The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, The Exchange Club Center for the Prevention of Child Abuse of the Treasure Coast, Inc. ("Respondent" or "Exchange Club"), is liable to Petitioner, Tiffany L. Rusinko ("Petitioner" or "Ms. Rusinko"), for employment discrimination and retaliation.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was a child abuse prevention agency that provided services to families in Martin, St. Lucie, Indian River, and Okeechobee Counties. Among other things, Respondent sought to prevent child abuse and neglect through education and parenting skills classes to parents of at-risk children. All of Respondent’s programs were funded by outside sources including grants and fundraising. Respondent ceased operations in September 2020. Petitioner was hired by Respondent on March 1, 2013, as a "Parent Educator" with Respondent’s Safe Families Program on a full-time basis. Petitioner understood that during her employment with Respondent, she was required to adhere to the Human Resources Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual ("Policies & Procedures"), as well as the Code of Ethics of the National Association of Social Workers ("Code of Ethics"). Upon hiring, Petitioner received copies of the Policies & Procedures and the Code of Ethics. Petitioner was required to sign and acknowledge receipt and review of both. On February 27, 2017, Petitioner was promoted to the position of "Program Supervisor" for the Safe Families Program. Her salary in that position was $40,000. This was also a full-time position and, as part of her responsibilities as a Program Supervisor, Petitioner supervised four parent educators. In June 2017, Petitioner agreed to take on the role of a Supervisor in Respondent’s PAT Program in addition to her role as a Program Supervisor for Respondent’s Safe Families Program. Petitioner remained a full-time employee of Respondent and her salary was increased to $44,000. Between July 27, 2017, and August 11, 2017, Petitioner was late or did not report to work as required due to various personal matters. On or about September 27, 2017, Respondent hired a "Program Manager" to manage Parent Educators in the Safe Families Program. The new Program Manager was paid a higher salary than Petitioner, which Petitioner believed was due to Respondent discriminating against her because of her race and gender. Thereafter, Petitioner sent a text message to Respondent’s Executive Director expressing her displeasure with her responsibilities and her rate of pay. Petitioner demanded a salary increase commensurate with what Petitioner believed she should be paid. Petitioner communicated with Andrea Medellin about her responsibilities and salary, which contravened Respondent’s Policies & Procedures. Andrea Medellin was the Executive Director of an agency that funded one of Respondent’s programs. On February 12, 2018, Petitioner submitted a grievance to Respondent claiming that she was the subject of discrimination based on race and gender. Specifically, she claimed that her salary and job responsibilities varied from those of a co-worker who was a Black male, but who had a similar title and experience. On February 13, 2018, Respondent issued a Corrective Action Notice to Petitioner, which resulted in Petitioner being placed on probation for ninety days. Based on her prior demand, Respondent gave Petitioner a cost-of- living increase that commenced in her February 16, 2018, paycheck and continued until her termination. In February and March 2018, Petitioner had several e-mail exchanges with her supervisor, Respondent’s Human Resources Director, and Respondent’s Executive Director, wherein she raised concerns about her salary and job responsibilities. On March 13, 2018, Petitioner submitted another grievance to Respondent reiterating her prior allegations of discrimination and claiming that she was the subject of a campaign of harassment and retaliation. Respondent subsequently became aware that Petitioner was making disparaging remarks about Respondent on social media, in violation of Respondent’s Policies & Procedures. Petitioner also allowed Respondent’s clients to be present in her home in violation of the Code of Ethics. Although several witnesses testified that Petitioner was a dedicated employee, Respondent ultimately determined that her termination was appropriate based on her violations of the Policies & Procedures and Code of Ethics. Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment on March 26, 2018.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S BRITTANY O. FINKBEINER Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 2021. Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Gary Shendell, Esquire Shendell & Pollock, P.L. 2700 North Military Trail, Suite 150 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Tiffany Rusinko 615 Southeast Eighth Avenue Okeechobee, Florida 34974 Seth A. Kolton, Esquire Shendell & Pollock, P.L. 2700 North Military Trail, Suite 150 Boca Raton, Florida 33431
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to costs as a prevailing party pursuant to Section 760.11, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On July 17, 2000, the Florida Commission on Human Relations forwarded to DOAH a request for formal administrative hearing filed by Anthony Cirruzzo, alleging that USAA, his employer, had discriminated against him because of his age. DOAH Case No. 00-2929 was opened and consolidated with two related age discrimination proceedings, Knopfel v. United Services Automobile Association, DOAH Case No. 00-2314, and Henry v. United Services Automobile Association, DOAH Case No. 00-2931. Mr. Cirruzzo was also one of the plaintiffs in a lawsuit filed in the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, on July 25, 2000, claiming age discrimination against USAA. On June 21, 2000, USAA filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the petition in DOAH Case No. 00-2929. In its answer, USAA requested a judgment awarding it attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Florida law. On November 15, 2000, counsel for Mr. Cirruzzo filed a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel. On November 30, 2000, USAA filed a motion to sever and administratively dismiss the petitions of Knopfel and Henry, pursuant to a settlement reached between USAA and those persons. By order dated December 7, 2000, the motion to sever and dismiss was granted. By order dated December 8, 2000, the motion to withdraw as counsel was granted. Also on December 8, 2000, the undersigned entered an order requiring Mr. Cirruzzo to notify this tribunal of his intent to proceed in the matter, either on his own behalf or represented by new counsel. On December 15, Mr. Cirruzzo filed a response stating his intent to proceed in the matter pro se. By Order dated December 28, 2000, the case was set for hearing on January 31 through February 3, 2001, in Tampa, Florida. On January 5, 2001, Mr. Cirruzzo filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of DOAH Case No. 00-2929. By order dated January 9, 2001, the file in DOAH Case No. 00-2929 was closed. USAA seeks costs in the amount of $1,410.00 for the transcription of the deposition of Mr. Ciruzzo taken on October 3, 2000, and the deposition of his supervisor at USAA, John Luke Carscallen, taken on October 5, 2000. The transcript of Mr. Cirruzzo’s partial deposition is 137 pages long. During the deposition, counsel for USAA questioned Mr. Cirruzzo regarding his age discrimination claim, but also as to whether Mr. Cirruzzo was discriminated against because