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SCOTT TUCKER AND PHILLIP WATSON vs EDDIE D. GRIFFIN, D/B/A QUALITY BROKERAGE AND UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, 92-007490 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Trenton, Florida Dec. 23, 1992 Number: 92-007490 Latest Update: Aug. 06, 1993

The Issue Whether or not Petitioners (complainants) are entitled to recover $5,640.19 or any part thereof against Respondent dealer and Respondent surety company.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners are growers of watermelons and qualify as "producers" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondent Eddie D. Griffin d/b/a Quality Brokerage is a broker-shipper of watermelons and qualifies as a "dealer" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. Respondent United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company is surety for Respondent Griffin d/b/a Quality. Petitioners' claims against the dealer and his bond are listed in the Amended Complaint in the following amounts and categories: 6-18-92 Inv. #657 45,580 lbs. Crimson melons @ .05 lb. $2,279.00 Advance - 700.00 NWPB* - 9.12 $1,569.88 6-19-92 Inv. #668 2,490 lbs. Crimson melons @ .05 lb. $ 124.50 (paid for 42,860 lbs. short 2,490 lbs.) NWPB* - .50 124.00 6-20-92 Inv. #695 6,818 lbs. Crimson melons @ .05 lb. $ 340.90 (paid for 39,062 lbs. short 6,818 lbs.) NWPB* 1.36 339.54 6-20-92 Inv. @ #702 .05 39,880 lbs. Sangria melons lb. $1,994.00 Advance - 700.00 Packing Straw - 10.00 NWPB* - 7.98 Pmt. - 90.00 1,186.02 6-21-92 Inv. @ #706 .05 44,740 lbs. Sangria melons lb. $2,237.00 Advance - 700.00 Packing Straw - 10.00 NWPB* - 8.95 1,518.05 6-22-93 Inv. @ #716 .04 11,280 lbs. Crimson melons lb. NWPB* - 2.32 460.88 6-22-92 Inv. @ #709 .04 46,740 lbs. Crimson melons lb. $1,869.60 Advance - 700.00 Packing Straw - 10.00 NWPB* - 9.35 1,150.25 Deducted for #706 - 441.82 441.82 PAID 708.43 Total Claimed $5,640.19 *NWPB = National Watermelon Promotion Board Fee Petitioners and Respondent dealer have had an oral business relationship for four to five years. Both parties agree that their oral agreement initially called for a federal inspection to be done on each load if the load were refused in whole or in part by the ultimate recipient. Respondent Griffin contended that over the years there had been further oral agreements to "work out" or "ride out" small discrepancies or partial refusals of loads without resorting to federal inspections, the cost of which inspections could eliminate the entire profit on single loads. Petitioners denied that such an amended oral agreement was ever reached and further maintained that the amounts of the loads at issue herein could not be considered "small" by any interpretation. Respondent submitted no evidence as to what the relative terms, "large" and "small," mean in the industry. Consequently, it appears that there was never a meeting of the minds of the parties on the alleged oral contract amendments relied upon by Respondent. Respondent testified that in past years, prior to 1992, he had interpreted the term "ride it out" to mean that he would simply accept the hearsay statements of ultimate recipients that named poundages of melons were bad and he would let the ultimate recipients pay for only the melons they said were good. Respondent would thereafter absorb any losses himself, not passing on the loss by deducting any amount from the full amount he would normally pay to the growers within ten days. However, 1992 was such a bad year for melons that the Respondent dealer chose not to absorb the greater losses and passed them on to the growers by way of deductions on "settlement sheets." In 1992 Respondent sent Petitioners the settlement sheets with the deductions explained thereon with the net payments as much as thirty days after the ultimate sales. Upon the foregoing evidence, it appears that Respondent had established a course of business whereby Petitioners could reasonably have expected him to absorb any losses occasioned by Respondent's reliance on hearsay statements of the ultimate recipients concerning poor quality melons unless Respondent chose not to test the questionable melons with a federal inspection. Petitioners obtained Exhibit P-5 for load 657 at Respondent dealer's place of business, but were not certain it applied to the load Mr. Tucker claimed he delivered to Respondent on 6-18-92 because Mr. Tucker did not know his load number that day. The exhibit represents the weight ticket Petitioners believe applies to the load which Mr. Tucker claimed to have delivered to Respondent dealer on 6-18-92. However, the exhibit bears two other names, "Jones and Smith," not Petitioners' respective names of Tucker or Watson. It has "WACC" handwritten across it, which Mr. Tucker claimed signified the name of his watermelon field. The number "657" also has been handwritten across it. There is no evidence of who wrote any of this on the exhibit. Respondent denied that load 657 was received from Mr. Tucker. The exhibit shows a printed gross weight of 78,900 lbs., tare weight of 32,860 lbs. and net weight of 66,800 lbs. Net weights are supposed to signify the poundage of melons delivered to the dealer. Nothing on the exhibit matches Mr. Tucker's journal entry (Petitioners' Exhibit 3) of delivering 45,580 lbs. of watermelons to Respondent dealer on 6- 18-92. Mr. Tucker testified that he was never paid for his delivery. Respondent denied there was such a delivery and testified that he paid Jones and Smith for load 657. Petitioners have established no entitlement to their claim of $1,569.88 on Invoice 657. Petitioners' Exhibit P-4 represents two weight tickets secured from Respondent dealer's records that Petitioners contend apply to load 668. The first page has "45,350/6-19-92/Scott Tucker WACC" handwritten across it. None of the four poundages imprinted thereon match any of the amounts claimed by Petitioners for invoice 668, and subtracting amounts testified to also does not conform these figures to Petitioners' claim on load 668. The second page weight ticket shows a date of 6-18-92 and a weight of 34,260 lbs. It also does not match Petitioner's claim that they were owed for 45,350 lbs. but were paid for only 42,860 lbs., being paid 2,490 lbs. short. Exhibit P-8 is the 668 invoice/settlement sheet which Respondent provided to Petitioners and shows invoice 668 with date of 6-19-92, tare and pay weight of 42,860 lbs. at $.05/lb. for $2,143.00 less $8.57 melon adv. association (a/k/a NWPB, see supra) for $2,134.43, less a $700.00 advance and $10.00 for packing straw for a total due Petitioners of $1,424.43 which Respondent has already paid. Petitioners have established no entitlement to their claim of $124.00 on Invoice 668. Petitioners Exhibit P-6 represents two weight tickets secured from Respondent dealer's records. The first page has "45,880 lbs./6-20-92/Scott Tucker Crimson WACC 695" handwritten across it. None of the printed gross, tare, or net weights thereon match any