Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department of Transportation was the state agency responsible foe enforcing the statutes involving commercial carrier and truck vehicle weight on covered vehicles operated on the streets and highways of this state. It does so through its Office of Motor Carrier Compliance staffed with uniformed certified law enforcement officers who have the authority to conduct random safety and compliance inspections of commercial vehicles being operated in this state. On January 6, 1992, Officer Borras stopped the Respondent's 1981 White truck, which was proceeding northbound on Haverhill Road in West Palm Beach, for a routine weight and safety check. Using a set of portable scales which are calibrated by the Florida Department of Agriculture's Division of Weights and Measures every 6 months, and following the Department's routine procedure of weighing at each axle and combining the two figures, Borras determined the Gross Vehicle Weight/load of the truck was 27,800 pounds. The maximum legal weight of the vehicle in issue, including the 10% tolerance, was 25,999 pounds. Therefore, according to the Department's scales, Respondent's vehicle was overweight by 1,801 pounds. Applying the statutory penalty of 5 per pound of overweight, resulted in Respondent being assessed a total penalty of $90.05 for this alleged violation. Since the Respondent's driver was driving with an expired driver's license, Mr. Rice was called to the scene to remove the vehicle. Mrs. Rice, as Secretary of the corporation, was required to produce the $90.05 in cash even though Department procedures provide for payment of a penalty by company or certified check. The Department's scales are supposed to be calibrated for accuracy every 6 months. The scales used by Officer Borras had last been calibrated on July 16, 1991, almost 6 months previously, and were due for re-calibration in January, 1992. In the experience of Lt. Thomas Carnicella, also of the Department's Office of Motor Carrier Compliance, the portable scales are considered to be possibly off to some degree. For that reason, the 10% tolerance is added to the authorized vehicle weight. Immediately after the citation was issued and the penalty paid, the vehicle was released to Mr. Rice who drove it, loaded with roofing waste, to the Palm Beach County dump where it was again weighted, both with full load and then empty after dumping, to determine the amount of dumping fee to be assessed. According to the County's in-ground permanent scales, which reportedly had been calibrated 3 days previously, Respondent's loaded vehicle was weighed at 24,280 pounds, or 1,719 pounds under the legal weight of 25, 999 pounds. On a prior occasion, Respondent's vehicle was also cited by the Department for being overweight, as here, and a penalty assessed. At that time, the dump scales and the Department's portable scales read almost the same. For that reason, Respondent did not protest the action and assessment. In this case, however, the discrepancy was considerable and because of that fact and the fact the citation indicated, incorrectly, that the truck was green, the protest was filed. Officer Borras explained the color discrepancy as having been the result of his confusion due to several vehicles being stopped at once, one of which was green. There is no doubt in his mind, however, that the Respondent's vehicle was the one cited for overweight and it is so found.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered in this case setting aside the civil penalty in the amount of $90.05 assessed against A. Rice Roofing, Inc., and directing reimbursement in that amount. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1992. Vernon L. Whittier, Jr. Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 John T. Rice A. Rice Roofing, Inc. 2458 Oklahoma Street Tallahassee, Florida 33406 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of an Unlawful Employment Practice by being discharged from his employment due to his handicap, obesity with resulting sleep apnea, in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired as a radiology escort in March, 1981, at Sun Coast Hospital. At that time Petitioner weighed approximately 325 - 335 pounds. The essential functions of Petitioner's job require that he transport patients by stretcher and wheelchair to and from the radiology department, and lift and maneuver up to 300 pounds without assistance. Other primary duties include assisting in the radiographic rooms as needed, removing soiled linen to a designated area, monitoring oxygen tanks, cleaning radiographic rooms and performing dark room duties as needed. In 1985, Petitioner received an average work performance evaluation. In 1986, Petitioner did not meet standards in four out of nine areas. Petitioner needed to improve his work habits and relationships with his coworkers. Petitioner frequently complained when requested he perform special tasks. Petitioner received two counsel sheets in 1986. Counsel sheets are the last stage of the progressive discipline procedure. One counsel sheet arose from Petitioner refusing to perform one of his job duties. The other sheet specified that Petitioner was not performing his share of the work. Petitioner complained about his work, slept on the job, and insisted on taking lunch breaks, even if there was a patient that needed assistance. Petitioner's performance improved in 1987. Nevertheless, Petitioner's self motivation was still below standard. In 1988, Petitioner experienced performance problems once again. Petitioner's 1988 annual evaluation specified that Petitioner needed to increase his productivity and decrease his absenteeism. In addition, Petitioner needed to be more self-motivating. In September, 1988, Petitioner received a written warning for falling asleep in the hospital's front lobby. Petitioner was warned not to sleep on hospital time or work premises. When Petitioner returned with a patient, he was short of breath and sweating. In November, 1988, Petitioner received a written counsel sheet again for his poor job performance. Petitioner was slow, did not do his share of the work, and complained in front of patients. Again, when Petitioner returned with a patient, he was short of breath and sweating. Petitioner insisted on sitting down and resting before he transported another patient. Other employees complained to his supervisor that they could not perform their job when Mr. Engleka was not getting patients to them. In 1988, Petitioner did not indicate that he needed reasonable accommodation. Petitioner's position as an escort