The Issue Whether the Appellant, Devoe L. Moore, has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that development rights in certain real property he owns have vested against the provisions of the Tallahassee-Leon County 2010 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property at Issue. On September 18, 1987, Devoe Moore acquired a tract of approximately 28 acres of real estate (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"), located on Lake Bradford Road just south of Gaines Street, in the City of Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. The Property was the former location of the Elberta Crate and Box Company. The Property was at the time of purchase, and still is, zoned M-2, Industrial. Development of the Property. Mr. Moore intended to develop the Property consistent with the Property's M-2, Industrial zoning. Mr. Moore intended to build a service/commercial/mini-storage development similar to another such development of Mr. Moore in the City. In December, 1987, Mr. Moore had his engineer prepare grading and drainage plans for the Property. On January 29, 1988, Mr. Moore had an application for an amendment to a stormwater permit, Environmental Management Permit 87-1087, filed with the Leon County Department of Public Works. At that time, Leon County issued such permits for property in unincorporated areas and inside the City's limits. The grading and drainage plans for the Property were filed with the application. Leon County had not been delegated any responsibility or authority to make land-use decisions for the City. The requested amendment to Permit 87-1087 was based on an assumption of Mr. Moore that the Property would consist of 80% coverage with impervious surface. Therefore, the City was aware or should have been aware that Mr. Moore intended to construct a major development on the Property. Such a development was consistent with the zoning on the Property at the time. Neither Leon County nor the City, however, approved or in anyway addressed the issue of whether 80% coverage of the Property with impervious surface was acceptable. Nor did the City or Leon County make any representation to Mr. Moore different from that made by the City's zoning of the Property. Mr. Moore filed a site plan showing a development of 80% coverage with the application for amendment to Permit 87-1087. These plans showed a development consisting of thirteen rectangular buildings, driveways and parking area. The indicated development, however, was not reviewed or in anyway approved by Leon County or the City. On May 6, 1988, a Stormwater Permit, amending Permit 87-1087, was issued to Mr. Moore. This permit only approved the construction of a holding pond and filling on the Property. The issuance of the permit did not constitute approval of any proposed development of the Property. In 1988, Mr. Moore began clearing the Property of buildings on the Property which the City had condemned. Mr. Moore also began filling and grading the Property in 1988, and has continued to do so to varying degrees through July 16, 1991. From January 1989, through August, 1990, SANDCO placed 1,174 loads of fill on the Property. Jimmy Crowder Construction Company has also performed filling and grading work on the Property since 1988. As of the date the City's vesting ordnance was adopted and as of the date of the hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings Mr. Moore has not completed filling on the Property. Mr. Moore also has not completed filtration improvements to the storm water hold pond to be constructed on the Property. Additional water treatment facilities on the Property must be constructed to handle runoff from the Property. No roadways, water services, sewer services or electric services have been constructed on the Property. Site preparation on the Property has not been completed so that construction of vertical improvements can begin. At the time that Mr. Moore acquired the Property, only building permits were required for the development of the Property. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Moore obtained the required building permits. The law was changed, however, to require approval of a site plan. Mr. Moore decided not to submit a site plan at least in part because of the City's work on the sewer main. The weight of the evidence, however, failed to prove that Mr. Moore was prohibited by the City from obtaining site plan approval. The City has not approved or reviewed a site plan for the Property. At the time Mr. Moore purchased the Property, and continuing to the present, a City sewer main which runs along the southern border of the Property has been a problem. The sewer main is a health hazard because it is located in proximity to the surface of the ground and it has numerous leaks. The City indicated that it intended to build a new sewer main across the Property and Mr. Moore agreed to give the City an easement for the sewer main. After Mr. Moore purchased the Property and before February, 1989, Mr. Moore made a number of requests to the City that the City identify the easement it desired and prepare the easement grant so that the City could construct the new sewer main and Mr. Moore could proceed with his development. Requests were also made by some City employees of the City Attorney that the easement be prepared and executed because of the problem with the existing sewer main. In April, 1989, the easement grant was prepared and executed. On August 3, 1990, James S. Caldwell, Assistant Director of the City Water and Sewer Department, wrote the following letter to Mr. Moore: It has been brought to my attention that your are proceeding with construction of a stormwater holding pond on the referenced site [the Elberta Crate Site]. As discussed with you this date and as you are aware, the City has a sewer line on this property. The sewer line would be damaged by your construction activity. The City has designed a relocation and upgrade of the sewer line to be constructed on an easement previously acquired from you. Our schedule for the sewer line construction is completion by January 1, 1991. A review of your stormwater holding pond drawings and the proposed sewer line reveals a potential conflict between the proposed line and the holding pond. We shall have City staff stake out and flag the existing sewer line and the proposed sewer line. We are requesting that your construction activity stay away from the existing sewer line. After stakeout of the proposed sewer line, you may check your stormwater pond plans to assure that there is no conflict. [Emphasis added]. Mr. Moore was also told on other occasions to avoid interfering with the existing sewer line and the construction of the new sewer line. Construction of the new sewer main on the Property was not commenced until January, 1991. The construction had not been completed as of March, 1991. Part of the delay in completing the sewer main was caused by contemplated changes in the location of the sewer main and the possible need for a different easement. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Moore was told to cease all activity on the Property. Costs Incurred by Mr. Moore. Mr. Moore paid approximately $1,000,000.00 for the Property. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that this cost was incurred in reliance upon any representation from the City as to the use the Property could be put other than the existing zoning of the Property. Mr. Moore spent approximately $247,541.22, for demolition of existing buildings, site clearing and grading, engineering costs, fill, permitting fees and partial construction of the stormwater management system for the Property. Mr. Moore also donated an easement to the City with a value of approximately $26,000.00. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that these expenditures were made in reliance upon any representation by the City as to the use to which the Property could be put other than the existing zoning of the Property and the stormwater management permit. Mr. Moore also incurred approximately $100,000.00 in expenditures similar to those addressed in the previous finding of fact for which Mr. Moore was unable to find documentation. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that these expenditures were made in reliance upon any representation by the City as to the use to which the Property could be put other than the zoning of the Property and the stormwater management permit. Development of the Property Under the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Mr. Moore's proposed development of the Property appears to meet the concurrency requirements of the Tallahassee-Leon County 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Mr. Moore's proposed development of the Property, however, appears to be inconsistent with the 2010 Plan because the Future Land Use Element district in which the Property is located does not permit industrial uses and the intended industrial use of the Property is incompatible with some of the uses to which adjacent property has been put. Procedure. Mr. Moore filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination prior to the filing of the application at issue in this proceeding. That application was denied by the City on October 16, 1991. In the first application Mr. Moore indicated that the Property was to be used for student housing. On or about November 13, 1991, Mr. Moore filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Application") (Application VR0295T), with the City. "Devoe L. Moore" was listed as the owner/agent of the Property in the Application. It is indicated that the project at issue in the Application is "[i]ndustrial development of former Elberta Crate and Box Company site by Devoe L. Moore." "Progress . . . Toward Completion" is described as (1) Owner/contractor estimate; (2) Environmental Management Permit; (3) Site preparation from December, 1987, to the date the Application was filed; and (4) Construction of the stormwater system in 1990. In a letter dated February 6, 1991, Mr. Moore was informed that his Application was being denied. By letter dated February 18, 1991, Mr. Moore requested a hearing before a Staff Committee for review of the denial of his Application. On March 11, 1991, a hearing was held to consider the Application before the Staff Committee. The Staff Committee was comprised of Jim English, City Attorney, Mark Gumula, Director of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department and Buddy Holshouser, Director for the City's Growth Management Department. At the conclusion of this hearing the Staff Committee voted 2 to 1 to deny the Application. By letter dated March 19, 1991, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department, informed Mr. Moore that the Application had been denied. By letter dated April 4, 1991, to Mr. Gumula, Mr. Moore appealed the decision to deny the Application. By letter dated July 3, 1991, the Division of Administrative Hearings was requested to provide a Hearing Officer to review this matter. By agreement of the parties, the undersigned allowed the parties to supplement the record in this matter on August 27, 1991. F. Other Projects Approved by the City. Mr. Moore submitted, without objection from the City, other vesting rights applications and final orders concerning such applications which were ultimately approved by the City. All of those cases are distinguishable from this matter. See the City's proposed finding of fact 30.
The Issue Whether or not the Petitioners are responsible for the payment of tax, penalty and interest under the terms of the Respondent's Notice of Proposed Assessment of February 9, 1978, as revised June 12, 1978, which assessment was made pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon the Petition for Administrative Hearing filed in behalf of the Petitioners, Housing by Vogue, Inc., and Mobile Home Industries, Inc., against the State of Florida, Department of Revenue, as Respondent. The case was subsequently referred to the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings, for formal hearing in accordance with the terms of Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Mobile Home Industries, Inc., is a Florida corporation and Housing by Vogue, Inc., is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the former-named corporation. The Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, is an agency of the State which has as its responsibility the investigation and enforcement of the tax laws of the State of Florida, to include Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. The facts reveal that on October 2, 1974, the Petitioners submitted a bid to the State of Florida, State Board of Education, for the purpose of contracting to execute and complete construction of the project identified as, "Relocatable InstructIonal Space for the Department of Education, Tallahassee, Florida." A copy of that bid proposal is found as Petitioners' Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. The specifications and drawings of that project may be found as Petitioners' Exhibit Number 1 admitted into evidence. In accordance with the instructions of the owner, the bid proposal stated a lump-sum bid price in the amount of $119,250.00 and, in addition, contained certain itemized costs. The Petitioners' bid was accepted and a contract was entered into between the Petitioners and the State of Florida, State Board of Education. A copy of that contract and other contract items may be found as the Petitioners' Composite Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. The contract was modified by proposal of the project engineer, upon suggestion of the contractor. A copy of this statement of suggested changes may be found in the Petitioners' Exhibit Number 4 admitted into evidence. The suggested changes were allowed and certain change orders were entered as shown through the Petitioners Exhibit Number 5 admitted into evidence. The project went forward as contemplated and under the terms and conditions of the contract, modules were fabricated by the Petitioners in their plant at Lake City, Florida. These modules were subsequently transported from the plant at Lake City to a location at Woodville, Florida, which is located in Leon County, Florida. The method of transportation was by the process of towing, with the modules being moved on the highway by virtue of a series of wheels and axles attached to the module proper. Once the modules were placed in the location in Woodville, Florida, the wheels and axles were removed and the modules were "set up," utilizing two methods to accomplish this task. Some of the modules were put on traditional footings and foundations similar to those involved in the "set up" of mobile homes, in the sense that footings were prepared and the modules were placed on concrete blocks and tie-down straps were attached to the bottom cross beams and secured by hellical anchors. The second method for placing the modules was to utilize a large hellical anchor device in lieu of the concrete blocks and tie downs. The modules themselves had fixed floors with interchangeable wall panels to allow assembly and re-assembly in various configurations for the purpose of instructional classroom space. After the modules had been arranged in an initial configuration, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract the modules were disassembled and placed in a different configuration at the site location in Woodville, Florida. The realty upon which these modules were located was a school ground and plant owned by the Leon County School Board, Leon County, Florida. The ownership of the modules was in the State of Florida, State Board of Education. The testimony in the course of the hearing did not indicate in any way that the Leon County School Board either was a party to the contract between the Petitioners and the State of Florida, State Board of Education, nor in any sense was granted ownership of the subject modules. Section 212.05, Florida Statutes, provides for the imposition of a four percent (4 percent) sales tax on the sale of articles of tangible personal property at retail within the State of Florida. The sale of the modules under the terms and conditions of the contract constituted a sale of tangible personal property by the Petitioners to the State of Florida, State Board of Education. Therefore, absent some specific exemption to the contrary, a sales tax was due. There does exist in law a partial exemption. This conclusion is reached after examination of the language of Subsection 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, which states: "212.08 Sales, rental, storage, use tax; specified exemptions.