The Issue Whether Respondents' license as real estate brokers in the state of Florida should be revoked, suspended or otherwise disciplined based upon the allegations of misconduct in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent, Deering, was licensed as a real estate broker in the state of Florida, having been issued license number 0563366. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Advantage, was licensed as a real estate broker, having been issued license number 0273342. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Deering, was licensed and operating as the qualifying broker for Respondent, Advantage. On October 22, 1992, Petitioner conducted an office inspection and audit of Advantage. The audit reflected what appeared to be a shortage in Advantage's security deposit escrow account (Number 027000122700) in the amount of $580.00, calculated as $6,600.00 in total trust liability, but only $6,020.00 as a reconciled bank balance. The audit also reflected what appeared to be a shortage in Advantage's rental distribution escrow account (Number 27000121900) in the amount of $369.40, calculated as $3,174.82 in total trust liability, but only $2,805.42 as reconciled bank balance. The audit also reflected that Deering, as the qualifying broker, failed to sign and properly reconcile Advantage's escrow accounts by comparing the total trust liability with the reconciled bank balance of the escrow accounts for the months of September and October, 1992. Marie Deering, Respondent, Deering's, wife and a corporate officer of Respondent, Advantage, signed the reconciliation form for the months of September and October, 1992. It appears from the record (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Respondents' Licensure file) that Roger J. Kathman was the Broker of Record for Respondent, Advantage until August 21, 1992, when he resigned. Apparently, part of the problem stemmed from using a form developed by the previous real estate agency which was not the form suggested by the Petitioner for this purpose. Since being advised about the form and that comparing the total trust liability of each escrow account with the reconciled the bank balance of each escrow account and signing the reconciliation form was the responsibility of the broker of record, Deering has been properly fulfilling that responsibility and reporting on the correct form. The total trust liability of Advantage's security deposit escrow account should have been $5,700.00 rather than the $6,600.00 indicated by the audit because the $900.00 included in the audit figure from the San Juan lease should not have been included since this amount was not to be escrowed pursuant to the lease. This was a verbal agreement between the parties that was later executed as an addendum to the lease. Advantage's reconciled bank balance for the security deposit escrow account should also be $5,700.00, calculated as $6,020.00 reflected in the audit, minus $1,000.00 that was erroneously disbursed from the Rental distribution escrow account (also called the property management escrow account) instead of the security deposit escrow account , plus $680.00 that was erroneously deposited into the rental distribution escrow account instead of the security deposit escrow account ( $6,020.00 - $1,000.00 + $680.00 = $5,700.00). The total trust fund liability of the rental distribution escrow account should be $3,175.42, calculated as $3,174.82 as reflected in audit plus $0.60 to correct bookkeeping error ($3,174.82 + $0.60 = $3,175.42). The reconciled bank balance for the rental distribution escrow account should be $3,175.42, calculated as $2,805.42 reflected in the audit, plus $1,000.00 transferred from the security deposit escrow account as reflected in Finding of Fact 8, minus $680.00 transferred to the security deposit escrow account as reflected in Finding of Fact 8, plus a deposit of $50.00 to correct an error made in crediting a tenant account with $50.00 more than was deposited from tenant ($2,805.42 + $1,000.00 - $680.00 + $50.00 = $3,175.42). Although there were clerical or bookkeeping errors made in the handling of Advantage's escrow accounts, there was no evidence that Deering failed to immediately deposit funds received in trust in an escrow account, albeit not always the correct one. After the audit, Respondent, Deering promptly and properly corrected the escrow accounts and accounted for the funds resulting in balanced escrow accounts. While the Respondents were negligent in the handling of the escrow accounts, there is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that Respondents were culpably negligent or that there was a breach of trust. The Respondents' license as real estate brokers in the state of Florida has never been disciplined.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent Deering and Respondent Advantage guilty of technical violations of Section 475.25(1)(e) and (k), Florida Statutes. For such violations, Respondent Advantage should be given a written reprimand and Respondent Deering should be given a written reprimand and required to complete a 30-hour broker management course. Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint should be dismissed. In making this recommendation, consideration has been given to the mitigating factors in relation to the disciplinary guidelines set out in Chapter 21V-24, Florida Administrative Code. Also, taken into consideration was the purpose of regulating any profession, the protection of the public by requiring compliance with those laws governing the profession. In this case, the recommended penalties will serve that purpose, the public has not been harmed, compliance has been accomplished and the penalty sufficient to remind the Respondents to be more diligent in the future. Adding any further penalty, including an administrative fine, would be unduly punitive. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-0606 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Unnecessary. 2.-12. Adopted in substance as modified by Findings of Fact 1 through 13. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 4, 5 and 8 through 13. Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 6 and 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate Hurston North Tower #308A 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Albert R. Deering, Pro se c/o Advantage Realty of Sarasota, Inc. t/a Century 21 Advantage 4121 Bee Ridge Road Sarasota, Florida 34233 Darlene F. Keller, Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1900
