Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Burton B. Griffin, was certified as a law enforcement officer by respondent, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), having been issued law enforcement certificate number 56974 on August 3, 1979. When the events herein occurred, respondent was employed as a police officer with the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office (JSO). This controversy involves charges that respondent (a) unlawfully possessed drug paraphernalia in October 1992, (b) unlawfully possessed a crack pipe in July 1992, and (c) falsified an arrest and booking docket for one Beverly Hay in July 1992. In 1991, respondent was assigned to the Zone 3 Community Problem Response Team (team). The team, which consisted of 6 to 8 officers at any given time, worked the "core city downtown" area, which was the most crime-ridden, dangerous and violent part of the City. As a member of the team, respondent often engaged in the dangerous task of performing undercover narcotics work, which required him to make undercover purchases of drugs from local dealers. Through undercover assignments, he also apprehended local prostitutes. In order to effectively carry out his responsibilities as an undercover agent, respondent was required to wear disguises, which included such "props" as civilian clothes, a beard, and glasses. In addition, respondent would drive an unmarked car and carry a bottle of liquor and crack pipes. The pipes were placed in the ashtray of the car and in his shirt pocket to convince the drug dealer that respondent was a "street person" and not an undercover law enforcement officer. When not being used, the props were kept in a bag in the trunk of the vehicle. On July 13, 1992, respondent and his partner were flagged down by a female prostitute named Beverly Hay on a downtown street. After solicting respondent, Hay was told she would be charged with prostitution, a misdemeanor. She was also in possession of what appeared to be a crack pipe, another misdemeanor. Hay had a previous record of prostitution arrests, and she did not want to be incarcerated for a long period of time. In return for not being arrested, she agreed to act as a confidential informant and make purchases of drugs from various crack houses in the neighborhood. With this information, JSO could then obtain search warrants for each of the illicit houses. After obtaining the approval of his supervisor not to arrest Hay, respondent released Hay but gave her his pager number and instructions to call him as soon as she was ready to make a buy. Respondent kept the crack pipe in his vehicle as leverage to insure that Hay would fulfill her side of the agreement. In other words, if she did not fulfill her part of the agreement, the pipe would then be used as evidence to arrest her for possession of drug paraphanalia at a later date. Before she was released, Hay was told that this would happen. This type of arrangement was not unusual for officers working in undercover narcotics. As of July 16, 1992, Hay had still not provided the agreed upon assistance. That evening, respondent observed Hay in the 700 block of West Monroe Street. After apprehending her, respondent learned that Hay did not intend to provide any assistance. Accordingly, he prepared an arrest and booking report in which he stated that Hay was being arrested for possession of the crack pipe which he had found on her three days earlier. In the "narrative" portion of the report, however, respondent stated that Hay had the pipe in her possession on July 16, rather than the correct day of July 13. The report and crack pipe were filed with the JSO, and Hay served approximately 16 days in jail before being released. Respondent filled out the report in this manner because both he and his partner were unsure how to fill out a "deferred arrest" for a misdemeanor offense. Indeed, while most witnesses in this case were generally familiar with the procedure for a felony deferred arrest, no one had ever made a deferred arrest for a misdemeanor. The report would have been accurate had respondent simply stated that Hay was arrested with the pipe on July 13, released that day on the condition that she would provide information, and after failing to perform under her agreement, she was again arrested on July 16 for the original offense. Respondent candidly acknowledged that in hindsight he was wrong and had used poor judgment in filling out Hay's arrest report in the manner that he did. Even so, there was no intent on his part to intentionally violate any JSO policy, Commission rule or state law. More specifically, he did not intend to falsify an official record as charged in the administrative complaint. Rather, the report was incorrectly prepared due to respondent's lack of knowledge on how to make a deferred misdemeanor arrest. On October 27, 1992, the JSO internal affairs section searched all team vehicles. While searching respondent's vehicle, the section found two crack pipes (and other props) that were used by respondent during his undercover work. Even if the pipes were used as props, under a JSO general order the pipes should have been returned to the property room at the end of each shift. By failing to turn them in, respondent unintentionally violated the JSO policy. In addition, by not turning in the Hay pipe for three days until she was arrested, respondent unintentionally violated the same policy. Respondent had found the two pipes used as props laying on a street during one of his many sweeps of known drug areas. Since they were necessary props for his undercover work, he kept them in a bag with his other props. Although the JSO had an informal policy calling for paraphanalia to be checked out of the property room before each undercover assignment, respondent was unaware of this requirement, and he knew of no other officer who had ever done the same. In addition, respondent believed the items had no intrinsic value, and under another JSO general order, unclaimed property having no intrinsic value did not have to be turned into, or checked out of, the property room. At the same time respondent was using the pipes as props, it was common knowledge among JSO officers that another JSO strike force, with its supervisor's approval, was using similar props without turning them into the property room each day. Therefore, it is found that respondent could have reasonably believed he was not violating any general order by keeping his props in a bag in the trunk of his vehicle. In any event, there is no suggestion, or even a hint, that the three pipes were used for any purpose other than official police business. For violating a general order pertaining to "Competency and the Handling of Evidence," respondent received a written reprimand and a limited suspension of sixty working days in 1993. The JSO did not sustain the