--The sale at retail, the rental, the use, the consumption, the distribution, and the storage to be used or consumed in this state of the following tangible personal property are hereby specifically exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter. (6) EXEMPTIONS; POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS, COMMUNICATIONS.--There shall also be exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the United States Government, the state, or any county, municipality or political sub- division of this state; provided this exemption shall not include sales of tangible personal property made to contractors employed either directly or as agents of any such government or political subdivision thereof when such tangible personal property goes into or becomes a part of public works owned by such government or political subdivision thereof, except public works in progress or for which bonds or revenue certificates have been validated on or before August 1, 1959; . . ." Under the language of the introductory portion of Section 212.08, Florida Statutes, and the specific provisions of Subsection 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, the sale which has been made to the State of Florida is exempt from tax implications, with the exception that the materials and supplies necessary for the fabrication of the modules, transportation of those modules and installation of the modules were tangible personal property which went into public works owned by the State of Florida, and as such were not exempt from taxation. (A public works is defined as "such works as are by statute authorized to be constructed for public purposes by the State or its agencies are generally regarded as public works." 26 Fla.Jur.section 2, citing to 43 Am. Jur., Public Works and Contracts section 2 as annotated at 92 ALR 835. From this definition, the modules which are used as instructional classroom space are considered to be public works within the meaning of Subsection 212.08(6), Florida Statutes.) It is unclear what the specific costs were on the question of the increments of expense for materials and supplies incurred by the Petitioners in carrying out their contract; however, it would be necessary for the Respondent to impose a tax together with a penalty and interest premised upon calculations made after determining Petitioners' cost items. This opinion is held notwithstanding the stipulation on the part of the parties (at the beginning of the hearing) to the effect that $4,048.57 in tax was in dispute, together with interest of $794.32 effective June 12, 1978, and additional interest at 47 cents per day from June 13, 1978, plus a penalty. In summary, there would be due tax, a penalty of 25 percent (such penalty being subject to further reduction) and interest on the amount which is the aggregate of the cost of materials and supplies used in the fabrication, transportation and installation of the subject modules. See Subsections 212.12(2) and (3), Florida Statutes. One final item should be considered. The parties in the course of their presentation and argument relied on various interpretations to be given Rule l2A-1.5l Florida Administrative Code, as a basis for their contention of tax liability or no liability. That provision would not have application to the facts sub judice, because the rule only applies to "sales to or by contractors who repair, alter, improve and construct real property". The installation of these modules which are the property of the State of Florida, State Board of Education, on realty which is owned by the Leon County School Board, of Leon County, Florida, does not constitute an action in which sales are made to or by contractors involved in the repair, alteration, improvement or construction of real property. While the modules as installed do constitute public works, they do not constitute repair, alteration, improvement or construction to real property. To consider this project to be one governed by Rule12A-1.5l, Florida Administrative Code, it would be necessary for the modules to be owned by the same entity which owns the property on which they are installed, as opposed to the facts in this case whereby ownership of the modules and real property are held by separate entities. In their present status, the modules are merely items of tangible personal property owned by the State of Florida, State Board of Education, which may be utilized at any location in accordance with the terms of their ownership.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Petitioners, Housing by Vogue, Inc., and Mobile Home Industries, Inc., be required to pay tax, a penalty of 25 percent and interest for those items of materials and supplies incidental to the fabrication, transportation and installation of the modules which are the subject matter of the contract in this dispute. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building MAILING ADDRESS: 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John C. Cooper, Esquire Douglass, Powell & Davey Post Office Box 1674 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Linda C. Procta, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA HOUSING BY VOGUE, INC., and MOBILE HOME INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-1637 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondent. /
The Issue Whether the decision to award the bid for Parcel No. 93S101, State Road 84 Spur, was in accordance with the governing rules and statutes or was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact In October of 1993 the Respondent declared that a spur property located at State Road 84 (the subject matter of these proceedings) was a surplus parcel. Such property is comprised of two identifiable tracts identified in this record as parcel 101-A and parcel 101-B. The Respondent utilizes a manual entitled "Disposal of Surplus Real Property" as its guide for the procedures used to comply with statutory and rule provisions regarding the disposal of surplus parcels. Since 1993 the Department has made several attempts to market the spur property. Such attempts included offering parcel 101-A to the Petitioner for no consideration. As recently as October of 2000 the Department offered the spur property to the Petitioner at no cost. The offer did include some conditions but same did not materially affect whether or not Davie would or could accept the transfer. For whatever reasons, the Petitioner did not accept the offer. Subsequently, the Respondent withdrew the offer in writing. Additionally, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that it intended to make the spur property (both parcels) available to the public through the competitive