The Issue The issues in this case are whether six outdoor advertising sign permits previously issued to Petitioner should be reinstated; or, if not, whether new permits should be issued for the six advertising facings (two on each of three sign structures) in Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact In June 1982, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.5 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 6868 issued by the City of Clearwater (the City), on October 22, 1981, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AF604 and AF605 issued by DOT on November 18, 1981. In January 1983, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.4 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 10406 issued by the City on October 15, 1982, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers A1288 and A1289 issued by DOT on December 20, 1982. On or about July 1, 1984, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.3 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number SN - 24060117 issued by the City on June 6, 1984, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AM631 and AM632 issued by DOT on January 12, 1984. National maintained the three outdoor advertising billboard structures, containing six advertising faces, as identified in Findings of Fact numbers 1, 2 and 3, above (the "subject sign structures"), in the same condition as they were when erected. Following the lawful erection of the subject sign structures, National paid DOT the required annual permit fees through the year 1995, which allowed National to maintain and operate the subject sign structures through December 31, 1995. In March of 1995, DOT notified National that it was dropping state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory because DOT had no jurisdiction over the segment of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, adjacent to which the subject sign structures were located. The evidence was that DOT did so by serving on National a "Notice of Violation," citing DOT's lack of jurisdiction. The "Notice of Violation" gave National the opportunity to request an administrative hearing to contest DOT's action. National had no reason to question DOT's position on the jurisdictional issue but rather relied upon DOT's determination that DOT did not have jurisdiction in March of 1995. National chose not to request a hearing. The evidence was not clear as to when the DOT lost, or believed it lost, jurisdiction; the evidence also was not clear whether the DOT ever had, or believed it ever had, jurisdiction. At the time DOT dropped state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory, DOT did not refund any permit fees to National, including the permit fees which National had paid for the 1995 calendar year. Consequently, permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 were fully paid through December 31, 1995. On November 2, 1995, the section of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, along which the subject sign structures are located became part of the National Highway System (NHS), and became jurisdictional for the purpose of permitting outdoor advertising billboard structures. On August 26, 1996, Kenneth M. Towcimak, as Director of DOT's Office of Right of Way, issued a memorandum to all District Outdoor Advertising Administrators addressing implementation of outdoor advertising control over roadways which were previously uncontrolled by DOT, and which became designated as part of the NHS on November 28, 1995. The Towcimak memorandum of August 26, 1996, required notification by registered mail, with return receipt requested, to all owners of such outdoor advertising billboard structures, that they must obtain state permits by January 1, 1997. There was no evidence as to whether DOT ever notified National by registered mail, with return receipt requested, that National was required to obtain state permits by January 1, 1997, for the subject sign structures. National filed six applications for the subject sign structures on or about December 29, 1997 (one for each of the two sign facings on each sign structure). On the part of the forms asking for the location of the sign, the six applications described the location of the signs, respectively, as: "Reinstated State Tag # AF 604-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AF 605-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 631-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 632-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AI 288-10"; and "Reinstated State Tag # AI 289-10." The applications contained copies of the permits previously issued by DOT for the operation and maintenance of the subject sign structures, copies of Landowner's permission and copies of City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures. Although the applications included copies of the City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures, DOT knew that the City no longer considered the sign structures to be legal under the City's code. In 1989, the City amended its code to place limitations on the size (height and area) and concentration (one per lot) of signs in the locations of the subject sign structures. The subject sign structures exceeded at least some of the new limitations; however, the code amendment provided for a seven-year "amortization" period, until January 19, 1996, during which the signs would be permitted as legal, non-conforming signs. At the end of the "amortization" period, the signs no longer were legal under the City code. Some of the information on National's six applications was incorrect or incomplete. But all of the incorrect or incomplete information could easily have been remedied, and "incorrect information" is not the real basis upon which DOT gave notice of intent to deny the applications. The real basis for the notice of intent was the illegality of the sign structures under the City code. On or about November 22, 1999, National filed with DOT a Petition for Reinstatement for each of the three signs (each petition seeking reinstatement of the two permits for the two advertising facings for each sign structure) under Section 479.07(8)(b)1-3, Florida Statutes (1999). On January 31, 2000, DOT issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Petition for Reinstatement as to each of the three such petitions filed by National.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Department of Transportation enter a final order denying National's petitions for reinstatement and National's applications for new sign permits. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Aileen Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Attention: James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact In August of 1995 Champion International Corporation gave Petitioner permission to place a sign advertising The Outpost on property that Champion owned in Walton County. The sign was to be located at the corner of the south side of State Road 20 and Black Creek Boulevard. State Road 20 is a federal-aid primary road. Black Creek Boulevard is a county maintained road. Petitioner subsequently erected a 4' X 8' outdoor advertising sign on Champion's property. The sign was located on the south side of State Road 20, two miles east of U. S. 331 and twenty (20) feet west of the intersection of State Road 20 and Black Creek Boulevard. The sign was double-sided with east and west faces. On September 1, 1995, Petitioner filed an application with Respondent requesting a permit for the 4' X 8' sign already erected on the south side of State Road 20 and twenty (20) feet west of the intersection of State Road 20 and Black Creek Boulevard. On September 22, 1995 Respondent issued a Notice of Denied Application informing Petitioner that it could not have a permit for a sign on the south side of State Road 20 and twenty (20) feet west of the intersection of State Road 20 and Black Creek Boulevard. Respondent denied this permit for two reasons: (a) the location was zoned "agricultural" which was an un-permittable land use designation; and (b) the proposed sign was located on the state's right-of-way. After receiving the Notice of Denied Application, Petitioner removed the 4' X 8' sign. On or about January 29, 1996 Petitioner filed a sign permit application with the Walton County Building Department. The application was for an off- premises sign to be located fifty (50) feet south of State Road 20 along Black Creek Boulevard. The application states that: If the proposed sign is located along a federal aid primary road, a permit from the Florida Department of Transportation (904/638-0250) must be obtained before a Walton County building permit is issued. The applicant must obtain a letter from Walton County to submit to the Department of Transportation to submit with the application. Petitioner did not apply for a permit from Respondent for this proposed sign. The Walton County Building Department issued Petitioner a permit to erect the proposed sign on January 29, 