allegations pertaining to unlawful possession of contraband and falsifying a report. Under Rule 11B-27.003(2), Florida Administrative Code, the employing agency (JSO) is required to forward to the Commission a completed form reflecting only those violations that are sustained. For reasons unknown, in the form filed with the Commission, the JSO internal affairs section incorrectly recited that all allegations had been sustained. Thereafter, the Commission issued an administrative complaint, as amended, seeking disciplinary action against respondent's law enforcement certification for the unsustained allegations. Except for the discipline meted out by JSO in 1993, respondent has had an exemplary career as a law enforcement officer, having served with various departments since 1979. He has continued his employment with the JSO since this incident and is now in a position of special trust as an evidence technician. At hearing, his superiors lauded his integrity, honesty, work ethic and dedication as a police officer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner enter a Final Order dismissing the administrative complaint, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-2909 Petitioner: 1-3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 9-13. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Rejected as being unnecessary. Rejected as recitation of testimony. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 18-24. Rejected as recitation of testimony. 25. Rejected as being irrelevant. 26-27. Rejected as being recitation of testimony. 28-29. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Covered in preliminary statement. Rejected as being unnecessary. 33 Rejected as being irrelevant. 34-49. Rejected as being recitation of testimony. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Rejected as being recitation of testimony. Respondent: Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4-7. Rejected as being unnecessary. 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 9-10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 12-14. Partially accepted in findings of fact 12 and 13. 15-16. Partially accepted in findings of fact 13. 17. Rejected as being unnecessary. 18-29. Partially accepted in findings of fact 5-11. 30-34. Partially accepted in findings of fact 15 and 16. 35. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 36-42. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. Note - Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, not supported by the evidence, cumulative or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Pauline M. Ingraham-Drayton, Esquire 711-B Liberty Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202-2715 T. A. Delegal, III, Esquire 5530 Beach Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 A. Leon Lowry, II, Executive Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael R. Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489
The Issue Whether it is in the public interest to place Petitioners, Booz-Allen and Hamilton, Inc., on the State of Florida Convicted Vendor List maintained by Respondent, State of Florida Department of Management Services (the Department) Section 287.133, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the facts, as follows: On August 19, 1993, Petitioner was convicted of the commission of a public entity crime as defined within subsection 287.133(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Petitioner pled guilty in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina to two counts of filing false claims in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 287. The conviction related to time charging irregularities on two subcontracts to the United States Environmental Protection Agency. On February 25, 1994, Petitioner properly reported this conviction in its proposal to the Lee County Board of Commissioners. At the time the plea was entered, Petitioner paid to the United States $1,638,000. This included a $1,000,000 criminal fine, and $488,000 in civil damages, and $150,000 to reimburse EPA’s Office of the Inspector General for the costs of the investigation. The government estimated that the amount of improper charges was approximately $200,000. Petitioner’s cooperation with the EPA included voluntarily providing a wide array of information to EPA. Employees from Petitioner’s Finance and Contracts Department met with EPA investigators and auditors to explain Petitioner’s accounting system. Petitioner assisted EPA by making employees available for interviews. Petitioner voluntarily provided documents and other information to EPA. Petitioner fully cooperated with the Department of Management Services in connection with its investigation initiated pursuant to Section 287.133, Florida Statutes. Petitioner provided information as requested. No other persons or affiliates were charged with public entity crimes in relation to these matters. As a responsible government contractor, Petitioner has taken steps to prevent actions like those that formed the basis for its guilty plea from recurring. These steps and the ethical history of the company are listed in the stipulation and settlement agreement attached as Appendix A and are incorporated herein. Petitioner properly reported its plea to the Lee County Board of Commissioners and provided additional, extensive information concerning its guilty plea and related matters to the Respondent on April 5, 1994 and June 23, 1995. Petitioner’s presence in the market adds to competition in Florida markets for the transportation and consulting in solving state/public sector problems and in implementing their solutions. Petitioner’s commercial freight practice is the foremost management consultant to port authorities in the United States. Petitioner’s depth of knowledge and understanding of port operations, management, and planning have made Petitioner the consultant of choice to port authorities throughout the country. Specific projects are outlined in the stipulation and settlement agreement and are incorporated herein. In addition, Petitioner, due to its over 80 years of experience in both public and private sector (including Florida), can provide a broad perspective on solving state/public sector problems and in implementing their solutions in areas including law enforcement, systems integration and health care. Petitioner has a long history of providing service to the communities in which it works. Again specific instances of community service are referenced in the stipulation and settlement agreement and are incorporated herein.
The Issue Whether the Agency for Persons with Disabilities abused its discretion when denying Petitioner’s request for exemption from being disqualified to work in a position of special trust.