of the amounts claimed by Petitioners for invoice 695. The second page shows the date 6-20-92 and a printed net weight of 32,000 lbs. Respondent dealer provided Petitioners with Exhibit P-7, invoice/settlement sheet 695 dated 6-20-92 showing tare and pay weights of 39,062 lbs. priced at $.05/lb. totalling $1,953.10, less melon adv. assoc. (a/k/a NWPB) fee of $7.81, for $1,945.29, less $700.00 advanced, less $10.00 for packing straw for a total of $1,235.29. The foregoing do not support Petitioner Tucker's claim based on his journal entry (P-3) that he was entitled to be paid for 45,880 lbs. he claims he delivered that day instead of for 39,062 pounds (short by 6,818 pounds) with balance owing to him of $339.54. Respondent has paid what was owed on invoice 695. By oral agreement at formal hearing, Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 9 shows that Petitioner Tucker delivered 39,880 lbs. of melons to Respondent dealer on 6-20-92 and Petitioner Watson received back from Respondent dealer an invoice/settlement sheet 702 showing 39,880 pounds @ $.05/lb. equalling $1,994.00 and that although $1,994.00 was owed Petitioners, Respondent thereafter subtracted for $800.00 worth of returned melons, a $700.00 advance, $7.98 for melon adv. association (a/k/a NWPB), and $10.00 for packing straw, and that a balance was paid to Petitioners of only $90.00. This is arithmetically illogical. The subtractions total $1,517.98. Therefore, if all of Respondent's subtractions were legitimate, the total balance due Petitioners would have been $476.02. If the right to deduct for the $800.00 in returned melons were not substantiated by Respondent dealer, then Petitioners would be due $1,276.02. Since all parties acknowledge that $90.00 was already paid by Respondent dealer, then Petitioners are due $1,186.02 if Respondent did not substantiate the right to deduct the $800.00. Load 702 was "graded out," i.e. accepted as satisfactory, by a representative of Respondent dealer or a subsequent holder in interest when the melons were delivered by Petitioners to Respondent dealer. That fact creates the presumption that the melons were received in satisfactory condition by the Respondent dealer. Nothing persuasive has been put forth by the Respondent dealer to show that the situation concerning the melons' quality had changed by the time the load arrived at its final destination. Respondent got no federal inspection on this load and relied on hearsay statements by persons who did not testify as to some melons being inferior. In light of the standard arrangement of the parties over the whole course of their business dealings (see Findings of Fact 5-7 supra), Petitioners have proven entitlement to the amount claimed on load 702 of $1,186.02. By oral agreement at formal hearing, Petitioners' Composite 10 shows Petitioners Tucker and Watson delivered 44,740 lbs. of melons to Respondent dealer on 6-21-92. At $.05/lb., Petitioners were owed $2,237.00, less melon adv. association fee (a/k/a NWPB) of $8.95, $700.00 for an advance, and $10.00 for straw. Those deductions are not at issue. Therefore, Petitioners would be owed $1,518.05, the amount claimed, from Respondent. However, the invoice also notes that Respondent made a $268.18 deduction for melons returned. Respondent's Composite Exhibit 1 purports to be a BB&W Farms Loading Sheet and Federal Inspection Sheet. Respondent offered this exhibit to show that only $68.18 was realized by him on load 706 which he attributed to Petitioner Watson. However, the federal inspector did not testify as to the results of the inspection, the inspection sheet itself is illegible as to "estimated total," the "estimated total" has been written in by another hand as "$62.60," and there was no explanation on the Composite Exhibit or in testimony as to how Respondent dealer came up with $200.00 in "return lumping charges" as also indicated on Exhibit R-1. Accordingly, Petitioners have established that with regard to load/invoice 706, they delivered watermelons worth $2,237.00 to Respondent dealer and Respondent dealer did not affirmatively establish that any melons were bad, despite the federal inspection sheet introduced in evidence. Petitioners have proven entitlement to their claim on invoice 706 for $1,518.05. However, Petitioners conceded that Respondent actually paid them $441.82 on invoice/settlement sheet 706. Therefore, they are only entitled to recoup a total of $1,076.23 on their claim for Invoice 706. In the course of formal hearing, Respondent dealer admitted that, with regard to load invoice 716, (Tucker) he did owe Petitioners $460.88 for 275 watermelons, and that it had not been paid purely due to clerical error. By oral agreement at formal hearing, Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 12 (Invoice and Weight Tickets 709, Watson) shows Petitioner Watson delivered 46,740 lbs. of melons to Respondent dealer on 6-22-92 and at $.04 lb., Petitioners were owed $1,869.60, less appropriate deductions. Petitioners conceded that Respondent dealer appropriately deducted $9.35 for melon adv. association (a/k/a NWPB), $700.00 for an advance, and $10.00 for packing straw, bringing the amount they were owed to $1,150.25. Petitioners and Respondent are in agreement the Respondent paid only $708.43 of the $1,150.25 owed on invoice/settlement sheet 709 because Respondent dealer also deducted from the amount owed on invoice 709 the $441.82 he had previously paid out on Invoice 706. See, Finding of Fact 13, supra. Since Petitioners have established that they were owed $1,518.05 on invoice 706 but were paid only $441.82 thereon, it appears that Petitioners should be paid $1,076.23 on Invoice 706 and realize nothing on Invoice 709.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order awarding Petitioners $1,186.02 on invoice 702, $1,076.23 on invoice 706, and $460.88 on invoice 716 for a total of $2,723.13, dismissing all other claimed amounts, and binding Respondents to pay the full amount of $2,723.13, which in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company's case shall be only to the extent of its bond. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of June, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott Tucker and Phillip Watson Route 2 Box 280 Trenton, FL 32693 Eddie D. Griffin d/b/a Quality Brokerage Post Office Box 889 Immokalee, FL 33934 William J. Moore USF&G Post Office Box 31143 Tampa, FL 33631 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company Post Office Box 1138 Baltimore, MD 21203 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture Division of Marketing, Bureau of Licensure and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68604.15604.20604.21604.34
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BROOKS TROPICAL, INC. vs SMALL INDIAN CORPORATION AND CUMBERLAND CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, 01-003321 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Aug. 20, 2001 Number: 01-003321 Latest Update: Jan. 11, 2002