of his gender and national origin, matters not alleged in DOAH Case No. 00-2929. Gender and national origin discrimination were alleged by Mr. Cirruzzo in a later filed complaint filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations, and in a federal lawsuit filed in December 2000. Mr. Carscallen’s deposition contains questions as to gender and national origin discrimination, as well as the age discrimination at issue in DOAH Case No. 00-2929. At the hearing, Mr. Cirruzzo argued that the costs for these depositions should not be fully taxed in this proceeding because large portions of them dealt with issues relevant only to his federal gender and national origin discrimination case. On or about February 8, 2001, USAA filed in the federal court a request for a shortened discovery period in the federal lawsuit. The request states that DOAH Case No. 00-2929 was "nearly identical" to the federal case, that the parties had already engaged in extensive discovery of the issues in the DOAH case, and that repeating that discovery in the federal case would be a waste of time, money and judicial resources. The record does not indicate whether or how the federal court ruled on this request. Thus, USAA does not dispute that the depositions will be useful in other phases of its litigation against Mr. Cirruzzo. Nonetheless, the depositions were taken in DOAH Case No. 00-2929. As the defendant in multiple cases, USAA acted reasonably and efficiently by covering in a single deposition all the issues raised by Mr. Cirruzzo. It would be unreasonable to expect USAA to separate the motives for the discrimination from the common set of facts and persons involved in Mr. Cirruzzo’s allegations regarding his employment at USAA, and to take a separate deposition for each alleged motive. The costs for the depositions are properly a part of this case. USAA seeks an award of costs in the amount of $260.00 for service of summons and subpoenas, and $37.50 in witness fees in DOAH Case No. 00-2929. These costs were documented, reasonable, and all related to obtaining documents and records related to Mr. Cirruzzo’s claims, or to securing the presence of witnesses identified by Mr. Cirruzzo as possessing relevant information. These costs are properly part of this case. Mr. Cirruzzo testified that his voluntary dismissal of DOAH Case No. 00-2929 was premised on his understanding that USAA had agreed that it would absorb its own costs if the case were dismissed. As evidence therefor, Mr. Cirruzzo offered a "Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims" drafted by counsel for USAA, in which USAA offered to pay a portion of Mr. Cirruzzo’s legal fees and to absorb its own fees and costs in exchange for Mr. Cirruzzo’s dropping all claims and causes of action against USAA relating to his employment. USAA did not disclaim having made this offer, but rightly pointed out that Mr. Cirruzzo had rejected it. This draft proposal provides no reasonable basis for Mr. Cirruzzo’s claim of an agreement with USAA that the company would absorb its costs.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying USAA's petition for costs incurred in DOAH Case No. 00-2929. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: John W. Campbell, Esquire Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLC Post Office Box, 1840 Tampa, Florida 33601-1840 Anthony Cirruzzo 7692 Deer Foot Drive New Port Richey, Florida 34653 Azizi M. Coleman, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Department of Management Services 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Department of Management Services Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from her position as a human resource assistant with Respondent because of her perceived handicap, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, a 33-year-old female, was hired by Respondent on or about February 6, 1995, as a temporary employee as a human resource assistant in the Personnel Services Department of the School Board of Orange County. Petitioner received the same training given to all new employees in her position. One employee in the department served as the primary trainer and Petitioner relied on her for training and assistance. On April 10, 1995, Petitioner was evaluated on her ability to perform in her temporary assignment. The assessment reflected satisfactory performance for the period February 6, 1995, through April 10, 1995. Petitioner demonstrated the ability to provide good telephone skills when dealing with customers. Petitioner did not notify Respondent that she was disabled or that she required a reasonable accommodation in order to perform her job. During this period, Petitioner was recommended to fill a regular position in the same department to replace an employee who had retired. Petitioner's regular position was effective May 1, 1995. As was customary, Petitioner was on probationary status for a six-month period following that appointment. The new position required Petitioner to work more independently than the temporary position had required. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner successfully completed her formal training and was responsible for her own workload and prioritized work tasks. At the time Petitioner assumed her new position all work in the area was current with no tasks pending. Shortly after her appointment to her new position, Petitioner demonstrated she was experiencing extreme difficulty in handling the detailed process that is required in order to complete tasks of the position. Petitioner received limited assistance to help her better understand the process; however, her skill level continued to deteriorate. During the period May 1, 1995, through July 14, 1995, Petitioner showed signs of stress and nervousness while at work and was late four times and took sick leave on two occasions. Petitioner did not discuss her "disability" or that she was having "psychological" problems with her supervisors. Petitioner was not regarded as having a physical or mental impairment while on probationary status. On July 14, 1995, Petitioner was terminated from her position while on probation. Petitioner was given the option of taking a probationary letter of termination or resigning. Petitioner submitted a letter of resignation. The basis for Petitioner's termination was that she was unable to effectively manage the technical aspects of the position; deterioration in her communication skills; and concern for the reasons for her absence and tardiness during her probationary period. Petitioner is not a disabled person, nor was she perceived to be disabled by her employer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Kyle McNeil 523 Hicksmore Drive Apartment A Winter Park, Florida 32792 Frank Kruppenbacher, Esquire Orange County School Board 445 West Amelia Street Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Edward Willison Carroll, III, is currently eligible for licensure and is licensed in this state as a Credit Life, including Credit Disability Insurance Agent; General Lines - Property, Casualty, Surety and Miscellaneous Lines Agent; General Lines - Motor Vehicle Physical Damage and Mechanical Breakdown Agent; Ordinary Life, including Health Insurance Agent; Health Insurance Agent; and Automobile and Inspection and Warranty Association Salesman. On March 10, 1980, respondent filed a verified application with petitioner for examination as a General Lines Agent (Property, Casualty, and Miscellaneous Lines) . Question number 13 of the application asked the following: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony? If