The Issue The issue is whether Mr. Carlson is guilty of misconduct in his practice as a certified public accountant by making personal use of trust fund monies or by his firm's issuance of an audit report on a bank while one of the firm's partners was a shareholder in the bank.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Carlson has been licensed as a certified public accountant in Florida, holding license #AC0002345. His address is 930 North Chrome Avenue, Suite 2B, Homestead, Florida 33030. Mr. Carlson became a partner in an accounting firm known as Brown, Carlson, and Derrer in 1985. Prior to Mr. Carlson's association with Richard Brown, one of the partners in that firm, the Islamorada Bank was a major client of Mr. Brown. Brown had issued audit opinions on the financial statements of the bank without disclosing that Brown was a stockholder of the bank, and therefore lacked independence with respect to the bank. Financial statements for the year ending December 31, 1986, were issued on the letterhead of Brown, Carlson, and Derrer, and signed by Richard Brown, along with an audit opinion with respect to the financial statements of the Islamorada Bank. Brown's lack of independence was not disclosed in the audit opinion letter. Mr. Carlson had specifically asked Mr. Brown on all audits, including the audit of the Islamorada Bank, whether Brown was independent of the client, and Brown unequivocally told Carlson that he (Brown), was independent. Other members of the firm, including Roger Infante, also specifically inquired about Brown's independence and was assured that Brown was independent with respect to the Islamorada Bank. After the audit report on the financial statements of the Islamorada Bank for 1986 was issued, the firm of Brown, Carlson, and Derrer broke up in April, 1987. In connection with the breakup, Carlson discovered that Brown had held stock in the Islamorada Bank, and was not independent with respect to the bank. At that time, Mr. Carlson's lawyer advised him that: If he notified all shareholders of the bank, this would be improper because Carlson was currently in acrimonious litigation with Brown over the breakup of the accounting firm, and such action could be viewed as harassment; Brown still denied the lack of indepen- dence despite the appearance of shares in the bank on Brown's personal financial statements, and If Carlson failed to notify anyone, he might be guilty of a potential violation of his professional responsibility. Thus, Carlson's lawyer told him that no matter what he did, he could be guilty of wrongdoing. In order to resolve this problem, Carlson reported the situation to the Department of Professional Regulation. He did not attempt to recall the audit that Brown had done on the bank. A certified public accountant who owns even one share of stock in a company for which he issues financial statements lacks independence. Because Brown lacked independence and the financial statements were issued on the letterhead of Brown, Carlson, and Derrer, the firm also lacked independence. Willard Teft, a client of Mr. Carlson, established an educational trust fund known as a Clifford Trust. Those trust funds were delivered to Mr. Carlson and held in Carlson's trust account. Mr. Carlson failed to post and reconcile the Teft trust account from January 1, 1985 until May, 1988. The failure to perform the posting and reconciliations resulted in overdrafts against the Teft trust. These overdrafts consisted of payments to clients and fees paid to the accounting firm. Only after the Teft trust was reconciled did Mr. Carlson realized he had used money that was not his. The Teft trust should have had a balance of $7,500-10,000 at all times. Mr. Carlson should have known by looking at the balance of his trust account that he was misusing trust fund money. Mr. Carlson's misuse of the trust fund money constitutes misconduct in the practice of public accounting. The Teft trust account had been reconciled and posted to date before the Department began its investigation. All monies due to the trust because of overdrafts had been returned to the account before the Department's investigation. Mr. Carlson provided full and complete cooperation in the investigation conducted by the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding Mr. Carlson guilty of violation of Section 473.323(1)(g), Florida Statutes, that he be reprimanded, and placed on probation with the usual probationary terms for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of June, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Tobi C. Pam, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Victor K. Rones, Esquire MARGULIES AND RONES 16105 Northeast 18th Avenue North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Martha Willis, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Board of Accountancy Suite 16 4001 Northwest 43rd Street Gainesville, Florida 32606
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure as a real estate salesperson.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency of the State of Florida responsible for the licensure of real estate professionals. On October 19, 1993, Petitioner submitted to Respondent his application for licensure as a real estate salesperson. In his application, Petitioner disclosed that he had been disbarred as a member of the Florida Bar by decision of the Florida Supreme Court. The actions for which Petitioner was disbarred were described in detail by the Florida Supreme Court's decision in The Florid Bar v. Ellis S. Simring, 612 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1993). The Florida Supreme Court found that there was clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner had repeatedly and intentionally violated trust accounting procedures, had commingled trust and personal funds, and had misappropriated client funds for his personal use. The Florida Supreme Court further found that the Petitioner had violated the Court's order that temporarily suspended him from practice. Petitioner denied that he misappropriated funds from any client, but he admits the other major violations found by the Supreme Court. Petitioner testified that he was suffering from chronic fatigue syndrome and flu-like symptoms when the trust account violations occurred during 1988 and 1989. As a result of a recommendation from an acquaintance, he took large doses of Vitamin C, which aggravated his hemorrhoidal condition and resulted in bleeding. Petitioner testified that his ability to practice law was limited by his medical condition and that his income from his practice suffered as a consequence. Petitioner testified that his secretary acted as his administrative assistant during that period of time and that she was responsible for maintaining his trust account, but he did not attempt to blame her for the admitted deficiencies pertaining to his trust account. Petitioner failed to keep or retain appropriate trust account records, caused the proceeds from the sale of his personal property and from loans he had taken out to be