1996. Petitioner subsequently erected a second sign on the south side of State Road 20, one foot off of the right-of-way, and about fifty (50) feet from the intersection of State Road 20 and Black Creek Boulevard. It was 8' X 8', two-sided, mounted in concrete, with red, black and white copy advertising The Outpost on both sides. The sign was placed so that it could be read by east and west bound traffic along State Road 20. Only the east face of the sign could be read from Black Creek Boulevard. The subject sign was located within 660 feet of the right-of-way of State Road 20. It did not qualify as an on-premise sign because the Outpost RV Park was located two miles away. Respondent never received a permit application from Petitioner for the 8' X 8' sign. There was no material difference in the location of Petitioner's previously removed 4' X 8' sign and the new 8' X 8' sign. On May 13, 1996 Respondent issued Notice of Violation No. 10BME1996110 to Petitioner for the west facing of the 8' X 8' sign. Respondent also issued Notice of Violation No. 10BME1996111 to Petitioner for the east facing of the same sign. Each Notice of Violation contained a location description for a sign which was the same as the location description contained in Petitioner's previously denied sign permit application. The basis for both violations was that neither sign had the permit required by Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes. The notices directed Petitioner to remove the sign structure within thirty (30) days. Respondent subsequently removed the 8' X 8' sign because Petitioner failed to do so within the prescribed time. Respondent's right-of-way on the north and south side of State Road 20 is the area that Respondent maintains which is approximately fifty (50) feet. Respondent's right-of-way map showing the maintained area is available to the public at Respondent's Right-Of-Way Office. In the past, Petitioner erected other signs along U. S. Highway 331 without obtaining a permit. Respondent issued a permit for at least one of these signs after Petitioner filed the appropriate application. Respondent required Petitioner to remove any sign that was not eligible for a permit. Respondent's inspector issued more than ten (10) notices of violation to owners of other outdoor advertising signs in the same general vicinity as Petitioner's 8' X 8' sign on May 13, 1996. These signs have been removed. There is a Reddick Fish Camp sign located on the south side of State Road 20 and west of the intersection of State Road 20 and County Road 3280. That sign is located six miles from the sign at issue here. Another sign has been nailed to a tree three-quarters of a mile west of the subject sign. There is insufficient evidence to determine whether these signs are illegal because they do not have a permit. There is no persuasive evidence that Respondent issues violations to Petitioner when it erects an off-premises sign without a permit but allows illegal signs of other property owners to exist without issuing similar notices of violation. Even if Petitioner had filed a permit application for the sign structure at issue here, it would have been ineligible for issuance of a permit because the location's land use designation was agricultural. If the property had been zoned commercial or industrial, Petitioner would have been required to have a permit because the sign did not qualify for any exceptions to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner erected a sign with two faces in violation of Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul T. Davis 4576 Highway 3280 Freeport, Florida 32439 Andrea V. Smart, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transporation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent should revoke Petitioner's sign permits and retrieve Petitioner's permit tags because Petitioner violated Sections 479.07(5) and 479.08, Florida Statutes, 1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14- 10.004(7), 2/ by allegedly removing its sign from its property and by failing to display the permit tag prior to removing the sign.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation formed in 1983 by Mr. Rodney Forton. Mr. Forton is the president and sole shareholder of Petitioner. Sometime in 1987, Petitioner entered into a management agreement with Cotee River Outdoor Advertising Company ("Cotee River"). The management agreement provided that Cotee River would construct a sign on property owned by Petitioner on U.S. highway 19 in New Port Richey, Florida (the "Cotee River sign"). Cotee River agreed to pay Petitioner a portion of the advertising revenues from the sign. The Cotee River Permit On May 26, 1987, Cotee River applied for an outdoor advertising sign permit from Respondent. The application described the Cotee River sign as a rectangular wood sign measuring 10 feet by 20 feet, with its lowest point approximately 15 feet above ground level and its highest point approximately 25 feet above the crown of the road. Respondent approved the application and mailed the approval to Cotee River on May 29, 1987. On June 3, 1987, Respondent located the Cotee River sign in Respondent's sign inventory at, Section 595, ". . . N/B 5.06 in F/N." The number "5.06" indicates that the sign is located at milepost 5.06 on U.S. 19. 3/ Mileposts describe the location of each sign by the distance of the sign from a fixed point. Each of Respondent's outdoor advertising inspectors measures the milepost for each sign in his or her territory using a distance measuring instrument. Respondent then enters the milepost for each sign in Respondent's sign inventory. The milepost of 5.06 that Respondent assigned to the Cotee River permit was incorrect. In May 1987, Cotee River constructed a sign on Petitioner's property pursuant to the permit granted by Respondent. The sign was a metal monopole sign rather than the wood sign described in the application. The Cotee River sign was not constructed at milepost 5.060. Cotee River rented the sign to outdoor advertisers. However, Cotee River failed to pay any portion of the advertising revenue to Petitioner, and the parties resolved the matter by mutual agreement. Petitioner and Cotee River agreed that Cotee River would release its right to manage the Cotee River sign in consideration for the right to manage a sign located on other property owned by Petitioner. The agreement provided that Petitioner would pay Cotee River a prescribed sum in exchange for the performance of specific duties by Cotee River. Cotee River failed to perform the duties specified in the agreement. Petitioner refused to pay the balance of payments. Petitioner sued Cotee River. Cotee River went into bankruptcy and was dissolved. Petitioner's Permit On July 14, 1992, Petitioner applied for an outdoor advertising sign permit for the Cotee River sign. The application described the sign as an existing rectangular, metal, monopole "sign in place," measuring approximately 10 feet by 20 feet. The application stated that the sign was first erected in May 1987. Respondent approved the application from Petitioner and mailed the approval to Petitioner on October 12, 1992. Respondent again incorrectly listed the location of the Cotee River sign in Respondent's sign inventory as, Section 595, ". . . N/B 5.060 in F/N." Respondent issued permit tag number BG341-25 to Petitioner. Although Petitioner used the Cotee River sign to generate advertising revenue, Petitioner never displayed any tag numbers on the sign. The tag numbers remained in Petitioner's files until sometime in 1995. Dr. Goluba's Permit At about the same time that Cotee River went out of business in 1992, Robert L. Goluba, D.D.S., owned property immediately adjacent to Petitioner's property. Prior to March 1993, an unidentified representative of Respondent contacted Dr. Goluba. The representative told Dr. Goluba that there were two signs on Dr. Goluba's property that were going to be taken down if the sign permits were not renewed. The representative mistakenly identified one of the two signs as the Cotee River sign. The representative went on to explain that Respondent could avoid the expense of taking down the two signs if Dr. Goluba obtained permits for the signs. Dr. Goluba wanted the advertising revenues and agreed to obtain the necessary permits. On March 2, 1993, Dr. Goluba applied for a sign permit for the Cotee River sign he mistakenly believed to be located on his property. The application described the sign as an "existing" rectangular, metal, monopole sign measuring approximately 10 feet by 24 feet, with its lowest point approximately 18 feet above ground level and its highest point approximately 30 feet above the crown of the road. The application stated that the sign was first erected in May 1987. Respondent approved the application from Dr. Goluba and mailed the approval to him on March 8, 1993. Respondent listed the location of the Cotee River sign in Respondent's sign inventory as, Section 595, ". . . N/M.P. 4.870 in F/N." Respondent incorrectly listed Dr. Goluba's permit in the sign inventory at milepost 4.870. On March 24, 1993, Respondent issued permit number BG960-35 to Dr. Goluba. Although Dr. Goluba never derived advertising revenue from the Cotee River sign, he did display his permit on the sign. Dr. Goluba inadvertently failed to pay the fee required to renew the sign permit in 1994 and, therefore, failed to display current permits on the sign. On April 11, 1994, Respondent issued a Notice of Violation, Failure To Display Permit Tag. The New Outdoor Advertising Inspector In early 1995, a new outdoor advertising inspector assumed responsibility for the territory in which the Cotee River sign was located. On April 11, 1995, the inspector conducted a field inspection to verify the mileposts and signs in the territory for which he was responsible. The inspector correctly identified the milepost of the Cotee River sign as milepost 4.980. He found no sign subject to regulation by Respondent 4/ located at milepost 5.060. Milepost 5.060 and 4.980 are approximately 422 feet apart. Relevant law prohibits the location of regulated signs within 1,000 feet of each other. 