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CLOSE CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 09-004996BID (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Sep. 14, 2009 Number: 09-004996BID Latest Update: Jul. 13, 2011

The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Close Construction, Inc. (Petitioner), (Close) was the lowest responsive and responsible bidder in the Request For Bid (RFB) Number 6000000262, whether the subject contract should be awarded to the Petitioner, and, concomitantly, whether the Respondent agency's decision to award the contract to the Intervener, Worth Contracting, Inc. (Worth) was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary or capricious.

Findings Of Fact The South Florida Water Management District is a public corporation authorized under Chapter 373, Florida Statutes. It issued a request for bids for the refurbishment and automation of certain facilities in Broward County, Florida. Close is a construction company duly authorized to do business in the state of Florida. It was one of the bidders on the procurement represented by the subject request for bids and is the Petitioner in this case. This dispute had its beginnings on June 5, 2009, when the Respondent issued RFB number 6000000262. The RFB solicited construction services for the refurbishment and automation of two facilities in Broward County. The procurement would involve the installation of new direct-drive electric pumps at the Respondent's G-123 Pump Station in Broward County, along with the construction of an equipment shelter and the replacement of a retaining wall with a poured concrete retaining wall, as well as refurbishment of "pump flap gates." The RFB also requested construction services for the replacement of gates at the Respondent's S-34 water-control structure in Broward County. Both facilities would thus be automated so that they can be remotely operated from the Respondent's headquarters in West Palm Beach. After issuance of the RFB, two addenda were supplied to vendors and were posted. The first addendum was posted on or about June 19, 2009, concerning a change in specifications for flap gates and is not the subject of this dispute. Addendum No. Two was electronically posted on or about June 30, 2009. It amended the technical specifications of the RFB by deleting Section 11212 regarding measurement of payment of electric motors/belt-driven axial flow pumps. That addendum also added a new measure and payment to Subpart 1.01 of the technical specifications to provide for an owner-directed allowance of $40,000.00 to provide for the potential need for certain electrical utility work to be done by FPL in order to complete the project. Addendum No. Two added an additional term to the RFB in providing that the $40,000.00 allowance price "Shall be added to the other costs to complete the bid." The second Addendum also stated, "The allowance price shall be used at the discretion of the District and, if not used, will be deducted from the final Contract Price." That addendum also directed bidders to replace the original Bid Form 00320-2, which had been enclosed with the RFB, with a new Bid Form, 00320R1-2. The new Bid Form is identical to the original form except that the schedule of bid prices contained in paragraph four, on page 003201-2, was altered to itemize the $40,000.00 discretionary cost allowance. The original form had contained a single line for the bidder's lump sum bid price, whereas the revised form provided for a lump sum bid amount to be itemized and a base bid amount, which required the bidder to enter on the form the amount of its bid, then add the discretionary cost amount and write the sum of those two numbers on a third line. In paragraph four of the new bid form there is re- printed language concerning the use of the discretionary allowance which appeared on the face of Addendum No. Two. Other than the change to paragraph four and the alteration of the page numbers to include an "R" in the page number, the revised bid form is identical to the original bid form. The other bid documents were not altered in any manner by Addendum No. Two. The deadline for bid submissions was Thursday, July 9, 2009, at 2:30 p.m. The Petitioner timely submitted its bid to the District. In submitting its bid however, the Petitioner used the original bid form which had been enclosed with the RFB. The bid form submitted was an exact copy of the bid form furnished by the District which Close had printed from the electronic copy of the RFB received from the District. The Petitioner did not substitute the revised bid form, attached to Addendum No. Two, for the original form in submitting its bid. The Petitioner's bid was deemed non-responsive by the District and was rejected on the basis that Close had failed to submit the bid on the revised form required by Addendum No. Two. Thereafter, the District, at its August 13, 2009, meeting, approved award of the bid to Worth. The intent to award was posted electronically on or about August 14, 2009. The persuasive evidence establishes that Close received both addenda to the bid documents. It was aware of the Addendum No. Two, and it accounted for all of the changes to the technical specifications made in both addenda in the preparation of its bid. The evidence shows that Close was aware of the $40,000.00, owner-directed cost allowance and that it incorporated it in the formulation of its total bid price. Thus, Close's final bid amount was $3,751,795.00. That number included the $40,000.00 cost allowance at issue, added to the bid documents by Addendum No. Two. The internal bid work sheets, prepared by personnel of Close, identified and itemized the $40,000.00 discretionary cost allowance as a component of the final bid price. The persuasive evidence thus establishes that Close's final bid amount did include the $40,000.00 cost allowance. Moreover, the written notes of witness Christopher Rossi, the estimator for Close, show the $40,000.00 amount as an "FPL Allowance." Both Mr. Rossi and Mr. Boromei, the Vice President for Close, who prepared the bid, explained that the $40,000.00 was understood by Close to be a cost allowance, that it would only be charged to the District to the extent that it was actually used, at the District's discretion. If it were not used, it was to be deducted from the overall contract price. Addendum Two specifically provides that the discretionary cost allowance was to be used only at the discretion of the District and that the unused portion would be deducted from the contract amount. When Close submitted its bid it mistakenly submitted it on the original bid form and failed to exchange the bid forms as directed in Item Two of Addendum No. 2. In paragraph one of both bid forms, however, the bidder is required to specifically fill out, acknowledge and identify all addenda. By doing so the bidder expressly agrees to build the project in conformance with all contract documents, including all addenda, for the price quoted in the bid. Close completed this paragraph, specifically identified both Addendum One and Addendum Two, and specifically agreed to strictly conform, in performance of the work to the plans, specifications and other contract documents, including Addendum Nos. One and Two. Paragraph one was not changed by the addition of Addendum No. Two and it is identical