Findings Of Fact Disqualifying Offenses As noted above, the Department of Children and Families, by correspondence dated July 5, 2018, informed Petitioner that his background check revealed two disqualifying offenses. The first offense is described by the Department as “04/25/2014 PINELLAS PARK POLICE DEPARTMENT, LARCENY,” and the second is described as “08/30/2005 ST. PETERSBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT, BATTERY DOM-VIOL.” As an initial matter, the August 2005 offense does not disqualify Petitioner from working in a position of special trust. Specifically, on August 30, 2005, Petitioner was arrested, and charged with misdemeanor battery in violation of section 784.03, Florida Statutes (2005), which is a disqualifying offense. Petitioner’s arrest occurred as a result of a physical altercation with his brother, who was a minor when the alleged offense occurred. According to the case summary sheet (Resp. Ex. 2, p. 99), on April 13, 2006, the charge was reduced to the “lesser included misdemeanor [of] disorderly conduct,” to which Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere. On or about May 17, 2006, Petitioner was “adjudicated guilty” of disorderly conduct in violation of section 509.143, Florida Statutes (2005). A violation of section 509.143 is not a disqualifying offense under any of the controlling statutes. On April 25, 2014, Petitioner was arrested and charged with violating section 812.014(2)(c)1., Florida Statutes (2013). This section provides, in part, that “[i]t is grand theft of the third degree and a felony of the third degree … if the property stolen is … [v]alued at $300 or more, but less than $5,000.” On May 28, 2014, Petitioner was found guilty of the offense as charged (adjudication of guilty withheld), and ordered to serve 18 months of probation which included restitution of $75.00 to the victim. According to Petitioner, this offense occurred when he stole cellphones from a Metro PCS store. Non-disqualifying Offenses On August 20, 2018, Petitioner was cited for multiple traffic violations. According to the arrest affidavit, the following events occurred: A stop was initiated on the Defendant’s vehicle for failure to stop at a steady red signal. Upon initiating a stop utilizing emergency lights and sirens, the defendant failed to stop for the emergency vehicle. He continued 3 blocks to the Choice gas station located at 3401 5th Ave., S. Upon making contact, Defendant was identified by FL DL and confirmed via David as being suspended on 8/13/2018 with notice provided on 8/9/2018 for failure to pay a traffic penalty. David also confirmed 4 prior DWLS/R convictions and previously listed as a habitual traffic offender. Petitioner was cited for felony “driving while license suspended or revoked, fleeing and eluding police officer, [and] possession of marijuana.” On October 9, 2018, the State Attorney administratively closed the “marijuana and fleeing” charges, and on October 11, 2018, reduced the felony “driving while license suspended or revoked” charge to a misdemeanor. On November 14, 2018, the Court (Judge Dittmer) accepted Petitioner’s guilty plea, and adjudicated him guilty of the misdemeanor offense of “driving while license suspended or revoked.” See Resp. Ex. 2, p. 253 and 255. While the charges referenced in the previous paragraph were pending, Petitioner, on October 6, 2018, was stopped by the police, and again cited for the felony offense of “driving while license suspended or revoked.” Unlike before, there was no reduction in this charge, and on November 14, 2018, Petitioner entered a plea to the charged offense, and was adjudicated guilty (Judge Quesada) of the third-degree felony of “Driving While License Revoked (Felony-Habitual).” See Resp. Ex. 2, p. 260-265. General Background Information Petitioner is enrolled as a student, and is working towards earning his associate of arts degree. Petitioner has a sporadic work history, and during the last few years has subsisted primarily on student loans. Petitioner testified that he regularly attends church. He is not involved in any community activities, nor has he received any special recognition or awards since his conviction for the disqualifying offense. From approximately October 2016 through June 2020, Petitioner worked at several institutional facilities that offer services to vulnerable adults. During this timeframe, Petitioner was investigated five times for possible mistreatment of vulnerable individuals, with each investigation dismissed as unsubstantiated.1
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Clifford Pennywell Apartment B3 5295 59th Circle West Kenneth City, Florida 33709 Trevor S. Suter, Esquire Agency for Persons With Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Francis Carbone, General Counsel Agency for Persons With Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Radhika Puri, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 309 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Danielle Thompson Senior Attorney/Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 309 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Barbara Palmer, Director Agency for Persons With Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Clifford Rocha was, at all times material to this proceeding, employed as a security officer by Dade Federal Security. He was hired on October 16, 1989, and worked for Dade Federal Security on a part-time basis until sometime after the incident from which this proceeding arises. As a general rule, all employees of Dade Federal Security, as part of the company's policy and procedures, are required to sign a copy of the written rules applicable to the security officer job in the presence of their supervisor to acknowledge they have read them. As part of that procedure each employee receives a copy of the rules. Usually this happens at time of hire. The written work rules include the following statement: "Any employee who abandons his or her assignment location without advising his or her supervisor and the company will be determined to be terminated on the spot." Aleli Puig, the owner and manager of Dade Federal Security, did not remember ever discussing the work rules with Mr. Rocha and could not remember ever telling Mr. Rocha that he was never to leave his post. As a general rule, security officers employed by Dade Federal Security are instructed that when they see a crime committed in their presence to first call 911 and then to call Dade Federal Security and ask for a supervisor. The owner and manager of Dade Federal Security in her thirteen years in the security industry has never told her security officer employees that they were to leave their posts to chase down a suspected criminal. The written rules described above were first placed in effect at some time after the Respondent was hired. There is no persuasive evidence in this case that the Respondent was ever provided a copy of the written rules. Similarly, there is no persuasive evidence that the Respondent was otherwise advised about any of the work rules mentioned above. 