5/ No exceptions to 1,000 foot prohibition applied to the Cotee River sign. The inspector concluded that Petitioner had removed the wood sign originally permitted to Cotee River in 1987 and which Respondent had incorrectly listed in its sign inventory as being located at milepost 5.060. On July 12, 1995, Respondent issued to Petitioner a Notice Of Violation -- Removed Sign. On August 22, 1995, Respondent ordered the revocation of Petitioner's tag permit because Petitioner had allegedly removed the Cotee River sign from milepost 5.060. Respondent never issued a Notice of Violation to Petitioner for failure to display his tag numbers on the Cotee River sign. Petitioner protested the revocation of its permit and refused to return the permit tags to Respondent. Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. In the meantime, Dr. Goluba's accountant had inadvertently failed to pay the permit fee for the Cotee River sign. Respondent placed the Cotee River sign on Respondent's "cutdown list" for failure to pay the required fees. On June 20, 1995, Respondent had the Cotee River sign cut down and removed. Respondent sent Dr. Goluba a bill in the amount of $4,990 for the cost of cutting the sign down and removing it. Prior to the date Respondent cut down and removed the Cotee River sign, Petitioner notified the inspector verbally and with written documentation that the sign was owned by Petitioner, located on Petitioner's property, and permitted to Petitioner. The inspector found that Respondent's records did not agree with Petitioner's records. The inspector informed Petitioner that the "cutdown order" came from Tallahassee and there was nothing the inspector could do. Dr. Goluba's tags were displayed on the Cotee River sign at the time it was cut down and removed. Ms. Maria Passanisi was the broker who managed the sign for Dr. Goluba. Ms. Passanisi was at the site when the sign was cut down and removed. She protested Respondent's action so vehemently that the police officers regulating traffic at the scene had to intervene to quell the disturbance. After Respondent cut down the Cotee River sign, Petitioner drove a stick into the ground where the sign had been located and displayed the permit tags for the removed sign on the stick. The tags were displayed on the stick at the time of the hearing. The Computerized Sign Inventory Respondent uses a computer system to maintain its sign inventory. The computer system does not accept the same milepost for two or more regulated signs. When Petitioner applied for its sign permit in 1992, Respondent was required to carry the Cotee River permit in the inventory as a void permit. The computer system would not accept the same milepost for Petitioner's permit and the void Cotee River permit. In order to circumvent the computer system, Respondent's supervisor of property management arbitrarily changed the milepost number entered for the Cotee River permit from milepost 5.060 to milepost 4.970. As late as September 20, 1993, Respondent's computerized sign inventory identified the Cotee River sign as being located at three incorrect mileposts. The inventory located the same sign permitted to Cotee River, Petitioner, and Dr. Goluba, respectively, at mileposts 4.970, 5.060, and 4.870. In 1995, the new outdoor advertising inspector correctly located the Cotee River sign at milepost 4.980. However, he mistakenly assumed that milepost 5.060 was the correct milepost for Petitioner's sign and erroneously concluded that Petitioner had removed its sign.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not remove the permitted sign and that the permits issued to Petitioner are valid. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1997.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner submitted applications on 13 June 1978 for signs facing north and south on I-110 0.433 miles north of SR 296 and these applications were denied by Respondent because the sign would not be located more than 800 feet from the noted business activity. The testimony produced at the hearing related solely to the distance the proposed sign would be located from an existing sign owned by and permitted to Lamar Outdoor Advertising. Petitioner's position at the hearing was that his application for a permit should be granted because the Lamar sign upon which the denial of his application was allegedly based was illegal because located less than 500 feet from the beginning of an on-ramp to the I-110. There was no dispute regarding the facts in this case. The position in which Petitioner intends to locate the proposed sign is less than 1,000 feet from a sign previously permitted to Lamar Outdoor advertising. The hearing in Docket No. 78-2179T was held the same date as the hearing in this case and it was there found as a fact that the Lamar sign is located less than 500 feet from the beginning of the on-ramp at the I-110.
The Issue As to DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 and 14-4927, the issues are whether the billboards identified in the notices of violation are located on the premises of Respondent's business and, thus, exempt from licensure; and, if not, whether the billboards are eligible for licensure pursuant to section 479.07, Florida Statutes, or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, Florida Statutes. With respect to DOAH Case No. 14-4928, the issue is whether Respondent engaged in, or benefitted from, the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation.
Findings Of Fact I. DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 & 14-4927 The Parties The Respondent in these proceedings is I-10 Pecan House, Inc. ("Pecan House"), an entity currently owned and managed by Olan Q. Nobles. As discussed in greater detail below, Pecan House is a small country store that has conducted business in Jefferson County, Florida, for nearly 40 years. The Department is the state agency responsible, inter alia, for the regulation of outdoor advertising signs located within 600 feet of, and visible from, interstate highways. The Events In or around 1976, Erma Jean Walker (Mr. Nobles' sister) and her husband, Lyman Walker, III, purchased three tracts of land that are relevant to this proceeding. The first such parcel, upon which the Walkers quickly constructed an open- air market, comprises one acre and is located on State Road 257, immediately north of the intersection of that roadway and I-10. The second relevant parcel, .18 acres in size and located a short distance to the southeast of the first tract, is situated adjacent to the westbound lanes of I-10. Upon their acquisition of this parcel, the Walkers constructed a billboard that advertised the open-air market and the related business activities conducted on the third parcel. The third parcel, which is roughly 2.3 acres in size and likewise adjoins the westbound lanes of I-10, is located less than 1000 feet to the east of the second tract. It is upon this tract that, in mid-to-late 1976, the Walkers built a concrete structure to be used for the purpose of manufacturing candy and jelly——products the Walkers offered for sale at the nearby open-air market. By the end of 1976, the Walkers also constructed (upon the third parcel) a billboard advertising the open-air market and jelly/candy manufacture. Although the billboards referenced above were visible from I-10 and located within 600 feet of the roadway——and, thus, within the Department's "controlled area"——the Walkers did not apply for outdoor advertising permits. This is because, as the Department concedes, the billboards were exempt from licensure from 1976 until the mid-1990s (or perhaps later, as Mr. Nobles asserts) under the "on premises" exemption set forth in section 479.16, Florida Statutes. Under the definition of "premises" in effect during that period, the land upon which a sign was located did not need to be contiguous to the advertised business