was a one person job. Petitioner could not rest in between patients because other employees could not get their work done. Delay resulted in radiological tests not being done in a timely fashion which resulted in delayed patient care. At the request of management, Petitioner was evaluated to determine if he was physically able to perform the essential requirements of his position. Dr. Rea, Respondent's personal physician, determined that continued employment of Petitioner would pose a reasonable probability of substantial harm to Petitioner. Petitioner's labile hypertension, evidence of heart disease, obesity, low blood oxygen levels, and the physical requirements of his job placed Petitioner at substantial risk of having a heart attack and/or stroke. Petitioner's prognosis as it stood was determined to be very guarded to poor. There was no way to decrease the substantial risk of potential heart attack or stroke, but for Petitioner to go on medical leave and lose weight. No reasonable accommodations could be made to enable Petitioner to perform his essential job functions and eliminate or reduce the significant risk of heart attack or stroke to Petitioner. It was decided to recommend that Petitioner go on medical leave and participate in a weight loss program to improve his physical well being which could result in improvement of his work performance. Petitioner was advised that the Hospital was placing Petitioner on a medical leave of absence requiring Petitioner to enter the Optifast Weight Loss Program, and get treatment for sleep apnea. Respondent agreed to and did pay for eighty percent (80 percent) of the weight loss program. Petitioner's last day of work was February 14, 1989. When Petitioner was initially told about the requirement for weight loss, he thought it was a good idea. The next Optifast program started in March, 1989. Petitioner was paid all outstanding vacation, holidays, and sick leave until the Hospital outlined the specifics of placing Petitioner on medical leave. On or about March 24, 1989, Petitioner signed the leave agreement which specified Petitioner would be terminated if he did not comply with the weight loss program. Additionally, the Hospital agreed to assist Petitioner in receiving some income. The document specified that Petitioner understood that he would be replaced in his job. The Optifast program lasted at least twenty-six (26) weeks. Petitioner was expected to be on a leave of absence for at least the twenty-six (26) weeks time period, and return to his position once he completed the Optifast program. Petitioner applied for unemployment compensation in February, 1989, but was denied unemployment when Petitioner told the Unemployment Commission that he was on a medical leave of absence. Petitioner started the Optifast program on March 14, 1989. At that time Petitioner weighed four hundred fifty-three (453) pounds. Petitioner had problems with weight loss program compliance in week 6 (April 18, 1989); week 12 (May 30, 1989); and Week 15 (June 20, 1989) when Petitioner gained more than five (5) pounds. Petitioner stopped attending the Optifast program after week 16, (June 27, 1989), of the 26 week program, and did not see the doctor after that date. A very important phase of a fasting program is the behavior modification phase where eating habits are actually changed so the patient does not regain the weight he lost. Petitioner quit the Optifast program before reaching maintenance. Petitioner was not released, nor did he graduate from the Optifast program. Petitioner did not comply with the Optifast Weight Loss Program, because he stopped the program after 16 weeks. Therefore, Petitioner did not comply with the agreement between himself and Sun Coast Hospital. Petitioner understood that he would be terminated by the Hospital if he did not complete the Optifast program. Petitioner was denied Social Security disability benefits in July 17, 1989. At that time, Petitioner told Ken Deibel, former Director of Human Resources for Suncoast Hospital, that he was in desperate need of some type of income. Deibel told Petitioner the Hospital would change Petitioner's status to layoff so he could receive unemployment. Petitioner immediately received two weeks severance pay in keeping with layoff status. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Rea wrote an undated note stating that Petitioner could return to a working status, in order for Petitioner to qualify for unemployment. Dr. Rea wrote this note after Petitioner complained that he would not be able to continue the weight loss program unless he had a source of income. Dr. Rea did not release Petitioner to return to his position of radiology escort. The note was not addressed to or received by the Hospital. The note did not qualify Mr. Engleka to return to work as an escort at Sun Coast Hospital. Petitioner did not receive unemployment compensation following the change of his status from medical leave of absence to layoff. Petitioner did not restart the Optifast program. Petitioner never brought a release from the Optifast program or told the Hospital that he was ready to return to work. On January 14, 1990, Dr. Rea wrote another letter stating Petitioner could return to a "working status." In January, 1990, when Sun Coast Hospital received the release for Petitioner to return to a "working status," Petitioner was not otherwise qualified for the escort position because he had not lost weight, and still represented a substantial risk to himself. At that time Petitioner had regained almost all the weight that he lost while on the Optifast program, weighing 443 pounds. In January, 1992, Petitioner was diagnosed as having congestive heart failure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: That a Final Order be issued which DENIES Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of May, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 1993. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner: Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent: Accepted in substance: paragraphs - 1, 2, 4-11, 18-20, 21(in part), 22-42, 45-49, 50 in part Rejected as irrelevant or subsumed: paragraphs - 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21(in part), 43, 44 COPIES FURNISHED: Robin E. Greiwe, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez, P.A. 109 Brush North Suite 200 Tampa, Florida 33602 Mr. Michael David Engleka 2826 Oak Lawn Avenue Apartment B Largo, Florida 34641 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the $490 fine assessed by the Respondent against the Petitioner was unwarranted or incorrect.
