Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Department of Transportation, was responsible for the licensing and regulation of the operation of commercial motor vehicles on all streets and roads in this state. The Respondent, Florida Mining & Materials operates and, at the time of the alleged violation, operated commercial vehicles over the roads of this state. By letter dated June 11, 1990, George L. Crawford, P.E., Acting Director of Lee County's Department of Transportation and Engineering, notified the Petitioner's Office of Motor Carrier Compliance that it appeared trucks were exceeding the posted weight limits of the Ortiz Road Culvert, located 0.3 miles south of SR - 80 in Lee County. As a result of this letter, the Department began to monitor the cited culvert and on July 19, 1990, Officer Ellis K. Burroughs observed Respondent's cement dump truck cross the culvert in front of and to the side of which, in plain view, was a sign indicating that trucks weighing over 5,000 pounds should detour and go down Luckett Road without crossing the culvert. According to Mr. Burroughs, Respondent's vehicle did not detour as directed and went north on Ortiz Avenue, over the culvert. Mr. Burroughs gave chase and finally stopped the driver of Respondent's truck some 6 or 7 blocks north of the culvert. When asked why he had failed to use the detour and had crossed the culvert, the driver of the truck said his office had told him to do so and he had done so before. This comment is introduced not to show aggravation but to dispel any inference of lack of knowledge of the limitation. The sign in question had been erected on December 4, 1980. Some months after this incident, the sign was changed and the current permissible weight is 20 tons. No reason was given for the change nor was any information presented as to whether any modifications were done to the culvert before or since the change. The culvert in issue was described as of light construction - a culvert pass-through underneath the roadway. Mr. Burroughs weighed the offending truck at the scene and determined it had a gross weight of 45,700 pounds. The legal weight on that bridge at the time was only 5,000 pounds and, therefore, the Respondent's truck was overweight by 40,700 pounds. At a penalty of 5 cents per pound of violation, the penalty was assessed at $2,035.00 which was paid by the Respondent on August 3, 1990. Respondent's representative, Mr. Watson, was not present at the time and had no personal knowledge of the incident. He claims, however, that his company was operating under the impression that even at the time, the weight limit over that culvert was 20 tons. He does not concede that at the time of the incident the load limit was only 5,000 pounds. The weight of the evidence, however, is that it was. He claims this road is the only way they have of getting to certain jobs and if cut off from crossing, they are cut off from their business. Mr. Watson admittedly is not familiar with the area and overlooks the fact that there are alternative routes to the other side of that culvert, albeit somewhat longer. He discounts the somewhat longer, (2 1/2 miles additional), route claiming, "That's a lot of milage when what you're hauling is redi-mix concrete." Mr. Watson introduced several pictures of other large trucks going over that same culvert in an effort to show that other vehicles may also have been in violation. Some of those pictures were taken subsequent to the limit change and reflect that the limit is 20 tons. Further, Mr. Burroughs and Mr. Thompson indicate that subsequent to the letter from the County requesting increased surveillance, at least 45 to 50 citations were issued at that culvert. Some carriers were cited several times. Respondent was cited only once. After paying the penalty assessed, Respondent appealed it to the Department's Commercial Vehicle Review Board which reviewed it at its November 8, 1990 meeting and determined that a refund was not appropriate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's request for a refund of the $2,035.00 fine paid for the violation of the weight limits on the culvert in question here be denied. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of July, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Robert Bishop, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 695 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ray Watson Operations Manager Florida Mining & Materials Post Office Box 2367 Tallahassee, Florida 33902 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the demeanor of the witnesses, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, respondent T.A.S. Auto Sales held independent motor vehicle license #6VI-2652, with a licensed place of business at 117 1/2 Central Avenue in Brandon, Florida. The owner of T.A.S. Auto Sales is Donald Hunt. On May 1, 1985, the Division of Motor Vehicles issued license number 5VI-003620A to T.A.S. Auto Sales for a supplemental location at 312 East Brandon Boulevard in Brandon, Florida. The expiration date on this license was April 30, 1986. Donald Hunt leased the property at 312 East Brand on Boulevard and operated a retail car sales business there until approximately mid-June of 1985. He then decided to sell the business to Clarence W. Jenkins, and entered into an Assignment of Lease on July 1, 1985. According to Mr. Hunt, it was his intent to allow Mr. Jenkins to operate under the supplemental license of T.A.S. Auto Sales while Mr. Jenkins, doing business as Brandon Auto Brokers, obtained his own Florida Dealers License. However, according to Mr. Hunt, said arrangement was to terminate no later