Findings Of Fact Respondent, Philip Lee Sullivan (Sullivan), has served as Chief of Police for the City of Panama City Beach, Florida since August 10, 1977. Sullivan's salary as Police Chief was $62,326.12 in 1994, and will total $63,211.20 in 1995. As Police Chief, Sullivan's duties include planning, organizing, and directing all activities of the Panama City Beach Police Department. He is also charged with supervision of all members of the police force, with particular attention to personnel at the administrative and supervisory level, and with the investigation and disposition of complaints against police officers. In his official capacity, Sullivan is also required to cooperate with state and federal officers in the apprehension and detention of wanted persons and with other agencies where activities of the police department are involved. Sullivan has the authority to take disciplinary action against an employee of the police department up to and including suspension without pay for 30 days, and can recommend termination to the City Manager. He also completes written performance evaluations on members of his command staff, which is comprised of the Patrol Division Commander, the Investigative Division Commander, the Assistant to the Chief, and the Reserve Division Commander. In 1987, Sullivan began a business as a loss prevention and security consultant, operating as a sole proprietorship. Sullivan's first client was Hilton, Inc. Charles Hilton is the Chief Executive Officer of Hilton, Inc. It was Mr. Hilton who made the initial decision to hire Sullivan. He considered one other person for the work, but rejected that individual based on the fee sought. Sullivan verbally sought approval from the City Manager to contract with Hilton, Inc. The City Manager verbally approved the arrangement. Hilton, Inc. owns and operates five hotels in Panama City Beach: The Holiday Inn Sun Spree, Ramada Inn, Days Inn, Best Western Del Coronado, and Best Western Casa Loma. All except Sun Spree, which was added in 1990, were owned by Hilton, Inc., when Sullivan began contracting with the corporation. Hilton, Inc. pays Sullivan $2,000 a month with an additional fee for background checks. Sullivan's next client was the Bay Point Improvement Association (Bay Point). Bay Point is outside the city limits of Panama City Beach. By letter dated February 2, 1989, Sullivan formally requested approval from the City Manager to accept the position of Director of Security for Bay Point. Approval was granted by letter dated February 15, 1989. Sullivan was initially hired in February, 1989, as Director of Security, but his employment status was subsequently changed to that of an independent contractor, similar to his position with his other private employers. Bay Point pays Sullivan $18,000 per year for his services. Sullivan's next client was the La Vela Beach Club ("La Vela") in March, 1993. He was hired by the club's owner, Alois Pfeffer. Sullivan no longer works for the La Vela Beach Club, but while he was working for the club he was paid $6,000 per year. Sullivan's next client was Boardwalk Beach Resorts, which hired him in September, 1993. Boardwalk Beach Resort is the fictitious name for a limited partnership, Resort Hospitality Enterprises, Ltd. ("Resort Hospitality"). The majority of the stock of Resort Hospitality is owned by People's First Properties, Inc. ("People's First"). Resort Hospitality owns and operates four hotel properties, totaling approximately 625 rooms, on Panama City Beach. Robert Henry, the chief financial officer for People's First, was the person who decided to contract with Sullivan after independently determining to the satisfaction of People's First that Sullivan did not have a conflict of interest. People's First pays Sullivan $18,000 per year with additional fees for background checks. In 1994 Sullivan was paid $6,450 for background checks and as of September 11, 1995, he was paid $4,720 for the background checks performed in 1995. Sullivan incorporated his business as Beach Security, Inc. on December 12, 1993. Sullivan's next client was the Miracle Strip Park/Shipwreck Island (Miracle Strip). He was hired in May, 1994 by the Miracle Strip's General Manager, Shelton Wilkes. Miracle Strip is located on Panama City Beach. Sullivan receives $7,200 per year from Miracle Strip. Sullivan's next client was Spinnakers, where he was hired in July, 1994, by W. B. Sparkman, III. Spinnakers paid Sullivan $6,000 per year. As of the date of the final hearing it was not known whether Spinnakers would continue its contract with Sullivan for the next season. Except for Bay Point, there are no written contracts between Sullivan and any of the businesses with which he contracts. Sullivan has no job description, no set work hours, and no regular meetings with his employers. As part of the services offered by Beach Security, Sullivan makes recommendations to his clients in developing their safety and security policies and procedures, particularly with respect to policies, procedures and training for the security staff. The ultimate decision whether to implement any of Sullivan's recommendations rests with Sullivan's clients. Sullivan is also expected to defend those policies and procedures in court as an expert witness in the event his employer adopts his recommendations and is sued. Sullivan neither sets nor manages security for his clients. He makes recommendations. Sullivan does not hire, fire, or make other employment decisions for the security personnel of his clients. He does not supervise or evaluate the performance of his clients' security staff on a daily basis, and does not evaluate the individual performance of any of his clients' employees. As part of Sullivan's services to Hilton, Inc., Boardwalk Beach Resort and La Vela, Sullivan did background checks for potential employees. Sullivan hired an employee of the police department to do the background checks for him. The background checks were performed at the Bay County Courthouse for local applicants. If the information needed was located in another county or state, Sullivan would contact the clerk of the court at the appropriate location for the information. Getting information from another county or state can be a slow process. The information which Sullivan uses in doing the background checks is information which is available to the general public. The Police Department of Panama City Beach (Police Department) has an agreement with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to allow the Police Department access to criminal history record information. Access to the information is limited to police department business. If a police department employee desires to access the information, the employee must log in on the computer, which creates a computer-generated log at FDLE. Sullivan personally does not know how to access the information. Sullivan could request a police department employee to access the information for him. Panama City Beach is a popular resort area, which experiences a large influx of teenagers and young adults during spring break. Problems associated with alcohol consumption, including traffic violations and accidents, assaults, and disorderly conduct, are commonplace police concerns, particularly during spring break. Spinnakers and La Vela are clubs located on Panama City Beach which cater to the spring break crowd and serve alcohol. The La Vela has a capacity for about 6,000 people and Spinnakers about 4,000. The Hilton, Inc. hotels, the Boardwalk Beach Resort, and the Miracle Strip also do heavy spring break business. The Miracle Strip deals with more than 600,000 visitors over the course of its season. The police department investigates crimes and responds to calls and complaints made by citizens. The department also investigates accidents and is routinely called any time an ambulance is called. In the past two years the police department has received more than five thousand calls for service at businesses which are located in Panama City Beach and which contract with Sullivan. No evidence was presented that Sullivan has ever disregarded public duty in favor of private interests, or misused confidential police information for the benefit of his private employers. In February 1993, Spinnakers was sued for the wrongful death of one of its patrons. The Complaint alleged that the deceased, Robert Gaither, was involved in an altercation with one or more of the club's other patrons. Spinnaker security became involved, and the other patrons were ejected. When Mr. Gaither left, security allegedly saw these individuals in Spinnakers' parking lot, but took no action. After leaving the club, Mr. Gaither was beaten to unconsciousness by these same people, and was either left or passed out in the street, where he was run over by a drunk driver. The Complaint alleges that Spinnakers' security staff was negligent in its handling of the incident. Although the incident took place before Spinnakers hired Sullivan, Sullivan has given a deposition in the case as a potential expert witness. The Panama City Beach Police Department investigated the death of Mr. Gaither. Part of Sullivan's services to Le Vela has been to instruct its staff on how to handle fights. The owner of the club has complained to Sullivan about reaction from Panama City Beach police officers when fights have occurred at the club. It is the club owner's observation that the police, in protection of their own physical safety, often leave the burden of breaking up a fight to the security officers, or wait until the participants wear themselves out. Since the club's insurance will not pay for damages if the club's security officers get involved in the fight, the owner wants the police officers to intervene at an earlier stage in the fight and has so complained to the police department. At the June 23, 1994 meeting of the Panama City Beach City Council, Sullivan's outside employment as a consultant was thoroughly discussed. Sullivan gave a detailed account of his operation. At that meeting the City Council voted to continue the City's policy of encouraging outside employment of its police officers and allowing police officers to use the police vehicles during off-duty hours as long as the police officer is on call. On October 12, 1995, the City Council of the City of Panama City Beach enacted Ordinance No. 455, which codified the rules governing secondary or off- duty employment by employees of the City of Panama City Beach. Section 2-46 of the ordinance deals specifically with law enforcement officers, including the Chief of Police. Section 2-46(d)(1) of Ordinance 455 provides: The following types of off-duty employment do not, on their face, constitute a conflict of interest for law enforcement officers: Security guard duty protecting premises or property. Security consultant within or without the City. Providing dignitary or official's protection. Conducting pre-employment checks into the applicant's previous criminal history provided that only public records are accessed. Performing accident investigations or providing technical services as otherwise per- mitted by the Department. Ordinance 455 requires that police officers who desire to have outside employment must submit an "Off-Duty Employment Request" form. The forms were made available to the police officers sometime during the early part of December, 1995. Shortly after Sullivan received the forms, he submitted authorization requests for off-duty employment with Bay Point Resort, Miracle Strip Amusement Park, Boardwalk Beach Resort, and Hilton, Inc.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order and Public Report be entered finding that Philip Lee Sullivan's employment with businesses within the jurisdiction of the Panama City Beach Police Department and his employment in doing pre-employment application background checks is in violation of Section 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and recommending that Philip Lee Sullivan be dismissed from his employment as Police Chief of the Panama City Beach Police Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4141EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: Accepted to the extent that the computer database can be accessed from the Police Department but rejected to the extent that it implies that Sullivan, himself, can physically access the information based on his testimony that he does not know how to operate the computer to get the information. Paragraph 6: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found Paragraph 7: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 8-12: Accepted. Paragraph 13: The first two sentences are accepted. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 14-21: Accepted. Paragraph 22: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 23: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder is accepted. Paragraphs 24-28: Accepted. Paragraphs 29-32: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 33-34: Accepted. Paragraph 35: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 36: The first sentence is accepted in substance to the extent that the information is available at the Police Department and can be accessed by Police Department staff pursuant to an agreement with FDLE. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 37: Accepted in substance except for the employment outside the police department jurisdiction. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance that Sullivan requested approval for employment as Director of Security for Bay Point. Rejected to the extent that the request could be construed as a request for blanket approval for Sullivan to do security consulting services. It appears from Sullivan's letter that his employment at that time dealt with more than consulting services given that he had the authority to hire, fire, and direct the security force at Bay Point. Paragraph 3: Accepted to the extent that Beach Security Inc. was incorporated in December, 1993. Paragraph 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: Accepted to the extent that Sullivan has submitted the off-duty employment authorization requests. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 8: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found Paragraph 9: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 11-15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: Accepted as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 17: The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence that such an arrangement could not tempt dishonor. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The first part of the second sentence is accepted in substance. The last part of the second sentence is rejected to the extent that although the businesses were anticipating that Sullivan would gather his information from public records, human nature being what it is, if Sullivan knew that an applicant was a suspect in a criminal investigation the employers would not want Sullivan to recommend that the applicant be hired. Paragraphs 19-22: Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss Advocate For the Florida Commission on Ethics Department of Legal Affairs PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Mary Ellen Davis, Esquire Hilton, Hilton, Kolk, Penson & Roesch Post Office Box 1327 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue The ultimate issue is whether the Applicant, Florida-Georgia Venture Group, is entitled to development orders for its proposed development of regional impact, Hunter's Ridge, in Flagler County and the City of Ormond Beach, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is Florida-Georgia Venture Group, 402 Clifton Avenue, Holly Hill, Florida 32117, and its authorized agent is Thomas L. Durrance, Managing Partner. The Hunter's Ridge project lies within the jurisdiction of both the Northeast Florida Regional Planning Council (NEFRPC) and the East Central Florida Regional Planning Council (ECFRPC) and underwent concurrent review. The Hunter's Ridge project as proposed in this proceeding is a proposed planned unit development located in the unincorporated area of Flagler County and in the City of Ormond Beach on approximately 5,037 acres. The portion of the Hunter's Ridge project located in the unincorporated area of Flagler County consists of approximately 3,800 acres, of which 1,940 acres will be preserved as conservation area. The portion to be developed in the unincorporated area of Flagler County is approximately 1,860 acres, consisting of 1,702 residential units, plus commercial, recreational, and other uses. The portion of the Hunter's Ridge project located in the City of Ormond Beach consists of approximately 1,237 acres, of which 327 acres will be preserved as conservation area. The portion of the property in Ormond Beach to be developed is approximately 910 acres, consisting of 982 residential units, plus commercial, recreational, and other uses. Of the residential units to be developed in the City of Ormond Beach, 109 residential units were approved by the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) under a preliminary development agreement. The Board of County Commissioners of Flagler County held a public hearing on the DRI/ADA on July 13, 1989, which was continued to October 12, 1989, to November 2, 1989, to January 11, 1990, and to January 25, 1990. On January 25, 1990, the Board of County Commissioners of Flagler County passed and adopted a Development Order for the Hunter's Ridge DRI, which Development Order was recorded in Official Records Book 0423, Page 0669 through 0728, Public Records of Flagler County, Florida. The City Commission of the City of Ormond Beach held a public hearing on the DRI/ADA on August 15, 1989, which was continued to September 5, 1989, to September 19, 1989, to October 3, 1989, to October 17, 1989 and to January 30, 1990. At the public hearing on January 30, 1990, the City of Ormond Beach adopted Resolution 90-20 denying the DRI/ADA for the portion of the Hunter's Ridge DRI located in the City of Ormond Beach. The DCA, pursuant to Section 380.07, Florida Statutes, and Rules 42- 2.002 through 42-2.011, Florida Administrative Code, timely filed a Notice of Appeal and Petition for Administrative Hearing with the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC), whereby DCA appealed the Development Order adopted by the Board of County Commissioners of Flagler County. The Applicant, pursuant to Section 380.07, Florida Statutes, and Rules 42-2.002 through 42-2.011, Florida Administrative Code, timely filed a Notice of Appeal and Petition for Administrative Hearing with FLWAC, whereby the Applicant appealed the denial of approval by Ormond Beach. This cause came before FLWAC on May 22, 1990, for consideration of the Appeals and the Petitions for Administrative Hearing; FLWAC ordered that this matter be forwarded to Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for assignment of a hearing officer and further proceedings. At the Administrative Hearing conducted by DOAH, on December 5-7, 1990, the Applicant amended its DRI/ADA to reduce the size of the project and to reallocate land uses, densities, and other components of the project. The current scope of the project is reflected in Florida-Georgia Exhibits 1-5, 9, and 14. As amended by the Applicant, the proposed project now consists of the following uses in Flagler County: 11.61 acres of Village Retail Office; 5.71 acres of Village Office; 16.68 acres of Light Industrial; 197.18 acres of Village Services/Recreational; 90.89 acres of Parks and Schools; 64.52 acres of Multi-Family Residential (with Upland Buffer); 259.34 acres of Wetlands; 146.93 acres of Roads, Drainage, and Retention; 52.90 acres of Lakes; 130.00 acres of Golf Course; 57.25 acres of Utility Easement; and 130.00 acres of Single Family Residential. The total number of dwelling units permitted in the County is 220 townhouses and villas and 145 apartments and condominiums. As amended by the Applicant, the proposed project now consists of the following uses in the City: 192.00 acres of Village Services/Recreational; 30.61 acres of Parks and Schools; 14.51 acres of Multi-Family Residential (with Upland Buffer); 174.54 acres of Wetlands; 110.95 acres of Roads, Drainage, and Retention; 28.65 acres of Lakes; 17.32 acres of Utility Easement; and 341.42 acres of Single Family Residential (with Upland Buffer). The total number of dwelling units permitted in the City are 932 single family units and 50 townhouses and villas. Generally speaking, the portions of the development within the County which are to be developed are in Township 41 South, Range 31 East, Section 22 and the east half of Section 21; Section 15 and the east half of Section 16, with the exception of a golf course in Section 15, constitute an area that, if it is to be developed in the future, will require a substantial deviation approval from all concerned agencies. Pursuant to stipulation of the Applicant and Flagler County, an area approximating Section 15 and the east half of Section 16 will be redesignated under the Flagler County Comprehensive Plan as Agricultural, with a permitted residential density of not more than one unit per five acres. Pursuant to stipulation, Sections 17 and 20 and the west halves of Sections 16 and 21, along with most of the portions of Sections 29 and 30 north of State Road 40, will be deeded to a public or public interest agency, with the Applicant retaining the right to conduct silviculture with best management practices except in those wetland areas of the property designated for conservation. The parties, with the exception of Citizens, have stipulated that Florida-Georgia Exhibit 5 constitutes the necessary affordable housing conditions for the project. The affordable housing provisions of the proposed project are consistent of the requirements of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, Rule 9J-2, Florida Administrative Code, and the State Comprehensive Plan. The affordable housing conditions adequately address affordable housing needs of the project consistent with all local government, state, and regional requirements and regulations. The Applicant, the Florida Audubon Society, Flagler County and the City of Ormond Beach, have stipulated that the conditions contained in their Joint Stipulation, filed as Florida-Georgia Exhibit 9 satisfactorily resolve all issues concerning wetlands, wildlife habitat, and endangered species. The soils on the project will support the proposed development. During review of the DRI/ADA by the RPCs, Volusia County submitted comments and recommendations to ECFRPC. The comments and recommendations of Volusia County were considered by ECFRPC when it adopted its recommended conditions of approval. The conservation area proposed by the Applicant represents a significant contribution to conservation and wildlife. The proposed Development Orders and Conditions of Approval adequately address the regional impacts of the project on the environment and natural resources. The proposed Development Orders and Conditions of Approval include measures intended to address impacts upon, and to protect, the Little Tomoka River. The proposed Development Orders and Conditions of Approval provide for preservation and conservation of wetlands. The proposed Development Orders and Conditions of Approval provide flexibility for protection of environmentally sensitive areas. The proposed plan of development reflects a development that provides adequate environmental protection. The proposed project will have no adverse environmental impacts in the City of Ormond Beach. The proposed Development Orders and Conditions of Approval provide protection for the Little Tomoka River, preventive measures regarding stormwater discharge and stormwater treatment, and mitigative, water quality treatment methods in the surface drainage system, if any degradation is found at a later date. The proposed Conditions of Approval require that all construction within the project be protected against flooding. The project has sufficient safeguards to prevent construction within flood prone areas. Minimum floor elevations for flood plain purposes will be controlled by FEMA flood plain designations and by local rules and regulations, and will be established on a case by case basis for the Hunter's Ridge project. The proposed Conditions of Approval addressing transportation impacts and facilities are consistent with the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, with the provisions of Rule 9J-2, Florida Administrative Code, and with the State Comprehensive Plan. The proposed Conditions of Approval ensure that the Hunter's Ridge project will not have an adverse impact on regionally significant roadways, including State Road 40. The proposed Conditions of Approval will ensure that the regional highway network will function at the desired level of service during the project buildout. The proposed Conditions of Approval are consistent with the provisions of Section 380.06(12), Florida Statutes, relating to transportation impacts. The