Findings Of Fact On May 1, 1989, Wando Trucking, Inc. ("Wando") obtained a trip permit from the Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT") authorizing the transportation of an overweight load. Wando proposed to transport one sealed containerized cargo unit. The permit was valid for one trip from Jacksonville, Florida to the Georgia border and expired on May 5, 1989. The permit contained several special requirements, including the typing, on the cargo packer's bill of lading, of the identification number stamped on the container seal. The DOT considers a permit to be void if permit requirements are not met. Packers of containerized cargo affix numbered seals to the containers. The seals are constructed so as to prevent the opening of a container without destruction of the seal. The DOT's requirement that the seal number be typed is to lessen the opportunity for a carrier to alter the cargo or substitute contraband for a sealed and permitted load. On May 1, 1989, the Wando truck stopped at the DOT weigh station on I- 95 in Yulee, Florida. Upon weighing the vehicle, the DOT employee found the truck, at 89,800 pounds, to be over the legal statutory weight of 80,000 pounds. The DOT employee examined the excess weight permit offered by the Wando driver and found that the container seal number was handwritten, across the bill of lading, rather than typed as the permit requirements stated. The DOT employee completed the appropriate documentation and assessed a fine of $490. The fine was calculated at five cents per pound for the 9,800 pound overage. Wando paid the fine. The evidence does not establish that the assessed fine was inappropriate. The assertion by Wando Trucking, Inc., that there was no intent to violate the permit provisions is irrelevant.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order dismissing the petition of Wando Trucking, Inc. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX The Petitioner did not file a Proposed recommended order. The following constitute rulings on Proposed findings of facts Submitted by the Respondent. Respondent The Respondents Proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3 are accepted as modified in the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Paul F. Tecklenburg, Esq. Post Office Box 1430 Charleston, South Carolina 29401 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esq. Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact Charles Schwartz, an unlicensed building contractor built several houses in St. Lucie County including the house now owned by Salvatore and Cecelia Patti. In early 1976, Schwartz was in serious financial trouble and after commencing construction of the house here involve and placing a mortgage in the amount of $29,600 on the property on February 20, 1976, found himself unable to make the mortgage payments. This mortgage provided for interest payments only until June 20, 1976 when both principal and interest payments would start. Patti had done work as a subcontractor for Schwartz and was aware Schwartz was anxious to dispose of the property subject to the above mortgage. In April, 1976, before the house was completely finished, Patti purchased the house from Schwartz but didn't obtain a deed or assignment of mortgage until a later date. Patti agreed to assume the mortgage and complete the unfinished work as consideration for transfer of the property. Schwartz advised Patti that he, Schwartz, would record the warranty deed and have it sent to Patti. This deed was recorded on June 1, 1976 and documentary stamp taxes in the amount of $0.30 and surtax stamps in the amount of $0.55 were placed on the deed. When Patti received a copy of the recorded deed he paid no attention to the documentary stamps that had been placed on this instrument. After recording the warranty deed upon the representation to the clerk that the property consisted of unimproved land, Schwartz left town and numerous creditors "holding the bag". Schwartz had also advised Patti that the ad valorem taxes for 1976 had been paid on the property. Patti learned in late 1976 that these taxes had not been paid and to remove the lien thereby created against the property in January, 1977 he redeemed the tax certificates sold for these taxes. Patti's first information that proper documentary stamp taxes had not been placed upon his deed was contained in NOTICE OF PROPOSED ASSESSMENT dated November 19, 1976 (Exhibit 1) which showed an assessment for documentary stamps in the amount of $86.70, penalty $86.70 and interest in the amount of $4.48 for a total of $177.88. Since Petitioner acknowledged the accuracy of the assessment of $86,70 this amount is found to be the proper assessment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Parker Construction d/b/a Robert's Components, was operating a commercial vehicle, traveling north on Interstate Highway 75, on March 27, 1991. The truck stopped at the Department's weight scales located in the area of White Springs, Florida. The Department's Inspector checked the vehicle registration handed to him by the driver. The tag registration was for a valid Georgia tag in the PF category. The PF category allows for a maximum gross vehicle weight of 30,000 pounds. The total weight of Respondent's truck on March 27, 1991, was 72,180 pounds. The total weight exceeded its registered weight by 42,180 pounds. Respondent was assessed a statutory penalty of five cents a pound for all weight over the commercial vehicle's registered gross vehicle weight of 30,000 pounds. At five cents a pound, the penalty assessed was $2,109.00. Robert Parker, president and owner of Parker Construction verified that the truck was registered in the PF category. Respondent was in the process of obtaining an IRP tag which would have allowed him to operate the truck at the weight it was carrying. Mr. Parker had no intent to purposely operate an overloaded truck and this was the first violation he had ever incurred since buying the truck. When Mr. Parker contacted a weight inspector with DOT, he was advised that if he wrote a letter to the Review Board advising them of the above facts, the fine would probably be reduced. Mr. Parker was also told that the decision rested with the Review Board. Mr. Parker followed the officer's advise. However, his fine was not reduced.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that the penalty of $2,109.00 was correctly assessed against Respondent, pursuant to Section 316.545, Florida Statutes, and that Respondent's request for a refund be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Robert Parker Robert's Components P. O. Box 2523 La Grange, Georgia 30241 Ben G. Watts, Secretary ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The issue in this case is the amount of money to be reimbursed to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, for medical expenses paid on behalf of Petitioner, Larry J. Griffis, from a personal injury claim settlement received by Petitioner from a third party.