in both the original and the revised forms at issue. Paragraph one of the original and the revised bid forms constitutes an agreement by the bidder to perform and construct a project "in strict conformity with the plans, specifications and other Contract Documents. . . ." The addenda are part of the contract documents and are expressly referenced as such in this agreement. Both bid forms, the original and the revised, include paragraph eight, which clearly states that the bidder will post a bid bond to secure and guaranty that it will enter into a contract with the District, if its bid is selected. Paragraph eight was unchanged by Addendum No. Two and its terms are identical in both Bid forms at issue, including the form that Close signed and submitted as its bid. The persuasive evidence shows that in submitting its bid, whether on either form, Close committed itself to the identical terms as set forth in the identical contract documents agreed to by Worth and the other bidders. The evidence established that Close intended to bind itself to the terms of the RFB, and all terms of Addendum No. Two, including the discretionary cost allowance term. Close considered itself bound to enter into a contract for the price of its bid if selected by the District. It likewise considered that the price of its bid, would only include the cost allowance if the discretionary allowance was implemented by the District. Upon the opening of the bids, the firm of Cone and Graham, Inc., was identified as the lowest bidder. Cone and Graham's bid was in the amount of $2,690,000.00. Close was the second lowest bidder, with a bid of $3,751,795.00. The third lowest bidder was Worth Contracting, Inc., with a bid of $3,898,410.00. Cone and Graham was allowed to provide additional information and to even meet with some District staff following the opening of its bid. The additional information it was allowed to provide concerned technical specifications of the pumps proposed in its bid. Through this verification process conducted with the Agency, Cone and Graham ultimately convinced the District to permit them to withdraw its bid without forfeiting their bid bond. This left the Petitioner, Close, the lowest bidder, at $146,615.00 less than the bid submitted by Worth, the initially-awarded bidder. Close's bid, upon review, was rejected as non- responsive due to its failure to exchange the original Bid form with the revised Bid form, as indicated above, in spite of the fact that Close had also agreed to adhere to the entirety of Addendum No. Two on the face of the Bid form. Thus the recommended award to Worth for the above-referenced additional amount of bid price was adopted by the District, engendering this protest. James Reynolds, the Contracts Specialist for the District, conceded that it was apparent on the face of Close's bid that a mistake had been made in the use of the original form, rather than the revised form. He conceded there was an inconsistency between Close's clear acknowledgement of and agreement to the terms of the contract documents, which expressly included Addendum No. Two and Close's apparent mistaken use of the original Bid form. Under the express terms of Article 19.03 of the RFB, "The Bid shall be construed as though the addendum(a) have been received and acknowledged by the bidder." Mr. Reynolds admitted, however, that he did not apply the terms of Article 19.03 of the RFB in his review of Close's bid and did not construe the bid in the manner provided in the RFB to resolve the apparent inconsistency. He reasoned that Close had used the wrong bid form and looked no further. The District's Procurement Manual provides a procedure whereby a bidder may correct inadvertent mistakes in its bid. Under the terms of Chapter 5-5 of that manual, where the District knows or has reason to conclude, after unsealing of bids, that a mistake may have been made by a bidder, the District "shall request written verification of the bid." In such a circumstance the bidder "shall be permitted the opportunity to furnish information in support of the bid verification as long as it does not affect responsiveness, i.e., the bid substantially conforms to the requirements of the RFB as it relates to pricing, surety, insurance, specifications and any other matter unequivocally stated in the RFB as determinant of responsiveness." See Joint Exhibit 7,6 pages 61 and 62, in evidence. Mr. Reynolds admitted in his testimony that he did not follow the procedure set forth in the manual for verifying a bid because, in his view, that would be allowing an impermissible supplementation of Close's bid. Ms. Lavery, in her testimony, in essence agreed. The Procurement Manual expressly required the District, upon recognizing the mistake and an inconsistency apparent on the face of Close's bid, to verify that bid and to provide Close with the opportunity to furnish information in support of bid verification. Thus, by the express terms of the manual, a bidder must be given an opportunity to clarify mistakes. The Procurement Manual expressly permits a bidder under these circumstances to correct any "inadvertent, non- judgmental mistake" in its bid. Chapter 5 of the Manual provides that "a non-judgmental mistake" is a mistake not attributable to an error in judgment, such as mistakes in personal judgment or wrongful assumptions of contract obligations. Inadvertent technical errors, such as errors of form rather than substance, are considered non-judgmental errors." See Joint Exhibit 7, page 62, in evidence. It is patently apparent that Close's use of the original bid form, inadvertently, while also unequivocally acknowledging and agreeing to the entirety of Addendum No. Two, represented a non-judgmental mistake. Both of the District witnesses, however, testified that the policy regarding mistakes was not followed and Close was not given an opportunity under the District's policy to provide additional information to support verification of the bid. Although Close failed to substitute the revised Bid form for the original Bid form, as called for by Addendum No. Two, its bid was substantively responsive to the technical specifications and requirements of the RFB, and the irregularity is technical in nature. The parties stipulated that the use of the original form, rather than the revised bid form, was the sole basis for Close being determined to be non-responsive by the Agency. In accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-7.301, in Chapter 5 of the District's Procurement Manual, the District reserves the right to waive minor irregularities in a bid. A material irregularity is defined by the District's policy as one which is not minor in that it: (a) affects the price, quality, time or manner of performance of the service such that it would deprive the District of an assurance that the contract will be entered into, performed and guaranteed according to the specified requirements; (b) provides an advantage or benefit to a bidder which is not enjoyed by other bidders; or (c) undermines the necessary common standards of competition. See Joint Exhibit 7, page 58, in evidence. The preponderant, persuasive evidence shows that the irregularity in Close's bid did not affect the price of the bid or truly deprive the District of assurance that the contract would be entered into and performed according to all the terms of the