than July 28, 1985. A letter setting forth this agreement was received into evidence as respondent's Exhibit 4. From July 1, 1985, through July 28, 1985, Donald Hunt did supervise all title work performed through Brandon Auto Brokers and/or Mr. Jenkins. During July and early August, 1985, Brandon Auto Brokers secured a County occupational license, a Department of Revenue Certificate of Registration to collect sales and use taxes, a reassignment of telephone numbers, an insurance binder, a surety bond and membership in the Florida Independent Automobile Dealers Association. Signage indicating either Brandon Auto Brokers or "under new management" was also placed on the premises, but the date upon which such signage was erected was not established. Lois Jarvis, an inspector with the Division of Motor Vehicles, testified that she spoke on the telephone with Mr. Hunt and Mr. Jenkins on August 9, 1985, and thereafter mailed to Mr. Jenkins an application form for a dealer's license. It was Inspector Jarvis' understanding that Mr. Hunt was allowing Jenkins to operate under Mr. Hunt's supplemental license until such time as Jenkins obtained his own license. On September 4, 1985, she visited the supplemental lot to check on Mr. Jenkins' incomplete application. Her next visit with either Mr. Hunt or Mr. Jenkins occurred on September 23, 1985. At that time, while at Mr. Hunt's lot on Central Avenue, Mr. Hunt informed her that he had nothing more to do with the supplemental lot on Brand on Boulevard, and gave Ms. Jarvis his license for that location. Inspector Jarvis then went over to the supplemental lot and issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. Jenkins/Brandon Auto Brokers for offering, displaying for sale and selling motor vehicles without a license. On September 24, 1985, Ms. Jarvis requested the Department to cancel dealer license 5VI-3620A on the ground that "dealer closed lot and surrendered license." Mrs. Jarvis testified that she did not visit either the supplemental lot or the main lot in July or August of 1985. Her work records for July and August do not reflect a visit to either location. Mr. Hunt, and several witnesses testifying in respondent's behalf, testified that he told Inspector Jarvis in early July that he would have nothing more to do with the supplemental lot beyond July 28, 1985. It was their testimony that Mrs. Jarvis' response was that "there was no way Mr. Jenkins could be issued a license by July 28th, to which Mr. Hunt responded, "that's not my problem." Mr. Hunt admits that he did not specifically request Mrs. Jarvis to cancel his license for the supplemental lot as of July 28th, and that he did not deliver that license to Mrs. Jarvis until September 23, 1985. Based upon the demeanor and possible motives of the witnesses, as well as the documentary evidence received into evidence, it is concluded that Inspector Jarvis did not visit either the supplemental lot or the main lot for which T.A.S. held licenses in June, July or August of 1985. It is further found that Inspector Jarvis did not become aware that Mr. Hunt intended to cease all relationships with the supplemental lot until he delivered the license for those premises to her on September 23, 1985. By statute, an independent motor vehicle license period is from May 1 to April 30 of the following year. Licenses expire annually, "unless revoked or suspended prior to that date." Section 320.27(4), Florida Statutes. The Department has no rule, regulation, policy or established procedure for a licensee to surrender or cancel a license prior to the expiration date. On July 30, 1985, Bruce Reich purchased a 1980 Chevrolet Camero from the Jenkins at the supplemental lot. His checks were made payable to Brandon Auto Brokers. He did not think he was buying a car from T.A.S. or from Don Hunt. On or about September 30, 1985, Mr. Reich filed a Complaint Affidavit against Brandon Auto Brokers regarding this transaction. As of the date of the hearing, Mr. Reich had still not received title to the vehicle he purchased. On August 26, 1985, William S. Ryder purchased a 1981 Van from the Jenkins at the supplemental lot. On or about October 2, 1985, Mr. Ryder filed a Complaint Affidavit against T.A.S. Auto Sales on the ground that he had not received a clear title or plates for this vehicle. He had previously attempted to locate Mr. Jenkins, but was unable to find him.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against the respondent be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 31st day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0471 The proposed findings of fact submitted by each of the parties have been fully considered and have been accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: Petitioner 8. Rejected; the evidence demonstrates that respondent intended that its responsibilities with regard to the supplemental lot would terminate on July 28, 1985. Respondent 1 - 3. Rejected in part as improper findings of fact. 4 - 9A. Rejected; not supported by competent, substantial evidence. 9H. Accepted, except that the evidence demonstrates that the Ryder complaint named T.A.S. Auto Sales as the dealer. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Neil Kirkman Building Room A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Michael N. Kavouklis, Esquire 419 West Platt Street Tampa, Florida 33606 Leonard R. Mellon, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue The issues concern the question of whether the Petitioner is entitled to impose a $1,660.00 assessment against Respondent for operating a commercial vehicle in Florida without appropriate registration.
