Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Annette J. Ruffin, held real estate broker license number 0076385 issued by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. When the events herein occurred, respondent was owner and broker for Century 21 A Little Bit Country at 915 Lithia Pinecrest Road, Brandon, Florida. She is presently employed by U. S. Homes Corporation in Tampa, Florida. James and Shirley Yaksic wished to sell their residence at 3512 Plainview Drive in Brandon, Florida. They listed their property with Century 21 Solid Gold Properties II, Inc. in Brandon in December, 1983. Deborah Cassidy was a salesman at respondent's office, and knew her parents, J. R. and Helen Anderson, were in the market for a new home. With Cassidy's assistance, the Andersons executed a contract on February 16, 1984, to purchase the Yaksics' residence. The contract called for a purchase price of $65,000 with a down payment of $10,000, including a $500.00 cash deposit which was given to respondent's firm several days after the contract was executed. The deposit was placed in Ruffin's escrow account on February 28, 1984. The Andersons were also required to seek VA financing on the balance owed. After the contract was accepted by the Yaksics on February 17, Helen Anderson made application on February 23 for a $55,000 VA loan with Norwest Mortgage, Inc., a lending institution in Tampa. Florida. Since her husband was in New York State, only Helen signed the loan application agreeing to allow verification of all representations made in the application. While filling out the loan application at Norwest, Helen Anderson learned that the Veterans Administration allowed applicants to apply for loans equal to 100% of the value of the property. Since the Andersons preferred to make no down payment, Helen Anderson wrote Norwest in early March requesting that their loan application be increased from $55,000 to $65,000. She also noted that she did not sign the "disclosure statement" on behalf of her husband since "it would be incorrect." In response to this Letter, Norwest wrote the Andersons in early April requesting a number of items needed to process the application as well as an amendment to the contract reflecting that the sellers agreed to 100% financing by the buyers. The Andersons did not respond to this inquiry. In addition, they never, advised the sellers that they had changed their loan application to 100% financing, and that the sellers would be required to pay more discount points at closing. Because no amendment to the contract was ever filed, Norwest processed the application for a $55,000 loan. Due to insufficient income and excessive obligations, the application was denied. The Andersons were so notified by letter dated May 3, 1984. After Helen Anderson received the denial letter she telephoned respondent's office manager on several occasions to seek a refund of her deposit. This information was apparently conveyed to Ruffin by the office manager. About the same time the sellers were advised by the listing salesman that the Andersons did not intend to close. On May 5, the sellers wrote a letter to Solid Gold requesting that it notify the selling broker to not "release the binder to the buyers as we are entitled to this money." For some reason, a copy of this letter was not mailed to respondent until May 31, and she received it in early June. Even though Ruffin may have been orally advised in early May of the Yaksics' intended claim by the listing office, she had no concrete evidence of this intention until she received their letter in early June. On June 29, 1984, Helen Anderson wrote respondent's office manager a letter requesting a return of her deposit no later than July 9. She also indicated the letter was being sent pursuant to instructions received from petitioner. On July 2, Ruffin replied by letter stating that "we cannot release your deposit as the house was off the market for such a long time," and that Norwest had advised her that the Andersons "did not bring in a lot of the information until it was too late." After Helen Anderson filed a complaint with the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR), DPR wrote respondent a letter dated July 19, 1984, stating in part that Anderson had been refused her deposit and that its records did not show that respondent had notified DPR of conflicting demands for that money. On July 30, 1984, respondent replied to DPR's inquiry and gave her version of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. After receiving no reply to this letter, she wrote a second letter in late December, 1984 to the Division of Real Estate (Division) requesting advice on the deposit matter. The Division sent a her form for requesting an escrow disbursement order on January 4, 1985 which was returned by respondent within a few weeks. An escrow disbursement order was eventually issued by the Division on April 19, 1985 directing her to refund the deposit to the Andersons. She did so on May 5, 1985. In conjunction with its investigation, DPR obtained copies of respondent's escrow account bank statements during the period when the Andersons' deposit was retained by Ruffin. Although the $500.00 deposit should have been maintained in that account from February, 1984 until disbursement in May, 1985, her account dropped below $500.00 on sixteen separate days during this period of time, and continuously from February 28 through April 30, 1985. Respondent, who has been a broker since 1977, maintained a record of all escrow deposits and expenditures in a ledger book which reflected when the Anderson money was deposited and when it was paid out. Although she inferred the problem may have been attributable to her bookkeeper, no adequate explanation was given as to why her bank balances dropped below $500.00 on a number of occasions. She acknowledged that she learned of the conflicting demands in May, 1984, but felt that she could still "solve" the credit problem of the Andersons. She stated that she intended to give notice to the Division of the conflicting claims on the deposit and needed no encouragement from the Division to do so. There is no evidence that respondent has ever been disciplined on any other occasion since first receiving her salesman license around twelve years ago.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty as set forth in the Conclusions of Law portion of this order. All other charges should be DISMISSED. It is recommended that respondent's broker license be suspended for ninety days and that she be fined $500.00. DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of September, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Bearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: Phyllis I. Reaves is now and was at all times material to these proceedings, a licensed real estate salesman in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0351816. Annette J. Ruffin is now and was at all times material to these proceedings, a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0076385. From May 2, 1983 to October 18, 1984, Respondent Phyllis I. Reaves was licensed and operating as a real estate salesman in the employ of Respondent Annette J. Ruffin, as broker, c/o International Investment Development Center, Belleair, Florida or Century 21 A Little Bit Country, Brandon, Florida. At all time material hereto, Respondent Phyllis I. Reaves was a licensed mortgage broker in the State of Florida. DOAH CASE NO. 85-1008/1138. COUNT I No evidence was presented concerning the allegations in Count I.. COUNT II No evidence was presented concerning the factual allegations of Count II. COUNT III No evidence was presented concerning the allegations of Count III. COUNT IV On June 10, 1983, Respondent Reaves entered into a real estate sales contract with Emmett K. Singleton, as seller to purchase certain real estate through the use of a land trust. The sales contract listed a total purchase price of $67,000. C-21 A Little Bit Country was listed on the contract as escrow agent of the binder deposit. The property had an existing first mortgage of approximately $33,854. Respondent Reaves agreed to assume the new mortgage and requested that Mr. Singleton obtain a second mortgage in the principal amount of $26,400. Reaves agreed to assume this second mortgage amount while allowing Mr. Singleton to keep the proceeds. Mr. Singleton agreed that the balance of the sales price would be paid via a purchase money mortgage to Respondent Reaves in the principal amount of $9,643.99. Respondent Phyllis I. Reaves executed a Hold Harmless and Indemnity Agreement which read as follows: "Phyllis Reaves does agree to hold Emmett K. Singleton harmless and does idemnify him against any future liability or losses related to the mortgage on subject property at 1912 Hastings Drive, Clearwater, Florida." The sales transaction closed on July 7, 1983, and Respondent Reaves received a real estate brokerage commission in the amount of $1,955. The contract provided that the "listing agent agrees to pay C-21 A Little Bit Country cooperating agent 3.5% of the total purchase price on closing." The purchase money mortgage note was actually signed by Michael R. Fisher, as trustee, and not by Respondent Reaves. Respondent Reaves requested that Mr. Singleton give her the mortgage payment booklets and she would assume and pay off the existing and second mortgages. Singleton trusted Reaves and relied upon her statements that she would do as she promised. Respondent Reaves failed to assume and pay the notes and mortgages and thereby caused the seller to become delinquent with the lenders. After closing, Respondent Reaves, acting as the owner, obtained tenants for the property and collected rental payments. Respondent Reaves solicited and obtained $3,000 in connection with a lease/option agreement. The lease/option agreement provided that the sales price of the home would be $78,000 in three years. The rent would remain at $495 per month for three (3) years. The agreement further provided that $3,000 per year would be paid for three (3) years which would reflect a total down payment of $9,000. This down payment was considered the "option consideration." The agreement provided that one third of the option money would be returned if the option were not exercised. The tenants paid Respondent Reaves a total of $3,000 of the option consideration. The renters became concerned when they began to receive notices from Freedom Mortgage Company stating that certain mortgages on the home were overdue. The renters did not exercise the option to buy the home. The renter requested, but did not receive, $1,000 of the $3,000 option consideration back from Respondent Reaves. COUNT V On July 6, 1983, Respondent Reaves entered into a real estate sales contract with Stephen B. Barnes, as seller, to purchase certain real estate through the use of a land trust. The property was not listed", but a broker from Tam-Bay Realty approached Barnes and stated that he had a buyer. The purchase and sale agreement provided for a total purchase price of $91,000. The agreement listed "C-21 A Little Bit Country" as escrow-agent for the binder deposit. In addition, the purchase and sales agreement provided that: "Listing agent Tam-Bay agrees to pay C-21 A Little Bit Country cooperating agent 3.5% of the total purchase price on closing." The seller agreed that he would allow Respondent Reaves to assume the existing mortgage of approximately $52,990. Mr. Barnes then agreed to obtain a second mortgage in the amount of $18,925. The seller agreed that the balance of the sales price would be paid via a purchase money mortgage in the principal amount of $16,670.91 to be paid by Respondent Reaves. In addition, Mr. Barnes obtained a home improvement loan in the amount of $4,900. According to