Findings Of Fact Griffis was severely injured in an accident occurring on April 29, 2012. The accident occurred generally as follows: Griffis owned and operated a large truck with a long aluminum dump trailer attached. He hauled hazardous waste and other materials for a living. At the end of each job, Griffis would raise the dump trailer for the purpose of cleaning out any residual material. On the date of the accident, Griffis did not clean his trailer in the usual because of some obstruction on that date. Instead, he drove out into a field next to his house to clean the trailer. When Griffis raised the trailer to clean it, he failed to notice electrical lines just above his trailer. He raised the trailer into the lines, resulting in an extremely high voltage of electricity running through his body. As a result of the accident, Griffis was transported to the burn unit at Shands hospital in Gainesville for treatment of his extensive injuries. He had over 50 medical procedures while at Shands, including debridement, skin grafts, tracheostomies, multiple chest tubes, etc. He had 19 different complications while in the hospital, including infections and kidney failure. Over 30 percent of his body surface area was burned; 23 percent of those burns were third degree. While undergoing treatment, Shands gave him only a 22 percent chance of surviving. Griffis remained in the hospital for three and one half months. The medical bills for Griffis’ treatment totaled Griffis cost $1,363,285.65. Medicaid paid $48,640.57 of that total amount. The Veterans Administration (VA) paid $275,911.87. Shands was eventually paid $324,552.44 of its charges and wrote off over $1 million. Griffis filed a lawsuit against Suwannee Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc. (“Suwannee”), seeking payment of economic and non-economic damages related to Suwannee’s alleged liability for the accident. After negotiations and mediation, a settlement was reached whereby Griffis was to receive the sum of $500,000 from Suwannee in full settlement of all his claims. After the settlement was reached between Griffis and Suwannee, the Agency attempted to enforce its lien, seeking repayment of the entire amount it had paid. Griffis, believing that less than the lien amount was actually owed, filed a Motion for Order Apportioning Damages as part of his pending lawsuit against Suwannee. The purpose of the motion was not to have the circuit court judge determine the amount of the Agency’s lien. The motion was filed to obtain an Order that would apportion the settlement among the lawful elements of damages to which Griffis was entitled. A hearing on the motion was set for April 14, 2015, before Circuit Court Judge Andrew J. Decker, III. The Agency was served a copy of the motion and the notice of hearing. The Agency filed an objection to the motion, seeking to relieve the circuit court of jurisdiction in favor of the Division of Administrative Hearings. See § 409.910 (17)(b), Fla. Stat. Griffis replied to the Agency’s objection, stating that “the purpose of the Motion is to differentiate or allocate the settlement among Mr. Griffis’ different elements of damages [rather than] asking this Court to resolve a Medicaid lien dispute.” At the Circuit Court hearing on Griffis’ motion, the Agency made an appearance and, in fact, cross-examined the expert witness who testified. The only testimony provided at that hearing was from retired District Court of Appeal Judge Edwin B. Browning, Jr. Judge Browning provided expert testimony as to the value of Griffis’ claim, which he set at $6 million. Mr. Smith also provided some argument in support of Griffis’ claim, but as an attorney, rather than a sworn witness. Judge Decker took the $6 million figure, plus economic damages in the sum of $211,518, plus past medical expenses of $324,552.44 for a total of $6,536,070.44. That was then divided into the $500,000 settlement figure amount. That resulted in a factor of 7.649 percent, which, applied to the “value of the case” amount, resulted in a figure of $458,919.49. Applying the factor to economic damages resulted in an amount of $16,179.01. The past medical expenses amount, once factored, resulted in a figure of $24,825.01.1/ After hearing the evidence presented at his motion hearing, Judge Decker entered an Order dated April 21, 2015, establishing the past medical expenses amount, i.e., the Agency’s lien, at $24,901.50. The Order did not address future medical expenses because they were not sought by Petitioner. Inasmuch as his future medical costs would be paid by VA, his attorneys did not add potential medical expenses to the claim.2/ A copy of Judge Decker’s Order was received into evidence in the instant proceeding (although, pursuant to section 90.202, Florida Statutes, it could have been officially recognized by the undersigned Administrative Law Judge). The Order, along with Griffis’ other exhibits and Mr. Smith’s testimony, constituted the evidence in this matter.
The Issue The issue is whether a penalty should be imposed on Pettegrove Equipment for driving a truck over a bridge when the truck weighed more than the posted bridge weight limit.
Findings Of Fact Raymond S. Cran drove a loaded dump truck owned by Pettegrove Equipment over a bridge on State Road 850 which crosses over Florida's Turnpike on September 26, 1990. The truck weighed 69,100 pounds. The truck was a straight truck, not a tractor trailer combination. The bridge which Mr. Cran drove across is a low limit bridge. Signs were posted in five places on the approaches to the bridge of the 26 ton limit for straight trucks. The first is at the intersection of State Road 850 and East Highland Pines Drive, which states "Weight Limit Restriction Ahead." One mile from the bridge at the intersection of Green Meadows Road is a second sign which states "Weight Limit" and has silhouettes of a straight truck and of a tractor trailer combination, showing a 26 ton limit for the straight truck and a 38 ton limit for the tractor trailer combination (tractor trailers have a higher limit because their weight is distributed differently). Similar signs are posted one half mile from the bridge, two tenths of a mile from the bridge, and at the foot of the bridge. Officer Joseph Barkas, a Department of Transportation Motor Carrier Compliance Officer, stopped Mr. Cran and prepared the Load Report and Filed Receipt describing the incident. The Respondent did not dispute that the truck was 17,100 pounds overweight, nor that the penalty for crossing the bridge based on that weight is $865, as shown on the Load Report and Field Receipt. Pettegrove Equipment disputes the fine because it's driver misunderstood the weight limit signs on the approach to the bridge. The silhouette of the straight truck is much shorter than the silhouette of the tractor trailer combination. Mr. Cran believed that the 26 ton limit for a straight truck applied to only small trucks, such as pickup trucks, and not to a large dump truck like the one he was driving. This contention is unpersuasive. Ordinary pickup trucks are incapable of carrying loads any where near 26 tons. Mr. Cran's interpretation is simply unreasonable. The limitations for straight trucks were clearly posted, and were violated.