The Issue The issue is whether Kelly Services is the lowest responsive bidder on Bid No. 89-23 and should be awarded the bid.
Findings Of Fact On June 2, 1988, the School Board of Bay County issued Bid Request No. 89-23 for garbage collection services at thirteen locations. A quotation sheet was included in the bid package. The quotation sheet indicated the thirteen locations with a blank next to each location and a dollar sign in front of each blank where each bidder was to indicate its average monthly total charge for each location. There was also a quotation schedule where the bidder was to indicate the calculations which went into the total bid for each location. The bid request provided: The Board reserves the right to waive formalities and to reject any and all bids or to accept any bid or combination of bids deemed in the Board's best interest and the decision of the Board will be final. Bidders desiring that their bid be considered on an all-or-none basis, either in whole or part, shall so indicate. It is the intent of this bid request to secure prices and establish contracts for garbage collection services for the twelve schools specified herein and the District Maintenance Department. Awards will be made by location and will be based on an average monthly total charge as calculated on the quotation sheet. The bids were opened at 10:00 am., June 13, 1988, at the offices of the Bay County School Board. Three completed bid packages were submitted. Kelly Services, Argus and M&O each submitted a completed bid quotation sheet containing the bid for each location. M&O also submitted a letter which stated: We would like to submit this bid on an all- or-nothing basis as specified in paragraph four of the cover letter to the bid. For an estimated cost of $3,391.84. The quotation sheet and quotation schedule submitted by M&O did not reflect the all-or-nothing bid amount. Instead, the quotation sheet and quotation schedule showed a total bid of $3,738.24 when calculated by location. Based on the bids submitted by each bidder as shown on the quotation sheet add quotation schedules, Kelly Services was low bidder on five locations (Callaway, Tyndall, Waller, Southport, and Cedar Grove) ; Argus was low bidder on six locations (Parker, Hiland, Haney, Mosley, Beach and Merritt Brown); and M&O was low bidder on two locations (West Bay and the District Maintenance Department). Prior to the deadline for submitting bids, John Harrison, Purchasing Agent for the Board, responded to an inquiry from M&O by advising M&O that it could submit two bids, one as specified in the Bid Request by location and one as an all-or- nothing bid. No other bidders were advised that they could submit two bids. At the bid opening, M&O did not submit a quotation sheet or schedule for its all-or-nothing bid. A bid which did not have a breakdown per dump per container per facility would not be acceptable to the Board and does not meet the specifications in the Bid Request. The breakdown per dump per container per location is necessary to verify proper invoicing for specific locations on months when there is a change in the number of dumps or containers at that location. After opening the bids, the Board compiled the low bid for each location and then totaled that list. That total of $3,606.09 was greater than the all-or-nothing bid by M&O. Because M&O's all-or-nothing bid failed to meet the specifications by not having a location breakdown the Board contacted M&O to determine if its "estimated" bid was firm and to request a breakdown on the quotation schedule form for the all- or-nothing bid. On June 15, 1988, two days after the bid opening, M&O submitted a letter to the Board clarifying that its all-or- nothing bid was a firm bid for each location and M&O submitted a quotation schedule for each location per dump per container (see page 7 of Joint Exhibit 1 and the last page of Joint Exhibit 2). The charge for each location in this quotation schedule is different than the quotation schedule submitted by M&O at the bid opening and is for the most part lower per location than either M&O's first quotation schedule or the low bids taken from the quotation schedules submitted at the bid opening. Based on the letter and all-or-nothing quotation schedule filed by M&O on June 15, 1988, the Board determined to award the bid for garbage collection services to M&O for the all- or-nothing bid of $3,391.84.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that The School Board of Bay County enter a Final Order rejecting all bids and readvertising the bid request for garbage collection services as specified in Bid Request No. 89-23. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 1988. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-3768BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Kelly Services: 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-3(1-3); 4-6(3); 7-11(7-11); and 12 (9) Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, School Board of Bay County: Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(2); 3(10&11); and 5(8). Proposed findings of fact 6, 7, and 9 are irrelevant. The first sentence of proposed finding of fact 2 is unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. The remainder of proposed finding of fact 2 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 3. Proposed finding of fact 4 is rejected as being unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. The last sentence of proposed finding of fact 5 is rejected as being argumentative, conclusory and unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. Proposed finding of fact 8 is unnecessary. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Intervenor, Argus Services, Inc.: Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 2-4(1-3); 6-8(5); 9 & 10(6) 11(3); and 12(11). Proposed findings of fact 1 and 5 are unnecessary. Proposed findings of fact 13-17 are rejected as constituting argument and not findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffrey P. Whitton Attorney at Law Post Office Box 1956 Panama City, Florida 32402 Franklin R. Harrison Attorney at Law 304 Magnolia Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 Scott W. Clemons Attorney at Law Post Office Box 860 Panama City, Florida 32402 School Board of Bay County Post Office Drawer 820 Panama City, Florida 32402-0820 M&O Sanitation, Inc. 266 N. Star Avenue Panama City, Florida 32404
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Mickey Rosado violated Subsection 112.313(8), Florida Statutes (2005),1 and, if so, what recommendation should be made for discipline.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Rosado served as member of the Cape Coral City Council (City Council) from April 2003 until he was suspended from office in January 2007. In addition to being on the City Council, Mr. Rosado owned a marketing business named Mickey Rosado Management, LLC. He and his wife also operated a small café and catering business. During the latter part of 2005, the City of Cape Coral (City) was involved in looking for property to expand the City’s office space. On December 5, 2005, the City Council met, and one of the items on the consent agenda was the request for authorization to offer $2,000,000 and negotiate a contract for the purchase of property located at 924 Del Prado Boulevard, Cape Coral, Florida. For purposes of this Recommended Order, this property will be referred to as the Motor City Property. Mr. Rosado voted against authorizing the negotiation of the purchase of the Motor City Property. In the discussion at the City Council meeting, Mr. Rosado stated that he felt the location had traffic problems. The motion to negotiate a contract for the Motor City Property passed on a seven-to-one vote. After the City Council meeting concluded, Mr. Rosado asked Terry Stewart (Mr. Stewart), who was the city manager, to look into purchasing some other property for the needed office space. The property was owned by Steve Westphal’s Used Car Factory, Inc., which is a car dealership owned by Steven L. Westphal (Mr. Westphal) and his children. The property to which Mr. Rosado was referring (Westphal Property) was located on Del Prado Boulevard, in Cape Coral, Florida. Mr. Stewart told Mr. Rosado that he would look into the Westphal Property. There are two versions of how Mr. Rosado came to know that Mr. Westphal would be willing to sell the Westphal Property to the City. According to Mr. Westphal, while visiting in Tennessee, he was watching the December 5, 2005, City Council meeting on television and listened to the discussion concerning the purchase of the Motor City Property. Mr. Westphal stated that he called Mr. Rosado to talk to Mr. Rosado in his capacity as a member of the City Council and advised Mr. Rosado that he would be willing to consider selling the Westphal Property to the City. Mr. Westphal stated that he also called A.J. Boyd, who was a member of the City Council, and told him of the possibility of selling the Westphal Property to the City. Mr. Rosado’s version is contained in a letter to the Ethics Commission staff dated February 12, 2009,2 in which Mr. Rosado responded to the question of how he learned about the availability of the Westphal Property as follows: Mr. Malone’s question was: “How did I find out about the property?” I replied that through a conversation with Mr. Westphal, when I called