bid process. It was contemplated that the bid process would allow any person from the public to competitively place bids for the subject property. Nevertheless, the Petitioner was advised that it would be given an opportunity to acquire the property. A letter of February 7, 2001, from the Department to the Petitioner advised the town of its right to acquire the property but did not in any manner prohibit or prevent the Town of Davie from bidding on the spur property. In fact, the Petitioner did not bid on the subject property. Further, the Petitioner did not and does not intend to purchase the subject property. The only way the Intervenor seeks to acquire the property is without cost. The Petitioner had actual knowledge of the Department's intention of making the property available through competitive bid. The Town of Davie did nothing to oppose the bid process. On May 30, 2001, the spur properties were advertised for competitive bidding with sealed bids to be opened by the Department on June 14, 2001. On June 21, 2001, the Town of Davie by and through its town administrator contacted the Department in order to exercise the town's right of refusal on the property. Accordingly, on June 25, 2001, the Respondent posted a notice stating it would reject all bids. On July 12, 2001, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that it had ten days to exercise its right to purchase the property. In connection with the proposed sale the Department offered the property to the Town of Davie at the approved appraised value of $1.9 million. The Petitioner made no counter-offer. Instead, on July 27, 2001, the Town of Davie responded to the offer stating it would accept the parcel for a public purpose for no consideration. Thereafter, the Respondent posted a "Revised Bid Tabulation" indicating it would award the spur property to the highest responsive bidder, the Intervenor. The Petitioner has not proposed to pay for the spur property. The Petitioner did not have an appraisal of the spur property prepared. The Petitioner did not bid on the spur property.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order confirming the award of the spur property to the Intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael T. Burke, Esquire Johnson, Anselmo, Murdoch, Burke & George, P.A. 790 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 400 Post Office Box 030220 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33303-0220 Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A. 350 East Las Olas Boulevard Suite 1130 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Brian F. McGrail, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is eligible for relocation assistance benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 4601 et seq. (P.L. 91-646) and the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970.
Recommendation Application for relocation assistance benefits by Mrs. Marie Lewis Mims be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of December, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William Guy Davis, Jr., Esquire 700 Brent Building Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32576 George L. Waas, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Joseph A. Alfes Chief of Right-of-Way Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether the Appellant, Terrance H. Fregly, has demonstrated that development rights in certain real property he owns have vested against the provisions of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property at Issue. In approximately 1977-1980, Mr. Fregly purchased several adjoining parcels of real estate. The parcels were to some extent marginally developable property. The total property acquired by Mr. Fregly was approximately 20 or 25 acres and was named the "Lakewood Industrial Center" by Mr. Fregly. The evidence presented by Mr. Fregly did not clearly establish whether the property consisted of 20 or 25 acres. Whatever the total acreage was, it will be referred to collectively as the "25 Acres". The 25 Acres are located on the east side of Capital Circle, Northwest, Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Mr. Fregly intended to develope the property in accordance with the land uses permitted under the M-2 zoning ordinance in effect in 1977-1980. At some time after acquiring the 25 Acres, Mr. Fregly developed part of the 25 Acres, by building approximately 65,000 square feet of warehouses on part of the 25 Acres. The warehouses and the real estate (hereinafter referred to as the "Warehouse Acres") they were built on were subsequently sold by Mr. Fregly. Mr. Fregly also sold another part of the 25 Acres. In total, by 1985 Mr. Fregly had sold approximately 11 acres of the 25 Acres. The remaining 14 acres (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property"), of the 25 Acres are the subject of the Application for Vested Rights Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Application"), filed by Mr. Fregly with Leon County, Application VR0042LC0. The Subject Property is comprised of tax parcel 009, consisting of approximately 4 acres, and tax parcel 210, consisting of approximately 10 acres. Development of the 25 Acres. Mr. Fregly obtained approval to rezone part of the 25 Acres from agricultural to M-2 Industrial. The weight of the evidence failed to prove when this occurred. The 25 Acres were zoned partly M-1 and partly M-2. In April, 1980, Mr. Fregly received from the Leon County Department of Public Works, Leon County Land Clearing and Development Permit No. 1017 (hereinafter referred to as "Permit 1017"). Permit 1017 authorized Mr. Fregly to clear, grade and fill the 25 Acres and to construct a stormwater detention system thereon. Permit 1017 was applied for by Mr. Fregly with an Application for Permit for Clearing and Development dated as received March 17, 1980. It was indicated on the Application for Permit for Clearing and Development that the purpose of the application is as follows: Application is hereby made for a permit to make changes in the contour of land proposed to be subdivided, developed, or changed in use by grading, excavating, removal, alteration, or destruction of the natural topsoil, as hereinafter located and described. . . . The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Leon County made any representation to Mr. Fregly in issuing Permit 1017 concerning the future development of the Subject Property other than authorizing Mr. Fregly to clear and grade the Subject Property for some future unspecified development, subdivision or other change to the use of the Subject Property. The State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation issued Construction Permit No. 37-36313-1E (hereinafter referred to as the "DER Permit"), on May 17, 1983. The DER Permit has an expiration date of May 30, 1985. The DER Permit authorized Mr. Fregly to fill approximately 3.5 acres of wetlands with approximately 9,500 cubic yards of fill. Not all of the 3.5 acres involved in the DER Permit are located on the Subject Property. Based upon information provided to DER on John W. DuBose, PLS, letterhead attached to the stipulation agreement entered into by Mr. Fregly and the Department of Environmental Regulation agreeing to the issuance of the DER Permit as Attachment A, it appears that the DER Permit authorized fill to be placed on tax parcel 423 which is not a part of the Subject Property. The DER Permit was issued pursuant to a Final Order issued by the Department of Environmental Regulation approving a settlement stipulation. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Leon County was involved in the granting of the DER Permit or that Leon County made any representation to Mr. Fregly when the DER Permit was issued. Mr. Fregly also received a federal dredge and fill permit in 1980 or 1981. This permit was not offered into evidence. The weight of the evidence failed to prove what portion of the 25 Acres this permit applied to. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Leon County was involved in the granting of the federal dredge and fill permit or that Leon County made any representation to Mr. Fregly when the permit was issued. Following the issuance of the DER Permit and the federal permit, Mr. Fregly alleged that approximately 109,500 cubic yards of fill material was placed on the Subject Property: 9,500 cubic feet on tax parcel 210 (prior to 1982-1985), and 100,000 cubic feet on tax parcel 009 (from 1982-1985). In light of the fact that the DER Permit also involved property other than the Subject Property, it is not clear whether these figures are correct. The 25 Acres were cleared and graded. A master stormwater system to accommodate stormwater runoff from the 25 Acres was constructed. A paved access road was constructed on the edge of tax parcel 009 and the Warehouse Acres. The road is used for access to the Warehouse Acres and will be used for access to the Subject Property. An easement for use of the road was granted to the purchasers of the Warehouse Acres. Mr. Fregly intends to extend the access road into tax parcel 210. The Warehouse Acres were prepared for construction and the warehouses were constructed prior to 1985 when the Warehouse Acres were sold. The foregoing activities occurred between approximately 1977 and 1985. Much of Mr. Fregly's development activities were associated with the development and sale of the Warehouse Acres and not the Subject Property. Between 1985 and the filing of the Application, the development of the Subject Property has been marginal. On July 31, 1989, the Leon County Department of Public Works, Division of Environmental Management, issued Environmental Management Permit No. 890312 for landscape, trees and "special condition" on tax parcel 009 of the Subject Property. On September 24, 1990, Mr. Fregly applied for Leon County Department of Public Works, Division of Environmental Management, Permit No. 90538 to authorize construction of additional stormwater facilities and landscaping on tax parcel 210 of the Subject Property. The infrastructure for the Subject Property has not been completed. In particular, the access road for tax parcel 210 of the Subject Property has not been completed. There has been no subdivision review or processing by Leon County for the Subject Property, no site plan approval for the Subject Property has been sought or granted and no building permits or planned unit development approvals have been issued for the Subject Property. Despite the representation in the Application to the contrary, not all of the permits to develope the Subject Property have been obtained. Costs Incurred by Mr. Fregly. Mr. Fregly offered a pleading titled "Chronology & Cost Data" (hereinafter referred to as the "Chronology"), as evidence concerning the costs incurred in the development of the 25 Acres, including the Subject Property. Pursuant to the Chronology, Mr. Fregly has suggested that he has incurred $172,846.21 since the 25 Acres were acquired. In Mr. Fregly's proposed final order it has been suggested that approximately $118,000.00 of the amounts listed on the Chronology were incurred for "site work, clearing, grading, filling, construction of the stormwater management system and access roadway". Exactly which of the cost items listed on the Chronology have been included in the $118,000.00 is not clear. In the conclusions of law of Mr. Fregly's proposed final order it has also been suggested that Mr. Fregly incurred in excess of $160,000.00 in expenses. Exactly what expenses make up this amount is also not clear. The weight of the evidence failed to prove the extent to which the following costs listed on the Chronology were incurred only for the Subject Property: $12,300.00 for "A. Dredge & fill permit"; $1,200.00 for "B. Engineering fee - Dredge & Fill DER & Federal"; $4,700.00 for "C. Engineering fee - Stormwater design Leon County"; $3,700.00 for "D. Pipe & Dredge ditch . . ."; $22,535.45 for "E. Road construction"; and $3,900.00 for "F. DOT entrance". The costs listed in paragraphs A-F of the Chronology were attributable in part to the Warehouse Acres. For example, the $22,535.45 was for paving the access road and "parking between warehouses." This amount is primarily attributable to the Warehouse Acres and only partly to the Subject Property. It is also not clear whether the costs allegedly attributable to filling the Subject Property are attributable only to the Subject Property. Based upon information provided to DER on John W. DuBose, PLS, letterhead attached to the stipulation agreement entered into by Mr. Fregly and the Department of Environmental Regulation agreeing to the issuance of the DER Permit as Attachment A, it appears that the DER Permit authorized fill to be placed on tax parcel 423 which is not a part of the Subject Property. The weight of the evidence failed to prove whether tax parcel 423 was filled or whether the costs associated with filling submitted were only incurred for filling the Subject Property. Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the weight of the evidence failed to prove what part of the costs listed on the Chronology or testified about by Mr. Fregly are attributable to the development of the Subject Property. It cannot, therefore, be determined the extent of any detriment which Mr. Fregly may have suffered as a result of any alleged Leon County representation concerning the development of the Subject Property. All of the costs listed in the Chronology were incurred after Permit 1017 was acquired. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the costs incurred by Mr. Fregly in reliance on the issuance of Permit 1017 were substantial. All that Permit 1017 authorized Mr. Fregly to do was to clear, grade and fill the 25 Acres and to construct a stormwater detention system. As Mr. Fregly knows, the laws governing the approved uses of land can change. It cannot, therefore, be concluded that Mr. Fregly reasonably believed that the issuance of Permit 1017 would allow him to fully develope the 25 Acres, or more particularly, the Subject Property, more than ten years later without any change in the laws governing how the Subject Property was to be changed. Development of the Property under the 2010 Plan. Mr. Fregly intends to develope the Subject Property by building 57,000 square feet of warehouse and office space. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Fregly ever informed Leon County or that Leon County was aware of this intended use of the property until these proceedings commenced. Throughout these proceedings, Mr. Fregly, who was proffered and qualified as an expert in commercial real estate development, testified that there was an executed "lease" on the Subject Property. Representations that there is an executed lease are made several times in the Application filed by Mr. Fregly. The weight of the evidence, however, failed to prove that such a lease exists. At best, Mr. Fregly proved that he has a "gentleman's agreement" concerning a proposed lease of part of the Subject Property. Mr. Fregly's proposed development of the Subject Property would be allowed under the M-1 and M-2 zoning of the Subject Property. For purposes of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the Subject Property is currently in a Mixed-Use B, land-use designated area. Under the current zoning of the Subject Property, there are a substantial number of possible uses that are authorized, but the extent of such uses is limited, based upon similar existing uses within the zone the property is located. There are also restrictions involving permeability, transportation, utilities and the effects on adjacent landowners. Leon County has issued a certificate of concurrency for part of tax parcel 210. The certificate indicates concurrency compliance for a bulk storage facility of 6,000 square feet, plus 1,500 square feet of office space. Mr. Fregly has not asked Leon County to perform a formal consistency review of the Subject Property. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Subject Property does not meet the concurrency requirements of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, or the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. In fact, the evidence proved that the Subject Property is in all likelihood consistent with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Procedure. Mr. Fregly filed the Application on or about August 20, 1990. On November 26, 1990, a hearing was held to consider the Application before the Staff Committee. At the request of Mr. Fregly the hearing was continued until December 17, 1990, to give Mr. Fregly an opportunity to provide additional information concerning the costs incurred by him in the development of the Subject Property. On December 17, 1990, the Staff Committee was reconvened. Mr. Fregly provided a map of the property and the Chronology. By letter dated December 19, 1990, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department, informed Mr. Fregly that the Application had been denied. By letter dated January 2, 1991, to Mr. Gumula, Mr. Fregly appealed the decision to deny his Application. By letter dated January 11, 1991, the Division of Administrative Hearings was requested to provide a Hearing Officer to review this matter. By agreement of the parties, the undersigned allowed the parties to supplement the record in this matter on April 17, 1991.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of misrepresentation, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing, trick, scheme or device in a real estate transaction in violation of Section 475.25, Florida Statutes. Whether the license of Respondent should be revoked or suspended or whether the Respondent should be otherwise disciplined.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a registered real estate salesperson who holds license no. 0066091. She was employed as a "listing solicitor" by World Wide Property Services, Inc., a registered real estate broker (now dissolved) from June 30, 1975 to April 2, 1976, soliciting listings for real estate in Florida. The solicitation was by telephone nationwide except Florida. Seymour L. Rottman was President of World Wide Property Services, Inc. and Lee Small was Vice President of the corporation during the time Respondent was employed. The purpose of World Wide Property Services, Inc. was to secure listings of and purchasers for various Florida properties. Mr. Rottman was a subpoenaed witness for Petitioner at subject hearing. During Respondent's period of employment he and Mr. Small were in charge of hiring salesmen for the company and hired Respondent. Respondent was employed to obtain listings by telephone from property owners who lived out of state but owned Florida property. The procedure followed was for a salesman to call an out of state land owner picked from a list of prospects and inquire if he or she would be interested in selling their property at a higher price than it had been purchased for. This was termed a "front" call and the salesman was termed as a "fronter." If the prospect expressed interest in listing the property, his or her name was provided to World Wide Property Services, Inc. who then mailed literature to the property owner describing the efforts that would be made by that organization to sell the property. Enclosed with this material was a listing and brokerage agreement. This agreement provided that the owner of the property would pay a prescribed listing fee to World Wide Property Services, Inc. which would be credited against a ten (10) percent commission due that firm upon sale of the property. In return, the corporation agreed to include the property in its "listing directory" for a one year period, direct its efforts to bring about a sale of the property, advertise the property as deemed advisable in magazines or other mediums of merit, and to make an "earnest effort" to sell the property. The accompanying literature explained that the listing fee was necessary in order to defray administrative costs of estimating the value of the property, merchandising, advertising, brochuring and cataloging the information. The material also stated that advertising would be placed in various foreign countries and cities of the United States. In addition, it stated that the property would be "analyzed," comparing it to adjacent property to arrive at a price based on recent sales of neighboring property and also review the status of development and zoning in the immediate area of the property to assist in recommending a correct selling price for approval by the owner. During the course of the calls to prospects Respondent advised them that the property would be advertised internationally and in the United States and that bona fide efforts would be made to sell the property. After the promotional literature was sent to the prospect, the salesmen including Respondent, made what was called a "drive" call to answer any questions and to urge that the property be listed. After making these calls Respondent had no further contact with the property owner. The listing fee was $325. The salesmen received approximately one-third of the fee, about $100 per listing. The salespersons, including Respondent, telephoned the prospects and then read from the script entitled "front" and "drive." The instructions from the broker was to stay within the script and she stated that Mr. Rottman or Mr. Small was in the office at all times they worked. During the course of operation of less than a year World Wide Property Services, Inc. secured about 200 listings and grossed approximately $80,000 to $90,000 in the "advance fee" listings, but no sales were made. Respondent made no sales but did secure a limited number of listings. Respondent testified that she read from the script heretofore referred to as "front" and "drive" and did not vary from it. She worked in a "listing office" which was one of the two offices of the employer. She was aware of articles stating foreign investors were interested in buying Florida property. Respondent did not attempt to make sales inasmuch as it was not the job for which she was employed. She had no knowledge or information that the advance fee operation of which she was a part was an illegal operation or an unethical operation. Respondent had no supervisory capacity in the corporation. She testified that she quit her employment with World Wide Property Services, Inc. as soon as she read it was under investigation but did not notify the Petitioner that she was no longer active. Petitioner contends: that while a salesman for World Wide Property Services, Inc. Respondent solicited and obtained listings by telephone of property owners and that as an inducement to list the property, falsely represented that the property could be sold for a price far in excess of its purchase price; that a bona fide effort would be made to sell the property and that it would be listed nationally and internationally and that the company had foreign investors wanting to purchase United States property. Respondent contends: that she did not know the "advance fee" operation was fraudulent; that World Wide Property Services, Inc. was a registered broker; that at the time she read that the actions of her employer were being investigated she discontinued her employment; that she never misrepresented or fraudulently induced any potential customer to send money to her employer.