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation sustaining the fine of $865 assessed against Pettegrove Equipment. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of June 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon Whittier, Esquire Assistant General Counsel WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June 1992. Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ann Porath, Esquire Wellington Country Plaza Suite 209 12773 Forrest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33414 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Attn: Eleanor F. Turner Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence presented at final hearing, the following facts are determined: Nature of Complainant's Handicap At all times material hereto, Petitioner, Charles Fenesy ("COMPLAINANT"), suffered from severe coronary heart disease (arteriosclerosis), diabetes, and excess weight. The arteriosclerosis consists of lipid deposits which obstruct and interfere with the flow of blood in all three major arteries to his heart; the diffuseness of the deposits make bypass surgery inadvisable. As a result of this disease, the COMPLAINANT began, in 1972, to experience occasional angina pectoris, which is sharp chest pain associated with activity. (Testimony of Fenesy, Hampton; P.E. 11.) The angina pectoris, however, occurred only when he was engaging in tasks involving physical activity and exertion, such as working in the yard, mowing the lawn, pulling weeds, and walking too fast; he has never experienced angina pectoris because of mental or emotional stress. During his 17 years as a computer analyst and programmer, he never experienced angina attacks in connection with his work environment; neither did his angina attacks ever interfere with his job attendance or performance or require that his work schedule be altered. Because of his heart disease, COMPLAINANT is unable to perform normal physical activity and exertion; his working activities are limited to those found in the office environment. The ability of a person inflicted with severe heart disease to capably function in a working environment is related to his temperament. The COMPLAINANT is a well-controlled, even- tempered person who has demonstrated ability to capably perform computer analyst and programmer duties and effectively cope with the stresses of an office environment. He has never experienced a heart attack. (Testimony of Fenesy; P.E. 11.) In order to control and treat his heart disease (which is incurable, without surgical bypass), and relieve angina pectoris symptoms, COMPLAINANT takes various vasodilators, including nitroglycerin and inderal; he is on a diet and takes diabinese to control his diabetes. If he suffers angina pectoris when mowing the lawn, he quickly takes the prescribed medication, the pain subsides, and he continues mowing. (Testimony of Fenesy; P.E. 11) Complainant's Application for Employment as a Program-Analyst On September 18, 1978, COMPLAINANT filed an application for employment as a program-analyst with the Respondent, GTE Data Services, Inc. ("COMPANY"). Betty Graef, Supervision of the COMPANY's CRB Source Group, had an available program-analyst position in the Customer Master File Unit; after review the COMPLAINANT's application, she concluded that he appeared to be qualified for the position and asked Nancy Fitzpatrick, the COMPANY's Personnel Representative, to arrange an employment interview. (Testimony of Fenesy, Graef, Fitzpatrick; R.E. 4.) Qualifications and Duties of the Available Program-Analyst Position. The program-analyst position which Ms. Graef had available entailed coding computer programs based on specifications prepared by a senior analyst. These programs maintained billing and address information on telephone company customers. There were approximately 22 other program-analysts in that department. The work required knowledge of assembly, also known as BAL or computer language, and typically required meeting deadlines and coping with emergency demands. Occasionally analysts were required to work long and irregular hours, due to emergencies, or in order to correct errors. The frequency of such a requirement would vary: employees who were capable and careful in their work were less likely to experience such demands. Substantial overtime work was not ordinarily required. (Testimony of Fenesy, Gradef.) During the subsequent employment interview conducted by Ms. Graef, COMPLAINANT specifically asked if the position required overtime work: she answered that, except under exceptional conditions, there would be no overtime required unless he fell behind in his work. To the extent Ms. Graef's testimony at hearing tended to describe the position as on regularly requiring excessive or extraordinary hours, it is rejected as at variance with her prior description of the position during the employment interview with COMPLAINANT, and is considered unpersuasive. (Testimony of Fenesy, Graef.) Qualification of Complainant At the time of his application, COMPLAINANT was employed by Pinellas County as an automatic mapping supervisor, at $12,000 per annum. He supervised 23 employees, and was responsible for their hiring, performance, and firing. Generally, he worked a 40-hour work week, although he occasionally worked irregular or overtime hours. During the summer of 1977, he worked 50 hours a week. (Testimony of Fenesy.) COMPLAINANT was knowledgeable and had extensive experience in the area of data processing. He had worked in that field for 17 years, and attended various technical training seminars; moreover, he had previous programming experience using BAL, the particular computer language required for the position. He also held a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration. By virtue of his technical knowledge and experience, COMPLAINANT was qualified to carry out the duties of the available program-analyst position in Ms. Graef's department. The only objection raised to his employment was based on his physical condition. (Testimony of Fenesy; R.E. 4.) The Company's Conditional Offers of Employment and Rejection of Complainant. On September 21, 1978, after the COMPLAINANT's employment interview with Ms. Graef and Ms. Fitzpatrick, the COMPANY offered to employ him as a program-analyst, at $16,000 per annum, conditioned upon his passing the standard pre-employment physical. After his rejection of the offer, the COMPANY made a second offer on October 6, 1978, with a salary of $18,000 per annum; this offer was also condition upon passage of the pre-employment physical. COMPLAINANT accepted this offer, and promptly gave notice to his present employer, Pinellas County, effective October 13, 1978. He was scheduled to begin work with the COMPANY on October 16, 1978. (Testimony of Fenesy, Graef, Fitzpatrick; P.E. 1,2,3) On October 10, 1978, the medical doctor ordinarily used by the COMPANY for this purpose, Edward F. Carter, M.D., gave the COMPLAINANT the standard pre- employment physical examination. On the medical questionnaire form, COMPLAINANT disclosed that he had angina pectoris, and was taking inderal for its control; and he also explained the "over exertion may cause angina pain" (R.E. 4), and gave the name of his cardiologist, John Dormois, M.D. Despite this disclosure, no diagnostic tests were administered by Dr. Carter to determine the severity of his heart disease, or the extent to which it might interfere with his performance as a program-analyst. The stated purpose of the examination, as indicated on the COMPANY form is "to determine if . . .