The Issue As to DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 and 14-4927, the issues are whether the billboards identified in the notices of violation are located on the premises of Respondent's business and, thus, exempt from licensure; and, if not, whether the billboards are eligible for licensure pursuant to section 479.07, Florida Statutes, or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, Florida Statutes. With respect to DOAH Case No. 14-4928, the issue is whether Respondent engaged in, or benefitted from, the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation.
Findings Of Fact I. DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 & 14-4927 The Parties The Respondent in these proceedings is I-10 Pecan House, Inc. ("Pecan House"), an entity currently owned and managed by Olan Q. Nobles. As discussed in greater detail below, Pecan House is a small country store that has conducted business in Jefferson County, Florida, for nearly 40 years. The Department is the state agency responsible, inter alia, for the regulation of outdoor advertising signs located within 600 feet of, and visible from, interstate highways. The Events In or around 1976, Erma Jean Walker (Mr. Nobles' sister) and her husband, Lyman Walker, III, purchased three tracts of land that are relevant to this proceeding. The first such parcel, upon which the Walkers quickly constructed an open- air market, comprises one acre and is located on State Road 257, immediately north of the intersection of that roadway and I-10. The second relevant parcel, .18 acres in size and located a short distance to the southeast of the first tract, is situated adjacent to the westbound lanes of I-10. Upon their acquisition of this parcel, the Walkers constructed a billboard that advertised the open-air market and the related business activities conducted on the third parcel. The third parcel, which is roughly 2.3 acres in size and likewise adjoins the westbound lanes of I-10, is located less than 1000 feet to the east of the second tract. It is upon this tract that, in mid-to-late 1976, the Walkers built a concrete structure to be used for the purpose of manufacturing candy and jelly——products the Walkers offered for sale at the nearby open-air market. By the end of 1976, the Walkers also constructed (upon the third parcel) a billboard advertising the open-air market and jelly/candy manufacture. Although the billboards referenced above were visible from I-10 and located within 600 feet of the roadway——and, thus, within the Department's "controlled area"——the Walkers did not apply for outdoor advertising permits. This is because, as the Department concedes, the billboards were exempt from licensure from 1976 until the mid-1990s (or perhaps later, as Mr. Nobles asserts) under the "on premises" exemption set forth in section 479.16, Florida Statutes. Under the definition of "premises" in effect during that period, the land upon which a sign was located did not need to be contiguous to the advertised business in order for the exemption to apply. For reasons that will soon be apparent, it is necessary to inject a third billboard into this discussion: in 1993, the Walkers constructed on the third tract of land a "double-stack" billboard, which is situated less than 200 feet and 1000 feet, respectively, from the signs erected in 1976 upon the third and second tracts. Although the double-stack billboard would have ostensibly satisfied the on-premises exemption, the Walkers nevertheless applied for——and were granted——an outdoor advertising permit. For all that appears, the Department has never initiated any proceedings to revoke the permit, which remains valid to this day. In 1995, Mrs. Walker transferred control of Pecan House to Mr. Nobles, who until that time had assisted the Walkers on an as-needed basis. Soon thereafter, Mr. Nobles upgraded the open-air market (on the first parcel) to a secure building and, of particular relevance here, ceased all manufacturing activities at the concrete building (on the third parcel). At or around that time, the Legislature amended the definition of "premises" to include a contiguity requirement.3/ This is significant, for the second and third parcels——the locations of the two billboards at issue herein——are not contiguous to the first parcel but, rather, are separated by a tract in which neither the Walkers nor Mr. Nobles holds a leasehold or ownership interest. Further, there is no recorded easement connecting Mr. Nobles' three parcels. Thus, although the two billboards constructed in 1976 lost their on-premises status in the mid-1990s, this fact apparently went unnoticed by the Department for roughly 13 years. Then, in March of 2008, the Department issued notices of violation in connection with both billboards. Among other things, the notices alleged that "outdoor advertising permit[s] [were] required, but ha[d] not been issued" for the billboards, which Mr. Nobles was instructed to remove within 30 days. A short time thereafter, an inspector or other agent of the Department conducted, in Mr. Nobles' presence, an examination of the 1976 billboards and Pecan House's business operations. At the conclusion of her inspection, the Department employee erroneously opined that, in fact, there was "no problem"4/ with the billboards in question, which Mr. Nobles reasonably took to mean that the signs continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption and, thus, were exempt from licensure. The reasonableness of this understanding was bolstered by the fact that, subsequent to the inspection, Mr. Nobles heard nothing more from the Department concerning the March 2008 notices of violation.5/ More than four years later, on December 17, 2012, the Department issued new notices of violation in connection with the 1976 billboards: notice 1352, relating to the billboard constructed upon the third parcel, which presently reads "Exit Now" and bears a Shell gasoline logo (hereinafter "Exit Now"); and notice 1487, relating to the billboard erected upon the second parcel, which presently reads "Welcome to Big O's / We Appreciate Your Business" (hereinafter "Big O's"). The parties thereafter engaged in settlement negotiations, in the course of which Mr. Nobles' counsel struggled mightily to convince the Department that the billboards continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption. When the Department rejected this argument, Mr. Nobles applied for an outdoor advertising permit for each billboard. The applications were ultimately denied, prompting the Department to refer the matters to DOAH for further proceedings. Based upon the evidence adduced at final hearing, it is evident that the billboards in question no longer meet the on-premises exemption and, thus, are subject to removal unless the signs meet either the current statutory requirements for a permit or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, which authorizes licensure if the billboards satisfy earlier statutory criteria and certain other conditions. Eligibility for Licensure – "Exit Now" Beginning first with the "Exit Now" billboard, the record makes pellucid that the current statutory requirements for licensure cannot be satisfied. Among other things, the sign is located a mere 190 feet from the permitted, double-stack billboard erected in 1993, a distance far less than the minimum spacing requirement of 1500 feet. See § 479.07(9)(a)1., Fla. Stat. As for the potential applicability of the grandfather provision to the "Exit Now" billboard, it is critical to observe that the Department's delay of nearly five years (March of 2008 through December of 2012) in pursuing removal has placed Mr. Nobles at a significant disadvantage. In particular, had the Department moved forward in 2008——instead of inexplicably abandoning the action, which, along with the statements of its inspector, led Mr. Nobles to believe, incorrectly, that no permit was required——Mr. Nobles likely would have applied for a permit,6/ which the Department would have evaluated pursuant to the version of the grandfather provision in effect at that time. This is significant, for the 2008 codification of the grandfather provision, which remained unchanged until July 1, 2014, did not preclude licensure in situations where a billboard had previously enjoyed on-premises status or some other recognized exemption from the permitting requirement. Further, the pre-July 1, 2014, grandfather provision was quite favorable in that it allowed a potential licensee to demonstrate that the billboard would have met the criteria for licensure in effect "[a]t any time during the period in which the sign has been erected." § 479.105(1)(e)2., Fla. Stat. (2013)(emphasis added). The current version of the grandfather provision is quite a different animal. For one thing, grandfather status can only be granted if the billboard at issue "has never been exempt" from permitting. § 479.105(1)(c)2., Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). For another thing, the current grandfather provision looks not at "any" time in which the sign has been erected but, rather, at the criteria in effect during the initial seven years in which the sign was subject to the Department's jurisdiction. § 479.105(1)(c)2.b., Fla. Stat. (2014). As Mr. Nobles readily acknowledges, his effort to obtain a permit for the "Exit Now" billboard is a nonstarter under the 2014 version of the grandfather provision, whose plain language prohibits the issuance of a permit where, as here, the sign was previously exempt from licensure. This does not end the matter, however, for the undersigned finds that the Department's unjustified delay in pursuing removal——along with its agent's erroneous statement that the billboard was legal, upon which Mr. Nobles relied——requires that the "Exit Now" application be evaluated under the version of the grandfather provision that was in effect from 2008 until July 1, 2014. Pursuant to the pre-2014 codification of section 479.105, "grandfathering" was authorized if the owner could demonstrate: 1) that the sign in question had been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for at least seven years; 2) that, at any time during the period in which the sign has been erected, the sign would have satisfied the criteria established in chapter 479 for issuance of a permit; 3) that the Department did not file a notice of violation or take other action to remove the sign during the initial seven-year period in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location; and 4) that the sign is not located on a state right-of-way and is not a safety hazard. § 479.105(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2013). Upon such a showing, the Department was authorized to treat the sign as conforming or nonconforming and issue a permit. Turing to the merits, the first prong is easily satisfied, as the "Exit Now" sign has been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for 39 years, far longer than the seven-year period the statute requires. The third prong is also met, for the record makes clear that the Department took no action to pursue removal during the initial seven-year period, i.e., 1976 through 1983, in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained. In addition, the Department stipulates that the sign neither poses a safety hazard nor is located upon a state