The Issue Whether Cindy Cammarota and Quail Oaks Apartments violated the Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance (Ord. 88-9 as amended) by discriminating on grounds of race and religion against Petitioners, Reverends William and Jacqueline Caractor with respect to an attempted eviction action.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Cammarota is the resident manager of Quail Oak Apartments. Respondent Quail Oak is an apartment complex in Hillsborough County which is subject to the Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance. Petitioners, who are black, are husband and wife. They are ordained ministers, who reside in Quail Oaks. They have used the community center at the apartment complex for services and frequently pray with other residents. They wear clerical garb and read their Bible in common areas at the complex. At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent Cammarota knew Petitioners were ministers at Mt. Carmel African Methodist Espiscopal Church. On July 30, 1990, a written rental agreement was entered into between Quail Oaks, lessor, and Petitioners, lessees, for an apartment at the complex. The term of the lease was from September 1, 1990 through August 31, 1991. At the option of Quail Oaks, payment of rent could be accepted conditionally by means of a personal check from the lessees. If the check was rejected for insufficient funds, Quail Oaks could require rent plus late charges to be paid by cashier's check, certified check or money order. In addition, Quail Oaks could terminate the lease for nonpayment of rent. Prior to leaving for vacation in November 1990, Petitioner Jacqueline Caractor issued a check in the amount of $645.00 for the November rent. The check was drawn upon the personal checking account belonging to her and her husband at Citizens and Southern National Bank (C & S). It was payable upon demand to Quail Oaks. Although a C & S counter check was used, all of the information on the check was correct. This check was accepted by Respondent Cammarota on behalf of Quail Oaks. It was presented to Barnett Bank of Tampa (Barnett) for collection and the bank was instructed to deposit the funds in Quail Oaks' account at the bank. Barnett Bank did not exercise ordinary care in regard to the check as required by the Uniform Commercial Code. Instead of collecting the funds from the payor bank, Barnett returned the check unpaid to Quail Oaks on November 5, 1990. Notice of the bank's dishonor was sent to Quail Oaks in a notice of debit with respect to the instrument together with the check itself. No reason was given by the bank for the dishonor. The provisional settlement of the check made by Barnett with Quail Oaks was revoked and the amount of credit given was charged back to Quail Oaks' account. Respondent Cammarota, who managed the Quail Oaks account with Barnett, misinterpreted this activity in the account as nonpayment of rent. A "three day notice" was issued by Quail Oaks to Petitioners for payment of rent or possession of the premises on November 7, 1990. The deadline for payment was November 13, 1990. Petitioners received actual notice on November 16, 1990, when they returned from vacation and found the notice posted on the front door of their apartment. A message concerning the matter was also on their answering machine. The message advised them that their check had been returned for insufficient funds. Petitioners went to their bank to determine why their check had not been honored. They had always paid their rent on time and they were concerned about the current state of affairs. The C & S Bank investigated the matter and discovered the check had never been submitted to it for payment. While Petitioners were present, a representative of the bank telephoned Respondent Cammarota and told her a bank error must have occurred as sufficient funds had always been available in Petitioners' account to cover the check, which had never been submitted to C & S for collection. Once Petitioners established that insufficient funds was not the basis for a dishonor of their personal check, they went to Respondent Cammarota to discuss the resolution of the problem. Respondent Cammarota was asked to resubmit the personal check for payment. She refused and requested a money order that included additional charges for the costs Quail Oaks incurred as a result of Barnett Bank's dishonor of the check. Respondent did not believe Petitioners' claim that the original check was a good check. Petitioners advised that they would not pay additional charges because they had complied with all of their responsibilities. They asked for the return of the original check and offered to pay the rent only by money order. Respondent Cammarota refused this potential solution of the problem. Respondent Cammarota did not believe Petitioners were at the office in order to make the check good. She did not believe that Petitioners were merely asserting their legal rights under the lease and negotiable instruments law. As a result, she was suspicious and unyielding during the discussion. She wanted them to pay late fees in order to remain in possession of their apartment. Petitioners, who were tired from their journey and surprised by Respondent Cammarota's lack of receptiveness to very reasonable requests, became somewhat excited by the fact that the process to remove them from their home had begun and they were being told to pay more money than they legally owed to remain in possession. In their response to the situation, Petitioners reminded Respondent Cammarota that they were Reverends. A suggestion that Respondent Cammarota should listen to God was construed by her as "preaching". The excited utterances from Petitioners caused the leasing agent in the office to ask them to leave, which they refused to do until they had read the notice of debit Respondent had received from Barnett Bank about their check. After the notice of debit was read and returned to Quail Oaks, Petitioners began to take their leave. At this point, Respondent Cammarota said something like, "And you people call yourself ministers". On November 20, 1990, Petitioner Jacqueline Caractor gave Quail Oaks a second November 1990 rent payment in the form of a money order. A letter dated the same day from Quail Oaks advised Petitioners that the money order could not be accepted because their account had already been turned over to Quail Oaks' attorney for eviction proceedings. On November 21, 1990, eviction proceedings were filed against Petitioners by Respondent Quail Oaks for nonpayment of rent. On November 28, 1990, Petitioners filed a housing discrimination complaint against Respondents. Attempts to resolve the housing discrimination complaint through conciliation was unsuccessful. Respondent Cammarota uses the term "you people" in conversation whenever she refers to two or more people in her presence. Ordinarily, it is not used to differentiate blacks from whites. In her conversation with the Petitioners, however, the term referred to their race or religion or both. It is Respondent Cammarota's opinion that ministers should behave differently than the Petitioners were behaving when they were asserting their legal rights in her office on November 16, 1990. Respondents did not articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the eviction action for non-payment of rent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of County Commissioners enter a Final Order finding that an unlawful discriminatory housing practice occurred when Respondent Cammarota, agent for Respondent Quail Oaks, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioners because of race or color and religion. That Respondents be required to pay a $500 fine to Hillsborough County. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See See HO HO #2. #11. 4. Accepted. See HO #3. 5. Accepted. See HO #5. 6. Accepted. See HO #10. 7. Accepted. See HO #11. 8. Accepted. See HO #12. 9. Accepted. See HO #13. 10. Accepted. See HO #14. 11. Accepted. See HO #14. 12. Accepted. See HO #14. 13. Accepted. See HO #18. 14. Accepted. See HO #20. 15. Accepted. See HO #21. 16. Accepted. 17. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Docket speaks for itself. See HO #22. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #22. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact and loose agreements. Rejected. Inconclusive evidence. Accepted. See HO #7. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #16. Rejected. Argumentative. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. Accepted. #17. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #2. Rejected. Redundant. 49.-57. Rejected. Irrelevant. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #3. Accepted. See HO #5, #7 and #8. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See HO #11. Accepted. See HO #12. Accepted. See HO #13-#14. Rejected. Self serving. Accepted. See HO #21. Accepted. See HO #22. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to lease. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact and legal test for unlawful discrimination. COPIES FURNISHED: Cretta Johnson, Director Hillsborough County Equal Opportunity and Human Relations Department P.O. Box 1110 Tampa, FL 33601 John McMillan, Esquire Levin & McMillan 9385 N. 56th Street, #200 Temple Terrace, FL 33617-5594 Catherine P. Teti, Esquire Assistant County Attorney P.O. Box 1110 Tampa, FL 33601 Reverend William Caractor Qualified Representative 4747 W. Waters Avenue #3807 Tampa, FL 33614
The Issue Petitioner seeks attorney's fees and costs as a prevailing small business party pursuant to Section 57.111, F.S. Appropriate stipulations have eliminated all but this central issue: whether the underlying enforcement proceeding had a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time that it was initiated or whether special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust.
Findings Of Fact Nicholas A. Musashe is a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida and was the respondent in the case, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Real Estate v. Nicholas Musashe, case no. 91-4463. During the relevant period, Musashe owned a business, Apartment Locator Specialists, with a principal office in Orlando, Florida. As stipulated by the parties, Nicholas A. Musashe is a "small business party", as provided in Section 57.111(3)(d), F.S. The underlying agency proceeding was based on a document sent to the Governor's office and forwarded to the Department of Professional Regulation on October 29, 1990. The document is a one-page copy of a newsletter from Apartment Locator Specialists. Portions of the newsletter are underlined, and at the bottom there is this handwritten notation: "Why are these people allowed to go on month after month breaking real estate laws? Are they brokers or not? This is a formal complaint! [signature illegible] 'Republican'." (p. 10, Investigative Report) The newsletter includes this text: To keep you posted on our lucky drawings -- Robin DeMorse at Summer Place Apartments posted a whopping $100 and Pam Hyde at Monterey Crossings once again received a check for $50 in asking those clients they were unable to help to call us at Apartment Locator Specialists. Remember these numbers -- 657-8282, 345-1000 and in Kissimmee 846-8808. These numbers could mean cash to you next month. Apartment Locator's helper of the month is Melodi Hanson of the Villas. Her name was drawn for always calling us to let our consultants know when a client rented or stopped by. A $50 gift certificate at the Florida Mall was her choice for that extra shopping spree. Thanks for being so considerate, Melodi. (page 10, investigation file) According to the Investigative Report, interviews were conducted between January 28 and February 5, 1991, and included Nicholas Musashe and the women mentioned in the newsletter. Musashe denied compensating unlicensed individuals for making referrals, but said that the drawings were "thank you rewards" for calling his office. Melodi Hanson, Pam Hyde and Robin DeMorse are each unlicensed employees of their respective apartment complexes. They confirmed that their names were drawn at random and that each time they called Apartment Locator Specialists their names were entered for the drawing. Apartment Locator Specialists had contracts with the respective apartment complexes and received a commission when their referrals rented an apartment. The apartment complex employees were encouraged to call Apartment Locator Specialists to report on the outcome of the referral. Each of the three women signed an affidavit stating she was not operating as a licensee as defined in Chapter 475, F.S., and would not so operate in the future without complying with the requirements of law. The investigative report form lists these alleged violations: "475.25(1)(e) Violation of a rule; Rule 21V-10.019 lotteries". There are two uniform complaint forms in the investigative file. One lists the same violations as on the investigative report form; the other lists, "475.42(1)(a) - unlicensed activity". An administrative complaint was drafted and was presented to the Florida Real Estate Commission Probable Cause Panel on February 19, 1991. The panel found cause and voted to proceed with administrative action in accordance with the proposed administrative complaint. The administrative complaint, dated February 20, 1991, makes factual allegations based on the investigation described above. Two counts of violations are alleged: COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, the Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, the Respondent is guilty of having employed persons as a salesman [sic] who were not the holders of a valid and current license as a salesman in violation of Subsection 475.42(1)(c), Florida Statutes and therefore in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. The case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) and was set for hearing. It was later continued and was placed in abeyance while the parties presented a stipulation to FREC. By this time Musashe had informed the agency attorney that he had sold his business and was pursuing other business interests. FREC rejected the stipulation on December 3, 1991, after Respondent Musashe made substantial changes in the standard stipulation text. Shortly thereafter, Musashe retained William M. Furlow, Esquire, and the case was again set for hearing by DOAH. On July 7, 1992, Musashe, through counsel, filed his motion to dismiss the administrative complaint. The motion to dismiss argued the agency's burden of proving the charges by clear and convincing evidence. It argued that Count I was unsupported by any allegations in the complaint or by any actual facts. The motion also argued that Count II was not supported by the allegations; that winning a drawing did