the agreements between Respondent Reaves and Mr. Barnes, Mr. Barnes was to keep the money obtained by the second mortgage and the home improvement loan. Respondent Reaves agreed to assume the existing mortgage, the second mortgage and the home improvement loan. Respondent Reaves advised Mr. Barnes to state to the lender that the purpose of the loans were for home improvements. Respondent Reaves executed a hold harmless and indemnity agreement which stated as follows: "Phyllis Reaves does agree to hold Stephen. B. Barnes harmless and does indemnify him against any future liability or losses related to the mortgages on property at 13222 - 88 Place North, Seminole, Florida." The sales transaction closed on August 10, 1983, and Respondent Reaves received a real estate brokerage commission in the amount of $2,513.45 and a mortgage brokerage fee of $946.25. Respondent Reaves failed to assume and pay the notes and mortgages and thereby caused the seller to become delinquent with the lenders. COUNT VI On September 3, 1983 Respondent Reaves entered into a real estate sales contract with Floyd and Christine Erwin, as sellers, to purchase certain real estate through the use of a land trust. The contract concerned Floyd and Christine Erwins' home located at 2805 Candlewood Drive in Clearwater, Florida. The purchase and sale agreement provided for a total purchase price of $53,000. The agreement listed C-21 A Little Bit Country as escrow agent for the binder deposit. The agreement further provided that the "listing agent agrees to pay C-21 A Little Bit Country cooperating agent 3.5% of the total purchase price on closing." Respondent Reaves agreed to assume the existing mortgages of $16,766.29 and $17,457.94. In addition, the sellers agreed to obtain a new mortgage in the principal amount of $4,900 and a $1,500 personal loan. Upon the advice of Respondent Reaves, the sellers stated to the lender that the purpose of the loans were for home improvements. Respondent Reaves and the sellers agreed that the sellers would keep the money obtained by the loans and that Respondent Reaves would assume the mortgages and make all of the required loan payments. The sellers agreed that the balance of the sales price was to be paid via a purchase money mortgage, payable by Respondent Reaves, in the principal amount of $12,375.77. Respondent Reaves executed a hold harmless and indemnity agreement which stated as follows: "Phyllis Reaves does agree to hold Floyd S. Erwin and Christine E. Erwin harmless and does indemnify them against any future liability or losses related to mortgages or liens on the subject property at 2805 Candlewood Drive, Clearwater, Florida." Floyd and Christine Erwin's home was listed with a broker, and the Erwins understood that Reaves was not their agent. Respondent Reaves told the Erwins that she was representing "some investors." The purchase money mortgage note was actually signed by "Michael R. Fisher, as trustee and not personally." Respondent Reaves made some payments on the purchase money mortgage note which was signed by Michael Fisher. The sales transaction closed on September 23, 1983, and Respondent Reaves received a real estate brokerage commission in the amount of $1,555.50. Respondent Reaves failed to assume and pay the mortgages and notes. Respondent Reaves has not made the payments due on the mortgages and notes and has caused the Erwins to become delinquent with their lenders. COUNT VII The evidence presented concerning Count VII consisted solely of documentary evidence. For reasons enumerated in the Conclusions of Law section, infra, the documents alone are insufficient to establish the basis of any offense. Therefore, a discussion of those documents would serve no useful purpose. COUNT VIII On October 16, 1983, Respondent Reaves entered into a real estate sales contract with Patricia and William Willis as sellers, to purchase certain real estate through the use of land trust. The contract concerned the Willis' home located at 417 North Missouri Avenue, Clearwater, Florida. The purchase and sale agreement provided for a total purchase price of $54,000. The agreement listed C-21 A Little Bit Country as escrow agent for the binder deposit. The agreement further provided that the listing agent ". . . agrees to pay C-21 A Little Bit Country cooperating agent 3.5% of the total purchase price on closing." Respondent Reaves and the Willis' agreed that Respondent would assume the existing mortgage of $15,396.52. The sellers agreed to obtain the new mortgage in the principal amount of $34,100. The sellers agreed that the balance of the sales price would be paid via a purchase money mortgage in the principal amount of $8,898.45 to be paid by Respondent Reaves. Respondent Reaves agreed to assume the existing mortgage and the new mortgage in the amount of $34,100 and make all of the required loan payments. Respondent Reaves advised the Willis' to state to the lender that the purpose of the $34,100 mortgage loan was for home improvements. The Willis' applied for the loan but refused to state that the purpose of the loan was for home improvements. Respondent Reaves executed a hold harmless agreement which stated as follows: "Phyllis Reaves does agree to hold Patricia L. Carrah, a/k/a Patricia L. Willis and William Willis harmless and does idemnify them against any future liability for losses related to any mortgages or liens on the subject property " The sales transaction closed on November 23, 1983 and Respondent Phyllis Reaves received a real estate brokerage commission in the amount of $3,213 and a mortgage brokerage fee of $2,216. Respondent Reaves failed to assume the notes and mortgages and thereby caused the sellers to become delinquent with their lenders. COUNT IX No evidence was presented concerning the allegations of Count IX. COUNT X No evidence was presented concerning the allegations of Count X. COUNT XI No evidence was presented concerning the factual allegations of Count XI. COUNT XII No evidence was presented concerning the factual allegations of Count XII. COUNT XIII No evidence was presented concerning the factual allegations of Count XIII. No evidence was presented concerning the factual allegations of Count XIV. COUNT XV on January 13, 1984, Respondent Reaves entered into a real estate sales contract with Clifford and Virginia Miner, as sellers, to purchase certain real estate through the use of a land trust. The contract concerned the Miner's home located at 1247 Burma Avenue, Clearwater, Florida. The purchase and sale agreement provided for a total purchase price of $62,000. The agreement listed "C-21 A Little Bit Country" as escrow agent for the binder deposit. In addition, the agreement provided that the listing agent ". . . agrees to pay C-21 A Little Bit Country cooperating agent 3.5% of the total purchase price on closing." Respondent Reaves and the sellers agreed that Respondent Reaves would assume the existing mortgage of $34,424.82. Respondent Reaves advised the sellers to obtain a $20,000 second mortgage that she would also assume. The sellers were to obtain the mortgage and keep the money as their equity, and Respondent Reaves was to assume the mortgage and make the payments. The sellers agreed that the balance of the sales price was to be paid via a purchase money mortgage in the principal amount of $6,865.33, payable by Respondent Reaves. Respondent Reaves promised the sellers that she would make all the required loan payments and assume the mortgages. Respondent Reaves executed a hold harmless agreement which stated as follows: "Phyllis Reaves does agree to hold Clifford S. Miner and Virginia N. Miner, his wife, harmless and does idemnify them against any future liability or losses related to any mortgages or liens on the subject property . . . ." The purchase money mortgage note was actually signed by Michael R. Fisher, "as trustee and not personally." Respondent Reaves told Mr. Miner that the hold harmless agreement provided additional assurance that she would personally assume all of the mortgage and loans. The sales transaction closed on January 31, 1984, and Respondent Phyllis Reaves received a real estate brokerage commission in the amount of $1,823.25 and a mortgage brokerage fee of $949.48. Respondent Reaves failed to assume and pay the notes and caused the Miners to become delinquent with their lenders, requiring them to "catch up" on the delinquent loan. COUNTS XVI, XVII AND XVIII. The evidence presented concerning Count XVI, XVII and XVIII consisted solely of documentary evidence. For reasons enumerated in the Conclusions of Law section of this Recommended Order, the documents alone are insufficient to establish the basis of any offense. Therefore, a discussion of those documents would serve no useful purpose. COUNT XIX During the later part of 1984, an investigator, representing the Department of Professional Regulation, went to speak to Mrs. Ruffin at her "Little Bit of Country" office concerning this case. The investigator requested that he be provided with the records from all of Respondent Reaves' transactions. Respondent Ruffin stated that she was unaware of the particular real estate transactions in question, but that she would check and provide the records at a later date because she was in the process of moving the location of her office. After subpoena was served, Respondent's counsel provided one of the documents in question. COUNT XX Respondent Ruffin employed Respondent Reaves as a salesman. Respondent Ruffin thought of Respondent Reaves as "an independent contractor." Respondent Reaves decided on her own hours and took care of her own transportation. Respondent Ruffin and Respondent Reaves were on an 85%-15% split fee arrangement. Respondent Ruffin knew that Reaves was interested in "buying a lot of property." Respondent Ruffin was basically aware of the method that Respondent Reaves was using to obtain property. Respondent Ruffin did not feel that the method was wrong, however, she did ask Respondent Reaves to leave employment after she received many calls complaining about Respondent Reaves and information that Respondent was in a "tight financial situation." Respondent Ruffin admitted that she had very little time to provide assistance or guidance to Respondent Reaves. DOAH CASE NO. 85-2454 COUNT I There was no evidence presented concerning the factual allegations of Count I. COUNT II There was no evidence concerning the factual allegations of Count II. COUNT III On October 2, 1984, an investigator, representing the Department of Professional Regulation, went to speak with Respondent Ruffin at her office. The investigator requested certain records relating to Respondent Reaves' transactions concerning the charges herein. Respondent Ruffin stated that she was unaware of the particular real estate transactions in question, but that she would check and provide the records at a later date because she was then in the process of moving her office. After a subpoena was served, Respondent Ruffin's attorney provided one of the documents in question. COUNT IV There was no evidence presented concerning the factual allegations of Count IV of DOAH Case No. 85-2454.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that Respondent Phyllis I. Reaves' license as a real estate salesman be revoked; and, RECOMMENDED that Respondent Annette J. Ruffin be issued a written reprimand and assessed an administrative fine of $500.00. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1986. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2 and 3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8 and 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15 and 16. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Matters not included therein are rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Findings of Fact 20 and 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Findings of Fact 26 and 27. Adopted in Findings of Fact 31 and 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Findings of Fact 37 and 38. Adopted in Findings of Fact 36 and 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 49. Adopted in Findings of Fact 49 and 50. Adopted in Finding of Fact 55. Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 58. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Gerald Nelson, Esquire 4950 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33809 E. A. Goodale, Esquire 14320 Indian Rocks Road Largo, Florida 33540 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact Robert & Gilman, Inc. at all times herein involved was registered as a real estate broker by the State of Florida. Delair A. Clark at all times herein involved was registered as a real estate salesman by the State of Florida. Residential property owned by William L. and Frances Crummett was listed with J.B. Steelman, Jr. real estate broker and put on Multiple Listing Service. On June 17, 1972, immediately after the For Sale sign was erected, Respondent, Delair A. Clark, presented an offer to the sellers on this property which was accepted by sellers on the same date presented (Exhibit 9). This contract provided the purchase price of $28,500 with a $300 earnest money deposit, the usual clauses in a form contract for sale and purchase, and two special clauses to wit: "A. Subject to: Buyer being reassigned to central Florida prior to June 22, 1972. In the event the assignment does not materialize by June 23, 1972 deposit will, be returned in full and contract will be null and void. B. Subject to: Buyer obtaining a 90 percent conventional loan for a period of 25 years or an FHA loan for 30 years." By telegram dated 6/20/72 (Exhibit 8) buyer confirmed re-assignment to Orlando, thus satisfying condition A in the contract. Buyers thereafter asked for earlier occupancy than originally called for. Since special arrangements would have to be made by sellers, Mr. Crummett asked for an amendment to the contract to increase the earnest money deposit to $1,000 of which $500 would be non-refundable if contract was not consummated. This amendment was duly executed by the buyers on July 15, 1972 and by the sellers. A copy thereof was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 11 which provides: "SPECIAL CLAUSE" "C. An additional deposit of $700 will be made on July 17, 1972, of which $500 will be non-refundable in the event the referenced contract is not consumated (sic)." This amendment was forwarded to the sellers by Respondent's Roberts & Gilman letter of July 17, 1972 which amendment was executed by the sellers upon receipt and mailed back to Roberts & Gilman. The July 17, 1972 letter was signed by Judy L. Rostatter of the sales processing department. A copy of the check received from the buyers was not enclosed although the letter stated it was enclosed. Prior to receipt of this amendment Crummett was advised by Richter, the buyer, that he had mailed a $700 check to Roberts & Gilman made payable to Crummett. Crummett was also advised by Respondent Clark that the check had been received. Since closing was scheduled to be held within a couple of days Crummett requested Clark to hold the check and he would endorse same at closing. Crummett never saw the original check for $700. On the day originally scheduled for the closing (circa July 18, 1972) Crummett received a telephone call from Respondent Clark to the effect that the appraisal on the property had come in some $3,000 below the asking price and inquiring if Crummett would accept $26,000 for his property. The latter advised he would not and, after some heated words, Crummett hung up. At this time it was evident to Respondent Clark and the sellers that the sale would not be consummated. Clark put a memo in the file dated July 28, 1972 saying: "Return checks of $700 + $300 in estrow (sic) to Richter. Seller advised we had no contract." A few weeks later, on August 3, 1972, after making several phone calls to Roberts & Gilman without success, Crummett had the listing broker, J.B. Steelman, write a letter (Exhibit 7) to Gilman making demand for the $500 deposit refund. By letter dated August 11, 1972 (Exhibit 6) Roberts and Gilman replied that they considered the contract had been terminated by the seller and saw no "justification by the seller to claim any escrow that has been returned to the buyer". This letter was signed "Dan T. Gilman /b.c." Several months later, in the spring of 1973, Crummett went to the office of Roberts and Gilman and obtained a photostatic copy of the check dated 7/15/72 that had been made by J.A. Richter in the amount of $700. This was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 12. At the hearing Dan G. Gilman, President of Roberts & Gilman, Inc. denied any recollection of any part of this transaction or ever having heard of the incident prior to the investigator from the FREC coming to inquire about the incident. At the time of this transaction the realtor's office was very busy with several branch offices and some 120 salesmen handling transactions in eight or ten counties in central Florida. He has no recollection of dictating Exhibit 12 or anything about the incident but his secretary at that time was Beverly Cass. It was standard practice for a broker to review every contract before trust account money was disbursed or refunded. His initial testimony that numerous people in the office had authority to sign his name to letters going out of the office was recanted when he was recalled as a witness after the close of the Commission's case. He then stated he never authorized anyone to sign his name to a document having legal implication. Clark testified that the first time he ever saw Exhibit 11, the amendment to the contract, was when shown to him by the investigator for the FREC. Likewise he claims never to have seen or received the $700 check signed by Richter. With respect to the return of the deposit to Richter, (after being shown Exhibit 13) his recollection of the cancellation of the contract was that Richter was not re-assigned to the Orlando area. This was the only contract ever handled by Clark which involved the return of an escrow deposit. He has no recollection of talking to any member of the realty firm regarding clearing the return of the escrow deposit to Richter. Exhibit 5 is a photocopy of the check by which the $300 earnest money deposit was returned to Richter. It is obvious that the contract for the sale of the residential property herein involved was amended to provide for an additional deposit from the buyers and a clause which required the buyer to forfeit one half of his deposit in the event the transaction was not consummated. It is incomprehensible that such an amendment to the contract could be made without the knowledge of the salesman or the broker. It therefore appears that the Defendants either: (1) are not telling the truth; (2) have faulty memories; (3) allowed the duties normally performed by brokers to be carried out by secretaries; or (4) operated a realty company in a slipshod manner without due regard to the duties and responsibilities imposed upon brokers and salesman by the real estate license law.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent obstructed or hindered the enforcement of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, or obstructed or hindered any person in the performance of his or her duties under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(i), Florida Statutes; or failed to preserve and make available to Petitioner all books, records and supporting documents, in violation of Rule 61J2-14.012(1), Florida Administrative Code, and thus Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. If Respondent is guilty of any of these violations, an additional issue is what penalty should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was known as Phyllis Mae Wilson, but is now known as Phyllis Mae Perry due to a change in marital status. Since 1987 or 1988, Respondent has been licensed as a Florida real estate broker, holding license number 0462610. From October 1, 1998, through June 4, 2001, Respondent registered with Petitioner her "location address" as 2200 East Oakland Park Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale. From October 1, 1994, through January 9, 2001, Respondent registered with Petitioner her "mailing address" as 1940 Northeast 55th Court, Fort Lauderdale. As part of Petitioner's rotating schedule of office inspections, Monroe Berger, Petitioner's Investigation Specialist II, sent a letter to Respondent dated May 24, 1999, at 1940 Northeast 55th Court, Fort Lauderdale. The letter, which was sent by regular mail, states that Petitioner wishes to conduct an office inspection and escrow review, pursuant to cited statutes and rules. The letter warns: "Please be advised, you must respond to my request within 15 days of your receipt of this letter. Failure to do so may result in you being charged with hindrance in the enforcement of chapter 475, Florida Statutes, and administrative action may be taken against your real estate license." When Mr. Berger did not receive a response to the May 24 letter, he requested, by letter dated June 10, 1999, from the United States Postal Service a confirmation of the Northeast 55th Court address or, if applicable, a new address for Respondent. After the United States Postal Service verified that the Northeast 55th Court address was a good address for Respondent, Mr. Berger sent a second letter to Respondent at the incorrect address of Northeast 55th "Street," not "Court." Dated September 24, 1999, this letter advises that "a complaint has been filed against you"--evidently, by Mr. Berger. This letter gives Respondent 20 days to respond to the complaint. At some point, Respondent received this letter or a copy of it, but the record does not permit a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, as to when Respondent received this letter. Respondent did not respond to the September 24 letter. The only information that Petitioner received from Respondent following the letters of May 24 and September 24, 1999, was a form that Respondent submitted, on January 18, 2000, to advise Petitioner of a change in licensing status of a salesperson working for Respondent. Although not intended to advise Petitioner of any changes in Respondent's location or mailing address, the form contains a new address for Respondent: 3466 Northeast 12th Terrace, Oakland Park. However, in no way does the form respond to the letters of May 24 and September 24, 1999. Although Mr. Berger did not testify at the hearing, as he is now retired, his supervisor at the time testified that Mr. Berger did not pursue the investigation more vigorously on the advice of the supervisor, who counseled patience. Respondent claims that a series of personal and business matters effectively prevented her from attending to such regulatory matters as updated her licensing information and seizing the initiative in response to her early contact with Mr. Berger. During this period of time, Respondent was not active in real estate, but was busy with another business that she and her husband were operating. Respondent was also deterred from producing her real estate records because she knew that a leaky roof had caused them considerable water damage. At the time of her first contact with Mr. Berger, during the period relevant to this case, Respondent had no listings or pending sales, and she so informed Mr. Berger. Respondent had known Mr. Berger and his previous supervisor, whom she had sometimes called when she had had a regulatory question. During the period relevant to this case, Respondent spoke with Mr. Berger four