him about a property located in Cape Coral, called Motor City. I asked him about the property in question and he replied that the property didn’t deserve to be a location for a customer service center for the City of Cape Coral. I told him your property would be much better since it was located by City property,[3] and he agreed. Furthermore, he said, tell Mr. Stuart [sic] I will sell the city the Del Prado property, and I did so immediately after the meeting that evening. Whether Mr. Westphal’s version or Mr. Rosado’s version is correct, the undisputed fact remains that Mr. Westphal advised Mr. Rosado, in Mr. Rosado’s capacity as a member of the City Council, that he was willing to sell the Westphal Property to the City and that Mr. Westphal wanted Mr. Rosado to convey to the City that the property was for sale. The evidence does not support a finding that Mr. Westphal was advising Mr. Rosado in Mr. Rosado’s private capacity that he was in the market to sell the Westphal Property to anyone other than the City. As Mr. Westphal put it, “I’m not going to call a guy that delivers sandwiches to my dealership about selling a large piece of property.” It is clear that Mr. Westphal was talking to Mr. Rosado in Mr. Rosado’s capacity as a member of the City Council. It is also clear that the information that Mr. Westphal was willing to sell his property to the City was not information that was available to the general public. The evidence establishes that, before Mr. Westphal and Mr. Rosado talked in December 2005 about selling the Westphal Property to the City, Mr. Westphal had not had the Westphal Property on the market. As requested by Mr. Rosado, Mr. Stewart began looking into the Westphal Property to determine whether the property would be appropriate for the City’s needs. Mr. Stewart contacted Mr. Westphal and was given permission to visit the Westphal Property along with two other pieces of property owned by Steve Westphal’s Used Car Factory, Inc. Sometime between December 5, 2005, and December 12, 2005, Mr. Rosado contacted an employee of Top Two Development, Inc., and advised that the Westphal Property was available for sale. Mr. Rosado, in turn, advised Mr. Westphal that Top Two Development, Inc., was interested in purchasing the Westphal Property. A meeting was arranged at which Mr. Rosado introduced Mrs. Giraldo to Mr. Westphal to discuss the purchase of the Westphal Property and other properties owned by Steve Westphal’s Used Car Factory, Inc., as well as the car dealership. Mrs. Giraldo spoke Spanish but not English, and Mr. Westphal spoke English but not Spanish. Mr. Rosado and Mrs. Giraldo’s daughter, who was also at the meeting, were bi- lingual and translated for Mr. Westphal and Mrs. Giraldo. Mr. Westphal, as representative of Steve Westphal’s Used Car Factory, Inc., and Mrs. Giraldo, as representative of Top Two Development, Inc., came to an understanding to negotiate for the purchase of the properties and the stock of the dealership. Mr. Rosado drafted the Letter of Interest/Understanding for Negotiation Purposes which Mrs. Giraldo and Mr. Westphal signed on December 12, 2005. After the meeting, Mr. Rosado approached Mr. Westphal and wanted to know if there would be anything in the deal for him. Mr. Westphal agreed to pay Mr. Rosado a finder’s fee of $261,000 if the sale of the stock of the dealership between Mr. Westphal and Mrs. Giraldo was completed. Mr. Rosado also asked Mr. Westphal if he would include a new car for Mr. Rosado’s wife, but Mr. Westphal balked at that suggestion. A couple of weeks after the December 5, 2005, City Council meeting, Mr. Stewart advised Mr. Rosado of his efforts regarding the Westphal Property, and Mr. Rosado told Mr. Stewart that the property was under contract. Mr. Rosado did not divulge his participation in the introduction of Mrs. Giraldo and Mr. Westphal. By Invoice 50313, dated January 12, 2006, Mickey Rosado Management, LLC, billed Top Two Development, Inc., $10,000 for the following services: Consulting services for Business opportunity with Steve Westphal’s Properties and Business Purchase. Developed Letter of Intent for business agreement, deliver negotiations agreement and notarized terms of agreement. When the transaction is final Top Two Development will also as part of the agreement with MRM will provide a vihicle [sic] of choice. By check dated January 16, 2006, Top Two Development, Inc., paid Mickey Rosado Management, LLC, $10,000 for the services invoiced on January 12, 2006. On March 12, 2006, Mickey Rosado Management, LLC, invoiced Top Two Development, Inc., $10,000 for the following services: Provide interpreting services, at all meetings pertaining Steve Westphal’s stock purchase agreement. In person, phone conferences, meetings, and all pertaining needed area’s [sic] requested January, February, March 2006. These services include all dates, hours, minutes, phone calls, meetings, arrangements, appointments, travel, transportation, etc. This invoice is an extension agreement of January Invoice 50313 as agreed by Mrs. Giraldo, payment is due 3/1/06 to continue services. By check dated March 21, 2006, Top Two Development, Inc., paid Mickey Rosado $10,000 for services rendered. In 2007, Mr. Rosado was arrested for his involvement in the attempted sale of the Westphal Property for operating as a broker without a license in violation of Subsection 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes. On January 30, 2007, Governor Charlie Crist entered an executive order suspending Mr. Rosado from his position as a member of the City Council. Mr. Rosado was not re-elected to the City Council in September 2007. On July 27, 2008, Mr. Rosado entered a guilty plea to one count of brokering without a license and one count of misuse of confidential information. The plea agreement provided that Mr. Rosado was to make restitution of $10,000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Mr. Rosado guilty of violating Subsection 112.313(8), Florida Statutes, and recommending the imposition of a public reprimand and censure and a civil penalty of $7,500. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th of January, 2010.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent's intent to award a contract for bridge-tending services (RFP DOT 92/93 2088 REBID) to Intervenor constitutes fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, illegal or dishonest action.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to findings of fact set forth in paragraphs 1.-12., below. Stipulated Facts Respondent issued the RFP for bridge-tending services on May 14, 1993. Proposals submitted in response to the RFP were opened on June 16, 1993. Proposals were submitted by five firms, including Petitioner and Intervenor. All proposals were determined at the time to be responsive. A Technical Review Committee (TRC) was appointed to review the technical portion of the proposals. The three members of the TRC were Alan Hyman, J. L. Gillis, and Yingyong Sujjavanich. The members reviewed the technical portion of the proposals on June 17, 1993. The evaluation forms completed by the TRC and a summary score sheet were delivered to Respondent's purchasing office on the morning of June 18, 1993. The price proposal was evaluated by Respondent's purchasing office. The price evaluation of each proposal was performed by applying a formula which compared the submitted price quotations. After the scores for the technical proposal and the cost proposals were totalled, it was determined that Intervenor's proposal had earned the highest number of points. This result was presented to Respondent's District 2 Executive Committee and a recommendation was communicated by the Purchasing Director to award the RFP to Intervenor. The Executive Committee accepted the recommendation and directed that the contract be awarded to Intervenor. On June 18, 1993, at 4 p.m., the bid tabs were posted noticing Respondent's intent to award the contract to Intervenor. On or about July 6, 1993, Petitioner requested a meeting with Respondent's representatives regarding the RFP. That meeting was held on July 9, 1993. At the meeting, Petitioner raised an issue regarding an arithmetic error in the scoring of the technical proposals. Intervenor remained the proposer with the highest number of points. However, another proposal formerly ranked as number two was lowered to number three status and Petitioner, previously ranked number three, was raised to number two rank. On July 12, 1993, Respondent posted an amended bid tab indicating its intent to award the contract to Intervenor. Other Facts Respondent chose to score the bid pricing, a non- subjective task, in Respondent's District 2 office. Technical portions of the proposals were reviewed by the TRC, comprised of members from Respondent's District 5 office. This unusual step was taken by Respondent in order to reduce prejudice to any proposal in view of previous accusations made against District 2 employees. Bud Rosier, Respondent's employee, has overall responsibility for bridge determination that District 5 employees chosen as committee members were qualified to evaluate the proposals. Each response to the RFP contained a technical proposal and a price proposal. Intervenor's technical proposal received 1.33 points less than Petitioner's technical proposal. The price proposals, as noted above, were scored in accordance