right-of-way, thereby satisfying the fourth prong.7/ This leaves only the second prong, which asks if the sign would have met the criteria for licensure at any time after it was erected. The selection of any time period subsequent to 1993 would surely doom the application, as the sign would be unable to satisfy the minimum spacing requirement due to its close physical proximity to the double-stack billboard——which, as noted previously, was issued a permit in 1993 and remains licensed. Prior to 1993, however, there does not appear to be any spacing conflict that would preclude licensure in this instance.8/ With the spacing concern resolved (and the relevant period of inquiry narrowed to "any" time between 1976 and 1993), the undersigned turns to the only other criterion for licensure that appears to be in dispute: section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the issuance of a permit only if the sign is located in "commercial-zoned and industrial-zoned areas or commercial-unzoned or industrial-unzoned areas." Unfortunately, this issue cannot be resolved on the instant record, for there is a dearth of persuasive evidence concerning the zoning designation of the third parcel (the location of the "Exit Now" sign) during the critical period of inquiry. Indeed, the record contains only the Department's speculative assumption that, because the area is presently unzoned, it therefore must have been unzoned at all times in the past.9/ Further, even accepting the Department's assumption at face value, it is impossible to determine whether the business activities conducted on the parcel from 1976 until the mid- 1990s——namely, the manufacture of candy and jelly and the sale of pecans——would satisfy the use test at any time between 1976 and 1993.10/ Under ordinary circumstances, such an absence of evidence would necessitate an adverse result for the permit applicant. Owing, however, to the unusual history and posture of this case, as well as the undersigned's conclusion that the pre-2014 grandfather provision should govern, it is recommended that the Department reevaluate Mr. Nobles' application to determine if the third parcel could have satisfied the requirements of 479.111(2) at any point between 1976 and 1993. Eligibility for Licensure – "Big O's" The undersigned turns next to the "Big O's" sign, which, like the "Exit Now" billboard, is unable to satisfy current licensing criteria due, among other reasons, to its close proximity to the double-stack billboard.11/ Further, as with the "Exit Now" billboard, the fact that the "Big O's" sign was previously exempt from licensure (owing to its on-premises status from 1976 through the mid-1990s) renders it ineligible for licensure under the 2014 codification of the grandfather provision. However, in sharp contrast to the "Exit Now" billboard, the "Big O's" sign is positioned within 500 feet of an interstate exit ramp, thereby constituting a safety hazard. This distinction is fatal to Mr. Nobles, as every codification of the grandfather provision from the mid-90s (when the sign lost its on-premises status) onward has prohibited the licensure of billboards that present a safety issue. The short of it, then, is that the sign was no more eligible for licensure in the past than it is today, which obviates the need for any further analysis under the pre-2014 version of the grandfather provision. For the reasons articulated above, Mr. Nobles has failed to prove that the "Big O's" sign is exempt from licensure by virtue of the "on-premises" exception. Further, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that, due to safety concerns, the sign would not have been eligible for licensure at any point in time. Accordingly, the undersigned is constrained to recommend the sign's removal pursuant to section 479.105. II. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 As noted earlier in this Order, DOAH Case No. 14-4928 involves an allegation that Mr. Nobles engaged in——or benefitted from——the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation. The relevant facts are recounted below. On January 21, 2013, Mr. Nobles executed a lease agreement with Michael McDougal, who owns a parcel of land adjacent to the eastbound lanes of I-10, approximately .6 miles from County Road 257. In relevant part, the terms of the lease authorized Mr. Nobles to place on the property a pickup truck, attached to which was a billboard that advertised the I-10 Pecan House. Shortly thereafter, in late January 2013, Mr. Nobles relocated the truck to a position on Mr. McDougal's property a short distance to the south of the fence line that separates the parcel from the Department's right-of-way. But trouble soon followed: in late February or early March, the Department received several reports of unusual vegetation removal in the general area of Mr. Nobles' truck sign. In response, the Department requested one of its contractors, Metric Engineering, Inc. ("Metric"), to conduct a field inspection of the area. The inspection was performed on or about March 12, 2013, by Bill Armstrong, a certified arborist employed by Metric. During the course of his inspection, Mr. Armstrong observed, first, an area that the Department had previously cleared to facilitate the installation of a new fence, which had yet to be installed. This particular area, which ran along the length of the fence line and had been cleared within the preceding six months, had a width (as measured from the fence toward the roadway) of approximately 12 feet. Immediately beyond this 12-foot zone, however, Mr. Armstrong noticed evidence of other activity that had occurred much more recently. Specifically, Mr. Armstrong observed, on the side of the fence immediately opposite Mr. Nobles' truck, an area 120 feet in length (parallel to the fence line) and approximately 25 feet in width that had been cleared of vegetation. Within this 120 by 25 foot area, Mr. Armstrong discovered 30 tree stumps, which, upon close examination, exhibited signs of having been recently cut. Such indications included the presence of sawdust; the fact that the stumps were bright in color and relatively clean; and the observation of fresh debris at both ends of the swath. These findings were recorded in a report dated March 25, 2013, which Metric promptly forwarded to Morris Pigott, the Department's Project Manager of Vegetation and Resource Management. Several weeks later, Mr. Pigott conducted his own site visit, during which he examined the particular area that had concerned Mr. Armstrong. Consistent with the findings contained in Metric's report, Mr. Pigott observed, within the 120 by 25 foot area, numerous, freshly-cut tree stumps. Mr. Pigott further concluded, quite reasonably, that this activity had not been performed by the Department or one of its contractors, for the stumps had not been cut to ground level, the vegetation immediately to the east and west of the area was "very dense," and the area had not been "grubbed."12/ (As explained during the final hearing, "grubbing" involves the removal of the top six inches of surface material, an action designed to prevent regrowth.) To cinch matters, Mr. Pigott observed that the selective clearing of the 120 by 25 foot area had enhanced the visibility of Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard for eastbound traffic. Thereafter, on April 14, 2013, Mr. Pigott cited Mr. Nobles for violating section 479.106(7), which provides that any person who engages in or benefits from the unauthorized removal of vegetation shall be subject to an administrative penalty. Mr. Pigott further notified Mr. Nobles that, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.057, the Department intended to assess mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25. Mr. Nobles promptly denied any and all involvement in the removal, claiming that a road crew had cleared the vegetation two years earlier. In response, Mr. Pigott contacted Mr. Armstrong, disclosed Mr. Nobles' explanation, and asked that a follow-up inspection be performed. Mr. Armstrong conducted his second inspection on August 8, 2013. At that time, Mr. Armstrong observed that Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard was still present, and that the stumps within the 120 by 25 foot area had sprouted and grown to a height of two to three feet. Samples of the sprouts were collected, which Mr. Armstrong later examined for evidence of internodes——i.e., rings that denote growth, with one ring forming during each growing season. Due to the absence of internodes, Mr. Armstrong concluded that the stumps were in their first growing season, thereby eliminating any possibility that the vegetation had been cleared several years earlier.13/ Finding that the evidence proves clearly and convincingly that Mr. Nobles benefitted from the unauthorized vegetation removal, the undersigned turns finally to the question of mitigation. As noted above, the Department seeks mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25, a figure derived from Mr. Armstrong's use of the formula referenced in rule 14-10.057. It is at this juncture that the Department's case falters. Although Mr. Armstrong offered credible testimony concerning the number and species of trees (water oaks, Florida maples, and the like) that were removed from the area, the record evidence regarding their market value consists entirely of hearsay. Indeed, the Department called no witness who possessed any firsthand knowledge as to the market value of the trees; instead, it presented only the testimony of Mr. Armstrong, who explained that he had telephoned three nurseries, obtained price quotes over the phone, averaged the three figures, and plugged the averages into the formula. To be clear, the undersigned has no quarrel with either the formula or Mr. Armstrong's initial reliance upon the price quotes. The problem is that, in the absence of a stipulation from Mr. Nobles concerning the amount of mitigation, the Department was obligated to adduce at least some non-hearsay evidence of the market values——the starting point of the calculations. Inasmuch as the record is devoid of such evidence, the Department's request for mitigation must be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: DOAH Case No. 14-4926 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding that the billboard identified in Notice of Violation 1487 ("Big O's") is illegal and subject to removal pursuant to section 479.105, Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that the Department enter a final order denying the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. DOAH Case No. 14-4927 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation take no further action on Notice of Violation 1352 until such time that it reevaluates (under the pre-July 1, 2014, codification of section 479.105) the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. If the application is granted, the Department should enter a final order dismissing Notice of Violation 1352. In the event, however, the application is once again denied, the Department should afford Respondent a point of entry into the administrative process. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating section 479.106, Florida Statutes, and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00 DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2015.