times. For the most part, they agreed that Respondent would try to reassemble whatever undamaged real estate records that she could find. By the summer of 2000, they had agreed that Mr. Berger would send her a questionnaire, which, when completed by Respondent, would confirm the absence of any active escrow account and would obviate the necessity of an office inspection and audit, except possibly to confirm that Respondent had properly posted a sign and license. However, Mr. Berger never sent Respondent the questionnaire, and, after health issues arose, Respondent was again prevented from pressing the matter to a conclusion. Undoubtedly, Respondent did not respond as completely as she should have to the May 24, 1999, letter and to the September 24, 1999, letter, whenever she received it. Obviously, though, the Administrative Law Judge has credited her version of conversations with Mr. Berger in the absence of Mr. Berger's testimony. Although Respondent's testimony concerning Mr. Berger's casual approach to this matter is possibly inconsistent with the September 24 letter, the misaddressing of the letter precludes a determination as to when Respondent received the letter and, thus, a finding of inconsistency between Respondent's version of events and the apparently toughened approach adopted by Mr. Berger in the September 24 letter. At times, Respondent's credibility seemed strained, but these occasions were limited to the seemingly endless accumulation of excuses as to why she may not have received a letter or notice or could not have dealt more directly with this matter at the time. More importantly, Respondent's description of the extent to which Mr. Berger casually pursued the investigation is consistent with the considerable period of time that passed during the investigation without formal action, the prior relationship that Respondent had developed with Mr. Berger and his previous supervisor, and the low risk that Respondent posed to the public, given that her real estate practice was nearly inactive in 1999. For all of these reasons, Petitioner has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to meet any unconditional demands from Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent obstructed or hindered the enforcement of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes; obstructed or hindered a person in discharging his duties under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes; or failed to keep and make available to Petitioner the books, records, and documents required by law to be kept and produced upon demand.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___ ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Dean Saunders, Chairperson Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack Hisey, Deputy Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Profession Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Robyn M. Severs, Senior Attorney Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Room N308 Orlando, Florida 32802 Phyllis Mae Perry 1940 Northeast 55th Court Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondents are guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against them, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against them, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Lori Wilk has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0349551. The last license issued was as a broker in care of Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc. At all times material hereto, Respondent Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc., has been a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0253076. At all times material hereto, Respondent Wilk has been licensed and operating as a qualifying broker and officer of Respondent Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc. Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert, as owner, had listed for sale certain real property with Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc./Gil Amara. Respondents obtained LPS Investments, Inc., as purchaser pursuant to a sales contract which was accepted by the seller on March 14, 1989. LPS Investments is owned by Leo and Patricia Scarola. Patricia Scarola was a former salesperson for Respondents. That Contract for Sale And Purchase of Real Property provided that a total of $500 as deposit monies was to be held in escrow by Stars and Stripes Realty. Respondent Wilk executed the portion of the Contract which acknowledged receipt of the first $100 of the deposit monies. Respondents' escrow account deposit slips reveal the first $100 was deposited into Respondents' escrow account. No proof of receipt of the additional $400 exists among the escrow account deposit slips admitted in evidence; however, Respondent Wilk's testimony is accepted that Respondents received in trust a total earnest money deposit in the sum of $500. Thereafter, LPS Investments, Inc., refused to close, alleging misrepresentation by the seller of the property. Although the property had been advertised as a "handyman special" and the Contract provided that the property was accepted in an "as is" condition, the Scarolas who never saw the property before they entered into the Contract to purchase it discovered that it would cost more to improve the property than they had guessed. They decided not to close. Rather, Pat Scarola instructed Respondents to transfer the $500 earnest money deposit to another piece of property not involving Gwendolyn Taylor- Herbert. Without the prior knowledge or consent of the seller or of the listing broker, Respondents transferred the Scarolas' earnest money deposit to another transaction for the benefit of the purchaser (LPS Investments, Inc.) and not involving the same seller. This was done without even considering whether the seller or the seller's agent might have an interest in the deposit. At no time prior to the time that the Respondents' transferred the deposit to a different property did the Respondents give the listing broker or the seller an opportunity or notice to make a demand upon the Respondents for the deposit. After the transfer, and after the contract failed to close, the seller and the seller's agent made a demand that the $500 deposit be accounted for and delivered. It was not. On June 1, 1989, Respondents obtained an offer from Herb Sider, as purchaser, for the property owned by Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert. That offer was accepted by the seller. The Contract for Sale and Purchase of Real Property provided that a total deposit of $1,000 was to be held in escrow by Stars and Stripes Realty. Respondent Wilk executed that portion of the Contract acknowledging that the first $100 of the earnest money deposit had been received by Respondents. That representation was false. Sider never gave Respondents the earnest money deposit specified in the Contract, and Respondents failed to advise anyone that the representation in the Contract was false. Although Respondent Wilk testified that she would "normally" keep $100 of Sider's money in her escrow account to be applied to the various contracts that he entered into through her, there is no evidence that there was $100 in Respondents' escrow account at the time or that it was available to be applied to this Contract. Rather, Respondent Wilk's testimony is accepted that she never received either the initial $100 or the additional $900 deposit monies from Sider for this property. Herb Sider refused to close. The seller, Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert, agreed to lower the sales price, and a modified contract was executed between Taylor-Herbert and Sider. Thereafter, Sider again refused to close. At no time did Respondents notify anyone that they did not have an earnest money deposit in escrow for the Taylor-Herbert/Sider transaction. Diane Quigley, branch manager of Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc., sent a letter dated July 11, 1989, to the Respondents transmitting release of deposit receipt forms and instructing Respondents to release the $500 earnest money deposit of LPS Investments, Inc., and the $1,000 earnest money deposit of Herb Sider to the seller Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert. Respondents ignored that demand letter. By letter dated August 25, 1989, Quigley again wrote to Respondents demanding the release of the Sider and the LPS Investments, Inc., deposits to the seller. That letter referred to the July 11th letter which Respondents had ignored and the numerous phone calls placed by Quigley to Respondents which had not been returned. On September 13, 1989, Respondents for the first time notified Petitioner of possible conflicting demands. That letter misrepresented the facts of the situation and suggested that the seller and buyer might still be able to strike a deal. On October 3, 1989, Respondents again wrote to the Florida Real Estate Commission advising that "there is now a conflicting demand" on the deposits relative to the Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert property. Respondents' letters reveal a lack of understanding of the basics of a real estate contract. Neither letter advised the Commission that Respondents did not have any of the monies in escrow at any rate. On December 27, 1988, Respondent Wilk made an offer to purchase real property from Bel-Properties, Inc., which offer provided that $100 earnest money deposit would be held in escrow by Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc., and an additional $2,050 earnest money deposit would be placed in the Stars and Stripes escrow account within 72 hours of acceptance. Respondent Wilk executed the portion of the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Real Property acknowledging that the initial $100 deposit had been received. That representation was false. The Contract which she prepared listed as the buyer "Lori Wilk, a lisenced [sic] real estate broker, and/or assigns." The offer was accepted by the seller on December 30, 1988. In connection with that offer, Respondent Wilk represented that she was the purchaser when, in fact, she was acting on behalf of the actual purchaser HBS Investments, Inc., a corporation owned, controlled, and operated by Herb Sider. Immediately upon the acceptance of Respondent Wilk's offer, she assigned the sales contract to HBS Investments, Inc. At no time did Respondent Wilk or HBS Investments, Inc., place the $2,150 earnest money deposit in the escrow account of Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc., as represented by Respondent Wilk to the seller and as required by the Contract. Further, at no time did Respondents advise the seller that they did not have an earnest money deposit in the Stars and Stripes escrow account. On November 28, 1988, Respondent "Wilk, a lisenced [sic] real estate broker, and/or assigns" made an offer to purchase real property from Darlene Farris. Farris accepted that offer on December 6, 1988. That Contract for Sale and Purchase of Real Property provided that an initial deposit of $100 had been placed in the escrow account of Stars and Stripes Realty and that an additional earnest money deposit of $1,900 would be placed in escrow within 72 hours of acceptance. Respondent Wilk executed the portion of the Contract acknowledging that she had received the initial $100 earnest money deposit. That representation was false. In fact, Respondent Wilk never placed any of the $2,000 earnest money deposit in her escrow account and never advised the seller or the seller's listing broker that no earnest money deposit had been made. On or about February 2, 1989, Respondents solicited and obtained Willy Pearson as a tenant for the Farris property. Respondents represented to Pearson that the lessor was HBS Investments, Inc. Respondent Wilk prepared a Memorandum to Enter Into a Lease acknowledging the receipt of $550 as a deposit from Pearson, although Respondent Wilk only received $250 from Pearson. When Respondent Wilk received half of the rental deposit, she gave Pearson both a receipt and immediate possession of the property. Respondents obtained the tenant without the prior knowledge and consent of Darlene Farris, owner of the property. Further Respondents did not notify Farris or Farris' broker that Respondents had rented Farris' property until sometime after Respondents had received the $250 deposit from Pearson and had given him possession of Farris' property. Neither Respondent Wilk nor HBS Investments, Inc., ever closed on the Farris property. Further, Respondent Wilk never obtained authority from Darlene Farris to obtain or place a tenant in Farris' property.