not establish an employment relationship; that the women who were employed by the apartment complexes were exempt from Chapter 475, F.S., pursuant to Section 475.011(4), F.S.; and that a FREC legal advisor had issued an opinion that the type of referral business conducted by Apartment Locator Specialists did not require licensure. The motion also pointed out that although Section 475.25(1)(h), F.S., prohibits paying a fee to a nonlicensed person for referral of business, the administrative complaint did not include that charge. Moreover, since the apartment complex employees were exempt from Chapter 475, it would not have been a violation to give them a fee. And finally, they were not given a fee, but rather a chance to win a prize, not for referrals, but for mere informational telephone calls. The administrative complaint recites facts which are substantially consistent with the facts outlined in the motion to dismiss. For example, paragraph 8 of the complaint states: 8. The Respondent admitted that each time an employee of a contracted leasing office calls his office, that individual's name is put into a fish bowl, from which the drawing is held. The Respondent stated that the name is entered whether or not the client rents the apartment. The parties agreed to further abeyance of the proceeding before DOAH and to presentation of the motion to dismiss directly to the FREC. On August 18, 1992, FREC granted Respondent's motion and the administrative complaint was dismissed. The Final Order was entered on September 2, 1992. As stipulated by the parties, Nicholas A. Musashe incurred reasonable and necessary legal fees in the amount of $6,756.25, and costs in the amount of $858.62, for a total of $7,614.87.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, Sarasota Housing Authority (the Housing Authority), discriminated against Petitioner, Estella Smith (Ms. Smith), based on her disability in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (the Florida FHA), and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Smith, a 52-year-old female, testified she participated in the Section 8 program for over ten years and never had any problems until she moved to Sarasota. Ms. Smith moved into the Sarasota rental unit in October 2009. The Housing Authority is a public housing authority that administers the Section 8 program, within Sarasota County, Florida, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1437f. Under the Section 8 program, the Housing Authority uses funds, supplied by HUD, to pay a percentage of the monthly rent on a leased "unit" directly to the landlord. The Section 8 program tenant pays the balance of the monthly rent to the landlord. Ms. Smith executed a residential lease for a HUD- approved unit on September 5, 2009, to begin a one-year rental. Ms. Smith agreed to abide by all the terms and conditions of the residential lease, including the timely payment of rent and the number of occupants (one adult and one child) in the rental unit without the written consent of the landlord. On or about October 1, 2009, Ms. Smith moved from Tampa, Florida, to Sarasota, Florida, and resided at the rental unit, 3047 East Tamiami Circle, Apartment A, Sarasota, Florida. On September 8, 2009, Ms. Smith executed the Housing Authority's personal declaration/tenant information form. Under part three of this form labeled: "Family Members (including Head of Household) currently residing in unit," there were blank lines to be completed by Ms. Smith. The following information was requested: name; date of birth; social security number; disabled; Hispanic; race; and relationship. Ms. Smith (or someone at her direction) completed the form including information about herself and her sole dependant. Under the disabled heading on the line for Ms. Smith, the word "Pending" is written. Additionally, in part five of this form labeled: "Expenses," was a question, "Are you or your spouse age 62 or older and/or disabled?" Ms. Smith (or someone on her behalf) checked the box before "no" after this specific question. Ms. Smith testified she suffered a stroke sometime in 2009 and was physically affected by it. However, she was unable to reference the specific time frame except for prior to her "porting" back to Sarasota. Ms. Smith claimed to use both a walker and a wheelchair at various times since suffering the effects of the stroke. Further, she later testified that, when she was in her rental unit, the doorways were narrow but she could maneuver in it. During her initial interview with the Housing Authority in September 2009, Ms. Smith stated she was using a walker that day and never told anyone at the Housing Authority that she was disabled. Ms. Smith admitted she withheld the rent from the landlord. However, she claimed her refusal to pay the rent was based on the lack of heat in the rental unit and the suspension of her laundry room privileges. Ms. Smith further testified Bertha L. Pete (Ms. Pete) provided Ms. Smith with assistance in her daily living activities and started living in Ms. Smith's rental unit after Christmas or in late December 2009. A copy of Ms. Pete's Florida driver's license, which reflects Ms. Smith's rental unit address as Ms. Pete's residence as of January 27, 2010, was admitted into evidence. On February 10, 2010, Ms. Smith executed a request for a live-in aide with the Housing Authority. Ms. Smith named Ms. Pete to be her proposed live-in aide. The date stamp for the Housing Authority reflects that the request was received by the Housing Authority on February 17, 2010. Any proposed live- in aide has to meet the requirements imposed by the Housing Authority and HUD. Ms. Pete did not meet the requirements. Additionally, on February 17, 2010, Ms. Smith executed a verification of live-in aide form to be completed by her physician and returned to the Housing Authority. That completed form was never returned to the Housing Authority. Both parties produced an executed medical doctor's prescription with Ms. Smith's name as the patient. The hand-written notation on the prescription is "patient needs in home aid." This verbiage is not sufficient nor equivalent to the requirements listed on the verification form for a "live-in aide." The Housing Authority did not know that Ms. Smith needed a live-in aide when she completed her application in September 2009. Although Ms. Smith utilized a walker at the time of her initial interview with the Housing Authority, the Housing Authority did not know she was disabled at that time. It is not the Housing Authority's practice to inquire of someone's physical status, as that could be perceived as a discriminatory question. Sharla Frantz (Ms. Frantz), director of human resources for the Housing Authority, is the hearing officer for the Section 8 program. Ms. Frantz testified as to the process utilized in the Housing Authority's Section 8 program. Ms. Frantz testified that Ms. Smith made a request for assistance on January 27, 2010, regarding the lack of heat in her rental unit. The Housing Authority caused an inspection to be made that same day, and a deficiency was noted. The repair was completed, and the rental unit passed a follow-up inspection on February 28, 2010. However, at the time of her complaint, Ms. Smith did not discuss any other conditions or circumstances regarding the rental unit, nor was any request for a live-in aide made. On or about February 11, 2010, the Housing Authority was made aware