The Issue The central issues in this case are whether Petitioner knowingly submitted an application with false or misleading information for the purpose of securing sign permits and, if so, whether the sign permits should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns a parcel located in Brevard County, Florida, upon which it desires to construct a sign with two sides (one facing north, one facing south). The parcel is located at 4121 Norfolk Parkway, West Melbourne, Florida, and is adjacent to Interstate 95 (I-95). Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating outdoor advertising located within 660 feet of the state highway system, interstate, or federal-aid primary highway system. It is undisputed the parcel owned by Petitioner together with the proposed two-sided sign falls within Respondent’s jurisdiction and is adjacent to I-95. The application process for sign permits follows a specified course to assure the applicant submits all requisite information and the parcel meets the statutory guidelines. In this case, Petitioner submitted not fewer than three applications for the desired permits. Each side of the proposed sign required a permit and each permit required an application. Each of the first applications was rejected and returned to Petitioner for reasons specified by FDOT. Among the reasons Petitioner’s applications were rejected were: the applicant did not answer all questions on the applications completely; the forms were not notarized; the applications did not have a signed statement from the local government official indicating the land use designation of the parcel; and the parcel identification numbers did not match on all documents. On December 17, 2012, Petitioner completed and had notarized one or two applications for the sign permits. Only one application for each side (dated December 17, 2012) was received by Respondent. Those applications indicated the zoning for Petitioner’s parcel as commercial parkway district, an acceptable zoning for the approval of a sign permit. In truth, however, Petitioner’s parcel is zoned residential. Respondent considered the applications dated December 17, 2012, complete but they contained an error other than the incorrect zoning that needed to be corrected. Based upon that error, FDOT issued a Notice of Denial and returned the paperwork to Petitioner to have the correction initialed. Once the applications were initialed, Respondent approved the applications and issued permit numbers 56284 and 56285. The applications submitted by Petitioner did not have the correct parcel identification number. Based upon the parcel identification number on the approved applications, the sign would be constructed on a parcel not owned by Petitioner. At all times material to this case, Petitioner represented it owned the parcel upon which the sign would be constructed. The parcel identified on the approved applications is correctly zoned for an outdoor advertising sign, but Petitioner’s parcel may not be. Petitioner has never intended to construct a sign on the parcel identified by its applications. Petitioner knew on December 17, 2012, that it had submitted applications with an incorrect parcel identification number. Petitioner knew on December 17, 2012, that the zoning for its parcel was residential not commercial. When Petitioner received the documents subsequent to the Notice of Denial (identified in paragraph 6), it did not correct the parcel number or advise FDOT that the parcel number was incorrect. Although the parcel numbers now matched for each section of the applications, the number related to a parcel owned by West Melbourne Holdings, II, LLC. Petitioner has no interest in West Melbourne Holdings, II, LLC. As a result, Petitioner did not accurately represent the zoning for the parcel it owns and upon which it sought to construct its sign. FDOT relies on the information submitted by applicants to determine whether a parcel is eligible for a sign permit. If an applicant submits false information, Respondent takes action to revoke a permit that was based on false information. In this case, Petitioner began to construct a sign on its property and another sign company (Petitioner’s competitor) notified FDOT that Petitioner was constructing a sign in an inappropriate location. Upon receipt of the complaint, FDOT began a review of Petitioner’s applications and discovered the applicant did not own the parcel that was approved for the sign. Although Petitioner had submitted an accurate street address, the parcel for which the sign permits were issued was not owned by Petitioner. Additionally, FDOT discovered a zoning discrepancy that would not allow approval of permits for Petitioner’s parcel. Had Petitioner submitted the correct zoning information for its parcel, the applications may not have been approved. Petitioner maintains that inaccuracies on its applications were inadvertent and unintentional. Petitioner argues it never knowingly submitted incorrect or misleading information. Having weighed the credible evidence submitted in this cause, such argument has been rejected. To the contrary, Petitioner knew the parcel number submitted on the applications dated December 17, 2012, was false. Petitioner knew the zoning for its parcel was residential. Petitioner did nothing to correct the errors after they were known and before the permits were issued. An applicant has an affirmative duty to submit truthful, accurate information.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order revoking the permits for the subject sign. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary B. Frese, Esquire Frese, Hansen, Anderson, Anderson, Heuston and Whitehead, P.A. Suite 301 2200 Front Street Melbourne, Florida 32901 Kimberly Clark Menchion, Esquire Department of Transportation Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Trish Parsons, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Ananth Prasad, Secretary Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 57 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Gerald B. Curington, General Counsel Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Stop 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact The property on which the structure was located was acquired by the Department of Transportation (DOT) for roadway purposes. The project was part of a federal program for road improvement. The structure in controversy is an outdoor advertising sign owned by Patrick Media. Relocation benefits were offered by the DOT pursuant to the Federal Uniform Relocation Act. This sign was a legal nonconforming sign at the time of taking. Patrick Media had a leasehold interest in the site on which the sign was located. Patrick Media has removed the structure. The structure in question was comprised of two facings (V-shaped configuration), lights, service ladders and catwalks. It was built in 1978 and has been in continuous service since that time. The site is leased on a year to year renewable basis with either party able to terminate the lease at the expiration of the lease year. Contracts with advertisers involve multiple locations with price depending upon the number of motorists passing the sign per unit of time. Revenue received from face A (facing west) from August 15, 1990 to May 5, 1991 was $3739 (net) and from face B (east facing) from May 25, 1990 to May 25, 1991 was $2288 (net). As a nonconforming sign, the sign could not have been rebuilt if destroyed had the site not been acquired by DOT. Shortly after the introduction of Chapter 479 into the Laws of Florida and the possibility of requiring the nonconforming signs to be purchased by DOT for removal, DOT met with sign companies and developed a format for determining compensation to be paid for removing these nonconforming signs. A copy of the format completed for the sign in issue here was admitted as Exhibit 1. (Form 178-507 4/83) Additionally, Comparative Cost Multipliers (Exhibit 2) is used to determine the inflation caused adjustment to be applied to structures built in earlier years. Exhibit 1 computed the estimated value of the sign in issue at $11,674.53. However, this compensation did not include catwalks or time clock. The removed sign has negligible salvage value.
Recommendation It is recommended that the fair value of the sign in issue be recalculated to add the value of catwalks and time clock to the total before applying the multiplier and that a Final Order be entered finding that total so calculated to be the fair market value of Patrick Media's sign. DONE and ORDERED this 20 day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth G. Repaal, Esquire Post Office Box 1441 St. Petersburg, FL 33731 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 ATTN: Eleanor Turner MS 58 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1992.
Findings Of Fact The facts here involved are not in dispute. In 1966 Petitioner leased the property adjacent to Cypress Street in Tampa and erected a structure thereon on the 1-275 3.6 miles west of 1-4, containing signs facing both east and west. By application dated 20 October 1977 (Exhibits 1 and 2) Petitioner applied for permits for these signs. The applications were disapproved because of spacing. Likewise, on 20 October 1977, Petitioner submitted application for a permit for a sign on the 1-4 2.9 miles east of U.S. 41 with a copy of the lease dated 1967. This sign is located in Tampa and the application was also disapproved because of spacing. Both of these locations are zoned commercial and are within the corporate limits of Tampa, Florida. The structure on which the signs shown on Exhibits 1 and 2 were erected was built in 1968 and the sign involved in Exhibit 3 was built in 1967. The signs for which a permit was requested in Exhibits 1 and 2 is located 325 feet north of a permitted structure owned by Tampa Outdoor Advertising, Inc. on the same side of the street and facing in the same direction. The sign for which a permit was requested in Exhibit 3 is 275 feet west of a permitted sign facing the same direction and on the same side of the street which is owned by Foster and Kleiser. No appeal was taken from these disapprovals, but by applications dated June 19, 1979, Petitioner in Exhibits 4, 5 and 6 reapplied for permits for the same signs that had been disapproved in 1977. These applications were also disapproved because of spacing. The I-4 and the I-275 are part of the Interstate Highway system.