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against them and revoking the licenses of Respondents Lori Wilk and Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-2468 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-21 and 23-28 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 22 has been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 2-9, 19, and 23 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondents' proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 10, 15, and 27 have been rejected as being contrary to the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 11, 12, 14, 16-18, 20-22, 24, 25, 28, and 30 have been rejected as not been supported by the weight of the credible, competent evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 13, 26, and 29 have been rejected as being irrelevant to determination of the issues involved in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Legal Section - Suite N-308 Hurston Building - North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Monte K. Rassner, Esquire Rassner, Malove, Rassner, Kramer & Gold Plaza 7000, Suite 500 7000 Southwest 62nd Avenue South Miami, FL 33143 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Robert Marriott has been a licensed real estate broker/salesman under the laws of the State of Florida, trading as Marriott Realty. In February of 1980, in his capacity as a real estate broker/salesman, Respondent obtained an offer to purchase commercial property in Miami from Orlando Villacis, a resident of Ecuador, as purchaser, for a total purchase price of $500,000. In conjunction with the offer, Villacis paid a $20,000 earnest money deposit to be held by Marriott Realty in escrow under the terms of the offer. Villacis' deposit check in the amount of $20,000 was deposited into the Marriott Realty escrow account on February 22, 1980. By March 11, 1980, Villacis' $20,000 had been withdrawn, leaving an escrow account balance of $40. This fact was never reported to Villacis. Having heard nothing definite from Respondent with regard to the offer, and because he spent most of his time out of the country, Villacis engaged the services of attorney Rafael Penalver. Prior to July 1980, Penalver contacted the Respondent and inquired as to the status of the offer. Each time, Respondent told him that the seller was still considering the offer. In July of 1980, Respondent told Penalver that the $500,000 offer had been rejected by the seller and recommended that Villacis present an offer for $570,000. Penalver prepared the offer in the amount of $570,000, again calling for a $20,000 earnest money deposit, which Penalver and Villacis assumed was still in the Marriott Realty escrow account. Receiving no response from Respondent on the second offer, Penalver attempted to contact Respondent by telephone on numerous occasions. When Penalver was successful, Respondent told him that the seller was reviewing the offer. In early September 1980, Respondent advised Penalver that the $570,000 offer had been rejected by the seller. By letter dated September 11, 1980, Penalver raised the offer to $600,000, set a deadline of September 19 for the acceptance of the offer, and directed Respondent to return the $20,000 immediately should the offer not be accepted. After September 19, having heard nothing from the Respondent, Penalver called him, at which time Respondent advised that the offer was being considered by the seller. Penalver then wrote a letter dated October 7, 1980, to Respondent demanding that Respondent deposit the $20,000 into Villacis' account. Again hearing nothing from Respondent, Penalver on numerous occasions attempted to contact him by telephone in order to again demand the immediate return of the $20,000 deposit. Being unsuccessful, Penalver wrote the Respondent on November 20, 1980, and January 22, 1981, both times demanding the return of the $20,000 earnest money deposit. After the letter of January 22, 1981, Respondent agreed to meet with Penalver in Penalver's office. On February 2, 1981, the Respondent and his wife met with Penalver. During that meeting, Respondent advised Penalver that the $20,000 was no longer available and that he and his wife had used the money to make mortgage payments and cosmetic improvements on their personal residence. Respondent challenged Penalver to sue him to get the money back. After discussing Respondent's position with Villacis, Penalver filed a civil action for return of the $20,000. In his Answer to the Complaint filed in that litigation, Respondent admitted that he had used the $20,000 deposit for mortgage payments and other personal household expenses and for payment of his IRS tax deficiency. Villacis obtained a Final Judgment in the civil action in the amount of $20,000 plus interest and costs on October 6, 1982. Respondent testified that he did not return the $20,000 earnest money deposit because, in approximately October 1980, Villacis verbally agreed to loan the $20,000 to Respondent. Villacis strongly denied making any offer of a loan to Respondent. The purported loan agreement would have occurred after Penalver had twice written Respondent regarding immediate return of the $20,000 and seven months after the $20,000 had disappeared from the escrow account. Further, after Penalver sent his November demand letter, Respondent wrote Villacis in December of 1980 asking that Villacis consider loaning Respondent the $20,000 in exchange for an unrecorded mortgage on Respondent's personal residence. Clearly, Respondent's testimony is not credible. As of the date of the formal hearing in this cause, the Final Judgment in favor of Villacis and against Respondent remained unpaid and Respondent had still not returned to Villacis the $20,000 earnest money deposit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaint filed against him and revoking his license as a real estate broker/salesman. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of April, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 David I. Schlosberg, Esquire 525 North 27th Avenue, Suite 100 Miami, Florida 33125 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by committing fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, etc., or by violating a duty imposed upon him by law or by the terms of a listing contract and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty; Whether Respondent violated section 475.25(1)(d)1., by failing to timely account or deliver to any person any personal property such as money, funds, deposit, check draft, etc. and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty; and Whether Respondent, a sales associate, registered as an officer, director of a brokerage corporation, or general partner of a brokerage partnership is in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-5.016 and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of real estate pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. DOAH has jurisdiction, pursuant to section 120.574, to render a decision in this matter, which shall be final agency action subject to judicial review under section 120.68. Mr. Rivas is a licensed real estate sales associate, holding license number 3385508, issued by the State of Florida. Structure of the Brokerage Corporation On or about April 7, 2015, Respondent registered GREH with the State of Florida, Division of Corporations ("Division of Corporations"), identifying himself as the registered agent and manager of GREH. Respondent filed documents on behalf of GREH with the Division of Corporations on the following dates and identified himself with the following titles with GREH: On April 13, 2016, March 14, 2017, and April 17, 2018, Respondent identified himself as the registered agent, managing member, and president; On November 22, 2017, and April 17, 2018, Respondent identified himself as an authorized member; On April 22, 2019, Respondent identified himself as a registered agent, an authorized member, and managing member; On October 23, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent and member; On November 27, 2019, Respondent identified himself as a registered agent, member, and manager; On December 6, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent and shareholder; and On December 10, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent. On March 23, 2017, GREH registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission") as a real estate corporation in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CQ 1053189. At no time was Respondent registered with the Commission as a real estate broker in the State of Florida. From November 27, 2017, to October 3, 2019, Mr. Avila, who at that time was a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number BK 3401612, was the qualifying broker of GREH. From October 3, 2019, to October 15, 2019, and from November 25, 2019, to December 9, 2019, GREH's license was invalidated due to it not having a qualifying broker. From October 15, 2019, to November 25, 2019, Gamila Murata was the qualifying broker for GREH. From December 9, 2019, to July 29, 2020, Mr. Henson was the qualifying broker for GREH. On August 22, 2019, without the authority of the qualifying broker for GREH, Respondent filed a civil action on behalf of GREH against Arnauld and Annelyn Sylvain (collectively, the "Sylvains") in the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in case number 502019CA008774XXXXMB, seeking, among other things, to recover real estate commissions allegedly claimed due by GREH and Respondent. Respondent subsequently retained attorney Monica Woodard to represent GREH in the civil proceedings, and GREH's complaint was dismissed. On or about November 19, 2019, the Sylvains filed a separate civil action against GREH in the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in case number 502019CC015230XXXXMB, seeking to recover a $10,000.00 escrow deposit. Respondent failed to inform the qualifying broker of record for GREH, Mr. Henson, who assumed that position shortly after the filing of the civil action, of the pending lawsuit. Respondent opened bank accounts on behalf of GREH, including an account called an "Escrow Account," which was controlled by Respondent and at no time was controlled by a qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent deposited escrow funds into the Escrow Account for GREH, without the authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent closed the Escrow Account held in the name of GREH and removed funds that were to be held in trust from the account without authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent controlled all communications regarding certain real estate transactions on behalf of GREH, without the knowledge or authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Contract 1 On or about March 4, 2019, an "AS IS" Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase ("Contract 1") was entered into between the Sylvains, as buyers, and Frederick F. Breault and Evelyn Breault (the "Breaults"), as sellers, for property located at 16595 93rd Road North, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 ("Subject Property 1"). Respondent facilitated Contract 1 on behalf of the Sylvains. Pursuant to the requirements of Contract 1, the Sylvains deposited $10,000.00 with GREH, to be held in escrow as the initial deposit. The escrow funds were delivered to Respondent in the form of a certified check drawn from SunTrust Bank in the amount of $10,000.00 and purchased by Mr. Sylvain on March 4, 2019 ("SunTrust Certified Check"). The $10,000.00 escrow funds were deposited into a bank account held in the name of GREH. The SunTrust Certified Check was deposited into a bank account over which Respondent had sole control. The GREH account in which the SunTrust Certified Check was deposited was at no relevant time controlled by a Florida licensed real estate broker. Contract 1 provided that the Sylvains had 20 days from the effective date to obtain loan approval ("Loan Approval Period"). Paragraph 18(F) of the Contract provided as follows: TIME: Calendar days shall be used in computing time periods. Time is of the essence in this Contract. Other than time for acceptance and Effective Date as set forth in Paragraph 3, any time periods provided for or dates specified in this Contract, whether preprinted, handwritten, typewritten or inserted herein, which shall end or occur on a Saturday, Sunday, or a national legal holiday (see 5 U.S.C. 6103) shall extend to 5.