Recommendation Reprimand the Respondent is writing. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Stanley M. Brody, Esquire 407 Lincoln Road Building Miami Beach, Florida 33139 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, Petitioner, PROGRESS DOCKET NO. 3102 DADE COUNTY vs. DOAH CASE NO. 77-1574 ELIZABETH P. OTTO POPPEN, Respondent. /
The Issue This case was presented on an administrative complaint filed by the Florida Real Estate Commission against Florida Vantage Properties, Inc. and Richard Stewart Grimes, alleging that the Respondents were guilty of violation of Section 475.42(1)(j), Florida Statutes, by having placed or caused to be placed upon the public records of Palm Beach County, a written document which purports to effect the title of, or encumber, real property; and the recording of which was not duly authorizod by the owner of the property and for the purpose of collecting or coercing the money to the Respondents. The Florida Real Estate Commission introduced evidence that the Respondent Grimes, in behalf of the Respondent Florida Vantage Properties, Inc., (hereafter Vantage) filed an affidavit with an attached letter of agreement, which was Introduced and received into evidence as Exhibit 2, in the public records of Palm Beach County. The Florida Real Estate Commission introduced other evidence that Grimes caused those documents to be placed upon public records of Palm Beach County without the authority of the owner of the property which was the subject of the documents and for the purpose of collecting or coercing the payment of money to the Respondents. The Respondents introduced evidence concerning the documents which had been placed on the public records of Palm Beach, County concerning their original execution, purpose, and circumstances surrounding their having been placed upon the public records. Based upon the evidence presented, the issue of fact presented in this case is whether the affidavit and letter of agreement (Exhibit 2) purports to effect the title of or encumber the subject real property?
Findings Of Fact Richard Stewart Grimes and Florida Vantage Properties, Inc. are registered real estate brokers holding registrations issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Grimes, together with his two co-owners, sold C.W. Collins Corporation, hereafter Collins Corp., the following real property pursuant to a deposit receipt contract executed on August 20, 1973 and identified and introduced into evidence as Exhibit 4. Lot 6, Block 2, & Lots 5, 9, & 11, Block 5, Carriage Hill, as recorded in Plat Book 30, Pages 67 & 68 of the Public Records of Palm Beach County. The deposit receipt contract (Exhibit 4) was the product of negotiations entered into between Collins Corp. and Grimes and his co-owners. These negotiations had resulted in the execution of a deposit receipt contract identified and received into evidence as Exhibit 6. This deposit receipt contract addressed the proposed purchase of six lots to include the four lots eventually sold pursuant to the deposit receipt contract (Exhibit 4). Also introduced and received into evidence was a letter of agreement covering the property described in the deposit receipt contract (Exhibit 6). This letter of agreement is the same in all respects as the latter of agreement in Exhibit 2 with the exception that it addressed the two additional lots which, were the subject of the deposit receipt contract (Exhibit 6). The evidence introduced, to include the exhibits referended above, show that a portion of the consideration for the sale of the property to Collins Corp. was the letter of agreement (Exhibit 2) which contained an exclusive right of sale for Vantage and a deferred payment agreement under which Collins Corp agreed to Pay Vantage $1,000 on each lot sold by Collins Corp. Both Grimes and Collins agreed that the exclusive right of sale had been terminated prior to the date Exhibit 2 was filed in the public records of Palm Beach County, November 6, 1975. However, Collins Corp. could not unilaterally terminate the deferred payment agreement expressed in the last sentence of the letter of agreement as follows: C. W. COLLINS CORP. may also sell the property themself (sic) and will then pay only a $1,000.00 fee to FLORIDA VANTAGE PROPERTIES, INC. on each lot or house and lot package at time of closing. Grimes, as chief officer of Vantage, consulted legal counsel when Collins Corp. failed to pay $1,000 to Vantage when the corporation sold the first lot. Grimes authorized counsel to take action to obtain payment of the monies due Vantage from Collins Corp. As a result, Grimes executed the affidavit of October 7, 1975 (Exhibit 2) and caused this to be placed on the public records of Palm Beach County by counsel for Vantage and Grimes. Neither the affidavit nor the letter of agreement assert any interest in the subject property and the filing in no way constituted a notice of lis pendens.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action on the complaint against Florida Vantage Properties, Inc. or Richard Stewart Crimes. DONE AND ORDERED this 4th day of August, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 APPENDIX The Respondent timely filed Proposed Findings of Fact (PFF) in this cause, which were considered by the Hearing Officer as follows: Paragraphs 1 and 2 of PFF are incorporated in paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order (RD). Paragraphs 3 and 4 of PFF are incorporated in paragraph 2 of the RD. Paragraph 5 of PFF is incorporated in paragraph 3 of the RD. Paragraphs 6, 7, 8 & 10 of PFF are incorporated in paragraph 4 of the RD. Paragraphs 9, 11, 12,13 and 14 are not material to consideration of the issue presented. Paragraph 15 is consistent with the ultimate conclusion of law reached in the RD. COPIES FURNISHED: John Huskins, Esquire Staff Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Arthur C. Koske, Esquire Post Office Box 478 299 West Camino Gardens Blvd. Boca Raton, Florida 33432 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION CD 14999 Petitioner, PROGRESS DOCKET vs. NO. 3283 FLORIDA VANTAGE PROPERTIES, INC. and RICHARD STEWART GRIMES DOAH NO. 78-696 Respondents. PALM BEACH COUNTY /
