest. Petitioner has not worked for Respondent since the date of his arrest. Of the 24 current employees of Respondent, 10 of them are over the age of 40. Of these current employees, three of them are older than Petitioner: (1) Pedro Araujo (d/o/b - 6/7/54); (2) Moises Herrer (d/o/b - 7/11/53); and (3) Isidro Lopes (d/o/b - 7/6/48). One additional employee is only eight days younger than Petitioner: Edwin Torres (d/o/b - 9/22/55). Between Spring 2006 and January 2009 (the period of Petitioner's employment), the only other Peruvian employee terminated by Respondent was Marco Samanamud, whose employment was terminated in November 2008. Additional Findings of Fact2 Petitioner alleged that, in addition to discriminating against him based on age, Ms. Gonzalez discriminated against him because he is from Peru. He said he earned $25.32 an hour, when the prevailing rate for a superintendent was $31. Wages were set by the MIA aviation authority in the contract for services with CIC, not by Ms. Gonzalez. She has had contracts for work at the airport for twenty years. Before he worked for Respondent, Petitioner was employed by prior airport subcontractors doing the same kind of work for ten years. To explain why Ms. Gonzalez hired him but discriminates against Peruvians, Petitioner alleged that hiring him helped her get the contract for CIC. On November 18, 2008, Marco Samanamoud, who was also Peruvian, drove Petitioner in a CIC van, to a 1:30 p.m., eye doctor's appointment because he was going to have his pupils dilated. While he was still at the doctor's office, Petitioner received a call from Ms. Gonzalez who wanted to know who was driving the van. He told her that it was Marco Samanamoud. Marco Samanamoud, who is also Peruvian, was the only employee on their crew, other than Petitioner, who was allowed to drive the 12-passenger van. The van was equipped with a GPS e-mail alert notification system that had reported by e-mail that the van was going 88 and 95 miles an hour in streets that had a 60-mile-per- hour speed limit. Petitioner called Mr. Samanamoud who said he was back at work at MIA and denied that he had been speeding. Both he and the Petitioner questioned the accuracy of the GPS e-mail alerts because both were received at 2:16 p.m., from two different locations. They had no knowledge, however, about the frequency of the e-mail alert transmissions. Petitioner and Mr. Samanamoud both testified that they each tried to tell Ms. Gonzalez that it was a mistake and the GPS system could not be correct. Both said that, when they talked to her, she made derogatory comments about Peruvians, including having said something about not wanting to work with Peruvians, about being fed up with Peruvians, and that Peruvians had caused her too many problems. Based on Mr. Samanamoud's prior record of speeding and reckless driving, Ms. Gonzalez told Petitioner to fire Mr. Samanamoud. Petitioner refused Ms. Gonzalez' directive to terminate Mr. Samanamoud's employment with CIC until she prepared a written warning and threatened to fire both of them. Petitioner said he had no choice but to fire Mr. Samanamoud even though he believed that to be an unlawful act of discrimination based on national origin. CIC employees routinely borrowed gasoline-powered saws from other companies working at the airport. On January 22, 2009, the foreman for one of the companies called Petitioner and requested the return of one of the saws. Petitioner instructed a CIC employee, Roberto Santiesteban, who was driving the CIC van, to go outside the airport check point to return the saw. After he returned the saw, Mr. Santiesteban received a radio call from Petitioner telling him to pick up six POVJ workers to bring them to their work site. Petitioner said POVJ wanted the workers inside as quickly as possible because they were "already on the clock" earning $31.00 an hour. Mr. Santiesteban, who had returned the gas saw on the fifth level of the employee's parking deck, supposedly replied that he did not have room in the van for six workers who had tool boxes and ladders. Petitioner then told him to make room by taking Petitioner's car keys from the van, opening the trunk of Petitioner's personal vehicle and leaving the gasoline there. Petitioner's vehicle was parked in a remote area of the fourth deck where employees' cars were not supposed to be parked. When Petitioner was arrested on January 22, 2009, the police confiscated his MIA employee badges. Initially sympathetic to him, Ms. Gonzalez subsequently received an e-mail and read the police report that made her believe that Petitioner had been stealing gasoline for some time. After Petitioner was unable to work and was discharged, he was replaced by a person who is Cuban. After Petitioner's case was nolle prossed in April 2010, he asked Ms. Gonzalez to initiate an ID confiscation hearing to help him get the badges and she refused. Ultimate Findings of Fact The evidence supports a finding that Petitioner, Mr. Bracamonte, was ordered to terminate the employment of Mr. Samanamoud not because he was Peruvian, but because Ms. Gonzalez had a legitimate business interest in avoiding liability for his speeding and reckless driving. The evidence supports a finding that Petitioner, Mr. Bracamonte, was not the victim of discrimination based on age based on Stipulated Finding of Fact, paragraph 16. The evidence supports a finding that Petitioner, Mr. Bracamonte, was terminated from employment because he could not work on the MIA project after his badges were confiscated, not because of his age or because of his national origin. The evidence supports a finding that Ms. Gonzalez was not willing to help Petitioner get the badges necessary to work at MIA because she received information after his arrest that tended to convince her that Petitioner had been stealing gasoline over a period of time.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for relief in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2010.