with a mathematical formula that compares price proposals to each other and does not take any subjective factors into consideration. Intervenor was awarded 5.55 points, compared to Petitioner who received no points for a proposal more than $140,000 higher for the initial year of the contemplated contract. Although members of the TRC were not given any background information by Respondent regarding the competing proposals, beyond that contained in the submitted bid packages, no information was withheld from the committee. The members were given adequate time to review the proposals and do any desired independent background checking regarding past performance of any proposer, although no requirement in the RFP mandated such a background review. At least one of the TRC members, Sujjavanich, chose not to independently research past performance of the Intervenor. No evidence was offered at hearing with regard to whether the other two members independently researched any of the proposers' past performances. Even if review of past performance, apart from the materials submitted by the proposers, were required by provisions of the RFP, failure of the evaluators to accomplish that task would result only in the loss to Intervenor of the 3.66 points awarded for past performance and Intervenor, with a remaining total of 81.89 points, would remain the highest ranked proposer. In view of the objective process used to arrive at the results of the evaluation of the prices of the competing proposals, there was no need to provide this information to the members of the TRC who were doing the technical proposal evaluation. Although the RFP provided that the TRC would be given such results, the failure of Respondent's personnel to provide this information to the evaluators could not have made any difference in the final result since the committee, using the objective price evaluation criteria, would have arrived at the same result as the purchasing office on cost scores. The admitted failure to provide the superfluous cost information to the TRC is inadequate to show that such omission resulted in prejudice to the final scores of any of the competing proposals and must be considered to be only a minor variation from the RFP by Respondent. Contrary to Petitioner's allegations, there is no competent substantial evidence to support any finding that the members of the TRC (Hyman, Gillis, and Sujjavanich) did not possess required background, experience or professional credentials adequate for evaluating proposals for bridge-tending services. All three members of the TRC were familiar with the RFP, attachments to the RFP, bridge-tending procedures and bridge-tending qualification procedures. There is no competent substantial evidence to establish that Intervenor's proposal is not financially feasible. Proposed utilization of 72 bridge-tenders by Intervenor for a total price of $673,333.44 does not mean that 72 bridge-tender positions would be established or filled, or that the positions would be paid at the rate proposed by Petitioner of $8.40 per hour. The evidence establishes that a proposer would need an optimum number of bridge requirements.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered granting the award of the bid in RFP DOT 92/93 2088 Rebid to Intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-4271BID The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. 1.-12. Accepted. 13.-16. Rejected, relevancy. 17. Accepted. 18.-19. Rejected, relevancy. 20.-25. Accepted. 26.-27. Rejected, cumulative. 28. Rejected, credibility. 29.-33. Rejected, relevancy. 34.-35. Accepted. 36.-37. Rejected, argumentative and mischaracterization. 38.-46. Rejected, subordinate to HO findings. 47.-51. Rejected, relevancy. Intervenor's Proposed Findings. 1.-2. Rejected, cumulative. 3.-4. Accepted. 5.-6. Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected, cumulative. Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected, argumentative. 10.-11. Rejected, unnecessary. 12.-13. Adopted by reference. 14.-16. Accepted, but not verbatim. 17.-22. Adopted by reference. 23. Rejected, unnecessary. 24.-30. Adopted, but not verbatim. 31. Rejected, narrative. 32.-35. Rejected, cumulative. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1.-11. Adopted. 12. Rejected, unnecessary. 13.-17. Adopted, not verbatim. 18.-19. Rejected, cumulative. 20.-22. Adopted. 23. Rejected, recitation of RFP. 24.-26. Adopted. 27. Rejected, recitation of RFP. 28.-29. Adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Cassidy, III, Esquire. John O. Williams, Esquire Renaissance Square 1343 East Tennessee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Carolyn S. Holifield, Esquire Mark D. Tucker, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Timothy G. Schoenwalder, Esquire 204-B South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3068 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building # 562 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner took an in-service distribution from his Investment Plan retirement account, and if so, must either repay the distribution in full or terminate employment with all FRS-participating employers, including his current employer, Orange County (County), for at least six calendar months.
Findings Of Fact The FRS is comprised of the Pension Plan, which is a defined benefit plan, and the Investment Plan, which is a defined contribution plan. The Division of Retirement administers the Pension Plan, while the SBA administers the Investment Plan. Section 121.4501(13) charges the SBA with administering the Investment Plan in compliance with the Internal Revenue Code in order to retain its qualified status. Until March 4, 2014, Petitioner was a member of the FRS Pension Plan by virtue of his employment as a Lieutenant with the Orange County Fire Rescue Department. The County participates in the FRS. Effective March 1, 2014, Petitioner used his one-time Second Election to switch from the FRS Pension Plan to the FRS Investment Plan. He switched plans in order to have ready access to his FRS retirement funds should he be terminated from employment by the County. On March 4, 2014, Petitioner was terminated from his employment for allegedly violating County rules and regulations. On March 10, 2014, Petitioner filed a formal grievance seeking reinstatement and all benefits. The decision to terminate his employment was later upheld. After the grievance was denied, but before he took a distribution, Petitioner obtained legal representation and initiated a lawsuit against the County on the basis that he was terminated because of his race and gender. Without a job or income, on September 4, 8, and 9, 2015, Petitioner withdrew distributions totaling $474,932.62 from his Investment Plan account. Before taking an Investment Plan distribution, a member is required to answer several questions, either on-line or by telephone, to verify that he is eligible to take a distribution. Petitioner elected to apply on-line. One question asks if the member is "pending reemployment," a term that means, among other things, the member is seeking reinstatement through a pending action against his employer at the time of the distribution. If a member answers yes, he is ineligible to take a distribution. Even though he had a pending discrimination lawsuit against his employer, which could lead to reinstatement if he prevailed, Petitioner answered no. Had he answered the question correctly, Petitioner would not have been allowed to take a distribution. The SBA does not check in real time the veracity of a member's answers to the questions asked during the distribution request process. Petitioner was advised by written information, however, that the SBA might undertake a later review of his distribution and seek repayment if it was determined to be invalid. During the distribution process, members have access to Ernst & Young planners on the MyFRS Financial Guidance Line to answer any questions they have concerning the distribution. Although he was aware of this educational resource, Petitioner chose not to call a planner. On May 24, 2016, Petitioner and his former employer entered into a Settlement Agreement and Mutual General Release (Settlement Agreement) to resolve the discrimination lawsuit. Without admitting liability, the County agreed, among other things, for Petitioner to be reinstated to his former position with all seniority, benefits, and accrued back pay effective June 6, 2016. He also had service credit restored for the period March 2014 through June 2016. The Settlement Agreement further provided that a letter of reprimand would replace the termination notice. Petitioner was represented by an attorney during the settlement negotiations. The SBA was not a party to the agreement. Following the execution of the Settlement Agreement, but before payment of the settlement funds, the County was advised by the SBA that because Mr. James was being reinstated and the termination set aside, an in-service distribution had occurred in September 2015, and Mr. James would be required to either pay back the distribution in full or terminate employment with the County for at least six months. The County was also advised that a change to the language in the Settlement Agreement confirming that Mr. James had in fact been separated from employment with the County for a period of six months would resolve