RFB, including addenda. The evidence established that Close actually included the $40,000.00 discretionary cost allowance in its final bid price. It merely did not show it as a separate itemization, because it did not use the revised form providing that itemization line. The fact that the discretionary allowance was itemized in the revised bid form, as part of the bid amount, does not equate to an effect on the contract price as a result of Close's using the original Bid form. Close's error, by mistakenly submitting its bid on the original bid form, did not alter the price of its bid. The evidence clearly established that the bid price for Close's bid would be the same regardless of which form it used. Moreover, the preponderant, persuasive evidence establishes that the use of the original Bid form by Close did not deprive the District of assurance that the contract would be performed in accordance with the all bid documents. Close's bid, secured by its bid bond, clearly acknowledged and agreed to the express terms of Addendum No. Two in their entirety, which included the terms under which the discretionary cost allowance could be applied. Close considered itself bound to the terms of the RFB and assured the Agency that it was so bound by the written acknowledgement and agreement it submitted to the Agency as part of its bid, concerning the elements of Addendum No. Two. The evidence demonstrated that Close understood that the $40,000.00 amount was a discretionary cost allowance and that Close would not be entitled to it unless the District decided to use it. Despite the opinion of Agency witnesses to the contrary, the error in Close's bid was a technical one and non- material because it did not confer a competitive advantage upon Close. Close's use of the wrong form did not alter the price of its bid. Its mistake in the use of the original bid form could only change the relative, competitive positions of Close and Worth if the amount of the discretionary cost allowance was greater or equal to the difference between those two bids, i.e., the $146,650.00 amount by which Worth's bid exceeded the bid of Close. 1/ The bid of Worth exceeds Close's bid by an amount far greater than the amount at issue in the discretionary cost allowance identified in Addendum No. Two and expressly itemized in the revised Bid form, i.e. $40,000.00. The District contends that Close gained some competitive economic advantage over other bidders by having the means by which it could optionally withdraw its bid, based upon alleged non-responsiveness, in not substituting the revised Bid form which would contain the itemization of the $40,000.00 cost allowance. It is difficult to see how it could gain a competitive advantage versus other bidders through some perceived ability to deem itself non-responsive, at its option, and withdraw its bid, thus denying itself the contract. The competitive bidding laws are designed to prevent a firm from gaining a competitive advantage in obtaining a contract versus the efforts of other bidders, not in depriving itself of the opportunity to get the work. Moreover, concerning the argument by the District that this may confer the advantage to Close of allowing it to withdraw its bid at its option and still obtain a refund of its bid bond; even if that occurred, it would not confer a competitive advantage vis-à-vis other bidders. It would merely involve a potential pecuniary advantage to Close's interest, versus that of the Agency itself, which obviously is not a bidder. Moreover, it should again be pointed out that Cone and Graham was allowed to provide additional information concerning its bid elements, and even to meet with the District staff, following the opening of the bids. It was then allowed to withdraw its bid without forfeiting its bid bond. If the District had inquired, by way of verification of Close's bid, as to whether the discretionary cost amount was included in it's bid, that inquiry does not equate to allowing Close to unlawfully supplement its bid. Indeed, if in response to such an inquiry, Close announced that the discretionary allowance was not included in its bid, its bid at that point would be materially non-responsive to the specifications. If Close was then allowed to supplement its bid by changing its price to add the allowance, such would indeed be an unfair competitive advantage and a violation of law on the part of Close and the Agency. The evidence does not show that such happened or was proposed by any party. If a verification inquiry had been made and Close announced that, indeed, its bid price did include the subject discretionary cost allowance, without further response to the specifications being added, then no competitive advantage would be afforded Close and no legal violation would occur. In fact, however, as pointed out above, the verification request, pursuant to the District's policy manual, was never made. This was despite the fact that the District's witness, Mr. Reynolds, acknowledged that the use of the original bid form was an apparent mistake on the face of the bid, when considered in conjunction with Close's express agreement to construct the project in strict conformance with all contract documents, and particularly with regard to Addenda Numbers One and Two. The non-judgmental mistake, involving use of the original bid form in lieu of the revised bid form, could have been easily clarified by a verification inquiry. That policy was not followed, based solely on the fact that the wrong bid form was used, even though the preponderant, persuasive evidence shows that in all material and substantive respects the bid was a conforming, responsive bid and included in its price the discretionary cost allowance. The preponderance of the evidence shows that the mistaken use of the original Bid form was a non- material irregularity under the District's policies and the terms of the RFB. The District's actions in failing to uniformly apply its own bid verification policy when, in fact, it had allowed verification to one of the other bidders, and when, according to its own witness, it perceived an apparent mistake, was clearly erroneous. It is true that Close may not supplement its bid by changing material terms, but it is permitted to verify whether, in light of the mistaken use of the original Bid form, its bid price, as submitted, included the $40,000.00 discretionary allowance or not. Providing such "yes or no" type of additional information in order to clarify, and only clarify, information already submitted in the bid, in response to an inquiry by the District does not constitute "supplementation" of the bid for purposes of Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2008). NCS Pearson, Inc. v. Dept of Education, 2005 WL 31776, at page 18 (DOAH, Feb. 8, 2005). Even without verification of the bid, the bid on its face agrees to compliance with all terms and specifications, including Addendum No. Two. It is thus determined that there is no material irregularity. The bid submitted by Close does not afford it any competitive advantage vis-à-vis the other bidders and it is responsive.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the South Florida Water Management District, awarding the subject contract for RFB 6000000262 to the Petitioner herein, Close Construction, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2010.