proposed Conditions of Approval adequately address the transportation concerns of Flagler County. The proposed Conditions of Approval adequately address the transportation impacts on the City of Ormond Beach. The proposed Conditions of Approval dealing with public facilities are consistent with the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, consistent with the provisions of Rule 9J-2, Florida Administrative Code, and consistent with the State Comprehensive Plan. If the conditions for providing public facilities are not met by the Applicant, development must cease. The proposed Conditions of Approval dealing with public facilities are consistent with the concurrency requirements of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. The proposed Development Orders and Conditions of Approval adequately address the regional impacts of the project on public services and facilities. The proposed plan for development of the Flagler County portion of the project provides for all required public facilities and services. The Applicant will have to subsidize any deficits in providing public services. The Applicant has agreed to make contributions intended to assist Flagler County in providing public services to residents of areas outside of the Hunter's Ridge project. Solid waste is not an issue in Flagler County. The proposed Conditions of Approval for the Flagler County portion of the project provide three options for wastewater treatment. The proposed Conditions of Approval for the Flagler County portion of the project require that the project must stand on its own and must provide water supply and wastewater treatment without cost to the rest of the residents of Flagler County. The Flagler County portion of the project requires 1,200 to 1,500 dwelling units to provide a self-contained, self-supporting, self-sufficient development which will not require subsidy by other Flagler County taxpayers. The good mix of land uses contained in the proposed plan for development will help the tax base of Flagler County and avoid a deficit during the buildout of the project prior to construction of 1,200 to 1,500 dwelling units. The tax base, the values, and the assessments for the proposed project will provide sufficient funds to support the development. The proposed Conditions of Approval for the Flagler County portion of the project provide for voluntary contributions by the Applicant in excess of what is required by local ordinance. The dedication and donation of the golf course and conservation areas to Flagler County are voluntary contributions by the Applicant. The Ormond Beach portion of Hunter's Ridge project will not require a separate police patrol zone. The Ormond Beach Police Department can provide acceptable response times for the portions of the project within the City. The public safety site to be dedicated by the Applicant will benefit the City and the Police Department and will be helpful in rendering public safety services to the citizens of Ormond Beach. The Ormond Beach portion of Hunter's Ridge project will provide needed revenue to provide needed Police Department services. The Ormond Beach Police Department can adequately provide public safety services for the Hunter's Ridge area and respond to public safety needs within a reasonable amount of time. The City of Ormond Beach is capable of providing potable water service to the project. Impact fees generated by the project will be sufficient to fund water supply and wastewater capital facilities needed to serve the project. The City has adopted the West Ormond Plan to provide utilities to the Hunter's Ridge project. The Applicant has dedicated to the City a westerly wellfield site which will be needed for the entire city in the future, even if the Hunter's Ridge project is not developed. The City of Ormond Beach does not lose money on water and sewer fees. If the homes built in the Ormond Beach portion of the Hunter's Ridge project approximate the assessed values of existing homes within the city, there will be no revenue strain on the operating budget of the City of Ormond Beach. The average sale price for homes in the Hunter's Ridge project will be higher than the current average sale price within the City of Ormond Beach. The Hunter's Ridge project will not place an economic strain on the City of Ormond Beach. Future growth in the City of Ormond Beach will pay for itself in terms of capital needs. The fiscal problems of the City of Ormond Beach are not unique, but are similar to those occurring throughout the state. Increased property values from the Hunter's Ridge project will help the city's fiscal problems in the long run. The City of Ormond Beach has a great deal of ad valorem capacity to meet service needs and operating budgets. The Hunter's Ridge DRI will make significantly more contributions to public services and facilities than traditional subdivisions. The reduced project as proposed for approval in this proceeding contributes a greater amount of money toward public facilities. The public safety site to be dedicated in the Ormond Beach portion of the project is adequate to serve the fire fighting needs of the project and the surrounding areas. The public safety site to be dedicated in the Ormond Beach portion of the project gives the city flexibility in providing fire fighting services if the road network connecting the project with Shadow Crossings and Breakaway Trails is in place and will enable the city to better serve Shadow Crossings and Breakaway Trails. The roadway network for the Hunter's Ridge project will provide interconnections with Shadow Crossings and Breakaway Trails for the provision of police, fire, and emergency services. The Hunter's Ridge project will have no impact on solid waste in the City of Ormond Beach. The Hunter's Ridge project will have no impact on the vehicular needs of the City of Ormond Beach Department of Public Works. The Hunter's Ridge project will have no adverse impact on road maintenance in the City of Ormond Beach. The proposed Hunter's Ridge DRI is consistent with the requirements of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, the requirements of Rule 9J-2, Florida Administrative Code, and the requirements of the State Comprehensive Plan. The Hunter's Ridge DRI meets all regional requirements. The Hunter's Ridge DRI does not represent "leap frog development," nor does it constitute "urban sprawl." The density of 982 dwelling units for the Ormond Beach portion of the Hunter's Ridge project is consistent with the State Comprehensive Plan and the requirements of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. Reducing the density proposed for the Ormond Beach portion of the project from 982 residential units to 882 residential dwelling units would not necessarily be considered an improvement to furthering the plan concept. The Hunter's Ridge DRI is consistent with the plans and policies of the Regional Planning Councils. As to the portions within Flagler County, the Hunter's Ridge DRI: Is consistent with the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes; Is beneficial to Flagler County; Is consistent with the Flagler County Comprehensive Plan; Is consistent with the NEFRPC report and recommendations; Is superior to existing zoning; Provides better development and more planning opportunities than non- DRI approaches to development; and, Provides adequate controls for the development of Hunter's Ridge. The Ormond Beach portion of the project: Is consistent with the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes; Is consistent with the Ormond Beach Comprehensive Plan and all City ordinances and regulations; Adequately mitigates against adverse impacts through the Conditions of the proposed Development Order. To the extent that the opinions of some witnesses, primarily Mr. Grace and Mr. Shearer, have not been adopted in these Findings of Fact, they are deemed to be unreliable or lacking in substantial weight or persuasive value.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a Final Order and therein: Adopt the development order with conditions as set forth in the Joint Stipulation of Florida-Georgia Venture Group and the City of Ormond Beach. Adopt the development order with conditions as set forth in the Joint Stipulation of Florida-Georgia Venture Group and Flagler County. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Florida-Georgia Venture Group Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-5(1-5); 12-14(6-8); 16- 19(9-12); 20(18); 22-25(19-22); 27-38(23-34); 40-89(35-83); 91(84); 92(85); 94(86); 97(87(; and 98(88). Proposed findings of fact 26, 39, 90, 93, 95, and 96 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 6-11 and 21 are unnecessary. Proposed finding of fact 15 is irrelevant. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Department of Community Affairs Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 8-12(13-17). Proposed findings of fact 1, 2, and 13-17 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 3-7 are unnecessary. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the City of Ormond Beach 1. Proposed findings of fact 1, 8, 10-17, 21, 33-36, 38-40, 43, 46, and 49 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 2-7, 19, 20, 22, 23, 37, 47, 48, and 50 are irrelevant. Proposed findings of fact 9, 18, 24-32, 41, 42, 44, 45, 51, and 52 are unsupported by the credible, competent and substantial evidence. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Citizens for Ormond Beach 1. Proposed findings of fact 7, 9-11, 13-19, 21-25, 35, 47, and 49-52 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 8, 12, 20, 26-32, 34, 42, and 57 are irrelevant. Proposed findings of fact 33, 36-39, 43-46, 48, and 53-56 are unsupported by the credible, competent and substantial evidence. Proposed findings of fact 1-6, 40, and 41 are unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Doyle Tumbleson, Attorney at Law Kinsey Vincent Pyle Professional Association 150 South Palmetto Avenue, Box A Daytona Beach, FL 32114 Fred S. Disselkoen, Jr. Attorney at Law City of Ormond Beach Post Office Box 277 Ormond Beach, FL 32175-0277 Gerald S. Livingston Attorney at Law Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, FL 32802 Timothy Keyser, Attorney at Law Post Office Box 92 Interlachen, FL 32148 Jonathan Hewett Attorney at Law Central Florida Legal Services, Inc. 216 South Sixth Street Palatka, FL 32177 David Russ, Senior Attorney Julia Johnson, Attorney Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Charles Lee Senior Vice President Florida Audubon Society 1101 Audubon Way Maitland, FL 32751 Linda Loomis Shelley Attorney at Law Dixon, Blanton & Shelley 902 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, FL 32303 Noah McKinnon Attorney at Law 595 West Granada Avenue Ormond Beach, FL 32075 Douglas M. Cook, Director Planning and Budgeting Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol, PL-05 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0001
