Findings Of Fact Respondent Carter is the owner of real property located at 102 Hummingbird Lane, Crescent City, Putnam County, Florida, ("The Property") The Property has a shore length of 68.5 feet on Crescent Lake. Crescent Lake is a "water of the state" as defined in Section 403.031, F.S. The agency, now DEP, is the state agency charged with environmental concerns and permission to use submerged state lands. There are two types of authorization an applicant must receive in order to construct a dock on state owned submerged lands. The first is regulatory, which addresses issues concerning environmental impacts. The second is proprietary, which addresses issues concerning use of state owned submerged lands. Mr. and Mrs. Hageman, Petitioners herein, own property adjacent on the east of Mr. Carter's property. 1/ They have a 240 foot dock in place going out into Crescent Lake. Mr. Carter's westerly neighbor also has a shorter dock going into the lake. The Carters purchased the Property from an estate, with the announced intention to erect their own dock for water recreational purposes. Before closing the sale, they were warned off the property by Mr. Hageman who claimed his riparian rights would be violated if any dock were built on the Property. After inquiries to DEP and the Army Corps of Engineers, the Carters purchased The Property anyway. DEP has no jurisdiction to regulate docks under 1000 square feet. Mr. Carter received DEP Exemption 542504222 to construct a dock under 1000 square feet on The Property. Mr. Carter constructed a single family private use dock, including a boat shelter, extending from The Property into Crescent Lake. The dock was built approximately 35 feet from Hagemans' property line, straight out into the water, and 25 feet from the property line of his neighbor on the other side. This placed the Carter dock roughly perpendicular to the approximate center of Mr. Carter's shoreline. Petitioners conceded that Mr. Carter honored his westerly neighbor's property line, but asserted that he should have, and had not, honored his easterly property line, the line dividing his and Petitioners' property, waterward beyond the shoreline. In all, Petitioners Hageman have filed three formal petitions against the Carter dock. See Findings of Fact 16, 18, and 33, infra. All three petitions herein oppose the Carter dock as constructed upon a theory that it crosses Petitioner's riparian rights line and therefore violates the setback criteria found in Rule 18-21.004(3)(d) F.A.C.; that it blocks a channel exclusive to Petitioners' use and poses an impediment to navigation of all boats, particularly Petitioners' sailboat; that its boat shelter is enclosed contrary to rule; that it does not meet the ten-to-one rule; and that it blocks Petitioners' view and lowers their property value. The Hagemans initially filed a complaint with the DEP in regard to the dock. In response to the Hagemans' complaint, Steven Biemiller, an environmental specialist in the dredge and fill compliance/enforcement section of DEP's northeast district, and John Hendricks of the Army Corps of Engineers visited the Property on July 25, 1994. They found that the Carter dock as built exceeded 1,000 square feet in surface area. It was, however, consistent in length, width, and alignment with other docks in the area, including Petitioners' dock. Mr. Biemiller calculated Carter's dock to be 1,400 square feet. It therefore exceeded the state exemption criteria and required a state permit. Mr. Carter had constructed his dock without a valid permit from the state agency, and DEP responded by issuing him a warning letter. Carter and DEP thereafter entered into Consent Order O.C.G. 94-2443 to address the unpermitted dock construction. Testifying as an expert in the agency's enforcement and compliance procedures, Mr. Biemiller established that negotiated consent orders of this type are a standard agency procedure to resolve minor permitting violations. His testimony is accepted on that issue and to the effect that the purpose of all consent orders, including the one at issue here, is to return the non-complying structure to compliance with the applicable state rules and statutes. The consent order provides, in pertinent part, that Mr. Carter will (a) pay the agency $300.00, which amount includes a $200.00 civil penalty and $100.00 for agency costs and expenses; AND (b) reduce the size of his dock to under 1,000 square feet or obtain an after-the-fact permit whereby the agency would authorize the 1400 square foot dock to remain in place as already constructed. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the consent order. The consent order herein addressed DEP's environmental concerns by jump-starting the permit process through which the agency could examine the environmental impacts posed by the dock project. In Mr. Biemiller's expert opinion, this consent order accomplished the agency's statutory and regulatory goals at that point because Mr. Carter paid his fine and applied for a dredge and fill permit. Agency permit 542558842 was issued to Mr. Carter on November 16, 1994. It approved the proposed project and authorized construction of a private use dock having a 4.75-foot wide plus 230-foot long access walkway, a 10.3-foot wide and 20.3-foot long covered boat shelter, plus an 8.5-foot long and 12.8-foot wide waterward "L" platform, within Crescent Lake, Putnam County. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the permit. The Hagemans' concerns about the Carter dock and boat shelter blocking their view and diminishing their property value were raised by their petitions, but no evidence or argument was presented on the latter issue. "View" and market value concerns are not addressed by the jurisdiction or authority conferred upon DEP by either statute or rule, and may not be considered here. In determining whether or not to issue dredge and fill permits, the agency examines a project's impact on water quality, its biological impacts, whether the project is contrary to the public interest and how it impacts, if at all, on wetlands. The agency does not look at riparian rights. Those rights are addressed, if at all, by agency review of applications for consents of use and the rules applicable thereto. Thomas Wiley was the field inspector for the dredge and fill permit which is at issue. He visited Mr. Carter's property with another agency employee, Erica Robbins, to conduct a site assessment. Mr. Wiley prepared the Permit Application Appraisal. Mr. Wiley has a Bachelor of Science degree in environmental biology and twelve hours towards his Masters degree in the same discipline. He has been employed by the agency for four and a half years as a environmental specialist. During that time, he has reviewed approximately 300 dredge and fill applications. He was accepted as an expert in the agency's environmental resource permitting procedures and the impacts of dredging and filling projects on wetlands. Mr. Wiley recommended issuance of the permit in part based on his determination that the long term adverse impacts of the Carter dock on water quality are minimal and that the long term adverse impacts of the project on submerged resources also are minimal. His expert opinion on these issues is accepted, as is his unrefuted mixed fact and opinion testimony that the project site contains submerged beds of eelgrass (vallisnaria). These eelgrass beds end approximately 20 feet landward of the Carter boat shelter and dock. Carter's boat shelter and dock do not pose a significant impact to the eelgrass and will not adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife. The Carter boat shelter has one almost closed side, one side which descends to about one and a half feet above the water and two open ends. It is not substantially different from other local boat shelters. There are water hyacinths in the same area as the eelgrass and nearer to the shoreline. DEP has issued a permit to Mr. Hageman to clear such water hyacinths from a 25-foot swath in front of his property so as to keep clear the channel to his dock and boat shelter. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that Mr. Hageman has been zealous in his removal of water hyacinths and has exceeded the 25-foot limitation. Existence of this permit allowing Mr. Hageman to remove hyacinths and existence of this larger cleared swath of water/shoreline is not dependable evidence of the Hagemans' riparian rights claim and does not alter or affect DEP's determination that no aquatic plants will be seriously endangered by the Carter dock and boat shelter. The parties stipulated that the construction of Carter's dock has not, and will not, degrade the water quality of Crescent Lake and that the water quality standards set forth in Chapter 62-302 F.A.C., are not violated because of the construction of the dock. The parties stipulated that the Carter dock as constructed will not adversely affect the fishing or recreational value or marine productivity on Crescent Lake. The parties stipulated that the dock as constructed will not adversely affect any historical or archaeological resources under the provisions of Section 267.061 F.S. In determining whether a dock poses a navigational impediment, DEP looks for the presence of marked navigational channels and the proximity of the dock to other docks in the area. The credible competent evidence as a whole shows that the Carter dock is similar to the Hagemans' dock and is located about 100 feet west of the Hagemans' dock. The Carter structure also conforms with the prevailing alignment of all docks in the immediate area and its distance from neighboring structures is sufficient so that the Carter dock will not present a hindrance to navigation. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that the Hagemans have sailed in and out from their adjacent dock without any obvious problems occasioned by the Carter dock. There is plenty of room between the Carter and Hageman docks so that the Carter dock has not so far obstructed the Hagemans' ability to navigate their sailboat. Mr. Carter has provided reasonable assurances that his dock is not contrary to the public interest under Section 373.414 (1)(a) F.S. In determining the cumulative impacts a project may have, the agency looks at the total impact of past, present and future projects on water quality and function in wetland systems. Mr. Wiley determined it is reasonable to expect other lakefront property owners will construct docks into the lake, but based on his experience and expertise, he concluded that Mr. Carter's project's long-term impact still will continue to be minimal. The permit is appropriate and insures compliance with all applicable statutory and rule guidelines for dredge and fill permits. Mr. Carter also applied to the agency for a consent of use for submerged state lands. This was appropriate because Crescent Lake is a "water of the state". A consent of use is generally a letter of authorization for minor projects, such as single family docks, bulkheads and dredging that occur on state owned land and submerged land. The ten-to-one ratio found in Rule 18- 21.005(1)(a)2 F.A.C. allows an applicant to have ten square feet of preempted area for every linear foot of the shoreline that he owns. If an applicant meets the rule criteria, he is issued a consent of use. Generally, if an applicant exceeds the criteria, he would be issued a lease, as opposed to a consent of use. The agency issued a consent of use to Mr. Carter on December 5, 1994. The Hagemans filed a petition challenging the consent of use. DEP acts as staff for the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. The authority to issue consents of use has been delegated to a planning manager. In the instant situation, that planning manager was Russell Price. Russell Price is employed by DEP as planning manager of the submerged land section and has served in that capacity for two years. Mr. Price holds a Bachelor of Science degree in biology, has a year of education towards his Master's degree in biology, and has reviewed approximately two to three hundred applications for consents of use. Mr. Price was accepted as an expert in state lands determination and regulation. In issuing the consent of use to Mr. Carter, Mr. Price relied on his education, training and experience in state lands regulation, and considered the application, the drawings, the agency's regulatory permit section's field report, comments from staff of the Army Corps of Engineers and a memorandum from the agency's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. See Finding of Fact 40. Mr. Price opined, on behalf of the agency's interpretation of its own statute and rules, that the agency does not uniformly require a lease where the ten-to-one rule is minimally exceeded; that the agency will issue a consent of use if the applicant's structure is still relatively small and is configured in the minimum way possible to obtain access at reasonable water depths; that in its discretion, the agency does not apply the ten-to-one rule to require leases; 2/ and that consents of use are issued to single docks that are the minimum length necessary to reach reasonable access to navigable waters. Mr. Price issued the consent of use in this case after determining that Mr. Carter's dock as constructed was a single family dock configured in the minimum size and length necessary to achieve reasonable access to navigable waters and that the nearshore area located adjacent to Mr. Carter's upland property required that his dock exceed the ten-to-one ratio in order to access reasonable water depths for navigation. In so doing, Mr. Price relied on the DEP Permit Application Appraisal measurement of the water depth at the end of Carter's dock as 4.5 feet deep and analyzed the configuration and angle of the other docks in the area. This was in accord with the specific language of Rule 18-21.005(1)(a)1 F.A.C. 3/ Evidence adduced at formal hearing suggests that there has been some erosion, possibly due to the removal of the water hyacinths and that shows that it is environmentally desirable to avoid recreational contact with the eelgrass, especially by boats. These factors also support the reasonableness of Carter's dock configuration, even though it minimally exceeds the ten-to-one rule. Petitioners Hageman contended that their riparian rights may be determined by projecting a line straight waterward from the upland fence line between their lot and Mr. Carter's property. If that is the appropriate determination of their riparian rights, then the Carter dock does cross that projected line, but that projected line has not been placed by a surveyor or determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. At best, there has been a post erected by Mr. Hageman as the result of a prior lawsuit concerning easements. Respondent Carter's property is narrower than Petitioners' property and somewhat wedge-shaped. Petitioners assert that because the lake curves, Mr. Carter's riparian rights form a narrow pie slice-shaped area in the water. However, without a legal determination to that effect, there is only the foregoing unsupported assertion concerning either landowner's riparian rights. Although the agency's rules require a 25-foot setback of a dock (10- foot setback for marginal docks) from the applicant's riparian rights line, 4/ the agency does not measure the setback of a dock by that rule unless there has already been a determination of a riparian rights line by a court of law. DEP witnesses clearly enunciated and explicated agency policy that DEP does not affirmatively take it upon itself to determine riparian rights as between private land owners because the agency has no constitutional or statutory jurisdiction to do so. To Mr. Price's knowledge, the agency has never determined the riparian rights line of two private property owners. The agency relies on circuit courts to resolve those types of disputes. In response to the Hagemans' concerns about encroachment on their asserted riparian rights and in an abundance of caution, Mr. Price sent aerial photographs, the county plat map, and the drawings submitted with Mr. Carter's application to the DEP's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. He requested that the Bureau make a guesstimation of the common riparian rights line based on a methodology it has developed for estimating riparian rights lines. The memorandum constitutes little more than legal research discussing various methodologies courts have used in the past for determining riparian rights. It reaches no definite conclusion with regard to the riparian rights between the Hagemans and Carter. Beyond explaining and supplementing the direct evidence of the agency policy to rely on courts to determine riparian rights, its contents and conclusions are unreliable hearsay which is outside the parameters of Section 120.58(1)(a) F.S., because no one connected with the preparation of that report testified at formal hearing. No reliable determination of the riparian rights line dividing the Petitioners' property and the property of Applicant/Respondent Carter was presented as evidence at formal hearing. DEP is not aware that any court determination specifically setting out the boundaries of the parties' riparian rights exists. DEP did not require Mr. Carter to institute a lawsuit to establish riparian boundaries before considering his application. This also appears to be common agency procedure. The agency addressed the absence of a clear showing of riparian rights and implemented its policy directed thereto in the standard language of the consent of use, which provided in pertinent part, as follows: 2. Grantee agrees that all title and interest to all lands lying below the historical mean high water line or ordinary high water line are vested in the Board, and shall make no claim of title or interest in said lands by reason of the occupancy or use thereof * * * 5. Grantee agrees to indeminity, defend and hold harmless the Board and the State of Florida from all claims, actions, lawsuits and demands arising out of this consent. * * * 12. In the event that any part of the structure(s) consented to herein is determined by a final adjudication issued by a court of competent jurisdiction to encroach on or interfere with adjacent riparian rights, Grantee agrees to either obtain written consent for the offending structure from the affected riparian owner or to remove the interference or encroachment within 60 days from the date of the adjudication. Failure to comply shall constitute a material breach of this consent and shall be grounds for its immediate termination.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order that dismisses the three petitions, ratifies the consent order, and issues the after- the-fact permit and consent of use with the safeguards already contained therein to protect the Petitioners' riparian rights in case the Petitioners hereafter obtain a circuit court determination of those riparian rights. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1995