so, complete the following and submit a full and detailed report on a separate sheet. Date Name of Court Address of Court Nature of Charge and Outcome Respondent answered no to this question. On May 28, 1982, respondent filed a verified application with petitioner for examination as an Ordinary Life including Disability Agent. Question number 15 of the application asked the following: Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony? If so, complete the following and submit a full and detailed report on a separate sheet. Date Name of Court Address of Court Nature of Charge and Outcome Respondent answered no to this question. Respondent's answers to question 13 on the March 10, 1980, application and question 15 on the March 28, 1982, application were false. On December 11, 1970, the State Attorney for the Second Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, filed an information with the circuit court which charged that respondent did on December 3, 1970, in Leon County, Florida ... knowingly commit a lewd or lascivious act in the presence of Alice Leigh Divita, a female child under the age of fourteen years, to-wit: of the age of six years, without intent to commit rape upon said child, contrary to Section 800.04, F.S. On March 9, 1971, respondent entered a plea of guilty to the crime of fondling, as charged in the information. The court withheld adjudication of guilty and imposition of sentence, and placed respondent on probation for a period of three years. At hearing, respondent conceded that he had been charged with the aforementioned felony. He averred, however, that his failure to disclose such charge on his applications was not intended to be deceitful but was premised on his belief that he could properly answer no to such inquiries because adjudication of guilty had been withheld. While respondent may reasonably have believed that he could respond in the negative to an inquiry concerning felony convictions, his contention that he held an honest belief that he could also respond in the negative to inquiries about whether the had ever been charged with a felony is not persuasive. But for the foregoing charge, respondent has not been charged or convicted of any other felonies. Nor, has the respondent been shown to have engaged in any improprieties as an insurance agent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered suspending respondent's licensure and eligibility for licensure for three months. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of August, 1988. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1988. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1. Addressed in paragraph 1. 2 & 3. Addressed in paragraph 2. 4 & 5. Addressed in paragraph 3. 6. Addressed in paragraph 5. 7 & 8 Addressed in paragraph 6. 9 & 10. Addressed in paragraphs 7 and 8. 11. Addressed in paragraph 9. 12-14. Rejected as not relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire Office of Legal Services 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Thomas L. Neilson, Esquire 105 West Fifth Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32303 The Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the victim of an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black woman who was employed by Wal- Mart, Inc., at its Marianna, Florida store, as a cashier, from May 29, 1995, until her termination on April 19, 1999. The Marianna store is a "Super Wal-Mart." Respondent is a large retail establishment subject to the "Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992," as contemplated by Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Prior to being employed by Respondent, Petitioner experienced mental depression and mood swings. She had anxiety attacks, including agoraphobia. Once she resided in her bedroom without exiting for nine months. Eventually, she became well enough to hold a job with Respondent. During the time she worked for Respondent she was also employed by a nearby service station. Ms. Jeannie Garrett, a black woman called as a witness by Petitioner, related an incident where she believed she was mistreated in a conflict involving whether a mop was or was not placed in a sink. She also was involved in a disturbance involving a customer in the restaurant portion of the store. She was admonished by the person in charge of the restaurant. Ms. Garrett was transferred to a cashier position and quit as a result. Ms. Garrett testified that, "It wasn't about race. It was because she didn't like me." Neither Ms. Garrett nor Petitioner presented any evidence that Respondent was prejudiced against anyone because of race. The evidence of record indicating that Petitioner was disabled consisted solely of her testimony that she had emotional problems, and a doctor's note dated August 26, 1998, entitled "For Margie Israel," which stated, "(undecipherable) needs one week off due to severe anxiety depression." Petitioner presented testimony regarding a number of incidences which she believed proved she was mistreated. In a question involving a determination of the correct amount of change, William Michael Gilmore (Mr. Gilmore), the store manager, talked harshly to her. Jan K. Peterson, in Petitioner's opinion, wanted to dominate Petitioner, resented Petitioner, talked harshly to Petitioner's husband, and "sassed" Petitioner's husband. Petitioner bought numerous items in the store and some of the cashiers did not want to check her out because she used coupons and determining the value of the coupons was too complicated for them. On one occasion Petitioner tried to use a coupon and a cashier named Rose instigated an argument about the matter. Petitioner believed Rose had a vendetta against her. The disagreement became loud and the Customer Service Manager (CSM) got involved. Francis Baker was the shift manager on duty and Petitioner tried to talk to him about the incident but he walked off. This hurt Petitioner's feelings. On one occasion a man attempted to utilize a discount card at another cashier's post and Petitioner intervened and informed the cashier that the man was separated from his wife, an employee of Respondent, and therefore was not eligible to use his discount card. The husband became angry and called her a "bitch." On another occasion the midnight cashier refused to check out Petitioner who had attempted to use a "comp ad." A "comp ad," is utilized in a situation where a customer produces an advertisement from a competitor which demonstrates that the competitor offers an identical product at a lower price. In such a situation, Respondent will sell the product at the competitor's price. Petitioner complained about this which attracted the attention of the night manager. This resulted in a disputatious event which disturbed the tranquility of the store. Petitioner wanted to be a backup CSM but was not installed as such. There is no actual position of "back-up CSM." It is simply a temporary working title. Petitioner never told Respondent's manager, Mr. Gilmore, or anyone else in authority, that she had a mental disability, although she once told Mr. Gilmore that she was suffering from depression. Petitioner never requested an accommodation. Mr. Gilmore was aware that Petitioner was afflicted with diabetes and made every accommodation for that condition, including giving her "breaks" and allowing her to have juice and water at her work station. This was accomplished even though Petitioner never provided Respondent with information from a physician indicating that she had diabetes. There was no record in her personnel file indicating that