[:]00 p.m. (where the Property is located) of the next business day. Because 20 days from the effective date fell on a Sunday, the Loan Approval Period expired on Monday, March 25, 2019. Paragraph 8(b)(i) of Contract 1 provided that: "Buyer [the Sylvains] shall ... use good faith and diligent effort to obtain approval of a loan meeting the Financing terms ('Loan Approval') and thereafter to close this Contract." Paragraph 8(b)(v) of the Contract further provided that if neither party timely cancelled the Contract pursuant to paragraph 8, the financing contingency would "be deemed waived." Paragraph 8(b)(vii) finally provided that "[i]f Loan Approval has been obtained, or deemed to have been obtained, as provided above, and Buyer fails to close this Contract, then the Deposit shall be paid to Seller … ." The parties agreed to close Contract 1 by April 10, 2019. The Sylvains did not obtain final loan approval ("clear to close") within the Loan Approval Period. The loan was not denied for any of the exceptions set forth in paragraph 8(b)(vii), to release of the escrow deposit to the seller. The Sylvains did not terminate the contract within the Loan Approval Period. After the Loan Approval Period expired, the Sylvains sought to extend Contract 1, without consideration for the extension. The Breaults countered the Sylvains' request to extend with an offer that an extension would be granted for consideration that the Sylvains agree to forfeit the earnest money deposit. The parties never reached an agreement to extend Contract 1 and Contract 1 failed to close. On or about May 2, 2019, the Sylvains's loan application for Contract 1 was denied. On May 8, 2019, the Breaults executed a Release and Cancellation of Contract demanding release of the $10,000.00 escrow deposit on Contract 1, which Respondent received by email on that date from Betty Khan, the sales associate representing the Breaults. The Sylvains also executed a Release and Cancellation of Contract seeking return of the $10,000.00 escrow deposit on Contract 1, which Respondent communicated to Ms. Khan on May 8, 2019. Also, on May 8, 2019, Respondent informed the Sylvains of the Breaults's claim on the earnest money deposit. Despite knowing that there were conflicting demands for the escrowed funds, Respondent failed to inform Mr. Avila, the qualifying broker for GREH at the time, or the Department, of the escrow dispute. The Breaults were never informed of any escrow dispute filed with the Department, were never sued in relation to the escrow deposit, and never went to mediation or arbitration with regard to the escrow deposit, despite making a demand for the escrow deposit. Respondent claimed that he applied the $10,000.00 escrow funds to another contract under which the Sylvains were buyers. Respondent closed the GREH Escrow Account, removing the $10,000.00 from the account, without consent of either the Sylvains or the Breaults. Contract 2 On or about May 2, 2019, an "AS IS" Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase (Contract 2) between the Sylvains, as buyers, and the Mossuccos, as sellers, for property located at 7584 Apache Boulevard, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 ("Subject Property 2"). Respondent facilitated Contract 2 on behalf of the Sylvains. In relation to Contract 2, specifically paragraph 2(a), which required an earnest money deposit in the amount of $10,000.00, Respondent requested that the Sylvains provide him a check in the amount of $10,000.00 to show the Mossuccos. On or about May 6, 2019, the Sylvains then drew a check from a business account held with TD Bank in the amount of $10,000.00 and payable to Global Business Financial Investment ("TD Bank Check"), which the Sylvains delivered to Respondent. Respondent took a photograph of the check and promised the Sylvains that the check would not be cashed or deposited. On or about May 6, 2019, Miledy Garcia, now known as Miledy Rivas, Respondent's spouse, a Florida licensed real estate sales associate, having been issued license number SL 3383271, issued an escrow deposit receipt for $10,000.00 for Contract 2 on a GREH form ("May 6, 2019, GREH Receipt"). The TD Bank Check was never deposited or cashed by Respondent; rather, the Sylvains immediately issued a stop payment order on the check to TD Bank. Despite having never deposited the TD Bank Check, Respondent communicated the May 6, 2019, GREH Receipt and a photo of the TD Bank Check to Mrs. Mossucco and Ms. Weintraub. The $10,000.00 escrow funds from Contract 1 were the escrow funds represented on Contract 2. Respondent represented that the $10,000.00 escrow funds were applied to Contract 2, prior to cancellation of Contract 1, and continued to represent the same, even after Respondent knew the Breaults were making a claim against the funds. Contract 2 failed to close. After Contract 2 failed to close, the Mossuccos and Sylvains agreed to cancel Contract 2 and release each other from liability under the terms of Contract 2, and further agreed that any earnest money deposit could be returned to the Sylvains. Respondent failed to deliver the escrow funds to the Sylvains. Rather, Respondent believed that the funds belonged to him (or one of his companies) and that he was entitled to remove the escrow funds and use them as he (or his company) saw fit. Respondent testified that he submitted a notice of escrow dispute, dated "9-30-2019," to the Department, identifying the parties to the transaction as the Mossuccos and the Sylvains, and the subject property as 7584 Apache Boulevard, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470. Respondent gave conflicting testimony, including, for example: First testifying that he believed the $10,000.00 escrow funds belonged to him (or his company) to be spent as he saw fit; then, after a break in the proceedings and on re-direct by his counsel, changing his story by saying that counsel for Petitioner put words in his mouth and that he meant only that there was a "dispute on the funds." First testifying that Mr. Avila was a signatory on the GREH "Escrow Account," then admitting that Mr. Avila was not a signatory on the account. There was also conflicting testimony between Respondent and several of the witnesses; however, where there were inconsistencies, Petitioner's witnesses' testimony was substantially consistent and supported by the documentary evidence presented. Parts of Respondent's testimony were inconsistent with documentary evidence admitted into evidence by stipulation of the parties. Facts Concerning Aggravation or Mitigation of Penalties Respondent collected escrow funds and deposited them into an account that he, only a licensed real estate sales associate, controlled, rather than one that was controlled by the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent admittedly removed escrow funds in the amount of $10,000.00 from the bank account in which they were deposited, without all parties having a claim to the escrow funds executing a release. Respondent testified that he believed the escrow funds belonged to him (or one of his companies) and that he had a right to do with the funds as he (or he through one of his companies) saw fit. Respondent used vulgar language, threats, and demeaning language toward his clients, other real estate professionals, and title agents to attempt to coerce those individuals into submitting to his demands. Respondent failed and refused to comply with the direction of the qualifying broker with supervisory responsibility over Respondent and GREH. Respondent failed to keep the qualifying broker of GREH apprised of the real estate transactions in which Respondent was involved. There was significant testimony establishing that Respondent was performing tasks that are only allowed to be performed by a licensed real estate broker, not a real estate sales associate, mortgage broker, or mortgage loan originator. Additional Facts Raised by Respondent In his proposed conclusions of law, Respondent raises, as a matter of fact, that the "Department failed to plead sufficient facts underpinning its argument" regarding the handling of escrow funds. In paragraph 25 of his Proposed Final Order, Respondent states: Nowhere in the administrative complaint does the Department allege that Mr. Rivas falsely represented that GREH received the TD Bank Check as earnest money for Contract 2, or that he falsely represented to the Sylvains that the Breaults did not have a legitimate claim against the $10,000.00 escrow funds deposited by the Sylvains toward Contract 1, or that he misrepresented to the Sylvains that the $10,000.00 funds from the SunTrust Certified Check could be and were applied to Contract 2. Respondent further argued that none of the "facts relevant to aggravation or mitigation" set forth in the Department's Proposed Final Order were pled in the A.C., in violation of Respondent's due process rights. Both of these arguments are rejected as set forth in paragraphs 108 and109 below. Additional Facts Concerning Department Costs The Department presented competent evidence that it incurred investigative costs in the amount of $1,551.00.