The Issue Whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioner, Nisrine Smith, on the basis of her disability, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (FHA), chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Ocean Towers is a residential condominium facility in Volusia County, Florida, with numerous condominium units. Respondent Sentry managed Ocean Towers during the time period relevant to the instant matter, but it no longer serves as the manager of Ocean Towers. Ms. Smith leased a furnished condominium unit from its owner and resided at Ocean Towers, beginning in January 2019. Ms. Smith paid monthly rent to the condominium unit’s owner, which also included all utility charges. Ms. Smith is a person with a nonvisible disability, which she described as post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety, who requires the use of an emotional support animal (ESA).3 On September 8, 2019, Ms. Smith brought an approximately 14-week- old female Rottweiler puppy named Vida to live with her at Ocean Towers. At that time, the “Daytona Beach Ocean Towers Rules & Regulations” provided, in part, as follows: Respondents’ Proposed Recommended Order concedes certain dispositive facts, and also includes contradictory factual findings—both within the Proposed Recommended Order itself, as well as when compared to evidence presented—that the undersigned considered and discusses in this Recommended Order. 3 Both Petitioner’s Proposed Recommended Order, as well as Respondents’ Proposed Recommended Order (which, as discussed in footnote 2 above, is largely duplicative of Petitioner’s Proposed Recommended Order), assert—in identical fashion—that Ms. Smith has a disability and requires the use of an ESA. While the evidence at the final hearing was not entirely clear on this point (a point which resulted in FCHR finding no reasonable cause), Respondents, in their Proposed Recommended Order, concede this point. The undersigned has thus based this Finding of Fact on this stipulation. Confusingly, other “original” or “nonduplicated” portions of Respondents’ Proposed Recommended Order state that Ms. Smith never provided documentation to it that she had a disability, which required an ESA, but Respondents have clearly conceded this particular factual finding in their Proposed Recommended Order. PETS: Guests may not have pets in the building. All authorized small pets except certified service dogs must be carried while in public areas of the building and garage. Unless inside units, pets must be on a leash and owners are responsible for cleaning up after their pet while on [Daytona] Towers property. Ms. Smith had not informed Ocean Towers about Vida’s arrival prior to bringing her to Ocean Towers. On September 12, 2019, Maria Montgomery, who was the administrative assistant for Ocean Towers, emailed Ms. Smith concerning Vida. The email stated that “new pets are to be firstly reported to the office and rules apply as I am sure you are aware.” It further states that “Service animal or companion pets all need to have registered papers copied to the office[,]” and further states “[w]e do not need to know ‘why’ if it is a companion animal-we just need to have the authorization on file for Security, etc. in the event someone asks why an animal not in the ‘normal’ pet description of 20 pounds or less is living in the building ” Ms. Montgomery’s September 12, 2019, email to Ms. Smith was likely precipitated by Ocean Towers resident Ms. Honeycutt, who was also the condominium association president in 2019. Ms. Honeycutt—who has been paralyzed since birth and uses a wheelchair—testified that she encountered Ms. Smith and Vida on two occasions. On the first occasion, in an elevator, Ms. Honeycutt testified that Vida jumped on her lap. On the second occasion, in the condominium lobby, Ms. Honeycutt testified that Vida again jumped on her lap, but that she was able to move away from Vida. Mr. Zehrung, who was the manager at Ocean Towers in 2019 (and employed by Sentry), testified that he received numerous complaints from other tenants about an unleashed Rottweiler, and was aware of Ms. Honeycutt’s encounters with the dog as well. After determining that Ms. Smith was the owner of the dog, he informed her of the Ocean Towers “Rules and Regulations” concerning pets; he stated that Ms. Smith did not initially tell him that Vida was an ESA, but did so about one week after this conversation. In response to Ms. Montgomery’s email request, Ms. Smith provided Ocean Towers with a letter, dated September 17, 2019, from the “Medical & Psychiatric Clinic of Florida, Inc.,” from “Yessica Sanchez, Office Coordinator, ARNP.” That letter stated: Ms. Nisrine Smith is currently being treated at the Medical & Psychiatric Institute of Florida, Inc. Ms. Smith presently has her pet Rottweiler, also known as Vida, with her in her apartment. It would be beneficial for her to have her pet if the apartment complex allows her to keep it. The September 17, 2019, letter, which is not from a treating physician, makes no reference to whether Ms. Smith has a disability, and further makes no reference to her dog as an ESA, but rather refers to the dog as a “pet.” Ms. Smith testified that, after submitting the September 17, 2019, letter to Ocean Towers, she felt everything would be “okay,” and that she would be able to keep Vida as an ESA. However, she testified that she was “rudely treated” by other residents, including comments about the dog’s size, and the Ocean Towers rules that require a resident to carry their pet while in the lobby and indoor common areas. Ms. Smith felt that she was being discriminated against by Ocean Towers because of Vida’s dog breed, Rottweiler. Both Ms. Honeycutt and Mr. Zehrung testified that the September 17, 2019, letter that Ms. Smith submitted to Ocean Towers was not a sufficient request for an ESA. They both testified that had Ms. Smith submitted an appropriate “ESA letter” with “correct documentation,” Ocean Towers would have allowed Ms. Smith to keep Vida at Ocean Towers. Mr. Zehrung testified that there were three or four other tenants of Ocean Towers who had ESA’s, with “documentation.” On September 19, 2019, Ocean Towers, through its attorney, sent, via certified and regular mail, a letter to Ms. Smith and the owners of the condominium unit, that stated, in pertinent part: It is our understanding that your current tenant has a rottweiler within the unit. Said possession of the dog in the unit in common elements of the Association is a violation of the governing documents of the Association. * * * The Association received a letter from your tenant indicating that the rottweiler is an emotional support animal; however, regardless if it is an emotional support animal, the Association will not permit this animal to reside at the property because it is a dangerous breed on the Association’s insurance and only small animals are permitted. The dog is not a service animal, and therefore must be removed from the property by September 30, 2019. Furthermore, prior to the removal of the pet from the property, the owner must carry the pet when the pet is not within their unit, the dog must be on a leash, the dog may not be in the common elements of the Association and must only use the facilities that are designated for relieving pet waste. At no point is this dog allowed to be not on a leash or not hand-carried. In the event that the dog is not removed by September 30, 2019, the Association will file before the Department of Business and Professional Regulation a petition for injunctive relief seeking the permanent removal of the dog. In the event that this is necessary, the Association will be entitled to recover their reasonable attorney’s fees and cost. The September 19, 2019, letter from Ocean Towers to Ms. Smith directly contradicts the testimony of Ms. Honeycutt and Mr. Zehrung in two important ways: (a) it admits that Ms. Smith’s September 17, 2019, letter was a request for an ESA; and (b) it denies Ms. Smith’s request (“regardless if is an emotional support animal”), based on the dog’s breed, labeling it a “dangerous breed on the Association’s insurance[.]”4 The undersigned further notes that the September 19, 2019, letter from Ocean Towers makes no reference to any incident of Vida jumping on Ms. Honeycutt, or any other incident of alleged aggressive behavior of Vida. Although Ms. Honeycutt’s testimony that Vida jumped on her lap on two occasions is credited, Respondents failed to present any other credible evidence that Vida was an “aggressive animal,” or whether Vida posed any direct threat to the safety of the residents of Ocean Towers, as Respondents contend in their Proposed Recommended Order. Additionally, Respondents did not present any evidence that demonstrated that a rottweiler was forbidden under any insurance policy that covered the Respondents. Ms. Smith testified that she felt that Ocean Towers and its residents discriminated against and harassed her, and as a result, she decided to move out of her condominium unit the weekend of September 21 to 23, 2019. She testified that she received the September 19, 2019, letter during the weekend that she moved out. 4 The September 19, 2019, letter also contradicts numerous proposed findings of fact in Respondents’ Proposed Recommended Order which contest whether Ocean Towers ever received “proper documentation” of Ms. Smith’s request for an ESA. Respondents’ Proposed Recommended Order states that the September 19, 2019, letter, and a September 25, 2019, letter “were silent as to the need of an ESA and neither letter addressed that Smith suffered from a disability that would entitle Smith to have an ESA animal[,]” and, ultimately, that “Towers did not discriminate against Smith because Smith never provided documentation to the Association that she had a disability that required her to have an Emotional Support Animal.” Resp. Proposed Recommended Order at p. 5, ? H. The undersigned notes that the September 19, 2019, letter, which contradicts these proposed findings, was written by Ms. Kirian, who is counsel of record in this matter, and who authored the Proposed Recommended Order. Additionally, as stated in note 3 above, Respondents concede, in their Proposed Recommended Order (which is identical to Petitioner’s Proposed Recommended Order on this point), that Ms. Smith “is a person with a non-visible disability who requires the use of an Emotional Support Animal (ESA).” Resp. Proposed Recommended Order, p. 3, ? A. After moving out, on September 25, 2019, Ms. Smith provided another letter from the “Medical & Psychiatric Institute of Florida, Inc.,” from “Asad H. Kahn, M.D.,” to Ocean Towers, which stated: Attention: Current Housing Manager Ms. Nasrine [SIC] Smith is currently receiving treatment at our office for psychiatric condition. She has a pet dog. It would not be emotionally beneficial for her to lose her pets at this point. We do not have any opinion on risk of safety of the residential area due to the animal. The safety of the area needs to be assessed by the security of the housing project. Ms. Smith testified that after moving out, she was able to purchase a home. She contends that she incurred moving expenses when she vacated Ocean Towers, and that her current monthly mortgage payments, which do not include utilities, are more expensive than her previous rental payments at Ocean Towers. However, Ms. Smith did not present any persuasive evidence that quantified any damages she contends that she incurred as a result of Respondents’ discriminatory housing practices. The undersigned finds that Ms. Smith established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondents discriminated against her based on her disability, by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation—an ESA—in violation of the FHA.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order granting Nisrine Smith’s Petition for Relief, in part, as follows: (a) finding that Respondents engaged in a discriminatory housing practice based on Ms. Smith’s disability, by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation to Ms. Smith in the form of an ESA; (b) ordering Respondents to prohibit the practice of denying reasonable accommodations to individuals and tenants who request a reasonable accommodation on the basis of their disability; and (c) ordering Respondents to pay for the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred by Ms. Smith’s counsel in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2021. Nisrine Smith Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Joseph John St. Angelo, Esquire Community Legal Services of Mid-Florida 122 East Colonial Drive, Suite 200 Orlando, Florida 32801 Laura Qualatone Daytona Beach Ocean Towers, Inc 4188 South Atlantic Avenue New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32169 5143 Taylor Avenue Port Orange, Florida 32127 Marlene Kirtland Kirian, Esquire South Milhausen, P.A. Gateway Center 1000 Legion Place, Suite 1200 Orlando, Florida 32801 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent Alexander J. Milanick should be required to pay attorney fees and costs in the amount of $4,976.00 to Petitioner Charles Osborne to compensate Petitioner for his defense of an ethics complaint filed with the Florida Commission on Ethics.