The Issue The issue is whether, as provided by the relevant statutes, Respondents owe Petitioner money for the sale of agricultural products.

Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner, which is located in Homestead, Florida, has been a producer of agricultural products. At all material times, Respondent Small Indian Corporation (Respondent) has been a dealer in agricultural products. Respondent Cumberland Casualty and Surety Company, as surety (Surety), issued a bond to Respondent, as principal, in the amount of $27,600 for the period, November 26, 1999, through November 25, 2000. Surety also issued a bond to Respondent in the same amount for the following bond year. During the periods covered by this case, Petitioner sold to Respondent numerous avocados, limes, and papayas. The shipments were timely and conformed in quality and quantity to the orders. Petitioner timely issued invoices to Respondent for the sales of these agricultural products, but Respondent never paid any portion of these invoices. On May 25, 2001, Petitioner filed a complaint with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department) for the period from November 22, 2000, through February 5, 2001. The Department required Petitioner to file separate complaints by bond year. Thus, Petitioner filed an amended complaint for $1190 for the bond year ending November 25, 2000, and an amended complaint for $54,591.25 for the bond year ending November 25, 2001. The date of the lone invoice within the bond year ending November 25, 2000, was November 22, 2000. The amended complaint concerning the bond year ending November 25, 2000, commenced DOAH Case No. 01-3320, and the amended complaint concerning the bond year ending November 25, 2001, commenced DOAH Case No. 01-3321. The allegations as to dates and amounts of invoices are all correct.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing the amended complaint in DOAH Case No. 01-3320 and finding Respondent liable to Petitioner in DOAH Case No. 01-3321 for the sum of $54,591.25. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt Bureau Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture 514 East Tennessee Street India Building Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Carolann Swanson General Counsel Brooks Tropical, Inc. Post Office Box 900160 Homestead, Florida 33090 W. Sam Holland Hinshaw and Culbertson 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Suite 800 First Union Financial Center Miami, Florida 33131 Deborah A. Meek Cumberland Casualty and Surety Company 4311 West Waters Avenue, Suite 401 Tampa, Florida 33614

Florida Laws (3) 120.57591.25604.21
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GLENDA S. BETHEL, ESTATE OF, D/B/A BETHEL FARMS vs NAPLES LANDSCAPE SERVICES, INC., AND AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, 95-000702 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Arcadia, Florida Feb. 17, 1995 Number: 95-000702 Latest Update: Jun. 01, 2009

The Issue Should the Petitioner Estate of Glenda S. Bethel, d/b/a Bethel Farms (Bethel Farms), under the provisions of Sections 604.15 through 604.34, Florida Statutes, be allowed to recover the full amount ($9,178.80) alleged in its Amended Complaint to be owed to Bethel Farms by Naples Landscape Services, Inc. (Naples)?