deposited in the trust account, and caused office expenses and personal expenses to be paid out of his trust account. Petitioner settled a personal injury action in which he represented a minor child by the name of Barnett. The proceeds of the settlement in the amount of $45,000 was transferred from his trust account to that of another lawyer who was a non-practicing retired lawyer and friend of the Petitioner. The purpose of that transfer was to hide those funds from the Internal Revenue Service. The Florida Supreme Court found that Petitioner misappropriated a portion of these funds. Petitioner disputes that finding. The misconduct to which Petitioner admitted at the formal hearing and his disbarment from the practice of law by the Florida Supreme Court create a presumption, pursuant to Section 475.17(1)(a), Florida Statutes, that he is not qualified for licensure as a real estate professional. Petitioner did not offer any competent, substantial evidence which would establish that he is honest, truthful, trustworthy, and of good character or that would otherwise rebut the presumption of disqualification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate salesperson should be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Ellis Stewart Simring, pro se 3785 Westminister Street Hollywood, Florida 33021 Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Suite 107 South Tower 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Darlene F. Keller, Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Notice to Show Cause and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating yacht and ship brokers and salespersons pursuant to Chapter 326, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent was a licensed yacht and ship broker salesman. He has been licensed since 1990. In December 1990, Respondent was issued license number 1322, as a yacht and ship broker salesman for Seafarer Brokerage, Inc. (Seafarer). In October 1998, he renewed his license, which had an expiration date of October 28, 2000. On July 31, 1997, Lorraine Woods, the President of Seafarer, wrote to Peter Butler, section head of the yacht and ship section of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, notifying him that Respondent was the broker of record for Seafarer. Ms. Woods' license had been suspended, and Respondent knew that her license had been suspended prior to his becoming broker of record for Seafarer. As the broker of record, Respondent knew that he was solely responsible for safeguarding the money of all clients in the brokerage's escrow account. Respondent did not know the details involving the suspension of Ms. Woods' license. He was not aware that Ms. Woods had abused the control of Seafarer's escrow account for her own benefit by taking client funds from the escrow account to pay for Seafarer's operating expenses. Mr. Butler was very concerned with the abuse of Seafarer's escrow account committed by Ms. Woods. He demanded assurance from Respondent that Ms. Woods would not have access to the escrow account, and Respondent provided that assurance. On August 4, 1997, Respondent wrote to Mr. Butler confirming that he (Respondent) was the broker of record for Seafarer. In his written communication, Respondent confirmed certain details of the escrow account of Seafarer, including that he was broker of record and that the account was located at First Union National Bank of Florida, with the address and account number listed. Moreover, Respondent indicated that, as of July 30, 1997, he became the sole signatory on the account. Respondent personally provided the signatory card, showing that he was the sole signatory on the account, to the bank. Even though the bank did not have a record of such a signatory card, the undersigned is persuaded that Respondent's testimony is credible and that he provided the signatory card to the bank. Even though Respondent was the broker of record for Seafarer, Respondent looked upon Ms. Woods as the employer and himself as the employee, resulting in an employer-employee relationship. Seafarer consisted of two persons, Respondent and Ms. Woods. If Respondent was unavailable for a situation in which a check had to be written and executed, he would prepare a blank check with his signature on it and give it to Ms. Woods. She continued to maintain the business records. Ms. Woods maintained all the operating and escrow records, checks, and bank statements in a locked drawer for which she had the only key; Respondent did not have free and unobstructed access to these documents even though he was Seafarer's broker of record. Respondent and Ms. Woods continued this procedure for over a year without incident. On April 2, 1999, Warren Scott made an offer on a 1974 CAL2-46, a 46-foot yacht, with Seafarer. He placed a $6,000.00 deposit on the yacht. Mr. Scott's dealings, regarding the yacht, were with Ms. Woods. He had dealt with Seafarer and Ms. Woods on a prior occasion, had made a deposit, and had his deposit refunded. As a result, Mr. Scott felt comfortable dealing with Seafarer and Ms. Woods even though he had not purchased a yacht from Seafarer. On April 5, 1999, Mr. Scott's check was deposited in Seafarer's escrow account. On April 5, 1999, check numbered 1144, made payable to cash for $4,305.00, bearing Respondent's signature was written. The check bore the notation at the bottom left corner at the "FOR" space: "CAL2-46 (illegible) Enterprises." This check cleared Seafarer's escrow account on April 7, 1999, leaving a balance of $2,512.34. Respondent had signed the check and left it for Ms. Woods to fill-in the details. The check was signed by Respondent in March 1999 for a closing that was taking place at the end of March, but the check was not used at the closing in March. Ms. Woods had written the check to pay the rent for Seafarer. Even though Respondent had signed the check, the undersigned is persuaded that he did not know that Ms. Woods was going to use the check for a purpose other than for what it was written. On April 27, 1999, Respondent signed a check for $100.00, payable to Complete Yacht Service for engine repair to the CAL2-46. This check cleared Seafarer's escrow account on April 30, 1999, leaving a balance of $5,796.36. After a sea trial and survey, Mr. Scott wrote to Ms. Woods on April 30, 1999, indicating that he had decided not to purchase the 1974 CAL2-46 pursuant to their arrangement of April 2, 1999. On May 3, 1999, Mr. Scott again wrote to Ms. Woods that his offer to purchase the 1974 CAL2-46 for $55,000.00 in the conditional acceptance of vessel agreement, dated April 29, 1999, was expiring on May 3, 1999, at 9:00 p.m. Mr. Scott went to Seafarer on May 4, 1999, to obtain a refund of his deposit from Ms. Woods. Respondent informed him that Ms. Woods was out and that they