in order for the exemption to apply. For reasons that will soon be apparent, it is necessary to inject a third billboard into this discussion: in 1993, the Walkers constructed on the third tract of land a "double-stack" billboard, which is situated less than 200 feet and 1000 feet, respectively, from the signs erected in 1976 upon the third and second tracts. Although the double-stack billboard would have ostensibly satisfied the on-premises exemption, the Walkers nevertheless applied for——and were granted——an outdoor advertising permit. For all that appears, the Department has never initiated any proceedings to revoke the permit, which remains valid to this day. In 1995, Mrs. Walker transferred control of Pecan House to Mr. Nobles, who until that time had assisted the Walkers on an as-needed basis. Soon thereafter, Mr. Nobles upgraded the open-air market (on the first parcel) to a secure building and, of particular relevance here, ceased all manufacturing activities at the concrete building (on the third parcel). At or around that time, the Legislature amended the definition of "premises" to include a contiguity requirement.3/ This is significant, for the second and third parcels——the locations of the two billboards at issue herein——are not contiguous to the first parcel but, rather, are separated by a tract in which neither the Walkers nor Mr. Nobles holds a leasehold or ownership interest. Further, there is no recorded easement connecting Mr. Nobles' three parcels. Thus, although the two billboards constructed in 1976 lost their on-premises status in the mid-1990s, this fact apparently went unnoticed by the Department for roughly 13 years. Then, in March of 2008, the Department issued notices of violation in connection with both billboards. Among other things, the notices alleged that "outdoor advertising permit[s] [were] required, but ha[d] not been issued" for the billboards, which Mr. Nobles was instructed to remove within 30 days. A short time thereafter, an inspector or other agent of the Department conducted, in Mr. Nobles' presence, an examination of the 1976 billboards and Pecan House's business operations. At the conclusion of her inspection, the Department employee erroneously opined that, in fact, there was "no problem"4/ with the billboards in question, which Mr. Nobles reasonably took to mean that the signs continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption and, thus, were exempt from licensure. The reasonableness of this understanding was bolstered by the fact that, subsequent to the inspection, Mr. Nobles heard nothing more from the Department concerning the March 2008 notices of violation.5/ More than four years later, on December 17, 2012, the Department issued new notices of violation in connection with the 1976 billboards: notice 1352, relating to the billboard constructed upon the third parcel, which presently reads "Exit Now" and bears a Shell gasoline logo (hereinafter "Exit Now"); and notice 1487, relating to the billboard erected upon the second parcel, which presently reads "Welcome to Big O's / We Appreciate Your Business" (hereinafter "Big O's"). The parties thereafter engaged in settlement negotiations, in the course of which Mr. Nobles' counsel struggled mightily to convince the Department that the billboards continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption. When the Department rejected this argument, Mr. Nobles applied for an outdoor advertising permit for each billboard. The applications were ultimately denied, prompting the Department to refer the matters to DOAH for further proceedings. Based upon the evidence adduced at final hearing, it is evident that the billboards in question no longer meet the on-premises exemption and, thus, are subject to removal unless the signs meet either the current statutory requirements for a permit or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, which authorizes licensure if the billboards satisfy earlier statutory criteria and certain other conditions. Eligibility for Licensure – "Exit Now" Beginning first with the "Exit Now" billboard, the record makes pellucid that the current statutory requirements for licensure cannot be satisfied. Among other things, the sign is located a mere 190 feet from the permitted, double-stack billboard erected in 1993, a distance far less than the minimum spacing requirement of 1500 feet. See § 479.07(9)(a)1., Fla. Stat. As for the potential applicability of the grandfather provision to the "Exit Now" billboard, it is critical to observe that the Department's delay of nearly five years (March of 2008 through December of 2012) in pursuing removal has placed Mr. Nobles at a significant disadvantage. In particular, had the Department moved forward in 2008——instead of inexplicably abandoning the action, which, along with the statements of its inspector, led Mr. Nobles to believe, incorrectly, that no permit was required——Mr. Nobles likely would have applied for a permit,6/ which the Department would have evaluated pursuant to the version of the grandfather provision in effect at that time. This is significant, for the 2008 codification of the grandfather provision, which remained unchanged until July 1, 2014, did not preclude licensure in situations where a billboard had previously enjoyed on-premises status or some other recognized exemption from the permitting requirement. Further, the pre-July 1, 2014, grandfather provision was quite favorable in that it allowed a potential licensee to demonstrate that the billboard would have met the criteria for licensure in effect "[a]t any time during the period in which the sign has been erected." § 479.105(1)(e)2., Fla. Stat. (2013)(emphasis added). The current version of the grandfather provision is quite a different animal. For one thing, grandfather status can only be granted if the billboard at issue "has never been exempt" from permitting. § 479.105(1)(c)2., Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). For another thing, the current grandfather provision looks not at "any" time in which the sign has been erected but, rather, at the criteria in effect during the initial seven years in which the sign was subject to the Department's jurisdiction. § 479.105(1)(c)2.b., Fla. Stat. (2014). As Mr. Nobles readily acknowledges, his effort to obtain a permit for the "Exit Now" billboard is a nonstarter under the 2014 version of the grandfather provision, whose plain language prohibits the issuance of a permit where, as here, the sign was previously exempt from licensure. This does not end the matter, however, for the undersigned finds that the Department's unjustified delay in pursuing removal——along with its agent's erroneous statement that the billboard was legal, upon which Mr. Nobles relied——requires that the "Exit Now" application be evaluated under the version of the grandfather provision that was in effect from 2008 until July 1, 2014. Pursuant to the pre-2014 codification of section 479.105, "grandfathering" was authorized if the owner could demonstrate: 1) that the sign in question had been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for at least seven years; 2) that, at any time during the period in which the sign has been erected, the sign would have satisfied the criteria established in chapter 479 for issuance of a permit; 3) that the Department did not file a notice of violation or take other action to remove the sign during the initial seven-year period in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location; and 4) that the sign is not located on a state right-of-way and is not a safety hazard. § 479.105(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2013). Upon such a showing, the Department was authorized to treat the sign as conforming or nonconforming and issue a permit. Turing to the merits, the first prong is easily satisfied, as the "Exit Now" sign has been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for 39 years, far longer than the seven-year period the statute requires. The third prong is also met, for the record makes clear that the Department took no action to pursue removal during the initial seven-year period, i.e., 1976 through 1983, in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained. In addition, the Department stipulates that the sign neither poses a safety hazard nor is located upon a state right-of-way, thereby satisfying the fourth prong.7/ This leaves only the second prong, which asks if the sign would have met the criteria for licensure at any time after it was erected. The selection of any time period subsequent to 1993 would surely doom the application, as the sign would be unable to satisfy the minimum spacing requirement due to its close physical proximity to the double-stack billboard——which, as noted previously, was issued a permit in 1993 and remains licensed. Prior to 1993, however, there does not appear to be any spacing conflict that would preclude licensure in this instance.8/ With the spacing concern resolved (and the relevant period of inquiry narrowed