the in-service distribution issue and make it unnecessary to repay the distribution or be separated from employment with the County. This information was orally conveyed to Petitioner's counsel. Despite this warning, Petitioner declined to modify the Settlement Agreement. The County reconfirmed this information in a letter dated June 14, 2016, to Petitioner's attorney. It read in pertinent part as follows: [T]his will confirm that you advised you met with Mr. James and counseled him on the potential implications of his acceptance of the enclosed payments under the Agreement (a copy of which was previously provided for your records), including the requirement that he repay to the Florida Retirement System (FRS) all sums that he previously received as disbursements from the FRS, and his responsibility for all penalties and tax consequences, if any, related to the Agreement payments and FRS disbursements. This will also confirm that although Orange County offered to enter into an alternate agreement form with Mr. James (for the same consideration) that would be acceptable to FRS and not require repayment of FRS disbursements, Mr. James elected to remain bound by the terms of the current Agreement and you advised Mr. James will make any FRS- related payments necessary. As we previously discussed, in the event Mr. James does not repay sums due and owing the FRS, Orange County will not repay such sums on his behalf. Further, in the event of Mr. James' non-repayment of funds to the FRS, we understand from Orange County that it may be compelled by FRS to separate Mr. James from his employment pursuant to applicable statutory laws, rules and regulations. In light of the serious consequences to Mr. James of non-repayment of the FRS funds, in an abundance of caution, Orange County once again advises that if an alternate form of settlement agreement that does not require repayment to FRS is preferred by Mr. James, Orange County stands ready to execute such an agreement in the form previously provided for your consideration. Jt. Ex. 8, pp. 0001-0002. This was fair warning to Petitioner that there were serious consequences if he chose to ignore the SBA's concerns. On June 15, 2016, Petitioner's counsel replied by letter that the settlement checks which accompanied the County's June 14 letter were cashed, Mr. James would not repay funds to the FRS, and Mr. James intended to return to work with the County. Id. at pp. 0003-0004. As of the date of the hearing, Petitioner had not repaid the distribution, and pending the outcome of this hearing, he has continued to work as a County employee pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. Based upon an audit by the Division of Retirement after Petitioner was reinstated, which showed that Petitioner had received a distribution, he was currently receiving FRS contributions from his employer, and he had no County termination date, the SBA determined the distribution was invalid. On August 1, 2016, Petitioner was notified by the SBA that his September 2015 distributions were considered "in- service" distributions based on reinstatement to his FRS-covered position and service credit given for the period from March 2014 through June 2016. He was offered the option of returning the distributions to his account by September 30, 2016, or being terminated by his employer, with leave to be reemployed by an FRS-participating employer after six months. Petitioner declined this option and filed an appeal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Hearing and determining that unless Petitioner repays the distribution to FRS within 30 days from the date of the final order, he must be declared a retiree and ineligible for future participation in the FRS; any retirement contributions received from Petitioner or the County after his first distribution on September 4, 2015, must be returned; service credit awarded for the period from March 2014 through June 2016 must be vacated; and Petitioner must be immediately terminated from employment for at least six calendar months. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry Girley, Esquire The Girley Law Firm, P.A. 125 East Marks Street Orlando, Florida 32803-3816 (eServed) Brian A. Newman, Esquire Pennington, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 (eServed) Sarah P.L. Reiner, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. 301 East Pine Street, Suite 1400 Orlando, Florida 32801-2741 (eServed) Ash Williams, Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer State Board of Administration 1801 Hermitage Boulevard, Suite 100 Post Office Box 13300 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-3300
The Issue Are the intended contract awards by the Department of Juvenile Justice (Department) to Intervenor, Ramsay Youth Services, Inc. (Ramsay) under Request for Proposal (RFP) Numbers J5G01 and J5G02 contrary to the Department's governing statutes, applicable rules or policies, or the specifications of the RFPs?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Background On March 29, 2002, the Department issued RFP No. J5G01 for the operation of a 350-bed residential commitment program for high-risk males in Polk City, Florida (Polk Program). On April 5, 2002, the Department issued RFP No. J5G02 for the operation of a 74-bed, multi-level residential commitment program in Homeland, Florida (Bartow Program). CSC is the incumbent provider for both the Polk and Bartow Programs. On or about April 25, 2002, two proposals were submitted in response to the RFP for the Polk Program, one from CSC and one from Ramsay. On or about May 3, 2002, four separate proposals were submitted by CSC, Ramsay, Sescuricor New Century (Securicor), and Lighthouse Care Center (Lighthouse) in response to the RFP for the Bartow Program. On June 25, 2002, the Department posted separate notices of its intent to award contracts for the Polk and Bartow Programs to Ramsay. The Notice of Intended Contract Award for the Polk Program (RFP No. J5G01) lists Ramsay as the highest-ranked bidder with 655.3 average points, and CSC as the second-ranked bidder with 537 average points. The Notice of Intended Contract Award for the Bartow Program (RFP No. J5G02) lists Ramsay as the highest-ranked bidder with 590.3 points, followed by Securicor with 542.7 average points, CSC with 535.7 points, and Lighthouse with 233.3 points. All parties stipulated to the Department's scoring of the past performance portion of both CSC proposals. With the exception of Item C-3.7, all parties stipulated to the Department's scoring of the past performance portion of both Ramsay proposals. With regard to Item C-3.7, the parties stipulated the Department's scoring for Ramsay should have reflected 60 additional points because Ramsay's Manatee Adolescent Treatment Services program (Department's Contract No. F7027) met or exceeded the approved Performance Based Budgeting performance measure for recidivism for the past two years. In light of the corrections for Item C-3.7, Ramsay's total average score for the Polk Program should have been 715.3 (i.e., 655.3+60), compared to CSC's score of 537. Likewise, for the Bartow Program, Ramsay's total average score should have been 650.3 (i.e., 590.3 + 60), compared to CSC's score of 535.7. The Process Since at least the end of 2001, the Department has utilized two procurement methods: one provides for the scoring of costs; the other does not because the RFP specifies a fixed maximum contract price. When the fixed price method is used and costs are not scored the Department conducts a so- called "negotiation phase" after issuing notice of intent to award the contract. During the so-called "negotiation phase," the Department and offeror determine such things as the unfilled bed rate and maintenance rate, but the Department does not negotiate material terms of the technical proposal or allow the selected offeror to modify its proposal. The Department does not allow the selected offeror to increase the cost or price included in its proposal. However, if an error is discovered in the selected offeror's budget, the budget can be adjusted to redistribute expenses from one line item to another, so long as the proposed services are provided and the proposed cost or price is not exceeded. If the Department is unable to complete execution of the contract because the selected offeror is unable to provide the program services within the contract set forth in its proposal, the Department moves on to negotiate with the next offeror. Use of the "fixed price" procurement method has enabled the Department to reduce procurement process from 180 to less than 120 days on average, and often as low as 60 days. Speeding up the procurement process helps to ensure that services will continue to be provided and that legislatively appropriated funds do not go unused and, as a result, become subject to forfeiture. This is important because the State has a "waiting list" of committed youth who require program services. The "fixed price" method also allows the Department to place its principal emphasis on the quality of programs offered. In this case, the RFPs for both programs contemplate fixed priced contracts. Each RFP specifies a maximum contract dollar amount that the Department will award for each contract. The dollar amount is a "fatal criterion," meaning that any proposal with a cost exceeding that amount would be