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, Bethel Farms was in the business of growing and selling "agricultural products" (grass sod) as that term is defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Naples was a "dealer in agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, issued license number 08525 by the Department, and bonded by Aetna in the sum of $16,000.00 - Bond Number 23 S 100840661 BCA. Bethel Farms and Naples had a course of dealing wherein Bethel Farms furnished agricultural products (grass sod) to Naples and Naples agreed to pay Bethel Farms for the grass sod. There was no evidence that Naples was acting as agent for Bethel Farms in the sale of the grass sod for the account of Bethel Farms on a net return basis or acting as a negotiating broker between Bethel Farms or its agent or representative and the ultimate consumer of the grass sod. Between June 7, 1994 and June 27, 1994, both dates inclusive, Bethel Farms billed Naples by invoices in the amount of $9,418.80, which included sales tax in the amount of $506.80 and pallet charges in the amount of 240.00. Naples refused and failed to pay Bethel Farms as invoiced by Bethel Farms. Bethel Farms filed a complaint with the Department's Bureau of License and Bond dated September 15, 1994, in the amount of $9,418.00 under the provisions of the Agricultural Bond and License Law, Sections 604.15 - 604.34, Florida Statutes, for the unpaid balance which included both sales tax and pallet charges. The Department preliminarily dismissed the pallet charges and Bethel Farms filed and amended complaint dated October 26, 1994, in the amount of $9,178.80 ($9,418.00 minus $240.00 pallet charge plus $0.80 error in amount claimed in initial complaint). The amended complaint included $8,672.00 for grass sod $506.80 sales tax. The parties stipulated, and there is no dispute, that Naples purchased grass sod in the amount of $8,672 from Bethel Farms and was invoiced for that amount of grass sod plus sales tax on the sale of the grass sod in the amount of $506.80. Naples does not dispute that it owes Bethel Farms for the sales tax. However, Naples contends that sales tax does not come within the definition of the term "agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes; therefore, sales tax is not collectible under the provisions of Sections 604.15 through 604.34, Florida Statutes. While Naples agrees that Bethel Farms furnished grass sod to Naples in the amount of $8,672.00, which remains unpaid, Naples contends that it is entitled to a charge back for the cost of replacing contaminated sod furnished to Naples by Bethel Farms that was included in the invoiced amount that remains unpaid. There is insufficient evidence to show that any of the grass sod furnished and invoiced to Naples between June 7, 1994, and June 27, 1994, was contaminated such that it required replacing, notwithstanding the testimony of Mark Kureth or Joseph Kureth to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility in this regard. Likewise, assuming arguendo that the sod was contaminated, there is insufficient evidence to show that Naples gave Bethel Farms sufficient and timely notice of such contamination in order for Bethel Farms to decide for itself the nature and extent of contamination and whether a charge back was warranted, notwithstanding the testimony of Mark Kureth and Joseph Kureth to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility in this regard.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order wherein the Respondent Naples Landscape Services, Inc. be ordered to pay Petitioner Bethel Farms the sum of $8,672.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-0702A The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted jointly by the Respondents Aetna and Naples in this case. Bethel Farms Proposed Findings of Fact: Bethel Farms elected not to file any proposed findings of fact. Naples' and Aetna's Proposed Findings of Fact Naples and Aetna have presented their proposed findings of fact in their (Proposed) Recommended Order in 23 unnumbered paragraphs starting on page 4 and ending on page 12 which shall be numbered as proposed findings of fact 1 through 23 for purposes of a response in this Appendix. Proposed finding of fact 1 is adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 4 - 6. Proposed finding of fact 2 is neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. The first sentence proposed finding of fact 3 is included the Statement of Issue. The balance of proposed finding of fact 3 is the recitation of testimony and not stated as a finding of fact. However, in any case, it is neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. Proposed findings of fact 4 - 7, 9,10, 12, 13, 15, 19 and 20 are the recitation of testimony or what a document reflects and are not stated as findings of fact. In any event, these proposed findings of fact are not supported by evidence in the record or are neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. See Findings of Fact 8 and 9. Proposed finding of fact 8 is neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. Proposed finding of fact 11 is the recitation of testimony and is not stated a finding of fact. In any event, it is neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. See Findings of Fact 8 and 9. Proposed finding of fact 14 is not supported by evidence in the record. Proposed finding of fact 16 is neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. See Findings of Fact 8 and 9. Proposed findings of fact 17 and 18 are neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. Proposed findings of fact 19 - 21 are the recitation of testimony or what a document reflects and are not stated as findings of fact. In any event, these proposed findings of fact are not supported by evidence in the record or are neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. Proposed finding of fact is argument and is cover in the Conclusions of Laws in the Recommended Order. Proposed finding of fact 23 is not supported by evidence in the record. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 C. William Allen, Esquire Allen & Meirose, P.A. Suite 340, One Urban Centre 4830 West Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33609 William Nugent Qualified Representative Bethel Farms 3244 N.W. Pearce Street Arcadia, Florida 33821

Florida Laws (7) 120.57120.68212.07604.15604.20604.21604.34
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CLASSIE SALES, INC. vs TONY AND ROBERT TOLAR, D/B/A TOLAR FARMS, AND PREFERRED NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 96-001776 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Apr. 12, 1996 Number: 96-001776 Latest Update: Dec. 11, 1997

The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Petitioner, Classie Sales, Inc. (Classie), is entitled to be compensated for produce sold and delivered to Respondent, Tolar Farms (Tolar), and if so, in what amount.