Findings Of Fact Outdoor Advertising Art, Inc. is the owner of a 12 x 40 foot sign located on State Road 540 in Polk County. The records of the Department of Transportation show the last valid permit for this sign was issued in 1973. The Respondent forgot to renew the permit for 1974 due to clerical error of its staff although it received notice as required by statute from the Department of Transportation. On October 2, 1975, Outdoor Advertising Art, Inc. attempted to obtain a permit for this sign for the year 1974 and 1975, and tendered a check to Department of Transportation in the amount of $20. In doing so, the Respondent relied upon what it stated the policy of the Department had been regarding renewal of delinquent permits; however, it did not fail to renew in reliance on this policy but through its own oversight. The Department of Transportation denied the permit on the sign which did not conform to the existing rules and regulations adopted by the State of Florida as part of the federal highways beautification program. Testimony was received that delinquent applications have been allowed to be filed by the Department of Transportation, but not in District I of the Department of Transportation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this Hearing Officer recommends that the sign be removed. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John J. Rimes, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 William D. Rowland, Esquire Post Office Box 539 Winter Park, Florida 32789
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the State of Florida's regulatory agency for advertising along state and federal highways. On January 1, 1995, Petitioner was the holder of three State of Florida outdoor advertising sign permits (among others): AU204-35, BH947-25 and BH948- 25. The sign covered by Permit No. AU204-35 (hereinafter "Sign A") was a wooden billboard located approximately 100 yards east of a weight station on Interstate 4. As trucks leave the weight station heading east, the sign was to their right. The sign covered by Permits No. BH948-25 and BH947-25 (hereinafter "Sign B) is an electrified high-rise sign located at the interchange of Interstate 4 and State Road 39. The sign is on the south side of the interchange. The signs at issue both serviced a truck stop on the north side of the interchange at Interstate 4 and State Road 39. Sign A also serviced a fueling operation at Interstate 4 and Park Road. About 27,000 outdoor advertising permits are listed within the Respondent's outdoor advertising system. Outdoor advertising sign permit renewal fees are due on January 15 of each year for all State of Florida outdoor advertising sign permits. If a permit holder's renewal fees are not received by the Respondent on or before January 15 of any given year, its outdoor advertising sign permits expire. By November 1 of each year, the Respondent sends a billing statement to every permit holder notifying them of the fees which will become due in January of the following year. Petitioner paid its permit renewal fees in 1994. In November of 1994, the Respondent sent to Petitioner a billing statement listing the fees which would become due on January 15, 1995, for its outdoor advertising sign permits. This billing statement included, among others, Petitioner's permits numbered AU204-35, BH947-25 and BH948-25. (Hereinafter referred to collectively as "Permits"). On January 15, 1995, permit renewal fees for Petitioner's Permits became due. If an outdoor advertising sign permit holder has not paid its permit renewal fees by January 15 of a given year, then by February 1 of that year it is the Respondent's practice to mail to the holder a notice of violation for nonpayment. The Respondent sends an average of 350 notices of violation each year. The notice of violation is sent certified mail, return receipt requested, and the article number on the certified mail card is documented on the bottom of the notice of violation. The notice of violation has a copy of the affected permits attached to it indicating the permits to which it applies. The notice is folded and inserted into a window envelope so that the address shows through the window. The envelope is then sealed and a certified mail card with the vendor's name on it is attached The notice of violation notifies the permit holder that the Respondent has not received its permit renewal fees and that the listed permits will expire if the holder does not submit its permit fees, including a ten (10) percent delinquent fee, within thirty (30) days. Petitioner's permit renewal fees were not received by January 15, 1995. On February 1, 1995, the Respondent mailed to Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested, a Notice of Violation and Order To Show Cause- Non-payment. (Hereinafter referred to as "Notice of Violation"). The Respondent's Notice of Violation was mailed to Petitioner at Post Office Box 945140, Maitland, Florida 32751. Petitioner's correct mailing address is Post Office Box 945140, Maitland, Florida 32795-5140. The article number on the certified mail card is documented on the bottom of the Notice of Violation. The Respondent's Notice of Violation had a copy of the affected permits attached to it indicating the permits to which it applied. The Respondent's Notice of Violation notified Petitioner that the Respondent had not received its permit renewal fees for its Permits and that they would permanently expire if Petitioner did not submit its permit fees, including a ten (10) percent delinquent fee, within thirty (30) days. The Respondent's Notice of Violation notified Petitioner that failure to pay its permit fees within the thirty (30) day period would subject its signs to immediate removal by the Respondent; and that Petitioner had a right to request an administrative hearing within thirty (30) days of the date of the Notice. Petitioner did not pay its permit fees or request an administrative hearing within the time limit set out in the Respondent's Notice of Violation. On February 23, 1995, Respondent received the 1995 renewal fees for an account identified as "Texaco Star Enterprise," which covers other permits, and that account is in good standing. The Respondent returned the check submitted by Petitioner on August 29, 1995 for the Star Enterprise (Petitioner) account. Star Enterprise is an organization which refines, distributes and markets petroleum products under the Texaco brand throughout twenty-six states. In 1994 and 1995 Star Enterprise owned approximately 400 locations in the State of Florida which were operated for the purpose of selling Texaco products to the general public. Star Enterprise operates some retail locations through its own salaried employees. These salaried operated retail outlets are known by the acronym "SORO." The SORO group is responsible for maintenance on SORO locations. Star Enterprise also owns retail locations which are operated by third parties under a lease. Star Enterprise presently oversees the day to day operations of its organization in the State of Florida from its office located at 650 South North Lake Boulevard, Suite 450, Altamonte Springs, Florida. In approximately 1993, Star Enterprise began to downsize and reorganize its operations. In December 1993, Star Enterprise moved its regional office to its current location in Altamonte Springs from 555 Winderly Place, Maitland, Florida. Whereas the Maitland office had operated with approximately 130 employees, only 34 employees moved to the Altamonte Springs location. Downsizing has continued, with approximately 25 persons still employed in the Altamonte Springs office. Since moving to its Altamonte Springs office, Star Enterprise has received mail at its physical location on North Lake Boulevard and at Post Office Box 945140 at the Maitland, Florida Post Office. Mail is delivered to the North Lake Boulevard location by the postal service and through various courier services. On weekdays mail is retrieved at the Maitland Post Office by a courier service and delivered by courier to Star Enterprise at the North Lake Boulevard office. Budget Couriers of Florida, Inc. (hereinafter "Budget Couriers"), is a delivery service operating throughout the Orlando metropolitan area. Budget Couriers' business is retrieving packages and mail from the Post Office and delivering them to its clients. Star Enterprise is a client of Budget Couriers. Budget Couriers picks up the mail for Petitioner at the Maitland Post Office. The mail is not retrieved from a box with a key, but is picked up at the back door area in plastic bins. A post office employee brings the mail bin to the courier at the dock and he signs for it. Budget Courier picks up mail at the location for several clients. Each one has separate bins for their mail. Budget Couriers acts in the capacity of Petitioner's agent for purposes of the retrieval and delivery of mail sent to Petitioner at its Post Office Box 945140 in Maitland, Florida. When an article of certified mail is sent to one of Budget Couriers' clients, Budget Couriers' employee signs for the article on behalf of that client. Petitioner authorizes Budget Couriers to sign for and retrieve certified mail on behalf of Star Enterprise. The certified mail is then placed in the client's bin. After retrieving the mail bins at the post office, the courier delivers the mail to each client, including Petitioner. When the mail is delivered the courier obtains a receipt for the contents of the entire bin. The receipt does not identify specific pieces of mail, including certified mail; nor is an inventory of the mail provided. When the Respondent prepares a notice of violation to be sent to a delinquent permit holder, the article number on the certified return receipt card is documented on the bottom of the notice of violation. The Respondent's Notice of Violation was received by Petitioner at its Post Office Box 945140 in Maitland, Florida, on February 6, 1995. The certified return receipt accompanying the Respondent's Notice of Violation was signed on behalf of Petitioner by an employee of Budget Couriers, Billy Hadd. The article number on the certified return receipt accompanying the Respondent's Notice of Violation corresponds to the number documented on the bottom of the Respondent's Notice of Violation. Petitioner acknowledged its receipt of the mail delivered by Budget Couriers on February 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9, 1995. Star Enterprise elected to have its mail retrieved from the Post Office by a contract courier. Petitioner did not receive an inventory of the individual articles of mail retrieved from its Post Office box and delivered to it by Budget Couriers. Petitioner received the Notice of Violation on February 6, 1995. The Respondent did not receive any payment in response to the Notice of Violation sent to Petitioner regarding its delinquent permit renewal fees. Petitioner had prior knowledge of the outdoor advertising sign permit renewal process. Petitioner has been renewing its outdoor advertising sign permits as far back as 1989. The action taken by the Respondent regarding Petitioner's Permits was consistent with the action it takes regarding any other outdoor advertising sign permit holder which fails to pay its outdoor advertising sign permit renewal fees in response to a notice of violation issued by the Respondent. It is the policy of Respondent not to accept late payments for expired outdoor advertising sign permits. Respondent believes that acceptance of late payments for expired outdoor advertising sign permits would violate the agreement between the Governor and the U. S. Department of Transportation. ( Hereinafter referred to as "Agreement"). Violation of the Agreement could possibly subject the State of Florida to penalties equal to ten (10) percent of the Federal participation in transportation projects within the State of Florida, which at this time would amount to a penalty of approximately sixty (60) million dollars per year. One of the key elements of the outdoor advertising regulatory process is to treat all permittees the same. Petitioner received the same treatment from the Respondent as would any other permittee under the same circumstances. Outdoor advertising sign permit renewal is a yearly occurrence and Petitioner was no stranger to the permit renewal process including the procedure for delinquent permit renewal fee payments. Petitioner failed to pay its outdoor advertising sign permit renewal fees on two other occasions in the past. On both of these occasions Petitioner received the Respondent's notice of violation at the same address as the violation at issue. On these past occasions Petitioner paid its renewal fees within the reinstatement period and its permits were reinstated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding Petitioner's outdoor advertising sign permits have permanently expired. RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered determining that the request for hearing filed by Petitioner was not timely filed; and denying its request to reinstate two outdoor advertising sign permits. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-0340T To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 (in part), 11 (in part), 12, 17, 18 (in part), 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 (in part), 34, 35 (in part), 36 (in part), 37 (in part), 39 (in part), 40 (in part), 46 (in part), 47, 48 (in part), 70 (in Preliminary Statement), 71 (Preliminary Statement in part), 74. Rejected as subsumed or irrelevant and immaterial: paragraphs 6, 8 (in part), 9, 10, 11 (in part), 13, 14, 15, 16, 18 (in part), 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 33 (in part), 35 (in part), 36 (in part), 37 (in part), 38, 39 (in part), 40 (in part), 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 45, 46 (in part), 48 (in part), 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71 (in part), 72, 73, 75 (conclusion), 76, 77 (conclusion of law). Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 (in part), 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,22, 25, 26 (in part), 27, 28, 29, and 30. Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraph 10 (in part), 12. Rejected as subsumed or irrelevant and immaterial: paragraphs 23, 24, and 26 (in part). COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth C Wheeler, Esquire Johnson and Bussey, P.A. Post Office Box 531086 Orlando, Florida 32853-1086 Murray M. Wadsworth, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ben W. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue By a Petition filed October 21, 1988, Petitioner sought a determination, pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, that a non-rule policy of the Department of Transportation was a rule that: (a) was not adopted properly under Chapter 120 Florida Statutes, and (b) was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner submitted application for state outdoor advertising permits which were received in the Department of Transportation (DOT) District Office on August 8, 1988, for a location on U.S. 90 (Scenic Highway), a federal aid primary highway in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida. Petitioner was denied the permits on the ground that permits had been issued to another outdoor advertising company prior to July 1, 1984, for a location less than a thousand feet from Petitioner's proposed site on the same side of the highway. There have been no tags displayed or sign maintained at the earlier site since issuance of the permits. It is DOT's interpretation that for permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, permittees are not required to display tags within 30 days and erect signs within 270 days as provided in Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 1984. DOT nonetheless requires pre-1984 permits to comply with sections 479.07(5)(b) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes. DOT's interpretation is not in writing and has not been promulgated as a rule pursuant to Sections 120.54 or 120.55, Florida Statutes. Petitioner is in the outdoor advertising business, particularly off- premises signs, and is so licensed. The spacing impediment caused by the earlier permits is the only basis for denial of Petitioner's permit applications by DOT as Petitioner meets all other requirements. Petitioner will have to confront the agency's "interpretation" with each permit application it makes. Petitioner is currently challenging the specific above-referenced permit denials in Section 120.57(1) proceedings which both parties herein opposed consolidating with the instant rule challenge when the undersigned suggested that possibility. Respondent has not challenged Petitioner's standing to bring this rule challenge, and Petitioner has demonstrated standing to bring it. The Petitioner asserts that the agency's acknowledged foregoing interpretation of the named statutes constitutes an arbitrary and capricious unpromulgated rule, applied without legislative authority and prejudicing Petitioner and all like-situated lessees of off-premises signs because it creates a perpetual grandfather clause for sign permits in existence prior to July 1, 1984, and new applicants post-1984 cannot know where earlier permits have been issued due to the lack of DOT enforcement of tag posting and sign maintenance requirements. Phil Brown, DOT Right of Way Specialist, testified by deposition that, indeed, if a pre-1984 permittee never erects a sign or posts tags, the spacing impediment can only be located through DOT records, in this case, a computer search. Phil Brown relied on DOT training sessions which advised him that Section 479.07(9), Florida Statutes, requires the current agency interpretation/non-enforcement of Section 479.07(5)(a) to pre-1984 permittees, and he applied it to Petitioner's application. In so doing, he utilized Section 479.05(9) so as to count the thousand foot spacing requirement for the permit site which had been requested by the Petitioner not from a permitted sign (which is the statutory phrase contained in Section 479.09) or from a sign in existence, i.e. a sign already erected, or from a tagged erected sign, or from a displayed tag, but instead counted the thousand feet, as he had been directed, from the site described on the permit issued pre-1984. Gary Kissinger, designated by DOT as its employee most knowledgeable about the application of statutes and rules to outdoor advertising, testified by deposition that pre-1984 outdoor advertising sign permits can, absent a future law change, go into perpetuity without the holder thereof ever erecting a sign or posting a metal tag as long as they keep renewing and paying their fees, even though Mr. Kissinger understood the purpose of the 1984 amendments to be the prevention of advertisers "stockpiling" unused sites/permits from the enactment date forward. No evidence established Mr. Kissinger as the drafter of the legislation or of the agency rules promulgated thereunder, and no evidence was submitted in the form of committee minutes, notes, legislative journals or by other means to clearly establish a legislative intent either coinciding or differing from Mr. Kissinger's perception. Mr. Kissinger relies for the DOT "interpretation" upon the definition of "nonconforming" signs given in Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes. He does not rely for DOT's interpretation on the exceptions listed in Section 479.16, Florida Statutes. It is his view that notwithstanding Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)(7), Florida Administrative Code, those permits issued before July 1, 1984, are valid with or without a sign being erected or tags maintained/displayed. Even though DOT's current permit application form requires applicants such as Petitioner to state, to the best of their knowledge, the location of the permitted sign nearest to the site for which they are applying, there is no way any post-1984 applicant can find out about preexisting unutilized permits on its own without getting that information from DOT. Only after the application is submitted, does DOT run its own check and deny the new permit application if a permit for a site within the distance given in Section 479.09 exists regardless of whether there is a sign erected or a tag displayed at the earlier permit's site. DOT applies its interpretation statewide and asserts that all the agency is doing is to not apply the posting and erection requirements of Section 479.07(5)(a) retroactively to pre-1984 permits, upon recognized standards of prospective statutory construction, and that the agency has not established any policy or rule thereby. The statute in question came about as a substantial rewording of Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, by way of amendments contained in Chapter 84- 227, Laws of Florida, which provided as follows: Sign permit required.-- Except as provided in s. 479.16, no person shall erect, operate, use, maintain, or cause to be erected, operated, used, or maintained, any sign on the state highway system outside incorporated areas or any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway systems without first obtaining a permit there for from the department and paying the annual fee as provided herein. No person shall apply for a permit unless he has first obtained the written permission of the owner or other person in lawful possession or control of the site designated as the location of the sign in the permit application. (3)(a) Application for a sign permit shall be made on a form prescribed by the department and a separate application shall be submitted for each permit requested. A permit shall be required for each sign facing. As part of the application, the applicant or his authorized representative shall certify in a notarized signed statement that all information provided therein is true and correct and that, pursuant to subsection (2), he has obtained the written permission of the owner or other person in lawful possession of the site designated as the location of the sign in the permit application. Every permit application shall be accompanied by the appropriate permit fee; a signed statement by the owner or other person in lawful control of the site on which the sign is located or will be erected, authorizing placement of the sign on that site; and, where local government regulation of signs exists, a statement from the appropriate local government official indicating that the sign complies with all local government requirements and that the agency or unit of local government will issue a permit to that applicant upon approval of the state permit application by the department. The annual permit fee for each sign facing shall be $25 for 20 lineal feet or less, and $35 for over 20 lineal feet. No fee may be prorated for a period less than the remainder of the permit year to accommodate short-term publicity features; however, all first-year fees may be prorated by payment of an amount equal to one-fourth of the annual fee for each remaining whole quarter or partial quarter of the permit year ending on January 15. Permit applications shall be acted on by the department within 30 days after receipt of the application by the department. Applications received after September 30 shall include fees for the last quarter of the current year and fees for the succeeding year. (4)(a) For every permit issued, the department shall furnish to the applicant a serially numbered permanent metal tag. The permittee is responsible for maintaining a valid permit tag on each permitted sign facing at all times. The tag shall be securely attached to the sign facing or, if there is no facing, on the pole nearest the highway, and shall be attached in such manner as to be plainly visible from the main-traveled way. The permit shall become void unless the permit tag is properly and permanently displayed at the permitted site within 30 days after the date of permit issuance. If the permittee fails to erect a completed sign on the permitted site within 270 days after the date on which the permit was issued, the permit