would have to wait for her return, which was going to be in about an hour. Mr. Scott was unable to wait. He left Fort Lauderdale, returning to Nevada, with the understanding that his deposit, less $100.00 for the engine survey, would be returned to him. Mr. Scott expected the monies within a week to ten days. On May 5, 1999, a deposit of $4,700.00 was made to Seafarer's escrow account, leaving a balance of $9,136.36. On May 5, 1999, Seafarer's escrow account contained sufficient monies to give Mr. Scott a full refund of his deposit, less the $100.00. Respondent left for a vacation to the United Kingdom on May 17, 1999, with his return on June 15, 1999. Prior to his leaving, Respondent signed two blank checks, numbered 1153 and 1154, from Seafarer's escrow account. The checks were written for an upcoming business transaction during his absence, regarding a closing and Respondent's commission on the closing. On May 18, 1999, Seafarer's escrow account balance fell to $5,192.21, after three checks cleared the account. Two of the three checks, signed by Respondent, were payable to Seafarer in the amount of $1,360.00 for "comm.-37'Irwin." During May 1999, checks totaling $6,900.00, which were signed by Respondent, cleared Seafarer's escrow account. Mr. Scott made several telephone calls to Seafarer regarding the return of his deposit. Each time Mr. Scott spoke with Ms. Woods and he was not provided with a satisfactory response from her. On June 16, 1999, Mr. Scott received a check, check numbered 1153, for $5,900.00 from Seafarer. He also received a telephone call that same day from Ms. Woods requesting him not to deposit the check until the end of the month; Mr. Scott agreed. Respondent was not aware that check numbered 1153 was going to be used to refund Mr. Scott's deposit. Respondent was unaware that the check was used for a purpose other than for what it was intended. On June 17, 1999, check numbered 1154, made payable to Seafarer for $1,000.00 for "petty cash" cleared Seafarer's escrow account. The check was used by Ms. Woods to pay Seafarer's telephone and utility bills. Respondent was unaware that check numbered 1154 was going to be used for a purpose other than for what it was written. When Respondent returned from his vacation, he was contacted by Mr. Scott who advised Respondent of the problem with the return of his refund. Respondent checked the bank statements for Seafarer's escrow account and discovered that Ms. Woods had not used the checks for their intended purpose and that she had used funds from the escrow account for improper purposes. On June 25, 1999, Mr. Scott deposited the check that he received from Seafarer. The check, payable to Mr. Scott, was posted to Seafarer's escrow account on June 29, 1999, leaving a negative balance of $2,667.22. For 67 days, between April 5, 1999, when Mr. Scott's deposit of $6,000.00 was deposited in Seafarer's escrow account, and June 29, 1999, the date Mr. Scott's refund of $5,900.00 cleared, Seafarer's escrow account did not have sufficient funds to pay the refund. The period between May 5, 1999, and May 17, 1999, was the only time period, during the 67-day period, that Seafarer's escrow account had sufficient funds to pay the refund. Mr. Scott indicates that his refund was received in his account in July 1999. Respondent remained with Seafarer long enough to ensure that Mr. Scott received his refund. On July 8, 1999, Respondent notified Mr. Butler that he was no longer the broker for Seafarer. Respondent has no prior disciplinary action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, enter a final order: Sustaining the Notice to Show Cause and finding that John Scales violated Subsections 326.002(1) and 326.005(1), Florida Statutes (1997). Suspending Respondent's license for three years. Imposing a civil penalty of $5,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Janis Sue Richardson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Tracy J. Sumner, Esquire 1307 Leewood Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Ross Fleetwood, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate. Petitioner is also responsible for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent, John P. Wickersham ("Wickersham"), is licensed as a real estate broker under license number 0095775. Respondent, Aladdin Real Estate of Rockledge ("Aladdin"), is a Florida corporation registered as a real estate broker under license number 0213244. Wickersham is the qualifying broker and corporate officer for Aladdin. Respondents maintain their escrow account at the Barnett Bank of Cocoa. On April 28, 1994, Ms. Marie Ventura, Petitioner's investigator, audited Respondents' escrow account. Ms. Ventura concluded that Respondents' escrow account had a liability of $46,287.30 and a reconciled balance of $43,557.26. Ms. Ventura concluded that Respondents' escrow account had a shortage of $2,730.04. Respondents provided Ms. Ventura with additional information. On May 16, 1994, Ms. Ventura concluded that Respondents' escrow account had a liability of $43,546.21 and a reconciled balance of $42,787.26. Ms. Ventura concluded that Respondents' escrow account had an excess of $11.05. Respondents never had a shortage in their escrow account. Respondents maintained an excess of $11.05 in their escrow account since September, 1993. In September, 1993, Respondents converted their method of bookkeeping to a computer system. The computer system failed to disclose an excess of $11.05 due to Respondents' misunderstanding of the appropriate method of labeling inputs to the software system. Respondents discovered and corrected the error prior to the formal hearing. Respondents properly made and signed written monthly reconciliation statements comparing their total escrow liability with the reconciled bank balances of their escrow account. Although Respondents did not use the form suggested in Rule 61J2- 14.012(2), Respondents satisfied the substance of the requirements for record keeping and reporting. Respondents maintained the information required in Rule 61J2-14.012(2) in bank statements, ledger cards, and checkbooks. At the time of the formal hearing, Respondents presented the information in a form that complied with the requirements of Rule 61J2-14.012(2). The shortage determined by Petitioner on April 28, 1994, was caused, in part, by errors made by Petitioner's investigator. It was the investigator's first audit, and the information provided by Respondents was not in an easily discernible form. However, Respondents never withheld any information, and Respondents maintained and provided all information required by applicable law.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b) and Rule 61J2-14.012(2). RECOMMENDED this 18th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January 1996.