Florida Laws (3) 1.01120.569120.57 Florida Administrative Code (1) 40E-7.301
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STATE PAVING CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 87-003848BID (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-003848BID Latest Update: Oct. 01, 1987

Findings Of Fact On or about June 3, 1987, DOT advertised that it would receive bids on State Project No. 97870-334, etc. in Dade, Broward and Palm Beach Counties to improve portions of the Florida Turnpike. On June 24, 1987, bids were received by DOT from Gilbert, State Paving and Archer Western Contractors. The apparent low bidder at bid opening on June 24, 1987, was Gilbert and State Paving was apparent second low bidder. DOT was informally advised by John Beck, an attorney representing State Paving, that Gilbert's bid was believed to be unbalanced and the appropriate officials referred the issue to the DOT Bureau of Estimates to look into the low bid to see if it was unbalanced to the detriment of the State. Review of the Gilbert bid began with an internal analysis of the bid prices in comparison to the DOT Estimate of the Work. All bid prices above or below a certain percent of the engineer's estimate of costs were prepared in a computer printout and those items were checked by the consultants on the project. Basically, the major items in the project, which comprises some 400 bid items, were broken down to 10 groupings and the bids for each item in these groups was prepared for the three bidders and tabulated in Exhibit 2. The DOT Technical Committee reviewed the bids and concluded there was no unbalancing in Gilbert's bid which was detrimental to the State. This recommendation was approved by the Awards Committee which had also been furnished the information in Exhibit 2 by the consulting engineer for the project. Based upon this information, the Awards Committee concluded that the awards should go to Gilbert as no unbalancing detrimental to the State was found. Specification made a part of all DOT bid proposals provide that DOT may reject an unbalanced bid. As a matter of policy, DOT only rejects unbalanced bids deemed contrary to the interests of the State. Bids may be unbalanced in numerous ways. One significant method is known as front loading where the bidder submits a high bid for the work to be done at the beginning of the project such as clearing and grubbing and low bids for the work done later in the project. If successful in getting the award, this bidder would have excess profits on the clearing and grubbing which could draw interest while the less profitable later work was being done. Another variant is to study the plans and specifications to see if the quantities listed in the bid proposal are accurately reflected in the plans and specifications. If not, those items for which the bid proposal shows more than the plans and specifications reasonably required can be bid low, and for those items by which the bid proposal shows less than actually will be required can be bid high. Since the contractor is paid by the units used, those excess units at a higher price would result in more profit for the contractor yet allow him to submit an overall lower bid. For example, if the bid proposal contains two similar items for which the request for proposal estimates 100 each will be required, and the bidder concludes that only 50 will be required at Site A and 150 at Site B, he submits a low bid for Site A and a high bid for Site B. If the fair price for these units is $10 each, and the bidder bids $5 per unit for Site A or $500, and $15 for Site B or $1500, the total bid price is $2000, but if the bidder only installs 50 at Site A he would be paid $250 and install $150 at Site B for which he would be paid $2250. His total compensation would be $2500. In competitively bid contracts, such as the instant project, contractors modify their prices by taking a calculated risk that certain items bid on will not need to be accomplished and submit a nominal bid of $1 or 1 cent for such an item. By definition, such a bid is unbalanced, but if the item so bid has to be provided, the contractor has to provide this service at the bid price. The only evidence submitted by Petitioner tending to show Gilbert's bid was unbalanced to the detriment of the State was testimony, objected to and sustained, that the plans and specifications showed more of certain units would be needed than the estimated quantities on the bid proposal, which constituted the basis for the bids submitted. Such evidence constitutes a challenge to the bid specifications and is untimely. Gilbert's witness who prepared the bid submitted by Gilbert adequately explained the basis for bids submitted by Gilbert on the challenged items. The document entitled "This is Not an Addendum," clearly states on its face that "an addendum may follow containing the following information." No bids are solicited thereby and for no item contained thereon is the State obligated to contract. This document was provided all bidders before bids were open and no unfair advantage to anyone or detriment to the State was shown. In a project containing some 400 bid items, many modifications of the contract during construction is required to cover unforeseen circumstances that arise. While it would be better to get competitive bids on every bit of work done on this project, in this imperfect world unforeseen items will appear. The document complained of attempts to alert the bidders to some anticipated work not foreseen when the bid proposal was prepared, but it is not a part of the bid solicitation.

Florida Administrative Code (1) 14-25.024
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PROCACCI FINANCIAL GROUP, LTD., AND PROCACCI COMMERCIAL REALTY, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 92-002650BID (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Apr. 28, 1992 Number: 92-002650BID Latest Update: Oct. 27, 1992

The Issue Whether Respondent's rejection of all bids for Lease No. 540:0920 was improper.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent published an invitation to bid seeking to lease approximately 9,907 net square feet of office space in Broward County (the Lease). There was no evidence of any irregularities in the preparation or the issuance of the invitation. The Petitioner, whose responsive bid was rejected by Respondent, timely and properly brought its protest and has standing to protest the Respondent's rejection of all bids for the Lease. Lynn Mobley was the statewide lease manager of the Respondent and had the responsibility to generally oversee the preparation of the bid package and the bid opening procedures. Barbara Lollie was a staff member under the supervision of Ms. Mobley and was in charge of the preparation of the request for bid proposals. Ms. Mobley's supervisor was a Ms. Barron. Five bids in response to the invitation to bid were duly received by Respondent. An evaluation committee chaired by Don Walker, Respondent's area administrator, was appointed to inspect the proposed properties and to evaluate the bids. The evaluation committee ranked the bids in the following order of preference: 1/ 1. In-Rel ($499,141.80) 2. Taft ($519,090.30) 3. Donlon ($541,119.90) 4. Procacci ($618,373.30) 5. Stirlingwood ($761,906.30) Thereafter the responses to the invitation were forwarded to Ms. Mobley's office for evaluation. Ms. Mobley's staff determined that the top two bids, those of In-Rel and Taft, were non-responsive. 