Petitioner was afflicted with diabetes or any other disorder. Petitioner agreed that during the time she worked for Respondent the drugs she was ingesting, designed to combat depression, controlled her problem. Petitioner affirmed that she was not limited in any major life activity as a result of her depression. Moreover, the record reveals that during the period prior to her termination she successfully worked at two different jobs. Jan K. Peterson is experienced in the retail trade. She was a supervisor of cashiers and CSM supervisor. She supervised Petitioner and observed that Petitioner was often late. Ms. Peterson tried to establish new hours for Petitioner for the convenience of Petitioner but Petitioner continued to be tardy nevertheless. She observed Petitioner clock in and thereafter visit with other associates rather than report to her work station. Ms. Peterson observed that Petitioner was disrespectful to the CSM's. On one occasion, Petitioner threatened to "get" her in the parking lot. Ms. Peterson concluded this communication was a threat of physical harm. Even though Ms. Peterson was often Petitioner's supervisor, Petitioner generally refused to speak to her. Petitioner indicated that she desired to be promoted to CSM. Ms. Peterson tried to train her so that her hopes could be realized. Ms. Peterson put Petitioner on the service desk to expand her vocational horizons. However, no openings for CSM occurred subsequent to Petitioner requesting the promotion and her eventual termination. Respondent demonstrated its caring attitude toward its personnel by providing a program called Resources for Living. This is a program for the benefit of employees although residual benefit is gleaned by Respondent. The program is designed to provide help to those who experience stress, or mental problems, alcoholism, or other maladies. The availability of this program was widely advertised in the store and Petitioner was aware of its availability. Petitioner never took advantage of this program. Brenda Garrett has worked at Wal-Mart for six and one half years and worked as a manager in another retail store before being employed by Wal-Mart. She is also a certified nursing assistant. Ms. Garrett observed Petitioner reporting to work late on numerous occasions. She was never informed by Petitioner that Petitioner believed she was mentally disabled. Ms. Garrett did, however, know that Petitioner was diabetic. During April 1997, Mr. Gilmore became manager of the Marianna Super Wal-Mart. Upon assuming his duties he reviewed employee work histories. Petitioner's record attracted his attention because it revealed entries involving insubordination, dress code violations, and tardiness. Mr. Gilmore attempted to counsel Petitioner in an effort to make her a better employee. Petitioner would not talk to him upon his initial attempt. Eventually she consented to talk to him and told him she wanted to be a CSM. Mr. Gilmore stated that if she improved her performance in her current position she could possibly be a CSM. Mr. Gilmore observed that Petitioner was capable of accomplishing her assigned duties. On one occasion Petitioner informed him that she was depressed. Mr. Gilmore asked her for documentation with regard to her depression but she never provided it. He did ensure that she was provided juice to ameliorate problems caused by her diabetes. Petitioner never asserted to Mr. Gilmore that she was disabled in any way and he observed no disability. Petitioner was the recipient of "coaching" forms. Some were entitled "Coaching for Improvement" forms. These forms are used to record a disciplinary breach and the corrective action taken. They cover the period May 7, 1997 through May 17, 1999. The coaching forms revealed that Petitioner was counseled for being short in her cash drawer, tardiness (twice), failing to make correct change, insubordination, shopping on duty, and causing a disturbance in the presence of customers on two occasions. Petitioner, during the time she worked at Respondent's store, was recorded as being late to work at least 38 times. Mr. Gilmore fired Petitioner because of her bad behavior, tardiness, absenteeism, and insubordination. He did not fire her because he did not believe she had a disability. He indicated a willingness to rehire her at some future date.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Margie R. Israel 2940 Carver Lane Marianna, Florida 32446 John A. Unzicker, Jr., Esquire Vernis & Bowling of Northwest Florida, P.A. 635 West Garden Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner was unlawfully terminated from her position with Respondent because of her race (Caucasian), in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (hereinafter "FCRA"), Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following relevant facts are determined: Respondent is a corporation, licensed to do business in Florida, that provides cleaning services to business clients; and is an employer, as that term is defined, under the FCRA. Petitioner began her employment with Respondent on January 1, 1997. Petitioner was hired as a restroom cleaner, and remained in that position until her termination from employment with Respondent on August 6, 1998. Throughout her employment with Respondent, Petitioner's supervisors were: Cecilia Haimes ("Haimes"), a Caucasian female; Danna Hewett ("Hewett"), a Caucasian Female; and Carlos Ramirez ("Ramirez"), an Hispanic male. Additionally, throughout her employment with Respondent, Petitioner was assigned to work at the Orange County Convention Center ("OCCC"). Hewett began her employment with Respondent as a restroom cleaner. Shortly thereafter, she was promoted by Ramirez to the position of lead restroom cleaner. Shortly after that, she was once again promoted by Ramirez, to the position of supervisor. As a supervisor, Hewett supervised Petitioner. Hewett became Petitioner's supervisor in or around August 1997. In her capacity as supervisor, Hewett was informed by other employees at OCCC that Petitioner was spreading rumors and gossiping about alleged affairs between certain employees and/or supervisors. Hewett and Ramirez discussed Petitioner's behavior, and they concluded that such behavior was extremely disruptive to the work environment. Specifically, such behavior by Petitioner affected employee morale and employees' respect for their supervisors. Based on these allegations, Ramirez contacted Ronald Jirik ("Jirik"), the Central Florida Regional Manager, to inform him of Petitioner's behavior. Upon meeting with Hewett and Ramirez, Jirik informed Ramirez to meet with Petitioner to try to get her to stop spreading such rumors. Ramirez met with Petitioner shortly thereafter. He attempted to resolve the problem and instructed her not to gossip or spread rumors. However, the problem persisted. Jirik contacted Ramirez to follow up on whether or not Ramirez was able to resolve the problem. Ramirez informed Jirik that he was unable to stop the rumors, and that he believed that Petitioner was continuing this improper behavior. Jirik then informed Ramirez that it would probably be best if Petitioner was transferred from the OCCC, and be given the option to transfer to another facility that was of equal distance from her home. Jirik is Caucasian. Jirik suggested that Petitioner be transferred to the Orlando Sentinel building due to the fact that, based on the information in Petitioner's personnel file, this location would have been of equal distance from her home. Additionally, such a transfer would not have changed any of the terms and conditions of Petitioner's employment, including but not limited to, pay, benefits, responsibilities, or shifts. Based on the foregoing, Ramirez met with Petitioner and she was offered a transfer to the Orlando Sentinel building location. However, Petitioner refused to accept the transfer. Thereafter, Petitioner's employment with Respondent was terminated on August 6, 1998. The evidence proved that Ramirez reprimanded Spanish- speaking and Caucasian employees in the same manner. Additionally, there was no credible evidence to show that Ramirez gave any form of favoritism to Spanish-speaking employees. Respondent's reason for terminating Petitioner was based on Respondent's perception that her conduct was disruptive to the work force. The allegation that Petitioner was terminated based on a discriminatory animus is unsubstantiated by the testimony and other evidence. There is no evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on her race (Caucasian).