rejected. Both RFPs required each offer to submit a technical proposal (Volume I) setting forth an introductory statement and specific sections describing the offeror's management capability, the offeror's past performance, and the program services being offered. Both RFP's required offerors to submit financial data (Volume II) including, among other things, a total cost or price for the program and an itemized budget. The total costs submitted by Ramsay and CSC did not differ significantly; the difference was less than one dollar for the Polk Program and only two dollars for the Bartow Program. Both RFP's provided that zero points would be assigned for costs or price, indicating that costs or price would not be scored. Instead, the primary scoring criteria are "program services" and "past performance." Together, these criteria reflect 700 out of the 1000s total points available. Nothing in the RFPs requires the Department to evaluate budget details in conjunction with its review of the technical proposals prior to the notice of intended award. The Department uses the budget information primarily as a baseline to assist it in moving through the "negotiation phase." It enables the Department to determine if specific costs would not be incurred or not allowable. It enables the Department to negotiate the unfilled bed rate, which allows the Department to reduce the contract rate to account for costs that would not be incurred for beds that are not occupied. It also forces offerors to determine whether they can provide the required services within the maximum price before they submit proposals. Based on a Department document entitled "Briefing for SSET Team Members and Advisors," CSC claims that the "RFP Process" requires the Department to evaluate proposed costs for realism, reasonableness, and completeness. The "Briefing" document does state that "the contract administrator is responsible for evaluating the cost proposals of each offeror for completeness, reasonableness, and reality using the COST [PRICE] PROPOSAL EVALUATING form. However, the "Briefing" document is not a part of the RFP's and does not reflect official Department policy. The "Briefing" document is merely a guideline. In this case, the Contract Administrator, Marvin Floyd, did not sign the "Briefing" document and did not score or perform an extensive analysis of the specifics of the proposed budgets for realism, reasonableness, and completeness. However, Marvin Floyd did review each cost proposal to determine whether it included a total cost or price and whether the budget information in Attachment H was filled out. In that sense, Marvin Floyd did review the cost proposal for completeness. Similarly, Marvin Floyd also reviewed the proposed costs and price to determine whether it exceeded maximum contract dollar amount, which the Department had previously determined to be realistic and reasonable. In that sense, Marvin Floyd did review the costs or price for realisms and reasonableness. CSC failed to demonstrate that the evaluation process utilized by the Department provided a competitive advantage to Ramsay. To the contrary, the same evaluation process and guidelines were used for both CSC and Ramsay. Ramsay's Proposed Budget Based on isolated statements made in Ramsay's technical proposal and a review of Ramsay's budget, CSC's senior Vice President, Paul Donnelly, opined that Ramsay's proposal was somewhat "naïve" and a "virtual primer . . . for a novice[.]" However, Donnelly opinions must be weighed in light of the fact that CSC received "minimal performance" and "noncompliance" ratings for both the Polk and Bartow Programs in the latest Department Quality Assurance reviews. Furthermore, Donnelly himself testified in deposition that Ramsay submitted an "impressive technical proposal." The record demonstrated that Ramsay is an experienced provider that currently operates nine programs for the Department, including the Department's only contracted maximum-risk program. CSC contends that the budget included in Volume II of Ramsay's proposal for the Polk Program is not realistic, reasonable, or complete because it did not include specific line items for certain direct expenses, including start-up costs, overtime, employee expenses, and taxes, as well as certain indirect expenses, such as insurance and corporate overhead. CSC failed to demonstrate that the RFP specifications or the Department policy requires such budgetary detail. Moreover, Ramsay's Chief Operating Office, Jorge Rico, explained that Ramsay's budget did address most of the costs identified by CSC in other, more general line items. Whereas CSC's budget was more specific as to some items, Ramsay's budget was more specific as to others. For example, Ramsay included a specific line item for recruiting, but CSC addressed this expense in the general category of corporate overhead. Similarly, Ramsay included specific line items for nursing staff, whereas CSC addressed nursing staff in the general category of medical services. CSC also faulted Ramsay for not including start-up or "transition" costs in its budget for the Polk Program. But had such a line item been included, it would have been eliminated during the so-called "negotiation phase" because the Department does not allow start-up costs for existing programs. CSC's argument that Ramsay should have budgeted these costs amounts to a claim that CSC should be given a competitive advantage because, as the incumbent provider, CSC would not incur transitional costs and, therefore, would have no reason to budget them. Such an advantage would be contrary to competitive principles by favoring the incumbent provider over other offerors. The primary indirect expense that CSC criticized Ramsay for not including in its budget is corporate overhead. As Rico explained, however, corporate overhead is a fixed cost that will not increase with the addition of a new program. Ramsay made a business decision to put whatever funds that might be allocated as corporate overhead into the program itself. CSC claims that Ramsay cannot provide the services outlined in its proposal without incurring a loss. Rico acknowledged that Ramsay likely would incur losses for at least the first year of the programs, as is common when a new provider takes over an existing program. However, whether or not a provider makes a profit on a program is not the Department's concern and is not an award criterion. In fact, when corporate overhead is allocated as CSC suggests Ramsay should have in its budget, CSC itself incurred losses on both Polk and Bartow Programs over the twelve-month period ending July 2002. In its totality, the evidence indicates that the budgets submitted by Ramsay and CSC differ due to differences in management styles. Those differences do not render Ramsay's budget unrealistic, unreasonable, or incomplete. The differences in total costs proposed by CSC and Ramsay were negligible. In any event, budgets are estimates, actual expenses never match budget line items. The evidence does not support CSC's claim that Ramsay will need to make material changes to its budget in order to provide the program services at the cost or price set forth in its proposal. Ramsay is committed to providing the services described in its technical proposal at the cost set forth in its cost proposal. Staffing Ratio Based on a statement in Ramsay's technical proposal, CSC suggests that Ramsay would not meet the staffing ratios required for the Polk Program. However, Ramsay's technical proposal clearly states in bold lettering that Ramsay "will meet staffing requirements documented in the RFP (1:8 days and evening; 1:12 nights)." Moreover, Ramsay's budget includes enough positions and dollars to meet the required staffing ratios. In fact, with regard to "youth workers," who provide the core of the program staff, Ramsay's budget includes considerably more positions (186 full time equivalent or "FTEs"), than does CSC's budget (120.9 FTEs). Instructions to Evaluators CSC failed to demonstrate that the Department failed to provide its evaluators with specific and legally sufficient instructions regarding the scoring of proposals. To the contrary, the scoring sheets provided to the evaluators contain specific and detailed instructions on how each scoring criterion was to be evaluated. For example, in evaluating "Programs Services," the scoring sheets advise the evaluators to assess "soundness of approach" and "compliance with requirements" as follows: SOUNDNESS OF APPROACH: (Does the proposal reasonably and logically identify the proposed approach to perform the services as specified and required by the RFP, Attachment G, Exhibit 1, Scope of Services?) COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS: (The degree to which the proposal complies with the requirement specified and required by the RFP, Attachment G, Exhibit 1, Scope of Services)(Does the proposal comply with all requirements for all service components, as identified in Attachment G, Exhibit 1, Scope of services, of the RFP?) The evaluators were then required to provide a numeric score ranging from 5 to zero. The scoring sheets provide specific criteria for determining the appropriate numeric score. For example, an "excellent" score of 5 would be appropriate if "[t]he proposal exceeds all technical specifications and requirements for all program components (and it) is innovative, comprehensive, and complete in every detail." Other Issues CSC failed to prove its allegations that the Departments' scorers evaluated and scored the proposals inconsistently or incorrectly or that the Department deviated from the RFP criteria in evaluating and scoring the proposals. CSC also failed to demonstrate that the Department's reduction in the number of beds for the Bartow Program from 74 to 50 beds after issuance of the RFP provided an unfair advantage to Ramsay or was otherwise contrary to competition.