2/ Ms. Mobley, who did not actively participate in the evaluation of the proposals, then advised Mr. Walker of that determination and advised him of two alternatives: to award the bid to the lowest responsive bidder or to reject all bids and re-advertise. The evaluation committee chaired by Mr. Walker had wanted to lease the property to either In-Rel or Taft. Mr. Walker told Ms. Mobley that he wanted to reject all bids and to re-advertise. Pursuant to the request for bids promulgated by the Respondent and Rule 13M-1.015, Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent reserved the right to reject any and all bid proposals for the Lease. The request for proposal of bids specifically stated: The Department reserves the right to reject any and all bid proposals for reasons which shall include but not be limited to the agency's budgetary constraints; waive any minor informality or technicality in bids, to accept that bid deemed to be the lowest and in the best interest of the State, and if necessary, to reinstate procedures for soliciting competitive proposals. Following the telephone conversation between Mr. Walker and Ms. Mobley, Ms. Mobley sent a letter dated March 23, 1992, to all bidders which notified each bidder that all bids had been rejected. That letter did not state the reasons for the rejection of all bids. Mr. Walker sent a memo on March 20, 1992, to Ms. Lollie recommending the rejection of all bids. Although this memo predated the rejection letter and was subsequently made available to Ms. Mobley, the memo was received by Ms. Mobley's office after the rejection letter had been sent. The memo gave no explication of Mr. Walker's reasons for wanting to reject all bids. The Department of General Services (DGS) published lease rate guidelines for Broward County to inform the Respondent of maximum acceptable lease rates. The purpose of these DGS guidelines was to advise the Respondent that proposed lease rates above the guidelines would be summarily rejected. At the time of obtaining bid proposals, the DGS lease rate guidelines were the only established guidelines which could be consulted by the Respondent. At no time did the Respondent calculate a pre-bid estimate of what the Respondent felt was an acceptable range of lease rates in order to be used in determining whether lease rates were too high. The Petitioner's bid, along with the other responsive bidders, were within the DGS lease rate guidelines. Mr. Walker made the request for re-bid after he learned that the bids of Taft and In-Rel were non-responsive. Mr. Walker's decision to recommend the rejection of all bids was based only on the information that the two top choices of the evaluation committee had been found to be non-responsive and on his desire to reopen the bid process in the hope of attracting more bidders. 3/ Mr. Walker wanted to modify the specifications of the invitation to bid in two regards. First, he wanted to amend the specifications to permit the leased premises to be in more than one building. Second, he wanted the geographical boundaries in which the leased premises could be located to be expanded to hopefully attract additional bidders. Mr. Walker believed that a re-bid would provide a wider range of buildings at comparable prices from which to choose and would give him an opportunity to make changes to the bid specifications. His decision to recommend the rejection of all bids was not based on a lease bid analysis or on lease rate guidelines. The recommendation was not dictated by budgetary considerations, but by his desire to shop the bid. It was Mr. Walker's understanding that at the end of his telephone conversation with Ms. Mobley that the decision to reject all bids had been made and that all bids would be rejected. Ms. Mobley made the decision to reject all bids pursuant to the recommendation of Mr. Walker after obtaining input from Ms. Lollie and Ms. Barron. Although Ms. Mobley had Ms. Lollie's analysis of the five bids, that analysis made no comparison of the rates contained in the bids with existing lease rates or the DGS guidelines. Ms. Mobley did not consult the DGS lease rate guidelines, although she was generally familiar with those guidelines, and she was unaware of any budgetary constraints that would dictate the rejection of all bids. When Ms. Mobley decided to reject all bids, she did not compare the bid proposals to the existing lease rates paid by the Respondent for leased office space in Broward County. The decision to reject all bids was not made on the advice of an attorney. Although Ms. Mobley testified that all bids on the Lease were rejected solely for price considerations, the evidence presented established that the decision to reject all bids was not based on price, price guidelines, or the Respondent's budgeting constraints. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Ms. Mobley rejected all bids because that was the action recommended by Mr. Walker. Respondent's invitation to bid did not contain any lease rate guidelines that would notify prospective bidders of a lease rate ceiling. There was no significant difference in the lease rates between the Taft and In-Rel bids that were favored but non-responsive and the third lowest bidder, the Donlon bid, which was responsive but rejected. Mr. Walker conceded that the Donlon bid was not rejected because of price considerations. Mr. Walker was of the opinion that the Donlon bid was at an acceptable price. He did not testify that the Petitioner's bid was at an unacceptable price and he did not testify as to what, other than the DGS guidelines, would be the maximum acceptable price. The DGS Lease Guidelines applicable to the bid for the Lease were as follows: A full service Lease (including electricity) -- $17.84 a square foot. 4/ Lease without electricity -- $15.18 a square foot. The present rate for the existing lease which was to be replaced by the Lease was $16.60 a square foot; this rate did not include electricity. If electricity was factored in at $2.50 a square foot, which was a factor regularly used by DGS, the present lease rate would be approximately $18.00 a square foot. The three responsive bids to the invitation were lower than the present lease after factoring in electricity. Ms. Goodman was of the opinion that Respondent's budget with respect to the Lease would be based on lease rates already in existence and consequently, that the responsive bids received and rejected were within the budget guidelines. Respondent offered no evidence to controvert that opinion. There was no evidence that the decision to reject all bids was based on economic considerations. All lease rates submitted by the rejected bidders were under the ceiling set by the DGS lease guidelines of $17.84. The Respondent acted arbitrarily when it rejected all bids.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusion of law, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent accept and evaluate the responsive bids submitted for the Lease and determine the proper recipient for an award of the Lease. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1992.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68255.25287.012
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MODERN MAILERS vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, 94-003593BID (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 07, 1994 Number: 94-003593BID Latest Update: Oct. 03, 1994

The Issue This case considers whether Petitioner's response to Invitation to Bid, No. 94-014, as revised, issued by the Respondent, is responsive to the terms of the Invitation to Bid. If Petitioner is found responsive, then the question is raised whether Petitioner has offered the lowest and best response to the invitation to bid.