6/ On December 16, 1992, the Respondent was assigned to work as a security officer at a shopping center located near the intersection of Bird Road (which is also Southwest 42nd Street) and 128th Avenue. While on duty in that capacity in the early morning hours, the Respondent observed two suspects who appeared to have stolen a six-pack of beer from a convenience store located in the shopping mall where the Respondent was working. The two suspects left the shopping mall in an automobile. The Respondent followed the two suspects in his own automobile, on which he had placed a flashing yellow light. Approximately 20 blocks from the shopping mall there was an automobile accident involving the Respondent's automobile and the automobile containing the two suspects. 7/ Shortly thereafter, the police were called and the two suspects were arrested. The office of Dade Federal Security was also called and Gangerico Cruz, who was the Respondent's supervisor, went to the scene of the accident. At the scene of the accident Supervisor Cruz spoke with the Respondent about what had happened. Among other things, the Respondent told his supervisor that he was pleased that he had been able to detain the suspects. Later when the Respondent spoke to the owner of Dade Federal Security he told the owner she should be proud of him for detaining the suspects. The Respondent suffered a broken leg in the automobile accident and was unable to work for an unspecified period of time. After his leg healed the Respondent continued to work for Dade Federal Security for an unspecified period of time. His employment was eventually terminated as a result of a later incident during which he was accused of sleeping while on duty.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case dismissing all charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of March 1995 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March 1995.
Findings Of Fact On March 22, 1995, Southern was convicted of the commission of a public-entity crime, as defined within Subsection 287.133(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Southern pled guilty to one count of 18 U.S.C., Section 371, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, in the United States Court for the Middle District of Florida. Pursuant to Subsections 287.133(3)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, Southern made timely notification to DMS and provided details of the convictions. On September 20, 1995, DMS issued a notice of intent, pursuant to Subsection 287.133(3)(e)1., Florida Statutes. On October 3, 1995, pursuant to Subsection 287.133(3)(e)2., Florida Statutes, Southern timely filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing to determine whether it is in the public interest for Southern to be placed on the State of Florida Convicted Vendor List. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3., Florida Statutes, establishes factors which, if applicable to a convicted vendor, will mitigate against placement of that vendor upon the Convicted Vendor List. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.d., Florida Statutes, establishes "[p]rompt or voluntary payment of any damages or penalty as a result of the conviction" as a factor mitigating against placement on the Convicted Vendor List. Southern paid restitution, fines and court costs totaling $30,193.00. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.e., Florida Statutes, establishes "[c]ooperation with state or federal investigation or prosecution of any public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. According to Ernest F. Peluso, Assistant United States Attorney, since early in 1994, George Peterson, President of Southern, provided active, accurate and meaningful support to the federal investigation. Mr. Peterson willingly provided documents, records and statements to illuminate the extent of the conspiratorial plan. Mr. Peterson fully cooperated with DMS in connection with its investigation initiated pursuant to Section 287.133, Florida Statutes. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.f., Florida Statutes, establishes "[d]isassociation from any other persons or affiliates convicted of the public entity crime" as a mitigating factor. This subsection is not applicable. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.g., Florida Statutes, establishes "[p]rior or future self-policing by the person or Florida affiliate to prevent public entity crimes" as a mitigating factor. Southern retained Michael N. Kavouklis, Esquire, to act as an ombudsman or clearinghouse for the receipt of information pertaining to any wrongdoing involving the solicitation of compensation or gratuities to customers. Each employee has received a copy of a notice directing them to report such actions to Mr. Kavouklis. The notice has also been posted in the work place as a reminder. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.h., Florida Statutes, establishes "[r]einstatement or clemency in any jurisdiction in relation to the public entity crime at issue in the proceeding" as a mitigating factor. Southern was not debarred from contracting with any governmental entity. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.i., Florida Statutes, establishes "[c]ompliance by the person or affiliate with the notification provisions of paragraph (a) or paragraph (b)" as a mitigating factor. Southern provided notice of the public entity crime violation by letter on February 17, 1995. This occurred before its conviction on March 22, 1995. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.j., Florida Statutes, establishes "[t]he needs of public entities for additional competition in the procurement of goods and services in their respective markets" as a mitigating factor. Public entities have a frequent and continuing need for roofing services. Subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.k., Florida Statutes, establishes "any demonstration of good citizenship" as a mitigating factor. Southern provided numerous documents detailing its involvement in numerous community and charitable activities. This Joint Stipulation provides a full and complete factual basis for determining whether Southern should be placed on the Convicted Vendor List. In light of the facts and criteria set forth in subsection 287.133(3)(e)3.a.