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Attas-Kaplan, Esquire Fisher & Phillips, LLP 450 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 800 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Mary J. Hall 1821 Ernest Street Maitland, Florida 32794 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Linda Mae Krueger, a white female, became a manager at One Stop Oil's Riverview, Florida, store on April 1, 1986. Petitioner's first immediate supervisor was Mr. Tom McBeth, area supervisor for six stores. Mr. McBeth was replaced by Mr. John Richardson on January 26, 1987. Upon becoming area supervisor, Mr. Richardson implemented certain changes in the manner in which all store managers under his supervision were to perform their duties. Petitioner disagreed with Mr. Richardson's changes and failed to follow some of Mr. Richardson's instructions regarding these changes. Petitioner developed a great deal of hostility towards Mr. Richardson and refused to accept the fact that the changes in operation were within Mr. Richardson's managerial capacity. The basis of Petitioner's claim of discrimination was Mr. Richardson's attempt to implement operational changes which Petitioner disagreed with and which were clearly not sexually discriminatory in nature. At the hearing, Ms. Krueger testified that she felt like she was treated unfairly by Mr. Richardson, but admitted that Mr. Richardson placed the same requirements on all other store managers. Petitioner, in June of 1988, told Mr. Richardson that she was considering leaving employment during the beginning of July. Petitioner marked on her store's calendar that she was leaving employment on July 2, 1988. Petitioner, on August 12, 1988, again gave verbal notice to One Stop Oil that she was separating employment with the company on August 27, 1988. At the time the Petitioner gave One Stop Oil this verbal notice of separation, Petitioner was planning to move with her family to North Carolina. On August 17, 1988, Petitioner quit her position as store manager at One Stop Oil's Riverview store. She quit because of a pay dispute over the amount of her bonus check. Petitioner and her husband expected a larger check. When Petitioner's husband saw the actual amount of the check he called the Jacksonville office of Respondent and told them he was closing the store and they had "better get somebody down there." Petitioner and her husband then left the store. Respondent sent Mr. Richardson to the store. He called in Cheryl Chipman and began accounting for the store receipts. He discovered that $1,700 in deposits was missing. Petitioner had given the deposit money to her husband on the day the check dispute arose. Petitioner's husband could not adequately account for the missing money. 1/ Respondent obtained Petitioner's store keys from her without any discussion. The keys were voluntarily turned over by Petitioner. Petitioner never reported for work afterwards. Petitioner's position was filled by Ms. Cheryl Chipman, a white female.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the petition against Respondent be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of January, 1989. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1989.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Wal-Mart Stores East, LP (“Walmart”), discriminated against Petitioner, Ramon Santiago Lopez (“Petitioner”), based upon his national origin or age, and/or terminated his employment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2016).1/
Findings Of Fact Walmart is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). Walmart is a national retailer. Petitioner is a Cuban (Hispanic) male. He was 62 years old when he was hired by Walmart in November 2005 and was 72 years old at the time of his dismissal. Petitioner was initially hired to work at a store in Jacksonville, but transferred to Tampa. In June 2010, Petitioner requested a transfer back to Jacksonville and was assigned to Store 4444 on Shops Lane, just off Philips Highway and I-95 in Jacksonville. The store manager at Store 4444 was Scott Mallatt. Mr. Mallatt approved Petitioner’s transfer request and testified that he “very much” got along with Petitioner. Petitioner confirmed that he never had a problem with Mr. Mallatt. Petitioner testified that when he first started at Store 4444, he had no problems. After about four months, however, he began reporting to a supervisor he recalled only as “Lee.” Petitioner described Lee as “kind of a maniac.” Lee would harass Petitioner and give him impossible assignments to accomplish. Petitioner testified that he complained repeatedly to Mr. Mallatt about Lee’s abuse, but that nothing was ever done about it. Eventually, Petitioner gave up complaining to Mr. Mallatt. Mr. Mallatt testified that Petitioner never complained to him about being discriminated against because of his national origin or age. Petitioner apparently did complain about being overworked, but never tied these complaints to any discriminatory intent on the part of Lee. Petitioner testified that Lee no longer worked at Store 4444 in January 2016. From 2010 to 2015, Petitioner worked from 1:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. in various departments, including Grocery, Dairy, Paper, Pet, and Chemical. In 2015, Petitioner spoke with Mr. Mallatt about working at least some day shifts rather than constant nights. Mr. Mallatt approved Petitioner’s request. In August 2015, Petitioner was moved to the day shift in the Maintenance department. As a day associate, Petitioner typically worked from 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Assistant Store Manager April Johnson transferred to Store No. 4444 in October 2015. Petitioner reported directly to Ms. Johnson. On January 14, 2016, Petitioner was scheduled to work from 8:30 a.m. until 5:30 p.m. He drove his van into the parking lot of Store No. 4444 at approximately 7:58 a.m. He parked in his usual spot, on the end of a row of spaces that faced a fence at the border of the lot. Petitioner liked this spot because the foliage near the fence offered shade to his vehicle. Closed circuit television (“CCTV”) footage, from a Walmart camera with a partial view of the parking lot, shows Petitioner exiting his vehicle at around 8:00 a.m. Petitioner testified that he could see something on the ground in the parking lot, 50 to 60 meters away from where his van was parked. The CCTV footage shows Petitioner walking across the parking lot, apparently toward the object on the ground. Petitioner testified there were no cars around the item, which he described as a bucket of tools. Petitioner stated that the bucket