Findings Of Fact On October 21, 1991, Respondent's commercial vehicle was inspected at the Petitioner's Yulee weight station located on Interstate 95 in Nassau County, Florida. It was discovered that the motor vehicle did not have a Florida registration. Furthermore, the South Carolina registration for the vehicle was not apportioned to allow operation in Florida. As a consequence a penalty was assessed for operating the commercial vehicle in Florida without benefit of an appropriate registration. The actual amount of penalty was $1,660.00 which is reflective of the gross weight of 68,200 pounds at a price of .05 per pound of the amount in excess of 35,000 pounds. Respondent paid the $1,660.00 fine plus the $30 single trip registration fee. This payment was rendered on the date that the commercial vehicle was stopped.
Recommendation Upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered finding that the $1,660.00 penalty was an appropriate amount to be assessed against the Respondent on October 21, 1991, as envisioned by Section 316.545(2)(b), Florida Statutes, and that the request for refund of that amount be rejected. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Sexton, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S.-58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 GayCille Swisher Isley Iron & Metal Company 1691 Lost Mountain Road Powder Springs, GA 30073 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S.-58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1992.
The Issue Whether General Motors' decision not to renew its franchise agreement with Gallman Pontiac was "unfair" as the term is defined by Section 320.641(3), Florida statutes.
Findings Of Fact Background On or about October 28, 1988, (general Motors Corporation, Pontiac Division (General Motors) notified it franchisee, Bill Gallman Pontiac, GMC Truck, Inc. (Gallman Pontiac), a licensed motor vehicle dealer in the State of Florida, of its election not to renew the franchise agreement, effective ninety days from the date of the delivery of the notice of its decision. Because the franchise agreement was scheduled to expire on November 20, 1988, Bill Gallman would have the option to void the nonrenewal due to General Motor's failure to notify the motor vehicle dealer ninety days in advance of the proposed nonrenewal. To avoid this result and to comply with the franchise agreement, General Motors informed the dealer in the same notification that the current agreement was being extended for the same ninety day period in which the dealer had been given notice of the proposed nonrenewal. General Motors' extension of the term of the franchise agreement was a unilateral proposed novation that was accepted by Gallman Pontiac when he relied upon the modification and continued to do business under the novation. Gallman Pontiac's acceptance of the novation is clearly demonstrated by the timing of the verified complaint in this proceeding, which was filed on January 12, 1989. The specific reason stated by General Motors for its decision not to renew its franchise agreement beyond the ninety-day period was that Gallman Pontiac failed to fulfill its minimum sales performance responsibilities pursuant to its contractual obligations as set forth in the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement. Gallman Pontiac subsequently filed a verified complaint, pursuant to Section 320.641, Florida Statutes, to contest the proposed nonrenewal of the franchise agreement. The complaint alleges that the proposed nonrenewal is unfair and that the grounds asserted for the nonrenewal were factually untrue and/or legally insufficient for the intended purpose. The Mathematical Formula for Sales Effectiveness The manufacturer's primary purpose for entering into a franchise agreement with a dealer is to have its automobiles sold. To determine whether a dealer is meeting its responsibilities in this regard, the franchise agreement contains a mathematical formula which is used to evaluate the sales performance of all dealers who sell Pontiacs. Pursuant to the formula, which is expressed in the agreement and tide annual sales performance evaluation form, a dealer's sales ratio and registration ratio must be calculated. A dealer's sales ratio is determined by dividing the dealer's actual unit sales of new motor vehicles, wherever registered, by industry new unit registrations in the Dealer's Area of Prime Responsibility. A dealer's registration ratio is determined by dividing new motor vehicle unit registrations by industry new unit registrations in the Dealer's Area of Prime Responsibility. After these ratios are recorded, the dealer's sales and registration ratios are compared to zone and national registration ratio levels to determine sales and registration effectiveness. If the individual dealer's sales and registration performances reach a comparative level of 85 percent effectiveness to the zone and national levels, the dealer's performance is considered effective by General Motors. When the comparisons were made in this case, the dealer's sales effectiveness was 53.6 percent in 1987 and 68.5 percent in 1988. Registration effectiveness was 56.5 percent in 1987 and 74.1 percent in 1988. These levels of performance do not meet the minimum levels required by the franchise agreement. Other Considerations Under the Agreement In addition to the mathematical formula, the franchise agreement states that General Motors will consider other relevant factors in its sales evaluation, including the following factors: the trend over a reasonable period of time of dealer's sales performance; the manner in which dealer has conducted the sales operations, including advertising, sales promotion and treatment of customers; sales to fleet customers if they have affected registrations; the manner in which dealer has submitted orders for new motor vehicles to the Pontiac Division; the availability of new motor vehicles to dealer; and significant local conditions that may have directly affected dealer's performance. If the mathematical formulas regarding