Findings Of Fact On June 30, 1990, Roger Harloff, on behalf of Roger Harloff Farms, and John A. Tipton, Secretary of Classie Sales, Incorporated, a sales agent founded by Harloff, entered into a written agreement whereby Classie would serve as sales agent for all sales of produce grown by or on Roger Harloff Farms. Between October 17, 1995 and December 9, 1995, Classie, on behalf of Roger Harloff Farms, sold watermelons with a total net sales price of $170,839.27 and tomatoes with a total net value of $1,720.00 to Tolar Farms. These sales were not direct sales to Tolar but transactions wherein Tolar was to sell the produce to whomever would buy it at an agreed price and would withhold its 3/4 per pound commission from the sales price, remitting the balance to Classie. Trucks arranged for by Tolar picked the produce up at the growing field and at the time of pickup, Classie issued to Tolar a packet jacket for each load sold. As the loads were sold Tolar would issue a ticket for that load which bore the shipping date, the lot number, the farmer, the transporting trailer's tag, the truck broker, the truck driver, and the weight of the product. Sometime later, when the produce was sold, Tolar issued an invoice bearing Classie Sales' logo, reflecting Tolar as the buyer and showing the lot number which corresponded to the load ticket, the shipping date, a description of the produce, the quantity, the unit price for that load, and the extended price from which was deducted Tolar's commission and an unspecified assessment. These documents were then forwarded to Classie. The terms of the sale between Tolar and Classie, on behalf of Harloff, were loose. The invoice documents reflected a net due 21 days after invoice date. The first delivery in issue here was made on October 17, 1995, and 21 days after that is November 7, 1995. The amount reflected by the deliveries made after that date is $27,509.72. Respondent, Preferred, claims that since Classie continued to make deliveries to Tolar's drivers after it was not paid within 21 days after the first shipment, it failed to mitigate its damages and should not be paid for any deliveries made after November 7, 1995. Classie was not paid for any of the instant invoices by Tolar, but Classie did not become concerned about Tolar's failure to make timely payment until January 1996. Tolar's payment and pricing practices were no different during this time than in years past. Typically, Tolar would start out quickly notifying Classie of the sales. As the number of shipments grew, however, the time for notification grew longer. It must be noted that less than two months transpired from the date of the first shipment in issue to the last.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture enter a Final Order in this matter directing Tony and Robert Tolar, d/b/a Tolar Farms, to pay Classie Sales, Inc., the sum of $172,559.27. In the event this sum is not paid by Tolar, the Department should apply the bond posted by Preferred National Insurance Company in the amount of $75,000.00. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-1776A To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. - 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein as the testimony of the witness. Not a Finding of Fact but a comment on the issues. Accepted and incorporated herein. Respondent Preferred's Proposed Findings of Fact. Preferred accepted all of Classie's Proposed Findings of Fact but suggested an amendment to Number 14. The suggested amendment was made a part of the Findings of Fact made by the Hearing Officer. Respondent Tolar's Proposed Findings of Fact: Tolar consented and agreed to all Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact except for Number 9. The substance of Tolar's objection to Classie's Number 9, relating to a provision for a commission, has been made a part of the Findings of Fact of the Hearing Officer. COPIES FURNISHED: Hywel Leonard, Esquire Carlton Fields Post Office Box 3239 Tampa, Florida 33601-3239 Scott R. Teach, Esquire Meuers and Associates, P.A. 2590 Golden Gate Parkway, Suite 109 Naples, Florida 34106 David A. Higley, Esquire Higley and Barfield, P.A. The Maitland Forum 2600 Lake Lucien Drive, Suite 237 Maitland, Florida 32751-7234 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800

Florida Laws (3) 120.57559.27604.21
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LEO R. FLEMING vs. WOODROW W. AND ELIZABETH G. MADDOX, D/B/A D & M PECAN COMPANY AND CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY, 87-002213 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-002213 Latest Update: Feb. 26, 1988