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a private yacht club located on Lots 5-11 inclusive, Block D, Bayside No. 6, Unit A, 830 South Bayway Boulevard, Clearwater, Florida. Founded some five years ago, the club provides a wide array of boating and social functions for its membership. It sits on the north side of Bayway Boulevard and is approximately 50 feet east of Clearwater Pass Avenue. The property is rectangular shaped and has dimensions of approximately 420 feet by 120 feet. The widest portion of the property fronts Clearwater Harbor to the north and Bayway Boulevard on the south. The yacht club is situated within an area currently zoned by the City as CTF-28 (high density commercial-tourist). This District provides for a complete range of motel-hotel developments with a major emphasis on tourism. The primary permitted uses and structures within the CTF-28 District are combination hotel, motel, apartment and business buildings, apartment houses, townhouse developments and restaurants. A number of special exceptions to the permitted uses are authorized within a CTF-28 District. These include, inter alia, three types of marina facilities, namely, Type A (pleasure craft docking), Type B (launching ramp site, commercial) and Type C (private marina). The City has never classified Petitioner under any of these categories. Upon obtaining a Type C classification, a property owner may engage in 12 separate uses of the property as a matter of right, and a thirteenth upon obtaining specific Board approval. These include: (a) sales and service facilities, (b) boat slips (excluding covered boat slips or dry storage unless specific Board approval is obtained), (c) boat handling equipment, (d) boat and gear storage, (e) launching facilities, (f) fuel station, (g) lockers and sanitary facilities, (h) restaurant facilities (not advertised), (i) club house, (j) motel or boatel, (k) recreational facilities (not commercial), (l) park or picnic area, and (m) automobile parking. Petitioner now engages in all permitted activities except items (a), and (j). It does not wish to engage in the latter three uses even if the application is granted. All activities presently conducted are done so in a manner consistent with the requirements of the Zoning Ordinance. On the east side of Petitioner's property is a multi-story restaurant and lounge while to the west lies a 4-story condominium complex (Bayside 17). Directly across Bayway Boulevard and to the south are two high-rise condominium complexes, one of which is still under construction. Boat docking facilities are located on the waterfront throughout the area, including that of Petitioner and adjacent property owners. The area may be generally described as a combination of high density residential and commercial buildings and structures catering to the tourist or part-time resident. The proposed reclassification is compatible with the surrounding properties and the character of the land. Its uses fit within the general scheme of zoning for a CTF-28 District, and are consistent with the Land Use Plan. The chief concern of the adjacent property owners who testified is a fear that reclassification of the property will diminish the view of the water now enjoyed across the clear space on the west side of Petitioner's property. However, since no change in the use of the property will be made by virtue of reclassification, the existing view should not be impaired.
Findings Of Fact Sunset Company of Wilton, Incorporated, is the record title owner of a parcel of real property in Government Lot 1, Section 5, Township 66 South, Range 33 East, on Crawl Key No. 3 also known as Fat Deer Key, Monroe County, Florida. A portion of that parcel has been conveyed by Sunset Company to Whaler's Plaza, Incorporated, although that deed may not have been recorded. Petitioner Fred Roth owns and controls both corporations and exerts ownership and control over the entire parcel. The submerged lands in Tarpon Creek which are waterward of the line of mean high water contiguous to the parcel are sovereignty submerged lands. Roth received "major development" approval from Monroe County to develop the parcel by constructing a commercial/retail development known as "Whaler's Plaza.' The major development plan submitted to and approved by Monroe County includes a docking facility. In 1979 Roth filed an application with the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation for a private dock facility at Whaler's Plaza. The Department of Environmental Regulation approved that application and issued to Roth Permit/Certification No. 44-18542-5E. Roth never constructed that docking facility, and the permit expired on August 1, 1980. One of the agencies involved in reviewing that permit application was the Respondent. On June 26, 1979, Respondent notified Roth that upon review of the application in DER File No. 44-18542-5E, it had determined that the submerged lands were state-owned but that no lease agreement with Respondent would be required. After Permit No. 44-18542-5E expired on August 1, 1980, the Department of Environmental Regulation directed a letter to Petitioner advising him that the permit had expired and further advising him that if he wished to pursue the project he would have to obtain a new permit. in October 1983 Roth sought new authorization from the Department of Environmental Regulation and Respondent to construct a docking facility at Whaler's Plaza. His application was assigned DER File No. 440774875. On December 29, 1983, Respondent notified Roth that a lease would be required for the use of state-owned lands contiguous to Whaler's Plaza, relative to DER File No. 440774875. Respondent's rules changed in 1982 so that Roth's docking facility would be required to meet new criteria. The docking facility proposed by Roth in 1983 was similar to the docking facility proposed in 1979. The 1983 proposed modified docking facility was still represented to the Department of Environmental Regulation to be a private boat dock. The Department of Environmental Regulation issued an intent to deny the 1983 application under its then-existing rules, and Roth requested a formal hearing on that preliminary denial. Before a final hearing could be conducted, Roth again modified the proposed docking facility so that he qualified for a dredge and fill permit exemption from DER, so that no DER permit was needed for his project. A final order was entered by the Department of Environmental Regulation on August 27, 1985. While Roth's 1983 application was pending before the Department of Environmental Regulation, Roth was processing his application with Respondent for a submerged land lease for the docking facility. The documents he filed with Respondent, however, indicated that the docking facility was not intended to be a private dock but rather was a dock related to the commercial development at Whaler's Plaza. Roth represented to Respondent that the proposed docking facility would be for the convenience of patrons of the stores and restaurant at Whaler's Plaza and for his own personal use. Specifically, on June 3, 1985, Roth directed a letter to Respondent pursuant to Respondent's request for additional information. He described the Whaler's Plaza docking facility as follows: The wood dock will be used for arriving and departing customers of the restaurant and stores and my own personal use. The upland land use and activities of the property--will be developed into a shopping center. At the present time, the first phase is completed which is a one-story building containing four units, housing six retail stores, plus offices. The next phase will consist of three more buildings having five units each, 1,0000 [sic] sq. ft. each unit which will be for retail stores and offices, and the final phase will be a 200 seat restaurant, a miniature [sic] petting zoo and possibly a miniature golf course. ... 70 percent of the slips will be open to the general public for their convenience In patronizing the restaurant and stores; the remaining 30 percent of the slips will be for my own personal use. Roth never completed the lease application he filed with Respondent, and he failed to obtain approval for the use of the sovereignty submerged lands preempted by the docking facility proposed in DER File No. 440774875. Eventually, his pending application with Respondent was deactivated, and the file was closed. In late 1986, Roth initiated construction of his docking facility on sovereignty submerged lands, and he caused 30 pilings with cross-bracing to be placed into the submerged lands. On September 1, 1986, Grant Gelhardt, one of Respondent's enforcement officers, discovered the dock being constructed and verbally instructed Roth, through Mrs. Roth, to immediately cease construction activity. No further construction has taken place. Despite the verbal notification, a subsequent warning notice sent by certified mail, and Respondent's Notice of Violation and Order for Corrective Action, Roth has failed to remove the pilings and/or to take corrective measures regarding the partially completed docking facility. Roth has allowed vessels to be moored at the partially completed docking facility, has moored his own vessels at the partially completed docking facility, and has failed to prevent other persons from mooring at the partially completed docking facility. Roth's actions have resulted in damage to a benthic seagrass community on the adjacent sovereignty submerged lands over which Roth's partially completed docking facility is located, and over which vessels using the facility have been and would be moored. Those submerged lands constitute a benthic community of seagrass which supports various fauna and which would be adversely affected by completion and operation of the docking facility. The water depths in the area are shallow, with areas of less than -4 feet mean low water. The width of Tarpon Creek in the project area is approximately 100 feet. The length of the partially completed docking facility is approximately 150 feet. Although the dock extends parallel to the shore, the distance the dock extends into Tarpon Creek, as measured from the shoreline, is approximately 35 feet. Roth knowingly trespassed on sovereignty submerged lands by initiating construction of the docking facility, and he has willfully damaged those lands by drilling holes and placing pilings, and by allowing moored vessels to shade the seagrass. Although Roth ceased construction of the docking facility when told to stop, he has failed to attempt to resolve the violation, to remove the pilings, to seek an after-the-fact approval, or to cease all mooring of vessels on sovereignty submerged lands adjacent to the uplands, even subsequent to receiving the Notice of Violation and Order for Corrective Action. Respondent's June 26, 1979 letter to Roth authorized the activities described in DER Permit No. 44-18542-5E, for the period authorized by that permit. Roth knew that the DEP permit, and therefore Respondent's approval to engage in the activity authorized by that permit, had expired. Roth further knew that his new application filed in 1983, DER File No. 440774875, which was approved by DER after Roth further modified it in order to qualify for an exemption, did not exempt him from obtaining authorization from Respondent to use sovereignty submerged lands for the project and further knew that when he commenced construction of the docking facility in 1986 that he had not obtained approval from Respondent to use state-owned submerged lands. Roth offered no evidence to demonstrate any detrimental reliance upon the June 26, 1979, DNR letter, and the letter did not create a vested right for Roth to construct a different docking facility at a later time without authorization from Respondent. The uplands at the Whaler's Plaza commercial/retail development are owned by for-profit corporations which Roth controls and which derive income from the business and commercial activities at Whaler's Plaza. The docking facility intended primarily for the use of customers of Whaler's Plaza would therefore constitute a revenue generating/income related activity.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring petitioner to: Remove the unauthorized structure within 20 days from the date on which the Final Order is entered and in accordance with Respondent's supervision of that removal; Immediately cease all mooring of vessels on sovereignty submerged lands adjacent to the uplands of the parcel known as Whaler's Plaza until authorized to use state-owned lands; and Pay a fine of $2500 within 15 days of receipt of a certified letter from the Executive Director of the Department of Natural Resources demanding payment to the internal improvement Trust Fund. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 31st day of October, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: David L. Manz, Esquire Post Office Box 177 Marathon Florida 33050 Ross S. Burnaman, Esquire Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Tom Gardner, Executive Director Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue The ultimate issue in this proceeding is whether the Department should issue a permit to the Applicant. In its request for hearing, Petitioner asserted that the proposed dock extension would constitute a navigational hazard and would cause certain adverse environmental consequences. At the hearing, Petitioner withdrew its contentions as to adverse environmental consequences. The only issues raised during the course of the hearing relate to whether the proposed dock extension will result in navigational hazards to adjoining property owners.
Findings Of Fact The Applicant owns a lot which includes 52 feet of frontage along a cove which is located to the south of the Fort Pierce Inlet. Applicant presently has a dock which extends 85 feet out from his shoreline. The dock is 4 feet wide and has an 8-foot by 14-foot platform at the end, forming an "L" shape. The Applicant presently uses the dock for two of his own boats. Additionally, he rents four or five additional docking spaces. The Applicant is proposing to extend his dock an additional 72 feet out from his property. He proposes to remove the existing platform and place a 12-foot by 24-foot platform at the end of the extended dock, maintaining the "L" configuration. The Applicant has had problems mooring his own commercial fishing boat at his present dock due to shallow depths at low-water periods. He proposes to utilize the dock extension to moor one of his own boats in a deeper area and to moor a commercial fishing boat which is owned by his son. The platform at the end of the extended dock would be used for fishing by the Applicant and his family and guests. When completed, the Applicant's present dock and proposed addition would extend 157 feet northward from the Applicant's property. There is space for two boats to be moored on the east of the present dock. Applicant does not propose to allow the mooring of additional boats on the east side of the extension. Docking would be expressly prohibited on that portion of the proposed dock. The Petitioner, 1010 Seaway Drive, Inc., owns land immediately to the east of the Applicant's property. The Petitioner's property includes approximately 118 feet of water frontage. The Petitioner operates a commercial marina on its property. Petitioner has a dock which extends considerably farther to the north than the Applicant's present dock and also considerably farther than the Applicant's dock with the proposed extension. Petitioner contends that permitting the proposed extension would result in a navigational hazard for boats that are moored at Petitioner's dock. This contention is not supported by the evidence. There is more than 25 feet between the proposed extension of the Applicant's dock and any structure connected with Petitioner's dock. The closest structures are mooring poles, not the dock itself. The Applicant's dock as proposed for extension will continue to allow boats ample ingress and egress to Petitioner's dock. If the mooring and docking of boats were permitted on the east side of the Applicant's proposed extension, however, a significant navigational hazard would result. The property immediately adjacent to the Applicant's property to the west is owned by the Books. The Books' property includes 40 feet of water frontage. The Books presently moor their boat at a small dock which runs along their shoreline. The proposed extension of the Applicant's dock would require the Books to exercise more caution in docking their boat, but it would not significantly interfere with their ingress and egress. The 24-foot platform at the end of the proposed extension could cause some problems. The Applicant, however, has indicated his willingness to shorten the platform to 14 feet. Thus shortened, the proposed extension and platform will cause no significant interference with the Books' ingress and egress. Furthermore, the Books are left with adequate room to build a dock in the future.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation issue a permit for the Applicant, Robert R. Phifer, to construct an addition to his existing dock in accordance with his application. The permit should contain all of the specific conditions included in the Department's letter of intent issued October 15, 1982. In addition, the platform at the end of the proposed extension should be reduced from 24 feet to 14 feet in length. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Assistant Director Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Ross A. McVoy, Esquire Madigan, Parker, Gatlin, Swedmark & Skelding Post Office Box 669 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Alfred J. Malefatto, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Robert R. Phifer 1006 Seaway Drive Fort Pierce, Florida 33449 Ms. Victoria Tschinkel Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kevin X. Crowley, Esquire Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Blvd., Suite 1300 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue The issue in these consolidated proceedings is whether the proposed single-family residential dock meets the requirements for a letter of consent for use of sovereignty submerged lands pursuant to chapters 253 and 258, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapters 18-20 and 18-21, such that the Consolidated Regulatory Exemption and Letter of Consent for Department of Environmental Protection File No. 0319584-003EE, as amended on September 30, 2020, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact The Parties DEP is the state agency charged with regulating specified activities in state jurisdictional surface waters, pursuant to chapter 373, part IV, Florida Statutes. Additionally, DEP is charged with performing all staff duties and functions for the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Trustees" or "Board") related to the administration of state-owned lands pursuant to chapter 253, including sovereignty submerged lands in aquatic preserves, pursuant to chapter 258. In this case, DEP is responsible for reviewing the application for the dock and issuing the Dock Approval that has been challenged in these proceedings. Fondriest owns the upland property riparian to the sovereignty submerged lands on which the Dock is proposed to be, at 1953 Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key, Florida. She is the applicant for the Dock Approval that has been challenged in these proceedings. The Trust owns the upland property located at 1975 Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key, Florida. This property is located immediately adjacent to, and west of, Fondriest's property. DeMaria and Appel own the upland property located at 1997 Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key. This property is located two parcels west of Fondriest's property. Appel owns two other upland properties located on Long Beach Drive, neither of which is located immediately adjacent to Fondriest's property. Crilly is the holder of a marine turtle permit issued by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission ("FFWCC"), and she volunteers as a sea turtle monitor for the Long Beach Drive area of Big Pine Key. History of the Dock Approval and Notice of Agency Action As stated above, on December 10, 2019, DEP issued a regulatory general permit and letter of consent to Fondriest, approving the 2019 Approval, which was then proposed as an 800-square-foot structure for use as a pier for non-motorized vessels. There was no evidence presented that Petitioners received a clear point of entry to challenge DEP's proposed agency action issued on December 10, 2019, either through receipt of written notice by mail, or constructively through publication of notice of the proposed agency action in a newspaper or other publication medium. The Trust filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing on January 30, 2020; DeMaria filed a Verified Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on January 31, 2020; and Crilly filed a Verified Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on February 27, 2020. On September 11, 2020, Fondriest filed a revised application with DEP, reducing the size of the Dock to 500 square feet; requesting a verification of exemption from permitting, pursuant to rule 62-330.015(5)(b) and section 403.813(1)(b)2; and requesting authorization, pursuant to chapters 253 and 258, and chapters 18-20 and 18-21, to use sovereignty submerged lands. On September 30, 2020, DEP issued Florida Department of Environmental Protection’s Notice of Proposed Changes to Agency Action—i.e., the "Dock Approval"— 2 Because the Dock will have less than 500 square feet of over-water surface area, it is exempt, pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b). from permitting under chapters 373 or 403. Petitioners have stipulated that the Dock qualifies for the permitting exemption under section 403.813(1)(b). verifying the regulatory exemption and authorizing the use of the sovereignty submerged lands by a letter of consent.3 DEP's agency action proposing to approve the Dock supersedes all prior DEP agency action with respect to the Dock, and constitutes the proposed agency action at issue in these proceedings. Long Beach Drive and the Surrounding Area Fondriest's property is located on Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key, in Monroe County. Long Beach Drive is located on a spit of land comprising the southern and westernmost part of Big Pine Key. The south side of Long Beach Drive, where Fondriest's, the Trust's, and DeMaria's and Appel's properties are located, borders the Straits of Florida.4 Thus, Fondriest's, the Trust's, and DeMaria's and Appel's properties are riparian to sovereignty submerged lands underlying the Straits of Florida. The land along Long Beach Drive is platted and has been developed for residential and commercial uses. The Long Beach Drive area of Big Pine Key is located within the Coupon Bight Aquatic Preserve ("CBAP"), an Outstanding Florida Water and aquatic preserve consisting of approximately 6,000 acres of bays, mangrove forests, seagrass beds, and offshore patch coral reefs. The Long Beach Drive area, including Fondriest's property, is characterized by a rocky shore, with some narrow sandy beaches. The shore accumulates a significant amount of weed wrack consisting of seaweed, seagrass, and other debris. A beach berm created by wave and tide action 3 The Dock Approval states that the Dock does not qualify for the federal State Programmatic General Permit for section 404 of the Clean Water Act and section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. Separate federal approval for the Dock has been issued by the Army Corps of Engineers, and Monroe County has issued a Building–Floodplain–Development Permit for the Dock. 4 All references to the shore or shoreline along Long Beach Drive refer to the shore or shoreline abutting the Straits of Florida. exists along much of the shore. The berm is frequently overtopped by water during high tides and storms. The beach is disturbed due to frequent use by residents and sea turtle monitors. Among the activities that take place on the beach are kayak launching, beach walking, beach cleaning and restoration, vegetation planting, and sea turtle nest monitoring. Several docks already exist along the shore on Long Beach Drive. The longshore current along the shore at Long Beach Drive flows, and transports sand from, east to west. The existing mangroves, jetties, and points along the Long Beach Drive shoreline trap sand and cause accretion of updrift beaches and starvation of downdrift beaches. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the docks along the shoreline on Long Beach Drive do not significantly contribute to beach accretion, starvation, or erosion in the area. The Proposed Dock The Dock is a private residential single-family dock associated with Fondriest's single-family residence at 1953 Long Beach Drive. It will not be used for commercial purposes or residential habitation, and there are no boat houses, boat lifts, or other enclosures proposed or approved as part of the Dock. As approved, the Dock will occupy 498 square feet, consisting of a 142-foot-long by 3-foot-wide access dock and a 12-foot-long by 6-foot-wide (i.e., 72-square-foot) terminal platform, and extending a total length of 154 feet. The access dock will be constructed with pressure-treated lumber planks spaced half-an-inch apart, to allow light penetration. The supporting pilings are comprised of PVC-encased aluminum, spaced approximately 9 feet, 5 inches apart. The PVC casing will help protect the piles from corrosion, thus helping to protect water quality. The terminal platform, which also will be supported by PVC-encased aluminum pilings, will consist of fiberglass grating, which allows sunlight penetration in order to prevent shading of seagrasses and other benthic resources.5 The top of the terminal platform is designed to be a minimum height of five feet above the mean high water line ("MHWL"). Handrails will be constructed along each side of the dock for its entire length, to prevent vessel mooring in adjacent shallow areas, thus helping protect against damage to benthic resources. The Dock will be used solely for the water-dependent activities of launching vessels and swimming. Only non-motorized vessels, such as kayaks, canoes, and paddleboards, may be launched from the Dock, and then only when there is a minimum depth of 0.5 feet (six inches, or half-a-foot) of water at the terminal platform.6 Additionally, the terminal platform must include signs of at least one-square- foot each placed on each side of the platform, stating "no mooring of motorized vessels allowed." A ladder is proposed to be located on one side of the terminal platform to provide access to the water for swimming or kayak launching, and the Dock Approval imposes a requirement that the ladder cannot be located over seagrass or hard bottom benthic communities. Although some turbidity in the water column may be generated by launching kayaks or other non-motorized watercraft from the terminal platform, the turbidity would be temporary and would not exceed that currently generated by dragging or hauling a kayak or other vessel from the shore across the substrate, to access sufficient water depth for launching. To prevent potential trapping, under the Dock, of sea turtles and other animals, such as Key Deer, an enclosure consisting of barriers one inch apart must be constructed beneath the portion of the Dock's landward access ramp having less than three feet of clearance above grade. 5 This is a standard construction material frequently used for docks in Florida. As further discussed below, the benthic survey performed for the area comprising the footprint of the Dock showed that no seagrass beds or other significant benthic resources are present. 6 The 0.5-foot water depth is keyed to the mean low water datum. At mean high water, the water depth at the terminal platform is approximately 1.2 feet. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the rest of the Dock will be elevated approximately five feet above the MHWL, so will be of sufficient height to allow animals to pass under without being trapped or impeded, and will provide sufficient clearance for sea turtle monitors to pass under as they traverse the beach. The competent, credible evidence also shows that the Dock will not impede the flow of water. The design is such that there are no structures on, or beneath, the Dock that will act as dams to prevent, or otherwise affect, the flow of water under and around the Dock. The water depth at the end of the terminal dock is 0.5 feet at mean low water, and 1.2 feet at mean high water. The Dock does not extend out to a depth of four feet of water. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not interfere with navigation. The water depth between the shore and the end of the Dock's terminal platform is too shallow to accommodate motorized watercraft, and the Dock will be of sufficient height to enable persons using non-motorized watercraft to pass under it. The Dock will be constructed to meet the 2017 Southern Building Code, so will be able to resist 180-mile-per-hour, three-second wind gusts. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that in a storm, the decking and stringers on the Dock will be washed off the pilings and will not become windborne projectiles. The Dock pilings will be imbedded into the substrate to a minimum depth of five feet, using a vibration hammer, rather than drilling and punching the pilings into the substrate. Using a vibration hammer will generate less turbidity in the water column than using the drill-and-punch installation technique, and turbidity curtains must be erected and maintained around the construction footprint to control turbidity and protect water quality. Additionally, the pilings will be installed using a spud barge elevated above the substrate, which also will help reduce turbidity during construction. Any turbidity generated during construction will be temporary. Installing the dock pilings using a vibration hammer also will generate less noise than the drill-and-punch technique. The Jacksonville Office of the National Marine Fisheries Service has issued a biological opinion stating that the vibration hammer installation technique "may affect/is not likely to affect" certain species listed as endangered, threatened, or of special concern. Additionally, because the Dock will be constructed in an open waterbody, the noise generated by piling installation is anticipated to be insignificant. Construction of the Dock may only be conducted outside of sea turtle nesting season, which runs from April 15 to October 31. Dock construction activities also must meet the requirements and standards established by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to protect manatees, sea turtle species, the Smalltooth Sawfish, and the Eastern Indigo Snake. The 2011 Standard Manatee Construction Conditions for In-Water Work require vessels to navigate at slow speeds; manatee awareness signs to be posted; and construction to stop if a manatee is spotted within 50 feet of the construction site. In any event, manatees are unlikely to be present in the vicinity of the Dock, due to the very shallow water. The sea turtle and Smalltooth Sawfish construction conditions require vessels to operate at idle speeds in the vicinity of the project; turbidity curtains to be erected and maintained; and construction to be stopped if individuals of these species are observed within 50 feet of the construction site. The Eastern Indigo Snake, an upland species, is unlikely to be present at the Dock construction site. To prevent harm to individuals of this species, the letter of consent requires that educational materials be distributed to the construction crew and educational signs be placed at the construction site. No permanent exterior lighting is authorized for the Dock. This will prevent the Dock from attracting sea turtles and other marine species that are drawn to light. No turning basins, access channels, or wave break devices are proposed to be constructed for or used by the Dock. Fondriest's property has approximately 100 linear feet of riparian shoreline. There are no other docks existing on the shoreline along Long Beach Drive for at least 65 linear feet in either direction. The Dock will be constructed perpendicular to the shoreline, and will be located in Fondriest's riparian area, set back more than 40 feet from each riparian line demarcating her riparian area. Thus, the Dock will be located well outside the 25-foot setback from each riparian line. Biological and Other Resources in the Vicinity of the Dock Much of the shoreline along Long Beach Drive below the MHWL, including that along Fondriest's property, consists of bare, hard rock. The water is extremely shallow, and the bare rock is exposed at low tide. Site assessments conducted in 2020 at the location and in the vicinity of the Dock, show that limestone caprock, loose rubble, and some deeper depressions in the rock exist in the footprint of the Dock. The substrate consists of hard, highly uneven rock, with pools of tannin-stained water. Water pooled in the rock depressions is heated at low tide and, due to rotting vegetation, is nutrient-rich. The dissolved oxygen levels are very low, rendering the pools incapable of supporting substantial marine life other than cyanobacteria and filamentous algae, both of which indicate poor water quality. Some algae species are attached to the limestone caprock in the footprint and immediate vicinity of the Dock. However, recent biological resource assessments show that no seagrass beds, corals, or other hard bottom communities exist in the footprint of the Dock. Thus, the competent, credible evidence shows that there are no aquatic resources of any significant value in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock. A small seagrass bed is located near the terminal platform. The letter of consent requires avoidance of this seagrass bed during construction and use of the Dock. Additionally, as discussed above, turbidity curtains must be installed to prevent turbidity and siltation of this seagrass bed during construction. The evidence establishes that the area waterward of the MHWL along Long Beach Drive generally supports a rich aquatic community. Fish and aquatic invertebrates inhabit the water in the vicinity, and numerous bird species use the area waterward of the MHWL, including that bordering Fondriest's property, as feeding and foraging habitat. However, no non-speculative evidence was presented to show that the construction, presence, and use of the Dock will result in adverse effects to this aquatic community, or to any plant or animal species in this aquatic community. Additionally, the competent, credible evidence shows that none of these resources exist in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock, and conditions have been imposed in the letter of consent to ensure that the construction and use of the Dock will not adversely affect these resources. To the extent that the vibration hammer installation of the pilings will result in noise that may cause fish, birds, and other animals to leave the area, that effect will be temporary and will cease when piling installation is completed. Although some benthic or attached species, such as seahorses, may be unable to leave the area, so may be subjected to noise stress, no persuasive, non-speculative evidence was presented showing that these species inhabit the area in the vicinity of the Dock. Thus, any alleged harm to these species is speculative. Because the Dock may only be used for nonmotorized vessels such as kayaks and canoes, use of the Dock will not generate noise or otherwise adversely affect the aquatic habitat waterward of the MHWL along Long Beach Drive. The Key Deer is listed as an endangered species. Key Deer traverse and forage along the shore at Long Beach Drive. No credible evidence was presented showing that the Dock would adversely affect the ability of Key Deer to traverse and forage on the beach on, or adjacent to, Fondriest's property. As discussed above, the Dock will be elevated waterward of the MHWL to approximately five feet above grade. The evidence showed that this height is sufficient to allow Key Deer to pass underneath without being impeded or trapped. No credible evidence was presented showing that the three-foot wide access ramp would interfere with Key Deer foraging or traversing along the beach. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Loggerhead Sea Turtle and Green Sea Turtle, both of which are listed as endangered species, use the beach above the MHWL along Long Beach Drive, including the beach on Fondriest's property above the MHWL, for nesting. The FFWCC has determined, through its Florida Sea Turtle Nesting Beach Monitoring Program, that the shore along Long Beach Drive has a relatively low nesting density—i.e., within the lower 25% of nesting density values—for both of these sea turtle species. The evidence establishes that the Hawksbill Sea Turtle, Kemp's Ridley Sea Turtle, and Leatherback Sea Turtle do not use the beach along the Long Beach Drive shoreline for nesting. No competent, credible evidence was presented showing that significant sea turtle food sources are present in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock. The competent, credible evidence does not show that the Dock will adversely affect the habitat value of the beach on Fondriest's property for sea turtle nesting, or that it will otherwise adversely affect nesting sea turtles and hatchlings. As previously discussed, an enclosure will be constructed under the access ramp to prevent nesting sea turtles and hatchlings from becoming trapped under the Dock. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not adversely affect other protected species, including the Lower Keys Marsh Rabbit, the Keys Rice Rat, or the Mole Skink—none of which inhabit or use the marine/beach habitat present along the shore at Long Beach Drive. To this point, no evidence was presented showing that these species are, or ever have been, present on the beach at Long Beach Drive. Thus, no evidence was presented showing that the Dock adversely affect these species. The Dock will be Located in a Resource Protection Area 3 Areas within aquatic preserves are classified as Resource Protection Area ("RPA") 1, 2, or 3, for purposes of imposing restrictions and conditions on the use of sovereignty submerged lands, to protect discrete areas having high quality and transitioning habitat. The RPA 1 classification applies to areas within an aquatic preserve that have resources of the highest quality and condition. Areas classified as RPA 1 are characterized by the presence of corals, marine grassbeds, mangrove swamps, salt marshes, oyster bars, threatened or endangered species habitat, colonial water bird nesting sites, and archaeological and historical sites. The RPA 3 classification applies to areas within an aquatic preserve that are characterized by the absence of any significant natural resource attributes. The RPA 2 classification applies to areas within an aquatic preserve that are in transition, either having declining RPA 1 resources, or new pioneering resources within an RPA 3. Recent biological resource assessments conducted at the location of, and in the immediate vicinity of, the Dock show that no mangrove swamps, salt marshes, oyster bars, archaeological or historical resources, or colonial water bird nesting sites are present. As discussed above, although sea turtles nest on the beach along Long Beach Drive, this area does not constitute significant sea turtle nesting habitat, and there is no significant food source for adult or juvenile sea turtles in the vicinity of the Dock. Thus, the evidence shows that the Dock will not be located in an RPA 1. The biological resource assessments also showed that no transitioning resources are present at the location, or in the vicinity, of the Dock. The competent, credible evidence showed that current natural resource conditions at the site are the same as those that historically existed before Hurricane Irma struck the Long Beach Drive area in 2013. Thus, the evidence shows that the Dock will not be located in an RPA 2. Because there are no significant natural resource attributes or transitioning resources in the footprint and the immediate vicinity of the Dock, it is determined that the Dock will be located in an RPA 3.7 7 Some portions of the CBAP do contain seagrass beds, offshore coral patch reefs, and mangrove swamp communities, and provide habitat for protected species, including the Key Deer and colonial water birds, and, thus, merit an RPA 1 classification. By contrast, none of these habitats and conditions are present at the location, or in the vicinity, of the Dock. The definitions of RPA 1, 2, and 3 in rules 18-20.003(54), (55), and (56), respectively, refer to "areas within aquatic preserves" which contain specified resources types and quality. Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(54) through (56)(emphasis added). Additionally, rule 18-20.004(1)(a) provides that in determining whether to approve or deny a request to conduct an activity in an aquatic preserve, the Trustees will evaluate each request on a "case-by-case basis." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(1)(a)(emphasis added). These rules make clear that determining whether an activity will be located in an RPA 1, 2, or 3 necessarily entails a site-specific resource assessment to determine the type and quality of habitat, and the conditions present, at that specific site. As discussed above, the site-specific biological assessments conducted show that the Dock will be located in an RPA 3, and Petitioners did not present any site- specific evidence to rebut that classification. Cumulative Impacts Analysis In determining whether an activity proposed in an aquatic preserve may be approved, an analysis must be performed to determine the projected cumulative impacts of the activity. This analysis focuses on determining the impact of the proposed activity, combined with that of similar existing activities and similar activities currently under consideration for approval. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18- 20.006. A cumulative impacts analysis performed by Fondriest's expert witness, Sandra Walters, showed that the Dock, in conjunction with similar existing docks and all other applications for docks that could be proposed for approval, will not result in adverse cumulative impacts to the aquatic resources in the CBAP. Walters's cumulative impacts analysis took into account both the acreage and linear footage of parcels within the CBAP for which a dock similar to the one at issue in this proceeding could be approved for construction. In performing a cumulative impacts analysis using linear feet of shoreline, Walters calculated a total of 19,357 feet, or 22.6 miles, of shoreline in the CBAP. Of this linear footage, approximately 7,500 linear feet of shoreline along Long Beach Drive and approximately 1,200 linear feet of shoreline along the ocean side of the Cook's Island portion of the CBAP are developable, for purposes of having the potential to be developed for a minimum-sized single-family residential dock similar to that proposed in this case. Walters's estimate is conservative, in that it included, as developable linear shoreline footage, parcels that likely could not be developed due to rate of growth, conservation easement, or other land use or environmental restrictions. Walters's linear footage analysis showed that approximately 5.7% of the entire CBAP shoreline possibly could be developed for construction of a perpendicular dock. Assuming that each of these docks is four feet wide—which is a valid assumption, using the four-foot maximum access dock width permitted under the aquatic preserves rules—a total of .23% of the shoreline would be impacted if a perpendicular dock was developed on each eligible parcel. Walters opined, credibly and persuasively, that this impact to the resources in the CBAP would be de minimis. In performing a cumulative impacts analysis on an acreage basis, Walters calculated that if a minimum-size single-family residential dock were developed on each of the 68 total developable lots within the CBAP, a total area of approximately 34,000 square feet, or approximately .013% of the acreage in the CBAP, would experience impacts similar to those created by the Dock. Walter credibly and persuasively opined that this impact to the resources in the CBAP would be de minimis. Walters used a conservative approach—i.e., projecting a realistic "worst case" scenario—in performing the cumulative impacts analysis. Specifically, she considered all parcels for which a minimum-size single-family residential dock reasonably could be proposed for approval in the future, rather than limiting her consideration of cumulative impacts to only those currently proposed for approval by the listed agencies. Additionally, she included impacts of similar dock projects for parcels that likely would not qualify for dock approval due to development restrictions. Thus, the cumulative impacts that Walters projected in her analysis are likely greater than the actual cumulative impacts of similar dock projects that reasonably can be anticipated to be developed in the area in the future. Petitioners presented the testimony of Michael Czerwinski regarding the cumulative impacts analysis required under the aquatic preserves rule for approval of an activity in an aquatic preserve. Czerwinski's analysis projected the potential cumulative impacts if every parcel along Long Beach Drive were developed with a minimum-size single-family residential dock, including the parcels on which development restrictions have been imposed such that they would not be eligible to be developed for a single-family residential dock. Based on this assumption, Czerwinski opined that such "buildout" along Long Beach Drive would result in a "cascading" or "nibbling" effect on the resources in the CBAP, and that there would be adverse impacts on sea turtle nesting habitat. Additionally, based on the unsupported assumption of maximum "buildout" of a single-family residential dock on every parcel along Long Beach Drive, Czerwinski projected that the resources within the entire CBAP would be adversely affected as a result of the cumulative impacts from approval of the Dock. Czerwinski's cumulative impacts analysis did not take into account the numerous parcels in the CBAP, including several on Long Beach Drive, that are unable to be developed for single-family residential docks due to conservation easements and local land development restrictions. As such, his analysis considered impacts which could not reasonably be expected to result in the Long Beach Drive area from approval of the Dock. Additionally, based on the unreasonable assumption of maximum dock buildout on every parcel on Long Beach Drive, Czerwinski projected adverse impacts to the entire CBAP as a result of the Dock. This analysis again failed to take into account that numerous parcels within the boundaries of the CBAP that are not located in the Long Beach Drive area also are under development restrictions that will prevent the construction of docks on those parcels. Czerwinski's analysis did not comply with the provisions of rule 18-20.005(1) and (3), which expressly limit the consideration of impacts to only those likely to affect the preserve and which reasonably could be expected to result from the proposed activity. For these reasons, Czerwinski's testimony regarding cumulative impacts as a result of the Dock was not credible or persuasive. As discussed above, Monroe County has issued a permit authorizing the construction of the Dock. This evidences that the Dock is permissible under the Monroe County local comprehensive plan. Additionally, as discussed in detail below, the Dock is an allowable use that is consistent with the CBAP Management Plan ("Management Plan"). As previously discussed, the competent, credible evidence establishes that there are no significant biological resources in the footprint, or in the immediate vicinity, of the Dock. Thus, the Dock will not cause the loss of beneficial biologic functions that would adversely impact the quality or utility of the CBAP. As previously discussed, the competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not cause the loss of the beneficial hydrologic functions, either in the immediate vicinity of the Dock, or in the CBAP. As discussed above, the Dock will be a minimum-size single-family residential dock that will not adversely affect the quantity or flow of water. Accordingly, it is determined that the Dock will not have adverse cumulative impacts on the CBAP. Consistency with the CBAP Management Plan The Management Plan expressly identifies single-family private residential docks as an allowable use within CBAP, and specifies the standards that such docks must meet. Specifically, a dock may not extent waterward of the MHWL more than 500 feet or 20% of the width of the waterbody; must be designed to ensure maximum light penetration; the terminal platform may not be more than 160 square feet in area; and the access dock may not be wider than four feet. As discussed above, the Dock will comply with these standards. The Management Plan also delineates "management areas" within the CBAP, and describes resources and allowable uses within the different management areas. The Management Plan states that final determinations of allowable uses within a particular management plan are made by agency staff on a case-by-case basis. The sovereignty submerged lands along Long Beach Drive, out to a distance of 500 feet from shore, are designated as "Management Area SF/1." The sovereignty submerged lands bordering Fondriest's property are included within the Management Area SF/1. The resources included in Management Area SF/1 generally include grass beds, fringing mangroves, coral banks, coral heads, and hardbottom communities. However, as discussed above, the site-specific biological resource assessment surveys conducted on the sovereignty submerged lands bordering Fondriest's property showed that none of these resources are present at, or in the vicinity of, the Dock site. Furthermore, private single-family residential docks are expressly identified as an allowable use in the Management Area SF/1. Long Beach Drive is not a pristine, undeveloped shoreline. There are residences and some commercial uses along Long Beach Drive, with accessory uses such as seawalls, revetments, and private docks. The Dock is consistent with these existing uses and with the aesthetics of the shoreline on Long Beach Drive. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock is consistent with the CBAP Management Plan.8 Petitioners' Interests and Timeliness of Crilly's Petition The Trust's Interests The Trust owns a parcel of real property located at 1975 Long Beach Drive, immediately adjacent to, and west of, Fondriest's property. Barry Roberts and Gloria Meredith are the trustees of the Trust. 8 Rule 18-20.004(7) states, in pertinent part: "[t]he aquatic preserve management plans shall be used by [DEP] to preserve and restore the distinctive characteristics identified by the inventories for each aquatic preserve. The management plans for each aquatic preserve are available for guidance purposes only." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(7)(emphasis added). Thus, to the extent a rule provision in chapter 18-20 conflicts with an aquatic preserve management plan, the rule controls. See Decarion v. Martinez, 537 So.2d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(an agency must follow its own rules). Neither Roberts nor Meredith, in their individual capacity, is a petitioner in these proceedings. Meredith testified that she and Roberts purchased the property at 1975 Long Beach Drive because of its location and the natural resources in the area, including the tide pool habitat in the rock depressions along the shore, and the animals that forage along, and inhabit, the shore. Meredith testified that she and Roberts both have a keen personal interest in, and use and enjoy, the natural resources along the shore at Long Beach Drive. They engage in bird watching; nature photography; kayaking; and observing nature, including Key Deer, birds, nesting sea turtles, and fish and invertebrates inhabiting tide pools in the rock depressions along the shore. After Meredith and Roberts purchased the property, they placed it in the Trust in order to preserve it, and its value as a residential property, for their children and grandchildren to enjoy in the future. Meredith and Roberts, as trustees of the Trust, have significant concerns about the aesthetic impact the Dock will have on the Trust property, particularly its impact on the view of the beach and the sunrise over the water. Meredith expressed her personal concern regarding the Dock's impacts on the biological resources at, and in the vicinity of, the Dock, and she also expressed concern that the Dock would interfere with her ability to safely walk along the shoreline. She testified that she was concerned that approval of the Dock would constitute a precedent, resulting in the construction of more docks and piers which would adversely affect the natural resources and the beauty of the beach. Meredith conceded that the Dock will be located within Fondriest's riparian area, will be set back more than 25 feet from the common riparian line, and will not cross the common riparian line into the Trust's riparian area. DeMaria's and Appel's Interests DeMaria is an original Petitioner in Case No. 20-2474, which is part of these consolidated proceedings, and Appel has moved to intervene and become a party to that case. DeMaria and Appel own the Deer Run eco-lodge bed and breakfast ("Deer Run") located at 1997 Long Beach Drive, immediately west of the property owned by the Trust. The Deer Run property is not located immediately adjacent to Fondriest's property. Appel owns two other parcels on Long Beach Drive, neither of which is located immediately adjacent to Fondriest's property. DeMaria testified that she and Appel purchased the Deer Run property because they were attracted to the unspoiled natural environment along Long Beach Drive. Deer Run attracts guests from around the world, who are drawn to the natural environment. These guests engage in nature photography and in-water recreational activities, such as kayaking, paddle boarding, and windsurfing; and they use and enjoy the natural resources and aesthetics of the area. DeMaria and Appel both testified that the presence of a long dock in close proximity to Deer Run would interfere with the view of the water and sunrise from Deer Run, and would significantly detract from the natural beauty and aesthetics of the environment at, and in the immediate vicinity of, Deer Run. Both testified that the presence of the Dock would render Deer Run a less attractive destination for guests. DeMaria testified that the presence of the Dock would interfere with her personal view of the water and the sunrise over the water; her ability to walk along shoreline below the MHWL; and her personal use and enjoyment of the natural beauty and aesthetics of the area. DeMaria also volunteers as a sea turtle nest monitor under the authority of Crilly's marine turtle permit. She expressed concerns similar to those expressed by Crilly—specifically, that the existence of the Dock would interfere with her ability to safely traverse the shoreline below the MHWL on Long Beach Drive to perform her sea turtle monitoring activities. Appel echoed DeMaria's concerns regarding the alleged injury to Deer Run's ecotourism business as a result of the Dock. He also testified that the presence of the Dock on Fondriest's property would injure his personal use and enjoyment of the natural beauty and aesthetics of the Long Beach Drive area. Appel also serves as a volunteer sea turtle monitor, and, in connection with that activity, traverses the shoreline along Long Beach Drive. He testified that the presence of the Dock would interfere with his ability to safely traverse the shoreline below the MHWL to conduct sea turtle monitoring activities. Appel also testified regarding the potential for the Dock to be damaged in storms, resulting in flying and floating debris that may damage his properties and the natural resources in the area. Crilly's Interests and Timeliness of Petition Crilly is the holder of a marine turtle permit issued by FFWCC, authorizing her to monitor sea turtle nesting along the beach at Long Beach Drive. Other volunteer sea turtle nest monitors work with Crilly under the authority of her permit. Crilly and her team of sea turtle monitors walk the beach daily during sea turtle nesting season. Crilly's responsibilities under the marine turtle permit include monitoring sea turtle nesting and false crawls; collecting data on the number of hatchlings that emerge from each sea turtle nest; and collecting data on sea turtle nesting mortality. The data are provided to the FFWCC for use in sea turtle research. Crilly testified that the Dock will impede her ability and that of her team to safely traverse along the shore below the MHWL to perform the sea turtle monitoring duties authorized under her permit. Specifically, Crilly testified that because the property above the MHWL is private, she must walk along the shoreline below the MHWL. The rock is slippery with numerous depressions, and traversing under the Dock would be treacherous. She testified that "I personally would not crawl under a dock and, therefore, I would not ask any of my volunteers on my team to crawl under a dock." According to Crilly, if she and her sea turtle nest monitoring team are unable to traverse the shoreline where the Dock will be located, they will be required to retrace their steps to the roadway on Long Beach Drive, walk down the road to a public access point, walk down to the beach, and walk back to the Dock, significantly increasing the time and effort to conduct their sea turtle monitoring activities. Crilly testified that she "learned of" DEP's approval of the Dock on December 30, 2019. No evidence was presented regarding whether, or how, Crilly received notice of the 2019 Approval sufficient to provide a clear point of entry for purposes of commencing the time for her to challenge that proposed agency action. Crilly filed her Petition challenging the 2019 Approval on February 27, 2020. When DEP issued the Dock Approval on September 30, 2020, superseding the 2019 Approval, Crilly already had filed her Petition at DEP, and the Petition had been referred to DOAH. IX. Findings of Ultimate Fact Regarding Compliance with Applicable Rules The term "dock" is defined in chapters 18-20 and 18-21. Chapter 18-20, applicable to aquatic preserves, defines a dock as "a fixed or floating structure, including moorings, used for the purpose of berthing buoyant vessels either temporarily or indefinitely." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.003(19). Chapter 18-21, which generally governs approvals to use sovereignty submerged lands, defines a dock as "a fixed or floating structure, including access walkways, terminal platforms, catwalks, mooring pilings, lifts, davits and other associated water-dependent structures, used for mooring and accessing vessels." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.003(22). The Dock meets the definition of "dock" in both rules.9 As discussed above, the Dock Approval limits mooring to non-motorized vessels, and Fondriest, a riparian owner, will use the Dock to access the water for the water-dependent activities of kayaking, paddle-boarding, and other water-dependent activities such as swimming, snorkeling, and fishing, consistent with rule 18-20.004(1)(e)5. 9 The Dock is not a "pier," which is defined as "a structure in, or, or over sovereignty lands which is used by the public primarily for fishing or swimming." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.003(41)(emphasis added). As discussed above, the Dock is a private single-family residential dock that will be constructed on sovereignty submerged lands waterward of Fondriest's property. It will not be open to, or used by, the public for fishing or swimming. As previously discussed, the Dock meets the 500-square-foot threshold for purposes of exemption from regulatory permitting, pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b). The evidence also establishes that the Dock is a "minimum-size" dock, as defined in rule 18-21.002(39). Specifically, the Dock's area has been reduced to the smallest size possible that will provide Fondriest reasonable access to the water for kayak launching. The Dock's reduced size also will minimize impacts to resources at, and in the vicinity of, the Dock. Thus, the Dock has been designed to minimize any adverse impacts to fish and wildlife and threatened and endangered species habitat, as required by rules 18-21.004(2)(b) and (i), and 18-21.004(7)(d). Compliance with Aquatic Preserve Management Policies, Standards, and Criteria Rule 18-20.004 establishes the policies, standards, and requirements for approval of uses of sovereignty submerged lands in aquatic preserves. As discussed above, the Dock extends a total of 154 feet waterward from the MHWL. This is substantially less than the allowable 500-foot maximum extent from the MHWL, and also is substantially less than 20% of the width of the Straits of Florida, which spans from the Florida Keys to Cuba. Thus, the Dock is consistent with rule 18-20.004(5)(a)1. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not be located in an area of significant biological, scientific, historic, or aesthetic value. However, even if such resources were present, the Dock would not cause adverse impacts due to its specific design features and the use of best management practices during construction. As discussed above, the Dock will minimize shading by reduction of the width of the access dock from four feet to three feet; by elevation of both the access dock and the terminal platform five feet above mean high water; and by the use of light-penetrable grating for the terminal platform. The Dock is designed to ensure that vessel use will not cause harm to site- specific resources, as required by rule 18-20.004(5)(a)3. The types of vessels that may use the Dock are limited to non-motorized vessels, and the letter of consent is conditioned to allow vessel launching only when there is a minimum depth of 0.5 feet of water at the terminal platform. As previously discussed, the evidence establishes that the Dock will be located in an RPA 3. Nonetheless, the Dock will comply with design standards applicable to docks in an RPA 1 or RPA 2. Specifically, the Dock will be constructed of wooden planking less than eight inches wide, spaced half an inch apart after shrinkage; will be elevated five feet above the MHWL; and will have a terminal platform consisting of light-penetrable grating to minimize shading. As previously discussed, the terminal platform will have a total area of 72 square feet—well below the 160-square foot maximum size allowed in aquatic preserves under rule 18-20.004(5)(b)6. The Dock extends out from the shoreline to a depth of approximately -0.5 ft at mean low water. Thus, Dock meets the requirement that it may not extend out from the shoreline further than to a maximum water depth of -4 feet at mean low water. Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(5)(b)3. Consistency with Coupon Bight Aquatic Preserve Management Plan Rule 18-20.004(7), which addresses management plans for aquatic preserves, states, in pertinent part: "[t]he aquatic preserve management plans shall be used by the Department to preserve and restore the distinctive characteristics identified by the inventories for each aquatic preserve." Rule 18-20.004(3)(a) states, in pertinent part: "all proposed activities in aquatic preserves having management plans adopted by the Board must demonstrate that such activities are consistent with the management plan." For the reasons discussed in detail above, it is determined that the Dock is consistent with the Management Plan, and, thus, complies with rule 18-20.004(3)(a). Public Interest Demonstration Chapters 18-20 and 18-21 both require an analysis to determine whether an activity proposed to be conducted on sovereignty submerged lands meets an applicable public interest test. Rule 18-20.004(1)(b), the aquatic preserve rule's public interest test, states, in pertinent part: "[t]here shall be no further sale, lease or transfer of sovereignty lands except when such sale, lease or transfer is in the public interest (see subsection 18- 20.004(2), F.A.C., Public Interest Assessment Criteria)." However, with respect to private residential single-family docks, rule 18-20.004(4)(c) states, in pertinent part: "[f]or the purpose of this rule, a private, residential single-family docking facility which meets all the requirements of subsection 18-20.004(5), F.A.C., shall be deemed to meet the public interest requirements of paragraph 18-20.004(1)(b), F.A.C." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(1)(b)(emphasis added). As discussed herein, the Dock meets all applicable requirements in rule 18- 20.004(5). Accordingly, the Dock meets the aquatic preserves public interest test in chapter 18-20. The Dock also meets the public interest test codified in chapter 18-21. Rule 18-21.003(53) defines "public interest" as "demonstrable environmental, social and economic benefits which would accrue to the public at large as a result of the proposed action, and which would clearly exceed all demonstrable environmental, social, and economic costs of the proposed action." Rule 18-21.004(1) states: "[f]or approval, all activities on sovereignty lands must be not contrary to the public interest, except for sales which must be in the public interest." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.004(1)(emphasis added). In this case, the Dock provides recreational water access to the riparian owner, and, as discussed extensively, will not have any adverse impacts on sovereignty lands, aquatic resources, or listed species. Thus, it is determined that the Dock is not contrary to the public interest, as defined in chapter 18-21. Petitioners assert that the Dock is inconsistent with article X, section 11 of the Florida Constitution, which states: Sovereignty lands. – The title to lands under navigable waters, within the boundaries of the states, which have not been alienated, including beaches below mean high water lines, is held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people. Sale of such lands may be authorized by law, but only when in the public interest. Private use of portions of such lands may be authorized by law, but only when not contrary to the public interest. Fla. Const., art. X, §11 (emphasis added). Chapters 253 and 258, and the implementing rules codified in chapters 18-20 and 18-21, authorize the use of sovereignty submerged lands for private residential single-family docks when not contrary to the public interest. As discussed above, the Dock is not contrary to the public interest under chapters 18-20 and 18-21. Thus, the use of sovereignty submerged lands for the Dock is consistent with article X, section 11 of the Florida Constitution. Petitioners raised, as a public interest concern, their ability to walk below the MHWL along the shoreline on Long Beach Drive. The evidence shows that the Dock will, within its narrow footprint, present a minor hindrance to Petitioners' ability to walk unimpeded along the shoreline below the MHWL. However, the competent, persuasive evidence established that Petitioners will be able to duck under the Dock, or walk around the end of the terminal platform, where the water is relatively shallow. Importantly, Petitioners did not cite any statutory or rule provisions affording completely unencumbered access, by the general public, to all sovereignty submerged lands.10 Cumulative Impacts Rule 18-20.006 requires that an activity proposed in an aquatic preserve be evaluated for its cumulative impact on the aquatic preserve’s natural system. As extensively discussed above, Fondriest's expert, Walters, conducted a comprehensive cumulative impacts analysis that addressed all pertinent considerations in rule 18-20.006, and she concluded that the Dock will not have any 10 A key purpose of chapters 18-20 and 18-21 is to establish standards for approval of private uses of sovereignty submerged lands which may, to a certain extent, hinder the general public's access to those sovereignty lands. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.004 ("[t]he following management policies, standards, and criteria shall be used in determining whether to approve, approve with conditions or modifications, or deny all requests for activities on sovereignty submerged lands"); and Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004 ([t]he following management policies, standards, and criteria are supplemental to chapter 18-21 . . . and shall be uses in determining whether to approve, approve with conditions or modifications, or deny all requests for activities on sovereignty submerged lands in aquatic preserves.") adverse cumulative impacts on the CBAP as a whole, or on any significant biologic, hydrologic, or other resources within the CBAP. As discussed above, Walters's analysis was comprehensive; her testimony was credible and persuasive; and her conclusion that the Dock will not result in adverse cumulative impacts to the CBAP, or to any resources within the CBAP, was rule- based, and considered all pertinent factual information. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock will not cause adverse cumulative impacts to the CBAP, or to any resources within the CBAP, as required by rule 18-20.006. Minimization of Adverse Impacts to Sovereignty Submerged Lands and Resources Rule 18-21.004(2)(b) states, in pertinent part, that activities that would result in significant adverse impacts to sovereignty lands and associated resources may not be approved. As discussed above, the evidence establishes that there are no significant natural resources present at the location, or in the vicinity, of the Dock. Thus, the Dock will not have adverse impacts on such resources or on sovereignty submerged lands. Nonetheless, numerous protective measures have been imposed as conditions to the letter of consent, to minimize the potential for adverse water quality impacts and to protect aquatic resources. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock will meet the resource impact minimization requirements in rules 18-20.004(5)(a)1. and 18-21.004(2). Measures to Avoid and Minimize Adverse Impacts to Listed Species and Habitat 18-21.004(7)(e) requires that "construction, use, or operation of the structure or activity shall not adversely affect any species which is endangered, threatened[,] or of special concern, as listed in rules 68A-27.003, 68A-27.004[,] and 68A-27.005." DEP consulted with FFWCC on the Dock application, to determine its potential impacts to species listed as endangered, threatened, or of special concern. As discussed above, FFWCC provided recommendations to minimize the Dock's potential impacts to several listed species, and those recommendations have been imposed as conditions to the letter of consent. As discussed above, the Dock will implement numerous measures to ensure that construction and use will not adversely affect manatees, sea turtle species, the Smalltooth Sawfish, and the Eastern Indigo Snake. As discussed above, Key Deer forage on and traverse the shore along Long Beach Drive. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not impose any substantial barrier to the Key Deer's use of the shore on Fondriest's property, and will not otherwise adversely affect the Key Deer. Also, as discussed above, the competent, credible evidence establishes that due to the lack of suitable habitat, other protected species, such as the Lower Keys Marsh Rabbit, Keys Rice Rat, and Florida Keys Mole Skink are unlikely to inhabit, or otherwise be present at or near, the Dock site. Thus, it is determined that the Dock will not have any adverse impacts on these species. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock will not have adverse impacts to listed species and their habitat. Riparian Rights Chapters 18-20 and 18-21 require that the riparian rights of owners of upland riparian property adjacent to an activity seeking approval to use sovereignty submerged lands be protected. Rule 18-20.004(4) states, in pertinent part: "[n]one of the provisions of this rule shall be implemented in a manner that would unreasonably infringe upon the traditional, common law and statutory riparian rights of upland property owners adjacent to sovereignty lands." Rule 18-21.004(3) states, in pertinent part: None of the provisions of this rule shall be implemented in a manner that would unreasonably infringe upon the traditional, common law riparian rights, as defined in section 253.141, F.S., of upland riparian property owners adjacent to sovereignty lands. Satisfactory evidence of sufficient upland interest is required for activities on sovereignty submerged lands riparian to the uplands. All structures and other activities must be designed and conducted in a manner that will not unreasonably restrict or infringe upon the riparian rights of adjacent upland riparian owners. [A]ll structures, including mooring pilings, breakwaters, jetties and groins, and activities must be set back a minimum of 25 feet inside the applicant's riparian line. Exceptions to the setbacks are private residential single- family docks associated with a parcel that has a shoreline frontage of less than 65 feet, where portions of such structures are located between riparian less than 65 feet apart. Pursuant to rule 18-21.003(63), "satisfactory upland interest" means owning the riparian uplands or having some other possessory or use interest, as specified in the rule. Section 253.141(1) defines riparian rights as follows: Riparian rights are those incident to land bordering upon navigable waters. They are rights of ingress, egress, boating, bathing, and fishing and such others as may be or have been defined by law. Such rights are not of a proprietary nature. They are rights inuring to the owner of the riparian land but are not owned by him or her. They are appurtenant to and are inseparable from the riparian land. The land to which the owner holds title must extend to the ordinary high watermark of the navigable water in order that riparian rights may attach. Conveyance of title to or lease of the riparian land entitles the grantee to the riparian rights running therewith whether or not mentioned in the deed or lease of the upland. Fondriest owns the upland property riparian to the sovereignty submerged lands on which the Dock is proposed to be located, and Petitioners stipulated that she has a satisfactory upland interest for purposes of rule 18-21.004(3). The Trust owns upland property bordering the Straits of Florida; thus, riparian rights inure to the Trust property, pursuant to section 253.141. As previously discussed, the evidence establishes that the Dock will be set back over 40 feet from the common riparian line between Fondriest's property and the Trust's property. To this point, Meredith acknowledged that the Dock would be set back more than 25 feet from the common riparian line, and will not intrude into the Trust's riparian area. No evidence was presented showing that the Dock would unreasonably interfere with the Trust's traditional riparian rights of navigation, boating, swimming, or fishing within its riparian area. Meredith testified that the Dock would obstruct the view of the waterbody, the shore, and the sunrise over the water, from the Trust property. She appeared to assert these interests on behalf of the Trust and herself. However, as