of a possible unauthorized person living at Ms. Smith's rental unit, as well as her failure to timely pay rent. Several days later, the Housing Authority issued a letter to Ms. Smith detailing the reasons for her termination from the Section 8 program: an unauthorized person living in the rental unit and her failure to pay rent. Ms. Smith requested a hearing from the Housing Authority, which was held on March 2, 2010. As a result of the hearing, the Housing Authority issued a letter detailing the basis for Ms. Smith's termination from the Section 8 program: an unauthorized person living in the rental unit and her failure to pay rent. Ms. Smith was afforded time to prove that the rental amount was paid in full and that Ms. Pete did not live with her. Ms. Frantz testified that at the Housing Authority hearing, Ms. Smith wrote a check for the past due rental amount. However, Ms. Frantz never received proof that the payment was actually made to the landlord. Ms. Smith testified the landlord wanted the payment in cash; however, Ms. Smith did not feel comfortable paying the rent in cash, as it did not provide her with a receipt. The rent was never paid. After waiting several days, the Housing Authority issued another letter to Ms. Smith stating that Ms. Smith was terminated from the Section 8 program for two program violations. It further described that a lease agreement, brought in to the Housing Authority, did not substantiate her claim that an unauthorized person (Ms. Pete) was not living in Ms. Smith's rental unit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Estella Smith in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on her sex or an alleged handicap contrary to Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2008), Fair Housing Act, as amended (the Act).
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence received at the final hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At approximately 9:30 A.M. on February 10, 1984, petitioner, a black female, telephoned a number listed in the newspaper to inquire about a duplex for rent. She was informed that an apartment was available and that she would need to bring $410.00 which included $200.00 for a security deposit and a monthly rental fee of $210.00. Petitioner informed the lady on the telephone that she would be there to see the apartment around 11:30 A.M. Petitioner went to the bank to get the $410.00 and then drove to the Highlands Apartments rental office. When she drove up in the driveway, a lady came running out and introduced herself as Evelyn Massey. According to the petitioner, Ms. Massey said "I told you on the phone that I had an apartment for you, but I don't have." She went on to explain that another lady had previously paid a deposit on the apartment and had not come back; but, between the time of talking to petitioner that morning and then, the lady had come back and paid the rest of the money and thus had the apartment. Ms. Massey also informed the petitioner that that unit was the only apartment available and that she had no other vacancies. After this incident, petitioner telephoned Laurie J. Turner between 12:30 and 1:00 P.M., told her what had happened and requested her to call the same telephone number petitioner had called and to inquire about an apartment. Ms. Turner, a white female, did call the number given her by petitioner, a gentleman answered the telephone, she inquired about the availability of the apartment in the newspaper and he told her, according to Ms. Turner, that it was still available. Ms. Turner then related this information to petitioner. In response to petitioner's contact with the EOO on February 10, 1984, Jeanette Fenton, the Equal Opportunity Assistant/Fair Housing Administrator, began her investigation and made several telephone calls to the Highlands Apartments on that same day. According to Ms. Fenton, "various responses, contradictory responses, were received as to the availability of apartments there." Ms. Fenton also decided to send a black female and a white female as testers to determine the type of treatment that would be received at the Highlands Apartments. On February 10, 1984, Ms. Fenton called Jeanese Wells, a black female, explained that she had a complaint of discrimination against the Highlands Apartments and requested her to go out there and inquire about an apartment. Ms. Wells telephoned the Highlands Apartments on February 11, 1984, spoke to a woman who did not identify herself and inquired if there was a unit available for rent. The woman indicated that there was and gave Ms. Wells directions to the apartments. When Ms. Wells arrived, a woman named Evelyn showed her an apartment and told her that the charges and terms would be a $350.00 deposit, a $35.00 application fee and a one-year lease. Ms. Wells was also informed that her credit references and previous residences would be checked. When Ms. Wells inquired as to whether anyone else was interested in the apartment, Evelyn replied that she had had several phone calls on it, but no firm commitments. According to Ms. Wells, Evelyn showed no reluctance to lease the apartment to her and "there was no negative interaction between the two of us." Ms. Wells did not describe the apartment she inspected. On the same day, February 11, 1984, Ms. Fenton, a white female, telephoned the number listed in the newspaper, spoke with a female named Evelyn, was informed that a unit was available and was given directions to the Highlands Apartments. Ms. Fenton drove out there and inspected a one-bedroom unit, accompanied by Evelyn. According to Ms. Fenton, Evelyn informed her that the requirements for renting the unit would be a $200.00 deposit, rental payments in the amount of $60.00 a week or $210.00 a month, and a six month's lease. No application fee would be required, but there was an application form which required information regarding employment, credit references and landlord references. Ms. Fenton was told, however, that she could move into the unit that day if she wished, that there were no other apartments that were vacant and that the one-bedroom apartment she was viewing was the one that was advertised in the newspaper. Petitioner submitted her formal housing discrimination complaint to the EOO on February 15, 1984. By letter dated March 1, 1984, the EOO informed Roy Hansen that a complaint involving the Highlands Apartments had been filed and transmitted a copy of the complaint to him. The EOO continued to investigate the matter, found probable cause that a violation of the Fair Housing Ordinance had occurred and attempted conciliation. Petitioner Shorter left Hillsborough County for six to eight months between February 15, 1984 and June of 1985. During the conciliation process, petitioner no longer wished to lease a unit at the Highlands Apartments and desired to settle her complaint for an amount of $10,000.00 in damages as compensation. Mr. Hansen was willing to settle the complaint for $200.00 to avoid the expense of attorney's fees. Petitioner rejected Mr. Hansen's counter- offer and requested a hearing by letter dated June 19, 1985. Ms. Evelyn Massey left the State of Florida shortly after the events which occurred on February 10 and 11, 1984. She did not testify in this proceeding and her whereabouts are unknown. Mr. Ron Massey left Florida around November of 1984 and his whereabouts are likewise unknown. Roy Hansen is a professor of sociology at the University of South Florida, a private consultant and a part- owner of the Highlands Apartments, which contains several complexes and includes 104 separate units. He employed a manager, Ron Massey, to care for the apartments on a day-to-day basis and to handle rentals. One of the reasons Mr. Massey was hired was because he had had prior experience in managing a predominantly black rental complex. In February of 1984, Ron Massey was married to Evelyn Massey and they lived together in one of the Highlands Apartment units which was also utilized as the rental office. While Evelyn Massey did answer the telephone in that office and did show apartments to potential tenants, only Ron Massey was employed as the manager and only he received a salary therefor. Mr. Hansen instructed the Masseys to apply equal criteria to all potential tenants. Out of 104 units, approximately 17 are rented to minorities. The normal deposit required at the Highlands Apartments was $200 or $350 if the tenant had a pet.