shall be void, and the department may not issue a new permit to that permittee for the same location for 270 days after the date on which the permit became void. A permit is valid only for the location specified thereon. Valid permits may be transferred from one sign owner to another upon written acknowledgment from the current permittee and submittal of a transfers fee of $5 for each permit to be transferred. However, the maximum transfer fee is $100 for any multiple transfer between two outdoor advertisers in a single transaction. If a permit tag is lost, stolen, or destroyed, the permittee to whom the tag was issued shall apply to the department for a replacement tag Upon receipt of the application accompanied by a service fee of $3, the department shall issue a replacement permit tag. A permittee shall at all times maintain the permission of the owner or other person in lawful control of the sign site to have and maintain a sign at such site. (5)(a) All licenses and permits expire annually on January 15, and all license and permit renewal fees are required to be submitted to the department by no later than January 15. On or before November 1 of each year, the department shall send to each permittee a notice of fees due for all permits of the permittee which were issued prior to September 30. Such notice shall list the permits and the permit fees due for each sign facing. The permittee shall, no later than January 1 of each year, advise the department of any additions, deletions, or errors contained in the notice. Permit tags not renewed shall be returned to the department for cancellation by January 15. Permit tags not renewed or returned to the department shall be accounted for by the permittee in writing, which writing shall be submitted with the renewal fee payment. (b) If the permittee has not submitted his fee payments by January 15, the department shall, no later than February 1, send a violation notice or the permittee requiring fee payment within 30 days after the date of the notice and payment of a delinquency fee equal to 10 percent of the original amount due, or, in the alternative to these payments, the filing of a request for an administrative hearing to show cause why his signs should not be subject to immediate removal due to expiration of his license or permit. If the permittee submits payment as required by the violation notice, his license or permit shall be automatically reinstated and such reinstatement shall be retroactive to January 15th. If the permittee does net respond to the violation notice within the 30-day period, the department shall remove the sign without further notice and without incurring any liability as a result of such removal. (6)(a) Any sign not granted a permit by the effective date of this act shall not be granted a permit unless such sign is located at least: One thousand five hundred feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on an interstate highway; One thousand feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on a federal-aid primary highway; The minimum spacing provided herein shall not preclude the permitting of V-type, back-to-back, side-to-side, stacked or double faced signs at the permitted sign site. No sign shall be granted a permit pursuant to this chapter to locate on any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway systems that: Exceeds 50 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main-traveled way, if outside an incorporate area; or Exceeds 65 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main-traveled way, if inside an incorporated area; or Exceeds 950 square feet of sign of facing including all embellishments. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of this act to become nonconforming. (7) Commercial or industrial zoning which is not comprehensively enacted or which is enacted primarily to permit signs shall not be recognized as commercial or industrial zoning for purposes of this provision and permits shall not be issued for signs in such areas. The department shall adopt rules within 130 days after this act takes effect which shall provide criteria to determine whether such zoning is comprehensively enacted or enacted primarily to permit signs. A Reviser's Bill renumbered and made scrivener's changes in the amendatory language so that the "interpreted" portions of Section 479.07 were codified as follows: (5)(a) For each permit issued, the department shall furnish to the applicant a serially numbered permanent metal permit tag. The, permittee is responsible for maintaining a valid permit tag on each permitted sign facing at all times. The tag shall be securely attached to the sign facing or, if there is no facing, on the pole nearest the highway; and it shall be attached in such a manner as to be plainly visible from the main-traveled way. The permit will become void unless the permit tag is properly and permanently displayed at the permitted site within 30 days after the date of permit issuance. If the permittee fails to erect a completed sign on the permitted site within 270 days after the date on which the permit was issued, the permit will be void, and the department may not issue a new permit to that permittee for the same location for 270 days after the date on which the permit became void. (b) If a permit tag is lost, stolen, or destroyed, the permittee to whom the tag was issued must apply to the department for a replacement tag. Upon receipt of the application accompanied by a service fee of $3, the department shall issue a replacement permit tag. A permit is valid only for the location specified in the permit. Valid permits may be transferred from one sign owner to another upon written acknowledgment from the current permittee and submittal of a transfer fee of $5 for each permit to be transferred. However, the maximum transfer fee for any multiple transfer between two outdoor advertisers in a single transaction is $100. A permittee shall at all times maintain the permission of the owner or other person in lawful control of the sign site to have and maintain a sign at such site. (8)(a) All licenses and permits expire annually on January 15, and all license and permit renewal fees are required to be submitted to the department by no later than January 15. On or before November 1 of each year, the department shall send to each permittee a notice of fees due for all permits which were issued to him prior to September 30. Such notice shall list the permits and the permit fees due for each sign facing. The permittee shall, no later than January 1 of each year, advise the department of any additions, deletions, or errors contained in the notice. Permit tags which are not renewed shall be returned to the department for cancellation by January 15. Permit tags which are not renewed or returned to the department shall be accounted for by the permittee in writing, which writing shall be submitted with the renewal fee payment. (b) If a permittee has not submitted his fee payment by January 15, the department shall, no later than February 1, send a notice of violation to the permittee, requiring the payment of the permit fee within 30 days after the date of the notice and payment of a delinquency fee equal to 10 percent of the original amount due or, in the alternative to these payments, requiring the filing of a request for an administrative hearing to show cause why his sign should not be subject to immediate removal due to expiration of his license or permit. If the permittee submits payment as required by the violation notice, his license or permit will be automatically reinstated and such reinstatement will be retroactive to January 15th. If the permittee does not respond to the notice of violation within the 30-day period, the department shall remove the sign without further notice and without incurring any liability as a result of such removal. (9)(a) A permit shall not be granted for any sign for which a permit had not been granted by the effective date of this act unless such sign is located at least: One thousand five hundred feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on an interstate highway. One thousand feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on a federal-aid primary highway. The minimum spacing provided in this paragraph does not preclude the permitting V-type, back-to-back, side-to-side, stacked, or double-faced signs at the permitted sign site. A permit shall not be granted for a sign pursuant to this chapter to locate such sign on any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system, which sign: Exceeds 50 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main-traveled way, if outside an incorporated area; Exceeds 65 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main-traveled way, if inside an incorporated area; or Exceeds 950 square feet of sign facing including all embellishments. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of this act to become nonconforming. Section 479.01(12) as amended provides: 'Nonconforming sign' means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions; of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was; lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. [Emphasis supplied.] The effective date(s) of Section 479.07 is significant as provided in Section 27 of Law 84-227: This act shall take effect October 1, 1984, except that the amendments to Section 479.07 F.S. shall take effect July 1, 1984; however, any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis Supplied.] Likewise, the exceptions set out in Section 479.16, Florida statutes, as amended by Chapter 84-227, must be considered. They are numerous, but do not specifically enumerate "Pre-July 1, 1984 permits," in that language. The new statue defines "erect" at Section 479.01(4) and "sign" at Section 479.01(14) as follows: (4) "Erect" means to construct, build, raise, assemble, place, affix, attach, create, paint, draw, or in any other way bring into being or establish; but it does not include any of the foregoing activities when performed as an incident to the change to advertising message or customary maintenance or repair of a sign. (14) "Sign" means any combination of structure and message in the form of an outdoor sign, display, device, figure, painting, drawing, message, placard, poster, billboard, advertising structure, advertisement, logo, symbol, or other form, whether placed individually or on a V-type, back-to-back, side-to-side, stacked, or double-faced display, designed, intended, or used to advertise or inform, any part of the advertising message or informative contents of which is visible from any place on the main-traveled way. The term does not include an official traffic control sign, official marker, or specific information panel erected, caused to be erected, or approved by the department. Both of these foregoing subsections are substantially the same as their predecessors in the pre-1984 statute. There appears to be no dispute that DOT has lawfully promulgated the following rules in order to facilitate its administration of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, as amended 1984: Rule 14-10.004(2)(d)--The application shall be notarized and shall contain . . . The sign's distance from the right of way, the nearest permitted sign on the same side of the highway, and the nearest intersection on the same side of the highway. [Emphasis supplied.] Rule 14-10.004(6)--Permits shall be renewed in accordance with Section 479.07(5). [Emphasis supplied.] Rule 14-10.004(9)--A sign granted a permit shall be erected and thereafter maintained in accordance with Section 479.07, F.S. and this Rule Chapter. [Emphasis Supplied. Rule 14-10.004(10)--The permanent metal tag issued by the Department shall be displayed and maintained in accordance with Section 479.07(5)(a) F.S. Rule 14-10.006(1)(b)(7)--The following shall apply to signs for which the initial valid permit application was submitted after July 1, 1984: Official signs, and signs exempt under Section 479.16 and structures that are not lawfully maintained shall