Findings Of Fact On May 26, 1994, Respondent provided a memorandum to prospective vendors concerning Bid No. 94-014, as revised. This memorandum informed the prospective vendors that the new bid due date was June 6, 1994. The memorandum attached the bid instructions. Under general conditions to the invitation to bid the prospective vendors were reminded in Paragraph 7 that the Respondent could ". . . reject any or all bids or waive any minor irregularity or technicality in bids received." Under the heading "Special Provisions" prospective vendors were informed that "The charge per 1,000 for individual items under Exhibit A shall be the rates for the contract with the successful bidder." The prospective bidders were instructed as follows: REQUIRED ITEMS TO BE SUBMITTED WITH BID: The bidder must complete all required items below and submit as part of the bid package. Any bid in which these items are not used or in which these items are improperly executed, may be considered non-responsive and the bid may be subject to rejection. Among the items to be submitted with the bid was Exhibit A. The bidders were informed about the process of EVALUATION/AWARD. There it was stated: Bids will be evaluated and awarded on an all or none basis to one bidder. Award will be based on the total costs of four (4) theoretical jobs (See Exhibit B-Bid Total) requiring varying services and on the bidder's qualifications to best serve the Department's needs. The prospective bidders were then reminded a second time that: "THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION RESERVES THE RIGHT TO REJECT ANY AND ALL BIDS AND TO WAIVE ANY MINOR IRREGULARITIES IN BIDS RECEIVED." Within Exhibit A to the bid document was a category referred to as "Tabbing", calling for the charge per 1,000 for that service. Within Exhibit B under the fourth theoretical job was a requirement to quote the subtotal cost for 200,000 newsletter preparations to include "Tabbing." Three vendors submitted responses to the invitation to bid. Those responses were opened on June 6, 1994. The vendors who responded were Petitioner, Educational Clearinghouse, Inc. and Mail Masters of Tallahassee, Inc. In the subtotal for costs for 200,000 newsletter preparations, in activity four, concerning theoretical jobs, found within Petitioner's Exhibit B to the response to the invitation to bid, Petitioner made a mistake. It misplaced the decimal point and described the subtotal cost for 200,000 newsletter preparations as $73.80 instead of $7,380.00. Respondent characterized this as a typographical error or nominal mistake. In fact, this error constituted a minor irregularity which did not preclude the ability to understand Petitioner's response so that it might be compared to the responses by the competition. Petitioner made a second error. This error occurred when Petitioner failed to indicate the amount that it would charge per 1,000 for "Tabbing" within Exhibit A. Respondent did not consider this to be a minor irregularity and rejected Petitioner's bid as non-responsive for the failure to include a quotation for the charge per 1,000 for "Tabbing." This resulted in the intent to award the contract to Educational Clearinghouse, Inc. whose bid total for the four theoretical jobs under Exhibit B was $9,137.25 compared to Petitioner's bid total of $8,374.62. In preparing Exhibit B, activity four, Petitioner included a theoretical charge for "Tabbing" in the amount of $8.00 per 1,000. Petitioner contends that the $8.00 per 1,000 found within that entry may be correlated with the missing information concerning "Tabbing" in Exhibit A to its response to the invitation to bid. In the instructions to the vendors, Respondent has informed the vendors that the charge per thousand for individual items identified in Exhibit A constitutes the rate that the Respondent would expect to pay under a contract with the successful bidder. By contrast, the function of the information provided in Exhibit B is for purposes of awarding the contract based upon total costs of the four theoretical jobs and on the basis of the vendor's qualifications to best serve the Respondent's needs. Although not stated in the invitation to bid it can be inferred that similar references within Exhibits A and B, such as the reference to "Tabbing", calls for a comparable price to be set forth for the item in both Exhibit A and Exhibit B. Otherwise vendors would have the opportunity to quote low prices in completing Exhibit B as a means to win the cost comparison with their competitors for purposes of the award and then have the opportunity to charge higher costs per 1,000 as reflected in Exhibit A when establishing the charges for the contract with the Respondent following the competition contemplated in the comparison of the theoretical bid total under Exhibit B. Therefore, it would be reasonable for the Respondent to expect that the Petitioner would charge $8.00 per 1,000 for "Tabbing" under a contract between the Petitioner and Respondent based upon information that was set forth in the response to Exhibit B, activity four, "Tabbing." In summary, Petitioner's oversight in leaving out reference to the tabbing charge in Exhibit A does not affect the comparison of bid responses as contemplated by the instructions to the vendors, a function performed by comparing the respective Exhibits B. Otherwise, Respondent may gain the necessary understanding of Petitioner's charge per 1,000 for "Tabbing" as contemplated in instructions concerning Exhibit A as a means for entering into the contract. This understanding is achieved by transposing the $8.00 per 1,000 "Tabbing" quotation in Exhibit B to the "Tabbing" charge within Exhibit A as $8.00 per 1,000. With this adjustment, Modern Mailers, Inc. is the lowest responsive bidder and best able to serve Respondent's needs pertaining to Invitation to Bid No. 94-014, as revised.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which finds that Petitioner is a "qualified" and "responsible" bidder who is the lowest and best responsive bidder to Invitation to Bid, No. 94-014, as revised and is entitled to the award of the contract contemplated by that invitation to bid. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of September, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1994. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning the proposed findings of fact of the Parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraph 1 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 3 through 5 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 6 and 7 are rejected to the extent that they are intended to establish an excuse for the Petitioner not providing information related to the cost for tabbing called for in Exhibit A in the invitation to bid. Paragraph 8 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 9 through 12 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 13 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 14 is rejected to the extent that it suggests that Petitioner may amend its response to the invitation to bid to specifically set forth the amount attributable to the tabbing charges per 1,000 in Exhibit A. Nonetheless one may infer that the cost per 1,000 for tabbing is the same as is set forth in Exhibit B. Paragraphs 15 through 17 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 18 constitutes legal argument. Respondent's Facts: Paragraph 1 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 2 is contrary to facts found Paragraph 3 is rejected in fact and law. Paragraph 4 is rejected in the suggestion that the Petitioner does not have the ability to perform the contract. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel W. Dobbins, Esquire Callahan & Dobbins 433 North Magnolia Drive Tallahassee, FL 32308 Vytas J. Urba, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 George Stuart, Secretary Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Informational Copies: Ronald W. Brooks, Esquire Brooks and LeBoeuf, P.A. 863 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32301 Joan Reeves, Vice President Educational Clearinghouse Post Office Box 3951 Tallahassee, FL 32315

