The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in relocating and reestablishment of his small business pursuant to section 421.55, Florida Statutes (2009),1/ as implemented by Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-66.007, which, in turn, incorporates by reference the provisions of 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 24, Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and Federally-Assisted Programs (effective October 1, 2006),2/ and the Florida Department of Transportation Right of Way Manual 9.3.15, and, if Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement, the amount owed to him.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and witnesses' testimony, the undersigned found the following facts: The Department is the state agency that has responsibility for paying certain relocation and reestablishment expenses of businesses that have been displaced because of a public transportation project. See § 421.55, Fla. Stat. Sometime in 1999 to 2000, Mr. Carey purchased eight rental units in Hillsborough County, Florida, as an investment property. Mr. Carey managed the rental property and testified that he would advertise vacancies through "word of mouth." The record shows that these rental units were rented weekly and included written and verbal leases. In 2005, the Department informed Mr. Carey that his rental property would be subject of an eminent domain taking and informed Mr. Carey about the law authorizing the Department to pay certain expenses in relocating and reestablishing a small business. On December 6, 2005, Mr. Carey filled out a Business Survey Questionnaire for the Department, stating his desire to relocate his rental business. The Department acquired Mr. Carey's property on April 18, 2009. By mid July 2009, Mr. Carey contacted Mr. Nappi to determine whether or not he was still eligible to receive relocation and reestablishment reimbursement for his small business. Mr. Nappi determined that Mr. Carey remained eligible to apply for reimbursement and informed him of that fact. On August 28, 2009, Mr. Carey purchased a replacement property located at 19002 Apian Way, Lutz, Florida, for $300,000.00. The replacement property contained a house that had been the homestead property of the prior owner. Mr. Carey credibly testified that the purpose of purchasing this replacement property was "to get back into the rental business" and that he advertised the replacement property for rent by "word of mouth." Receipts introduced into evidence show that Mr. Carey began making repairs and purchasing materials as early as the first week in September. Mr. Carey testified, on cross-examination, that he could not remember the exact date when he listed the replacement property for sale, or the exact date when he entered into a contract for the sale of the replacement property. Mr. Carey testified that he would speculate that the contract for sale of the replacement property occurred in early October 2009. On October 15, 2009, Mr. Nappi went to the replacement property with Mr. Carey to review the work that Mr. Carey had already begun on the replacement property and to discuss the expenses eligible for reimbursement. In reviewing Mr. Carey's claimed expenses, Mr. Nappi found that the following expenses would be eligible for reimbursement: (1) the drywall work detailed in Exhibit A; (2) $561.00 worth of the receipts of materials purchased from Home Depot; and (3) the painting expenses detailed in Exhibit C. Mr. Nappi also testified that in reviewing the claimed expenses that Mr. Carey would be eligible for reimbursement of a portion of the replacement property's ad valorem taxes. According to Mr. Nappi, Mr. Carey would have been eligible to receive the difference of the amount of the property taxes between the acquired property and the replacement property in the amount of $849.56. The only expenses that Mr. Nappi identified as not being reasonable were for hauling away yard waste contained in Exhibit D. According to Mr. Nappi, the Department questioned the amount of the charges and determined that an appropriate amount would be $1,200.00 as opposed to the $2,450.00 sought by Mr. Carey. Consequently, the majority of the expenses claimed by Mr. Carey were eligible items for reimbursement. On November 4, 2009, the Department sent Mr. Carey a letter denying his eligibility to receive reimbursement for expenses in relocating and reestablishing his small rental business. The Department denied Mr. Carey's eligibility because the updated TRIM notice for the property tax, that Mr. Carey provided the Department, showed the replacement property was homestead property. Because the replacement property was homestead, the Department reasoned that Mr. Carey had not reestablished a small business. Mr. Carey informed Mr. Nappi that the replacement property was not homestead property and that the TRIM notice was wrong. In response, on November 9, 2009, Mr. Nappi wrote the Hillsborough County Tax Collector to determine whether or not Mr. Carey's replacement property was homestead property. On November 23, 2009, while the Department waited for a response from the Hillsborough County Tax Collector, Mr. Carey closed on the sale of the replacement property for $332,500.00. Mr. Carey did not inform the Department that the replacement property had been sold. In February 2010, the Hillsborough County Tax Collector informed the Department that the replacement property was not homestead. Also, the Department learned for the first time that Mr. Carey had sold the replacement property. After learning that Mr. Carey had sold the replacement property, Mr. Nappi contacted his supervisor Elbert Johnson (Mr. Johnson). Mr. Nappi informed Mr. Johnson that "it did not appear that the reestablishment status of the landlord had been in fact established[,]" and the claim would be denied. Mr. Nappi testified the Department attempted to determine whether or not Mr. Carey had reestablished his rental business by examining Mr. Carey's efforts to rent the replacement property. Mr. Nappi directed a right-of-way specialist for the Department to contact realtors, who were associated with the property, to determine if Mr. Carey had listed the property for rent; to contact the local newspaper to learn if the property had been advertised for rent; and to conduct an internet search of the property. According to Mr. Nappi, the realtor indicated that she was not aware of whether or not Mr. Carey listed the property for rent and learned nothing from the newspaper or internet search. Mr. Nappi admitted that the Department did not contact Mr. Carey to ask him about his efforts to rent the property. The Department did not contact Mr. Carey or ask him to provide any information about his efforts to rent the property. Consequently, the Department did not have before it any information concerning Mr. Carey's efforts as to "word of mouth" advertising of the property. Mr. Knight, the state administrator of Relocation Assistance, testified that asking Mr. Carey about his efforts to rent the property would have been helpful information to have in considering the reimbursement. However, Mr. Knight acknowledged that Mr. Carey's selling of the home prior to determination of whether or not he was entitled to reimbursement made the issue moot. In the Department's estimation, Mr. Carey had simply "flipped a house" and had not reestablished his business. On March 25, 2010, the Department informed Mr. Carey that it was denying his application for reimbursement because he was not eligible because he had not reestablished his small rental business at the replacement property.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order affirming its denial of Mr. Carey's application for reimbursement of reestablishment expenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 2011.
The Issue Does the Division of Administrative Hearings have jurisdiction of this housing discrimination petition?
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner rented the residence at 1881 Northwest 27th Avenue, Miami, Florida (displaced residence), where he lived with his wife and four children for four years prior to being displaced by Respondent in 1990. The displaced residence was approximately 1100 square feet of livable space and contained two bedrooms and two baths. Petitioner owned an import business which imported baby strollers from outside the United States for resale in the United States. Petitioner used approximately 150 square feet of space in one of the rooms of the displaced residence to store these baby strollers. William Sawyer was the owner of the displaced residence and the real property on which it was situated. Mr. Sawyer rented the residence to Petitioner and his wife pursuant to a lease dated July 2, 1986. The monthly rental for the residence was $475.00 (which was later verbally increased to $500.00). In addition to the residence, the property on which the displaced residence was located contained approximately 100 feet of frontage on the south side of the Miami River with a dock that was capable of mooring seagoing vessels. The property also contained a small warehouse. Pertinent to this proceeding, the lease contained the following provisions: #10. It is understood by Tenant that Landlord must have access through Drive-Way to Warehouse Building on property and that some of Landlord's equipment may be stored on property. #11. It is further understood and agreed by Tenants that Warehouse Building and all Dock Space area of property is reserved for the exclusive use and purposes of Landlord & free access to same is to be granted by Tenants at all times. Said Warehouse & Dock Space may be rented out by Landlord as he sees fit. Respondent purchased the subject property from Mr. Sawyer1/ in order to widen Northwest 27th Avenue, Miami, Florida, as part of a federally funded project. Petitioner was displaced from his residence and became entitled to relocation benefits provided by the Federal Uniform Relocation Assistance Program, 49 CFR 24. The program, as it pertains to projects within the State of Florida, is administered by Respondent. Under the relocation program, Respondent is required to locate a functionally equivalent replacement dwelling taking into consideration the needs and the life-styles of the persons being displaced. The amount of the relocation benefits is calculated pursuant to a formula by which the difference between the rent and utilities for the original residence and the rent and utilities for the replacement residence is determined and thereafter multiplied by 42. Respondent calculated the benefits to which Petitioner was entitled as being in the amount of $23,821.14. Petitioner accepted that amount under protest and reserved his right to challenge in these proceedings his right to additional benefits, contending that the replacement residence was not functionally equivalent to the Sawyer property for two reasons: First, the replacement residence did not have access to deep water. Second, zoning of the replacement residence did not permit the operation of his import business from his home as did the Sawyer property.2/ Petitioner's testimony that he was initially attracted to the displaced residence because its zoning permitted him to operate his business from his residence and because of the river frontage is found to be credible and is accepted. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner owned a steel- hulled sailboat that is 70 feet in length and 20 feet in beam. The river frontage adjacent to the Sawyer property was important to Petitioner because it gave him deep water access and protection during the hurricane season. The river frontage provided security for his boat and allowed him quick and easy access to it. The depth of the river at the Sawyer property was approximately 10 feet and was sufficient depth for Petitioner's boat. Petitioner could have sailed his boat from the Sawyer property into the Atlantic. For one month in either late 1987 or early 1988, Petitioner rented the dock from Mr. Sawyer at the rate of $270.00 per month. Petitioner did not lease the dock from Mr. Sawyer or have the right to moor his sailboat at the dock at any time other than the one-month period in late 1987 or early 1988. At least during part of the time Petitioner resided at the Sawyer property, the sailboat was moored approximately 150 yards from the Sawyer property where it was undergoing a complete overhaul of its masts. The work that was being done on the sailboat could not have been done at the Sawyer property because there was insufficient access for the heavy-duty crane that was required for the work. Although Petitioner testified that he could have rented the dock at any time he wanted at the rate of $270.00 per month, and that he intended to rent the dock from Mr. Sawyer after extensive repairs had been made to his boat, there was no evidence that Petitioner actually used the dock at the times pertinent hereto or that he had the right to use the dock. Petitioner's ownership of the boat was an important part of his and his family's life-style. Petitioner had built the sailboat himself, he had invested considerable sums in the boat, he and his family had traveled extensively on the boat, and he and his family had lived on the boat at one time. When Respondent's displacement specialist first met with Petitioner, Petitioner was informed that the river frontage would be included in calculating the displacement benefits.3/ The river frontage of the displaced residence was considered by Respondent to be water view only since Petitioner had no legal right to use the frontage and because Petitioner was not in fact using the dock. The zoning of the displaced residence permitted Petitioner to operate his import business from the residence. This business consisted of importing items, such as baby strollers, from out of the United States for resale in the United States. Petitioner utilized approximately 150 square feet of the space of the displaced residence to store those items from time to time. Petitioner located a dwelling that Respondent used as the replacement dwelling in calculating the benefits that were paid to Petitioner. Petitioner used the benefits he received from Respondent as a down-payment on his purchase of that dwelling. All comparables considered by Respondent in determining the displacement benefits to which Petitioner was entitled, including the replacement dwelling purchased by Petitioner, had water view. The replacement dwelling purchased by Petitioner has no access to deep water on which he can sail his boat. The zoning of the replacement dwelling purchased by Petitioner does not permit the operation of Petitioner's business from the residence. The replacement dwelling, as compared to the displaced dwelling, is larger (1,400 square feet vs. 1,100 square feet), has more bedrooms (3 vs. 2), and has more total rooms (9 vs. 6). The replacement dwelling also has a garage and a screen porch whereas the displaced residence did not. Respondent established that Petitioner has been properly compensated for the displacement if Petitioner's claims for additional compensation are rejected.4/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds that Petitioner was properly compensated under the relocation program and which denies Petitioner's appeal. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1992.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an "in lieu" payment under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4622) as implemented by I. M. 80-1-71 and amended by P. M. 81-1.2.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Florida department of Transportation, because of the proposed widening of State Road 61, Thomasville Road in Tallahassee, Florida, notified Petitioner in the spring of 1974 that the property on which the business was located was to be taken by the Respondent for road purposes. Petitioner was offered, but did not accept, relocation assistance to move his business to another location or to reimburse him in the amount that a never would charge. Other relocation assistance by the Respondent to find sites which would be appropriate for Petitioner's business was offered and four such sites were presented to Petitioner. Petitioner found the sites undesirable and has located a site at which he intends to move his business. Petitioner contends that the location on Thomasville Road is a good location; that he acquires "walk-in" business from time to time; that the sign on the building is of a type consistent with the limited type of advertising available to members of his profession and is beneficial to him; that the building he rents on Thomasville Road has additional space in which he at one time did rent to other interests, but which rental possibilities were foreclosed upon the general public knowledge that the Respondent would widen Thomasville Road and in the process remove the rental building. Petitioner operates his business from the location and shows that the operation of his consultant service is his sole business. The Petitioner filed for in lieu payments after refusing to accept relocation assistance for the moving of his business Petitioner contends: that nothing in the Act states or implies that a displaced person is required to accept relocation assistance if it is economically unsound; that the Respondent failed to sustain the burden of proof that Petitioner is not entitled to "in lieu" payment under the Act. Respondent contends: that the Petitioner failed to show he is entitled to "in lieu" payments under the Act; that the losses such as production costs, rental income, and advertising possibilities are not within the contemplation of the Act.
The Issue Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.018(3)(c) requires that a request for an extension of a CON's validity period be made 15 days in advance of the period's expiration (the "15-Day Requirement.") The issue is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration should waive the 15-Day Requirement for Miami Jewish Home.
Findings Of Fact CON 9893 and its Construction Timeline On June 29, 2007, AHCA awarded CON 9893 (the "CON") to MJHHA. The CON authorized MJHHA to establish a 30-bed long term acute care hospital (LTCH) in Dade County. The Agency determined that the LTCH authorized by the CON was needed and would be of benefit in the service district (AHCA Acute Care District 11) where it would be located. It also determined that the LTCH would enhance access to health care in conformance with the goals of the Health Facilities and Services Development Act. The determination followed a contested comparative review proceeding at DOAH in which it was found that Miami Jewish Home had "demonstrated need for its project through a thorough and conservative analysis." MJHHA Ex. 26, p. 49, para. 106. All findings of fact and conclusions of law of the administrative law judge in the Recommended Order were accepted by the Agency in its Final Order that approved MJHHA's CON application. Un-rebutted evidence in this proceeding, moreover, establishes that the need for the LTCH continues to exist in AHCA Acute Care District 11. Miami Jewish Home proposed to locate the LTCH on its Douglas Gardens Campus, the site of a broad array of health and social services that span the continuum of health care. The continuum includes services related to community outreach, independent and assisted living facilities, nursing home diversion, chronic illness, outpatient programs, acute care hospital, rehabilitation and post-acute care, Alzheimer's disease, pain management, skilled nursing and hospice. The community surrounding the campus is an area known as "Little Haiti," one of the most densely populated areas of Dade County. The community is primarily low-income. It is a federally-designated "medically underserved area." Miami Jewish Home is a "safety net" provider of health care services, one of only 20 or so in the entire state. Its skilled nursing facility is the largest provider of Medicaid skilled nursing services in the state. Miami Jewish Home operates Florida's only Teaching Nursing Home program. Medical students, interns, and other health professionals rotate through the service program in the nursing home and hospital on a regular basis. In its teaching capacity, Miami Jewish Home serves as a student and resident training site for the University of Miami and Nova Southeastern University Medical Schools and the Barry University, Florida International University and University of Miami nursing schools. The LTCH was proposed as a hospital-in-a-hospital (HIH), that is, it would be part of an existing hospital and constructed within the hospital's existing structure rather than as a free-standing facility. Its status as an HIH meant that the construction required for it to achieve operable status would be more in the nature of renovation as opposed to breaking new ground as in the case of a free-standing LTCH facility. The Construction Deadline Paragraph (a) of Subsection 408.040(2), Florida Statutes, requires successful applicants for CONs to commence construction within 18 months of the CON's issuance. If construction is not timely commenced, the CON validity period expires and the CON terminates. By operation of law, therefore, December 28, 2008, was the deadline for the commencement of construction (the "Commencement of Construction Deadline" or the "Deadline"). See Finding of Fact 1. The Approach of the Deadline In the wake of the issuance of the CON, Miami Jewish Home worked to develop the project approved by the CON and to implement it. Shortly after the award of the CON, Miami Jewish Home contracted for the construction and development work with an architectural firm, Louis Sousa & Associates ("Sousa"). The firm was engaged "to do preliminary drawings to cost out [the] project and get … more detail on … other issues that [might] be encountered in the renovation of the area." Tr. 68. Garrett's Construction was identified as the construction company that would perform the construction on the basis of the Sousa drawings. After the issuance of the CON, a new Chief Executive Officer took the helm at MJHHA. Eventually, Sousa completed a full scale set of drawings that included changes and expansions in the program that had not been shown on the drawings that accompanied the CON application. Among the expansions were the addition of an elevator tower, a drive-through canopy and a second operating room in which the new CEO took an interest because of his development background. The completed drawings were submitted to the City of Miami for approval and Sousa was engaged to be the architect during construction. There were several surprises during the process of developing the drawings. These were described at hearing by Mr. Knight, MJHHA's Chief Financial Officer: It was identified that the backup generator located in the Chernin Building was not sufficient and could not bear the load to support a 30-bed acute care hospital [the LTCH.] * * * In addition . . . , it was identified that the current 02 or oxygen tank farm that we have on the west side of the property was problematic. It was freezing up. . . . it was advised . . . by an external vendor that it would not be able to accommodate the additional 30 beds [beyond] the 30 beds … in operation. *** It was a little over a million two [hundred thousand dollars] for both of those projects . . . , a significant increase over what we had anticipated to be the total cost of the project. Tr. 69-70. Submitted in June of 2008 to the City of Miami, permits for the generator and the 02 farm project were received in December of 2008. The 02 farm project started in the third week of March 2009 and was fully underway at the time of the final hearing in this case. Demolition for the generator project was scheduled to commence within two weeks of the conclusion of the hearing, that is, in April of 