-k., Florida Statutes, there are no disputes issues of material fact between DMS and Southern which would require a formal hearing. Both parties concur that it is not in the public interest to list Southern on the Convicted Vendor List, pursuant to Section 287.133, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Charles P. Williams, was a counselor at South Miami Heights Elementary School (SMHES) in Miami, Florida. He was under a continuing contract with petitioner, School Board of Dade County (Board). Respondent has been a teacher or counselor in the school system since 1967. On August 19, 1987 the Board voted to dismiss Williams without pay effective that date for "immorality and misconduct in office." The action stemmed from respondent being arrested in May, 1987 and charged with possession of cocaine, a felony. A Notice of Specific Charges was later issued on November 30, 1987 setting forth the charges in greater detail. On the evening of Friday, May 22, 1987 the City of Miami Police Department assigned a special task force unit known as the Street Narcotics Unit (SNU) to conduct a reverse sting operation in an area of the city where narcotics were being sold. In such an operation, the police officers became the sellers of drugs and then arrested their customers. On this day, SNU selected the area around 15th Avenue and 68th Street, a "known narcotic area" of the city. The officers took over the complete block and "moved out" all known sellers and lookouts. The officers wore baggy street clothes and were given cocaine rock, powder cocaine and marijuana to sell to buyers. They also carried weapons and a badge, both hidden. One officer was Sharon Troy who was assigned the job of "selling" drugs on the east side of 15th Avenue and 68th Street. Officer Troy is an experienced officer who has participated in some ten to fifteen sting operations and has made approximately 150 to 200 arrests. Around 10:58 p.m. that evening, Officer Troy was approached by respondent who happened to be in the neighborhood. Williams asked Troy where he could find some narcotics. She replied, "Well, what do you want?" Williams said "cocaine." When offered a choice between rock and powder cocaine, Williams chose "rock." Officer Troy then sold him two "rocks" for $20 cash. After the exchange of money and drugs took place, Officer Troy identified herself as a police officer and arrested Williams. She immediately placed the $20 cash and the two rocks in an empty pocket. Williams was escorted by Officer Troy and another officer to a nearby apartment complex that had been converted into a temporary holding area. At the holding area, Officer Troy elicited certain information from Williams and filled out an arrest affidavit received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 4. The money and drugs were placed in an envelope, the envelope was sealed with tape, and Officer Troy placed her name, the contents and the arrestee's name on the outside of the envelope. The envelope was then placed in an evidence box which was carried to the property unit of the Police Department. Williams was transported from the holding area to the Metro-Dade jail where he was fingerprinted, photographed and placed in a small cell with approximately twenty to thirty other arrestees. He remained there until Monday morning. After the evidence was taken to the property unit, Officer Troy retrieved the envelope, broke the seal and placed the money and drugs into two separate envelopes. The envelopes were resealed with evidence tape and given to the property specialist who placed them in the vault. The sealed envelope with the drug was not broken until the contraband was hand- delivered to the Metro- Dade laboratory on September 9, 1987. There, a Metro-Dade criminalist tested the substance and determined the rocks contained 0.2 grams of cocaine, a controlled substance. The envelope was resealed and remained in that posture until final hearing. The seal on the money bag was not broken until the bag was opened in the undersigned's presence at final hearing. Therefore, it is found that the chain of custody was not broken between the time of the arrest and the submission into evidence of the money and drugs. A few days after respondent's arrest, a Metro-Dade social worker heard a radio news report on a Spanish radio station, WQBA, concerning the arrest of an unnamed SMHES counselor. At SMHES, a few secretaries made comments about respondent's arrest and most of the faculty asked the principal about the matter. There was no television or newspaper commentary on the arrest nor was there any indication that students, parents or other community members were aware of the same. According to Dr. D. Patrick Gray, who has been accepted as an expert in the area of ethics and professional standards for educators, respondent's effectiveness as a counselor and employee of the Board has been seriously impaired by virtue of his arrest for possession of cocaine. This opinion was echoed by the school principal. It was also Dr. Gray's opinion that respondent has violated the standards of ethical conduct of the teaching profession. More specifically, Dr. Gray opined that Williams failed to maintain the respect and confidence of his colleagues, students, parents and other community members. Both at hearing and at a conference for the record, respondent denied that he purchased the drugs. Instead, he maintained that he was in the neighborhood that evening searching for a funeral home to ascertain the time of a family friend's funeral to be held on Saturday, May 23. According to Williams, Officer Troy approached him and, after asking what he was doing, without any cause handcuffed and arrested him for purchasing cocaine. Although there are two funeral homes within a few blocks of where Williams was arrested, his story is not deemed to be credible and is accordingly discredited. Williams received a satisfactory evaluation at SMHES for school year 1986-87. He was the school's only full-time counselor and worked with troubled students. Ironically, he was in charge of the school's "say no to drugs" program and the youth crime watch" program. His principal described him as having done a good job at school and characterized his work as "very satisfactory." There is no evidence of any prior disciplinary action against the licensee. Williams stated he loves the teaching profession and desires to continue teaching. He has successfully completed a court imposed "Self-help Program" which required, among other things, that respondent submit himself to a weekly test for drugs. After completion of the program, the court withheld adjudication of guilt and authorized the expunction and sealing of respondent's criminal record. Williams has taught for some twenty years, and during his recent suspension, has taken additional college course work to sharpen his education skills.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of immorality and that he be suspended from his position for two years, said suspension to be retroactive to August 19, 1987. The remaining charge should be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 14th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 1988.