Findings Of Fact The Town of Beverly Beach, Florida has a population of about 600 located in Flagler County, Florida. It is about one mile from north to south, and occupies about .4 square miles. It is bounded on the west by the Intracoastal Waterway and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. Highway A1A is the main north-south route through the town. Mr. Osborne is an aerospace engineer who served on the Beverly Beach Town Commission from 1997 through March 1999. He was mayor from March 1999 until 2001. He has lived at 2641 Osprey Circle, in Beverly Beach, in a home constructed at that location, since 1995. This residence is closer to the southern boundary of Beverly Beach than to the northern boundary. Dr. Milanick is a dentist who, along with his brother John, and a person named McGee, during times pertinent, owned land immediately north of Beverly Beach. On the property then and currently owned by Dr. Milanick, and east of A1A, is a restaurant named the Shark House. The premises has also been known as Crabby Joe's. In 1995, Dr. Milanick applied to the Town Commission to have his property, and that of his brother, and that of McGee, annexed into the town limits of Beverly Beach. He did this by asking a Mr. Taylor to do what was necessary to cause the annexation to occur. Mr. Taylor thereafter filed a petition with the Town Commission. By Ordinance 95-9-4, the Town Commission, in 1995, assented to the request and it was made effective November 15, 1995. The Ordinance purported to annex the Milanick property into the Town of Beverly Beach and to zone it general commercial. Mr. Osborne was not a member of the Town Commission and was not mayor during this time. The Ordinance, however, was defective in four ways. The Ordinance purported to annex the property into Bunnell, Florida; it was not properly signed by all commissioners; it was not publicly noticed; and it did not provide a legal description of the property. It was not filed with either the Flagler County Clerk of the Court or the Florida Secretary of State. The matter languished until 1997 when Dr. Milanick determined that his property had not in fact been moved within the boundaries of Beverly Beach. Dr. Milanick brought this to the attention of the Town Commission in October 1997. At a Town Commission meeting on December 3, 1997, the Town Attorney stated that he had not had a chance to look into the Milanick and Shark House issue. At a Town Commission meeting on February 4, 1998, Dr. Milanick inquired as to the progress being made on the annexation of his property and was told that the Town Attorney would get with him and discuss the procedure. Subsequently, the Town Attorney, Pat McCormick, suggested that it would be necessary to start the process from the beginning if the land was to be annexed. At a Town Commission meeting on March 4, 1998, Mayor Osborne stated that there was no benefit to the annexation of the Shark House. One member of the Town Commission suggested that they honor past commitments. Dr. Milanick was in attendance at this meeting. At a Town Commission meeting on May 5, 1999, Dr. Milanick and his brother again attended the Town Commission meeting and requested the annexation of their property and discussed the procedure that would be necessary. At a Town Commission meeting on June 2, 1999, a motion was made to go forward with Ordinance 95-9-4 and to amend the official city map and legal description to include the Shark House property. The motion passed but Mayor Osborne vetoed it. During a regular monthly meeting of the Town Commission on July 7, 1999, James Kearn, an attorney retained by Dr. Milanick, who was authorized to act for Dr. Milanick, appeared and requested that the Commission direct the Town Clerk to sign Ordinance 95-9-4 and to forward it to the county and the state in order to determine if the Ordinance was valid. This request was approved by the Town Commission. Mayor Osborne, vetoed the measure. Thereafter, the veto was over-ridden by the Commission. At a Town Commission workshop on July 21, 1999, there was additional discussion regarding the annexation of the Shark House. Mr. Kearn accused Mayor Osborne of discussing the Milanick annexation matter with Sid Crosby, Clerk of the Court of Flagler County. Mayor Osborne denied the charge. The discussion became heated and accusatory and Mayor Osborne threatened to have the sheriff eject Mr. Kearn from the meeting. Subsequent to the action of the Town Commission of July 7, 1999, the Town Clerk, Douglas Courtney, took Ordinance 95-9-4 to Syd Crosby, Clerk of the Court for Flagler County. In a memorandum dated July 26, 1999, Mr. Courtney reported to the Town Commission that Mr. Crosby would not file Ordinance 95-9-4 because it was defective. One of the defects cited was that the instrument purported to annex the land into the City of Bunnell, Florida. No creditable evidence was adduced which indicated that Mayor Osborne visited Syd Crosby for the purpose of preventing the recording of the annexation of Dr. Milanick's property. Mr. Crosby concluded from the beginning that Ordinance 95-9-4 was not recordable. Mayor Osborne suggested some solutions which would permit the annexation, including, re-submission of a proper application. Over a period of time some "glitch" bills were considered which would annex the land. However, none passed. Mr. Kearn attended the Town Commission meeting on February 2, 2000, and the minutes of the meeting noted that he was accompanied by "a person taking notes." Following this meeting, in a February 16, 2000, letter to Dennis Knox Bayer, Town Attorney, Mr. Kearn claimed that Mayor Osborne had a personal vendetta against Dr. Milanick, and that he was exercising dictatorial efforts to prevent citizens to speak at town meetings. He further demanded that ". . . all Town officials, including you as their representative, refrain from saying things that are simply and blatantly false, which only serve to incite Mr. Milanick." At a town meeting on March 1, 2000, Mr. Kearn complained about the annexation not being on the agenda and Mayor Osborne stated that a request for inclusion on the agenda had not been made in writing. Mr. Kearn was permitted to speak for three minutes, he spoke for three minutes, and immediately thereafter Mayor Osborne adjourned the meeting. On or about April 25, 2000, Dr. Milanick and his brother John, filed suit against the Town of Beverly Beach and Mayor Osborne personally, in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in and for Flagler County. The suit alleged that the Town of Beverly Beach and Mayor Osborne violated the civil rights of the Milanicks. The suit alleged that Mayor Osborne had a vendetta against Dr. Milanick and should be held personally liable to Dr. Milanick. The Circuit Court dismissed the civil rights count against Mayor Osborne and the town, and this dismissal was affirmed by the Fifth District Court of Appeal. The Circuit Court also dismissed the mandamus action, finding that the 30- day limitations' period for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari applied and that a prima facie case for mandamus had not been established. The Fifth District Court of Appeal, on October 19, 2001, remanded that count to the Circuit Court with directions to grant the petition for mandamus, but upheld the dismissal of the civil rights counts. On January 23, 2003, the Circuit Court entered its Alternative Writ of Mandamus. The Writ incorporated the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint by reference and ordered that the Defendants take whatever steps necessary to sign and record Ordinance 95-9-4. When this occurred, Mr. Osborne was no longer an elected official of Beverly Beach. The Circuit Court complaint filed by Dr. Milanick recited that the recording of the ordinance did not occur because Mayor Osborne conferred with the Clerk of the Court to block recording of the ordinance. The adoption of the matters recited in the complaint as true, by the appellate court, does not make them proven facts because no evidence was taken in the case. The complaint, moreover, alleges actions, such as being tyrannical and peevish, which could not in any event constitute a violation of a person's civil rights. The complaint does not allege that Mr. Osborne took any action, as mayor, because he wished to obtain a personal advantage and does not allege that the annexation of Dr. Milanick's real property would affect Mr. Osborne's real property in terms of value or otherwise. As of the date of the hearing, Dr. Milanick's property had not been annexed into the corporate limits of Beverly Beach. Mr. Osborne, while serving as mayor, was not helpful in causing the annexation to occur and it is apparent that his relations with Mr. Kearn were not amicable. Mr. Osborne, while serving as mayor was irascible, intimidating, and controlling. Mr. Osborne believed that the annexation would bring no benefit to Beverly Beach and believed it would, "change the town's character." Mr. Osborne gained nothing directly or personally by preventing, or making difficult, the annexation of Dr. Milanick's land. As an elected official, he was permitted to advance his own ideas with regard to what he believed would be best for Beverly Beach and for himself as a citizen and property owner of Beverly Beach. He could act in this regard so long as he did not secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, as opposed to a general benefit. A letter signed by Mr. Kearn dated July 18, 2003, accompanied by an affidavit signed by Dr. Milanick, requested that the Commission conduct an investigation into the activities of Mr. Osborne during the period when he was the mayor of Beverly Beach. For reasons which become apparent hereafter, this letter, which had the words "Via Airborne Overnight Mail" stamped on its face, will be hereinafter referred to as the "Airborne" letter. The following statements were contained in the "Airborne" letter: Specifically, while Mayor, Charles Osborne simply refused to sign and record the ordinance duly adopted by the Town, which annexed land into the Town as a general commercial, simply because he personally did not want anymore general commercial land in the Town, which could jeopardize his personal investment in the Town. He also met with the former Clerk of Court for Flagler County, Mr. Syd Crosby, to persuade the Clerk to not record anything regarding the annexation of such land, in order to prevent the completion of the annexation. He thus plainly put his purely personal concerns, ahead of his duties as mayor, and fiduciary duty to the citizens of Beverly Beach. The mayor still refused to oblige the Town's request, or to honor the duly adopted resolution, for his own personal reasons, irrespective of his duties as mayor to the citizens of Beverly Beach.... Even worse, he met with the former Clerk of Circuit Court of Flagler County, Mr. Syd Crosby, to attempt to persuade Mr. Crosby to not record any ordinance presented by the Town, annexing the Milanicks' property. Mayor Osborne repeatedly ignored and defied the will of the Town to complete the annexation, to pursue his own personal agenda, i.e., stopping annexation of land as general commercial. The "Airborne" letter then parroted items that indicated that the Circuit Court had found to be true, as follows: Additionally, Mr. Osborne simply does not allow anyone to speak with whom he disagrees, or to address matter that he does not want addressed. Mayor Osborne has... refused to put the Milanicks' matters or requests on the Town Council agenda; taken action regarding the Milanicks' properties, without any notice to the Milanicks, or without knowledge by the Milanicks that such action was being taken against their property, as required by the Town's own law; refused to allow the Milanicks to speak to matters that affect their personal and property interests, once the Town Council had opened discussion regarding the annexation and zoning of the Milanicks' properties; blatantly and willfully misrepresented the Milanicks' positions, actions, and statements at Town meetings, beyond the scope of the privilege normally attendant to a politician's statements at such meeting, in order to defeat the Milanicks' requests, and to harm the Milanicks; refused to honor Ordinances passed by previous Town councils, as detailed above; refused to follow through with completing the annexation approved by previous council members of the Town; worked to undercut the recording of the completion of the signing of the ordinance, and the recording of the ordinance, to complete the annexation, all as detailed above. The matters in paragraph 25, are misleading because they indicate that the Circuit Court found these items to be true when in fact no evidentiary proceedings with regard to these items occurred in the Circuit Court. Moreover, the Complaint alleged several matters which Dr. Milanick either knew to be untrue, or should have known that it was untrue. Specifically, the Complaint alleged that Mayor Osborne "did not want anymore general commercial land in the Town, which could jeopardize his personal investment in the Town." This allegation implies that he was acting for some personal and specific reason financial reason, as opposed to a general opposition to development. This allegation, had it been true, would have been actionable pursuant to Section 112.313(6) The Complaint also alleged that Mayor Osborne met with Syd Crosby in order to prevent the annexation of the Milanicks' property. This allegation, coupled with the allegation as to a financial interest, bolsters the asserted improper purpose. Based on this Complaint, the Executive Director of the Commission issued a Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate, which was filed with the Commission on September 26, 2003, and assigned Complaint Number 03-091. Investigator Travis Wade of the Commission was directed to conduct a preliminary investigation into whether or not there was probable cause to believe a violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, had occurred. That section reads as follows: (6) Misuse of public position.