2009. By December of 2008, however, none of the construction plans had been submitted for review to AHCA. (In fact, none had been submitted by the last day of final hearing in this case, March 25, 2009.) AHCA's review "of plans . . . is an essential part of implementing a project that requires construction." Tr. 263. Following cross-examination on this point at hearing, Mr. Gregg was asked by AHCA's counsel to review the definition of "commenced construction" in the Health Facility and Services Development Act: "Commenced construction" means initiation of and continuous activities beyond site preparation associated with erecting or modifying a health care facility, including procurement of a building permit applying the use of agency-approved construction documents, proof of an executed owner/contractor agreement or an irrevocable or binding forced account, and actual undertaking of foundation forming with steel installation and concrete placing. § 408.032(4), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added.) After his review of the definition, Mr. Gregg explained that construction cannot be commenced without AHCA plan review because "it's a[]. . . technical . . . area that requires the expertise of the people in [AHCA's] office of plans and construction to give a project an okay from the health care perspective before it proceeds to the point of construction." Tr. 319. Plans were not submitted and construction was not commenced by the Deadline because of difficulty in financing the construction. The more than one million dollars required to update the generator system and the O2 Farm, unanticipated at the time of the CON approval, contributed to the difficulty. In the main, however, the delay was due to what the stipulation of the parties describes as "unique in the history of Florida's CON regulation," that is, the financial crisis of which the public became generally aware in the early fall of 2008. Distress in the Financial Markets In the early autumn of 2008, as the Commencement of Construction Deadline neared, the financial markets in the United States became unstable. World-wide financial markets followed suit. The gravity of the financial situation has been widely acknowledged to be the most serious since the Great Depression that immediately preceded World War II. During the years that Florida's CON regime has been in place, there has been no time period during which economic distress has been as severe as the period that commenced in September of 2008 and continued at least into early 2009, after the expiration of the Deadline. The problems in financial markets made further development of the CON unreasonable. Miami Jewish Home had proposed and was approved to pay for the costs of the implementing the LTCH from its cash on hand and other assets. At the time of the approval, the "cash-on-hand" approach was reasonable. It continued to be achievable, despite cost increases, until the late 2008 financial crisis' serious negative impact on MJHHA's investments. Loss in Investment Income Miami Jewish Home's un-audited balance sheet, admitted into evidence as MJHHA's Ex. 1, shows a steep reduction in Net Assets over the six months from June 30, 2008 to December 31, 2008, the six months in which the financial crisis occurred. The Balance Sheets June 30, 2008 column (audited) shows "Net Assets" of $101,363,000. The 12/31/2008 column shows "Net Assets" of $82,209,000 a reduction in net assets of between $19 million and $20 million. Over $12 million of the loss was due to losses suffered by MJHHA's endowment and foundation account which represents Miami Jewish Homes investments. This "investment account" was $72 million on June 30, 2008 and had shrunk to $50 million by the end of 2008. At the time of hearing, the investment account had lost another $40 million, making MJHHA's decision not to proceed with the LTCH appear to be a prudent one at the time of final hearing. The decision was prudent not merely because of a loss of funds. The impact of the loss of investment funds was compounded for Miami Jewish Home because of the use of income from those funds to keep MJHHA's nursing home operation afloat. Mr. Knight explained, "when the significant decrease in cash occur[red], that also reduced the income potential on that cash and ultimately the subsidy back to the nursing home." Tr. 74. Miami Jewish Home's nursing home operation's financial stability was also threatened by Medicaid reimbursement "looking to be getting worse." Tr. 75. With the Deadline approaching, the situation was summed up by Mr. Knight: [B]etween the incremental costs that were identified [with regard to the generator and the O2 farm] and the significant decrease in our ability to fund from cash [the loss of investment return produced by the investment account] and ultimately the . . . loss on the nursing home operations, in September and October of '08 [MJHHA] began the process of seeking another developer or another potential acquirer of a certificate of need. Tr. 77. Looking for a Purchaser of the CON As Miami Jewish Home became aware of the deterioration of its financial situation, it began to seek alternative means to finance the development of the LTCH, including standard loans and alternative financing. It approached its commercial banker SunTrust. The deterioration of MJHHA's finances, however, was occurring at the same time as "the credit crunch came into place." Tr. 96. SunTrust was not interested in financing the LTCH. With the realization that it could not reasonably fund the development of the LTCH and still believing it to be a needed service, MJHHA began to seek out other operators and developers. At first, MJHHA looked for a known LTCH company or a compatible provider to develop the LTCH on the Miami Jewish Home campus. Promise Health Care and Mt. Sinai were approached. For various reasons, no firm commitments were forthcoming. As autumn wore on, Miami Jewish Home continued to make progress toward the permits necessary to develop the LTCH, but it became clear it was not in a financial position to go forward with construction. It scheduled a call with AHCA for December 18, 2009, to inform AHCA that it would be abandoning the project. Nearly resigned to the loss of the project, MJHHA management met with principals of the Sanderling group in mid- December 2008. Sanderling showed a desire to work through the details of the LTCH project with Miami Jewish Home. A general agreement was reached between Sanderling and Miami Jewish Home by the time of the scheduled call with AHCA. When the call took place on December 18, 2008, instead of relinquishing the CON, MJHHA informed AHCA that there was a provider compatible with Miami Jewish Home that intended to purchase the CON and develop the LTCH. During the call, the Agency responded verbally that MJHHA should do whatever it needed to do to keep the project moving forward. Miami Jewish Home took immediate action. It submitted a written request for the extension of the validity period of the CON. The December 18 Written Request for an Extension On the same day as the call, Miami Jewish Home provided AHCA with written notice of intent to transfer the CON. The letter informed AHCA of MJHHA's financial difficulty due to "additional costs . . . required to develop the LTCH which were material, . . . the large (20%)losses to the Homes endowment . . . and] [g]iven these changed circumstances, . . . [that] the Home . . . cannot justify the development costs to implement [the CON] without impacting other services." MJHHA Ex. 11. Dated December 18, 2009, the letter bears the heading, "Via Electronic Mail". Id. The letter went one step further. It specifically noted that paragraph (c) of Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.018(3) (the "Transfer Extension Paragraph"), provides that a 60-day extension of the life of the CON would be granted upon receipt of a notice and application for a transfer if the notice and application were received 15 days prior to the deadline for commencement of construction. After quoting the paragraph verbatim, the letter asked for relief under the variance and waiver provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, "[p]ursuant to Section 120.542, F.S., we are requesting a waiver of the 15 days prior notice provision." Id. at 2. Noting that "there is no statutory requirement for the 15 days notice," the letter asserted that the notice and proof of the closing of the acquisition would be submitted "with the initial transfer application as soon as possible and before the December 28, 2008 termination date." Id. The written request that comprised the letter (the "December 18 Written Request") was furnished five days later than required by the Transfer and Extension Paragraph. Had it been submitted on December 13, 2008, instead of December 18, 2008, it would have been timely. Before AHCA responded in writing to the December 18 Written Request, Miami Jewish Home took further action. It submitted a more formal request for relief: an emergency petition. The Emergency Petition On December 24, 2008, six days after the submission of the December 18 Written Request, Miami Jewish Home filed with AHCA a document entitled, "Emergency Petition for Variance of Waiver of Rule 59C-1.018(3)(c), F.A.C." (the "Emergency Petition"). See MJHHA Ex. 12. Denominated an emergency "because the CON is scheduled to terminate on December 28, 2008," id. at 2, the Emergency Petition pointed out that "the 90 days typically provided for review of petitions for variance or waiver would not allow the resolution of this petition." Id. Substantially similar to the December 18 Written Request, the petition expressed one new fact and pointed out an additional significant feature for AHCA's consideration. The new fact was that the initial application for transfer of the CON to Sanderling had been submitted to AHCA on December 24, 2009, along with the petition. The featured consideration was asserted in the petition's final paragraph: Granting the waiver will foster the goals of the Health Facility and Services Development Act as stated in the Recommended Order and Final Orders in DOAH Case No. 06-557 (AHCA No. 2006000716) approving CON 9893. Id. at para. 12., p. 4 (emphasis added.) This assertion amounted to the claim that the statute underlying the Transfer Extension Paragraph and the entire Termination and Extension Rule is not merely the law implemented by the rule but the entire Health Facility and Services Development Act. The Act The Act is a subset of one part of Chapter 408, Florida Statutes. The chapter governs "Health Care Administration" and is composed of Parts I - IV. Part I consists of Sections 408.031 through 408.7071. Fifteen sections, Sections 408.031 through 408.045, comprise the Act. "Sections 408.031-408.045 shall be known and may be cited as the "Health Facility and Services Development Act." § 408.031, Fla. Stat. Of the Act's fifteen statutory sections, several stand out as having been applied by the Agency and the DOAH in the process that led to the approval of Miami Jewish Home's application and the award of the CON. These include Section 408.037, which prescribes the content for a CON application, Section 409.035, which delineates the criteria for review of a CON application, and Section 408.039, which establishes the process for review of a CON application. The Act recognizes the transfer of CONs from the holder of a CON to another. See § 408.042, Fla. Stat., the catchline of which is: "Limitation on Transfer." This recognition is reflected in the section's opening sentence: "The holder of a certificate of need shall not charge a price for the transfer of the certificate of need to another person that exceeds the total amount of the actual costs incurred by the holder in obtaining the certificate of need." (emphasis added.) One of the 15 provisions of the Act bears particular relevance to this proceeding: Section 408.040, Florida Statutes, the "Conditions and