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the housing discrimination complaint filed by Julia M. Shorter on February 15, 1984, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 11th day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Julia M. Shorter 8307 Bahia Street Tampa, Florida 33619 George W. Phillips P. O. Box 270504 Tampa, Florida 33688 Amelia G. Brown Assistant County Attorney P. O. Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601 Robert W. Saunders, Director Equal Opportunity Office P. O. Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601 APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact submitted by the respondent and the intervenor have been approved and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: Respondent 3. Rejected, contrary to the evidence of record. Intervenor 1. No substantial evidence that Ms. Shorter applied for a "one bedroom apartment." 8. Rejected, not supported by competent substantial evidence.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was and is a licensed real estate broker in the state of Florida, having been issued license No. 0098626. Her address is U.S. Highway 1, Mile Marker 30, Big Pine Key, Florida. At some time during 1971, Joseph Kite met Respondent while she was employed as an associate in the office of Betty M. Brothers Real Estate on Little Torch Key, Monroe County, Florida. Mr. Kite apparently purchased some property through this real estate office, which occasioned his meeting Respondent. At some time during November of 1978, Mr. Kite contacted Respondent and requested that she find a renter for and manage the rental of his home on Big Pine Key, Florida. Respondent advised Mr. Kite that she would agree to find someone to rent the premises, but because of other business considerations, she no longer managed rental properties. Subsequently, Mr. Kite and Respondent discussed Mr. Kite's requirements concerning rental of his property. There were to be no pets or children, and any lease of the premises was to be for not less than six months duration and preferably for one year. Mr. Kite explained to Respondent that he was most concerned about vandals, since the property was to serve as his retirement home and he wanted it kept in good condition until such time as he retired and settled there. The parties agreed that Respondent would receive 15 percent of any rental charged and received by Mr. Kite on the property. Other than the above, there was no specific understanding between Mr. Kite and Respondent concerning Respondent's specific responsibilities. Kite wrote an undated letter to Respondent summarizing their agreement which provided, as follows: This is to confirm our telephone Conversation[sic] of Saturday, 25 November, 1978, in which I requested and you agreed to list my home on Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key, Florida, in your rental department. Subject to my instructions relative to the duration of the lease and the size of the family occuping[sic] the property you are to use your own judgement[sic] in all details pertinent to the lease and you are hereby authorized to do so. . . . Respondent rented the property to an initial tenant for a period of one year, collected the first and last months' rent and a security deposit, and forwarded the first and last months' rent to Mr. Kite. Subsequently, she sent the next two months' rent to Mr. Kite. Thereafter, the tenant became ill, vacated the property, and returned to his home in Philadelphia. The property stood vacant for approximately two months. Respondent then rented the premises for a period of three months. The tenants moved out of the house at the expiration of the three-month period. Respondent rented the property a third time in July of 1979 to a man who signed the lease under the name of "John Brown." At the time the lease was signed, Respondent had no reason to believe that the lessee had any name other than "John Brown." On July 28, 1979, "Brown" returned to Respondent's office with his mother and made an offer to purchase the property. The offer to purchase was submitted in the name of "Jeffrey Benz." At about this time, Respondent also learned that this individual had approximately one year previously used the name "Jeffrey Benn" or "John Benn." The record in this cause does not establish the true identity of this individual. However, Respondent attempted to communicate this difference in names directly to Mr. Kite by mail, but was apparently unsuccessful. Respondent did communicate this difference in names to Mr. Kite's sister-in-law, with whom she often communicated because Mr. Kite, who was engaged in the construction business, often could not be contacted. In any event, Mr. Kite learned in either August or September of 1979 that "Brown" and "Benz" were the same persons, and thereafter continued to accept rental payments from him. Further, Mr. Kite was not interested in selling the property, so the offer to purchase from "Benz" came to nothing. In early 1980 "Brown" or "Benz" ceased making rental payments under the terms of the lease. Thereafter, pursuant to instructions from Mr. Kite, Respondent instituted and successfully concluded eviction proceedings. In mid-April, 1980, a severe squall passed through the Big Pine Key area, doing extensive damage to the house located on the property. Respondent and her employees observed the damage, and performed some cursory cleanup, and secured the property so that it would not be vandalized until Mr. Kite's return. Upon resumption of possession of the house, Mr. Kite apparently was under the impression that damage to the home had been caused by the prior tenant. However, there is absolutely no direct evidence in this record that "Brown" or "Benz" in any way caused damage to the property. The only direct testimony of record in this proceeding concerning the source of damage is that it occurred as a result of the April storm.