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint dated June 18, 1996, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission is the state agency responsible for certifying and revoking the certification of law enforcement officers. Section 943.12(3), Florida Statutes (1997). Ms. Gilbert was certified by the Commission as a law enforcement officer on March 12, 1993, and was issued Law Enforcement Certificate No. 136544. On July 1, 1994, Ms. Gilbert was employed as a sworn law enforcement officer by the Metro-Dade Police Department. On July 1, 1994, Officer William Romero was employed by the Metro-Dade Police Department as a law enforcement officer. He was first employed on March 29, 1993, and was still on probation on July 1, 1994. He was working as a uniform patrol officer, and, at the time of the incident in question, he was working alone. On the evening of July 1, 1994, a black female flagged down Officer Romero while he was patrolling the neighborhood. When Officer Romero stopped, she told him that an elderly, Hispanic male was in the vicinity armed with a handgun. Officer Romero promptly confronted the person pointed out by the black female and told him to turn around. When the man did so, Officer Romero saw a revolver sticking out from the waistband of the man's trousers. Although the gun was not in the man's hand at the time, Officer Romero immediately drew his firearm and told the man to put his hands up. The man did not respond but continued to talk with very slurred speech, and he appeared intoxicated to Officer Romero. After a few moments, the man grabbed the revolver in his waistband, but it stuck, and he was not able to remove it. Officer Romero overpowered the man, and they fell to the ground and wrestled. Officer Romero was able to remove the gun from the man's waistband, and he threw it onto a nearby grassy area. Officer Romero handcuffed the man and picked up the gun. He opened the cylinder of the revolver and saw that there were no bullets in the cylinder. Officer Romero took the gun back to his patrol car, and put the suspect in the car as well. Officer Romero then called fire rescue because the man was elderly and intoxicated, and Officer Romero was concerned because they had wrestled for what seemed like several minutes. Officer Romero did not speak with the black female who had flagged him down after she initially told him about the man with the gun, nor did he interview any other persons in the area. Lieutenant Kevin Lindahl arrived on the scene immediately after Officer Romero placed the suspect in the patrol car. Officer Romero explained the situation to Lieutenant Lindahl, showed him the suspect's handgun, and specifically told him that the gun was unloaded during his altercation with the suspect. When he showed the gun to Lieutenant Lindahl, the cylinder was open, and it was obvious that there were no bullets in the gun. Lieutenant Lindahl left the scene a short time after he arrived. As Lieutenant Lindahl was leaving the scene, then- Officer Gilbert and Officer Willie McFadden arrived. These officers were the primary unit assigned to the call. At the time of the July 1, 1994, incident, Officer McFadden was on probation as a new law enforcement officer, and Officer Gilbert had recently completed her probation. They were assigned to the same squad but were not routinely assigned to work together. When they arrived at the scene, both Officer McFadden and Officer Gilbert approached Officer Romero as he sat on the driver's side of his patrol car. Officer Romero told them what happened after he was flagged down; Officer Gilbert and Officer McFadden were both privy to Officer Romero's remarks.2 Officer Romero gave the suspect's revolver either to Officer McFadden or to Officer Gilbert. Officer McFadden asked Officer Romero whether the gun was loaded. Officer Romero responded that the gun was not loaded, and Officer McFadden examined the gun and confirmed that the cylinder was open and that there were no bullets in the cylinder. Both Officer Gilbert and Officer McFadden understood Officer Romero's statement that the gun was not loaded to refer to the time during which Officer Romero and the suspect struggled over possession of the gun, when Officer Romero took the gun from the suspect. Officer Romero turned the suspect over to Officer Gilbert and Officer McFadden and then left the scene. Officer Romero sought out and spoke with his acting sergeant, Officer Sandra Leon. He told her about the incident and advised her that Lieutenant Lindahl had appeared at the scene. During this conversation, Officer Romero told Officer Leon that there were no bullets in the gun. It was important to him because he was a rookie police officer and the July 1 incident was the first time he had confronted an armed suspect; he was nervous because he almost shot the suspect. Officer McFadden spoke with several witnesses at the scene who told him that the suspect's revolver had been loaded at some point during the afternoon and that the bullets had been removed from the gun. He was also told that the suspect had put the gun to someone's head and pulled the trigger twice but that the gun did not discharge. Officer McFadden "asked around for the bullets; no one could give me the bullets. And I immediately said then the gun is unloaded, we can't find any bullets."3 None of the witnesses Officer McFadden interviewed told him that the suspect had discharged the gun before Officer Romero arrived. Officer McFadden did not interview witnesses in the house in front of which the altercation took place. Rather, he stayed with the suspect while Officer Gilbert went into the house and spoke with several witnesses. She was told by Brenda Smith, the woman who had flagged down Officer Romero, that, earlier in the afternoon, the suspect had discharged the firearm into the air outside the house. Ms. Smith also told Officer Gilbert that the suspect entered the house after discharging the gun, pointed the gun at her and another person in the house, and pulled the trigger twice; the gun did not fire but just clicked when the hammer fell. Officer McFadden and Officer Gilbert stayed at the scene about 30 or 40 minutes. They discussed the offenses with which to charge the suspect and began preparing the required paperwork, which consisted of the arrest affidavit, the offense/incident report, and the property receipt. During the discussion at the scene, Officer McFadden raised the possibility of charging the suspect with the offense of "using a firearm while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, chemical substances, or controlled substances" (hereinafter "using a firearm while under the influence"), a crime defined in Section 790.151, Florida Statutes (1993), and identified as a first degree misdemeanor. Officer McFadden looked up the offense in the police manual setting forth crimes and their elements.4 The focus of discussion between Officer Gilbert and Officer