Findings Of Fact In the summer of 1986, petitioner, Leo R. Fleming, as the agent for a Mr. Griffin, entered into an agreement with Jimmy Davis, representing D & M Pecan Company, to sell an unspecified amount of watermelons to D & M at the "ground" price which was to be determined daily. The parties also agreed to "joint" the melons, meaning that D & M and Mr. Griffin would split whatever profit or loss was made on the sale of the watermelons. Under the terms of the agreement D & M supplied the trucks and petitioner was responsible for harvesting and loading the melons on the trucks. Fifteen loads of watermelons were loaded and sold to D & M between June 28 and July 2, 1986. On June 28, 1986, D & M paid petitioner $3,000 as an advance on the watermelons so that the field crew could be paid. On June 30, 1986, D & M paid $5,000 and on July 2, 1986, D & M paid $3,000. None of the monies paid to petitioner between June 28 and July 2 were for specific loads or lots of melons, but were advances to be credited against the total amount that was ultimately owed to petitioner. From the first day of loading, June 28, 1986, D & M experienced problems with the melons loaded by petitioner. Mr. Davis would call petitioner the night before the loading to advise him as to the type and size of melon that was to be put on each truck to be loaded the following day. However, petitioner would get the orders confused, which resulted in the trucks being loaded with a different size and type of watermelon than was ordered. D & M usually did not discover the problem until the trucks reached their destination. On a few occasions, the discrepancies were discovered when petitioner called back in after the trucks had left the field to report the amount of melons put on each truck. In any event, the failure to load the right melons on the trucks caused D & M to have to find other buyers and reroute the trucks or reduce the price of the melons delivered. On July 12, 1986, petitioner and Mr. Davis met in Cordele, Georgia, for the purpose of determining the amount owed by D & M for the watermelons. Petitioner brought typed invoices with him which reflected the type of watermelon, the number of pounds shipped, and ground price per pound for each lot or load. However, due to the problems with the wrong melons being loaded, the parties agreed to reduce the price per pound on those loads which had not been loaded as ordered. The adjusted price agreed upon was written on the original invoices and the typed price was marked through. No adjustment was made for the lots that were loaded properly. Lot 621 was not included in the negotiations because petitioner did not present an invoice for that lot and neither party at that time knew what had happened to that truck. However, the parties did agree to settle the other 14 loads for a total price of $25,783.60. (See Appendix A which lists the invoiced price and negotiated price per load.) D & M deducted $10,000 from that total for the advances that had been made and gave petitioner a check for $15,783.60. 1/ The stamp marks on the back of the check reveal that the check was deposited by petitioner on or before July 14, 1986. On July 15, 1986, petitioner wrote a check to the grower for the watermelons. The amount of the check was based on the negotiated price minus petitioner's commission and the cost of the harvesters. This amount is reflected on the original invoices. (P.Ex.1) However, Mr. Griffin did not accept the changes in the price and insisted upon payment from petitioner based on the original invoiced amount. Petitioner then paid Mr. Griffin based on the original invoiced amount "for keeping him from going to the PACA." (T-30) Thereafter, on August 6, 1986, petitioner sent D & M a statement reflecting a balance due based on the original invoiced amounts. From thee evidence presented, it is clear that on July 12, 1986, the parties reached an agreement concerning the full amount to be paid for all the loads of watermelons purchased by D & M except for the load labelled Lot No. 621. D & M admits that it owes petitioner for Lot No. 621, but it contends that it only owes $1,898.40 for that load, whereas the invoice indicates that $2,133.90 is owed. Mr. Davis explained that D & M should not have to pay $2,133.90 for that load because that was the total amount it was able to get for the load. In other words, if D & M paid the full invoiced amount, it would not make a profit. Nevertheless, the original agreement of the parties was that D & M would pay ground price for the melons. D & M paid full invoice price on the melons that were correctly loaded and paid an agreed upon adjusted price for the melons that were not loaded as ordered. D & M failed to present any evidence establishing that Lot No. 621 consisted of melons that were not of the type and size ordered. Therefore, D & M owes petitioner $2,133.90 for Lot 621.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture directing respondent to pay petitioner the sum of $2,133.90 within 15 days after the final order is entered. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1988.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57604.15604.20604.21
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GIN BROWN MATTHEWS, D/B/A COOK BROWN FARMS vs J. G. L. PRODUCE COMPANY AND REDLAND INSURANCE COMPANY, 00-004934 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Dec. 08, 2000 Number: 00-004934 Latest Update: Apr. 27, 2001

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents owe Petitioner $13,512.09 for watermelons, as alleged in the Amended Complaint.