Monitoring" Section. Section 408.040, Conditions and Monitoring Section 408.040 has two subsections: the first is concerned primarily with "conditions," the second with monitoring." The section, accordingly, bears the catchline, "Conditions and monitoring." Subsection (2), the "monitoring" subsection, is directly at issue in this case because it is cited in Rule 59C- 1.018 as its "law implemented." It provides, in pertinent part: (2)(a) Unless the applicant has commenced construction . . . , a certificate of need shall terminate 18 months after the date of issuance. The agency shall monitor the progress of the holder of a certificate of need in meeting the timetable for project development specified in the application, and may revoke the certificate of need, if the holder of the certificate is not meeting such timetable and is not making a good faith effort, as defined by rule, to meet it. * * * (c) The certificate-of-need validity period for a project shall be extended by the agency, to the extent that the applicant demonstrates to the satisfaction of the agency that good-faith commencement of the project is being delayed by litigation or by governmental action or inaction with respect to regulations or permitting precluding commencement of the project. § 408.040(2), Fla. Stat. Because the subsection is concerned with termination and extension of the deadlines for commencement of construction of CON project, the subsection will be referred to in this order as the "Termination and Extension Subsection." Paragraph (a) of the Termination and Extension Subsection focuses on the 18-month CON validity period during which the agency is to monitor the progress toward project development. It provides for revocation of a CON if a good faith effort is not being made toward meeting the 18-month timetable. It further provides for termination of the CON at the end of the 18-month CON validity period. Paragraph (c) of the Termination and Extension Subsection focuses on when the time for termination may be extended and the circumstances for such an extension: in cases plagued by litigation or when governmental action or inaction causes delay. One observation of the Termination and Extension Subsection is of particular import to this proceeding. It is silent with regard to extensions of a deadline for commencement of construction when a CON is transferred. Although not mentioned as a basis for an extension in the Termination and Extension Statute, transfer of a CON is a basis for an extension under paragraph (c) of Section (3) of Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.018 (the "Termination Rule"). The Termination Rule The Termination Rule is divided into three sections. The first, denominated "Validity Period of Certificate of Need," restates the Termination and Extension Subsection's prescription that a CON shall terminate 18 months after issuance "unless the holder meets the applicable conditions for an extension set forth in Section 408.040(2), F.S., and this rule." Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.018(1). The second section of the Termination Rule, called "Undertaking a Project Authorized by a Certificate of Need," prescribes minimum requirements to prevent termination of a CON and the expiration of its validity period. These requirements govern both new construction or renovation projects and non- construction projects that involve capital expenditures. The third section of the Termination Rule governs extension of a CON's validity period. It is divided into three paragraphs. Paragraph (a) deals with extensions when there is a demonstration that "good faith commencement of the project is being delayed by litigation or governmental action or inaction," Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.018(3)(a), related to regulation which precludes commencement. Delay caused by litigation or government are the two bases for an extension provided by the statutory Termination and Extension Subsection. Unlike the case where extensions are sought because of a transfer, the filing of a request under paragraph (a) does not extend the validity period of a CON. A paragraph (a) extension request requires the Agency to pay close attention to a number of details in its review. The requester must make a showing of good faith. Other details the Agency must examine are revealed by the following provisions: The request must provide the agency a detailed explanation of the problem and a plan of action to be undertaken by the holder to resolve the problem within the time frame requested. Land zoning issues will be considered for extension of the certificate of need validity period beyond the 18 months, if the certificate of need holder can demonstrate that action has been initiated to obtain proper zoning for the proposed site for the facility, and that such action was timely with respect to the requirements for obtaining proper zoning. Untimely filing of submission of plans and requests for local and state permits, based on the processing time required by the state and local governments for such plans and permits, will not be considered as justification for an extension beyond the 18-month period. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.018(3)(a). Paragraph (b) contains yet another consideration for the Agency in cases of extensions requests on the basis of litigation. The extension "shall be granted for the actual time of the validity period which is equivalent to the period of litigation, including appeal." Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C- 1.018(3)(b). Paragraph (c) (the "Transfer Extension Paragraph") deals with extensions requests in the case of transfers, as in this case: Upon written request from the holder of a certificate of need received at least 15 days prior to the termination date of the certificate of need, and upon submission of a transfer application by the proposed transferee, the agency will extend the validity period of the proposed transferred certificate of need for a period of 60 days to ensure that the certificate of need remains valid throughout the agency's timetable for review of the transfer application. Only one such request for a 60 day extension will be granted under the provisions of this subsection. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.108(3)(c) (emphasis added.) The terms of the Transfer Extension Paragraph that govern "transfer extensions" are significantly different from the terms of paragraphs (a) for other extensions. For one, there is no showing of "good faith" required on the part of the holder of the CON as there is with paragraph (a). Instead, Paragraph (c) directs extension upon the submission of two documents: a written request and a transfer application ("the agency will extend the validity period . . .", emphasis added). By comparison, paragraph (a) is written in "discretionary" language: "[e]xtensions . . . may be requested by a certificate of need holder . . .". (emphasis added.) Paragraph (a) extensions require much more review by the Agency; the paragraph sets up points at which the Agency may exercise discretion in turning down the request. In addition to the "good faith" demonstration by the holder of the CON, there must be a detailed explanation offered and a plan of action to resolve the problem within the time frame requested. In contrast, review triggered under the Transfer Extension Paragraph by a written extension request is minimal. All the Agency need determine is whether a transfer application has been submitted by the transferee and that no other requests on the basis of a transfer have been granted previously. Miami Jewish Home seeks a waiver from only one clause in the Transfer and Extension Paragraph: that its written request must have been received fifteen days prior to the termination date of the CON (the "15-day Requirement"). It makes the request for the waiver under Section 120.542, Florida Statutes. Section 120.542: the Variance and Waiver Statute Section 120.542, Florida Statutes (the "Variance and Waiver Statute") was enacted in 1996 as part of a major revision to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Described as perhaps "the most significant aspect of the revised APA," Loosening the Chains that Bind: the New Variance and Waiver Provision in Florida's Administrative Procedure Act, Vol. 24, at 353, Florida State University Law Review (1997), the section sets forth the legislative intent in two straightforward sentences: Strict application of uniformly applicable rules requirements can lead to unreasonable, unfair and unintended results in particular instances. The Legislature finds that it is appropriate in such cases to adopt a procedure for agencies to provide relief to persons subject to regulation. § 120.542, Fla. Stat. The operative part of the Variance and Waiver Statute is found in subsection (2), the first sentence of which reads, "Variances and waivers shall be granted when the person subject to the rule demonstrates that the purpose of the underlying statute will be or has been achieved by other means by the person and when application of a rule would create a substantial hardship or would violate principles of fairness." The Variance and Waiver Statute provides a process for agencies in dealing with variance and waiver petitions. The agency is to give notice to the Department of State within 15 days of receipt of the petition. The Department of State, in turn, publishes notice of the petition in the first available issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly. See § 120.542(6), Fla. Stat. Within 30 days of receipt of the petition, the agency is to review it and request additional information it is permitted to require, see Section 120.542(7), Florida Statutes, "except for requests for emergency variances or waivers". Id. Agency Response to the December 18 Written Request The Agency did not rule on the December 18 Written Request prior to the expiration of the CON's validity period on December 28, 2008. The December 18 Written Request was hand-delivered to Mr. Gregg's office six days before the filing of the Emergency Petition (December 24, 2008). Mr. Gregg took the December 18 Written Request to the legal staff and said "please respond to this." Tr. 265. Before any response to the December 18 Written Request was issued in writing, the Emergency Petition was filed with AHCA together with the transfer application. Agency Response to the Emergency Petition The timing of the filing of the Emergency Petition, Christmas Eve, was problematic for the Agency. Mr. Gregg explained at hearing: [B]eing the holiday season, various key people were not there . . . The chief facilities counsel had broken his foot. The deputy secretary was out before Christmas. I was out after Christmas. This is a perfect example, apart from the fact that we all are juggling many different subjects, of why we would need [a] review period [as called for by the 15-Day Requirement] in order to develop an opinion about any request for extension or a request for a variance and transfer. Tr. 273. Since Mr. Gregg was not available to review the Emergency Petition the day of its submission, it was reviewed by the Deputy Secretary and Acting General Counsel. They formulated the Agency response: denial. Later, after Mr. Gregg had returned to the office and read the Emergency Petition, "we all agreed it was not something that we could grant." Tr. 266. In the wake of the receipt of the Emergency Petition and the transfer application, the Agency followed prescribed process. It issued a CON application omissions letter to Sanderling. Notice of the receipt of the Emergency Petition was published on January 16, 2009 in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Notice was also published on the Agency internet site. In the meantime, AHCA notified counsel for MJHHA that the CON had expired. The Agency letter, dated January 15, 2009, states: It has been determined that the holder of CON Number 9814 for the above