Findings Of Fact Respondent (all references to Respondent are to Respondent Simmonds) is a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida holding license numbers 0404486 and 0245930. His most current licenses are as a broker, c/o the corporate Respondent. He has been licensed about six years in Florida. The corporate Respondent (all references to the corporate Respondent are to Respondent L. G. Simmonds Realty, Inc.) is a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida holding license number 0245825. At all material times, Respondent was licensed and operating as a qualifying broker and officer of the corporate Respondent. He is the sole shareholder of the corporate Respondent and the only broker employed by the corporate Respondent. Respondents were brokers in three sales transactions in which they received competing claims for earnest money deposits that they held in trust. The three contracts are the sale from Durant to Durant by contract dated February 13, 1987, and amended December 7, 1987; the sale from Dyer to James by contract dated August 27, 1988; and the sale from Kollar and Nilands Bar & Package, Inc. to Hamilton by contract dated October 11, 1988. Each of the three contracts is on a standard printed form. Each contract requires the corporate Respondent to hold the earnest money deposit in escrow and disburse it at closing, at which time the corporate Respondent earns its commission. Each contract provides that the corporate Respondent may interplead the funds in circuit court in the event of a dispute and further provides that the corporate Respondent shall comply with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The Durant contract provides for the corporate Respondent to hold a $1000 earnest money deposit. A dispute between the parties to the Durant contract arose, and Respondent contacted the Florida Real Estate Commission for advice. By letter dated November 22, 1988, Respondent informed the Florida Real Estate Commission of a demand by the seller for the deposit because the buyer had failed to follow through on his mortgage application. The letter states that Respondent is convinced that the seller is entitled to the deposit and that Respondent intends to pursue interpleader. By Notice dated February 2, 1989, the Florida Real Estate Commission informed Respondents that it could not issue an Escrow Disbursement Order because of the unenforceability of certain contractual language. Referring to Rule 21V-10.32, the letter advised Respondents that, within 30 days of receipt of the letter, they must pursue arbitration, with the consent of all parties, or a judicial adjudication, such as through interpleader. At some point, Respondents obtained an application for arbitration and sent it to the parties. By letter dated June 12, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission that they had sent an arbitration contract on March 21, 1989, to the seller, who had not yet responded to the request to arbitrate. Subsequently, Respondents retained counsel at their expense to discuss interpleading the funds in circuit court. Counsel advised them that the relatively modest sum involved, as a practical matter, precluded the judicial remedy because the attorneys' fees would exceed the amount in dispute. Eventually, the parties to the Durant contract settled their dispute, and Respondents disbursed the funds pursuant to the parties' stipulation. There is no evidence of a complaint about Respondents' handling of the earnest money deposits, nor is there any evidence that Respondent failed to account or deliver the deposit to any person as required by law. The Dyer contract also involved an earnest money deposit of $1000, which was later increased by addendum to a total of $3000. The Dyer contract, which also failed to close, provides for the corporate Respondent to hold the earnest money deposit. By letter dated March 2, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission that, as of the same day, they had received conflicting demands for the earnest money deposit. By Notice dated August 28, 1989, the Florida Real Estate Commission informed Respondents that it could not issue an Escrow Disbursement Order because of factual disputes that the Commission is not empowered to resolve. The Notice states that Respondents must "immediately" choose one of the remaining alternatives--arbitration or interpleader in circuit court. By letter dated September 8, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission that they would seek help through the Arbitration Society of Florida, Inc. It is unclear whether Respondents sent an arbitration application to the parties in the Dyer contract, but no arbitration ensued. The parties to the Dyer contract resolved their dispute in March, 1990, and Respondents disbursed the funds pursuant to the parties' stipulation. There is no evidence of a complaint about Respondents' handling of the earnest money deposits, nor is there any evidence that Respondents failed to account or deliver the deposit to any person as required by law. The Kollar contract resulted in the receipt by the corporate Respondent of an earnest money deposit of $10,000. This contract also failed to close. By letter dated January 19, 1989, Respondents informed the Florida Real Estate Commission of conflicting demands received the same day. The Commission issued an Escrow Disbursement Order on August 16, 1989, with which Respondents promptly complied. There is no evidence of a complaint about Respondents' handling of the earnest money deposit, nor is there any evidence that Respondents failed to account or deliver the deposit to any person as required by law. On January 30, 1990, Petitioner's investigator visited Respondents' office pursuant to a complaint that never provided any basis for disciplinary action. Respondent said that he was ill and asked her to reschedule the visit. They agreed to reset it for February 6, 1990. On February 6, 1990, Petitioner's investigator met Respondent at his office and asked for copies of all pending contracts, bank statements, deposit slips, cancelled checks, and similar materials so that she could reconcile the trust account. Respondent supplied her with all of these materials except for the cancelled checks, which he said were at the accountant's office. Respondent gave the investigator access to his office copier so that she could copy whatever she needed. She apparently copied various documents, but failed to copy the pending contracts. From February, 1988, through February, 1990, Respondents held 6-10 earnest money deposits. On February 6, Respondents had only three pending contracts for which they held deposits. These were the Dyer contract and two unidentified contracts with $3500 and $500 earnest money deposits. Respondents did not handle other trust funds, such as property management funds. Petitioner's investigator determined that the trust account was short $2897.73. She found pending contracts indicating that Respondents should be holding a total of $7000 in earnest money deposits, but she found a bank balance of only $4102.27, which included a deposit of $1392.26 made on February 5. Respondents' trust account has been short previously. For example, in August, 1989, the Dyer, Durant, and Kollar contracts, which were still outstanding, generated a trust account liability of $14,000, but the account balance was as low as $700. Respondent admits that he improperly removed funds from the trust account, without the parties' knowledge, to apply toward personal medical expenses that he had incurred. In the fall of 1989, he deposited into the trust account proceeds from a loan he had recently received. However, he removed additional trust funds when he later