Findings Of Fact Plotkin is the owner and operator of the Rendale Hotel located at 3120 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, which has been operated by Plotkin, a family owned corporation, for more than twenty-five years. The apartment/hotel has 98 studio apartments. In the Spring of 1972, after Plotkin corresponded with DOR, it made the determination that it was exempt from the imposition of sales tax on the rentals it charges. Plotkin made the same determination for consecutive years through and including 1978. Early in September 1978, DOR caused an audit to be made of Plotkin's records and determined that Plotkin was not an exempt facility and that taxes were due for the three years prior to September , 1978, for all rentals to "non- permanent" guests. DOR's auditor utilized only the transcript of guest charges in making his determination. The transcript was compiled from April 1, 1975, a period beyond three years prior to the date of the audit. A transcript is a compilation generally prepared by the night clerk of all the active folio cards or guest ledge cards for that particular day. When tenants or guests were absent from the apartment hotel for various periods of time, they were not carried on the transcript. At times when a tenant had no charges for a particular day, the tenant was not carried on the transcript. As of April 1, 1975, Plotkin had 87 units occupied. As of June 30, 1975, it had 55 units occupied. Thirty of those units were occupied continually during that test period in 1975. As of April 1, 1976, 80 units were occupied and as of June 30, 1976, 55 units were occupied. Twenty-five units were continuously occupied during that three month test period. As of April 1, 1977, 95 units were occupied and as of June 30, 1977, 50 units were occupied. During the test period, 29 units were occupied for a continuous period of time.
The Issue The two issues raised in this proceeding are: (1) whether the basis and reason Respondent, Vestcor Companies, d/b/a Madalyn Landings (Vestcor), terminated Petitioner, Carlos Gomez's (Petitioner), employment on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for Petitioner's protected conduct during his normal course of employment; and (2) whether Vestcor committed unlawful housing practice by permitting Vestcor employees without families to reside on its property, Madalyn Landing Apartments, without paying rent, while requiring Vestcor employees with families to pay rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended, and Chapter 760.23, Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the demeanor and candor of each witness while testifying, exhibits offered in support of and in opposition to the respective position of the parties received in evidence, stipulations of the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (2002), and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant, material, and substantial facts are determined: Petitioner filed charges of housing discrimination against Vestcor with the Commission on August 30, 2002. Petitioner alleged that Vestcor discriminated against him based on his familial status and his June 28, 2002, termination was in retaliation for filing the charge of discrimination. Vestcor denied the allegations and contended that Petitioner's termination was for cause. Additionally, Vestcor maintained Petitioner relinquished his claim of retaliation before the final hearing; and under oath during his deposition, asserted he would not pursue a claim for retaliation. Petitioner was permitted to proffer evidence of retaliation because Vestcor terminated his employment. The Commission's Notice was issued on January 7, 2005. The parties agree that Petitioner was hired by Vestcor on June 25, 2001, as a leasing consultant agent for Madalyn Landing Apartments located in Palm Bay, Florida. Petitioner's job responsibilities as a leasing consultant agent included showing the property, leasing the property (apartment units), and assisting with tenant relations by responding to concerns and questions, and preparing and following up on maintenance orders. Petitioner had access to keys to all apartments on site. At the time of his hire, Petitioner was, as was all of Vestcor employees, given a copy of Vestcor's Employee Handbook. This handbook is required reading for each employee for personal information and familiarity with company policies and procedures, to include the company requirement that each employee personally telephone and speak with his/her supervisor when the employee, for whatever reason, could not appear at work as scheduled, which is a basis and cause for termination. The parties agree that Vestcor's handbook, among other things, contains company policies regarding equal employment; prohibition against unlawful conduct and appropriate workplace conduct; procedures for handling employee problems and complaints associated with their employment; and procedures for reporting illness or absences from work, which include personal notification to supervisors, and not messages left on the answering service. Failure to comply with employment reporting polices may result in progressive disciplinary action. The parties agree that employee benefits were also contained in the handbook. One such employee benefit, at issue in this proceeding, is the live-on-site benefit. The live-on- site benefit first requires eligible employees to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, and be a full-time employee. The eligible employee must pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the live-on-site unit. Rent-free, live-on-site benefits are available only to employees who occupy the positions of (1) site community managers, (2) maintenance supervisors, and (3) courtesy officers. These individuals received a free two-bedroom, two-bathroom apartment at the apartment complex in which they work as part of their employment compensation package. The rent-free, live-on-site benefit is not available for Vestcor's leasing consultant agent employees, such as Petitioner. On or about July 3, 2001, Petitioner entered into a lease agreement with Vestcor to move into Apartment No. 202-24 located at Madalyn Landing Apartments. The lease agreement ended on January 31, 2002. The lease agreement set forth terms that Petitioner was to receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, which became effective on September 3, 2001. Although he was eligible for the 25-percent monthly rental concession, to have given Petitioner the full 25 percent of his monthly rental cost would have over-qualified Petitioner based upon Madalyn Landing Apartment's tax credit property status. Petitioner and Vestcor agreed he would receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, thereby qualifying him as a resident on the property. Petitioner understood and accepted the fact that he did not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. Petitioner understood and accepted Vestcor's $50.00 monthly rental concession because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. The rental concession meant Petitioner's regular monthly rental would be reduced by $50.00 each month. On September 1, 2001, Henry Oliver was hired by Vestcor as a maintenance technician. Maintenance technicians do not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Oliver did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Oliver was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 13, 2001, Michael Gomez, the brother of Petitioner (Mr. Gomez), commenced his employment with Vestcor as a groundskeeper. Groundskeepers did not meet the qualifications for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Gomez did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Gomez was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 21, 2001, 81 days after his hire, Mr. Oliver commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 203-44 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Mr. Oliver's