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made. Cook Brown Farms is a melon farm in Punta Gorda, Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Cook Brown Farms was a "producer" as defined in Subsection 604.15(5), Florida Statutes, of agricultural products in the State of Florida. Melons come within the definition of "agricultural products" as defined in Subsection 604.15(3), Florida Statutes. J.G.L. Produce is a Florida Corporation, owned by John W. Johnson, Jr., and located in Pompano Beach, Florida. At times pertinent to this proceeding, J.G.L. Produce was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Subsection 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Andrew J. Cook, a principal owner of Cook Brown Farms, and Mr. Johnson of J.G.L. Produce entered into an oral agreement regarding the sale of watermelons grown at Cook Brown Farms. The core of this case is a dispute concerning the nature of this agreement. Mr. Cook testified that, under the agreement, J.G.L. Produce would purchase the melons at the farm at their daily market price, plus 1/2 cent to cover Cook Brown Farms' cost of picking, sorting, and placing the melons in special bins and in special pallets required by the ultimate purchaser, Kroger Supermarkets. J.G.L. Produce would provide the bins and pallets and would provide the trucks to ship the melons. Mr. Johnson testified that the agreement was not for purchase but for brokerage of the melons. J.G.L. Produce would act as broker of Cook Brown Farms' watermelons, use its best efforts to sell the melons at the highest price available, and pay Cook Brown Farms the proceeds of the sale, minus expenses and a brokerage fee of one cent per pound. Mr. Johnson testified that J.G.L. Produce never took title to or purchased the melons, and that the risk of loss always remained on Cook Brown Farms. Mr. Johnson testified that he approached Mr. Cook about the melons because he had a ready buyer in another local dealer, Delk Produce, which had a longstanding arrangement to provide melons to Kroger. Mr. Johnson agreed with Mr. Cook that the arrangement included the provision of bins and pallets by J.G.L. Produce, though Mr. Johnson stated that the arrangement also called for J.G.L. Produce to retain $0.015 per pound from the amount paid to Cook Brown Farms to cover the cost of the bins and pallets. J.G.L. Produce took approximately 24 truck loads of watermelons from Cook Brown Farms. J.G.L. Produce deducted a one cent per pound brokerage fee from each load of melons it took, except for certain loads noted below, without contemporaneous objection from Cook Brown Farms. The Amended Complaint claims that J.G.L. Produce owes money to Cook Brown Farms for five of the loads taken by J.G.L. Produce. In sum, the Amended Complaint states that J.G.L. Produce owes Cook Brown Farms $19,991.74 for the five loads, less $6,479.65 already paid, for a total owing of $13,512.09. Item One of the Amended Complaint alleges that J.G.L. Produce owes $4,438.54 for a load of 38,596 pounds at a price of $0.115 per pound, sold on April 20, 2000. Item Two of the Amended Complaint alleges that J.G.L. Produce owes $4,625.30 for a load of 40,220 pounds at a price of $0.115 per pound, sold on April 21, 2000. The Amended Complaint alleges that the melons on these two loads were inspected and approved for shipment during loading by Delk Produce employee Freddie Ellis. The Amended Complaint states that Cook Brown Farms was paid in full for the loads on May 3, 2000, but that the contested amounts were deducted from subsequent settlements by J.G.L. Produce. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Item One were initially sold to Delk Produce for delivery to Kroger. On May 3, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid Cook Brown Farms the amount of $4,438.54, which constituted the price for 38,596 pounds of melons at $0.125 per pound, less $385.96 for the one cent per pound brokerage fee. Jay Delk, the principal of Delk Produce, testified that this load was rejected by Kroger's buyer in Virginia due to "freshness," meaning that the melons were unsuitably green. Mr. Delk stated that the melons were taken to North Carolina to ripen and eventually sold at $0.06 per pound. The final return on this load, less the brokerage fee, was $1,543.84. In its final settlement with Cook Brown Farms on May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce deducted the difference between the original payment of $4,438.54 and the final payment of $1,543.84. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Item Two were initially sold to Delk Produce. On May 3, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid Cook Brown Farms the amount of $5,809.80, which constituted the price for 50,520 pounds of watermelons at $0.125 per pound, less $505.20 for the one cent per pound brokerage fee. Seminole Produce purchased 10,300 pounds of this load at $0.145 per pound, or $1,493.50. The remainder of the load was rejected by Kroger due to freshness and had to be resold at a lesser price of $0.0346 per pound, or $1,391.00. In its final settlement with Cook Brown Farms on May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce deducted the difference between the original payment of $5,809.80 and the final payment (after deduction of the brokerage fee) of $2,576.11. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Item Three were sold to Delk Produce. On May 9, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid Cook Brown Farms the amount of $2,731.30, which constituted the price for 42,020 pounds of watermelons at $0.0675 per pound, less $105.05 for the brokerage fee, reduced to $0.0025 per pound. Mr. Johnson testified that he decided to forego the full brokerage fee to save money for Mr. Cook and his farm, because it was "hurting" due to the rapidly plummeting price for watermelons. Mr. Johnson discovered at this time that Delk Produce had not been retaining the agreed- upon $0.015 per pound to cover the cost of bins and pallets and decided not to lose any more money on that item. In its final settlement with Cook Brown Farms on May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce deducted the difference between the original payment of $2,731.30 and $2,206.05, deducting $525.25 from the original payment to cover the cost of the bins and pallets. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Items Four and Five were originally shipped to Wal-Mart in Kentucky on April 29, 2000, and were rejected on the ground that the melons were not packed to specifications. The melons were trucked back to Florida at J.G.L. Produce's expense. The melons claimed under Item Four totaled 41,100 pounds. J.G.L. Produce divided the melons into four loads and sold them to four local dealers at an average price of $0.775 per pound, totaling $3,185.41. J.G.L. Produce deducted its $0.015 charge for bins and pallets, reducing the total to $2,671.51. J.G.L. Produce then deducted $1,750.00 from the total as reimbursement for the freight charge it paid to bring the melons back to Florida after their rejection by Wal-Mart. J.G.L. Produce did not include a brokerage fee. On May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid the remaining $921.51 to Cook Brown Farms as part of the final settlement. The melons claimed under Item Five totaled 45,600 pounds. J.G.L. Produce sold 2,426 pounds to Seminole Produce at $0.10 per pound, or $242.60. J.G.L. Produce sold the remaining 43,174 pounds to Belle Glade Produce at $0.065 per pound, or $2,800. From the total for Item Five, J.G.L. Produce deducted its $0.015 charge for bins and pallets and $1,950.00 for the freight charge it paid to bring the melons back to Florida after their rejection by Wal-Mart. J.G.L. Produce did not include a brokerage fee on this load of melons. On May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid the remaining $416.64 to Cook Brown Farms as part of the final settlement. The weight of the credible evidence, excluding the hearsay that was not supported by the direct testimony of Mr. Johnson, leads to the finding that there was a brokerage arrangement between the parties. J.G.L. Produce routinely deducted brokerage fees from its payments, without objection by Cook Brown Farms. This course of dealing strongly indicates a brokerage arrangement. Mr. Cook testified as to prior dealings with J.G.L. Produce, which also involved a brokerage arrangement. The evidence indicated that J.G.L. Produce fully accounted for the five loads of melons at issue, and paid Cook Brown Farms the full amounts due and owing for those loads.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing the Amended Complaint filed by Gin Brown Matthews, d/b/a Cook Brown Farms. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Redland Insurance Company 222 South 15th Street, Suite 600, North Omaha, Nebraska 65102 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 John W. Johnson, President Post Office Box 1123 Pompano Beach, Florida 33061 Harold M. Stevens, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1440 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Edward L. Myrick, Jr., Esquire Beighley & Myrick, P.A. 1255 West Atlantic Boulevard Suite F-2 Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Honorable Terry L. Rhodes Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810