to "any" time between 1976 and 1993), the undersigned turns to the only other criterion for licensure that appears to be in dispute: section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the issuance of a permit only if the sign is located in "commercial-zoned and industrial-zoned areas or commercial-unzoned or industrial-unzoned areas." Unfortunately, this issue cannot be resolved on the instant record, for there is a dearth of persuasive evidence concerning the zoning designation of the third parcel (the location of the "Exit Now" sign) during the critical period of inquiry. Indeed, the record contains only the Department's speculative assumption that, because the area is presently unzoned, it therefore must have been unzoned at all times in the past.9/ Further, even accepting the Department's assumption at face value, it is impossible to determine whether the business activities conducted on the parcel from 1976 until the mid- 1990s——namely, the manufacture of candy and jelly and the sale of pecans——would satisfy the use test at any time between 1976 and 1993.10/ Under ordinary circumstances, such an absence of evidence would necessitate an adverse result for the permit applicant. Owing, however, to the unusual history and posture of this case, as well as the undersigned's conclusion that the pre-2014 grandfather provision should govern, it is recommended that the Department reevaluate Mr. Nobles' application to determine if the third parcel could have satisfied the requirements of 479.111(2) at any point between 1976 and 1993. Eligibility for Licensure – "Big O's" The undersigned turns next to the "Big O's" sign, which, like the "Exit Now" billboard, is unable to satisfy current licensing criteria due, among other reasons, to its close proximity to the double-stack billboard.11/ Further, as with the "Exit Now" billboard, the fact that the "Big O's" sign was previously exempt from licensure (owing to its on-premises status from 1976 through the mid-1990s) renders it ineligible for licensure under the 2014 codification of the grandfather provision. However, in sharp contrast to the "Exit Now" billboard, the "Big O's" sign is positioned within 500 feet of an interstate exit ramp, thereby constituting a safety hazard. This distinction is fatal to Mr. Nobles, as every codification of the grandfather provision from the mid-90s (when the sign lost its on-premises status) onward has prohibited the licensure of billboards that present a safety issue. The short of it, then, is that the sign was no more eligible for licensure in the past than it is today, which obviates the need for any further analysis under the pre-2014 version of the grandfather provision. For the reasons articulated above, Mr. Nobles has failed to prove that the "Big O's" sign is exempt from licensure by virtue of the "on-premises" exception. Further, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that, due to safety concerns, the sign would not have been eligible for licensure at any point in time. Accordingly, the undersigned is constrained to recommend the sign's removal pursuant to section 479.105. II. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 As noted earlier in this Order, DOAH Case No. 14-4928 involves an allegation that Mr. Nobles engaged in——or benefitted from——the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation. The relevant facts are recounted below. On January 21, 2013, Mr. Nobles executed a lease agreement with Michael McDougal, who owns a parcel of land adjacent to the eastbound lanes of I-10, approximately .6 miles from County Road 257. In relevant part, the terms of the lease authorized Mr. Nobles to place on the property a pickup truck, attached to which was a billboard that advertised the I-10 Pecan House. Shortly thereafter, in late January 2013, Mr. Nobles relocated the truck to a position on Mr. McDougal's property a short distance to the south of the fence line that separates the parcel from the Department's right-of-way. But trouble soon followed: in late February or early March, the Department received several reports of unusual vegetation removal in the general area of Mr. Nobles' truck sign. In response, the Department requested one of its contractors, Metric Engineering, Inc. ("Metric"), to conduct a field inspection of the area. The inspection was performed on or about March 12, 2013, by Bill Armstrong, a certified arborist employed by Metric. During the course of his inspection, Mr. Armstrong observed, first, an area that the Department had previously cleared to facilitate the installation of a new fence, which had yet to be installed. This particular area, which ran along the length of the fence line and had been cleared within the preceding six months, had a width (as measured from the fence toward the roadway) of approximately 12 feet. Immediately beyond this 12-foot zone, however, Mr. Armstrong noticed evidence of other activity that had occurred much more recently. Specifically, Mr. Armstrong observed, on the side of the fence immediately opposite Mr. Nobles' truck, an area 120 feet in length (parallel to the fence line) and approximately 25 feet in width that had been cleared of vegetation. Within this 120 by 25 foot area, Mr. Armstrong discovered 30 tree stumps, which, upon close examination, exhibited signs of having been recently cut. Such indications included the presence of sawdust; the fact that the stumps were bright in color and relatively clean; and the observation of fresh debris at both ends of the swath. These findings were recorded in a report dated March 25, 2013, which Metric promptly forwarded to Morris Pigott, the Department's Project Manager of Vegetation and Resource Management. Several weeks later, Mr. Pigott conducted his own site visit, during which he examined the particular area that had concerned Mr. Armstrong. Consistent with the findings contained in Metric's report, Mr. Pigott observed, within the 120 by 25 foot area, numerous, freshly-cut tree stumps. Mr. Pigott further concluded, quite reasonably, that this activity had not been performed by the Department or one of its contractors, for the stumps had not been cut to ground level, the vegetation immediately to the east and west of the area was "very dense," and the area had not been "grubbed."12/ (As explained during the final hearing, "grubbing" involves the removal of the top six inches of surface material, an action designed to prevent regrowth.) To cinch matters, Mr. Pigott observed that the selective clearing of the 120 by 25 foot area had enhanced the visibility of Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard for eastbound traffic. Thereafter, on April 14, 2013, Mr. Pigott cited Mr. Nobles for violating section 479.106(7), which provides that any person who engages in or benefits from the unauthorized removal of vegetation shall be subject to an administrative penalty. Mr. Pigott further notified Mr. Nobles that, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.057, the Department intended to assess mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25. Mr. Nobles promptly denied any and all involvement in the removal, claiming that a road crew had cleared the vegetation two years earlier. In response, Mr. Pigott contacted Mr. Armstrong, disclosed Mr. Nobles' explanation, and asked that a follow-up inspection be performed. Mr. Armstrong conducted his second inspection on August 8, 2013. At that time, Mr. Armstrong observed that Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard was still present, and that the stumps within the 120 by 25 foot area had sprouted and grown to a height of two to three feet. Samples of the sprouts were collected, which Mr. Armstrong later examined for evidence of internodes——i.e., rings that denote growth, with one ring forming during each growing season. Due to the absence of internodes, Mr. Armstrong concluded that the stumps were in their first growing season, thereby eliminating any possibility that the vegetation had been cleared several years earlier.13/ Finding that the evidence proves clearly and convincingly that Mr. Nobles benefitted from the unauthorized vegetation removal, the undersigned turns finally to the question of mitigation. As noted above, the Department seeks mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25, a figure derived from Mr. Armstrong's use of the formula referenced in rule 14-10.057. It is at this juncture that the Department's case falters. Although Mr. Armstrong offered credible testimony concerning the number and species of trees (water oaks, Florida maples, and the like) that were removed from the area, the record evidence regarding their market value consists entirely of hearsay. Indeed, the Department called no witness who possessed any firsthand knowledge as to the market value of the trees; instead, it presented only the testimony of Mr. Armstrong, who explained that he had telephoned three nurseries, obtained price quotes over the phone, averaged the three figures, and plugged the averages into the formula. To