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57287.012
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KELLOGG AND KIMSEY, INC. vs LEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 91-007597BID (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Nov. 26, 1991 Number: 91-007597BID Latest Update: Mar. 02, 1992

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence addressed at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The request for sealed bids for the construction of the Project was advertised on October 9, 16 and 23, 1991. There were six addenda to the original bid documents which added, deleted or modified provisions of the original bidding requirements, contract requirements, administrative requirements and technical specifications. The original bid documents plus the six addenda will be referred to herein as the "bid documents". The bid documents required that all bids be in full accord with the contract documents. Sealed bids for the Project were opened on October 30, 1991. Wright submitted the lowest lump sum bid for the Project, with Sovran submitting the second lowest lump sum bid and Kellogg submitting the third lowest lump sum bid. At the time of the bid opening, the bid documents listed only four casework manufacturers that were approved to furnish casework for the Project. Empire Custom Cabinets, Inc. (Empire) was not listed as one of the four approved casework manufacturers in the bid documents. The bid documents did not require the bidder to list the casework manufacturer it intended to obtain the casework from, but only that the bidder name the casework subcontractor. The only work item in the bid documents which requires identifying the name of the manufacturer on the subcontractor's list is the metal roof system. Because Empire's bid on the casework was extremely low compared to other bids received by Wright on the casework, Wright called Empire prior to submitting its bid to confirm that Empire's bid was submitted per plans and specifications. Although Wright did not specifically inquire of Empire at this time as to which manufacturer Empire was obtaining the casework from for the Project, Empire did advise Wright that Empire's bid on the casework was according to plans and specifications. Additionally, Empire did not divulge or advise Wright at this time that the bid was based on Empire manufacturing the casework for the Project. Based on this representation from Empire, Wright listed Empire as its casework subcontractor, and calculated its lump sum bid for the Project using Empire's bid. Although Wright listed Empire as its casework subcontractor in its bid, this did not create an irregularity in Wright's bid since Wright's bid was per plans and specification without exception or exclusion. This would require Wright to furnish casework for the Project manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers listed in the bid documents regardless of which subcontractor Wright listed as the subcontractor for casework. By letter dated November 1, 1991, the Board's architect for the Project requested Wright to have Empire submit written certification by one of the four approved casework manufacturers that its casework was being furnished to Empire for the project. By letter dated November 4, 1991, Empire advised Wright that Empire's bid on the casework for the Project was based on casework to be manufactured by Empire. On the same day, Wright furnished the architect for the Project a copy of Empire's letter of November 4, 1991. In response to a request by the Board, Wright, by letter dated November 7, 1991, advised the Board that Wright would furnish casework manufactured by one of the four approved manufacturers listed in the bid documents for the Project. By letter dated December 3, 1991, Empire advised Wright that Empire would need to withdraw its bid if Empire was required to use casework manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers listed in the bid documents. On that same day, Wright furnished the Board a copy of Empire's letter and requested that the Board allow Wright to remove and replace Empire with Steven Ward and Associates, Inc. (Ward), as the casework subcontractor since Ward would be able to furnish and install casework manufactured by LSI Corporation of America, Inc., one of the four approved casework manufacturers. No Action has been taken on that request. The bid documents provide for a subcontractor to be removed and replaced from the list of subcontractors after the bid is opened if there is a showing of good cause and written approval by the Board and the Project architect is obtained. Although Empire's bid on the casework for the Project submitted to Wright was based on Empire manufacturing the casework, there is competent substantial evidence in the record to establish facts to show that at the time Wright submitted its bid on the Project it had reasonable grounds to believe that Empire's bid on the casework was based on Empire furnishing and installing casework manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers. After determining that Empire could not perform under its bid, Wright obtained a bid from Ward for furnishing and installing the casework for the Project which was less than Ward's original bid submitted to Wright before the bid opening. However, this bid was substantially more than Empire's bid, and if Wright is allowed to substitute Ward for Empire, Wright will have to absorb the additional costs since the bids were lump sum bids. Wright is neither attempting to furnish casework from a manufacturer that is not approved, nor is Wright requesting an increase in the lump sum bid price. The advertisement for Sealed Bids for the Project required that all bidders be prequalified by the Board prior to the bid date. Sovran and one other bidder were not prequalified by the Board prior to the bid date in accordance with Advertisement for Sealed Bids for the Project. Sovran received the bid documents for the Project approximately one month before the bid date but did not file a Notice of Protest of the prequalification requirement contained in the Advertisement for Sealed Bids for the Project. Sovran holds a certificate as a general contractor licensed in the State of Florida in accordance with Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. As a certified general contractor Sovran, pursuant to Section 489.125, Florida Statutes, was authorized to bid on the Project notwithstanding the Board's prequalification requirement. This was explained by the Board's representative at the bid opening. The bid documents required that a subcontractor list be submitted by all bidders, and when submitted with the bid becomes an integral part of the bid. The purpose of the subcontractor list was to prevent bid shopping, and to allow the Board an opportunity to review the subcontractors to determine if any subcontractor on the list had performed unsatisfactorily on previous Board projects. Neither the statutes relating to competitive bidding nor the bid documents prohibit the listing of the general contractor together with a subcontractor on a subcontractor list. The subcontractor list submitted by Sovran indicated "Sovran Constr/Naples" as the name of the subcontractor for the masonry work and "Sovran/Naples" as the name of the subcontractor for the poured-in-place concrete work. "Naples" is Naples Concrete and Masonry Work, Inc. The bid received by Sovran from Naples was for both labor and materials for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. Sovran neither requested nor did Naples furnish Sovran a bid to provide labor only for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. There was no agreement between Sovran and Naples whereby Sovran would supply the materials and Naples would furnish the labor for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. Sovran did request and receive bids from other companies for furnishing materials only for the poured-in-place concrete and masonry work. Sovran listed itself, the general contractor, along with Naples on the subcontractor list for the purpose of supplying the materials for the poured-in- place concrete and masonry work. Sovran's main reason for supplying the materials was that Naples was not bondable. Without a payment bond from Naples, Sovran would be without protection and could be forced into paying double for the materials in the event Naples failed to pay the material suppliers. Although the Superintendent of the Lee County Schools has recommended to the Board that the Board accept Wright's bid for the Project, the Board has not voted on that recommendation. The fact that Wright used Empire's bid to calculate its lump sum bid in no way excuses Wright for the requirement set out in the bid documents that casework used for the Project (when the time comes) be manufactured by one of the four approved casework manufacturers. Wright gains no economic advantage in this regard since the lump sum bid price remains the same. The advertisement for Sealed Bids on the Project provides that the Board reserves the right to waive any and all irregularities of any bid received.