Florida Laws (3) 120.57206.05604.15
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JIMMIE MOTT AND D. W. NEELY vs. ANTHONY AND JOSEPH PELLEGRINO, 78-002023 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-002023 Latest Update: Mar. 21, 1979

Findings Of Fact The Petitioners and the Respondents had a contractual agreement, whereby the Respondents agreed to purchase watermelons from the Petitioners during the 1978 harvest season. The Petitioners were to be compensated for their watermelons by the pound as the melons crossed the scales during loading of the melons onto trucks. The actual price fluctuated based upon the market conditions. The Respondents' employees were responsible for picking and loading the melons. Pete Potenza was in charge of the loading operation for the Respondents. Mr. Potenza advised the Respondents that the price for the watermelons would be two and one-half cents per pound for the medium watermelons and three cents per pound for large ones. At the agreed price, the Petitioners would have been entitled to compensation of $1,197.75 for one load of watermelons, and $1,083.50 for another load. The Respondents compensated them $958.20 and $866.80 for the respective loads. The price paid by the Respondents was less than had been agreed upon. The Petitioners are entitled to $217.50 additional compensation for the first load, and $239.55 additional compensation for the second load. The Petitioners are entitled to total additional compensation in the amount of $457.05. There was no dispute as to the quality of the Petitioners' melons. The Respondents picked several loads of melons from the Petitioners subsequent to those which were disputed. Mr. Potenza advised the Petitioners that they would receive additional compensation, but they have not. The Respondents are licensed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services as an agricultural commodity dealer. The Respondents have filed a $20,000.00 bond with the Department.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services finding that the Petitioners are entitled to $457.05 in additional compensation for agricultural goods which they sold to the Respondents and requiring the Respondents to pay this sum to the Petitioners. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of February, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Chastain, Esq. General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32304 William F. York, Esq. GILMAN, MCLAUGHLIN & HANRAHAN Ten Post Office Square Boston, MA 02109 J. Victor Africano, Esq. P. O. Box 1450 Live Oak, FL 32060 Joseph Pellegrino, President A. Pellegrino & Sons, Inc. 24 New England Produce Center Chelsea, MA 02150 E. G. Musleh, Esq. P. O. Box 924 Ocala, FL 32670

Florida Laws (3) 120.57604.20604.21
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS vs MEDARDO G. SOTO, 90-004692 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Immokalee, Florida Jul. 26, 1990 Number: 90-004692 Latest Update: Oct. 29, 1990

The Issue The issues are whether (a) respondent, Medardo G. Soto, should have a $1,500 civil penalty imposed for allegedly violating Sections 450.33(5) and and 450.35, Florida Statutes (1989), and (b) whether respondent, Martin G. Soto, should have a $250 civil penalty imposed for allegedly violating Section 450.30, Florida Statutes (1989).

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This controversy arose on the morning of January 29, 1990, when Larry Coker, a compliance officer with petitioner, Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Labor, Employment, and Training (Division), made an inspection of a citrus harvesting crew working in an orange grove on the Black Bay Citrus and Cattle Company on County Road 763 in DeSoto County, Florida. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the crew and its supervising contractor were in compliance with state regulations. Upon entering the premises, Coker observed a crew of eighteen workers harvesting fruit in a citrus grove. Respondent, Martin G. Soto (Martin), was operating a high lift at the work site. Coker approached Martin and asked him who was the farm labor contractor for the crew. Martin responded that his brother, Medardo G. Soto (Medardo), who is also a respondent in this cause, was the licensed farm labor contractor but he (Medardo) was in Immokalee. Martin acknowledged that he (Martin) was supervising the crew for his bother and was being paid $50 per day to do so. Division records reflect that Martin is not licensed by the State to perform that activity. Accordingly, it has been established through Martin's admissions and Coker's observations that Martin was acting as a farm labor contractor without a license. Martin was issued a citation that day which he read and signed. At the bottom of the citation Martin acknowledged that the charges contained therein were true. By allowing his brother to supervise a crew without a proper license, Medardo used an unregistered farm labor contractor in contravention of the law. Martin further acknowledged that he had driven the workers to the field that day in Medardo's 1986 Ford van. A search of Division records revealed that the 1986 Ford van did not have the required vehicle inspection or proof of liability insurance on file with Division offices. Agency rules require that evidence of such inspection and insurance be filed with the Division. Accordingly, it is found that Medardo operated a vehicle used to transport workers without furnishing the Division proof of the necessary vehicle inspection and insurance.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that respondent Medardo G. Soto has violated Sections 450.33(5) and (9) and 450.35, Florida Statutes (1989) and that respondent Martin G. Soto has violated Subsection 450.30(1), Florida Statutes (1989). It is further recommended that Medardo and Martin Soto be fined $1,500 and $250, respectively, such fines to be paid within thirty days from date of the final order entered by the Division. DONE and ENTERED this 29th of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administraive Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Francisco R. Rivera, Esquire 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S. E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0658 Mr. Medardo G. Soto 1013 North 19th Street Immokalee, FL 33934 Mr. Martin Soto 1013 North 19th Street Immokalee, FL 33934 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Dept. of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S. E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0658 Stephen D. Barron, Esquire 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0658

Florida Laws (4) 120.57450.30450.33450.35
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