McFadden was the statutory requirement that the firearm be loaded; they did not discuss whether the charge was appropriate in light of the fact that the offense was a misdemeanor. Officer McFadden and Officer Gilbert continued discussing the offense of using a firearm while under the influence as they drove the suspect to the Dade County Jail and as they completed the arrest affidavit, which they did while sitting in the patrol car in the jail parking lot. Officer Gilbert told Officer McFadden during this discussion that a witness had told her that the suspect had discharged the gun earlier in the afternoon, before Officer Romero arrived on the scene. Officer Gilbert believed that it was appropriate to charge the suspect with this offense because he was intoxicated and because she had been told that the gun had been discharged during the afternoon. Since she had been told that the gun had been discharged, Officer Gilbert reasoned that the gun had been loaded at some point during the afternoon, a fact which was corroborated by the witness statement given to Officer McFadden. Officer Gilbert and Officer McFadden agreed to charge the suspect with the offense of using a firearm while under the influence.5 Officer Gilbert filled out the arrest affidavit in the jail parking lot, in Officer McFadden's presence. She included the charge of using a firearm while under the influence, and she inserted the phrase "since the gun was loaded" into the narrative portion of the arrest affidavit, squeezing it in at the end of one line of printing as she was editing and completing the affidavit. As revised, the narrative in the completed arrest affidavit contains the following sentence: "V-01 advised that he and V-02 was in fear of their life being taken [when the suspect pointed the gun at them and pulled the trigger] since the weapon was loaded." Officer Gilbert did not mention in the arrest affidavit narrative that the witness Brenda Smith had told her that the suspect had discharged the revolver earlier in the afternoon. Before they left the patrol car, Officer Gilbert and Officer McFadden signed both pages of the affidavit, attesting by their signatures that "I swear that the above Statement is correct and true to the best of my knowledge and belief."6 The offenses set forth in the arrest affidavit when Officer Gilbert and Officer McFadden signed it in the parking lot of the jail were aggravated assault, discharging a firearm in public,7 carrying a concealed firearm, resisting arrest, and using a firearm while under the influence. Probable cause existed to arrest the suspect regardless of whether the offense of using a firearm while under the influence was properly charged. Although Officer McFadden had searched the suspect at the scene, he was searched again by the corrections officers at the jail. This search produced a knife and six bullets, which were found in the suspect's clothing. Officer Gilbert was told that these items were on the suspect's person, and, based on the information that the suspect was carrying a knife, she added to the arrest affidavit the charge of carrying a concealed weapon. Officer McFadden was aware that Officer Gilbert added the concealed weapon charge, which he considered an appropriate charge under the circumstances. The arrest affidavit was turned in at the jail. Officer McFadden completed the first page of the required offense/incident report at the station, after he and Officer Gilbert left the suspect at the jail.8 He included the charge of using a firearm while under the influence, and he cited the charge to Section 790.151, Florida Statutes. Officer McFadden claimed that he was not aware that he had included that offense in the report, that he was simply copying the information from the arrest affidavit completed by Officer Gilbert without thinking about what he was writing.9 At some point, Officer McFadden stopped working on the offense/incident report and began completing the property report. While Officer McFadden was preparing the property report, Officer Gilbert completed the narrative portion of the offense/incident report. Although Brenda Smith was listed in the report as a witness, Officer Gilbert did not mention in the narrative that Ms. Smith had reported that the suspect had discharged the gun during the afternoon, nor did she include in this narrative any statement regarding whether the gun was loaded or unloaded. Officer Gilbert cannot explain these omissions. As acting sergeant and the supervisor of Officer McFadden and Officer Gilbert on July 1, 1994, Officer Sandra Leon was responsible for reviewing the offense/incident report at issue in this proceeding and ensuring that all of the information provided was complete and correct. Officer Leon reviewed the offense/incident report on the evening of July 1, 1994, and she noticed that the offense of using a firearm while intoxicated was included in the report. She was not familiar with this offense, so she looked up the statute defining the offense. She noted that an element of the offense was that the firearm be loaded, and she remembered that Officer Romero had told her that the gun was not loaded when he struggled with the suspect. Nonetheless, without speaking with either Officer McFadden or Officer Gilbert, Officer Leon signed the offense/incident report and forwarded it through channels pursuant to the usual procedures. At the time she signed the report, Officer Leon knew that the narrative did not include all of the elements of the offense of using a firearm while under the influence, and she recalled that Officer Romero had told her that the gun was not loaded at the time he arrested the suspect. The next day, in a brief encounter, Officer Leon "casually" asked Officer Gilbert whether the gun was loaded.10 According to Officer Leon, Officer Gilbert responded affirmatively, and Officer Leon did not pursue the matter any further with Officer Gilbert. Officer Leon and Officer Gilbert did not engage in a conversation regarding the offense/incident report, and Officer Leon asked Officer Gilbert only the one question. Shortly after she spoke with Officer Gilbert, Officer Leon spoke with Officer McFadden about the condition of the gun because he had also signed the offense/incident report. According to Officer Leon, Officer McFadden appeared "visibly upset" during this conversation, and Officer Leon attributed this to the fact that, because he had signed the offense/incident report, he and Officer Gilbert were "equally at fault."11 Officer McFadden told Officer Leon that the gun was not loaded. Finally, Officer Leon spoke again with Officer Romero, who confirmed that the gun was not loaded when he took it from the suspect. Four or five days later, Officer Leon brought the matter to the attention of Lieutenant Lindahl, who had taken several days off from work after the July 1 incident. Officer Leon