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order dismissing CSC's protests and awarding the contracts to Ramsay pursuant to RFP Nos. J5G01 and J5G01 as originally proposed. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of October, 2002. Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian Berkowitz, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 James C. Hauser, Esquire Warren Husband, Esquire Metz, Hauser and Husband, P.A. Post Office Box 10909 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2909 Gary V. Perko, Esquire Hopping, Green, Sams & Smith 123 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Law Offices of R. Terry Rigsby, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 505 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary P. Sams, Esquire Hopping, Green, Sams & Smith Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 William G. Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechern, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue Whether Respondent Consolidated Services, Inc. (CSI) owes Petitioner $20,674.50 for peppers purchased from Petitioner, as alleged in Petitioner's Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a producer of peppers and other produce. It owns and operates Goodson Farms in Balm, Florida, which is located on the west coast of the Florida peninsula. At all times material to the instant case, Don and Jan Goodson have been the owners of Petitioner. At all times material to the instant case, Steve Macholl has been Petitioner's sales manager. At all times material to the instant case, Craig Sovine has been employed by Petitioner, "handl[ing, along with Mr. Macholl] sales[,] shipping[,] receiving," and related paperwork. At all times material to the instant case, Mr. Macholl and Mr. Sovine have had the authority to enter into agreements on behalf of Petitioner to sell produce Petitioner grows on its farm. At all times material to instant case, it has been Petitioner's practice to sell on only a cash basis, and not to extend credit, to any unbonded and unlicensed dealer who is not listed in either the "Blue Book" or "Red Book" (both of which, among other things, provide credit rating information) and with whom it does not have an established relationship. CSI is a Florida-licensed dealer in agricultural products. At all times material to the instant case, CSI had offices in Nogales, Arizona and Pompano Beach, Florida, which is located on the southeast coast of the Florida peninsula. At all times material to the instant case, Robert Allen has been the owner of CSI. At all times material to the instant case, Harry Guice was employed as a sales representative by CSI. As a sales representative, Mr. Guice had the authority to enter into agreements on behalf of CSI to purchase produce. Mr. Guice no longer works for CSI. In or about April of 1998, Mr. Guice, acting in his capacity as CSI's sales representative, visited Goodson Farms to discuss with Petitioner's representatives, Mr. Macholl and Mr. Sovine, the possibility of CSI obtaining peppers from Petitioner. (Prior to this time, CSI had not had any direct business dealings with Petitioner.) Mr. Guice was accompanied on his visit by John Haire. Mr. Haire owned and operated a business, Signal Produce, from his home in Appollo Beach, Florida, which was located a short distance from Goodson Farms. Although there is a conflict in the evidence, the more credible evidence establishes that the following occurred during and after Mr. Guice's visit. Mr. Guice and Mr. Haire introduced themselves to Mr. Macholl and Mr. Sovine and presented them with their business cards. Mr. Guice's business card reflected that he was a sales representative for CSI. On the back of the card, Mr. Guice wrote down his home telephone number. Mr. Haire's business card reflected that he was with Signal Produce. Mr. Guice told Mr. Macholl and Mr. Sovine that he was familiar with Petitioner's product because he had purchased Goodson Farms' produce (on behalf of CSI) from Don Monteef, who, Mr. Guice related, had recently passed away. (Mr. Monteef had been, like Mr. Haire, unbonded, unlicensed and not listed in either the "Blue Book" or "Red Book." Petitioner, at the outset, had done business with Mr. Monteef on a cash basis exclusively, but after having established a business relationship with him had allowed him to defer payment until "two or three days" after he "picked up" his order.) Mr. Guice advised Mr. Macholl and Mr. Sovine that CSI was interested in purchasing product directly from Petitioner. He further indicated that Mr. Haire would assist him in making such purchases for CSI by visiting Goodson Farms and inspecting the produce available for purchase. After determining that CSI had an exemplary credit rating, Mr. Macholl and Mr. Sovine informed Mr. Guice that Petitioner would sell to CSI on credit. When Mr. Guice indicated that CSI would make payment within seven to ten days, Mr. Macholl and Mr. Sovine told him that CSI would receive a discount if payment was actually made within that time frame. During the period beginning April 20, 1998, and ending May 26, 1998, CSI, through Mr. Guice, verbally agreed to purchase from Petitioner, and Petitioner, through its representatives, verbally agreed to sell to CSI (FOB), five separate loads of peppers for a total price of $20,674.50 ($12,515.50 for a load purchased and sold on April 20, 1998; $2,561.00 for a load purchased and sold on April 29, 1998; $2,556.00 for a load purchased and sold on May 23, 1998; $612.00 for a load purchased and sold on May 25, 1998; and $2,430.00 for a load purchased and sold on May 26, 1998).2 All five loads were delivered to and accepted by CSI's agents (the truck drivers Mr. Guice dispatched to Goodson Farms). On one occasion (the May 23, 1998, delivery) Mr. Haire picked up the peppers from Goodson farms for CSI. For each transaction, Petitioner prepared (in triplicate) a "manifest" ("manifest" number 0997 for the April 20, 1998, transaction; "manifest" 1089 for the April 29, 1998, transaction; "manifest" number 1551 for the May 23, 1998, transaction; "manifest" number 1578 for the May 25, 1998, transaction; and "manifest" number 1601 for the May 26, 1998, transaction). The "manifest" indicated, among other things, the date of the transaction; the number of peppers sold; CSI's status as the purchaser of these peppers; the CSI purchase order number used to make the purchase (2311 for the April 20, 1998, purchase; 2334 for the April 29, 1998, purchase; 2440 for the May 23, 1998, purchase; 2462 for the May 25, 1998, purchase; and 2327 for the May 26, 1998, purchase); the name of the trucking company and driver picking up the load for CSI, the tag number of the driver's truck; and when the load was picked up. The "manifest" was presented to the truck driver picking up the load for the driver's signature. After signing the "manifest," the driver was given a copy as a receipt. Mr. Macholl thereafter added price information to the "manifest" to reflect the amount that, pursuant to the parties' verbal agreement, CSI owed Petitioner for the peppers in question. He then sent a copy of the "manifest" (with this additional information) to CSI's Pompano Beach office. At all times material to the instant case, documents received at CSI's Pompano Beach Office that were labeled as "manifests" were placed in the mailboxes of the CSI sales representatives responsible for the transaction. At no time prior to the commencement of the instant action did CSI advise Petitioner that it disputed any of the information contained in the above-described "manifests." CSI received and paid invoices from John Haire/Signal Produce dated April 26, 1998, April 30, 1998, May 23, 1998, and May 25, 1998, seeking payment for peppers purportedly purchased by CSI with purchase order numbers 2311 (for $9,955.50), 2334 (for $2,406.00), 2440 (for $3,337.50), and 2462 (for $660.00), the same purchase orders that Mr. Guice gave Petitioner when he placed orders, on behalf of CSI, with Petitioner for the peppers that were the subject of the April 20, 1998, April 29, 1998, May 23, 1998, and May 25, 1998, transactions described above. CSI has not yet paid Petitioner for the peppers that were the subject of these transactions; nor has it paid Petitioner for the peppers that were the subject of the May 26, 1998, transaction.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the that the Department enter a final order (1) finding that CSI is indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $20,674.50, (2) directing CSI to make payment to Petitioner in the amount of $20,674.50 within 15 days following the issuance of the order, and (3) announcing that if payment in full of this $20,674.50 indebtedness is not timely made, the Department will seek recovery from NYSC, CSI's surety. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1999.