[the applicant] meet(s) the physical standards of the position for which . . .[he is] applying." (R.E. 4.) Several days later, COMPLAINANT was notified by Ms. Fitzpatrick that he had "flunked" the physical. Dr. Carter's brief written "Physician's Report" indicated the COMPLAINANT had "angina, on medication", and "diabetes regulated and diet"; the box labeled "unemployable at this time", was checked. (Testimony of Fenesy; R.E. 4.) COMPLAINANT protested to Ms. Fitzpatrick and tried to contact the COMPANY's affirmative action officer. He also asked Dr. Dormois (his cardiologist who was familiar with the nature of his heart disease) to call Dr. Carter to discuss his condition. On October 16, 1978, Ms. Fitzpatrick told him they would try to arrange a second physical with another doctor. Due to his resignation (extended one week), the COMPLAINANT faced unemployment as of October 20, 1978, and was anxious to quickly resolve the matter. A second physical examination was thereafter scheduled for October 20, 1978, with Phillip Hampton, M.D., a practitioner of internal medicine with specialties in both diabetes and cardiology. The COMPANY's representative involved had, at that time, resolved to go along with whatever decision was made by Dr. Hampton. (Testimony of Fenesy, Fitzpatrick, Hampton). On October 20, 1978, Dr. Hampton took the COMPLAINANT's medical history, and conducted a 15-minute physical consisting of x-rays, an electrocardiogram, blood, and urine tests. COMPLAINANT explained that he had experienced angina pectoris for approximately three years, in situations of physical exertion and stress.3 Dr. Hampton was aware that COMPLAINANT was taking vasodilatory medication to alleviate angina pain, as well as diabinese to control his diabetes. The medically recognized diagnostic test to coronary diabetes. The medically recognized diagnostic test for coronary heart disease is a coronary arteriography; however, Dr. Hampton did not administer this test to COMPLAINANT. There is one objective diagnostic test to determine whether an individual suffers from angina pectoris--the stress test. It consists of placing the patient on a treadmill requiring physical exertion; the effects of exertion on blood pressure and production of pain (angina pectoris) are detected, as are changes in the patient's electrocardiogram. However, Dr. Hampton did not perform a stress test upon COMPLAINANT. (Testimony of Fenesy, Hampton.) On October 27, 1978, Dr. Hampton notified the COMPANY of the results of his examination of COMPLAINANT: "Dear Mrs. Fitzpatrick: As a result of my examination of Mr. Charles A. Fenesy on Oct. 1978, I find that he has obesity, diabetes and angina pectoris. He would be largely relieved of diabetes and angina if he would reduce his weight to under 200 lbs. which means a loss of about 70 lbs. If he does not he is not a good risk physically and in danger of a myocardial infarction." (R.E. 3.) Based on Dr. Hampton's letter, Ms. Fitzpatrick notified COMPLAINANT on October 30, 1978, that Dr. Hampton had concurred with Dr. Carter, and that he would not be hired. COMPLAINANT asked for a letter to that effect which the COMPANY never furnished. (Testimony of Fitzpatrick, Fenesy; R.E. 3.) Neither Dr. Carter nor Dr. Hampton recommended to the COMPANY that COMPLAINANT was "employable" if he took medication to control his condition. They both were aware that he was already taking such medication. (Testimony of Hampton, Fenesy; R.E. 4.) However, after COMPLAINANT warned that he would file a grievance because of his rejection, Tannia Yarborough, the COMPANY's Equal Employment Opportunity Administrator, told him that he would be considered for employment if he submitted a letter from his doctor stating that his medical problems were under control and if he would participate in a COMPANY weight reduction program; the weight reduction program requisite was later withdrawn. [The COMPANY did not have a policy to monitor the weight of its employees.] Ms. Yarborough, who was involved in the COMPANY's decisions concerning COMPLAINANT, thought angina pectoris was a cardiac disease, and not a symptom of the disease. (Tr. 213.) She also was not aware at the time of hearing that COMPLAINANT's cardiac disease was progressive--that is could be controlled but not cured. In response to Ms. Yarborough's suggestion, COMPLAINANT's cardiologist, Dr. Dormois, wrote a letter on January 18, 1979, stating that COMPLAINANT's symptoms (angina pectoris) were under control by medication, that COMPLAINANT had shown "absolutely no tendency over the last several years to have any difficulty performing his usual assigned task," and that he had "no reason to think that in the foreseeable future that this will be greatly altered." (P.E. 4.) (Testimony of Fenesy, Yarborough; P.E. 4.) Effect of Complainant's Coronary Heart Disease on His Performance as a Program-Analyst There is insufficient evidence to establish that COMPLAINANT's coronary heart disease would adversely impact or interfere with his performance as a program-analyst with the COMPANY. The two COMPANY doctors who examined him had no awareness of the particular demands of the position for which he applied; they did not even discuss with him his extensive experience in the data processing field (18 years), and whether his disease had interfered with his work in an office environment. (Testimony of Fenesy, Hampton.) The actions of the two doctors supports an inference that the COMPANY had not enunciated, in advance, the purpose of pre-employment physicals, and the standards which apply to determining the medical "employability" of a job applicant. The COMPANY accepted the simple checking of an "unemployable" box on a form by Dr. Carter, and Dr. Hampton's reinforcing conclusion that COMPLAINANT "is not a good risk physically" (R.E.3) if he does not reduce his weight; these documents form the basis of the COMPANY's rejection. Dr. Hampton's conclusions concerning COMPLAINANT's disease were admittedly based on statistical probability, not on an individual assessment of COMPLAINANT's temperament, his defense mechanisms, and his ability to perform data processing work in an office environment. In essence, they concluded that COMPLAINANT's longevity or life expectancy is not good because of the progressive nature of his disease. (Testimony of Fenesy, Hampton; P.E. 11, R.E. 3,4.) Complainant's Lost Wages and Attorney's Fees COMPLAINANT made reasonable and diligent efforts to obtain employment after his rejection by the COMPANY. For 19 weeks he was unemployed; if the COMPANY had