sales and registration effectiveness set forth in the franchise agreement were the sole measure used to determine Gallman Pontiac's sales performance through January 1989, it is clear that the dealer was not meeting its contractual obligations to General Motors in this area of responsibility. However, under the terms of the agreement, General Motors must look to other relevant factors that may have directly affected dealer's performance before a final determination can be made regarding an individual dealer's sales effectiveness. Contrary to the terms of the agreement, the annual evaluation forms show that Gallman Pontiac's performance was evaluated on retail sales only. The other relevant factors in the franchise agreement were not reviewed before the decision not to renew the franchise agreement was made. Other Relative Factors in the Agreement Which Should Have Been Considered in the Dealers Evaluation When the trend of the Gallman Pontiac's sales performance is reviewed, the evidence shows that Gallman Pontiac's sales performance over the life of the franchise agreement has improved relative to market growth by a small percentage (7.51%). This slight upward trend does not demonstrate an effective performance as the sales were below an acceptable standard before the increase in sales, and the improvement barely exceeded the local market growth. The time period over which the trend evaluation occurred is reasonable in this case because both parties agreed to a two-year term in the franchise agreement, which was subject to an overall evaluation prior to a renewal of the agreement. Although there was opinion testimony from a former sales manager from the dealership that Gaillman Pontiac did not order sufficient quantities and mix of vehicles, and imprudently focused the advertising towards the limited, younger group of buyers in Naples, this testimony was not found to be credible by the Hearing Officer. All of the other evidence presented by both sides regarding the manner in which the dealer conducted sales operations demonstrates that Gallman Pontiac met or exceeded his contractual obligations in this area of responsibility. Sales to fleet customers did not affect registrations in 1988. The dealer chose not to compete in the fleet market because the later resale of these vehicles interferes with the sale of new vehicles at this dealership. The manner in which the dealer submitted orders to the Pontiac Division was not criticized by General Motors. The dealer's procedures were continuously reviewed and evaluated through the Dealer Assistance Program. There was no showing that the dealer's ordering procedures directly affected its sales performance. The allocation procedures were applied to Gallman Pontiac in the same manner they were applied to other dealers. The evidence did not show that imprudent selections were made by the dealer in the ordering process, nor was it sufficiently established that manufacturer delays or the unavailability of certain products interfered with the dealer's sales in Naples. A significant local condition that may have directly affected the dealer's sales performance was the lack of receptivity in the Naples market area for linemakes in the class of automobiles offered by Pontiac. Actual sales performance data for all new car registrations in the area show that the Naples market prefers to purchase automobiles from the high group of automobiles such as Cadillac, Lincoln, BMW, Mercedes Benz, and Porsche. Pontiac does not have a linemake designed to compete in this market segment. Application of the Other Relevant Factors To The Decision Not To Renew Because the franchise agreement and the annual sales evaluation form have not made provisions for any adjustments to the original statistical formula based upon the additional considerations mentioned in paragraphs 9-13, these factors are to be considered independently from the initial mathematical calculation. The purpose of the review of these factors is to determine if the statistical analysis is a reliable indicator of the sales performance of the dealer who is being evaluated before General Motors makes its final decision regarding termination. There has been no showing that General Motors ever used the additional considerations for any other purpose in its course of dealings with other dealers in the past or that any other interpretation has been given to these factors. In this case, when the additional relevant factors are reviewed in addition to the ineffective sales and registration performance statistics, the mathematical formula continues to be a reliable indicator that the sales performance at the Gallman Pontiac dealership does not meet required standards. The additional considerations set forth in the franchise agreement which are relevant to this case, do not seriously undermine the fairness of the application of the initial mathematical calculation to the sales performance of Gallman Pontiac. While the local market's lack of receptivity directly affects Gallman Pontiac's performance, the statistical formula takes this into account to a large degree when a dealer is required to meet eighty-five percent of the zone or national average to demonstrate minimum performance. If yet another mathematical formula was created to give additional weight to this local condition beyond the provision in the minimum standards formula, the manufacturer could be harmed by a individual dealer's lack of market penetration efforts. Because it is difficult to determine the primary cause and effect of poor market penetration in a specific area, the statistical formula is generally fair to both sides in most situations. It does not unfairly accuse either the dealer or the manufacturer as being responsible for the lack of sales. One indicator of the fairness involved in the application of the formula as designed can be found in Mr. Anderson's comparative analysis of the Naples automobile market and the Sarasota market. Mr. Anderson is the expert in automobile marketing analysis presented by General Motors. This analysis refutes the opinion of