not be counted nor shall measurements be made from them for purposes of determining compliance with spacing requirements. [Emphasis supplied.] Rule 14-10.007(1) provides in pertinent part: . . . A sign which was conforming on June 30, 1984, but which does not comply with the size, spacing, and height requirements of Section 479.07(9) F.S. shall not be considered a nonconforming sign. [Emphasis supplied.] Rule 14-10.007(2)(e) provides in pertinent part: (2) The following shall apply to nonconforming signs: (e) A sign face which remains void of advertising matter for 12 months or longer shall be deemed an abandoned or discontinued sign and shall lose its nonconforming status. [Emphasis supplied.] None of these duly promulgated rules has been challenged in this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact On or about May 8, 1981, the Department issued permit number AE316-10 to Henderson Signs. This permit authorized the erection of a sign to be located approximately 1.9 miles west of SR 267 in Gadsden County, Florida. This location is in an unzoned area, and the permit was granted because of its proximity to a nearby commercial activity known as Imperial Nurseries. Subsequently, the Respondent, Tri-State Systems, Inc., purchased the subject permit from Henderson Signs, and thereafter the sign in question was erected by the Respondent. The area where this sign was placed is rural in nature and generally suitable for agricultural activities. However, the business being conducted by Imperial Nurseries in 1981 was the growing of ornamental evergreens primarily for wholesale distribution in Northern markets. These ornamental evergreens were grown in containers on top of the ground, and shipped by refrigerated trucks. A view of the area in 1981 would show evergreen plants in containers sitting on top of dry sod. Imperial Nurseries produces three to four million evergreens, does two to three million dollars in business, and employs approximately 130 employees. Although the only structure now situated within 660 feet of the interstate is a weather shed, in 1981 there was a loading dock located within 660 feet of the interstate from which the loading and shipping took place, there was a portable toilet, low bed trucks, semi-trailers, and tractors working near this loading dock, and men working in the area. Prior to the Department's issuance of the subject permit, one of the its inspectors whose duty is to observe a proposed sign site and determine if it is as represented in the application and if it meets the requirements of the statutes and rules, field inspected the proposed site of the subject sign. Based on this inspection he recommended the issuance of the permit upon his determination that this area was unzoned commercial, that the sign site was within 800 feet of a commercial activity known as Imperial Nurseries, and that this commercial activity was within 660 feet of the right of way of I- 10, and visible from the main-traveled way of I-10. There is sufficient credible evidence in the record of this proceeding to support a finding of fact that the subject area was as the field inspector found it to be. The field inspector's recommendation to approve the site as a permittable location was joined in by his supervisor after the supervisor had also conducted a field inspection of the area. Both of them based their approvals on their observations in 1981 of commercial activities being conducted within 660 feet from I- 10. The site where the Respondent erected its sign was within 800 feet of the place where the loading dock was situated in 1981. The assertion of Henderson Signs on its sign permit application that the proposed location was within 800 feet of a business was not false or misleading. The Department's inspector and his supervisor concurred in this characterization of the area. Neither has the Respondent violated any of the provisions of chapter 479, Florida Statutes. All of the facts were set forth on the permit application submitted by Henderson Signs, and these facts were verified by the Department after the area was inspected to determine their accuracy. The policy of the Department leaves the determination of what is and what is not an unzoned commercial area to the field inspector, with the approval of his supervisors. In this case, the determination was made that the activities of Imperial Nurseries were commercial in nature, and the permit was granted on the basis of this determination, not on the representation of Henderson Signs or the Respondent. In the summer of 1984, the subject site was inspected by the Department's Right-of-Way Administrator, who determined that the business being conducted by Imperial Nurseries in 1984 was agricultural, and not commercial in nature. Although Imperial Nurseries now has an agricultural exemption on its property, there is no evidence that it had this in 1981, and the facts support a finding that Imperial Nurseries is a commercial activity and was such in 1981. There is no statutory definition of "agricultural" 1/ and the Department has not defined the term by rule. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged, Second Edition, defines "agricultural" as the cultivation of the ground, the art of preparing the soil, the tillage or the culture of the earth. These are not the activities of Imperial Nurseries now, and were not in 1981.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department's violation notice seeking removal of the Respondent's sign on the north side of I-10, approximately 1.9 miles west of S.R. 267 in Gadsden County, Florida, be dismissed; and that permit number AE 316-10 remain in effect as a permit for a nonconforming sign. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 1st day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1985.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the Department of Transportation's Notice of Denied Application for an outdoor advertising permit at State Road 61 (U.S. 319), 168 feet west of Thomasville Road, Leon County, issued to Lamar of Tallahassee on May 30, 2008, should be upheld pursuant to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes,1/ or whether the sign should be permitted as a nonconforming sign as defined by Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department is a state agency empowered to regulate outdoor advertising signs along the interstate and federal-aid primary highway systems of Florida pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Lamar is licensed to engage in the business of outdoor advertising within the state of Florida pursuant to Section 479.04, Florida Statutes. Lamar owns a V-shaped sign located on certain real property at 1940 Thomasville Road in Tallahassee. Thomasville Road is also known as State Road 61. Lamar does not own the real property, but has the right to erect and maintain its sign on the property under a lease that Lamar executed with the landowner in 1998. Lamar's sign was erected in 1998, with the approval of the City of Tallahassee. The sign is located on the southwest corner of the intersection of Thomasville and Betton/Bradford Road, behind the Southern Flooring showroom. The east side of the sign face is within 660 feet of and visible to State Road 61. State Road 61 is a federal-aid highway and thus a "controlled road" subject to the jurisdiction of the Department pursuant to Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the east side of the sign requires a permit from the Department. The west side is visible only to Bradford Road and does not require a permit from the Department. On February 10, 2008, Lisa Adams, an outdoor advertising inspector conducting an annual inventory on behalf of the Department, identified the subject sign as an unpermitted sign that is visible from State Road 61. Ms. Adams completed a Department compliance checklist stating that the sign was possibly illegal because it lacked a Department permit and the east side of the sign was visible from State Road 61. On April 22, 2008, the Department issued a notice of violation stating that the sign was illegal and must be removed within 30 days of the date of the notice, pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. Lamar did not file a request for hearing in response to the notice of violation, and does not contest the notice of violation in this proceeding. On May 16, 2008, Lamar filed an Application for Outdoor Advertising Permit for the sign. The Department reviewed the application and issued a Notice of Denied Application on May 30, 2008. The application was denied because the sign site does not meet the spacing requirements of Section 479.07(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes, in that it is closer than 1,000 feet from another permitted sign owned by Lamar. The other permitted sign was built in 1979. The 1,000 foot spacing requirement has been in the statute at all times since the 1998 construction of the sign at issue in this proceeding, meaning that it could never have met the spacing requirement of Section 479.07(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes. Myron Laborde was Lamar Advertising Southeast's regional manager in 1998 when the sign was built. His area of authority included Tallahassee. Mr. Laborde testified that in 1998 the view of the sign from State Road 61 was obstructed by several palm trees, some scrub oaks, and a very tall tallow tree. Some of these trees were removed when Southern Flooring took over and remodeled the old Helms Exterminators building at 1940 Thomasville Road about four years ago. Mr. Laborde testified that the sign is now visible from State Road 61 due to the removal of the trees, but only "if you . . .turn your head 90 degrees" while driving north on State Road 61. Loyd Childree has been the vice-president and general manager of Lamar of Tallahassee since 2003. Mr. Childree testified that the renovations to the Helms Exterminators building began some time after March 2005, and that the building's size was nearly doubled to accommodate the Southern Flooring showroom. Mr. Childree testified that a lot of trees were removed during the renovation, including palm trees and a "canopy-type tree" about 25 to 30 feet tall with a full crown similar to that of an oak. Mr. Childree testified that the sign is now visible from State Road 61 due to the removal of the trees. Mr. Childree further stated that Lamar markets the sign to advertisers based on the traffic counts from Bradford Road, not those from State Road 61. Ms. Adams, the inspector who identified the possible illegality of the sign, has worked for the Department's contractor, TBE Group, since August 2004. Her job is to conduct an inventory of permitted signs on controlled roads such as State Road 61 and determine which unpermitted signs are visible from the roadway. Ms. Adams inventoried State Road 61 in 2005, 2006 and 2007 without identifying Lamar's sign as an unpermitted sign visible from the roadway. Ms. Adams testified that her predecessor in the position inventoried State Road 61 every year since Lamar's sign was erected and never identified the sign as one visible from State Road 61. Ms. Adams testified that she might have seen the sign in a previous year but did not identify it as illegal because she believed it had "on-premise" advertising, i.e., it advertised Southern Flooring. With certain restrictions, a sign erected on the premises of a business establishment that bears advertising for that establishment is exempt pursuant to Section 479.16(1), Florida Statutes. Ms. Adams frankly conceded that she was speculating and that her memory was unclear as to whether she had seen and noted this sign in past years. In any event, Lamar's log of advertisers showed that Southern Flooring never advertised on the sign. Lynn Holschuh is the Department's state outdoor advertising administrator, and had held this position since 1992. Ms. Holschuh testified that State Road 61 has been inventoried by an outdoor advertising inspector every year since Lamar's sign was erected in 1998. None of the inspectors noted