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the administrative complaint dated January 19, 1989; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the prehearing stipulation filed by the parties, the testimony of the witnesses, and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating and disciplining real estate licensees. The Respondent, Charles P. Grimes, is, and has been at all times material to the allegations of the administrative complaint, licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, license number 0034301. In November, 1980, a contract for sale and purchase of real estate was drafted between Dorothy Langham Scott, seller, and Phillip Crawford, buyer. The contract, which was subsequently executed by both parties, provided that a deposit in the amount of $18,500 was to be held in escrow by Respondent. A separate brokerage agreement between Respondent and the seller, executed November 30, 1980, provided that Respondent would receive a brokerage fee of ten percent of the total gross sales price. The brokerage agreement specified that "should the buyer default and not close the transaction in accordance with the Contract, the Broker shall not be entitled to any commission." The agreement further provided that Respondent would "use reasonable diligence and his best efforts to see that the transaction is closed in accordance with the executed Contract." The contract described in paragraph 3 did not close. Subsequently, the seller sued Respondent in the Circuit Court in Palm Beach County, Case no. 82-1974 CA (L) 01 B. On August 13, 1985, an amended final judgment was entered which provided, in part: The facts adduced at trial indicate that Crawford and Scott entered into a contract for the purchase and sale of certain real property, located in Putnam County and that for no apparent reason Crawford defaulted on the contract. The evidence is clear and convincing and unrefuted. Crawford has admitted several letters which he says were communicated to the attorney for Scott. However, the substantial weight of the evidence will not support his repudiation of the contract. Accordingly, it is clear that as between Scott and Grimes, the real estate agent who was allegedly holding the deposit under the provisions of the deposit receipt contract, Scott is entitled to a judgment for $18,500.00, plus its costs and attorney's fees. John L. Burns, an attorney who represented the seller, Scott, during the contract negotiations in November, 1980- January, 1981, received a letter from Respondent on December 12, 1980. That letter, dated December 5, 1980, provided: "I have enclosed the signed contract and have received the deposit check from Dr. Crawford." On or about January 29, 1981, Mr. Burns received a letter from Respondent which indicated that the contract would close in March, 1981. Respondent did not advise the seller that the deposit on the Crawford/Scott contract was not in escrow. Respondent erroneously assumed that a deposit from the buyer (which had been deposited on another contract for sale and purchase) could be applied to the contract. That deposit, in the amount of $20,000.00, was not transferred and was not used to satisfy the amended judgment entered in Scott's favor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, enter a final order finding the Respondent guilty of the violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1000.00, suspending his license for a period of 60 days, and placing the Respondent on probation for a period of two years. It is recommended that the Respondent be found not guilty of the other alleged violations. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 89-2517 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraphs 1 through 4 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 5, it is accepted that on or about November 30, 1980, Respondent was attempting to procure the contract described; however, the exact date the parties executed the contract is not known. The contract was ultimately executed by both parties but did not close. Consequently, the proposed fact, as written, is not supported by the record. Paragraphs 6 and 7 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 8, it is accepted that the contract did not close and that a court of competent jurisdiction determined that the deposit should be awarded the seller; otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as outside the scope of this record. Paragraph 9 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 10 is accepted. Paragraph 11 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 12 is accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Glenn M. Blake Blake & Torres, P.A. 200 South Indian River Drive Suite 101 Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, George Sherbon, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued broker's license number 0348688 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). When the events herein occurred, respondent was employed as a salesman for V. P. Stone, Inc., a real estate firm located at 5905 Gulf Boulevard, St. Petersburg Beach, Florida. On April 1, 1987, Paul D. and Anna Martin entered into a listing agreement with Century 21 Spinning Wheel Ent., Inc. (Century 21) to sell their home at 2543 58th Terrace South, St. Petersburg, Florida. The listing agent was Cheryl Coudry, now known as Cheryl Hutton, a licensed salesperson with Century 21. On September 11, 1987 respondent solicited and obtained a contract for sale on the Martin property executed by Frank Dicenzo, a resident of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, who had a daughter living in the St. Petersburg area. Dicenzo had responded to an advertisement run by Sherbon in a Pittsburgh newspaper. After a week or so of negotiations, the parties eventually agreed to a sales price of $92,500, and the final contract was executed on September 20, 1987. The contract called for Dicenzo to make an initial $100 deposit when the contract was executed and an additional deposit of $19,900 by September 25, 1987, or a total deposit of $20,000. Dicenzo gave respondent the initial $100 which was deposited into the escrow account of V. P. Stone, Inc. The contract provided further that the sale would be contingent on Dicenzo obtaining a $72,500 first mortgage. Finally, in accordance with Dicenzo's request, the contract provided that Dicenzo could take occupancy of the premises four weeks after the loan was approved. It is noted that Dicenzo initially asked for occupancy by October 16, 1987. On September 18, Sherbon introduced Dicenzo to Tony Black, a loan officer at Savings of America, a local lending institution, for the purpose of Dicenzo making a loan application. On September 24, or the day before the additional deposit was due, Dicenzo became ill with what he described as a bleeding ulcer and decided to return to Pittsburgh and stay at his mother's home. Before he left, Dicenzo did not make the additional deposit as required by the contract. According to Dicenzo, he placed no great significance on the September 25 due date and felt that if the deposit was made "within a reasonable time," it would be okay. Respondent was aware of the September 25 deadline and attempted to get a check for the $19,900 deposit from Dicenzo's daughter but was unsuccessful. Respondent contends he kept trying to contact Dicenzo in Pittsburgh during the next five week period but was unable to reach him. Dicenzo acknowledged he knew that Sherbon was trying to contact him but still made no effort to talk to Sherbon. Instead, he simply told his daughter he would take care of the matter when he returned to Florida in late October. Whether this message was conveyed to Sherbon is not of record. Sherbon prepared contemporaneous notes concerning the transaction and used these to refresh his recollection at hearing. He pointed out that such notes were kept on all real estate transactions. According to his notes, he telephoned Coudry and Black on September 24 concerning Dicenzo's illness and the fact that he was having difficulty obtaining the additional deposit from Dicenzo. Although Black recalled talking with Sherbon, he denied that Sherbon told him that there was no deposit and said such information was a material item that would have prompted him to stop processing the application until the deposit could be verified. Likewise, Coudry, who could not recall many aspects of the transaction, did recall speaking with Sherbon but remembered Sherbon simply telling her that he was in the process of showing Dicenzo various commercial properties and would be obtaining the deposit at that time. Their testimony is deemed to be more credible and persuasive and is hereby accepted. Coudry assumed that Sherbon had received the additional deposit since she was never specifically told otherwise by Sherbon. Accordingly, she did not contact the Martins until several weeks after the September 25 due date. Coudry did not learn that no deposit had been collected until mid-January 1988 when Anna Martin disclosed to her this fact. In the meantime, although the Martins knew the contract was contingent on Dicenzo obtaining a loan, they nonetheless assumed that Dicenzo would have no problem securing a loan and that such a loan would be approved in a week or so. Also, they knew the contract called for possession of the property by Dicenzo four weeks after the loan was approved. Because of these assumptions, and having received no advice from Coudry that the full deposit had not been made on September 25 as required by the contract, the Martins made application around September 28 to buy another home in a nearby modular home park and asked that the application be expedited. Unfortunately for the Martins, they were far more successful than Dicenzo in securing prompt approval of their loan application. Once approved, and after a closing was held, the Martins had the utilities hooked up, erected a storage shed, and incurred other expenses. Also, they began making mortgage payments on the second house. On October 24, 1987 the Martins telephoned Sherbon and told him their listing with Century 21 had expired. During the conversation, Sherbon did not mention that Dicenzo had failed to make the $19,900 deposit. Dicenzo's application with Savings of America was denied on October 30, 1987 because of Dicenzo's "ratio of ... expenses to ... total income." By this time, Dicenzo had returned to Florida and had spoken with Sherbon. At respondent's urging, Dicenzo reapplied to the same institution and was turned down a second time on November 12, 1987. In addition, at Coudry's suggestion, Dicenzo had already visited another lender in October but refused to pay a $250 application fee and consequently did not file an application. Also, through Sherbon, Dicenzo was given the name of a mortgage lender suggested by the Martins but, after three visits, decided not file an application. Information regarding the second Savings of America denial was conveyed to Coudry around mid-November but, for whatever reason, she did not contact Sherbon regarding the status of the contract. It is noteworthy that at that time Sherbon did not tell Coudry that Dicenzo had still failed to make an additional deposit as required by the contract. Despite the loan application denials, Sherbon encouraged Dicenzo to keep trying to arrange financing so that the deal could go through. Dicenzo agreed to do so but, as noted in the following finding of fact, at that point Dicenzo considered the contract to be "null and void." Sherbon's efforts to find financing continued until mid-January 1988. When the loan application was denied on November 12, Dicenzo construed the contract to be void since the financing contingency was not met. According to Dicenzo, he did not believe the property was tied up while his contract was pending, felt no obligation to make the $19,900 deposit because it meant he would have to transfer funds from a money market account he purportedly maintained in Pittsburgh, and felt no moral obligation to the Martins even though by then they had committed themselves to a second home. The Martins were advised by telephone on the evening of November 12 of the second turn down of Dicenzo's loan application. By then, however, they were already committed to the second purchase. They claimed they did not learn of Dicenzo's failure to make the $19,900 deposit until mid-January 1988 when Sherbon visited their home and disclosed this fact. This is also borne out by a letter from the Martins' attorney to Dicenzo on December 1, 1987 advising Dicenzo that the contract was void and a claim might be made on his deposit for damages. When the Martins learned that only $100 had been deposited, they filed a complaint with the Division. That prompted this proceeding. Because of the failed contract, the Martins were unable to maintain two mortgage payments and were ultimately forced to give up the second home at a substantial monetary loss. They have since returned to their first home. The evidence shows that in the real estate trade, it is not customary or proper for the buyer's realtor to personally contact the seller. Rather, the practice and custom is for the buyer's agent to advise the listing broker of all pertinent developments and the listing broker then relays any necessary information to the seller. Thus, Sherbon had no responsibility to personally advise the Martins of any information pertaining to the contract. Rather, this responsibility rested with Coudry. Respondent contended he kept Coudry abreast of all developments concerning Dicenzo and that he assumed Coudry would advise the Martins that no deposit had yet been collected. To the extent this version of events conflicts with previous findings, it is not accepted. Sherbon expressed sympathy for the Martins' plight but maintained he was not at fault. There is no evidence that Sherbon has been subjected to prior disciplinary action by the Division.