be clear, the undersigned has no quarrel with either the formula or Mr. Armstrong's initial reliance upon the price quotes. The problem is that, in the absence of a stipulation from Mr. Nobles concerning the amount of mitigation, the Department was obligated to adduce at least some non-hearsay evidence of the market values——the starting point of the calculations. Inasmuch as the record is devoid of such evidence, the Department's request for mitigation must be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: DOAH Case No. 14-4926 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding that the billboard identified in Notice of Violation 1487 ("Big O's") is illegal and subject to removal pursuant to section 479.105, Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that the Department enter a final order denying the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. DOAH Case No. 14-4927 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation take no further action on Notice of Violation 1352 until such time that it reevaluates (under the pre-July 1, 2014, codification of section 479.105) the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. If the application is granted, the Department should enter a final order dismissing Notice of Violation 1352. In the event, however, the application is once again denied, the Department should afford Respondent a point of entry into the administrative process. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating section 479.106, Florida Statutes, and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00 DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2015.
The Issue Whether respondent's nonconforming sign was destroyed by an Act of God, and therefore its license should be revoked, or whether respondent's sign was merely damaged and the action taken by respondent constitutes reasonable repair and maintenance of the sign.
Findings Of Fact Harvey's Groves, Inc. is a citrus grower, shipper and retailer. Harvey's Groves has three retail stores in Brevard County. Ten billboards advertise these stores. Two signs advertise the store located at the intersection of I-95 and State Road 50. One of those signs is located one mile north of the intersection and advertises to traffic headed south. The other sign, which is the sign involved in this dispute, is located five miles south of the intersection. It is designed to advertise to northbound motorists, especially tourists on their return trip north. This sign has been in existence since the mid or late sixties. Respondent holds DOT sign permit number 7865-10 for the sign located five miles south of the intersection of I-95 and state road 50. The sign is a nonconforming sign as defined in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. The sign is located in an area zoned agricultural, and thus would be prohibited except for its nonconforming status. On December 14, 1985, the sign was blown down by a windstorm. All six of the poles which supported the sign snapped a few feet above the ground and below the face of the sign resulting in the rest of the sign structure falling flat on its back. Other than the snapped poles, the sign was only slightly damaged. The two stringers on the top left hand corner of the sign and the top stringer on the right end of the sign had been broken but the remainder of the structure was basically intact. The sign face was still attached to the structure. The majority of the sign face had not been damaged. Mr. Harvey, the only person who saw the sign face prior to its repair, testified that two of the 4' x 8' panels had cracked but were still usable. However, the pictures of the old sign face, introduced-into evidence by respondent, showed that three 4' x 8' panels were missing from the sign face and apparently needed to be replaced. Further, two panels that were in the sign face at the time the pictures were taken contained no copy, and thus appeared to be replacement panels, but no evidence was presented to explain the blank panels. Prior to December 14, 1985, the sign consisted of a 14' x 40' rectangular sign face, with "cutouts" or embellishments which extended the height of the sign at certain points, attached to a sign structure consisting of six perpendicular poles and seven horizontal stringers. The sign face was attached to the stringers which ran the width of the sign. The stringers consisted of 2" x 4" boards which were nailed or spliced together to run the 40' width of the sign. A 2" x 4" board does not come in a 40' length. The poles extended approximately 18 feet above ground level; however, additional boards had been attached to the top of the poles so that the top of the sign extended above the top of the poles. The top two horizontal stringers supporting the sign face were located above the top of the pole that was measured as extending 18 feet above ground level. (R.Ex.#4) The HAGL, or height above ground level, of a sign is measured from the ground to the bottom of the sign face. Immediately prior to December 14, 1985, the HAGL of the sign was approximately 10 feet. However, the evidence was conflicting as to whether the HAGL had always been the same. Mr. King testified that the HAGL was measured in 1976, and at that time the HAGL was five feet. However, although Mr. King personally measured the sign, his testimony was not based on his personal knowledge of the measurement, but was instead based on his recollection of what the DOT records indicated the sign measured. The only record of DOT introduced into evidence, the Outdoor Advertising Inventory Update Listing, listed the HAGL at four feet. However, the computer printout listing alone is not sufficient to establish the HAGL of the sign because there was no competent evidence establishing the source, date, or reliability of the information. Further, other evidence is inconsistent with a 4-foot HAGL. Mr. Wright measured one of the broken poles and determined that the part of the pole still standing was four feet from the ground level to the break on top. However, petitioner's exhibit number 8, which shows the measured pole, notes the location of a 1964 permit tag affixed to the pole. The permit tag is not located on the 4-foot portion of the pole that is still standing; it is located on the portion of the pole that had broken off, and it is located well above the break. Thus, it is apparent that the HAGL could not have been four feet because that would put the permit tag behind the sign face. Petitioner argues that the HAGL had to be only four feet because the broken pole measured 18 feet above ground level and a 14-foot sign face on an 18-foot pole would leave only four feet between the bottom of the sign face and the ground. However, petitioner's argument is premised on the assumption that the top of the sign face was level with the top of the pole. There was no evidence presented to support this assumption. To the contrary, as found in the proceeding paragraph, the evidence clearly indicated that the top of the sign face was located above the top of the pole. Thus, in that there was no competent evidence to the contrary, the testimony of Mr. Harvey, that the HAGL has always been the same, is accepted, and it is found that the HAGL of the sign at all pertinent times prior to December 14, 1985, was approximately 10 feet. Prior to December 14, 1985, the sign was well maintained and in good condition. Every year in October or November the sign was checked to determine if any repairs were necessary. Every two or three years the sign was painted. On December 14 or 15, 1985, Mr. Harvey was advised that the sign was down. He went to the location and found the sign intact, flat on its back, and all six poles broken. Since the sign was down, Mr. Harvey had the sign face removed and taken to Harbor City Signs for painting. About three weeks after the incident, respondent installed six new poles that were 30' in length and extended about 24' above ground level. Respondent put all new stringers on the poles because it was easier and faster to put up new stringers than to remove the stringers from the old poles and put them on the new poles. Because the sign is responsible for a substantial amount of respondent's business, respondent's major concern was to get the sign back up as soon as possible. On January 21 and 22, 1986, Mr. King went to the location. He observed that the old sign structure was on the ground and that a new sign structure, with all new stringers and poles, had been erected. The new structure had nine stringers and the bottom stringer was approximately ten feet above the ground. The sign face had not been attached to the new structure. Mr. King placed a stop work order on the structure. When respondent was ready to attach the repainted sign face, apparently a short time after Mr. King's inspection, the stop work order was discovered. Thereafter, and apparently in an attempt to comply with what he perceived the DOT rules to be, Mr. Harvey had the new stringers removed from the new poles and had the stringers from the old structure affixed to the new poles. The new structure contained 10 horizontal stringers supporting the-sign face, one of which was new material. The cutout was also supported by a new horizontal stringer and a new perpendicular stringer. (P.Ex.10 and 12) The sign face was attached to this structure in March of 1986. The repainted sign face was essentially the same as it was prior to the accident, except that at the bottom, where it previously had stated "Indian River's Finest Citrus", the sign stated "Next Exit Florida's Best." The HAGL of the reerected sign was approximately the same as the old sign. Although Mr. King testified that the new HAGL was about 12 feet and Mr. Wright testified that the new HAGL was from 12-14 feet, their testimony was simply what they estimated the HAGL to be. Mr. Clayton, who actually affixed the stringers and repainted sign face, testified that the repainted sign face was placed at the same height above ground level as it had been before. Further, the photos taken of the sign in March and July (P.Ex.