fulfilled its offer to employ him on October 39, 1978, he would have earned $6,576.93 during that period. He eventually secured various employment positions in the data processing field, and now works again for Pinellas County. As of the date of hearing, the difference between what he earned in those positions and what he would have earned with the COMPANY (had he been hired at $18,000 per annum) is $3,379.88. (Testimony of Fenesy; P.E. 6.) COMPLAINANT claims lost of fringe benefits which he would have received if he had remained in his job with Pinellas County in 1978; alternatively, he claims loss of fringe benefits which he would have received from the COMPANY if he had been employed since October, 1978. However, the benefits accorded by the two employers, including pensions, vacation, sick leave, and insurance coverage, are markedly dissimilar. Based on the quality of the evidence submitted on this question, any conclusion concerning COMPLAINANT's actual monetary loss in fringe benefits due to the COMPANY's action would be conjecture and unreliable. (Testimony of Fenesy; P.E. 6,9.) Because of the COMPANY's rejection of his employment application, COMPLAINANT applied for and received Social Security Disability Payments from October, 1978 through March, 1979. However, since he subsequently found gainful employment in March, 1979, (i.e., he did not remain disabled for the requisite period) the Social Security Administration retroactively denied his eligibility. He may now be required to reimburse the government for the disability payment which he received. (Testimony of Fenesy; P.E. 5.) The COMPLAINANT testified that he is obligated to pay attorney's fees of $600 in connection with this proceeding. In the absence of the COMPANY contesting this amount, it is concluded that such attorney's fees are reasonable. (Testimony of Fenesy; P.E. 6.)
Conclusions Conclusions: That Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by failing or refusing to hire Petitioner because of his handicap. The Respondent failed to substantiate its asserted defense--that the absence of Petitioner's particular handicap was a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary for the performance of the position for which he applied. Recommendation: That the Commission prohibit the Respondent from engaging in such practice in the future, require it to pay Petitioner lost wages and attorney's fees, and offer him employment in the next available program-analyst position. Background On November 21, 1978, Petitioner, Charles Fenesy ("COMPLAINANT"), filed a complaint of discrimination with the Intervenor, Florida Commission on Human Relations ("COMMISSION"), alleging Respondent, GTE Data Services Inc. ("COMPANY"), denied him employment because of his physical handicap--heart disease. After investigation, the COMMISSION's Executive Director issued a "Determination: Cause" on October 22, 1979, concluding that there was reasonable cause to believe that the COMPANY had committed an unlawful employment practice prohibited by Section 23.167(1), Florida Statutes (1979) [formerly Section 13.261(1), Florida Statutes (1977)]. After the parties failed to conciliate, or informally resolve the dispute, COMPLAINANT filed his Petition for Relief with the COMMISSION on February 29, 1980. Thereafter, the Petition was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of a hearing officer to conduct a Section 120.57 hearing. Final hearing was then set for May 20, 1980. Subsequently, upon the COMPANY's motion, and without objection, hearing was continued and reset for July 9, 1980. Thereafter, upon COMPLAINANT's motion, and without objection, the hearing was again continued and reset for September 10, 1980. Several pleadings were filed and disposed of prior to final hearing. On April 29, 1980, the COMMISSION's Executive Director moved to intervene as a party in this proceeding, which motion was granted. By way of affirmative defense to COMPLAINANT's Petition for Relief, the COMPANY asserted, among other things, that the Petition was untimely in that the COMMISSION had failed to comply with its own rules, Section 9D-9.05(3), Florida Administrative Code. Specifically, the COMPANY asserted that the above rule requires the service of a "Notice of Failure of Conciliation" 30 days after service of the "Determination: Cause". Records show that the COMMISSION denied the COMPANY's petition for reconsideration of the "Determination: Cause" on December 5, 1979; but the Notice of Failure of Conciliation was not issued until February 21, 180. On May 12, 1980, the COMMISSION moved to dismiss the COMPANY's affirmative defense. The COMPANY responded to the COMMISSION's motions, and moved for summary judgment. By order dated June 30, 1980, the COMMISSION's motion to dismiss the COMPANY's affirmative defense was granted on the grounds that (1) Rule 9D-9.05 does not specify the time period which a Notice of Failure of Conciliation must be issued, (2) COMPLAINANT's Petition for Relief was filed within the requisite time period from the issuance of the Notice, and (3) the COMPANY's actions contributed to the delay in issuance of the Notice. Also, the COMPANY's motion for summary judgment was denied on the ground that the conduct of the parties during settlement negotiations was not germane to the issues to be decided at final hearing. On June 18, 1980, the COMPANY moved to compel COMPLAINANT to answer interrogatories, which motion was granted on July 1, 1980. At final hearing, COMPLAINANT testified in his own behalf and offered Petitioner's Exhibit1 Nos. 3 through 7, each of which was received.2 The COMMISSION presented no witnesses or documentary evidence. At the close of hearing, the parties requested and were granted the opportunity to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by October 21, 1980. Proposed findings were subsequently filed; those filed by the COMMISSION and COMPLAINANT are the subject of a pending motion to strike filed by the COMPANY.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order: Finding the COMPANY engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of Section 23.167(1), Florida Statutes (1979), and prohibiting such practice in the future; and Providing COMPLAINANT affirmative relief from the unlawful practice by requiring the COMPANY to (a) pay him lost wages in the amount of $9, 956.81; (b) offer him the next available program-analyst position at a salary and under conditions similar to that which he would have received in October, 1978, but for the COMPANY's unlawful practice; and (c) pay him $600 for attorney's fees incurred in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Telephone: (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1980.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Hayes & Hayes Trucking triple axle dump truck being driven by Norman Williams on June 20, 1990, on U.S. 92 between 56th Street and Orient Road in Tampa, Florida, was being operated with its air axle up, resulting in its being over the maximum weight for its tandem rear axles, as well as for its steering axle, under Section 316.535, Florida Statutes (1989).