--No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney shall corruptly use or attempt to use his or her official position or any property or resource which may be within his or her trust, or perform his or her official duties, to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, herself, or others. This section shall not be construed to conflict with s. 104.31. Mr. Osborne learned of the Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate and thereafter retained Robert J. Riggio, of the firm of Riggio & Mitchell, P.A., located in Daytona Beach, as his attorney. Mr. Riggio worked on the case from October 24, 2003, until September 29, 2004. He charged $150 per hour, which is below the customary charge in the Daytona Beach area, and the hourly rate therefore, is reasonable. He expended 33 hours which is reasonable. He expended $180 in costs. These expenditures totaled $4,976 which was billed to Mr. Osborne. He paid the bill. On April 6, 2004, a second letter dated July 18, 2003, was sent to the Commission by Mr. Kearn by facsimile. This will be referred to as the "Fax" letter. This was precipitated by a request to Mr. Kearn from Investigator Wade that he provide a copy of the original letter. The "Fax" letter differed from the "Airborne" letter. In the second paragraph of the "Fax" letter the following sentence appears: "Specifically, while Mayor, Charles Osborne simply refused to sign and record the ordinance duly adopted by the Town, which annexed land just north of Mr. Osborne's manufactured home . . . ." And in the fourth paragraph of the "Fax" letter, the following sentence appears: "The Mayor objected, because it would serve to annex land as general commercial, just north of his own manufactured home." It further stated that his motivation was ". . . stopping land as commercial near him." Mr. Kearn testified under oath that when Investigator Wade was discussing the case with him, that he, Mr. Kearn, realized the "Fax" letter was a draft that had been sent to Investigator Wade in error. Mr. Kearn said that the "Fax" letter was a draft that had subsequently been edited by Dr. Milanick who knew, July 18, 2003, that Mr. Osborne did not live in a manufactured home located immediately south of the property which was sought to be annexed. Mr. Kearn said that it the "Airborne" letter was supposed to be the operative document. He said that he realized that the "Fax" letter was being used by Investigator Wade when he was talking to him on the telephone on June 8, 2004, and that he advised Investigator Wade of the error. He testified that he made it perfectly clear to Investigator Wade that the "Airborne" letter was the operative document. Investigator Wade's Report of Investigation, however, recites that during the telephone interview of Mr. Kearn, that Mr. Kearn advised him that Mr. Osborne resided in a mobile home community immediately south of the Milanick property, while he served as mayor and that Mr. Osborne's interest in stopping the annexation was to use his position for his personal benefit. At the hearing, Investigator Wade stated under oath that Mr. Kearn advised him during their telephone conversation that Mr. Osborne resided in a mobile home community immediately south of the Milanick property while he was serving as mayor. Investigator Wade stated that the issue of whether or not Mr. Osborne lived in the immediate vicinity of the Milanick property was the key element in his investigation because if that were true, stopping the annexation could be a personal benefit to Mr. Osborne. Mr. Wade was a disinterested and credible investigator and witness and his testimony is taken as true and accurate. Mr. Osborne did not live in either a manufactured or mobile home. The type of home he lived in is irrelevant. What is relevant is that Mr. Osborne did not live adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the Milanick property. In fact, Mr. Osborne did not live near the north side of town. He lived closer to the south side of town and it is unlikely that the annexation of the Milanick property would have an economic effect on Mr. Osborne's property. Mr. Kearn was aware of Mr. Osborne's resident address because he had him served with a civil suit at his residence in 2000. Mr. Kearn knew that Mr. Osborne did not live in a mobile home community, or in a manufactured home near the Milanick property, or anywhere near it. Nevertheless, he asserted that to be true when he talked to Investigator Wade. Mr. Kearn is the attorney and agent of Dr. Milanick. Mr. Kearn is, therefore, the alter ego of Dr. Milanick so that the actions of Mr. Kearn, are the actions of Dr. Milanick. The Commission, found in their Public Report, dated September 8, 2004, that Mr. Osborne's opposition to the annexation was not connected to any desire to secure a benefit for himself. The Commission dismissed the Milanick complaint on a finding of "no probable cause."
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Ethics enter an order requiring Dr. Milanick to pay Mr. Osborne $4,976.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 James J. Kearn, Esquire James J. Kearn, P.A. 138 Live Oak Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114-4912 Gary S. Edinger, Esquire 305 Northeast First Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Martin A. Pedata, Esquire Martin Pedata, P.A. 505 East New York Avenue, Suite 8 DeLand, Florida 32724 Robert J. Riggio, Esquire Riggio & Mitchell, P.A. 400 South Palmetto Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phillip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Virlindia Doss, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioners are eligible for a permit, pursuant to Section 161.053, Florida Statutes, for construction seaward of the Coastal Construction Control Line in Broward County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact On November 30, 1993, Vander Ploeg and Associates, Inc., on behalf of Paul Leto, Richard Meyer, and Berta Anderes (Petitioners) submitted an application to the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (Respondent) for a permit to perform construction on their property seaward of the Broward County Coastal Construction Control Line. Respondent deemed their application complete on April 18, 1994. Petitioners proposed construction will be seaward of the Coastal Construction Control Line. The proposed construction will occur on two adjacent lots in Broward County. Petitioner Leto is the owner of one of the lots described as Lot 19, Block 196, Hollywood Central Beach, Plat Book 4, Page 20, Public Records of Broward County. Petitioners Meyer and Anderes are the owners of the other lot described as Lot 20, Block 196, Hollywood Central Beach, Plat Book 4, Page 20, Public Records of Broward County. Petitioner Leto purchased his lot in September 1992 and Petitioners Meyer and Anderes purchased their lot in March 1993. The lots were platted in or around the 1920's. Both lots are seaward of the seasonal high water line, on a sandy beach with no frontal dune structure. They are bordered by the Atlantic Ocean on the eastern most side and by a roadway (Surf Road) which is immediately adjacent to the lots on the western most side and landward of the lots. Approximately 200 feet north of the lots is an existing structure and approximately 800 feet south of this first existing structure is another existing structure. Petitioners topographical survey, which was submitted to Respondent in December 1993, showed that Lots 19 and 20, each measured 40 feet in a shore parallel direction and 80 feet in a shore normal direction, i.e., perpendicular to the shoreline. The proposed structure will be located directly on the sandy beach. The City of Hollywood, Florida has granted Petitioners a variance. Further, the proposed construction complies with the rules, zoning regulations, and ordinances of the City of Hollywood. Petitioners' application requests a permit for the construction of a single-family residence on the lots, which will house two families. However, the proposed construction is for a duplex, not a single-family residence. Petitioners are willing, and agreeable, to changing the design of the proposed structure to comply with Respondent's specifications for a single- family residence. Additionally, the proposed construction includes a riprap which will also be located on the sandy beach. A riprap is typically used for protective armoring. No structure presently exists for the riprap to protect. Furthermore, the riprap proposed by Petitioners is not adequately designed as a coastal protection structure, and if the proposed single-family residence is modified in accordance with Respondent's specifications, the proposed modified single-family residence would not be eligible for coastal armoring. The riprap structure is not an integral part of the structural design. Petitioners are willing, and agreeable, to eliminating the riprap structure. No other issues exist as to the structural integrity of the design of the proposed project. The lots on which the proposed structure will be located are a part of the beach-dune system. The natural function of the beach provides protection to upland property. The lots on which the proposed structure will be located are subject to normal storm-induced erosion. Tide and wave forces will impact the proposed structure during storms of minor intensity, including five-year storms. The proposed structure will induce greater erosion on the lots as a result of scour due to the interaction of the storm waves and currents with the proposed structure. During the storm, the normal storm-induced erosion combined with the scour erosion will form a breach or depression in the subject property. In turn, the upland property will be exposed to greater tide and wave forces, increasing the risk of erosion and damage to the upland property. The subject lots and surrounding properties have been subjected to unnatural forces which have added to the erosion. The Port Everglades inlet has inhibited the natural downdrift of sand. The City of Hollywood's beach maintenance division has been regularly pushing sand seaward and in the process, breaking down natural forming cliffs. Even though these unnatural forces are capable of being eliminated, the normal storm-induced erosion and the scour erosion would still exists. The existing developed structures to the north and south of the subject lots appear to create a reasonably uniform line of construction. However, the developed structures have been unduly affected by erosion. The proposed structure will be located within this line of construction. During a major storm along the shoreline, waves remove sand from the beach and dune area and deposit the sand in an offshore bar. After the major storm, a recovery of the beach and dunes takes place. Normal wave activity carries the sand from the offshore bar back to the beach, and the sand is then carried landward by winds and is caught and trapped by dune vegetation; thereby reforming a dune. Constructing the structure as proposed will not locate the structure a sufficient distance landward of the beach-dune system. As a result, the proposed structure will interrupt natural fluctuation in the shoreline and not preserve the natural recovery following the storm-induced erosion. The cumulative impact on the beach-dune system by the proposed structure would be severe, i.e., the effects on the beach-dune system by repeating this same proposed structure along the subject shoreline would be severe. There would be structure-induced scour and general degradation of the beach-dune system. Additionally, the recovery potential of the subject area following a major storm event would be threatened. Over the years, the beach of the subject property has been subjected to a re-nourishment project consisting of pumping sand from offshore. This method of re-nourishment may have negatively impacted the sand bar system immediately offshore affecting the hindrance of erosion. A sand bar system immediately offshore softens wave action on the shore and aids in inhibiting erosion. The proposed structure will hinder lateral public beach access. Currently, lateral beach access exists along the beach between the existing northern developed property and the existing southern developed property. The proposed structure will be located on the sandy beach, and the seaward face of the proposed structure will be within approximately one foot of the wet sand beach. At times, the proposed structure will be surrounded by water on at least three sides. No alternative beach access would be available. The proposed riprap will also be located on the sandy beach and will further hinder lateral public beach access. 