#5 and #10) do not support a finding that the new HAGL was 12-14 feet. Even if the measurement of 28 1/2 feet drawn on petitioner's exhibit number 10 were accurate, and there was no testimony revealing how this figure was derived, it is not useful in determining the HAGL since it purports to measure the distance from the top of the cutout to the ground. The 14' height of the sign does not include the height of the cutout, and there was no testimony to establish how many feet the cutout added to the height of the sign. Therefore, the testimony of Mr. Clayton is accepted as being the most competent evidence regarding the new HAGL. Thus, the HAGL on the sign after the sign face had been replaced was approximately 10 feet. After the sign face was attached in March, the sign looked about the same as it had prior to December. The sign's location in relationship to the road was the same and the HAGL was approximately the same. There was no increase in visibility. As Mr. King testified, there was no significant difference in the way the sign looked after its repair and the way it looked prior to December 14, 1985. There was no evidence presented concerning the actual cost expended by respondent to repair or rebuild the sign. There also was no evidence presented concerning the depreciated value of the sign prior to December 14, 1985. The only evidence presented as to cost was an estimate of the cost to replace the six poles. It was estimated that a new pole would cost about eighty or ninety dollars and that it would cost about thirty dollars per pole to have the poles placed in the ground.
Recommendation It is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation's violation notices seeking revocation of sign permit number 7865-10 be dismissed and that permit number 7865-10 remain in effect as a permit for the nonconforming sign located five miles south of the intersection of I-95 and State Road 50. Respectfully submitted and entered this 2nd day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-0967T Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in paragraph 2. Rejected as stated in paragraphs 5 and 6 as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Accepted, except evidence showed seven stringers, in paragraph 5. Accepted in paragraph 2. Accepted, except as to date, in paragraph 3. Accepted in paragraphs 8 and 9. Accepted generally in paragraphs 9 and 10. Accepted in paragraph 4. Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence in paragraph 11. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 1-2. Accepted in paragraph 1. Accepted in paragraph 2. Rejected as irrelevant since only the depreciated value of the structural materials in the- sign is relevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted generally in paragraphs 5 and 6. Accepted in paragraph 7. 8-9. Accepted generally in paragraphs 3 and 4, except as to number panels replaced and damage to stringers. Whether panels could have been reused is irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant (see ruling on paragraph 4). Rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence and contrary finding in paragraph 8. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted except as to date in paragraph 9 and in Background section. Accepted generally in paragraph 10. Rejected as irrelevant since only actual costs of new materials is irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted as stated in paragraph 10. Accepted in paragraph 12. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Victor M. Watson, Esquire 1970 Michigan Avenue Building C Cocoa, Florida Kaye Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether an application for an outdoor advertising permit for a sign in Santa Rosa County should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Transportation is the state agency responsible for the regulation of outdoor advertising signs that are located on all federal-aid primary highways. U.S. Highway 90 (U.S. 90) is a federal-aid primary highway. A permit is required prior to erecting an outdoor advertising sign on all federal-aid primary highways. Southeast- SD, LLC (Southeast) filed an application for an outdoor advertising permit, application # 57549/57550 (the application) on June 29, 2009. Southeast's proposed sign structure meets the size and height requirements of section 479.07. The parcel was commercially zoned in accordance with the provisions of section 479.11, Florida Statutes. Southeast's application site is located on U.S. 90 at milepost 3.118, approximately 550 feet east of the centerline of Woodbine Road. The Department denied Southeast's application and issued a Notice of Denied Outdoor Application (initial denial) on July 29, 2009. The reason stated in the initial denial was: Sign does not meet spacing requirements (1500' for interstates, 1000' for FAP). [s. 479.07(9)(a),1.,& 2. F.S.] In conflict with permitted sign(s), tag#(s): CC479. Held by: Bill Salter Advertising, Inc. Bill Salter Advertising, Inc. (Salter's) sign with tag CC479 was located on U.S. 90 less than 500 feet from the application site. Permit CC479 was the subject of a Department revocation proceeding.2/ On March 8, 2010, the Department issued a Clerk's Order of Dismissal on the challenge to the revocation of CC479. Thus, the revocation of the conflicting sign, CC479, was final on March 8, 2010. On August 16, 2010, the Department issued an Amended Notice of Denied Application (Amended Notice). In the Amended Notice, the Department gave a different reason for the denial. The reason given in the Amended Denial concerned a different Salter tag: Sign does not meet spacing requirements (1500' for interstates, 1000' for EAP). [s. 470.07(9)(a),1., & 2. FS] In conflict with permitted sign(s): CF793. Held by: Bill Salter Advertising, Inc." CF793 was originally permitted in 1978. At that time, an application for a sign permit was reviewed and notated by the Department, and became the actual permit. The application for CF793 contains information that is type-written on the application form, presumably by the applicant, Salter. In the portion of the application form stating "DOT DESCRIPTION OF SIGN LOCATION (DOT USE ONLY)" the following is hand-written: "Sect. 59 W- 39.95 Miles W-SR 85." Most of the application/permit was filled out by the applicant, and part of it was filled out by the Department. In 1996, the Florida Legislature amended section 479.02, directing the Department to inventory and determine the location of all signs on the state, interstate, and federal-aid primary highway systems. The Department conducted the inventory and, upon completion, sent the database information to each sign owner, giving each owner an opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the results. Salter did not file such a challenge regarding CF793. As of July 30, 2009 (the date of the initial denial), tag CF793 was shown at milepost 13.205 on U.S. 90, in a location approximately 13 miles away from the application site in the Department's database created pursuant to section 479.02(8). Tag CF793 was physically located 13 miles away from its originally permitted location. The Department acknowledges that tag CF793 was not valid in its location 13 miles away from its current location, where it was located from at least 1998 to 2010. The database reflected milepost 13.205 as the location for CF793 from 1998 until 2010. In 2004, the Department sent Salter a Notice of Non- Compliance demanding that Salter post tag CF793 at milepost 13.205. In October 2009, the Department received a letter from Salter regarding moving CF793 to the location specified in the 1978 permit. At this point, the Department investigated the original application and discovered a "huge discrepancy" between the database location and the permit location in the Department's files. The Department has no documentation regarding how tag CF793 came to be located at milepost 13.205 since the 1998 inventory. The Department decided that its