contained a screwdriver, welding gloves, a welding face mask, and a hammer. The CCTV footage does not show the bucket. Petitioner crosses the parking lot until he goes out of camera range.3/ A few seconds later, Petitioner returns into camera range, walking back toward his car while carrying the bucket of tools. When Petitioner reaches his van, he opens the rear door, places the bucket of tools inside, then closes the rear door. Petitioner testified that after putting the tools in the back of his van, he went to the Customer Service Desk and informed two female African American customer service associates that he had found some tools and put them in his car. Petitioner conceded that he told no member of management about finding the tools. Walmart has a written Standard Operating Procedure for dealing with items that customers have left behind on the premises. The associate who finds the item is required to take the item to the Customer Service Desk, which functions as the “lost and found” for the store. Mr. Mallatt and Ms. Johnson each testified that there are no exceptions to this policy. Petitioner was aware of the Standard Operating Procedure. On prior occasions, he had taken found items to the Customer Service Desk. Petitioner conceded that it would have been quicker to take the bucket of tools to the Customer Service Desk than to his van. However, he testified that he believed that he could have been fired if he had taken the tools to the desk before he had clocked in for work. Petitioner cited a Walmart policy that made “working off the clock” a firing offense. It transpired that the policy to which Petitioner referred was Walmart’s Wage and Hour policy, which states in relevant part: It is a violation of law and Walmart policy for you to work without compensation or for a supervisor (hourly or salaried) to request you work without compensation. You should never perform any work for Walmart without compensation. This language is plainly intended to prevent Walmart from requiring its employees to work without compensation. Petitioner, whose English language skills are quite limited, was adamant that this policy would have allowed Walmart to fire him if he performed the “work” of bringing the tools to the Customer Service Desk before he was officially clocked in for his shift. Therefore, he put the tools in his van for safekeeping and informed the Customer Service Desk of what he had done. Petitioner was questioned as to why he believed it was acceptable for him to report the situation to the Customer Service Desk, but not acceptable for him to bring the tools to the desk. The distinction he appeared to make was that the act of carrying the tools from the parking lot to the desk would constitute “work” and therefore be forbidden, whereas just stopping by to speak to the Customer Service Desk associate was not “work.” The evidence established that Petitioner would not have violated any Walmart policy by bringing the tools to the Customer Service Desk before he clocked in. He could have been compensated for the time he spent bringing in the tools by making a “time adjustment” on his time card. Mr. Mallatt testified that time adjustments are done on a daily basis when associates perform work prior to clocking in or after clocking out. Petitioner merely had to advise a member of management that he needed to make the time adjustment. Mr. Mallatt was confident that the adjustment would have been granted under the circumstances presented in this case. Petitioner did not go out to retrieve the tools after he clocked in. Mr. Mallatt stated that employees frequently go out to their cars to fetch items they have forgotten, and that Petitioner absolutely would have been allowed to go get the tools and turn them in to the Customer Service Desk. Later on January 14, 2016, Ms. Johnson was contacted by a customer who said tools were stolen off of his truck.4/ Ms. Johnson had not heard anything about lost tools. She looked around the Customer Service Desk, but found no tools there. Ms. Johnson also called out on the store radio to ask if anyone had turned in tools. Finally, the customer service manager at the Customer Service Desk told Ms. Johnson that Petitioner had said something about tools earlier that morning. Ms. Johnson called Petitioner to the front of the store and asked him about the missing tools. Petitioner admitted he had found some tools in the parking lot and had placed them in his vehicle. Ms. Johnson asked Petitioner why he put the tools in his vehicle. Petitioner told her that he was keeping the tools in his car until the owner came to claim them. Ms. Johnson testified that Petitioner offered no other explanation at that time. He just said that he made a “mistake.” Ms. Johnson explained to Petitioner that putting the tools in his vehicle was not the right thing to do and that he should have turned them in to “lost and found,” i.e., the Customer Service Desk. Petitioner was sent to his van to bring in the tools. After this initial conversation with Petitioner, Ms. Johnson spoke with Mr. Mallatt and Mr. Cregut to decide how to treat the incident. Mr. Cregut obtained approval from his manager to conduct a full investigation and to interview Petitioner. Mr. Cregut reviewed the CCTV footage described above and confirmed that Petitioner did not bring the tools to the Customer Service Desk. Ms. Johnson and Mr. Cregut spoke with Petitioner for approximately an hour to get his side of the story. Petitioner also completed a written statement in which he admitted finding some tools and putting them in his car. Mr. Cregut described Petitioner as “very tense and argumentative” during the interview. As the interview continued, Mr. Cregut testified that Petitioner’s reaction to the questions was getting “a little bit more hostile [and] aggressive.” Mr. Cregut decided to try to build rapport with Petitioner by asking him general questions about himself. This tactic backfired. Petitioner volunteered that he was a Cuban exile and had been arrested several times for his opposition to the Castro regime. Petitioner then claimed that Mr. Cregut discriminated against him by asking about his personal life and prejudged him because of his activism. Mr. Cregut credibly testified that he did not judge or discriminate against Petitioner based on the information Petitioner disclosed and that he only asked the personal questions to de-escalate the situation. Mr. Cregut’s only role in the case was as an investigative factfinder. His report was not colored by any personal information disclosed by Petitioner. At the conclusion of the investigation, Mr. Mallatt made the decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment. The specific ground for termination was “Gross Misconduct – Integrity Issues,” related to Petitioner’s failure to follow Walmart policy by bringing the tools to the Customer Service Desk. Mr. Mallatt testified that his concern was that Petitioner intended to keep the bucket of tools if no owner appeared to claim them. Mr. Mallatt credibly testified that had Petitioner simply taken the tools to the Customer Service Desk, rather than putting them in his vehicle, he would have remained employed by Walmart. Walmart has a “Coaching for Improvement” policy setting forth guidelines for progressive discipline. While the progressive discipline process is used for minor and/or correctable infractions, such as tardiness, “serious” misconduct constitutes a ground for immediate termination. The coaching policy explicitly sets forth “theft” and “intentional failure to follow a Walmart policy” as examples of serious