Dr. Ostlund, the expert presented by Gallman Pontiac during the hearing regarding automobile marketing analysis. It is Dr. Ostlund's opinion that Naples is a unique market in which the usual statistical formula becomes unfair if it is applied to all registrations in the Dealer's Area of Responsibility. Based upon this analysis, Dr. Ostlund suggests that a weighted average be applied in the standard formula to all of the sales made by Gallman Pontiac during the franchise period. However, even if this were done, Gallman Pontiac's performance would have been 84.7 percent, which is still below the required standard of 85 percent. Contrary to Dr. Ostlund's analysis, the Naples-Sarasota comparison conducted by Mr. Anderson demonstrates that Pontiac can compete in a high income area with similar demographics to Naples within the same zone along the same Florida coast. Therefore, the usual statistical formula remains a reliable indicator of the sales effectiveness of a Pontiac dealer in Naples, Florida, and should be applied without any further weighting of averages in the statistical analysis required by the franchise agreement. Application of Additional Factors Relevant to the Decision Not to Renew Pursuant to Statute A nonrenewal of the franchise agreement is clearly permitted by the franchise agreement. The nonrenewal has been undertaken in good faith and good cause. The manufacturer has continuously encouraged the dealer to meet sales performance standards and has worked with Gallman Pontiac in an effort to achieve this goal within the time frame agreed to by the parties. Because franchise dealers are the major outlet the manufacturer has for the sale of new automobiles, it is essential that minimum levels of sales performance are achieved on a regular basis. Failure to meet the minimum sales performance over the term of this agreement by Gallman Pontiac is a material and substantial breach of the contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order dismissing Gallman Pontiac's complaint with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 28 day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28 day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-0505 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #3. Reject all but last sentence. Conclusions of Law. Accept the last sentence. Rejected. Conclusion of Law. Accepted. Reject that the dealer code problem can be attri- buted to the conduct of the manufacturer. Insufficient proof. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Reject the weighted average basis. See HO #14 and #15.. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Speculative. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #17. Rejected. Irrelevant. Attempt to shift evidentiary burden. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Rejected. See HO #15. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted. Accept that additional factor's need to be considered. Rejected Dr. Ostlund's interpretation. See HO #9 through #15. Rejected. Improper summary. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. Accepted, except for the last sentence which is an opinion or closing argument as opposed to a finding of fact. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted, except for Nissan. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Closing argument as opposed to finding of fact. Rejected. Irrelevant and contrary to fact. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Rejected. Conclusionary. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. See HO #10. Rejected. See HO #17. Rejected. See HO #15 and #17. Rejected. See HO #17. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #17. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO 415. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #11. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #15. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Redundant. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #9. Rejected. Unreliable conclusion. Accepted. See HO #17. Rejected. Irrelevant. Outside the reasons given for nonrenewal. See HO #8. Rejected. Same reason as given in above. Rejected. Same reason as 49 and 50. Also contrary to fact. Rejected. Irrelevant to this hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant to this hearing. Accepted. See HO #17. Accepted. See HO #15. Rejected. Redundant and argumentative. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Improper argument. Rejected. The use of "sales reported" was allowed by the Hearing Officer at hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant in these proceedings. Rejected. Irrelevant and unreliable speculation. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Dr. Ostlund was very credible. Mr. Anderson's analysis, based upon y~he Sarasota- Naples comparison, which tended to refute the testimony of Dr. Ostlund, was given greater weight by the Hearing Officer. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Adams, Esquire Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Feaman, Adams, Harris, Department of Highway Fernandez & Deutch, P.A. Safety And Motor Vehicles Corporate Plaza, Fourth Floor Neil Kirkman Building 4700 N.W. Second Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 S. William Fuller, Jr., Esq. Vasilis C. Katsafanas, Esquire Fuller Johnson & Farrell Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Post Office Box 1739 Cabaniss, Burke & Wechsler Tallahassee, Florida 32302 11 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motors Vehicles William J. Whalen, Esquire Department of Highway Office of General Counsel Safety and Motor Vehicles General Motors Corporation B439 Neil Kirkman Building New Center One Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 3031 West Grand Boulevard Detroit, Michigan 48232 Enoch J. Whitney, Esquire General Counsel S. Thomas Wienner, Esquire Departments of Highway Dykema Gossett Safety and Motor Vehicles 35th Floor Neil Kirklan Building 400 Renaissance Center Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Detroit, Michigan 48243