incurred more medical expenses. By February 6, Respondent knew that the trust account was short, but evidently did not know precisely by how much. His repeated vagueness concerning the specifics of trust account withdrawals and deposits from August, 1989, through February, 1990, discredits his testimony that he never withdrew more than the amounts of pending commissions, which were unearned in any event when withdrawn by Respondent. On February 7, Respondent deposited $2897.73 into the trust account to eliminate the deficiency found by Petitioner's investigator. During the following week, the investigator returned to Respondents' office. She requested Respondent to produce the same documents that she had examined previously, but Respondent refused on the grounds that he had already produced all the documents once and he was seeking legal counsel. The investigator contacted Respondent a couple more times concerning the requested documents, but Respondent continued to refuse to cooperate. Petitioner next tried to compel the production of the requested documents by service of an administrative subpoena. By subpoena duces tecum issued February 19, 1990, and served February 21, 1990, Petitioner demanded that Respondents produce, on February 26, 1990: All current pending sales contracts, on L. G. Simmonds Realty Escrow Account #144100004792 all bank deposit slips from 2/1/88-2/1/90, the check book for account #14410004792. Upon receipt of the subpoena, Respondent contacted his attorney, who prepared a petition to invalidate subpoena, which was served by mail on February 25, 1990, and received by Petitioner on February 28, 1990. The basic objections are that the subpoena is "unreasonably broad in scope and/or requires the production of irrelevant material" and that Respondents are entitled to know what complaint is being investigated prior to producing the information. Petitioner issued another administrative subpoena on March 12, 1990, which was served upon Respondents on March 26, 1990, and requested, by March 30, 1990: On L. G. Simmonds Realty Escrow Account #14410004792: All sales contracts for which L. G. Simmonds Realty, Inc. is holding escrow deposits, the 1/90 and 2/90 bank statements, cancelled checks, number 177 through 270. On March 29, 1990, Respondents' attorney served the same objections to the petition, and Petitioner received the objections on April 4, 1990.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order reprimanding Respondents; imposing on each Respondent an administrative fine of $3000 (for a total from the two Respondents of $6000); requiring Respondent to complete an approved 60-hour course; suspending the licenses of both Respondents for a period of six months, commencing retroactive to when their licenses were revoked pursuant to the emergency order; placing both licenses on probation for a period of three years commencing the conclusion of the suspension; and requiring, during the period of suspension, that Respondents provide the Florida Real Estate Commission, or its signated representative, with escrow account status reports at such intervals as the Commission shall require. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-4438 Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1-7: adopted. 8: rejected as subordinate. 9-10 (first sentence): adopted. 10 (second and third sentences): rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. In fact, Respondent supplied the investigator with copies of the contracts on February 6, but refused subsequent requests to produce them. He indicated that he wanted to obtain advice of counsel. 11: rejected as subordinate. In addition, the implication that files of the Division of Real Estate were the sole source of information regarding the contracts is rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. The investigator found in the EDO files of the Division of Real Estate a copy of the Dyer contract, which, as noted in the recommended order, was one of the three contracts generating the escrow account liability that the investigator calculated on February 6. Although she saw the other two contracts (in order to generate the liability), she never received copies of them, even through the final hearing. 12-19: adopted or adopted in substance. 20-21 (with respect to each paragraph, first sentence and first clause of second sentence): adopted. 20-21 (with respect to each paragraph, remainder): rejected as irrelevant. 22: adopted. 23: rejected as irrelevant. 24-27 and 30-33: adopted. 28 and 34: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence and unnecessary. 29: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Respondents 1-12: adopted or adopted in substance. 13: rejected as subordinate. 14-15: adopted. 16 and 19: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence and legal argument. 17: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. 18: adopted. 20: rejected as irrelevant. 21: rejected as subordinate. 22: adopted. 23-24 and 26-27: rejected as recitation of testimony. 25: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. 28-33 (first clause of second sentence): adopted. 33 (second clause of second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence and legal argument. 33 (remainder): adopted. 34-35: except as to the fact of the issuance of the subpoena and petition to invalidate, rejected as unnecessary. 36: rejected as unclear. Respondent gave the investigator a chance to see the three pending contracts generating the February 6 trust account liability, but never gave her copies of any of them when she later discovered that she had failed to copy them. She found a copy of the Dyer contract in the EDO file, but she never received copies of the other two contracts, even at the final hearing. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The determination in the recommended order on this point was not dependent upon Respondents' handling of the subpoenas, but on their handling of repeated and reasonable requests for relevant information. 37: rejected as irrelevant. 38: adopted. 39: rejected as unnecessary. 40-43: adopted or adopted in substance. 44: adopted. 45: rejected as unnecessary. 46-49: adopted or adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Attorney Thomas V. Infantino Infantino and Berman Post Office Drawer 30 Winter Park, Florida 32790-0030 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Attorney James H. Gillis Division of Real Estate Florida Real Estate Commission 400 W. Robinson St. Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 *Previously assigned DOAH Case No. 90-4319 closed as a duplicate.
The Issue Whether an administrative fine should be imposed against Respondent for alleged violation of Sections 400.102(1)(b) and 400.162, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the letter of Joseph D. Dowless, Jr., dated March 16, 1978. Representatives of Respondent Sweeting Nursing Home did not appear at the hearing and therefore the matter proceeded as uncontested pursuant to Rule 28- 5.25(5), Florida Administrative Code. At the commencement of the hearing, the Hearing Officer inquired of Petitioner's counsel as to the accuracy of the charge of a violation of Section 400.102(1)(b), F.S., which involves misappropriation or conversion of the property of a resident of a nursing home facility, Petitioner's counsel announced that it wished to proceed under Section 400.102(1)(c) as a violation of provisions of Chapter 400 rather than on a conversion theory. In view of the fact that such an amendment involves an allegation of lesser severity than that originally alleged in the notice of charges and was fairly encompassed within such letter, the Hearing Officer permitted the amendment.