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) to the extent noted in the conclusions of law and that his broker's license be suspended for three months. All other charges should be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 26th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4688 Petitioner: 1-2. Covered in finding of fact l. Rejected as being unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 2. 5-7. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 10. Covered in finding of fact 7. Rejected since respondent owed a duty to Coudry, and not the Martins, to keep her abreast of all pertinent matters. Covered in findings of fact 7 and 12. Covered in findings of fact 7 and 8. Covered in finding of fact 8. Covered in findings of fact 6 and 10. Rejected as being subordinate to other findings. Covered in finding of fact 11. 18-19. Covered in finding of fact 6. Respondent: Respondent's proposed order contains sections entitled "admitted facts", "unrebutted facts" and "uncontested facts". They are ruled upon in that order. Admitted facts: Covered in finding of fact l. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in background. Unrebutted facts: Covered in finding of fact 7. Covered in finding of fact 15. Covered in finding of fact 10. 4-6. Covered in finding of fact 6. 7-8. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 12. Rejected since Sherbon learned of the loan denial even though he did not receive a written copy of the turn-down letter. Covered in finding of fact 13. Covered in finding of fact 8. Rejected since the testimony of Anna Martin is accepted as being more credible on this factual issue. Uncontested facts: Rejected as being cumulative. Partially covered in findings of fact 6, 7 and 16. The remainder is rejected as being cumulative, argument of counsel or not supported by the more credible evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Daniel B. Schuh, Esquire 248 Mirror Drive St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Darlene Keller, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents' real estate licenses should be disciplined on the ground that Respondents violated a rule and various provisions within Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner on May 20, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: When the events herein occurred, Respondents, Mercedes M. Powers and Patricia A. Fleck, were both licensed as real estate brokers, having been issued license numbers 0151412 and 0027277, respectively, by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). Fleck served as qualifying broker for Patricia A. Fleck Real Estate, 5466 Spring Hill Drive, Spring Hill, Florida, while Powers was employed as a broker-salesperson at the same firm. Douglas K. Rogers, a Spring Hill resident, was interested in purchasing a lot in a Spring Hill subdivision and observed a "for sale" sign on Lot 7 at 12287 Elmore Drive. The lot was owned by Wayne and Faith Ryden, who resided in North Hero, Vermont. Rogers contacted the Rydens by telephone in mid or late March 1997 to ascertain the price of the lot. Rogers had also seen a nearby lot for sale carrying a sign from Respondents' firm. On March 23, 1997, he telephoned Powers and inquired about another lot in the same subdivision. Powers contacted the owners but learned that they did not want to sell. After relaying this advice to Rogers, she told him that she had a listing on Lot 6; however, Rogers was not interested in Lot 6 and merely indicated he would "get back" to her later. On April 3, 1997, Rogers again telephoned Powers and told her he was interested in purchasing Lot 7, which was owned by the Rydens. Powers invited Rogers to come to her office where she would call the sellers. Powers then "ran the public record" and learned that the Rydens owned the lot. On Friday, April 4, 1997, in the presence of Rogers, Powers telephoned Mrs. Ryden and spoke with her for three or four minutes. In response to an inquiry from Mrs. Ryden, Powers indicated that if the Rydens listed the property with her, she would represent the sellers; otherwise, she would represent the buyer in the transaction. Based on Mrs. Ryden's response, Powers was led to believe that the Rydens wanted Powers to represent them in the transaction. Accordingly, she explained the arrangement to Rogers, and he voluntarily signed an Agency Disclosure form which acknowledged that he understood, and agreed with, that arrangement. With Powers' assistance, that same day Rogers executed a contract for the sale and purchase of Lot 7 for a price of $8,500.00. The contract called for the sellers to accept the offer no later than April 7, 1997, or three days later, and that the contract would close by May 15, 1997, unless extended by the parties. The contract further called for Rogers to provide a $200.00 cash deposit, which was "to be placed in escrow by 4-7-97." The contract, listing agreement, and expense report were all sent by overnight mail to the Rydens the same day. Because Rogers did not have sufficient cash for a deposit with him, he advised Powers that he would return with a check the following Monday, or April 7. Notwithstanding the language in the contract, he gave Powers specific instructions that when he delivered a check, she was to hold it until the Rydens signed the contract, and then deposit the money. This is confirmed by a contemporaneous note made by Powers which read: "Mr. Rogers will bring check Monday. Then to hold until Rydens sign contract, then deposit it." Rogers testified that he delivered check no. 3497 in the amount of $200.00 to a receptionist in Respondents' office approximately two hours after he executed the contract. He also says he got the receptionist to make a copy of the face of the check, which has been received in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5. If in fact a check was actually delivered to a receptionist that day, that person lost the check and never advised Powers or Fleck (or anyone else) that one had been delivered. Indeed, until June 6, 1997, Respondents were not aware that one was purportedly delivered, and they never saw a copy of the face of the check until they received the Administrative Complaint, with attached exhibits, in May 1998. The original check has never surfaced, and it was never presented for payment to the bank. Under these circumstances, it was impossible for Respondents to deposit the check in the firm's escrow account, as required by rule and statute. According to a Division investigator, there have been other instances where a realtor denies receiving a deposit from the buyer. It can be fairly inferred from his testimony that when this occurs, if the realtor's denial is accepted as being true, the realtor will not be held accountable. At no time did Respondents ever intend to violate any rule or statute governing the deposit of escrow funds; had they known that a check had been delivered to the firm, it would have been handled in an appropriate manner. The contract technically expired on April 7, 1997, when the Rydens had not yet accepted the offer. However, on April 8, 1997, Powers again contacted Mrs. Ryden by telephone since Powers had not received a reply. Based on that conversation, which led Powers to believe that the Rydens may not have received the first set of documents, Powers re-sent by overnight mail copies of the contract, agency disclosure, and expense sheet to the Rydens with a request that they either accept or refuse the contract, but in either event, to return the contract and let her know their decision. The Rydens, however, never extended her the courtesy of a reply. It is fair to infer from the evidence that by now, Rogers had again contacted the Rydens by telephone about purchasing the lot in a separate transaction so that the parties would not have to pay a realtor's commission. Rogers telephoned Powers once or twice in April or May 1997 to ask if the contract had ever been returned by the Rydens. He made no mention of his check. Those inquiries are somewhat puzzling since Rogers was well aware of the fact that the parties intended to negotiate a separate agreement. In any event, on the reasonable belief that the contract had never been accepted, and no deposit had ever been made by Rogers, Powers did nothing more about the transaction until June 6, 1997, when Rogers telephoned her at home that evening asking for "his check." By then, he had a separate binding contract with the Rydens for the sale of the lot; he had already stopped payment on the check a week earlier; and he knew that it had never been deposited. Powers advised Rogers that if in fact his check was at the office, he could drop by the next day at 10:30 a.m. and get it from the broker. Rogers came to the office the next morning, but he arrived at around 8:45 a.m., or well before Powers expected him. In Powers' absence, the on-duty receptionist was unsuccessful in locating his file (which was in Powers' office) and the check. On June 14, 1997, Rogers sent a complaint to the Division. That complaint triggered this proceeding. It is fair to infer that Rogers filed the complaint to gain leverage in the event Respondents ever brought an action against him to recover their lost real estate commission. Unknown to Respondents, on June 10, 1997, the sale was completed, and the Rydens executed and delivered a warranty deed to Rogers and his wife conveying the property in question. For all their efforts in attempting to accommodate Rogers, Respondents were deprived of a real estate commission through the covert acts of the buyer and seller, and they were saddled with the legal costs of defending this action. In terms of mitigating and aggravating factors, it is noted that Fleck was never involved with this transaction until the demand for the check was made in June 1997. There is no evidence that Powers has ever been disciplined by the Real Estate Commission on any prior occasion. On an undisclosed date, however, Fleck received a fine and was required to complete a 30-hour broker management course for failing to adequately supervise a "former rental manager" and failing to "timely notify FREC of deposit dispute." Neither Rogers or the Rydens suffered any harm by virtue of the deposit check being lost, and the parties completed the transaction on their own without paying a commission. During the course of the investigation, Respondents fully cooperated with the Division's investigator.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Herbert S. Fecker, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Ghunise Coaxum, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Charlie Luckie, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 907 Brooksville, Florida 34605-0907 William M. Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