leasing consultant agent was Petitioner in this cause. Like other eligible Vestcor employees and as a part of the lease application process, Mr. Oliver completed all required paperwork, which included, but not limited to, completing a credit check, employment verification, and income test to ensure that he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Fifteen days later, on November 28, 2001, Mr. Gomez commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. As part of the leasing process, Mr. Gomez, as other eligible Vestcor employees who intend to reside on Vestcor property, completed all necessary paperwork including, but not limited to, a credit check and employment verification and income test to ensure he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Included in the paperwork was a list of rental criteria requiring Mr. Gomez to execute a lease agreement to obligate himself to pay the required rent payment, consent to a credit check, pay an application fee and required security deposit, and agree not to take possession of an apartment until all supporting paperwork was completed and approved. Mr. Gomez's leasing consultant was Petitioner. On December 28, 2001, Petitioner signed a Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 206-24, effective February 1, 2002. The Notice to Vacate was placed in Vestcor's office files. Petitioner's reasons for vacating his apartment stated he "needed a yard, garage, more space, a big family room, and some privacy." Thirty-four days later, February 1, 2002, Mr. Gomez moved into Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments without the approval or knowledge of Vestcor management. On January 9, 2002, a "Corrective Action Notice" was placed in Petitioner's employee file by his supervisor, Genea Closs. The notice cited two violations of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Specifically, his supervisor noted Petitioner did not collect administration fees from two unidentified rental units, and he had taken an unidentified resident's rental check home with him, rather than directly to the office as required by policy. As a direct result of those policy violations, Ms. Closs placed Petitioner on 180 days' probation and instructed him to re-read all Vestcor employees' handbook and manuals. Petitioner acknowledged receiving and understanding the warning. At the time she took the above action against Petitioner, there is no evidence that Ms. Closs had knowledge of Petitioner's past or present efforts to gather statements and other information from Mr. Gomez and/or Mr. Oliver in anticipation and preparation for his subsequent filing of claims of discrimination against Vestcor. Also, on January 9, 2002, Petitioner was notified that his brother, Mr. Gomez, did not qualify to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments because of insufficient credit. Further, Petitioner was advised that should Mr. Gomez wish to continue with the application process, he would need a co-signer on his lease agreement or pay an additional security deposit. Mr. Gomez produced an unidentified co-signer, who also completed a lease application. On January 30, 2002, the lease application submitted by Mr. Gomez's co-signor was denied. As a result of the denial of Mr. Gomez's co-signor lease application, Vestcor did not approve Mr. Gomez's lease application. When he was made aware that his co-signor's application was denied and of management's request for him to pay an additional security deposit, as was previously agreed, Mr. Gomez refused to pay the additional security deposit. As a direct result of his refusal, his lease application was never approved, and he was not authorized by Vestcor to move into any Madalyn Landing's rental apartment units. At some unspecified time thereafter, Vestcor's management became aware that Mr. Gomez had moved into Apartment No. 206-24, even though he was never approved or authorized to move into an on site apartment. Vestcor's management ordered Mr. Gomez to remove his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24. Subsequent to the removal order, Mr. Gomez moved his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24 into Apartment No. 103-20. Mr. Gomez's move into Apartment No. 103-20, as was his move into Apartment No. 206-04, was without approval and/or authorization from Vestcor's management. Upon learning that his belonging had been placed in Apartment No. 103-20, Mr. Gomez was again instructed by management to remove his belongings. After he failed and refused to move his belongings from Apartment No. 103-20, Vestcor's management entered the apartment and gathered and discarded Mr. Gomez's belongings. As a leasing contract agent, Petitioner had access to keys to all vacant apartments. His brother, Mr. Gomez, who was a groundskeeper, did not have access to keys to any apartment, save the one he occupied. Any apartment occupied by Ms. Gomez after his Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 103-20 was without the knowledge or approval of Vestcor and in violation of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Therefore, any period of apartment occupancy by Mr. Gomez was not discriminatory against Petitioner (rent-free and/or reduced rent), but was a direct violation of Vestcor's policies. On February 10, 2002, Mr. Oliver signed a one-year lease agreement with Vestcor. Mr. Oliver's lease agreement reflected a 25-percent employee rental concession. Throughout Mr. Oliver's occupancy of Apartment No. 203-64 and pursuant to his lease agreement duration, Mr. Oliver's rental history reflected his monthly payment of $413.00. There is no evidence that Mr. Oliver lived on site without paying rent or that Vestcor authorized or permitted Mr. Oliver to live on site without paying rent, as alleged by Petitioner. On June 2, 2002, Ms. Closs completed Petitioner's annual performance appraisal report. Performance ratings range from a one -- below expectations, to a four -- exceeds expectations. Petitioner received ratings in the categories appraised as follows: Leasing skills -- 4; Administrative skills -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork, computer updating, and policy adherence; Marketing skills -- 4, with comments that Petitioner had a flair for finding the right markets; Community awareness -- 3, with no comment; Professionalism -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork reporting; Dependability -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in attendance; Interpersonal skills -- 3, with no comments; Judgment/Decision-making -- 3, with no comments; Quality of Work -- 2, with comments that work lacked accuracy; Initiative -- 4, with no comment; Customer service -- 3, with no comments; Team work -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in the area of resident confidence; Company loyalty -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in adherence to company policy and procedures; and Training and development -- 3, with no comments. Petitioner's Overall rating was 2.5, with comments that there was "room for improvement." On June 27, 2002, while on 180 days' probation that began on January 9, 2002, Petitioner failed to report to work and failed to report his absence to his supervisor, Ms. Closs, by a person-to-person telephone call. This conduct constituted a violation of Vestcor's policy requiring all its employees to personally contact their supervisor