database was incorrect and that it needed to be corrected. On February 1, 2010, the Department changed its database to reflect the location for CF793 as milepost 2.993 on U.S. 90. Salter posted the tag for CF793 at its current location sometime after March 22, 2010 and prior to May 3, 2010. Once Salter placed the tag for CF793, the database was changed again to reflect the physical tag location at milepost 2.950 on U.S. 90, the "current location." The Department hired Cardno TBE, an engineering firm, to conduct field work. An inspector performed field measurements on May 3, 2010, using the wheel and laser methods for field measurement. The inspector identified the stake that was in the ground on Southeast's proposed sign site. He measured along the edge of the pavement on U.S. 90 from the location marked by Southeast to the new location of Salter's CF793 tag. The inspector determined that the distance between the proposed site and the nearest permitted sign, CF793, is 890 feet. Based upon these findings, the Department then determined that Southeast's proposed sign did not meet the 1000- foot spacing requirement. By letter dated May 27, 2010, the Department notified Salter that the location of CF793 was "nonconforming" and that pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.007, a completed sign must be erected within 270 days or the permit would be revoked. No sign has been built, and the permit has not been revoked. Moreover, it appears that a sign will never be built, as the Department is in possession of correspondence from Santa Rosa County to Salter indicating that a sign cannot be constructed at the current location of tag CF793 due to conflict with several local ordinances. Also on May 27, 2010, the Department sent a letter to Southeast stating that CF793 "now presents a spacing conflict" with Southeast's application location. The letter further states that the Department had advised Salter that a completed sign must be erected within 270 days and that if no sign is erected within that time frame, the permit would be revoked. On August 16, 2010, three months later, the Department amended its denial as set forth above in paragraph 8. Just prior to the hearing, the Department again sent the inspector to conduct another field measurement. This time, the inspector relied upon information regarding the location of the sign from the original application/permit that was provided by the applicant (Salter) in 1978. That is, the inspector measured from a location described by the applicant in the original permit application, then measured the distance from the location to Southeast's proposed site, and determined the distance to be 884 feet. In making these measurements, the inspector assumed that the nearest intersection in 1978 was in the same location as today, that the original measurer started the measurement from the centerline of that intersection, and that the distance from the nearest intersection indicated by Salter on the original application/permit was measured with the same accuracy as a hand-wheel or laser.3/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation enter a final order approving Southeast's sign permit application. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Barbara J. Staros Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2011.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The outdoor advertising sign that is the subject of the instant proceeding (hereinafter referred to as the "Sign") is a billboard with steel "I" beams and iron stringers which sits perpendicular to U.S. Highway 1 approximately 1,800 feet south of Hypoluxo Road and approximately 1,000 feet north of Neptune Drive in Palm Beach County. Petitioner has owned the Sign since about 1978 or 1979, when it purchased the assets of the Sign's previous owner, Outdoor Media. The Sign was originally erected in 1963 by Ferrin Signs, Inc., pursuant to a permit issued by Palm Beach County. In 1967, Ferrin Signs, Inc., obtained a permit from Palm Beach County to perform further work on the sign. Shortly thereafter, Ferrin Signs, Inc., sold the Sign to Outdoor Media. Prior to March of 1970, the land on which the Sign is located was in the unincorporated area of Palm Beach County. In March of 1970, the land was annexed by the Town of Hypoluxo and has been within the Town's jurisdictional boundaries ever since. The Town of Hypoluxo has an ordinance currently in effect that regulates signs within the Town. The ordinance, like its predecessors dating back to 1961, prohibits "off premises signs." It also contains a section dealing with "nonconforming signs," which provides as follows: Signs or sign structures made nonconforming by this sign and signage code shall be governed by the following regulations: A sign existing within the town on or before November 30, 1992, which, because of its height, square foot area, location or other characteristics, does not conform to this article is hereby declared to be a nonconforming sign. A nonconforming sign under this subsection may be allowed to remain in existence, but if destroyed or allowed to deteriorate in excess of 50 percent of the depreciated value of the structure, it may not be replaced. The status afforded signs under this section shall not be applicable to any sign for which no sign permit was ever issued; such signs are deemed illegal signs and are subject to the provisions of this article governing illegal signs. No conforming sign or sign structure shall be permitted to be erected for the same property containing an existing nonconforming sign until the nonconforming sign has been removed or made conforming. An "off premises sign" that does not qualify for "nonconforming sign" status is subject to removal under the ordinance. The Town also has a building code. Under the code, a building permit is required before a sign within the Town may be altered or repaired. No building permit has ever been issued by the Town for any work to be performed on the Sign. On December 27, 1990, the Department issued a Notice of Violation alleging that Petitioner was maintaining the Sign without a state-issued outdoor advertising sign permit, as required by Section 497.07, Florida Statutes. In response to the Notice of Violation, Petitioner advised the Department that it would be filing an application for such a permit. Petitioner filed its application on January 12, 1993. The application was accompanied by, among other things, a copy of the 1963 Palm Beach County permit referred to in Finding of Fact 3 above. The application package, however, contained neither a permit for the Sign issued by the Town of Hypoluxo, nor a statement from any Hypoluxo official indicating that the Sign was eligible for such a permit or was otherwise allowable under the Town's sign ordinance. Accordingly, after receiving the application package, the Department contacted the Mayor of the Town, the Honorable Al Merion, to ascertain the Town's position on the matter. In conjunction therewith, it provided Mayor Merion with a copy of the 1963 Palm Beach County permit that had accompanied Petitioner's application. By letter dated January 25, 1993, Mayor Merion responded to the Department's inquiry. In his letter, he wrote: Receipt is hereby acknowledged of your fax transmittal containing a permit issued by Palm Beach County to the Ferrin Signs, Inc. on January 24, 1963. The permit issued by Palm Beach County is not valid because it is not within their [sic] jurisdiction to issue sign permits for property lying within the territorial boundaries of the Town of Hypoluxo. To the best of our knowledge, the Town of Hypoluxo has no record of a permit being issued to Ferrin Signs Inc. It should be noted that, in the past years, on numerous occasions, the billboard in question has been illegally constructionally altered by virtue of no permit having been obtained from the Town. On or about February 2, 1993, the Department returned Petitioner's application to Petitioner. In the Memorandum of Returned Application that it sent to Petitioner, the Department gave the following reason for denying the application: "local permit not provided for Town of Hypoluxo." Although the Town no longer contends that Palm Beach County was without authority to issue the 1963 pre-annexation permit for construction of the Sign, the Town still takes the position that, because of unpermitted post- annexation repairs and alterations, the Sign is prohibited and subject to removal under the Town's current sign ordinance. 1/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a state outdoor advertising sign permit. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of January, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 1994.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that respondent, Department of Transportation, enter a final order denying the application of petitioner, Lamar Advertising Company, for a sign permit. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of March, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1985.