The Issue On May 12, 2004, did Respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT), act illegally, arbitrarily, dishonestly, or fraudulently when it cancelled the posting and noticed its intent to reject the bid of Rosiek Construction Co., Inc. (Rosiek), in relation to financial project Nos. 256903-1-52-01 and 256903-1-56-01, Pinellas Bayway Bridge Replacement, SR 682 (the Project)? § 120.57(3)(f), Fla. Stat. (2004).
Findings Of Fact The subject of this protest is financial project Nos. 256903-1-52-01 and 256903-1-56-01, Pinellas Bayway Bridge Replacement. Respondent and 12 other pre-qualified bidders received copies of the bid solicitation notice, plans and specifications for the Project at issue. Rosiek submitted a responsive bid for the Pinellas Bayway Bridge Replacement on April 28, 2004. There were no other bidders. Rosiek is pre-qualified to bid and receive the contract for the Project and therefore is a responsible bidder. On May 12, 2004, DOT posted its notice of intent to reject all bids. Rosiek timely filed this bid protest on May 14, 2004, with DOT, along with the statutorily required bid protest bond. DOT's 2004 Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction is applicable to this project. FACTS BASED UPON ROSIEK'S ADMISSIONS DOT had advertised its bid solicitation notice for Financial Project Nos. 256903-1-52-01 and 256903-1-56-01, Pinellas Bayway Bridge Replacement on or about March 4, 2004. Rosiek received the copy of the Bid Solicitation Notice for the Project. Rosiek did not file a specifications challenge with respect to the referenced Project. DOT advertised the amount of $37,087,000.00 as its budgeted amount for the Project. Rosiek submitted a total bid of $50,470,378.12 for the Project (total bid A+B). ADDITIONAL FACTS Juanita Moore is a manager of the DOT Contracts Administration Office. She served as a member of the Technical Review Committee and the Awards Committee in relation to the Project. When the Technical Review Committee is confronted with a bid, such as the Rosiek bid, which is from a single bidder, something is missing from the bid or for certain differentials in price between the bid received and the official cost estimate, the Technical Review Committee considers these to be "problem jobs." In connection with terminology, Ms. Moore explained that the budget figure, referred to in the Bid Solicitation Notice for the Project as a Proposal Budget Estimate, is derived from an earlier estimate in the process and in turn an official cost estimate was established for the Project. The official cost estimate is also referred to simply as the estimate. The official cost estimate has not been disclosed as has been explained in the Preliminary Statement to the Recommended Order. The official cost estimate here is broken down into component items within the Project pertaining to cost for Mobilization, Concrete Class IV, Concrete Class V, etc. After the Technical Review Committee considered the Rosiek bid, the bid was passed on to the Awards Committee where it was decided to reject the bid. According to Ms. Moore the bid was rejected as too high when compared to the official cost estimate. The reference to a bid being too high relates to a bid which is more than 10 percent in excess of the official cost estimate. The budget figure and the official cost estimate are not necessarily the same in a given instance. The fact that it was the only bid was also a factor considered in the rejection. As Ms. Moore explained, at the time the Rosiek bid was rejected, it was principally because it was too high in relation to the official cost estimate. Given the posture in this case, the rejection as the only bid will form the basis for resolving this dispute, absent DOT's willingness to divulge the amount of the official cost estimate or how it was established. DOT does not have an established policy for rejecting bids based upon the fact that only a single bidder responded to the solicitation. In her experience, Ms. Moore does not remember DOT rejecting a bid solely on the ground that there was only one bidder. The minutes of the Awards Committee meeting held on May 12, 2004, detail the response by that committee to the Rosiek bid. In the copy of that document provided for this proceeding, DOT's official cost estimate is redacted. The percentage differential between the official cost estimate and the Rosiek bid is likewise redacted. The item number 0101-1 for Mobilization reflects Rosiek's bid of $4,900,000.00 compared to the official cost estimate which is redacted. Similarly, Item No. 0400-4-4, Concrete Class IV refers to the contractor bid price of $800.00 per cubic yard compared with the official cost estimate which is redacted. There are other comparisons between several additional categories or items in which the contractors bid price is reflected but the official cost estimate in comparison is redacted. The minutes go on to describe how the review being made by the Awards Committee led to the conclusion that the official cost estimate could be adjusted, placing the bid received by Rosiek a certain percentage above the estimate on a 10 percent criteria job but the differential between the adjusted official cost estimate and the Rosiek bid is not revealed as a percentage because of redaction. The DOT district where the project would be located is District 7, the Tampa office. The minutes of the Awards Committee meeting indicate that the district and the Technical Review Committee recommended to the Awards Committee that it reject the Rosiek bid and re-advertise. That was the decision made by the Awards Committee on May 12, 2004, to re-let in June. Nothing in the minutes prepared by the Awards Committee refers to the significance of Rosiek as the only bidder and any concern which the Awards Committee had about that fact. On May 12, 2004, when DOT provided a Cancellation of Posting and a Notice of Intent to Reject to Rosiek, it did not state the rationale for that decision. It merely indicated to Rosiek that it was DOT's intent to reject all bids on the project and advised Rosiek of its opportunity to contest that decision. On May 5, 2004, Kenneth A. Hartmann, P.E., the District 7 Secretary, prepared the District Response to Post- Bid Evaluation of Bids in Excess of Approved Award Criteria. The document is presented in question-and-answer form. In response to the question numbered 4 within the document, related to the prospect of critical safety deficiencies in the existing system being corrected by the construction of a new bridge, Mr. Hartmann responded with the answer "No." In relation to question numbered 2, excluding normal inflation, the question was asked whether re-advertising the project would likely result in a higher bid. Mr. Hartman answered "No." In response to question numbered 16, related to his recommendation as the district secretary, for action that should be taken by the Awards Committee he stated "This project should be rejected and re-advertised for a June 2004 1st [sic]. Considering that the project is medium to large and was competing against two other large bridge projects on the same day it is understandable that the contractor's bid was higher than our estimate." In response to question numbered 15 concerning the work load level of the contracting industry in the locality where the project would be constructed, Mr. Hartmann referred to "a high level of work load." At hearing Donald Skelton, P.E., the District 7 Secretary testified in support of the rejection of the Rosiek bid. In the past he had served as Director of Transportation Development with DOT, a position that made him responsible for preparation of the design plans and contract packages that are bid. He had involvement with this Project pertaining to the preparation of design plans and getting the Project to contract letting. He reviewed the Rosiek bid. In discussions related to the Rosiek bid during the post-bid evaluation period, there was a concern over a lack of competition and the differential between, what Mr. Skelton refers to, as the budget amount and the bid amount by Rosiek. Mr. Skelton was mindful of potential safety issues that might warrant the prospect of trying to find additional money to fund the Project, if it was necessary to replace the existing bridge for safety reasons. If the bridge were structurally deficient or in bad shape, that would need to be addressed, versus the additional time necessary to potentially rebid the project. No safety issues of that sort were found by Mr. Skelton. Mr. Skelton explained that the fact that there was single bidder made it difficult, if not impossible, to make a comparison between that bid and what the true market value of the bridge construction would be. Mr. Skelton expressed the hope by the DOT, that there would be more than one bidder in the future to truly get an impression of the degree of competition and whether the competition would result in a realistic price for the public. He recognized that there is no guarantee that DOT is going to get a lower bid if the project is re-bid. Mr. Skelton indicated that when you have multiple bids you can compare what the economic system would support in relation to the affordability of the project. That comparison is of similarity in prices among the competitors trying to win the job, with the belief that bidders put their best effort forward to prevail in the competition. A single bid does not give any indication of