misconduct meriting termination. Petitioner conceded that no one at Walmart overtly discriminated against him because of his age or national origin. He testified that he could feel the hostility toward Hispanics at Store 4444, but he could point to no particular person or incident to bolster his intuition. Petitioner claimed that his dismissal was in part an act of retaliation by Ms. Johnson for his frequent complaints that his Maintenance counterparts on the night shift were not adequately doing their jobs, leaving messes for the morning crew to clean up. Ms. Johnson credibly testified that Petitioner’s complaints did not affect her treatment of him or make her want to fire him. In any event, Ms. Johnson played no role in the decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner’s stated reason for failing to follow Walmart policy regarding found items would not merit a moment’s consideration but for Petitioner’s limited proficiency in the English language. It is at least conceivable that someone struggling with the language might read the Walmart Wage and Hour policy as Petitioner did. Even so, Petitioner was familiar with the found items policy, and common sense would tell an employee that he would not be fired for turning in customer property that he found in the parking lot. At the time of his dismissal, Petitioner had been working at Walmart for over 10 years. It is difficult to credit that he was completely unfamiliar with the concept of time adjustment and truly believed that he could be fired for lifting a finger to work when off the clock. Walmart showed that in 2016 it terminated three other employees from Store 4444 based on “Gross Misconduct – Integrity Issues.” All three were under 40 years of age at the time their employment was terminated. Two of the employees were African American; the third was Caucasian. Petitioner offered no evidence that any other employee charged with gross misconduct has been treated differently than Petitioner. At the hearing, Petitioner’s chief concern did not appear to be the alleged discrimination, but the implication that he was a thief, which he found mortally offensive. It could be argued that Mr. Mallatt might have overreacted in firing Petitioner and that some form of progressive discipline might have been more appropriate given all the circumstances, including Petitioner’s poor English and his unyielding insistence that he never intended to keep the tools. However, whether Petitioner’s dismissal was fair is not at issue in this proceeding. The issue is whether Walmart has shown a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Petitioner’s employment. At the time of his dismissal, Petitioner offered no reasonable explanation for his failure to follow Walmart policy. Mr. Mallatt’s suspicion regarding Petitioner’s intentions as to the tools was not unfounded and was not based on any discriminatory motive. Petitioner offered no credible evidence disputing the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by Walmart for his termination. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Walmart’s stated reasons for his termination were a pretext for discrimination based on Petitioner’s age or national origin. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that his termination was in retaliation for his engaging in protected activity. The employee who was allegedly retaliating against Petitioner played no role in the decision to terminate his employment. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that Walmart discriminated against him because of his age or national origin in violation of section 760.10.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2018.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether Petitioner was terminated from his employment with Respondent because of his race, his alleged disability, and in alleged retaliation for his attempt to file a workers' compensation claim in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. Petitioner also has been diagnosed with obsessive/compulsive disorder and major depression. On March 21, 1997, Petitioner began his employment with Florida Department of Corrections as a substance abuse counselor at Lancaster Correctional Institution. Petitioner's employment status was in career service, probationary status for six months from the date of his employment. A probationary status employee can be terminated without cause. Petitioner's employment as a counselor required him to be present at the institution a reasonable amount of time in order to perform his counseling duties. From March 21, 1997 through September 2, 1997, Petitioner failed to report for work 39 full workdays out of a possible 115 workdays. In addition, Petitioner had five other workdays that he only worked part of the day, with a total of 16 hours of leave used over those days. Sixteen hours is the equivalent of two full workdays missed by Respondent. As a result, Petitioner was absent from work approximately 35 percent of the time. Thirty-five percent absence rate was excessive based on Petitioner's job duties. Most of the leave was without pay because Petitioner had not accumulated enough sick or annual leave to cover his absences. The leave was taken for various reasons, but a large part of the leave was taken when Petitioner was hospitalized due to his mental condition. Petitioner's doctor released him from his hospitalization on August 8, 1997; however, Petitioner did not return to work until August 20, 1997. The last pay period ran from Friday, August 22, 1997 to Thursday, September 4, 1997. Petitioner only worked 20 hours out of 40 the first week and two hours out of 40 the second week. Around September 1, 1997, Petitioner went to the personnel office to inquire about filing a workers' compensation claim based on his disability. The staff person he spoke to did not know the procedure for filing a workers' compensation claim. She told Petitioner she would find out the procedure and asked him to return the next day. Other than Petitioner's speculation about the events following his initial inquiry about filing a workers' compensation claim, other material evidence regarding the events following his initial inquiry and Respondent's response thereto was submitted into evidence. The evidence is insufficient to draw any conclusions of a factual or legal nature regarding Petitioner's workers' compensation claim and his termination. Petitioner was terminated on September 2, 1997, the day following his initial inquiry about workers' compensation. Petitioner received his letter of termination on September 2, 1997. Petitioner was a probationary status employee when he was terminated. Eventually, Petitioner filed a workers' compensation claim. The claim was denied by the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security. In 1997, L.D. "Pete" Turner was the warden at Lancaster Correctional Institution. As warden, Mr. Turner supervised Petitioner. Mr. Turner made the decision to terminate Petitioner due to his excessive absences. Mr. Turner did not terminate Petitioner based on Petitioner's race, his alleged disability, or because of Petitioner's attempt to file a workers' compensation claim. Petitioner was needed at work and he was not there a sufficient amount of time to fulfill his job duties. In fact, there was no competent evidence that there was any connection between Petitioner's termination and/or his race, disability, or desire to file a workers' compensation claim. Petitioner alleged that two employees at the institution were excessively absent but were not terminated. The employees were Doris Jones and Victoria Englehart. Both individuals were career service employees with permanent status. They were not probationary status employees. Doris Jones is an African-American female. Victoria Englehart is a white female. No other evidence was produced at the hearing regarding these two employees, their attendance records, job duties or anything else of a comparative nature. Clearly, the evidence is insufficient to make any comparison between these two employees and Petitioner's employment and termination.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Otis Ware Post Office Box 2155 Trenton, Florida 32693 William J. Thurber, IV, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Azizi M. Dixon, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The threshold issue in this case is whether Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived all claims, including claims for employment discrimination, against Respondent, his former employer. If he did not, then the question is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his alleged disability when it terminated his employment.