more fully discussed below, under Florida law, the riparian right to an "unobstructed" view does not entail a view completely free of any infringement or restriction by structures or activities appurtenant to neighboring riparian properties. Rather, the right to an "unobstructed" view means that a riparian owner is entitled to a direct, unobstructed view of the channel of the waterbody and a direct means of ingress and egress to the channel. No evidence was presented that the Dock—which will be constructed perpendicular to the shoreline within Fondriest's riparian area—would obstruct the Trust's or Meredith's view of the channel of the Straits of Florida. Additionally, as previously discussed, the Trust presented no evidence to show that the presence of the Dock in Fondriest's riparian area would interfere with the Trust's direct ingress and egress to and from the channel of the Straits of Florida. Accordingly, it is determined that the Dock will not unreasonably infringe on the Trust's riparian rights. Similarly, it is determined that the Dock will not unreasonably infringe on the riparian rights incident to the Deer Run property, or to Appel's properties on Long Beach Drive. To this point, Demaria and Appel did not present any evidence showing that the Dock will obstruct their view of the channel of the Straits of Florida, either from the Deer Run property, or from Appel's properties. DeMaria and Appel also failed to present evidence showing that the Dock would interfere with direct ingress and egress to and from the channel of the Straits of Florida, either from the Deer Run property or from Appel's properties. Accordingly, it is determined that, consistent with section 253.141 and rule 18-21.004(3), the Dock will not unreasonably infringe on the riparian rights of the Trust or of DeMaria and Appel. General Requirements for Authorization to Use Sovereignty Submerged Lands As discussed above, the Dock will be constructed and used in a manner that will avoid and minimize adverse impacts to sovereignty submerged lands and resources, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(d). The competent, credible evidence also demonstrates that the construction and use of the Dock will not adversely affect listed species, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(e). As discussed above, the Dock will not unreasonably interfere with the riparian rights of the Petitioners, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(f). Additionally, the Dock will not constitute a navigational hazard, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(g). Due to the shallow water in the footprint and in the vicinity of the Dock, navigation in the area is typically by kayak or canoe. The competent, credible evidence shows that the Dock will not impede navigation of these types of vessels. Because the sandy beach areas on Long Beach Drive are in private ownership, the Dock will not interfere with the public easement for traditional uses of sandy beaches, as provided in section 161.141, Florida Statutes; thus, the Dock is consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(h). Also, as discussed above, the Dock will be constructed, operated, and maintained solely for the water-dependent uses of launching non-motorized vessels and swimming, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(j).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection issue a Final Order granting Respondent Julia Fondriest's application for a Letter of Consent to Use Sovereignty Submerged Lands and verifying that the Dock is exempt from the requirement to obtain a regulatory permit, pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b). DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Julia Fondriest Doug Scheele Lifetime Dock & Lumber, Inc. 24536 Overseas Highway Summerland Key, Florida 33042 Luna E. Phillips, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A. Suite 1400 450 East Las Olas Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Deborah K. Madden, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A. Suite 1400 450 East Las Olas Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Paul Joseph Polito, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Mail Stop 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Ralf Gunars Brookes, Esquire Ralf Brookes Attorney Suite 107 1217 East Cape Coral Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Noah Valenstein, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue to determine in this matter is whether Respondent Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) properly issued its proposed verification of an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) exemption, dated March 23, 2018, for the installation of nine pilings off of Respondent Larry Lynn’s residential property, in the direction of Petitioner MarineMax, Inc.’s commercial property (MarineMax), pursuant to section 373.406(6), Florida Statutes, commonly known as the “de minimus” exemption.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Lynn has owned the real property located at 111 Placid Drive, Fort Myers, Florida, since 1994. Mr. Lynn’s residential property is a corner lot that fronts a canal on two of the four sides of his property, and also contains his home. MarineMax is a national boat dealer with approximately 65 locations throughout the United States and the British Virgin Islands. MarineMax has approximately 16 locations in Florida. MarineMax, through subsidiary companies, acquired the property at 14030 McGregor Boulevard, Fort Myers, Florida, in December 2014 (MarineMax Property). Prior to MarineMax’s acquisition, this property had been an active marina for more than 30 years. MarineMax continues to operate this property as a marina. The MarineMax Property is a 26-acre contiguous parcel that runs north-south and that is surrounded by canals and a larger waterway that connects to the Gulf of Mexico. The “northern” parcel of the MarineMax Property is surrounded by two canals and the larger waterway that connects to the Gulf of Mexico. The “southern” parcel is a separate peninsula that, while contiguous to the northern parcel, is surrounded by a canal that it shares with the northern parcel, along with another canal that separates it from residential properties. Mr. Lynn’s property is located directly south of the northern parcel of the MarineMax Property, and the canal that runs east-west. As his property is a corner lot, it also fronts an eastern canal that is directly across from the southern parcel of the MarineMax Property. The eastern canal described above also serves as a border between MarineMax and a residential community that includes Mr. Lynn’s residential property. Mr. Lynn has moored a boat to an existing dock on the eastern canal described in paragraphs 5 and 6 for many years. MarineMax holds ERPs for the business it conducts at its MarineMax Property, including the canal between the northern parcel of the MarineMax Property and Mr. Lynn’s property. For example, these ERPs permit: (a) the docking of boats up to 85 feet in length with a 23-foot beam; (b) boat slips up to 70 feet in length; (c) up to 480 boats on the MarineMax Property; and (d) a boatlift and boat storage barn (located on the southern parcel). The MarineMax Property also contains a fueling facility that is available for internal and public use. It is located on the northern parcel of the MarineMax Property, directly across the east-west canal from Mr. Lynn’s property. The prior owner of the marina constructed this fueling facility prior to 2003. Request for Verification of Exemption from an ERP Mr. Lynn testified that after MarineMax took over the property from the prior owner, he noticed larger boats moving through the canal that separates his property from the MarineMax Property. Concerned about the potential impact to his property, including his personal boat, Mr. Lynn contracted with Hickox Brothers Marine, Inc. (Hickox), to erect pilings off of his property in this canal.2/ On March 8, 2018, Hickox, on behalf of Mr. Lynn, submitted electronically a Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit to DEP. The “Project Description” stated, “INSTALL NINE 10 INCH DIAMETER PILINGS AS PER ATTACHED DRAWING FOR SAFETY OF HOMEOWNER’S BOAT.” The attached drawing for this project depicted the installation of these nine pilings 16 and 1/2 feet from Mr. Lynn’s seawall, spaced 15 feet apart. On March 23, 2018, DEP approved Mr. Lynn’s Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit, stating that the activity, as proposed, was exempt under section 373.406(6) from the need to obtain a regulatory permit under part IV of chapter 373. The Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit further stated: This determination is made because the activity, in consideration of its type, size, nature, location, use and operation, is expected to have only minimal or insignificant or cumulative adverse impacts on the water resources. The Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit further stated that DEP did not require further authorization under chapter 253, Florida Statutes, to engage in proprietary review of the activity because it was not to take place on sovereign submerged lands. The Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit also stated that DEP approved an authorization pursuant to the State Programmatic General Permit V, which precluded the need for Mr. Lynn to seek a separate permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Megan Mills, the environmental specialist and program administrator with DEP’s South District Office, testified that DEP’s granting of Mr. Lynn’s Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit was routine, and that his Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit met the statutory criteria. After DEP granted the Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit, Hickox, on behalf of Mr. Lynn, installed the nine pilings in the canal at various distances approximately 19 feet from Mr. Lynn’s seawall and in the canal that divides Mr. Lynn’s property from the MarineMax Property (and the fueling facility).3/ MarineMax timely challenged DEP’s Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resource Permit. Impact on Water Resources MarineMax presented the testimony of Sam Lowrey, its corporate vice president of real estate, who had detailed knowledge of the layout of the MarineMax Property. Mr. Lowrey testified that the canal between the MarineMax Property and Mr. Lynn’s residential property is active with boating activity, noting that MarineMax’s ERP allows up to 480 vessels on-site. With the installation of the pilings, he testified that he was concerned that MarineMax customers “will be uncomfortable navigating their boats through this portion of the canal[,]” which would be detrimental to MarineMax’s business. Mr. Lowery testified that he had no personal knowledge of whether MarineMax has lost any business since the installation of the pilings. MarineMax also presented the testimony of Captain Ralph S. Robinson III, who the undersigned accepted as an expert in marine navigation, without objection.4/ Captain Robinson has been a boat captain, licensed by the U.S. Coast Guard, since 1991. He has extensive experience captaining a variety of vessels throughout the United States and the Bahamas. He is an independent contractor and works for MarineMax and other marine businesses. Captain Robinson is also a retired law enforcement officer. Captain Robinson testified that he was familiar with the waterways surrounding the MarineMax Property, as he has captained boats in those waterways several times a month for the past 15 years. Captain Robinson testified that he has observed a number of boats with varying lengths and beams navigate these waterways, and particularly, the canal between the MarineMax Property and Mr. Lynn’s property. Captain Robinson estimated that the beam of these boats range from eight to 22 feet. He also testified that the most common boats have a beam between eight and 10 feet. Captain Robinson’s first experience with the pilings in the canal occurred in April 2018, when he was captaining a 42- foot boat through the canal. He testified that an 85-foot boat was fueling on the fuel dock, and when he cleared the fueling boat and pilings, he had approximately one and a half feet on each side of his boat. He testified that “[i]t was very concerning.” Captain Robinson testified that since this experience in April 2018, he calls ahead to MarineMax to determine the number and size of boats in the portion of this canal that contains the pilings. On behalf of MarineMax, in December 2018, Captain Robinson directed the recording of himself captaining a 59-foot Sea Ray boat with an approximately 15- to 16-foot beam through the canal separating the MarineMax Property and Mr. Lynn’s residential property, with another boat of the same size parked at MarineMax’s fueling dock.5/ Captain Robinson testified that these two boats were typical of the boats that he would operate at the MarineMax Property and surrounding waterway. The video demonstration, and Captain Robinson’s commentary, showed that when he passed through the canal between the fuel dock (with the boat docked) and Mr. Lynn’s residential property (with the pilings), there was approximately four to five feet on either side of his boat. Captain Robinson stated: This is not an ideal situation for a boat operator. Yes, it can be done. Should it be done? Um, I wasn’t happy or comfortable in this depiction. Captain Robinson testified that his “personal comfort zone” of distance between a boat he captains and obstacles in the water is five or six feet. Ultimately, Captain Robinson testified that he believed the pilings in the canal between the MarineMax Property and Mr. Lynn’s property were a “navigational hazard.” Specifically, Captain Robinson stated: Q: In your expert opinion, has Mr. Lynn’s pilings had more than a minimal, or insignificant impact on navigation in the canal, in which they are placed? A: I believe they’re a navigational hazard. The impact, to me personally, and I’m sure there’s other yacht captains that move their boat through there, or a yacht owner, not a licensed captain, um, that has to take a different approach in their operation and diligence, um, taking due care that they can safely go through. It’s been an impact. Q: Is a navigational hazard a higher standard for you as a boat captain, being more than minimal or insignificant? A: Yes. A navigational hazard is, in my opinion, something that its position could be a low bridge or something hanging off a bridge, a bridge being painted, it could be a marker, it could be a sandbar, anything that is going to cause harm to a boat by its position of normal operation that would cause injury to your boat, or harm an occupant or driver of that boat. Ms. Mills, the environmental specialist and program administrator with DEP’s South District Office, testified that after MarineMax filed the instant Petition, she and another DEP employee visited Mr. Lynn’s residential property. Although not qualified as an expert in marine navigation, Ms. Mills testified that, even after observing the placement of the pilings and the boating activity the day she visited, the pilings qualified for an exemption from the ERP.6/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned recommends that DEP enter a final order dismissing MarineMax’s challenge to the determination that Mr. Lynn’s pilings qualify for an exemption from an environmental resources permit pursuant to its March 23, 2018, approval of Mr. Lynn’s Request for Verification of Exemption from an Environmental Resources Permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT J. TELFER III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2019.
Findings Of Fact Sea Isles Condominium Association (Petitioner) is the riparian owner of lands at 25714 Hickory Boulevard, Bonita Springs, Florida 33923. The Petitioner's lands lie along the Broadway Channel connecting the Gulf of Mexico to Estero Bay. There are 84 upland units in the condominium. Some condominium residents without docking slips have requested that the Petitioner apply for expansion of the existing facility. The waters adjacent to Petitioner's upland property are located within the Estero Bay Aquatic Preserve (pursuant to Section 258.39(28), Florida Statutes) and are designated as Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW) by the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER). At some point in approximately 1982, the condominium developer sought approval for the construction of docking facilities. By letter of January 25, 1982, Richard P. Ludington, then Director of the Division of State Lands of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), indicated that there was no objection to the proposed dock project. The parties to this case have jointly stipulated that the Ludington opinion was based on the fact that the proposed project was a private non-income producing facility (a lease therefore not being required) and was not in conflict with any existing rules. The DER issued permit number 36-42521-5E, dated February 9, 1982, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued general permit number SAJ-33, both approving and authorizing the construction of the docking facility. Although the water body had been designated as an aquatic preserve, there were no adopted administrative rules regulating such projects at the time of the initial dock construction. The approved sixteen slip docking facility was constructed along the margin of the shoreline in 1983 by the developer of the condominium. Due to extremely shallow water depths, only two of the slips were accessible. At some point thereafter, the Petitioner began efforts to remedy the unusable slip situation. Initially, the Petitioner desired to dredge the area, but was unable to secure approval to dredge from regulatory agencies. The Petitioner then began to consider additional solutions. The solution upon which the Petitioner decided was removal of the existing slips and construction of an extended boardwalk and dock located in navigable water. On March 28, 1985, the DNR notified the Petitioner that the project would require approval in the form of a submerged land lease from the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Board"). On August 20, 1985, the DER issued permit number 361011295, authorizing the removal of the existing structure and the construction of a 22 slip docking facility as proposed by the Petitioner. On behalf of the Board, the DNR reviews applications for leases of sovereignty submerged lands. In reviewing such requests, the DNR calculates the maximum amount of sovereignty submerged lands which may be preempted by a proposed facility. According to administrative rule, the area of sovereignty submerged land preempted by a private residential multi-slip docking facility may not exceed the total square footage equal to ten times the riparian waterfront footage of the affected waterbody. DNR's calculation