referenced project [CON 9893] has violated the provision of section 408.040(2)(a), Florida Statutes . . . and Rule 59C-1.018(2) Florida Administrative Code in that the project has not commenced continuous construction, as defined in section 408.032(4), F.S., by the December 28, 2008 termination date. Therefore the CON has expired. * * * The final determination on your request for an emergency waiver could have an impact on whether or not this CON remains valid. Exhibit "E" attached to MJHHA Ex. 13. On January 22, 2009, written comments in opposition to the Emergency Petition were received from Victoria Healthcare, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Select Medical Corporation and from Kindred Hospitals East, L.L.C. No comments were received in support of the petition. On January 23, 2009, the Agency issued a Final Order denying the Emergency Petition. The Agency's Final Order The findings of fact in the Final Order relate the history of the CON and the filing of the Emergency Petition. The order does not make reference to the December 18 Written Request. The findings of fact also cite and quote text from relevant statutory and rule provisions. The sixth and last finding of fact in the final order is: Since CON 9893 expired on December 28, 2008, Rule 59C-1.018(3)(c) required . . . the request and transfer application be received by the Agency no later than December 13, 2008. The petition and transfer application were received on December 24, 2008, eleven days late. MJHHA Ex. 13, at 2-3. The Final Order does not identify the specific statute underlying the Termination and Extension Rule. Nonetheless, it concludes with regard to the first prong of the Waiver and Variance Statute that the Emergency Petition comes up short: Beyond the bare, unsupported, and conclusory allegation in paragraph 9 of the Petition that "requiring the CON to terminate would be detrimental to the goals of the Health Facility and Services Development Act and the accessibility and quality of health care services to the community," and a reference in passing to the Recommended and Final Orders in DOAH Case No. 06-0557 CON, the Petition does not address or provide specifics explaining how waiving the 15 day prior notice rule requirement would achieve the purpose of the statute. Id. After its conclusion that MJHHA failed to meet the first prong, the Final Order reflects the Agency's conclusion that it was not necessary to address the second prong of the Variance and Waiver Statute. The order, however, reflects the Agency's decision to deal with the second prong "briefly." MJHHA Ex. 13, at 5. The Final Order finds that MJHHA failed to demonstrate that application of the rule would work create a substantial hardship or that principles of fairness had been violated. Accordingly, the Final Order denies the Emergency Petition. Section 120.57(1) Petition The Final Order's denial of MJHHA's request for a variance was challenged by a petition filed on February 2, 2009 (the "Section 120.57(1) Petition"). In the Section 120.57(1) Petition, MJHHA characterizes the December 18, 2009 Written Request, as a "written request" within the meaning of the term in the Termination Rule and characterizes the Emergency Petition as a "second" written request. The Section 120.57(1) Petition, of course, raises the issue of whether it demonstrated that both prongs of the Variance and Waiver Statute had been met. It also raises a number of issues surrounding the emergency nature of the Emergency Petition, whether the CON terminated, and whether there is a statutory basis for the 15-Day Requirement. See Section 120.57(1) Petition, at 7-9. Stipulated Facts Prior to hearing, the parties filed a joint pre- hearing stipulation. The stipulation contains a section entitled, "Facts Which Are Admitted and Require No Proof at Hearing." The section contains the following: AHCA is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Certificate of Need program in Florida. AHCA did not provide MJHHA copies of the relevant statutes and rules when it was presented with a request for relief (the December 18 letter) from the provisions of the rule. (Item a of the petition) The current financial crisis is unique in the history of the Florida's CON regulation. (Item g of the petition) Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, at. 4. Final Hearing At final hearing, the Agency identified the statute it believes underlies the Termination and Extension Rule: Section 408.040(2), Florida Statutes, referred to in this order as the Termination and Extension Subsection. The Agency offered further evidence of the context in which its decision was made. Mr. Gregg opined that Miami Jewish Home was not positioned to request an extension. Construction plans had not been submitted for AHCA review. The extension request was first presented to AHCA ten days before the Construction Deadline; normally, AHCA is informed months in advance of the need for an extension. The Agency denied the request in an "attempt to be consistent and treat each situation in the same way." Tr. 274. Mr. Gregg further opined: And in the case of CON, given that we know that the financial situation is very widespread, if we were to be too liberal in our application of these laws and rules, I can guarantee you that we would quickly have other people asking us to do a similar thing, based upon financial problems. And we don't feel we have [that] flexibility . . . . In recognition of that, we have proposed . . . a total extension of the CON validity period that would extend it from 18 month to three years. And that is included in a bill that is generally referred to in this season as the agency's regulatory reform bill. [Without such legislation] we don't think we have authority to [give MJHHA an extension.] Tr. 275-6. Mr. Gregg also mentioned another instance in which a CON holder "had communicated . . . that they have financial problems . . . but they also happen to have local planning and zoning issues and environmental issues as well." Tr. 274. That instance was a case involving Hillsborough Extended Care, LLC. The Hillsborough Case On August 30, 2005, CON 9814 was issued to Hillsborough Extended Care, LLC, ("Hillsborough") to relocate 120 existing community nursing home beds from one facility in Tampa to a new freestanding 120-bed facility. The deadline for commencing construction of the project authorized by CON 9814 was February 28, 2007. Prior to November of 2007, Hillsborough invoked the Termination and Extension Rule on four separate occasions. Extensions were granted each time on February 1, May 17, June 15, and August 13, 2007. The letter granting the last extension informed Hillsborough that the CON validity period expired October 7, 2007 "and specifically stated that to request another extension pursuant to Rule 59C-1.018, Florida Administrative Code, that the extension request must have been received by the Agency no later than October 7, 2007." MJHHA Ex. 21 at 2; see also the fourth page of Exhibit "B" attached to MJHHA Ex. 21. On October 16, 2007, nine days late, Hillsborough filed a fifth extension request. The Agency sent a letter to Hillsborough on October 23, 2007. It denied the request and informed Hillsborough as follows: It has been determined that the holder of CON Number 9814 . . . has violated the provisions of section 408.040(2)(a), Florida Statutes . . . and Rule 59C-1.018(2), Florida Administrative Code in that the project has not commenced continuous construction, as defined in Section 408.032(4), F.S., by the October 22, 2007 termination date. Therefore, the CON has expired. Fifth page of Exhibit "B" attached to MJHHA Ex. 21. Hillsborough filed an emergency petition for a variance from or a waiver of the Termination Rule. The emergency petition invoked the Variance and Waiver Statute. The emergency petition recognized the law implemented by the Termination Rule to be the Termination and Extension Subsection, Section 408.040(2), Florida Statutes. With regard to the "underlying statute," Hillsborough took a position similar to that of Miami Jewish Home in this proceeding, that is, that the underlying statute is the Act. See MJHHA Ex. 20 at 2. The emergency petition asserted that in support of the end promoted by the Act, "the orderly development of health facilities and services in the State," id., the Agency had determined a need for the nursing home beds authorized to be relocated by CON 9814. The Agency issued a Final Order denying Hillsborough's emergency petition on December 28, 2007 (the "Hillsborough Final Order of December 28, 2007.") The Agency found that although a need for the nursing home beds had been determined when CON 9814 was issued, "there is no longer a need for these beds in Hillsborough County." MJHHA Ex. 21. The Agency at first, see Finding of Fact 86, below, concluded that the statute underlying the Termination Rule was the Termination and Extension Subsection not the Act. The Agency in the order further concluded that while "it appears there may have been ongoing litigation or other matters pending relating to permitting which may have justified a fifth extension of CON 9814," id. at 5, that the issue was whether a variance from or waiver should be granted as to the 15-Day Requirement. The Agency recognized that the 15-Day Requirement is not statutory. See MJHHA Exhibit 21 at 6, para. 18: "[i]t is true that there is nothing in the statute explicitly requiring that CON validity extension requests by received at least 15 days prior to the extension date . . .". The Agency further concluded that Hillsborough did not demonstrate that the purpose of the underlying statute, the Termination and Extension Subsection, would be met by a variance from or waiver of the 15-Day Requirement. In fact, the Agency wrote an untimely request "is contrary to the purpose of the underlying statute, which requires the Agency to determine whether an extension is justified before the CON has expired." Id. at 7. The Agency expanded upon the meaning of the term, "underlying statute" when it wrote the following in the Hillsborough Extended Care final order: Moreover, the entire CON statute, found at Chapter 408, Part I, [the Act] is dedicated to the principle that a CON is granted when there is a demonstrated need. * * * Therefore, the purpose of the underlying CON statute [emphasis added] has not been met in this case: this district does not need these beds [any longer.] The issue, always, in the CON program is whether there is a need for a facility or service, not whether it would be desirable to have additional options and choices beyond that need. In this case, the need does not exist. The Petitioners have not demonstrated that they have met the purpose of the underlying statute. [emphasis added.] Id. at 7-8. Thus, the Agency concluded that the Act is the statute underlying the Termination Rule as well as the law implemented, a provision contained within the Act. The Hillsborough Final Order or December 28, 2007, accordingly denied Hillsborough's emergency petition. Hillsborough challenged the decision by filing two petitions for formal administrative hearings. On February 19, 2008, the Agency entered a second final order (the "Hillsborough Final Order of February 19, 2008.") It reports, "[t]he Agency and Hillsborough have reached a settlement by which the AHCA notices are superseded and Hillsborough is given an extension to begin continuous construction pursuant to the time line schedule included in the Settlement Agreement." MJHHA Ex. 22 at 2. The final order approves and adopts the Settlement Agreement as part of the final order. The Settlement Agreement in its "whereas" clauses describes action and inaction of the local government that justified an extension. See MJHHA Ex. 22, Settlement Agreement at 3-4. With regard to the 15-day Requirement that its earlier letter had found Hillsborough to have violated, the Settlement Agreement recites the following in a "whereas" clause: "the parties agree