2/ Loggerhead turtles, which are nesting marine turtles, engage in nesting activities along the stretch of beach where the subject property is located. They are a threatened species, i. e., close to extension. Although they do not nest every year, the turtles usually provide several nests in a single year. Typically, one hundred eggs comprise a turtle nest. In 1992, approximately 2,221 loggerhead turtle nests were in Broward County, with 22 of these nests located within 1,000 feet of the subject property. Turtle nesting efforts have been observed in the beach area of the subject property. One nest was found within the subject property. Structures located on the sandy beach interfere with marine turtle nesting habits. If female turtles make contact with the structures, they often abort nesting attempts, which results in false crawls. Repetitive false crawls harms successful nesting, which may cause malformed egg chambers, impacting the successful incubation of the nest. Also, interaction with a structure can cause injury or death to a female turtle attempting to nest. Additionally, urbanization activity and lighting on the beach deter nesting. A loss of marine turtle nesting habitat will result if the proposed structure is constructed. Also, armoring, such as the proposed riprap, can result in nests being placed more seaward. 3/ Consequently, the nests would be threatened with tidal inundation, which would affect the mortality of the nest itself. As one nest has been located within the subject property, at least one nest or crawl per year would be affected by the proposed structure. Within 30 years, the proposed structure will be seaward of the seasonal high water line. The location of the proposed structure is seaward of the 30-year erosion projection for the subject property. Beach Defense Fund, Inc. (Intervenor) presented no evidence to show that its interest is different than the public at large and that it has substantial interest separate and apart from the public.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order denying the application of Paul Leto, Richard Meyer, and Berta Anderes for a permit, pursuant to Section 161.053, Florida Statutes, for construction seaward of the Coastal Construction Control Line in Broward County, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 1996.
Findings Of Fact The record presented consists of a transcript of the proceedings before the Palm Beach County Construction Industry Licensing Board considering allegations against Ronald Pintacuda and a portion of the exhibits presented to that Board during the proceedings. The record does not contain the Administrative Complaint or other charging documents upon which the Palm Beach County Construction Industry Licensing Board proceeded against Ronald Pintacuda. The allegations against Pintacuda are summed up in a statement by Mr. Flynn, prosecuting attorney for the Board on page 6 of the transcript. The prime contention of the prosecution and the proceeding before the local board was that Pintacuda was guilty of aiding and abetting an unlicensed company to avoid the provisions of the building code by virtue of a specific agreement referred to throughout the transcript but which was not made a part of the evidentiary record presented to the Hearing Officer. Mr. Ciklin, counsel for Mr. Pintacuda, refers on page 5 to three charges outstanding against Pintacuda before the local board, and in his summation at page 38 outlines these as follows: Willful and deliberate disregard of the applicable building codes or law; Combining or conspiring with an uncertified or unregistered person (by allowing one's certificate or registration to be used by any uncertified or unregistered person with the intent to evade the provisions of this part); and Acting in the capacity of a contractor under someone else's certificate except for the name of the certificate holder. In the absence of a charging document or a statement of charges having been read into the record, Mr. Ciklin's outline of the charges considered by the local board against Ronald Pintacuda are taken as true and accurate. The critical element in consideration of this case is the time sequence of the events. The sequence of events between Ronald Pintacuda and Ralph Howell began in 1974, when Howell approached Pintacuda about forming a construction business. C Pinta & Howell, Inc., was created in a corporate reorganization from an inactive corporation, Martin & Pinta, Inc., in January, 1975. Martin & Pinta, Inc., was a corporation formed by John Martin and Ronald Pintacuda in which John Martin was president and Ronald Pintacuda vice-president. John Martin, a Canadian, ceased participation in the business upon his return to Canada, and the corporation went into an inactive status. In January, 1975, Ralph Howell approached Ronald Pintacuda about forming a construction corporation. This resulted in the formation of Pinta & Howell, Inc. Because of domestic problems, Ralph Howell's father, Alexander Howell, served as president of Pinta and Howell, Inc. Ralph Howell was construction superintendent of this corporation and was the primary manager of the Howell interests in the corporation. Pintacuda participated actively in the business affairs of Pinta & Howell, Inc., from January, 1975, until December, 1975. Although it is not explicitly stated in the transcript, it is apparent that Pintacuda decided to cease his active role in Pinta & Howell, Inc., in December, 1975. At that time Pintacuda entered an agreement with Alexander Howell which was the basis of an allegation of combining or conspiring with an uncertified or unregistered person by allowing one's certificate or registration to be used by any uncertified or unregistered person with intent to evade the provisions of the law. Although this agreement is not a part of the exhibits presented to the Hearing Officer, a portion of that agreement was read into the record by Mr. Pintacuda at page 29 of the transcript. That portion of the agreement provided as follows: Agreement between Ronald Pintacuda and Alexander Howell--That Ronald Pintacuda and Alexander Howell, officers of Howell & Pinta, Inc. stipulate that Howell & Pinta, Inc. shall not conduct any business unless both parties agree in writing to such business. This includes, but is not limited to, the signing of any contracts or financial obligations. The basis of the complaints upon which the prosecution of Pintacuda was based, arose in early 1970, when Ralph and Gerald Howell accepted contracts in behalf of Tri-County Marine Construction, Inc., and pulled permits from local authorities in the name of Pinta & Howell, Inc. In addition, Ronald Pintacuda is charged with obtaining four building permits in the name of Pinta & Howell, Inc., for construction contracts taken by Tri-County Marine Construction, Inc. (Tri-County Marine). After the formation of Pinta & Howell, Inc., Ralph Howell who was an officer in Tri-County Marine suggested to Pintacuda that Tri-County Marine be made, an affiliate or subsidiary of Pinta & Howell, Inc. Pintacuda concurred in this, and Howell had the advertising, letterhead, contracts, and yellow page advertisement for Tri-County Marine altered to reflect that Tri-County Marine was an affiliate or subsidiary of Pinta & Howell, Inc. Documentary evidence concerning the corporate status of Pinta & Howell, Inc., and Tri-County Marine which was presented to the local board was not made a part of the exhibits presented to the Hearing Officer. However, testimony of witnesses at the proceeding based upon those exhibits indicate that there was no record in the Secretary of State's office of any corporate interrelationship between Pinta & Howell, Inc., and Tri-County Marine, Inc. The testimony of Pintacuda and the contracts presented in support of the Board's case do show that Tri-County Marine represented itself to the public and functioned as an affiliate or subsidiary of Pinta & Howell, Inc. This affiliation was even recognized by the Board's prosecuting attorney, Mr. Flynn, at page 6 when he stated ". . . Tri- County Marine Construction, Inc. is an affiliate of Pinta & Howell, Inc." Initially, efforts in January, 1976, to contact Pintacuda by local Board authorities and investigators of the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board were unsuccessful. From the testimony of Mr. Verner, investigator for the Construction Industry Licensing Board, many telephone and personal messages left with Mr. Ralph Howell and his secretary were not passed on to Mr. Pintacuda. When Mr. Pintacuda was eventually contacted by Mr. Verner, Mr. Pintacuda was cooperative, forthright, and took immediate steps to deregister as qualifier for Pinta & Howell, Inc., in an effort to prevent further abuses by Ralph and Gerald Howell. The Palm Beach County Construction Industry Licensing Board did not find Ronald Pintacuda guilty of any of the three allegations charged. The action to revoke the license of Ronald Pintacuda was on a motion by Mr. Barrett at page 41 of the transcript which does not recite a finding regarding Pintacuda's guilt of any of the allegations against him. It was this motion which was seconded and passed by the Board. The local board therefore revoked the license of Ronald Pintacuda without a finding of guilt on any of the complaints against him.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and review of the proceedings before the Palm Beach County Construction Industry Licensing Board, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board against the license of Ronald Pintacuda. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Barry Sinoff, Esquire 1010 Blackstone Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Alan J. Ciklin, Esquire Post Office Box 3704 Professional Plaza West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, Petitioner, vs. DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, DOCKET NO. 77-785 RONALD PINTACUDA dba TRI-COUNTY MARINE CONSTRUCTION, INC., CG C005834, 6561 Katherine Road, West Palm Beach, Florida 33406, Respondent. /
Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction And Closing File in this proceeding.