The Issue Whether Respondent committed fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction as alleged in the Administrative Complaint in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455 and 457, Florida Statutes. Petitioner has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings before the Florida Real Estate Commission (FREC) and is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within FREC’s jurisdiction. At all times material, Respondent was a licensed Florida real estate broker, license number 684990, under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker at Florida’s Best Buy Realty & Mortgage Lender, LLC, Post Office Box 551, Winter Park, Florida 32793. On or about February 15, 2007, Respondent entered into a contract to manage the single-family dwelling owned by Jacqueline Danzer. The property is located at 2979 Krista Key Circle, Orlando, Florida 32817 (Subject Property). The agreement was for the period February 15, 2007, until February 15, 2008. Respondent was authorized, under the management agreement, to seek a tenant for the property. Said management agreement authorized Respondent to be compensated at the rate of 10 percent of the rent due during each rental period. On or about March 27, 2007, Respondent negotiated a lease agreement with Veronica Valcarcel to rent the Subject Propery. The tenant applied through the federal Section 8 program, administered by the Orange County Housing and Community Development Division (Agency), for rental assistance in order to rent the Subject Property. Section 8 assists low-income families with their rent. A tenant who qualifies for Section 8 assistance is prohibited from paying more than 40 percent of his or her income for rent and utilities. On April 26, 2007, Respondent, acting on behalf of the landlord for the Subject Property, entered into and signed a “Housing Assistance Payment Contract” or “HAP” contract with the Agency as part of the Section 8 program. The HAP contract provided that for the initial lease term for the Subject Property (for the period April 1, 2007, until March 31, 2008), the initial monthly rent was $1,150 per month. This was determined to be the maximum payment the tenant could pay without exceeding 40 percent of her income. The HAP contract explicitly provides in its terms that “[d]uring the initial lease term, the owner may not raise the rent to tenant.” Respondent knew that he was prohibited from charging more than the monthly rent stated in the HAP contract. Respondent has had experience in the past with other tenants who participated in the Section 8 program. Respondent has previously signed other HAP contracts which contained the same restrictive language. Under the lease contract that the tenant Veronica Valcarcel signed with the property owner Jacqueline Danzer, the monthly rent would be $1,150 per month. The signature page in the lease contract is not the same page on which the monthly rental amount is written. The property owner Jacqueline Danzer asserts that the initials in the lease contract reflecting a monthly rental of $1,150 were not all her initials. Under the terms of the Exclusive Property Management Agreement, Respondent was being compensated at the rate of 10 percent per month after the first month. A monthly rental amount of $1,500 indicates that the property owner would receive a net of $1,350 per month. The property management agreement provided that Respondent would make payments to the property owner by direct deposit. The property management agreement lists a 12-digit bank account number, with the last four digits of “6034,” into which Respondent was to make direct deposits. At the hearing, property owner Jacqueline Danzer testified that she had received payments from Respondent for the Subject Property to her Bank of America savings account, with the account number ending in “6034.” The last four digits of the account number on the Bank of America Statement match the last four digits on the account number found on the Property Management Agreement. According to the Bank of America records, Respondent made the following payments to the property owner: a) $1,550 on May 9, 2007 b) $1,000 on May 9, 2007 c) $850 on June 12, 2007 d) $1,350 on July 11, 2007 e) $1,350 on September 10, 2007 On September 12, 2007, property owner, Jacqueline Danzer went to see Lois Henry, the manager of the Section 8 department for the Agency. During the course of that meeting, Dnazer advised that Respondent was collecting $1,500 a month rent from the tenant instead of $1,150 a month. On September 12, 2007, during the course of a telephone conference with Jacqueline Danzer and Lois Henry, Respondent admitted that he had been collecting $1,500 monthly rent for the Subject Property, retaining a commission of $150 and depositing the balance in Danzer’s account. Respondent denied making an admission during the telephone conference on September 12, 2007. He also denied that he was collecting $1,500 from the tenant, and further denied that he was violating Section 8 regulations. Respondent’s testimony is not credible. The witness Danzer’s testimony is credible. Petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated the Housing Assistance Payments Contract. The total amount of investigative costs for the Petitioner for this case, not including attorney’s time, were $874.50.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, enter a final order: Finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes; Revoking Respondent’s license, and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00; and Requiring Respondent pay fees and costs related to the investigation in the amount of $874.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 2009.