that AHCA has evenly enforced its fifteen day requirement for filing an extension request and did nothing incorrect in denying the late filed extension request and canceling the CON ...". Id. at 5. Neither the Hillsborough Final Order of February 19, 2008 nor the Settlement Agreement attached to it provides any explanation as to why the 15-Day Notice Requirement was no longer to be enforced against Hillsborough. The lack of explanation is particularly worthy of observation in light of the agreement that AHCA did nothing incorrect in enforcing it in the first place. The Settlement Agreement sets out a detailed schedule for plan review, commencing construction and continuing construction. Id. As for future extensions, the Settlement Agreement contained a few additional provisions that relate to circumstances that would support further extensions and timely requests for extensions: The schedule and continuous construction commencement date of CON 9814 may only be extended by agreement of the parties because of governmental action or inaction or for unforeseen natural disasters or Acts of God. If such an extension or extensions become necessary, the Petitioner agrees to timely file the request(s) for extension in full compliance with the requirements of Rule 59C-1.018(3)(a), F.A.C., and upon failure to fully comply with the requirements of said rule, Petitioner agrees that CON 9814 shall become null and void by operation of law, without further action by the agency, and without any further administrative or legal remedies being available to the Petitioner. Id. at 7-8. The Agency's Position at Final Hearing At final hearing, the Agency embellished upon the circumstances that led to its decision to deny the Emergency Petition, including its view of why the outcome in the Hillsborough case is justifiably different from the Agency's preliminary denial in the Final Order in this case. See Finding of Fact 76. In essence, the Agency adhered to the position taken in the Final Order in this case: that MJHHA's Emergency Petition should be denied because it was filed eleven days late and Miami Jewish Home had failed to demonstrate a basis for waiving the 15-Day Requirement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Agency waive the 15-Day Requirement for Miami Jewish Home with regard to its written request to extend the validity period of CON 9893, revoke the termination of the CON, and grant an extension of 60 days of the CON's validity period upon issuance of a final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Karl David Acuff, Esquire Watkins & Associates, P. A. 3051 Highland Oaks Terrace, Suite D Post Office Box 15828 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5828 Shaddrick Haston, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Holly Benson, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Justin Senior, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Petitioners maintained a separate household within a multiple occupant displacement dwelling for purposes of calculating the appropriate amount of their relocation assistance benefits.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioners, Anthony T. Black and Melissa Owen, formerly resided in a mobile home at 5315 Drew Street, Brooksville, Florida. Respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT), recently began acquiring property for the construction of the Suncoast Parkway, a non-federal-aid, limited access toll facility which will run forty miles from just north of Tampa, Florida, to Brooksville, Florida. Among other properties, DOT has acquired parcel number 144.001T on which Petitioners once resided, and they have been forced to relocate to another residence. This controversy concerns a determination as to the appropriate amount of relocation benefits to which Petitioners are entitled. The amount of benefits due a displaced person is determined by a federally-mandated formula codified in 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 24, and adopted by DOT. The regulations provide that if multiple persons live in the same dwelling, and those persons can establish that they maintained separate households within a single-family dwelling, they are entitled to greater benefits than if all persons are considered a single household. Federal regulations contain no definitive guidelines on this issue, but rather they leave that determination to the discretion of the state agency administering the program. In this unusual case, Petitioners contend that they were a "separate household" within a single-family dwelling which was jointly shared with another person. DOT contends, however, that Petitioners are entitled only to a prorata share of a single payment to all occupants of the dwelling. The seven-room mobile home at 5315 Drew Street was owned by Margie Black, the mother of Anthony T. Black. Beginning in January 1995, she allowed her son, his girlfriend, Melissa Owen, and a friend of her son, Daniel L. Bell, to live in the mobile home rent-free, but the tenants were required to pay for taxes, utilities, and the upkeep of the premises. At different points in time, other persons also shared the home, but they vacated the premises before this dispute arose. There was no written agreement between the three tenants on how to allocate living space or pay expenses, but they informally agreed that they would share in common expenses, such as utilties and maintenance repairs. Bell lived in one of the three bedrooms in the mobile home, while Petitioners shared another. In order to qualify for assistance, a tenant must have occupied the premises for at least 90 days before the displacement occurred, a requirement easily met by Petitioners. Also, replacement housing assistance is restricted to an amount not to exceed $5,250.00 per household. This cap may be exceeded when a person qualifies for a super rent supplement in order to place the displaced person in "last resort housing." In this case, Petitioners qualifed for such a supplement because there were no comparable mobile homes in the area. In calculating the amount of the super rent supplement, DOT is required to ascertain the amount of rent paid by the displaced persons, their income, and their monthly utility bills. To assist it in gathering this information, DOT utilizes a private consulting firm, Universal Field Services (UFS), whose representatives meet with the displaced persons. Although the parties have disagreed as to the degree of cooperation UFS and DOT received from Petitioners in verifying their income, utility bills, and rent, they have ultimately agreed that, if the three tenants are treated as multiple occupants of one displacement dwelling, then based on Petitioners' annual income and utility payments in 1995 and 1996, Petitioners are entitled to $9,027.08 in total relocation assistance payments, including the super rent supplement. This amount represents two-thirds of the total payment of $13,541.22, which is the product of a federally-mandated formula. Bell, the other tenant, received the remaining one-third of the payment. The parties also agree that if only a single household existed, DOT's calculation is correct. Petitioners contend, however, that they maintained a separate household from the third tenant, and thus they are entitled to a greater amount of assistance. Although there are no written state guidelines on how to make this determination, as a matter of policy, DOT requires that the tenants provide written documentation and other proof to establish that the tenants maintained separate households within a single residence. While it has never been confronted with a "separate household" claim before, to establish a good claim, DOT suggested that, at a minimum, the claimants would need to have a written lease by each of the tenants reflecting the rental of certain space for a specific amount of rent each week or month, and perhaps written rules regarding the use of the space that tenants must comply with. In addition, the dwelling would have to have separate and exclusive living areas for each tenant, such as separate entrances, kitchens or efficiency areas, that would not cross over into any common areas. Examples of such dwellings would be a boarding room, hotel, adult congregate living facility, duplex, or mother-in-law suite. In this case, there was no written lease agreement by any of the tenants concerning each tenant's respective space since all persons lived rent-free on the premises. There was also no formal agreement or rules governing the use of common living areas by the tenants. While it is true that Bell had a separate entrance to his bedroom, he was allowed to keep food in the same refrigerator used by Petitioners, he occasionally cooked or ate meals on the premises, and he was not prohibited from using other common areas of the home. Given these circumstances, and the lack of any documentation to the contrary, it must be found that all persons occupying the dwelling shared a single- family dwelling and that a separate household did not exist. Petitioners contended that the process was flawed because UFS personnel made only one visit to the premises before making a recommendation in the case. Petitioners were, however, allowed to submit further documentation after that visit to substantiate their claim, and at least one other UFS representative visited the premises on a later date. In addition, a DOT supervisor visited the home and made the final agency decision. Petitioners also suggested that the allocated benefits are insufficient to cover their new rent. But DOT has no discretion except to follow the federal formula in allocating benefits. Petitioners further asserted that the "comparable" property found by DOT to replace the rent-free mobile home was too expensive. Unfortunately, however, this concern is not an issue in this proceeding. Finally, Petitioners pointed out that other displaced persons have experienced difficulty in dealing with UFS personnel. Even if this were true, it would have no bearing on the issues in this case since all UFS determinations are preliminary in nature and subject to DOT review and an evidentiary hearing if requested by the parties.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order denying Petitioners' request for greater relocation benefits, and that it reaffirm the amount previously awarded. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day 16th of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Diedre Grubbs, Agency Clerk Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-00458 Anthony Black Melissa Owen Post Office Box 10868 Brooksville, Florida 34603 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire Department of Transporation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela S. Leslie, Esquire Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact By letter dated May 31, 1979 Respondent notified Petitioner that it was acquiring part of the property on which Petitioner's office was located and that it would be necessary for him to relocate. At the time Petitioner worked as a real estate appraiser in the office of the Pickens Agency owned by Philip Pickens. Pickens provided work space, telephones, secretary, data bank and supplies. The data bank contained data on real property throughout Florida and was invaluable to the appraisers in getting comparables to use for appraising like property. Due to the acquisition of additional property for the U.S. 90 right-of- way, it was necessary to move the two-story building in which Petitioner's office was located. This required moving out of this building into different quarters. In the building Petitioner's office, located on the second floor, comprised approximately 800 square feet in which he had desk, telephone and work space. The data bank was also located on the second floor. Philip Pickens owned another building in the Immediate vicinity into which Petitioner moved. The data bank was left in the original building which was jacked up in preparation for its move. Thee data bank remained available for use albeit less convenient for those using it. Petitioner had less space in the one-story building into which the Pickens Agency moved and Petitioner's office was located near the back door through which clients visited the Pickens Agency. He shared a telephone with another appraiser and had a smaller desk and less work space. He also experienced interruptions from visitors entering the office through the back door which opened into Petitioner's office space. During the two years immediately preceding the relocation of the office, Petitioner's appraisal work was performed exclusively for DOT. Part of this work was assigned him by the Pickens Agency and in some cases he was contacted directly by DOT for the appraisal . When employed directly by DOT, Petitioner received 50 percent of the appraisal fee and the Pickens Agency received 50 percent. When assigned work by the Pickens Agency, Petitioner received 45 percent of the appraisal fee. During the five months following Petitioner's move into the new quarters his income dropped substantially from what it had been before the relocation. Petitioner filed application for relocation benefits as soon as he moved his office and before any change in income occurred. Normally, there is a lag of three to six months between tile Line the appraisal work is done and payment is received. Petitioner's income during the first nine months of 1980 (January - October) we $10,622.97. For similar periods in 1979, 1978, and 1977 his income was $29,750, $26,382.50 and $22.252.50, respectively. Petitioner testified that he believes the loss of income was due to his inability to turn out as much work in the more restricted space and less privacy in the one-story building than he had before the move. Petitioner moved some 30 yards from his original location kept the same mailing address and the same telephone number. During the latter half of 1979 and the first half of 1980, the Lake City District of DOT had fewer relocation claims than in comparable periods of the two previous years. Relocation claims are related to appraisals which would indicate fewer appraisals were ordered by DOT in Lake City in 1979-80 than in the two previous years. During the period in question, most of Petitioner's work for DOT was generated by the Bartow office. This would require most of Petitioner's appraisal time out of Lake City with the use of the office primarily for the preparation of his appraisal report. No evidence was submitted to show the effect, if any, on the Pickens Agency's business resulting from the move or the business done by the other appraisers who also moved. During the period 1977-1980 the Pickens Agency employed between two and five appraisers and at the time of the relocation employed two appraisers, one of whom was petitioner. (Tr. p. 31). The number of appraisers employed varied with the volume of business coming into the agency. The appraisal work done by the Pickens Agency was statewide and not concentrated in the vicinity of Lake City.
The Issue Whether the comparable replacement dwellings used by the Jacksonville Transportation Authority (JTA) in the computation of the replacement housing payment offered to Petitioner were sufficient under the requirements of Title 49 C.F.R., Part 24, as adopted under the Florida Department of Transportation Right of Way Manual (Right of Way Manual), and whether Petitioner's property had water access which could be considered a compensable major exterior attribute of Petitioner's residential dwelling.
Findings Of Fact The JTA is a state-chartered authority which is responsible for providing mass transit and building roads and bridges in Jacksonville, Florida. Petitioner is a commercial fisherman who owned two parcels of land in the eastern part of Jacksonville. He fished the local waters utilizing a boat which he owned. The two parcels of land owned by Petitioner were taken by the JTA under threat of condemnation. The JTA required this land so that it could be used in connection with a road construction project known as the Wonderwood Connector. The two parcels of land were situated adjacent to and on the south side of an unimproved public right-of-way known as Wonderwood Drive. The two parcels of land were internally identified by the JTA as Parcels 400 and 404. Only Parcel 404 is the subject of this case. Parcel 404 had an appraised value of $32,300.00 which the JTA offered to Petitioner for the fee simple title, and which Petitioner accepted. In addition to the value of the fee simple property, Petitioner was also eligible under the applicable statutes and guidelines to an RHP. Petitioner was eligible for a RHP because the cost of comparable replacement housing was in excess of the fair market value of $32,300.00 for Parcel 404. Respondent offered Petitioner an RHP of $35,600.00, which was based on an analysis of three comparable replacement dwellings in accordance with the requirements and procedures of Title 49, C.F.R, Part 24, as adopted by the Right of Way Manual. The JTA uses the Right of Way Manual in its acquisition programs for road, bridge, and highway construction. The comparable replacement dwellings used for computing the RHP were single family houses located 6.5 miles, 7.4 miles, and 6.4 miles from Parcel 404. They were functionally equivalent to Petitioner's displacement dwelling. Additionally, the comparable replacement dwellings used performed the same function, and provide a comparable or better style of living, as the displacement dwelling. The comparable replacement dwellings were reasonably accessible to Petitioner's place of employment. In other words, they were reasonably located near saltwater. Parcel 404 was not adjacent to any body of water. The title to Parcel 404 did reserve to the owner the right to use a platted easement for pedestrian access to Greenfield Creek, which was a saltwater creek. This easement was located south of Wonderwood Drive. This easement was not, by its terms, available for commercial uses and in fact was not used by Petitioner. North of Parcel 404, and slightly to the east, across Wonderwood Drive, Petitioner, prior to his difficulties with the JTA, maintained a floating dock on Greenfield Creek at which he moored his commercial fishing boat. Access to the dock was located on a right-of-way owned by the City of Jacksonville. It was convenient for Petitioner to walk across the road, embark on his boat, and go about his business as a fisherman. Petitioner believed that he had a right to ingress the area of the floating dock and believed he should have been compensated for the loss of this convenience as part of his RHP. The comparable properties used to determine the RHP were not so convenient to saltwater and, had Petitioner lived on any of the properties, he would have found it necessary to pull his boat on a trailer to a public launching ramp in order to conduct his fishing business. Because Petitioner had no right, title, or legal interest in the floating dock or the ground beneath it, the use of the area could not be considered to be a major exterior attribute of Parcel 404. There was no legal connection between Parcel 404 and the city's right-of-way on the saltwater creek, which Petitioner had used for his fishing business.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued denying Petitioner's claim for additional compensation. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas L. Thomas Route 1, Box 223T Nahunta, Georgia 31553 David Cohen, Esquire John C. Sawyer, Jr., Esquire Edwards & Cohen, P.A. 200 North Laura Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by refusing to rent her an apartment because she is legally blind and relies upon a service dog to ambulate independently.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Lourdes Guzman (“Guzman”) is legally blind and relies upon a service dog (also referred to as a guide dog or “seeing eye” dog) to ambulate independently. Respondent Charles Harris (“Harris”) owns an eight-unit apartment building (the “Property”) located in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. Harris, who is retired, holds the Property for investment purposes and lives on the rental income it generates. In or around April of 2002, Harris placed an advertisement in the newspaper seeking a tenant for one his rental units. Guzman saw this ad, was interested, and made an appointment to see the Property. A short time later, Guzman and her live-in boyfriend José Robert (“Robert”) met Harris and Paul Karolyi (“Karolyi”) late one afternoon at the Property. (Karolyi is a tenant of Harris’s who helps out at the Property; Guzman and Robert viewed him as the “building manager,” which was apparently a reasonable perception.) During their conversation, the prospective renters mentioned that they owned a dog. Upon hearing this, Harris explained that he had just finished renovating the advertised unit because the previous tenant’s dog had destroyed the rug and caused other damage to the premises. Thus, Harris told Guzman and Robert, he was not interested in renting this unit to someone with a dog. Robert then informed Harris that: (a) Guzman’s sight was impaired; (b) the dog in question was a service dog; and (c) Harris was legally obligated to let Guzman bring the dog into the unit, should she become Harris’s tenant, as a reasonable accommodation of her handicap. Once he understood the situation, Harris acknowledged that a service dog was different and stated that he would not refuse to rent the unit to someone with a service dog. Accordingly, Harris gave Guzman and Robert a rental application, which Guzman later completed and returned to Harris. After receiving Guzman’s application, Harris checked her references and discovered that Guzman’s two most recent landlords considered her to be a poor tenant. While Guzman disputes the veracity of some of the information that was provided to Harris, at hearing she admitted that much of what he learned was true. The following rental history is based on Guzman’s admissions. Town & Country Apartments. From October 2001 until January 24, 2002, Guzman lived at the Town & Country Apartments in Bay Harbor Islands, Florida. Her landlord was T & C Associates, Ltd. (“T & C”). At least six times during this 16-month period, Guzman failed to timely pay her rent and was required to pay a late fee. She also received at least five statutory “three-day notices” warning that her failure to pay the overdue monthly rent within 72 hours would trigger an eviction proceeding.1 T & C sued to evict Guzman after she failed to pay the rent due for December 2001. Consequently, when Guzman vacated the Town & Country Apartments on January 24, 2002, she did so pursuant to a writ of possession. Guzman claims that she chose to be evicted as an expedient means of breaking her lease with T & C. The Sahara. After being evicted from the Town & Country Apartments, Guzman moved into a unit at the “Sahara”—— which Guzman described at hearing as a “motel”——pursuant to a short-term lease. Guzman’s landlord at the Sahara was Allen L. Kaul (“Kaul”). Guzman lived at the Sahara for about two months.2 Guzman had some sort of dispute with Kaul, and when she moved out of the Sahara she took the keys to the unit she was vacating and the remote control device that opened a gate to the premises; these items were never returned to Kaul. These facts convinced Harris that Guzman was not an acceptable risk. He notified Guzman that he would not rent to her due to her “poor credit history.” Ultimate Factual Determinations Harris rejected Guzman’s rental application, not because of her handicap or service dog, but because he discovered, through a reasonable process of checking references, that Guzman had recently been evicted from one apartment and vacated another under suspicious (or at least questionable) circumstances, taking with her some personal property of the landlord’s that she never returned. There is no credible, competent evidence that Harris rented his apartments to non-handicapped persons having rental histories similar to Guzman’s. Nor does the evidence support a finding that Harris invoked Guzman’s negative rental history (the material aspects of which were undisputed) as a pretext for discrimination. In short, Harris did not discriminate unlawfully against Guzman; rather, he rejected her rental application for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Guzman’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2003.