Other Judicial Opinions OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030(b)(1)(C) AND 9.110, TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S AGENCY CLERK, 107 EAST MADISON STREET, MSC 110, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-4128, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. Final Order No. DEO-11-0028 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Economic Development, and that true and correct copies have been furnished to the persons listed below in the manner described, on this JS Thay of November, 2011. Y ‘ Miriam Snipes, Agenéy Clerk DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 107 East Madison Street, MSC 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 By U.S. Mail and Electronic Mail: Mr. Benjamin Gross, Esq. City of Daytona Beach 301 S. Ridgewood Avenue Daytona Beach, FL 32114 grossb@codb.us By Hand Delivery: David L. Jordan, Assistant General Counsel Department of Economic Opportunity 107 East Madison Street, MSC 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 By Filing with DOAH: The Honorable J. Lawrence Johnston Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Community Affairs, is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility of administering the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The Department has the authority to appeal to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission any development order issued in an area of critical state concern pursuant to Sections 380.031(18), 380.032, and 380.07, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding and to DOAH Case Number 93- 7165DRI, Petitioner, Fred Snowman, owned the real property known as Lot 75, Matecumbe Ocean Beach subdivision, Lower Matecumbe Key, in Monroe County, Florida (the subject property). A building permit issued by Monroe County, described below, for this property was the subject of DOAH Case Number 93- 7165DRI (the underlying proceeding.) The lot is approximately 100 feet wide and, at different points, between 200 and 225 feet deep. The subject property is bounded on the landward side by U.S. 1 and fronts the Atlantic Ocean in an area known as Matecumbe Beach. Matecumbe Beach is a known resting and nesting habitat for marine turtles. This building permit constituted a development order on property within the Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. On September 30, 1993, Monroe County issued to Mr. Snowman, as the owner and general contractor, building permit number 9330008850, which authorized the construction on the subject property of a single-family residence containing 2,472 square feet of heated and cooled area, 1,568 square feet of porches, 1,435 square feet of storage enclosure below base flood elevation, and a swimming pool. The authorized construction was to be consistent with the building site plan, which was also approved by Monroe County. On November 18, 1993, the Department timely appealed the subject building permit to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC) pursuant to Section 380.07, Florida Statutes. FLWAC referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings where it was assigned DOAH Case Number 93- 7165DRI. A formal hearing was conducted in DOAH Case Number 93-7165DRI in Key West, Florida, on June 30, 1994. Following the formal hearing, the parties were afforded the opportunity to file post-hearing submittals. Thereafter, a recommended order was entered which recommended that FLWAC enter a final order that dismisses the Department's appeal. After the entry of the recommended order, the Department voluntarily dismissed its appeal. FLWAC subsequently entered a final order of dismissal. Petitioner, Fred Snowman, was the prevailing party in DOAH Case Number 93-7165DRI. SMALL BUSINESS PARTY The issue as to whether Petitioner is a "small business party" as defined by Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes, was disputed by the Department in this proceeding. The parties stipulated that Mr. Snowman meets the remaining criteria contained in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, for an award of attorney's fees and costs. The following testimony elicited by Petitioner's counsel of the Petitioner was the sole evidence pertaining to the number of employees of the Petitioner: Could you tell us a little bit about your business? What's the nature of your business? Primarily I'm a speculation - spec builder and general contractor in the Florida Keys, and have been since 1973. Q. How many employees do you maintain on a regular basis? A. I mainly have subcontractors. Occasionally when I have a job, I hire for that particular job. But I'm the sole proprietor and I'm the employee. (Transcript, page 9, lines 12-22.) While the foregoing testimony establishes that as of May 15, 1995, Petitioner was the sole proprietor and sole employee of his business, it does not establish that Petitioner had fewer than 25 employees in 1993 when the Department initiated its actions against him. 1/ The following testimony elicited by Petitioner's counsel of the Petitioner pertains to his net worth: Q. What is your net worth? Let me ask you this. Does your net worth exceed a million dollars? A. No. Q. Less than a million dollars? A. Yes. (Transcript, page 9, line 23 through page 10, line 3) The following testimony elicited by Respondent's counsel of the Petitioner on cross examination also pertains to his net worth: Q. When you're identifying your net worth, what exactly are you considering? A. Well, net worth is all my assets minus my liabilities. Q. All of your personal assets? A. Which are far and few between (sic) today. Q. Do you have business assets? A. No. Q. Do you own any property? A. Lot 75. Q. Any property other than Lot 75? A. I own three lots, small lots in Plantation Key. Q. Are they developed or undeveloped? A. No, they're undeveloped. Q. Do you know how much they're worth? A. They're valued at fifteen thousand per lot. Q. They're not on the water? A. Not on the water. Q. Lot 75, do you know what that property's worth? A. That property is worth about a hundred and seventy-five thousand. Q. Without the house on it? A. Without the improvements, yes. Q. How about in its improved condition? A. I would say, in the improved condition, with this home, it would be about five hundred thousand. Q. Okay. Other than the real estate, do you have any personal or business investments, stocks or -- A. No. Q. No? A. Just my condo. (Transcript, page 10, line 8 through page 11, line 13.) There was no other evidence presented as to Petitioner's net worth. While the foregoing testimony establishes that as of May 15, 1995, Petitioner had a net worth of less than two million dollars, it does not establish that his net worth was below that figure in 1993 when the Department initiated its actions against him. SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION The Department's appeal initially raised several issues. All issues in the underlying proceeding but one were voluntarily dismissed by the Department either prior to the hearing or at the hearing. The only issue litigated at the formal hearing in DOAH Case Number 93-7165DRI was the appropriate setback from the portion of the beach-berm complex located on the subject property known to serve as an active nesting or resting area of marine turtles. Pertinent to this proceeding, Section 9.5-345(3)(f), Monroe County Code, provides: f. No structure shall be located within fifty (50) feet of any portion of any beach-berm complex which is known to serve as an active nesting or resting area of marine turtles, terns, gulls or other birds; There was no dispute in Case 93-7165DRI that the turtle nesting setback applied to Mr. Snowman's property. The dispute was how to apply the setback. There was a bona fide factual dispute as to the extent of the beach berm complex on the subject property that should be considered to be "beach berm complex which is known to serve as an active nesting or resting area of marine turtles" within the meaning of the setback ordinance. The Department established that it followed its standard procedures in deciding to appeal the subject development order. The Department maintains a field staff in the Florida Keys that routinely reviews development orders issued by Monroe County for consistency with the land development regulations, the Monroe County comprehensive plan, and Chapters 163 and 380, Florida Statutes. The permit package typically reviewed, and reviewed in this case, includes the permit, a permit conditions sheet, surveys, and site plans. The Department staff usually reviews a biological survey or habitat evaluation index, reviews the County's entire file, reviews aerial photographs and conducts a field assessment. In this case, the Department also looked at records of the Department of Natural Resources and of the Save A Turtle volunteer environmental group. In this case, the Department conducted a field assessment of Mr. Snowman's lot and measured the point it considered to be the landward extent of the turtle nesting setback line. Kate Edgerton, an experienced biologist employed by the Department, measured the point the Department asserted was the landward extent of the turtle nesting setback line. Ms. Edgerton made a good faith assessment of the beach berm complex and considered the property to contain one beach berm complex. (Transcript, DOAH Case 93-7165DRI, page 166, line 17.) Ms. Edgerton testified in the underlying proceeding that she considered herself bound by the definitions in the Monroe County land use regulations and that she believed herself to be applying the pertinent definition when she measured the setback line. (Transcript, DOAH Case 93- 7165DRI, page 163, lines 20-23.) Following field staff review, a report is prepared and forwarded to Tallahassee for review by additonal staff, including the Department's administrator of the critical state concern program. Department staff in Tallahassee review the field staff report and participate in formulating a recommendation as to whether to appeal the permit. The appeal decision is then made either by the Department Division Director or by the agency head. Each material step in the Department's customary practice of reviewing permits was followed in reviewing the subject permit. Section 9.5-4(B-3), Monroe County Code, contains the following definition of the term "beach berm" that was found to be pertinent to the underlying proceeding: (B-3) "Beach berm" means a bare, sandy shore- line with a mound or ridge of unconsolidated sand that is immediately landward of, and usually parallel to, the shoreline and beach. The sand is calcareous material that is the remains of marine organisms such as corals, algae and molluscs. The berm may include forested, coastal ridges and may be colonized by hammock vegetation. The term "berm" is identified in the Monroe County comprehensive plan as . . . a mound or ridge of unconsolidated sand that is immediately landward of, and usually parallel to, the shoreline and beach. A berm is higher in elevation than both the beach and the area landward of the berm. At the formal hearing in the underlying appeal, there was conflicting evidence as to the extent of the beach berm complex on the subject property. The Recommended Order found that there were two distinct ridges located on the subject property. The issue of whether both ridges could be considered part of the "beach berm complex" was one of first impression. Succinctly stated, it was the position of the Department in the underlying appeal that both ridges were in an area of potential habitat on a beach that is known habitat and it asserted the position that both ridges should be considered to be one beach berm complex. The Department asserted the position that the setback should be measured from the landward extent of the second ridge (the more landward of the two ridges). Monroe County had measured the setback from the landward extent of the first ridge. Mr. Snowman agreed with the County's determination of the setback. Mr. Snowman presented evidence that the County had, for several years, applied the setback from the landward extent of the first ridge and argued that, based on the foregoing definitions each ridge should be considered to be a separate beach berm, but that only the first should be considered to be a beach berm. The Department presented evidence that the County had applied the setback provision in an inconsistent manner by measuring from the crest of berms in some cases and measuring from the landward extent of berms in other occasions. The Recommended Order rejected the Department's position and concluded that the definition of "beach berm" contained in Section 9.5-4(B-3), Monroe County Code, and the description of "berm" in the comprehensive plan were unambiguous. Although the Department argued that other provisions of the code and comprehensive plan supported their construction of the setback requirement, it was concluded that the issues should be resolved based on the unambiguous definition of "beach berm". It was also concluded that no deference should be afforded the Department's construction of the term "beach berm" because there is a plain and unambiguous definition of the term that is a part of the Monroe County Code. It was observed that "[w]hile a greater setback may better serve the goals of the comprehensive plan, as argued by the Department, the imposition of a greater setback requirement should come from a change in the Monroe County Code." This observation was made because the Department had found support for its interpretation of the setback requirement from other parts of the code and comprehensive plan. This case involved bona fide disputed issues of material fact and legal issues that were of first impression. It is found that those issues, although resolved against the Department following the formal hearing, were of sufficient merit to substantially justified the Department's actions in initiating the underlying appeal.