the visibility or possible illegality of the sign until Ms. Adams noted the sign on February 12, 2008. Ms. Holschuh lives in Tallahassee and has driven on State Road 61 hundreds of times over the years. In her deposition, she testified that she believed the sign was not visible when it was built, and only became visible from State Road 61 when a third party removed the obstructing trees. The testimony of Mr. Laborde, Mr. Childree, and Ms. Holschuh was credible and uncontroverted as to the history of the sign. It is found that the sign was not visible from State Road 61 when it was erected in 1998, but that it became visible from State Road 61 when trees were removed by the landowner during renovations to the old Helms Exterminators building at some point after March 2005. Lamar's sign, now visible from State Road 61, is subject to the Department's jurisdiction pursuant to Section 479.01, Florida Statutes, because State Road 61, as a federal- aid primary highway, is a "controlled road" under the statute. A sign visible from a controlled road must carry a Department permit. Lamar contends that the facts of this case establish that its sign meets the definition of a "nonconforming sign" set forth in Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes: "Nonconforming sign" means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. Lamar's sign was not visible from State Road 61 in 1998 and therefore was "lawfully erected" in terms of the Department's licensing requirements. Lamar contends that the removal of trees by a third party constituted "changed conditions" that rendered the sign out of compliance with state law, and that the sign is therefore a nonconforming sign under Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes. The Legislature has provided no definition of the term "changed conditions," and the Department has no rule to provide interpretive guidance to the words of the statute. On September 17, 2008, Lamar filed a motion for leave to amend its petition for hearing in this case to challenge the Department's alleged interpretation of the phrase "due to changed conditions" as an unadopted rule. In particular, Lamar alleged that the Department was applying an unadopted rule limiting "changed conditions" to those initiated by a government agency. On September 19, 2008, the Department filed an unopposed motion to remand the case to the agency. The motion was granted on September 22, 2008. In the Florida Administrative Weekly dated November 26, 2008 (vol. 34, no. 48, p. 6228), the Department published a Notice of Development of Proposed Rule, with the following preliminary text of an amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.006: 14-10.006 Additional Permitting Criteria. Each application for an outdoor advertising sign permit shall meet the requirements of Sections 479.07(9) and 479.11, F.S. In addition, an application must comply with the requirements of the agreement between the state and the United States Department of Transportation referenced in Section 479.02(1), F.S., which have not been duplicated in Sections 479.07(9) and 479.11, F.S., or superseded by stricter provisions in those statutes. The requirements are: through (8) No change. (9) The term "changed conditions" referenced in Section 479.01(14), F.S., defining nonconforming signs, means only the actions of a governmental entity, as defined by Section 11.45, F.S., which includes for example: Rezoning of a commercial area, reclassifying a secondary highway as a primary highway, or altering a highway's configuration causing a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. (Emphasis added) Ms. Holschuh testified that this draft rule language was written in direct response to Lamar's allegation that the Department's denial of its application was based on an unadopted rule. On December 16, 2008, the Department held a workshop on the draft rule. At the workshop, the Florida Outdoor Advertising Association ("FOAA") submitted the following suggested draft language for subsection (9) of Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.006: (9) The term "changed conditions" referenced in Section 479.01(14), F.S., defining nonconforming signs, means, and shall include, any of the following: An action taken by a governmental entity, as defined by Section 11.45, F.S., such as the rezoning of a parcel of property fro commercial to noncommercial, reclassifying a secondary highway to a primary highway, altering a highway's configuration, or the taking of any other action within the powers of such governmental entity which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction; The action of a third party, who is not the owner of a preexisting sign, relating to modifications to the topography, vegetation, buildings or other physical characteristics of the property upon which the sign is located, or the property surrounding the sign, which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. an act of God which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. The Department rejected the FOAA's proposed language, and ultimately abandoned the effort to adopt a rule defining the term "changed conditions." On September 18, 2009, the Department filed a motion with DOAH to reopen this case and proceed to a fact-finding hearing regarding its proposed rejection of Lamar's application. In her deposition, Ms. Holschuh testified that the rulemaking effort was abandoned because the language proposed by the FOAA made it clear that it would be "nearly impossible" to arrive at a definition that would cover "every situation that might arise for when an existing sign might suddenly become visible." Ms. Holschuh testified in deposition that it is now the Department's policy to review these matters on a case-by- case basis. However, she also testified that the Department, as a matter of "policy," continues to limit its consideration of "changed conditions" to actions taken by a governmental entity. The Department bases this limitation on the examples provided by 23 C.F.R. § 750.707(b), defining "nonconforming signs" for purposes of the Federal Highway Administration: A nonconforming sign is a sign which was lawfully erected but does not comply with the provisions of State law or State regulations passed at a later date or later fails to comply with State law or State regulations due to changed conditions. Changed conditions include, for example, signs lawfully in existence in commercial areas which at a later date become noncommercial, or signs lawfully erected on a secondary highway later classified as a primary highway. Ms. Holschuh stated that the Department's policy was applied to Lamar in the instant case, and would continue to be applied in the future unless some "extraordinary circumstance" in a specific case led the Department to revisit the policy. At the final hearing, Ms. Holschuh backed away somewhat from her flat statement that the Department's "policy" was to limit consideration of changed conditions to those caused by government action. She stated that FOAA's proposed rule language caused the Department to reconsider its position that governmental action should be the exclusive reason for granting a permit for "changed conditions," and testified that the Department will consider other circumstances in its case-by-case review of permit applications. Ms. Holschuh testified that, under the facts presented in this case, the Department would deny the permit because there is DOAH case law on point for the proposition that tree removal does not constitute "changed conditions," and because broadening the definition of "changed conditions" to include the situation presented by this case would open up the process to abuse. Ms. Holschuh testified, at more than one point in the proceeding, that the Department would have very likely granted the permit had the trees been removed by the Department rather than the private landowner. She gave no indication that Section 479.105(1)(e), Florida Statutes, or any other statute would prevent the Department from granting the permit for Lamar's nonconforming sign, should the Department find that the sign fell into nonconformity due to "changed conditions." The DOAH case law cited by Ms. Holschuh is Lamar of Tallahassee v. Department of Transportation, Case Nos. 08-0660 and 08-0661 (DOAH September 15, 2008), discussed more fully in the Conclusions of Law below. Ms. Holschuh testified that Lamar's sign is not located in a Department right-of-way and is not a hazard to the public in its current location.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation denying the application of Lamar of Tallahassee for a state sign permit for a location described as State Road 61 (U.S. 319), 168 feet west of Thomasville Road, in Leon County, Florida (Application Number 57155). DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2010.
Findings Of Fact In mid-1983 National had a properly permitted outdoor advertising structure bearing tag numbers AD-016-10 (south-facing sign) and AD-018-10 (north-facing sign) on the east side of U.S. 27 on leased property in Highlands County. In the latter part of 1983 this property was purchased by Young. On September 15, 1983, Young notified National that he was the owner of the property on which this sign was located and requested National to remove the sign. On September 16, 1983, Young applied for a permit to erect an outdoor advertising sign at this location. Young's application was disapproved by DOT on November 7, 1983, because DOT's records showed this to be a site occupied by a permitted sign (Exhibit 3). On or about October 26, 1983, after having received no response from National to his request for National to remove the sign, Young cut down the sign by sawing its supporting posts. On November 28, 1983, Young requested a hearing on the denial by DOT of his application for a permit for a sign at this site. On November 3, 1983, National obtained a lease (Exhibit 2) on property abutting Young's property and, on or about November 4, 1983, erected a sign on this property using the same faces from the fallen sign and attached the tags issued for its original sign. National's original lease dated 10/13/80 (Exhibit 1) with John Larino provided that either party could terminate the agreement on thirty days' notice. When Young purchased the property from Larino, he complied with the lease provisions regarding termination of the lease, including rebating the rent for the unused portion of the lease. Young erected a sign on this property on November 6, 1983, before his application had been denied and two days after National had re-erected its sign. Young obtained a county building permit on September 16, 1983, for the sign he subsequently erected. National has not applied for permit for the structure erected on the land leased from Boyd but attached permit tags AD-016-10 and AD-018-10 to the sign. The juxtaposition of the signs is as follows: proceeding north on U.S. 27, the first sign is owned by Young, next is the site of the former National sign, and then National's new sign. All of these locations are on the east side of U.S. 27, are less than 1,000 feet from a permitted sign to the south, are more than 500 feet from the sign, and all are within 180 feet of each other. When an applicant applies for a permit for a new sign, the site is inspected by a member of the Outdoor Advertising staff in the DOT district where the sign is to be located in company with the application, or the site is staked out by the applicant and viewed by a staff member. This inspection is to ascertain that the proposed sign will be located the required minimum distance from an existing sign and the proper distance from the roadway from which the sign will primarily be observed. DOT'S policy is that any relocation of the sign from the authorized location constitutes a new sign and requires the submission of a new application and approval therefor. The approved application for National's original sign was on U.S. 27 2.9 miles north of "Junction 17-Sebring." This location is on the property now owned by Young.