went to Lieutenant Lindahl because, even though she had signed and submitted the offense/incident report, she was concerned that there was a problem with charging the suspect with the offense of using a firearm while under the influence. Officer Leon told Lieutenant Lindahl that she had asked Officer Gilbert about the condition of the gun and that Officer Gilbert told her that it was loaded. Lieutenant Lindahl then had a copy of the arrest affidavit sent to his office via facsimile.12 Lieutenant Lindahl reviewed the arrest affidavit and questioned Officer Romero and Officer McFadden about the condition of the gun. Officer Romero reiterated his story that the gun was not loaded when he took it from the suspect. Officer McFadden told Lieutenant Lindahl that he had told Officer Gilbert repeatedly that the charge of using a firearm while under the influence was improper because the gun was not loaded, but he did not tell Lieutenant Lindahl that Officer Gilbert had told him that a witness reported that the suspect had discharged the gun before Officer Romero arrived at the scene. Lieutenant Lindahl did not ask Officer Gilbert why the charge of using a firearm while under the influence was included on the arrest affidavit and in the offense/incident report. Rather, he decided it was appropriate to refer the matter to the police department's internal affairs section, and he promptly filed a complaint against Officer Gilbert.13 Lieutenant Lindahl based his decision to file the complaint against Officer Gilbert on the statements of Officer Romero and of Officer McFadden. Lieutenant Lindahl concluded that Officer Gilbert included the charge of using a firearm while under the influence in the arrest affidavit even though she knew that the gun was not loaded and that this was an essential element of the offense. Lieutenant Lindahl testified that, if the gun had in fact been discharged, the charge of using a firearm while under the influence "would have been appropriate."14 Lieutenant Lindahl did not speak with Officer Gilbert after he filed the complaint because she was the subject of an internal affairs investigation, and it would have been improper for him to interfere in the investigation by talking with her. It is not unusual for arresting officers to charge a suspect with an offense when all of the elements of the offense are not present. If a charge included in an arrest affidavit is not appropriate, the responsible police officers bring it to the attention of the assistant state attorney handling the case, who sees that the unsupported charge is stricken from the arrest affidavit. When Officer McFadden and Officer Gilbert met with the assistant state attorney at what is called the "prefile conference" to discuss the arrest on July 1, 1994, they asked the assistant state attorney whether, in his opinion, the charge of using a firearm while under the influence should be stricken from the arrest affidavit because the gun was not loaded. The assistant state attorney reviewed the statute and concluded that the charge should be dropped. On October 20, 1994, Officer Gilbert gave a sworn statement to the internal affairs investigator for the Metro-Dade Police Department. In that statement, Officer Gilbert testified that she overheard Officer Romero state that the gun was unloaded at the time of the altercation; that she and Officer McFadden agreed to charge the suspect with using a firearm while under the influence; that the charge and the phrase "since the gun was loaded" were on the arrest affidavit before Officer McFadden signed the affidavit; and that she never spoke with Officer Leon about the offense/incident report. The evidence presented by the Commission is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Gilbert knowingly made a false statement that was intended to mislead when she included in the arrest affidavit the offense of using a firearm while under the influence and inserted in the affidavit the phrase "since the gun was loaded." Rather, based upon the consideration of all of the evidence presented herein and upon the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the persuasive evidence supports the finding that Ms. Gilbert acted in good faith when she included the charge and the phrase "since the gun was loaded" in the arrest affidavit. It was Officer Gilbert's understanding from the statement of Brenda Smith that the suspect had discharged his gun prior to the arrival of Officer Romero and that the suspect was intoxicated when he did so, and Officer McFadden agreed with Ms. Gilbert that the offense of using a firearm while under the influence could appropriately be charged.15 In any event, Ms. Gilbert's use of the phrase "since the gun was loaded" in the arrest affidavit was, under the circumstances, ambiguous. Pursuant to her testimony, which is credited, Officer Gilbert assumed that, because the suspect discharged the gun, the gun had, at some point, been loaded; Officer Leon and Lieutenant Lindahl assumed that the phrase referred to the time period in which the suspect was involved in the altercation with Officer Romero. The first opportunity Officer Gilbert was given to explain what she meant by the phrase was in the sworn statement she gave on October 20, 1994. The evidence presented by the Commission is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Ms. Gilbert gave false statements, which she did not believe to be true, in her sworn statement given on October 20, 1994, to the Metro-Dade Police Department's internal affairs investigator. First, the conflicts in the testimony of Officer McFadden and Ms. Gilbert have been resolved on the basis of the evidence presented herein, and the persuasive evidence supports the finding that Ms. Gilbert did not make a false statement under oath when she stated that Officer McFadden signed the arrest affidavit after she included the offense of using a firearm while under the influence and inserted the phrase "since the gun was loaded." Second, contrary to the position taken by the Commission, Ms. Gilbert did state in the October 20, 1994, sworn statement that she had overheard Officer Romero state that the gun was not loaded when the suspect was arrested. Third, although Ms. Gilbert's testimony in her sworn statement that she had never discussed the report with Officer Leon conflicts with Officer Leon's testimony that she asked Officer Gilbert if the gun was loaded, it is reasonable to infer that, due to the brief, casual nature of Officer Leon's inquiry to Ms. Gilbert and the length of time which elapsed between the incident and her sworn statement, Ms. Gilbert simply forgot that Officer Leon had asked her that one question.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission dismiss the Administrative Complaint against Hawanda Gilbert dated June 28, 1996. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1999.