of the affected shoreline indicated that the Petitioner's riparian waterfront measured 433 feet. Application of the 10:1 ratio would indicate that the area of sovereignty submerged land preempted by the proposed multi-slip docking facility could not exceed 4330 square feet. As early as 1986, a surveyor employed by the Petitioner believed the DNR shoreline calculation to be erroneous and determined the Petitioner's riparian shoreline to be 601 feet. After discussing the discrepancy between measurements, the DNR representative informed a representative of the Petitioner that Sea Isles could obtain a mean high waterline survey to determine the actual shoreline footage if it disagreed with the DNR calculation. Although there is testimony that a survey provided to the DNR established the mean high waterline, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the survey was not identified as a mean high waterline survey, but as a safe upland line survey. No credible mean high waterline survey was provided to the DNR by the Petitioner at that time. Abutting the Petitioner's property to the south is a man-made channel which results in an unnatural extension of the shoreline. Such extensions are not included in computing the allowable square footage of sovereign submerged lands because the man-made shoreline does not abut sovereign submerged lands. It is unclear whether the calculations of shoreline were affected by this consideration. Despite the discrepancy, the Petitioner reduced the size of the requested docking facility to include a boardwalk and dock of ten slips totalling approximately 4300 square feet and extending 208 feet into the waterbody (approximately 35 percent of the waterbody's width). The length of the extension violates administrative rule provisions governing extension into a waterbody which are addressed elsewhere herein. On July 23, 1986, Lee County passed a resolution of approval for the proposed docking facility land lease and granted a variance to Lee County Ordinance 85-25. The resolution of approval contained additional requirements, included a provision restricting the approval to not more than ten slips. The Petitioner asserts that the determination of shoreline was incorrect and was the result of "mutual mistake". The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner's acceptance of the DNR's shoreline determination was based upon "mutual mistake." The evidence establishes that the Petitioner's representatives were aware of the discrepancy. The fact that the Petitioner agreed to deed a 575 foot conservation easement to the Board (to offset the potential adverse impact on manatee habitat as discussed elsewhere herein) would suggest that the parties were aware that the 433 foot measurement was inaccurate. For whatever reason, the Petitioner agreed to the DNR shoreline and dock calculation which formed the basis for the lease approved by the Board. Prior to approval of the lease, the Board reviewed a written "public interest" assessment which indicates that the length of the boardwalk to the proposed docking facility exceeded standards set by administrative rules. Pursuant to rule, exceptions to length restrictions may be made only where the applicant demonstrates that such exception is necessary to insure reasonable riparian ingress and egress. The Petitioner apparently demonstrated that, given the location of the existing sand flat, such exception was necessary to provide ingress and egress. According to the written analysis, the proposed project adversely impacted the manatee habitat located in the aquatic preserve. The analysis states that 575 foot conservation easement to the Board would offset the potential adverse impact on manatee habitat. The Petitioner committed to the conservation easement in order to meet the public interest test required of all docking facilities within an aquatic preserve. Special lease condition paragraph 5 requires the Petitioner to record a conservation easement for approximately 575 linear feet of shoreline in perpetuity to run with the land. The provision requires that documentation of the recording of the easement be provided to the Board within thirty days of the Board action and prior to execution of the lease. The lease conditions clearly indicate that the Petitioner will not seek authority to expand the docking facility. Special lease condition paragraph 5 prohibits any additional docking facilities or any other such development along the lessee's shoreline. Review of proposed special lease condition paragraph 6 (as compared to the staff recommendation and a subsequent affidavit executed by the Petitioner's representative on June 6, 1987) indicates that the paragraph appears to contain a typographical error in deleting the word "not" from the condition. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the Petitioner agreed not to request authorization to dredge the docking area or channel or to request additional expansion of the facility. On April 21, 1987, the Board, apparently acting against the staff recommendation, voted to grant to the Petitioner a submerged land lease for the construction of a ten slip facility. Representatives of the Petitioner appeared before the Board during consideration and approval of the lease. On June 6, 1987, a representative of the Petitioner executed an affidavit on behalf of the Petitioner which sets forth the language of special condition paragraph six as originally proposed. In the affidavit, the Petitioner's representative agrees not to apply for authorization to dredge the dock or access channel, or to request expansion of the facility. A deed of conservation easement dated October 21, 1985, and signed by a representative of the Petitioner, was attached to the materials submitted to the Board for the April 21, 1987 meeting. Contrary to the lease requirement, the attached deed of conservation easement was never recorded. In 1986 or 1987, a conservation easement was recorded by the Petitioner in favor of the Board, but the easement contained no legal description of the subject property. However, the recorded easement does prohibit additional docking facilities and waives the Petitioner's rights of ingress or egress related to any such additional facilities. In early 1991, the Petitioner requested approval to expand the existing dock from 10 to 14 slip. The expanded structure would preempt 5620 square feet of sovereign submerged land. On May 15, 1991, the DER granted approval of the four slip expansion. On November 27, 1991, the DNR, by letter signed by Michael E. Ashley, Chief of the Bureau of Submerged Lands and Preserves, denied the requested four slip expansion. The letter was prepared at the direction and with the approval of the Director of the Division of State Lands. Mr. Ashley cites two reasons for the denial. First, the request violated the terms of the existing lease which provides that there will be no expansion requested. Second, the Petitioner had failed to record the 575 foot conservation easement which was required by the terms of the original lease. The request for extension was not presented to the Governor and Cabinet for consideration, but was reviewed by the "agenda review committee" of the DNR. The committee includes the Deputy Director, two Deputy Assistant Executive Directors, the General Counsel, and the Cabinet Coordinator for the DNR. The committee reviews matters which are identified as potentially requiring Board action to resolve. Where issues exist related to existing sovereignty submerged land leases, the DNR attempts to resolve the matter without referral to the Board. The authority to conduct business in this manner has not been reduced to writing, but is based on verbal direction from the Board and from Cabinet assistants. Subsequent to the letter of denial issued by Mr. Ashley, the Petitioner on or about December 30, 1991, filed a conservation easement granting to the Board, a perpetual interest in a parcel of land lying ten feet landward of the Safe Upland Line as described in the deed recorded in the records of Lee County, Florida, (OR 2268, Page 0401) with the Clerk of Court for Lee County. The parcel of land identified in the deed runs along the shoreline for a distance of 601 feet. The easement provides for modification by the signed agreement of the parties. Because the Petitioner seeks to expand an existing lease, it is required to demonstrate an additional public benefit would result from approval of the request. The Petitioner has proposed to plant an area of mangroves in the shallow "sand bar" area located behind the existing slips. There is no additional public benefit related to the request. The evidence fails to establish that granting the request to expand the docking facility is in the public interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund enter a Final Order denying the request of Sea Isles Condominium Association to modify the existing sovereignty submerged land lease to provide for four additional boat slips to their existing ten slip docking facility. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of April, 1993 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-1077 The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 17. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. 19. Rejected as to comments by Miller, irrelevant. 20-21. Rejected, irrelevant. Rejected as to 6,010 square feet of permissible preemption. Based upon shoreline calculation which is not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. Rejected, irrelevant. The manatee information was required under the conditions of the existing lease, and do not constitute a benefit to be considered in addressing the request to modify the lease. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 16. Rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund c/o Kenneth Plante, General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station #10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Robert Routa, Esquire Post Office Drawer 6506 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6506 L. Kathryn Funchess, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station #35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue is whether the applicants-respondents Floyd and Alice Melton have provided reasonable assurances that their proposed dock meets the requirements of Chapter 403, Florida Statutes (1989) and Chapter 17, Florida Administrative Code, for issuance of a dredge and fill permit. Only four issues of disputed fact are raised by the pleadings in these cases: (1) whether the project will adversely affect navigation as that term is used in Section 403.918(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes; (2) whether the project will adversely affect recreational values in the vicinity of the project, in the context of the public interest test of Section 403.918(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes; (3) whether an increased number of boats at the proposed dock would cause "pollution" which would violate water quality criteria promulgated by the Department, and (4) whether the pilings will harm seagrasses in the vicinity of the dock.
Findings Of Fact An 85' dock perpendicular to the shoreline of the Meltons' property at Lot 4, Block 2, Buccaneer Point Estates, Key Largo, was in existence in 1988, some portion of which was apparently constructed without the benefit of a dredge and fill permit. On October 20, 1988, Floyd Melton applied to the Department (hereinafter "DER") for an after-the-fact permit for a 48' x 20' section, as an addition to a previously existing structure. After DER received the Meltons' permit application, an agency field inspector visited the site to determine whether the Meltons' proposed project could be constructed in conformance with Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, including the "public interest" tests at Section 403.918(2), and the "Keys Rule," Rule 17-312.420, Florida Administrative Code. The project site is located in Class III, Outstanding Florida Waters. The relevant factual determinations that DER personnel had to make at the Melton site, to ascertain compliance with the Keys Rule, were (a) the water depths, and (b) the presence or absence of seagrass communities in the proposed boat mooring area. The proposed 90' dock would have terminated over seagrass community in less than 5' of water depth. DER informed the Meltons, on February 9, 19890, that the permit would be denied unless they redesigned the dock to extend a distance of 275' out from the shore (289' total length), to where a water depth of 5' existed, limited the dock to a 4' width, and elevated the access walkway 6 feet above mean high water, to prohibit mooring along it and to increase light penetration underneath the dock. The Meltons amended their permit application to so comply. There are seagrasses under the entire length of the proposed dock. There are dense seagrass communities at the terminus of the proposed dock, surrounded by less dense seagrass communities. Under the boat currently moored near the terminus of the Meltons' uncompleted dock, there is a dense seagrass bed that is not adversely affected by the presence of the boat, which is moored in 5' of water. There is a "halo" of denuded bottom extending 4-6 inches around each piling, and occasional gouges that extend beyond the halo, which features are an ordinary and expected effect of driving pilings into the sea bed. Petitioners' expert's uncontroverted testimony is that 10 pilings placed in the dense seagrass bed at the end of the proposed dock would have no effect on the viability of that seagrass bed, while 100 pilings "would definitely damage" its viability. The survey introduced by the Meltons shows six pilings where the terminal platform is to be constructed, and three more offshore pilings for mooring purposes, for a total of nine. Other existing mooring pilings shown in the survey, landward of the proposed terminal platform, are to be removed in accordance with the permit. The water depth at the end of the Meltons' existing 85' dock is between 3.0' and 3.25', which is comparable to other existing docks in the area. Fast boats, such as water-skiing boats and one-person watercraft, operating in shallow water over a seagrass bed can damage seagrasses by "prop scarring" or by stirring up sediments. At another dock in the area, where the water depth is 3.75' at the dock's terminus, there is evidence of damage to seagrass beds by such prop-scarring. The water depth at the end of Petitioner Traurig's dock is only 1.67' to 2.0', necessitating very careful boat operation to prevent damage to seagrasses. The stipulated modification to the permit allowing three mooring pilings and requiring mooring waterward of the terminal platform clarifies DER's understanding that boats would only be moored on the waterward side of the terminal platform. No more than one or two boats can reasonably be moored at the facility. That is no more than could have been moored at the previous dock; in fact, it is equivalent to the two moored at Petitioner Traurig's dock. The environmental impact of the proposed Melton dock would be far less than that of the other docks along this shoreline, primarily because it causes boats to be operated and moored in deeper water. Neither the proposed project, nor the one or two boats that can be expected to moor at the terminal platform, will have any adverse effect on Florida Bay or the seagrass communities in the immediate vicinity. The entire area of Florida Bay except for the shoreline area where the Melton and other docks in the vicinity are located is open for navigation. It is between 0.4 and 0.5 miles from the end of the proposed dock to the nearest navigation channel. The proposed dock is not a hazard to navigation in that nearest channel, the Intracoastal Waterway. It is, however, an inconvenience and can present a hazard to unwary nighttime recreational users in the waters next to the shoreline where the Melton, Clarke, and Traurig docks are located. Petitioners' witnesses' testimony focused on how the Melton dock would force them to change their usual paths while recreating in the area, or traveling to and from nearby docks. Water-skiers and "knee-towers" have had to modify the route they used to take when water-skiing or knee-towing past the Melton property, now that much of the dock is in place. Some boat operators, Petitioners' witnesses included, continue to operate their boats so close to the Melton dock that near- collisions take place. A sailor chose to forego landing his catamaran at a dock near the Melton dock because its presence would have given him "a hard time getting out." Youngsters on "hydoslides" and "wet bikes," and in small boats, have passed landward of the outermost pilings of the uncompleted Melton dock, literally going under the structure, on several occasions. One neighbor witnessed three nighttime collisions with the uncompleted Melton dock by boaters, each of which ended when the boaters extricated themselves from the pilings. Traurig's tenant next door to the Meltons, when traveling to and from her dock, complained that "you can't go straight out anymore. You have to go out and then around. You have to be cautious..." Petitioner Traurig stated that the Melton dock would "almost cause her to jump out of her unpowered sailboat and tow it into her dock," as it would limit her ability to tack in the close confines created by the new dock. Petitioner Charles Clarke, whose property is separated from the Meltons by Petitioner Traurig's property, stated that the proposed dock is "an obstacle essentially to navigation and enjoyment of that waterway as I used it...," and that he is prevented from tacking into his dock by the presence of the Meltons' dock. Buccaneer Point is full of docks. The neighboring docks are generally approximately 100' long, while the Meltons' dock that DER proposes to permit will be 289' long, with mooring pilings and a boat extending this facility between 300' and 310' offshore. Boaters will be required to avoid this dock while recreating in the area, and while travelling to and from nearby docks. The proposed dock will discourage boaters and water- skiers from traveling through the very shallow waters off the ends of the other docks in the vicinity, potentially injuring themselves and the benthic communities. The Melton dock will not cross over the riparian lines of the Melton property. The project is clearly in the public interest by preventing ongoing adverse impacts of the existing dock, allowing the recolonization of habitat in those disturbed areas, and by extending the dock to prevent the destruction of the bay bottom. This is accomplished by elevating the dock to 6' and restricting its width to 4' in order to allow better sunlight penetration below the dock. This is also accomplished by prohibiting the mooring of vessels other than seaward of the terminus platform, thereby keeping vessels in deeper water to prevent additional destruction of the seagrass beds throughout the area. During the course of the final hearing, the Meltons and DER entered into several stipulations which will promote the absence of impact to the seagrass community. They have agreed that the following conditions will be made part of any permit issued by DER: The dock structure will be modified so that it is T-shaped rather than L-shaped. The terminal platform and access walkway will be of the dimensions contained in DER's "intent to issue." The access walkway can intersect the terminal platform at any point along the platform's 40' length. There will be 3 mooring pilings placed seaward of the terminal platform. The permit will restrict the mooring of vessels to the seaward side of the terminal platform. The Meltons will remove the 3 mooring pilings located to the right of the dock and 2 of the 4 pilings located to the left of the dock. The Meltons will not use a water-based barge in less than 2' of water in connection with the dock construction or driving or removing the pilings.