Findings Of Fact Sweeting Nursing Home, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, is a facility licensed by Petitioner under Chapter 400, Florida Statutes. As a result of an audit of the facility for the year ending March 31, 1976, Petitioner's hospital consultant with its Office of Licensure and Certification visited Petitioner's premises on March 10, 1978, to see if certain deficiencies existing in the patient trust fund, as indicated in the audit, had been corrected. The audit deficiencies were failure to reconcile patient trust fund account balances with the general ledger account balance on a regular basis, improper documentation to support fund receipts and disbursements, failure to reconcile patient trust fund account liability and patient trust fund cards, transfer of patient trust fund cards to the patient's file upon the patient's departure from the home, and inclusion of old balances in the liability account due to patients who are no longer at the facility. Petitioner's consultant found that inadequate records existed to properly audit the accounts and determined that the deficiencies cited in the audit had not been corrected. On the occasion of his visit, Respondent's administrator, Mrs. Marie Camacho, admitted that she was in violation of pertinent regulations regarding handling of patient trust funds and that such funds were frequently used to meet payroll expenses due to the fact that the home did not receive other regular funds from state sources on a timely basis. She stated, however, that trust fund monies were always returned to the trust fund account when the facility received Medicare or Medicaid payments. Petitioner's consultant also inquired as to the availability of bank statements of the trust fund accounts and was told that such records were at an accounting firm in Miami, Florida. No attempt was made, however, by the consultant to contact the accounting firm. (Testimony of Hanson) Patient trust funds are derived from monies received by patients from governmental or private sources for personal expenses. In the case of Medicaid, patients receive $25.00 a month from their social security checks for this purpose. Deposits and withdrawals from these accounts are recorded on individual patient ledger cards. Normally, disbursements are made from a petty case account with a monthly withdrawal from the patient's trust fund bank account to equal the amount withdrawn within the period. Although there is a lag time of approximately three months from the time a patient is admitted in the nursing home until the government commences monthly payments for care, the nursing home is expected to be sufficiently solvent to meet its expenses pending receipt of such monies. (Testimony of Hanson)
Recommendation That an administrative fine of $1,000 should be imposed against Respondent Sweeting Nursing Home for violation of Sections 400.162(4) and (5), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of July, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Harold L. Braynon District X Legal Counsel Department of HRS 800 West Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Sweeting Nursing Home 2137 N.W. 4th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Steven W. Huss Staff Attorney Central Operations Services Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Philip H. Bergman Stephen W. Crair 9000 Southwest 87th Court Miami, Florida 33176
The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are whether Respondents, who are licensed real estate brokers, failed to preserve and make available certain records relating to trust accounts and real estate transactions, and/or obstructed or hindered Petitioner's investigators in an official investigation, as alleged by Petitioner in its Administrative Complaint. If Petitioner proves one or more of the alleged violations, then an additional question will arise, namely whether disciplinary penalties should be imposed on Respondents, or either of them.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent Nestor G. Mendoza ("Mendoza") is a licensed real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission"). Respondent Diamonds Realty of Miami Beach, Inc. ("Diamonds Realty") is and was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission. Mendoza is an officer and principal of Diamonds Realty, and at all times relevant to this case he had substantial, if not exclusive, control of the corporation. Indeed, the evidence does not establish that Diamonds Realty engaged in any conduct distinct from Mendoza's in connection with the charges at issue. Therefore, Respondents will generally be referred to collectively as "Mendoza" except when a need to distinguish between them arises. Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("Department"), Division of Real Estate, has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Commission. At the Commission's direction, the Department is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within the Commission's jurisdiction. On January 15, 2008, Veronica Hardee, who was then employed by the Department as an investigator, conducted an audit of Mendoza's records at Mendoza's real estate brokerage office, which was located in Miami Beach. Ms. Hardee was accompanied by her supervisor, Brian Piper. Ms. Hardee knew Mendoza because, in the latter part of 2007, she had investigated a consumer complaint against him, which arose from a transaction that had taken place in the fall of that year. In the course of that investigation, which focused on the period from August 20, 2007 through November 30, 2007, Mendoza had provided Ms. Hardee with business records, including bank statements and documents relating to the brokerage's escrow account. Ms. Hardee's previous investigation had not resulted in charges of wrongdoing being brought against Mendoza. During the audit, Ms. Hardee asked to review some of Mendoza's business records. She testified about this on direct examination as follows: Q. All right. Did you tell [Mendoza] what he would need to bring——or what he could expect from an audit? A. I don't remember, but usually procedure [sic], I would tell them we need to see older escrow accounts, older operating accounts, deposit slips, deposit checks, anything that has to do with their financial matters. Final Hearing Transcript ("TR.") 40-41 (emphasis added). On cross examination, Ms. Hardee elaborated: Q. (BY MR. MENDOZA) . . . I remember quite well that you did not ask me for the whole year of——for instance, of 2004, you never asked me for whole year, you asked me for a certain month; is that correct? * * * THE WITNESS: During the investigation I requested certain documents, yes. You're correct, I asked you for certain months, you had different issues with the Department that I was looking at. . . . * * * You didn't provide all the months requested and we came to the audit, you didn't provide——at that time, we asked you to see all of your accounts, it just wasn't for the investigation, we wanted to see your escrow account so you should have had for——I don't remember the——we wanted 1-15-08, we would have done from January of '08 to six months prior, let's just say. I don't remember what dates we gave you at the time. But then you would have a file with those documents in your escrow reconciliation statement, with all of your checks, all of your deposits with the bank statement attached, you know, organized. But it wasn't so and you said that you wanted to organize it properly and that's why we allowed you to organize it. So the question, did you provide me documents, yes, you provided me documents in the investigation but not all of the documents requested. TR. 58-60 (emphasis added). The undersigned attempted to elicit from Ms. Hardee a more detailed description of the materials requested during the audit, giving rise to the following exchange: THE HEARING OFFICER: Okay. And can you describe for me what it was in particular that you did request on that day in January of 2008? What did you ask [Mendoza] for? THE WITNESS: Yeah. We asked him for his escrow documents, reconciliation statements, such as the one that you see in [Petitioner's Composite] Exhibit 3. We asked about those months that were missing. We asked him——I don't know if we asked him for six months or one year. I don't remember the time frame we gave him, but pretty much when we go in to do an audit, we get the last six months, usually the months that are particularly discussed, the checks or the deposits that we're looking into for an investigation. * * * So pretty much that's what we asked, all of his escrow operating account that we had for the company, which includes the reconciliation statement, bank statement, deposit checks, as the statute statues here. THE HEARING OFFICER: Okay. You're standard procedure would have been you say in an audit like this, to have asked for the last six months of records right? So you're nodding your head, that's a yes? THE WITNESS: Yes. In this case we asked for the months that I was missing and plus I wanted to do a whole——we were going to do a whole audit. I don't remember right now if I asked him for six months or twelve months, I don't remember that part, but usually we ask for all the documents. THE HEARING OFFICER: And if I could just ask you to clarify do there's no mistake about this, when you say the months that are missing, what months are you referring to? THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, November of '04 and December of '04. TR. 73-75 (emphasis added). The Department did not, at the time of the audit, reduce its request for records to writing, which is unfortunate for the Department because, as the above-quoted testimony shows, Ms. Hardee's memory of specifically what Mendoza had been asked to produce was spotty. Although Ms. Hardee did identify two particular months——November and December of 2004——for which contemporaneous records were sought, this detail is practically random (because no context was given to explain the description of these periods, which predated the audit by more than three years, as "missing" months) and, in any event, fails to make the testimony as a whole explicit or distinctly remembered. The undersigned finds that Ms. Hardee's testimony was insufficiently precise to constitute clear and convincing evidence concerning the particular items that the Department wanted to see. Even if Ms. Hardee's testimony were sufficient on the previous point, however, the proof regarding Mendoza's alleged failure to produce records, which is a separate issue, is less compelling. Ms. Hardee's testimony was that Mendoza made available some but not all of the documents she and Mr. Piper wanted to see. (Actually, a fairer characterization of Mendoza's relative compliance, accepting Ms. Hardee's testimony as true, would be that he produced most of the documents requested, namely six-to-12 or 13 months' worth, failing only to make available documents associated with the last two or three months of 2004.) Mendoza then requested, and was given, additional time to assemble the rest of the materials. For some reason, Mendoza never contacted the Department thereafter to produce the items he could not locate on January 15, 2008, which caused the Department to initiate the instant proceeding. The undersigned largely credits Ms. Hardee's testimony regarding this overview of the events, with the qualification that Mendoza's compliance, while less than 100 percent, was nevertheless substantial. (He might, after all, have produced satisfactorily as much as 13 months' worth of documents, according to Ms. Hardee's testimony.) Given that Mendoza is alleged to have failed only to produce specific documents relating to the particular period from October through December 2004, the undersigned infers that he produced everything else that the Department wanted to see. The Department did not, however, at the time of the audit (or later), prepare an inventory of the records Mendoza made available (or failed to produce), take copies of the materials Mendoza produced, or otherwise reduce to writing the particulars of his noncompliance (e.g. by sending him a letter, soon after the audit, reminding him of the obligation to produce the materials that were not accessible on January 15, 2008, and listing or describing those materials). The absence of a contemporaneous written record of Mendoza's alleged failure to make documents available at the audit is unfortunate for the Department because, on the question of what Mendoza did and did not produce, Ms. Hardee testified as follows: THE HEARING OFFICER: All right. And when you went back in January of 2008 to see the ——Mr. Mendoza at his office and audit his books and records, he produced nothing to you and your supervisor whatsoever on that date in response to the things that you requested to see? THE WITNESS: He may have provided certain documents but were incomplete. I do not remember which documents he provided. * * * I'm not saying he didn't provide me with anything. He didn't provide us with all of the documents we requested. TR. 71-72 (emphasis added). In sum, the evidence against Mendoza consists of the testimony of Ms. Hardee, who in a nutshell says that, while she cannot clearly remember exactly what the Department asked Mendoza to produce, she knows that she requested documents relating to November and December of 2004, and that, while she cannot remember what documents Mendoza made available, she is sure he did not produce everything associated with the fourth quarter of 2004. Assuming for argument's sake that the Department requested the specific documents Mendoza is charged with failing to produce (which is not entirely clear), and accepting that Mendoza did not produce everything that the Department asked to see, the Department's evidence is still too conclusory to support disciplinary action, in view of Ms. Hardee's testimony that the temporal scope of the Department's request for documents was not limited to the three-month period comprising the fourth quarter of 2004 and indeed might have covered 15 months or more. Because, as found above, Mendoza did produce a substantial, albeit indeterminate, amount of documentation, and because there is no clear proof regarding the contents of the records that Mendoza made available, the undersigned is unable to find, based on clear and convincing evidence as the law requires, that Mendoza failed to produce the documents he has been accused of failing to produce. The Charges In Counts I and V of the Administrative Complaint, the Department alleges that Mendoza and Diamonds Realty are guilty of failing to preserve and make available to the Department all deposit slips and bank statements associated with the broker's trust account(s), in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-14.012(1), which is a disciplinable offense under Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. In Counts II and VI, it is alleged that Mendoza and Diamonds Realty failed to prepare written monthly statements comparing the broker's total trust liability to the bank balance(s) in the broker's trust account(s), in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-14.012(2)-(3). This alleged violation is a disciplinable offense under Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. In Counts III and VII, the Department accuses Mendoza and Diamonds Realty of having failed to preserve and make available to the Department books, accounts, and records pertaining to the brokerage business, in violation of Section 475.5015, Florida Statutes. This alleged violation constitutes a disciplinable offense under Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. In Counts IV and VIII of its Administrative Complaint, the Department asserts that Respondents obstructed or hindered the enforcement of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(i), Florida Statutes, which is a disciplinable offense under Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Ultimate Factual Determinations As found and explained above, the evidence is insufficient to prove, clearly and convincingly, that Respondents failed to make available the specific records they are alleged to have withheld. At most the evidence establishes that Respondents were unable, on January 15, 2008, to produce an imprecisely identified (and not clearly proved) subset of the universe of documents that the Department's investigators sought to examine during the audit. This is insufficient to prove, much less clearly and convincingly to demonstrate, that Respondents failed to keep or preserve any particular documents. There is no persuasive evidence that Respondents obstructed or hindered the Department's audit. To the contrary, the evidence shows that Mendoza cooperated with the Department's investigators and substantially complied with their demands. Ultimately, therefore, it is found that Respondents are not guilty of the offences charged in Counts I through VIII of the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Mendoza and Diamonds Realty not guilty of the offenses charged in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick J. Cunningham, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building-North Tower, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Nestor G. Mendoza Diamonds Realty of Miami Beach 12501 Southwest 26th Street Miami, Florida 33175 Thomas W. O'Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 802, North Orlando, Florida 32801 Reginald Dixon, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