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioners are entitled to replacement housing payments in connection with Respondent's acquisition of their mother's home, at which both Petitioners also reside, and whether Petitioner Pedro Bofill is entitled to business moving expenses for the business that he operates from his mother's former home.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are siblings. By permission of Respondent, Petitioners presently reside in a single-family home at 540 Northwest Boulevard in Miami. Once part of a larger neighborhood, Petitioners' home now stands alone, as the other homes have been cleared in preparation for the construction of improvements to the nearby Dolphin and Palmetto Expressways. Until purchased by Respondent, the home at 540 Northwest Boulevard was owned by Petitioners' mother. For at least 20 years, Petitioner Pedro Bofill (Mr. Bofill) has resided in the home, which was divided so that he could live in one section and operate a small retail perfume business, and his mother and one or two sisters could live in the other section of the home. Petitioner Martha S. Bofill (Ms. Bofill) lived in the home up until the early 1990s, when she moved out after becoming married, but she returned a few years later after a divorce. The side occupied by Mr. Bofill has its own exterior entrance, kitchen, and bathroom, and the side occupied by Petitioners' mother and her two daughters has its own exterior entrance, kitchen, and bathrooms. One of Respondent's agents, an employee of Post, Buckley, Schuh, and Jernigan, Inc. (Post Buckley), first observed the home in 1988, as she was preparing the initial public information campaign for the Palmetto Expressway Improvements Project. Respondent identified nearly 40 residences to be demolished and over 80 families to be displaced by the project. On June 25, 2004, the Post Buckley representative knocked on the door of the residence located at 540 Northwest Boulevard. She was met by Mr. Bofill. The representative explained that Respondent would be purchasing this and surrounding homes and asked if they could speak. During their conversation, the representative told Mr. Bofill that the purpose of her visit was to determine the needs of the persons who would be displaced by the road project. Mr. Bofill informed the representative that the residence comprised two separate dwellings: his and that of his mother and sisters. The Post Buckley representative asked Mr. Bofill to complete a survey, and he agreed to do so. As reflected by the completed survey, which was filled out by the representative, pursuant to Mr. Bofill's responses, and signed by Mr. Bofill, Mr. Bofill stated that he paid $150- $250 monthly in utilities and $1200 monthly in "contract rent." He added that he "wants to move into same setting w/mother and continue to have home office." The Post Buckley representative asked to speak with Mr. Bofill's mother, but she was unprepared to receive a visitor. Mr. Bofill did not offer to take the representative to the other side of the house. However, he provided the information to the representative so she could complete a survey for Mr. Bofill's mother. This survey discloses that Ms. Bofill lives with her mother, the mother is retired, and Ms. Bofill is unemployed, as she is a student. This form indicates that Mr. Bofill pays for the utilities for both sides of the house. From this information, Post Buckley prepared a Needs Assessment Survey Report. This document helped Respondent determine the number of impacted families, the existence of any special needs, and whether sufficient properties in the market were available to accommodate the displaced persons. In September 2004, Post Buckley notified Petitioners' mother of the acquisition and relocation program that was now underway. The notification informs the homeowner of the right to obtain an independent appraisal, at Respondent's expense. On the same date, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioners' mother informing her of the process, including her entitlement to full compensation for the property acquired by Respondent and relocation assistance benefits. Although Petitioners are bilingual, their mother speaks only Spanish. The Post Buckley representative is bilingual, and the two letters sent to Petitioners' mother in September were sent in English and Spanish. By letter dated July 14, 2005 (English only), Respondent conveyed an offer to purchase the fee simple interest in the property owned by Petitioners' mother for $340,000. This is the acquisition payment and does not include relocation assistance, such as a replacement housing payment, which is described in greater detail below. A separate letter in English bearing the same date informed Petitioners' mother of her right to receive a replacement housing payment, if, among other things, "a comparable replacement dwelling costs more than the amount you are paid for your current dwelling." On August 11, 2005, the Post Buckley representative updated the surveys by forwarding them to the attorney of Petitioners' mother, as the attorney had asked the representative not to contact his client. The information did not change from the earlier surveys. On October 6, 2005, the Post Buckley representative and two representatives of Respondent met at the attorney's office with Mr. Bofill's sister. The meeting lasted 30-45 minutes and addressed the special needs of Petitioners' mother, such as that she required an outside walkway to reduce the risk of falling in the yard and needed to live near a hospital due to her age and medical condition. At this point, Post Buckley and Respondent assessed the information available and determined that Respondent should pay a single housing replacement payment to Petitioners' mother and no housing replacement payments to Petitioners. The available information was not limited to Mr. Bofill's survey response concerning his intent to relocate with his mother. Post Buckley and Respondent were aware that Petitioners, as adult children, had lived with their mother for many years, their mother was in poor health and living on a fixed income, Ms. Bofill has not been employed at anytime during this matter, and Mr. Bofill pays all of the utilities at the residence. Concluding from these circumstances that it was unlikely that Petitioners would establish separate residences from their mother, Respondent justifiably interpreted the absence of a request for separate residential housing payments from either Petitioner as evidence that they would continue to live with their aged mother. The decision of Respondent to proceed with a single housing relocation payment was further justified by later events. On November 15, 2005, a representative of Respondent spoke with Mr. Bofill by telephone about the effect of the payment of a separate housing relocation payment to him and his sisters, in terms of reducing the payment to their mother. Mr. Bofill said that he and his sisters would not pursue separate housing relocation payments. On December 1, 2005, Respondent signed a Statement of Eligibility for Supplementary Replacement Housing Payment for Owner (Statement of Eligibility). The Statement of Eligibility states that Petitioners' mother is eligible for a replacement housing payment of $120,000, based on the difference between the $460,000 cost of comparable replacement housing and the $340,000 acquisition price. By letter dated December 16, 2005, Petitioners' mother rejected the comparable replacement housing used in the December 1 letter, noting, among other things, that she lived solely on her Social Security payments of $550 per month and suggesting that comparable replacement housing would need to be in the range of $600,000 to $750,000. The clear implication of this letter, given the disparity between the mother's annual income of about $6000, and the substantial costs of maintaining a house in this price range, in terms of property taxes and utilities, for instance, was that she would continue to receive assistance from her children, who had lived with her, paid some rent, and helped her with the activities of daily living. By Revised Offer and Purchase Agreement, signed by Post Buckley and Petitioners' mother on December 22, 2005, and accepted by Respondent on March 8, 2006, Respondent agreed to acquire the home for $411,400. By Replacement Housing Payment Computation Explanation of the same date, Respondent's Relocation Project Manager stated to Respondent's Relocation Administrator that the home contained only one residential dwelling, the acquisition price would be $411,400, the selection of the proper comparable--with similar square footage and number of rooms to the acquired property--resulted in a replacement housing payment of $123,600, so that Respondent would pay Petitioners' mother an additional $123,600 in the form of a replacement housing payment. Petitioners' mother signed a new Statement of Eligibility--in both English and Spanish--on the same date, reflecting these new figures. The closing eventually took place on March 13, 2006. According to a letter written by Ms. Bofill, in February 2006, she learned that Respondent would pay a single housing relocation payment to her mother. She retained an attorney. Four days prior to the closing, she met with two representatives of Respondent and complained about not receiving any housing relocation payments. At the closing, the attorney sat with Ms. Bofill and her mother and explained each of the documents that she was signing, and at no time did Petitioners' mother indicate an intent not to proceed with a single housing relocation payment, payable to her. Respondent's finding of a single household is probably based on the extent to which Petitioners' mother and Petitioners necessarily pooled their resources to pay for basic necessities. However, the configuration of the home suggests separate households, so this Recommended Order will treat the home as comprising two households (although the ultimate result is the same under either analysis). One household was occupied by Mr. Bofill and the other was occupied by Petitioners' mother and her two daughters. However, neither Petitioner was entitled to a separate replacement housing payment under the present facts. As noted above, Mr. Bofill affirmatively stated his intent to relocate with his mother, and Respondent reasonably inferred the same intent by Ms. Bofill, based on the financial circumstances of her and her mother, their prior history of living together, and Ms. Bofill's failure to take affirmative action to claim a separate housing replacement payment until after the closing, at which Respondent obligated itself to pay a single such payment to Petitioners' mother. For the reasons explained below, Respondent's failure to pay a separate housing relocation payment to Mr. and Ms. Bofill was thus proper.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying the requests of Petitioners for housing relocation payments and business moving expenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: James C. Meyers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Alexis M. Yarbrough, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Stephanie Kopelousos, Interim Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Susan Schwartz Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Martha S. and Pedro Bofill 540 Northwest Boulevard Miami, Florida 33126