when late and/or absent from work and prohibited leaving messages on the community answering service machine. On June 28, 2002, Petitioner reported to work. Ms. Closs, his supervisor, informed Petitioner of his termination of employment with Vestcor for failure to report to work (i.e. job abandonment) and for probation violation, as he had been warned on January 9, 2002, what would happen should a policy violation re-occur. It was after his June 28, 2002, termination that Petitioner began his personal investigation and gathering of information (i.e., interviews and statements from other Vestcor employees) in preparation to file this complaint. Considering the findings favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by Vestcor, when they terminated his employment on June 28, 2002. Considering the findings of record favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of housing and/or rental adjustment discrimination by Vestcor, based upon familial status of himself or any other employer. Petitioner failed to prove Vestcor knowingly and/or intentionally permitted, approved, or allowed either Mr. Gomez or Mr. Oliver to live on site without a completed and approved application followed by appropriate rent adjustments according to their employment status and keeping within the tax credit requirement, while requiring Vestcor employees with families (or different employment status) to pay a different monthly rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Petitioner failed to prove his termination on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for his actions and conduct other than his personal violation, while on probation, of Vestcor's policies and procedures.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Florida Commission on Human Rights enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief alleging discrimination filed by Petitioner, Carlos Gomez. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2005.
The Issue The issue to be resolved concerns whether the Petitioner was the victim of a discriminatory housing practice, by allegedly being denied the opportunity to rent an apartment from the Respondents, and by being falsely informed of its non- availability, based upon her race.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an African-American female. In early January 2007, she learned of an apartment for rent, owned or managed by the Respondents. She called to inquire about the apartment and was told by the Respondent, Ms. Lindsay, that the rent would be $625.00 per month, with a one-month rent amount and security deposit due in advance. She was told that the Lessee of a neighboring apartment, Clint Cook, would have a key and would show her the apartment. She went to view the apartment, and decided that she wished to rent it. She then telephoned Ms. Lindsay, and Ms. Lindsey faxed an application to her to complete. In the conversation, she told Ms. Lindsay she would not have the required deposit money until Friday. This was on a Monday or Tuesday. Ms. Lindsay then told her securing the apartment was on a “first come-first-served” basis. The Petitioner never completed the application and never tendered the security deposit. Shortly after that telephone conversation, Ms. Lindsay was contacted by Stacey Edwards, while the apartment was still available for rent, concerning rental. Ms. Edwards, on behalf of herself and her boyfriend/husband, submitted an application to rent the apartment, together with the appropriate required deposit and rental amount on January 15, 2007. Ms. Lindsay leased the apartment to the couple. They had a planned move-in date of February 1, 2007. They are a mixed-race couple, and Ms. Lindsay was aware of that fact when renting to them. Sometime after January 15, 2007, the Petitioner called Ms. Lindsay a second time, and was told that the apartment had been rented (to the Edwards couple) and was no longer available. Testimony to this effect is corroborated by the Edwards rental application and deposit receipt, which are in evidence. The Edwards rental was documented on January 15, 2007. Later that month, the Petitioner noticed the “for rent" sign displayed, or displayed again, and she and/or her witness, Lynn Kliesch, called about the apartment’s availability. Ms. Lindsay again stated that it was rented. Indeed, it was, to the Edwards. The rental sign had been left up because the Edwards couple were not scheduled to move in until February 1, 2007. This communication between the parties occurred before Ms. Edwards informed Ms. Lindsay that they would not be moving in. Shortly before February 1,2007. Ms Edwards and her husband/boyfriend learned that his employment had ended (or he was transferred to another job location). They therefore informed Ms. Lindsay that they had to re-locate to South Florida and could not take the apartment. She charged them for the two weeks of rental, and refunded their deposit. She then placed the apartment back on the rental market. On January 31, 2007, Ms. Mari Ferguson inquired of Ms. Lindsay about the apartment’s availability. This was after Ms. Edwards had informed Ms. Lindsay that she would not be renting the apartment. Ms. Lindsay told Ms. Ferguson that the property was available and she rented it to Ms. Ferguson that same day. Ms. Ferguson and her boyfriend, who occupied the apartment with her, were also a mixed-race couple, with children. In fact, the boyfriend is the nephew of the Petitioner herein. Ms. Ferguson and family moved into the apartment. Some months later a hostile situation arose between the Respondents and Ms. Ferguson. Ms. Lindsay apparently received reports that “drug dealing” was occurring in the apartment. Ms. Ferguson and/or the other occupants were responsible for some damage, and Ms. Ferguson became several months behind on rental payments. The Respondents therefore, through legal process, had her evicted. The Respondent, Ms. Lindsay, through her firm, Elite Properties of Northwest Florida, Inc., manages some 37 rental properties in Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties. She is the president and broker for the firm and has no employees or agents. Among the rental property owners she and her firm represent is her Co-Respondent, Michael Houser. Both Ms. Lindsay and Elite Properties, as well as Mr. Houser, have a significant number of minority tenants, both Hispanic and African-American. A substantial number of those, both historically, and at the time of the hearing are single, African-American females, as heads of households. There is no evidence, aside from the Petitioner’s unsubstantiated opinion, that either the Respondent has ever refused to rent to the Petitioner or anyone else, based upon race, nor that they have falsely denied availability of a dwelling for rent or sale for that reason. There is no evidence that they have refused or attempted to avoid holding out a property for rent or sale for reasons based on racial animus.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, determining that the Respondents did not commit a discriminatory housing practice based upon the Petitioner's race and that the Petition be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sylvia Mims 3382 Greenbriar Circle, Apt. B Gulf Breeze, Florida 32561 Beverly Lindsay 5252 Springdale Drive Milton, Florida 32570 Michael Houser 3533 Edinburgh Drive Pace, Florida 32571 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