market factors, in his view. Michael Rosiek is the vice-president for Rosiek. In his testimony, he expressed a concern that if the project was re-let for bid, Rosiek's competitive position would not be good, in that the other contractors would have read the Rosiek bid that was made in the first letting, informing the competitors of the Rosiek price to its detriment. Further, Mr. Rosiek expressed a concern that in a re-letting the company would be bidding "against ourselves." Louis Wenick, P.E., has a business consulting service. The nature of the business is consulting work relating to the construction industry. A considerable part of the business involves DOT projects. In his work Mr. Wenick is involved with scheduling, cost analysis, and entitlement analysis in DOT projects. He is familiar with DOT's specifications, policies, and procedures. Mr. Wenick is a registered engineer in Florida and a certified general contractor in Florida. Mr. Wenick obtained information from DOT concerning its history in receiving sole bids for a project and the instances in which the sole bidder was awarded the contract. Mr. Wenick looked at procedures followed by DOT in awarding contracts. Mr. Wenick looked at the DOT experience in re- letting bids to determine if a company was a low bidder in the first letting when bids were rejected, and what percentage of the time that low bidder would succeed in being awarded the contract upon a re-letting. Mr. Wenick prepared certain charts intended to depict the DOT response in the areas examined by the witness. Rosiek's Exhibit numbered 3 is referred to as Problem Jobs for the April 28, 2004, letting, with two posting dates of May 20, 2004, and June 7, 2004, respectively. The chart depicts the proposal I.D. number (bid), the project number and the type of problem identified in reviewing bid responses and a brief statement of the Technical Committee's comments and the Awards Committee's disposition in those projects depicted. Nothing more is described in the chart. In no case set forth in the chart was the type of problem described in any detail or, limited to an experience with a single bidder, as opposed to perceived problems in relation to the bid that was too high, as well as having a single bidder or to the problem of having a bid that was too high alone. Seven projects were awarded. Two were not. The rejections were based upon the bids being too high. One of the projects initially awarded was later rejected due to the unavailability of local funding to support the project. Mr. Wenick prepared a chart, Rosiek's Exhibit numbered 4. This reflects the DOT award results for sole or single bidders from the period July 1999 through April 2005. The columns in the chart show the numeric count of sole bids, at certain letting dates, with the contracts numbers, the name of the low bidder, and the disposition of the bids. The numeric count of sole bids is a running tally over the period. This reflects 52 sole bids of which eight were rejected, making the percentage accepted 84.62 percent. Again the nature of the projects is not shown in the chart, and this chart does not indicate the basis for rejection. Rosiek's Exhibit numbered 5 is another chart prepared by Mr. Wenick. It reflects instances in which projects were re-let for bid in the period July 1999 to April 2005. The letting dates are reflected. The project numbers, the low bidders names, if known, and the amount quoted is set out. The re-let date if the project was re-let is reflected. The low quote on re-bid and the low bidder's name on re-bid are reflected, as is the percentage difference between the low quote in the first letting and the low quote in the re- letting. Where data is established in all columns in the chart, 18 of the projects are shown to have been re-bid out of 24 projects that were bid initially. Within that group, five bidders who bid in the initial letting were awarded the contract in the re-letting, while 13 low bidders in the first letting were disappointed in the re-letting. This equates to 27.78 percent success rate by the low bidder in the initial letting when re-bidding in the re-letting. Having considered the exhibits prepared by Mr. Wenick, the information is insufficient to discern the reason for DOT's past policies and practices and to compare them to the present case for consistencies in the application of those policies and practices when rejecting bids. Additionally, the reason for the choices in any single project described in the charts cannot be appropriately understood from the charts and compared to the experience here. On the topic of the success rate for contractors who provided the low bid in the original letting and the low bid in the re-letting, it is so general an analysis, that it cannot be relied upon to determine the real significance for contractors who provided the low bid in the original letting, only to be disappointed in the re-letting when the contractor did not receive the contract.
Recommendation Upon consideration, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Rosiek Amended Formal Written Protest challenging the DOT decision to reject its bid. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___________________________________ CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 2005.
The Issue Whether the amount awarded Petitioner for relocation was a sufficient and proper award.
Findings Of Fact Prior to the acquisition of a highway right of way for project 57050- 2515 in Okaloosa County, Florida the appellant operated a small business on parcel 103, which was needed for the highway. The business was known as Koolie of West Florida, Inc., and among other things sold bottle drinks, blue luster products and large round cakes of soybean meal used for fish bait. On August 23, 1976 the Respondent, Department of Transportation, informed Mr. Dick Carter, the President and Owner of the business of the different options available for reimbursing him for moving expenses. It was explained that if he hired a licensed mover the Florida Department of Transportation could pay the mover on an actual cost basis. It was further explained that if he wished to move the business, using his own personnel, he would be reimbursed up to the amount of the lowest of two commercial bids. One commercial bid was obtained but the requirement of two commercial bids was waived for the reason that Crestview, Florida is a small town and has only one licensed mover. On September 29, 1976, Mr. Carter was informed of the amount of the bid and Mr. Carter chose to move his business himself, although Mr. Carter made known his dissatisfaction with the amount of the low bid. Upon learning of the dissatisfaction with the estimate, the Respondent Department requested Mr. Carter to notify it of the time and date of the move so that any additional moving expenses could be documented. The Department was not informed and the Petitioner moved to its new location. Thereafter, a claim was made for additional moving expenses and a supplemental move cost claim in the amount of $347.25 was offered to the Petitioner and he was notified that if the amount was not satisfactory, an administrative hearing would be arranged. The additional amount was refused and Petitioner requested the subject hearing. The supplemental move cost claim and the supplemental amount allowed, $347.25 was based on the certified inventory sent by the Petitioner to the Respondent. The move took place some four months after the inventory was sent to the Respondent and the Petitioner had expressed its dissatisfaction with the moving reimbursement, but although requested by the Respondent, did not notify the Respondent of the time and date of moving so that a representative of the Respondent could be present to assess the additional cost of moving, if any. Petitioner contends that the inventory sent the Respondent was incorrect and that instead of 200 soybean cakes that had to be moved it was in fact 1000 soybean cakes. Petitioner contends that he should have received $625.00 for 250 cakes of soybean meal which he said were destroyed in moving plus a sum of $97.50 which was in addition to the original estimate by the moving company. Respondent contends that there are provisions for a self move providing the cost is less than a $1000.00 on the lowest of two estimates; that in the City of Crestview there is only one certified mover so a special dispensation was allowed so that the one certified mover would submit an estimate of moving cost; the Petitioner provided an inventory, and an estimate of moving cost was submitted by Shaw, a certified mover. The Petitioner chose to move himself and was offered reimbursement in the amount of the estimate by the certified mover as revised and was also offered reimbursement for one-third loss of 200 cakes of soybean meal inasmuch as this was an uninsurable item. Respondent further shows that all of the inventory except the soybean cakes would have been insured by the mover in the event of breakage or damage and that Petitioner had the choice of being moved by a certified mover or moving himself. Respondent further contends that it properly followed the requirements of law and the Petitioner has been offered payment in accordance with law.
Recommendation Deny the petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: C. Thomas Holland, Esquire 440 North Main Street Crestview, Florida 32536 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