Findings Of Fact On June 20, 1990, Norman Williams was operating a dump truck owned by Hayes & Hayes Trucking on 56th Street in Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida. The truck was equipped with a steering axle, tandem rear axles and a middle "mini-axle" that can be lowered to carry heavy loads. When required to carry heavy loads, the "mini-axle" can be raised only during turning but must be lowered upon completion of the turn. When Williams got to U.S. 92, he raised the "mini-axle" and made a right turn onto U.S. 92, headed east. He did not lower the "mini-axle" after the turn. While headed west on U.S. 92, about a hundred yards east of 56th Street, Rebecca Stalnaker, a DOT Motor Carrier Compliance Officer, observed the dump truck Williams was driving traveling east on U.S. 92 with its air axle up. She made a U-turn to check the load. After making her U-turn, Stalnaker followed the truck, which was traveling in the left lane of the eastbound traffic on U.S. 92, for approximately a mile. Three or four times, Stalnaker changed to the right lane to verify that the truck's air axle still was up. After following for about a mile, Stalnaker put on her blue light to get the driver of the truck to pull over and stop. For the first time, Williams saw Stalnaker in his side view mirror and, as he began to pull into the right lane, put his truck's air axle down. Williams pulled the truck off the right side of the road. When Stalnaker confronted Williams and accused him of driving with the air axle up, Williams replied that he thought it was permissible to drive with the air axle up in town when driving in traffic in streets having traffic signalization. Stalnaker required Williams to put the air axle back up and drive his truck to a weigh station. The scale showed that the front, steering axle of the truck was supporting 19,980 pounds and the rear, tandem axles of the truck were supporting 47,400 pounds. After weighing the truck, Stalnaker issued a citation and $181.50 fine to Hayes & Hayes Trucking. The company paid the fine and required Williams to reimburse the company. The company never challenged the fine, and there is no evidence in the record that the company authorized Williams to challenge it on the company's behalf. Williams requested that the Commercial Motor Vehicle Review Board drop the fine. The Review Board and the Department acquiesced in Williams' standing, but the Review Board declined to drop the fine.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order upholding the $181.50 fine it assessed against Hayes & Hayes Trucking in this case. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1991.
The Issue The issues concern the intention by Petitioner to levy an $836 fine for the alleged operation of a commercial vehicle on a low-limit bridge when the commercial vehicle exceeded the weight limit for that bridge. See Section 316.545, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On December 17, 1990, a commercial vehicle driven by William Roy Grayson for the carrier Massey Franklin (Massey Trucking) came into Florida from Georgia on US Highway 17. In doing so it crossed the bridge over the St. Marys River. Petitioner has jurisdiction over that bridge. Petitioner in accordance with law had limited the weight that could be placed on that bridge by a commercial vehicle. That weight restriction was 32 tons. The commercial vehicle in question was weighed shortly after entering Florida at an inspection station operated by Petitioner. It weighed 80,720 pounds. Persons such as Mr. Grayson who operate commercial vehicles coming into Florida across the subject bridge are warned of the weight limit on the bridge by posted signs using symbols from the manual on Uniform Traffic Highway Administration as the national standard in accordance with Title 23 US Code. Those silhouette symbols used to post the weight limit for the bridge show a single unit truck with the weight limit of 27 tons and a combination truck with a weight limit of 32 tons. The truck in question was a combination truck. These warning signs on the weight limit were posted in Georgia at the time in question for the south bound traffic. Respondent's truck was south bound on that date. The first sign in Georgia before you enter Florida states "weight limit restrictions ahead." The second sign provides weight limit symbols showing a combination truck with a limit of 32 tons and notes that the distance from that restriction is three miles. The third sign before arriving at Scrubby Bluff Road in Georgia has the weight limit symbol of 32 tons for a combination truck and notes that this is the last exit before being restricted in weight. A fourth sign shows weight limit symbols with 32 tons for a combination truck and an arrow describing the exit from Scrubby Bluff Road to Interstate 95. The truck in question exceeded the weight limit by 16,720 pounds and was assessed a fine .05 per pound for a total penalty of $836.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which imposes a fine in the amount of $836, pursuant to Section 316.545(3)(b), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of July, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 1991. APPENDIX The proposed facts by the Petitioner are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S.-58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Franklin Massey Massey Trucking 101 Wind Creek Lane Enterprise, AL 36330 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S.-58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