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered granting the Meltons' application for a dredge and fill permit, conditioned upon the stipulations and the mitigative recommendation set forth in this Recommended Order. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16 day of October, 1990. LINDA H. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16 day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NOS. 89-6051 and 89-6135 Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 3, 6, 7, 22d, 22g, 22j, and 22r have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 22f, 22h, 22i, and 22n- 22q have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 4, 5, 19, 22a, 22c, 22e, 22i, 22k, and 22m have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues in this cause. Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 8-18, 20, 21, 22b, 22s, and 22t have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony, argument of counsel, or conclusions of law. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 2, 6, 8-10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19-23, and 26 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. The Department's proposed finding of fact numbered 3 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 4, 5, and 25 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony, argument of counsel, or conclusions of law. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 7, 11, 13, 16, 18, and 24 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues in this cause. Respondents Meltons' proposed findings of fact numbered 1-13 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael F. Chenoweth, Esquire 31 Garden Cove Drive Key Largo, Florida 33037 James S. Mattson, Esquire Joseph J. Vetrick, Esquire MATTSON, TOBIN & VETRICK Post Office Box 586 Key West, Florida 33037 Cecile I. Ross, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on the Department's Motion, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: In October of 1995, Petitioners, who desired to construct a single-family, concrete dock in the Hillsboro Canal (in Broward County, Florida) for their 171-foot yacht and to perform dredging adjacent to the dock (Project), filed with the Department a Joint Application for Environmental Resource Permit/Authorization to Use State Owned Submerged Lands/Federal Dredge and Fill Permit (Application). In the Application, Petitioners indicated that their mailing address was: c/o Flynn Enterprises 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60611 Flynn Enterprises, Inc., is a business owned by Petitioner Donald Flynn. The Application listed "Jeff Adair, Project Manager" of "Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 N. Andrews Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309," as the "agent authorized to secure permit" for Petitioners. The application form that Petitioners used to submit their Application contained the following signature page: By signing this application form, I am applying, or I am applying on behalf of the applicant, for the permit and any proprietary authorizations identified above, according to the supporting data and other incidental information filed with this application. I am familiar with the information contained in this application and represent that such information is true, complete and accurate. I understand this is an application and not a permit, and that work prior to approval is a violation. I understand that this application and any permit issued or proprietary authorization issued pursuant thereto, does not relieve me of any obligation for obtaining any other required federal, state, water management district or local permit prior to commencement of construction. I agree, or I agree on behalf of my corporation, to operate and maintain the permitted system unless the permitting agency authorizes transfer of the permit to a responsible operation entity. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430, F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below) Signature of Applicant/Agent Date (Corporate Title if applicable) AN AGENT MAY SIGN ABOVE ONLY IF THE APPLICANT COMPLETES THE FOLLOWING: I hereby designate and authorize the agent listed above to act on my behalf, or on behalf of my corporation, as the agent in the processing of this application for the permit and/or proprietary authorization indicated above; and to furnish, on request, supple- mental information in support of the appli- cation. In addition, I authorize the above- listed agent to bind me, or my corporation, to perform any requirement which may be necessary to procure the permit or authorization indicated above. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430. F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant Signature of Applicant Date (Corporate Title if applicable) Please note: The applicant's original signature (not a copy) is required above. PERSON AUTHORIZING ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY MUST COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: I either own the property described in this application or I have legal authority to allow access to the property, and I consent, after receiving prior notification, to any site visit on the property by agents or personnel from the Department of Environ- mental Protection, the Water Management District and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers necessary for the review and inspection of the proposed project specified in this application. I authorize these agents or personnel to enter the property as many times as may be necessary to make such review and inspection. Further , I agree to provide entry to the project site for such agents or personnel to monitor permitted work if a permit is granted. Typed/Printed Name Signature Date (Corporate Title if applicable) The name "Jeff Adair" appears on the "Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below)" line under the first paragraph on the signature page of Petitioners' Application; however, neither Adair's signature, nor any other signature, appears on the signature line under this paragraph. Petitioner Donald Flynn's signature appears on the signature lines under the second (agent designation and authorization) and third (access to property) paragraphs on the page. By letter dated November 17, 1995, the Department informed Petitioners of the following: Preliminary evaluation of your project leads staff to the conclusion that the project as proposed cannot be recommended for approval. While this is not final agency action or notice of intent, it does represent the staff review of your application based on consider- able experience in permitting matters. We are sending you this letter at this stage of the processing to allow you to assess fully the further commitment of financial resources for design dependent on permit issuance. . . . In summary, please revise plans to: (1) reduce the amount of dredging; (2) reduce impacts to natural resources; (3) reduce the size of the dock; (4) reduce encroachment on navigational channel; (5) reduce encroachment on adjacent properties; and (6) after minimization, offer mitigation plans that would address the loss of seagrass in the vicinity (watershed or basin) of the project site. Your application is currently "incomplete" and Final Agency Action will not occur until a reasonable amount of time is allowed for the submittal of a revised plan. A completeness summary has been sent under separate cover, addressing the items that are still outstanding. Staff will continue to process your application in the normal manner; however, I suggest you contact Tim Rach of this office . . . to discuss these possible alternatives regarding your project. The Department's November 17, 1995, letter was addressed to Petitioners "c/o Jeff Adair, Project Manager, Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 North Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309-2132," as were subsequent requests for additional information made by the Department and other correspondence from the Department concerning the Project. Adair responded to the Department's requests for additional information and otherwise corresponded and communicated with the Department on behalf of Petitioners. In July of 1996, Adair participated in a telephone conference call during which the Department advised him that, if the Application was not withdrawn, it would be denied. On August 13, 1996, Adair sent the following letter to the Department concerning the Project: Pursuant to our recent discussions pertaining to the proposed mitigation plan and final review and processing of the Flynn Dock application, we have been advised via Mr. Flynn's attorney not to withdraw the application. Therefore, we await the Department's final decision relative to the permittability of this project. As you have indicated, we are anticipating the Depart- ment's response toward the end of this month. In making your decision, we strongly urge you to consider the merits or our innovative and "no risk" mitigation plan. We believe our mitigation plan more than compensates for proposed impacts and provides substantial net benefits to the environment and the research community. In particular, information obtained from our proposed research effort would not only benefit our project, but would also facilitate scientific analysis and review of similar applications and issues. As always, please do not hesitate to call should you have any questions or concerns. On August 19, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611," the address that Petitioners had indicated in the Application was their mailing address: We have reviewed the information received on May 31, 1996 for an Environmental Resource Permit and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands. The Department has deemed the application complete as of this date. Final action on your application for an Environmental Resource Permit and sovereign[] submerged lands authorization will be taken within 90 days of receipt of your last item of information unless you choose to waive this timeclock. If you have any questions, please contact me at . . . . A copy of this August 19, 1996, letter was sent by the Department to Adair. On August 27, 1996, the Department issued a Consolidated Notice of Denial (Notice) in which it announced its preliminary decision to deny Petitioners' Application. The Notice contained the following advisement: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department's action may petition for an administrative proceeding (Hearing) in accordance with Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Petitions filed by the permittee and the parties listed below must be filed within 14 days of receipt of this letter. Third party Petitioners shall mail a copy of the petition to the permittee at the address indicated above at the time of filing. Failure to file a petition within this time period shall constitute a waiver of any right such person may have to request an administrative determination (hearing) under Section 120.57, F.S. The Petition must contain the information set forth below and must be filed (received) in the Office of General Counsel of the Department at 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000: The name, address, and telephone number of each petitioner, the permittee's name and address, the Department Permit File Number and county in which the project is proposed; A statement of how and when each petitioner received notice of the Depart- ment's action or proposed action; A statement of how each petitioner's substantial interests are affected by the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of the material facts disputed by petitioner, if any; A statement of facts which petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of which rules or statutes petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; and A statement of the relief sought by petitioner, stating precisely the action petitioner wants the Department to take with respect to the Department's action or proposed action. If a petition is filed, the administrative hearing process will constitute a renewed determination of the Department's decision on the application. Accordingly, the Department's final action may be different from the position taken by it in this letter. Persons whose substantial interests will be affected by any decision of the Department with regard to the permit have the right to petition to become a party to the proceeding. The petition must conform to the requirements specified above and be filed (received) within 14 days of receipt of this notice in the Office of General Counsel at the above address of the Department. Failure to petition within the allowed time frame constitutes a waiver of any right such person has to request a hearing under Section 120.57, F.S., and to participate as a party to this proceeding. Any subsequent intervention will only be at the approval of the presiding officer upon motion filed pursuant to Rule 28-5.207, and 60Q-2.010, F.A.C. This Notice constitutes final agency action unless a petition is filed in accordance with the above paragraphs or unless a request for extension of time in which to file a petition is filed within the time specified for filing a petition and conforms to Rule 62-103.070, F.A.C. Upon timely filing of a petition or a request for an extension of time this Notice will not be effective until further Order of the Department. . . . The Notice was mailed (by certified mail, return receipt requested) to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611." Although the Notice's certificate of service reflected that a copy of the Notice had been mailed to Adair "before the close of business on AUG 27 1996," in fact, as a result of inadvertence on the part of Department staff, a copy of the Notice had not been mailed to Adair. On September 3, 1996, the Notice sent to Petitioners was received by a Flynn Enterprises, Inc., employee at the address to which it was mailed. The employee executed a return receipt upon receiving the Notice. The Notice was referred to Victor Casini, Esquire, the general counsel of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., on September 4, 1996. Casini set the document aside for filing. He did not believe that there was any immediate action that he or anyone else in the Flynn Enterprises, Inc., office in Chicago needed to take in response to the Notice. Casini noted that Adair's name was listed in the Notice as among those who purportedly had been furnished copies of the Notice. He knew that Adair was handling all matters relating to the permitting of the Project for Petitioners. He therefore assumed that any action that needed to be taken in response to the Notice would be taken by Adair on behalf of Petitioners. Inasmuch as it appeared (from his review of the Notice) that the Department had already furnished Adair with a copy of the Notice, he saw no reason to contact Adair to apprise him of the issuance of the Notice. In taking no action in response to the Notice other than setting it aside for filing, Casini acted reasonably under the circumstances. Adair first learned of the issuance of the Notice during a telephone conversation he had on September 9, 1996, with an employee of Broward County, who mentioned to him, in passing, that the Department had denied Petitioners' Application. 2/ Adair thereupon immediately telephoned the Department to confirm that the Application had been denied. The Department representative to whom he spoke confirmed that the Notice had issued, apologized for the Department's failure to have sent him a copy of the Notice, and promised to rectify the error by sending him a copy of the Notice as soon as possible. Keith Skibicki, the vice president of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., in charge of its day-to-day operations, served as the liaison between Adair and Petitioners. On September 12, 1996, Adair telephoned Skibicki to inquire (for the first time) if Petitioners had received a copy of the Notice. Skibicki, who previously had neither seen nor heard about the Notice, asked around the office and learned that the Notice had been received and was in Casini's files. Skibicki related this information to Adair. Later that same day, September 12, 1996, Adair received the copy of the Notice that the Department had sent him. He then faxed a copy of the Notice to Harry Stewart, Esquire, the Florida attorney who had been retained by Petitioners to assist them in their efforts to obtain favorable action on their Application. Shortly thereafter Adair telephoned Stewart to discuss what they should do in response to the Notice. During their conversation, Stewart expressed the opinion that the 14-day period for filing a petition for an administrative proceeding began to run only upon Adair's receipt of the Notice and that therefore Petitioners had until September 26, 1996, to file their petition. During the two-week period that followed their telephone conversation, Adair and Stewart worked together to prepare such a petition. The petition was filed with the Department on September 26, 1996 (which was 23 days after the Notice had been delivered to the Chicago office of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., but only 14 days after Adair, Petitioners' designated agent in their dealings with the Department, had received a copy of the Notice). The actions taken on behalf of Petitioners in response to the Notice were intended to preserve Petitioners' right to challenge the proposed denial of their Application. At no time was there any knowing and intentional relinquishment of that right.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter an order finding that Petitioners' petition challenging the proposed denial of their Application is not time-barred and remanding the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the merits of Petitioners' challenge. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of February, 1997. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1997.