Findings Of Fact A. Background Facts Petitioner Waldemar Casanova ("Casanova") is a high school graduate who has completed four years of college level courses in the field of business administration. As of the final hearing, he had worked in the airline industry for more than 30 years. In 1987, Casanova began working for Respondent Worldwide Flight Services ("Worldwide"), a ground handling services organization that specializes in, among other things, providing customized cargo, ramp, passenger, and technical services to various passenger and cargo airlines. Casanova was stationed in New York City for about 12 years, providing services to Worldwide's client, American Airlines, at the John Kennedy and LaGuardia Airports. In 1999, Casanova transferred to Florida, where he continued to work in furtherance of a contract between Worldwide and American Airlines to provide passenger services at the Fort Lauderdale Airport. Casanova initially was assigned to work as a Ramp Supervisor, in which position he was responsible for overseeing passenger baggage services. Thereafter, in the spring of 2002, Casanova was assigned to work as a Cabin Services Supervisor, in which position he was responsible for overseeing the cleaning and servicing of aircraft.1 Facts Relating to Casanova's Hernia Surgery In June 2002, Casanova underwent hernia surgery. He took a leave of absence from work to recover. A couple of months later, Casanova's doctor certified that Casanova could return to "light" work duties on September 3, 2002. The doctor's certificate specified that, upon his return to work, Casanova should not lift more than 10 pounds. To accommodate this restriction, when Casanova returned to work in September 2002, Worldwide reassigned him, temporarily, to its administrative office, where Casanova was responsible for reviewing attendance records. Cancellation of the Contract Between American Airlines and Worldwide and the Consequences Thereof On Casanova's Employment with Worldwide. Effective September 15, 2002, American Airlines canceled its ramp-handling/cabin services contract with Worldwide at the Fort Lauderdale Airport. As a result, Worldwide laid off approximately 33 employees in September and October 2002, including Casanova and five or six other supervisors who, like Casanova, were employed in connection with the American Airlines contract. By letter dated September 18, 2002, Worldwide informed Casanova that he was being laid off. In that letter, Worldwide offered Casanova a lump sum severance payment equaling 13 weeks of pay at his base salary in exchange for, and subject to, Casanova's execution of a Severance Agreement and General Release ("Agreement"). The Agreement was enclosed with the September 18, 2002 letter. The release contained in the Agreement provided, in pertinent part: I agree . . . to release Worldwide . . . from any and all claims for relief of any kind, whether known to me or unknown, which in any way arise out of or relate to my employment or the termination of my employment at Worldwide Flight Services, concerning events occurring at any time up to the date of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, any and all claims of discrimination of any kind. This settlement and waiver includes all such claims, whether under any applicable federal law, including but not limited to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Americans with Disabilities Act, Equal Pay Act and Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Older Worker Benefit Protection Act, or under any applicable state or local laws I further agree not to file a claim or suit of any kind against Worldwide Flight Services et al. . . . I further agree not to bring, continue, or maintain any legal proceedings of any nature whatsoever against Worldwide Flight Services et al. before any court, administrative agency, arbitrator or any other tribunal or forum by reason of any such claims, demands, liabilities and/or causes of action, arising out of, relating to or resulting from my employment or termination from employment . . . . In the September 18, 2002, letter, Worldwide also advised Casanova that the decision whether to accept the terms and conditions of the Agreement was completely voluntary, that he should consult with an attorney of his choice before signing the Agreement, and that he could take up to 45 days to consider the Agreement. In addition, Worldwide advised Casanova that, if he had any questions concerning his separation package, he could consult either with Alvin Brown, a human resources representative at Worldwide's corporate headquarters, or Barry Simpson, then General Manager at Worldwide's Fort Lauderdale station. Casanova signed and dated the Agreement on October 2, 2002.2 He then returned the instrument to Worldwide, where Barry Simpson executed the Agreement on the company's behalf, also on October 2. By the terms of the Agreement, Casanova was afforded a period of up to seven days after execution of the Agreement to revoke the acceptance of its terms. At no time during the seven-day revocation period did Casanova notify Worldwide that he wanted to revoke his acceptance of the Agreement. After the expiration of the seven-day revocation period, and in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, Casanova received a lump sum payment of $8,091.20 by check dated October 26, 2002, which sum constituted 13 weeks of severance at Casanova's base salary.3 Since his receipt of this payment, Casanova has neither tendered back nor attempted to tender back the severance payment to Worldwide. At hearing, Casanova admitted that he had understood fully the language and effect of the Agreement, including the release of all claims, and that he knowingly and voluntarily had accepted the terms of the Agreement as well as the benefits provided to him thereunder.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing with prejudice Casanova's Petition for Relief because, for valuable consideration, Casanova knowingly and voluntarily released Worldwide of and from any claims arising out of his employment with Worldwide. Alternatively, the final order should declare that Worldwide is not liable to Casanova because (a) he is not a handicapped individual and (b) even if he were a handicapped individual, Worldwide has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Casanova's discharge, which Casanova failed to prove was a pretext for discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2005.