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly RECOMMENDED: That the Board enter a Final Order dismissing the instant bid protest and awarding to Wright the contract for the construction of Elementary School "C", Job No. 91063. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of February, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13 day of February, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NUMBER 91-7597B1D The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 1 - 3(1,2 and 3 , respectively); 4 - 5(6); 6(4); 7 - 9(5); 12(10); 13(11); 15 - 16(12); 17(13); 18 - 19(16); 20(29); 21(18); 23(19); 24 - 25(20); 26(22); 27(23); 28(22); 29 - 30(29); 32 - 33(25); and 34(26). Proposed finding of fact 10 is rejected as not being supported by competent substantial evidence in the record in that Wright's bid was as per plans and specifications without exceptions or exclusions which included the use of casework manufactured by one of the approved casework manufacturers. Proposed finding of fact 11 is rejected as not being supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record in that the Board knew of Empire's bid being based on nonconforming materials prior to issuing its Notice of Intent. However, the only information the Board had in reference to Wright's bid before issuing its Notice of Intent was that Wright had bid as per plans and specifications and would be installing casework manufactured by one of the approved manufacturers. The only question was whether Empire could furnish casework manufactured by one of the approved manufacturers. Proposed finding of fact 14 is neither material nor relevant. How the Board's architect interpreted Wright's bid is neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. Proposed finding of fact 22 is unnecessary to the conclusion reached in the Recommended Order. Proposed finding of fact 31 is more in the way of an argument than a finding of fact. Proposed findings of fact 35 and 36 are covered in the Preliminary Statement. The timeliness of Kellogg's protest is not an issue and therefore, a finding that it was timely is unnecessary. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent While not specifically adopting proposed finding of fact 1, where material or relevant or necessary to this proceeding, and supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record the stipulated facts have been adopted. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 2(4,5); 3(9); 4 - 5(7); 7 - 8(8); 10(16); 11(14); 12(31); 13(21); and 15(23). Proposed finding of fact 6 is more in the way of an argument than a finding of fact. Proposed finding of fact 9 and 14 are neither material nor relevant. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Intervenor See ruling on Respondent's proposed finding of fact Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 2 - 3(21); 4(24); 5 - 6(21); 13(23); 14(24,28); 15(22); 16 - 17(23,24); and 18(28). Proposed findings of fact 7 through 12 are neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. COPIES FURNISHED: David E. Gurley, Esquire Norton, Gurley & Darnell, P.A. 1819 Main Street, Suite 610 Sarasota, FL 34236 Marianne Kantor, Esquire The School Board of Lee County 2055 Central Avenue Fort Myers, FL 33901 James M. Talley, Esquire Fisher, Rushmer, Werrenrath, Keiner, Wack & Dickson, P.A. Post Office Box 712 Orlando, FL 32802 Karl Engel Superintendent Lee County School Board 2055 Central Avenue Ft. Myers, FL 33901 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57489.125
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LEE A. EVERHART AND COMPANY, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 83-001761 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-001761 Latest Update: May 02, 1990

Findings Of Fact On or about February 9, 1983, the State of Florida, Department of General Services, Division of Construction and Property Management, Bureau of Property Management ("DGS"), received a certification of need from the Department of Corrections ("DOC") requesting authority for DOC to advertise for competitive bids from private persons interested in providing leased office space needed to house DOC's Bureau of Industries. The Bureau of Industries was then located in leased space with leases which were scheduled to expire June 30, 1983. The Bureau of Industries has been located in DOC's central office area since its creation in 1957. The DOC central office includes the Secretary and Deputy Secretary; the Assistant Secretaries for Operations, Programs, Management, and Budget. All these officials, together with subsidiary bureaus, staff, and other subordinates are located in two adjacent buildings of the Winewood Office Complex on Blair Stone Road in Tallahassee. The prison industry program is under the supervision of the industries administrator who reports directly to the Assistant Secretary for Operations. DOC sought approval from DGS to enter into a lease for privately owned office space because of its perceived need to locate within walking distance of its central office. Programs administered by the Bureau of Industries work closely with other DOC personnel and functions located in the central office in the Winewood Office Complex. Moving any distance from the central office would create problems for the DOC mailing system and would require extra time spent traveling to and from the central office. Personnel in the Bureau of Industries utilize central office files, and confer often with staff located in the central office. Locating outside the general area of the central office would require additional expenses with regard to availability of vehicles, pick up of mail and supplies, and duplication of support services. Accordingly, DGS and DOC determined, and the record in this cause establishes, that it would not be in the state's best interest to require DOC to locate its Bureau of Industries program either in state-owned buildings in the Capitol Center, or in any area beyond walking distance of the central office location. On March 21 and 31, 1983, respectively, DOC published an advertisement in the Tallahassee Democrat inviting all interested persons to submit sealed bids at or before 2:00 p.m. on April 19, 1983, in accordance with the Invitation to Bid and Specifications prepared by DOC for the office space needed to house the Bureau of Industries. A portion of the bid specifications required that office space to be leased be located within a circle drawn on a city map of the City of Tallahassee, Florida, which could roughly be described as the southeastern portion of the city, in the vicinity of the Winewood Office Complex. There were four possible bidders in the area within the circle on the map attached to the bid specifications. Of these four possible bidders, two within the area actually submitted bids--Blairstone Center Partners and Washington Square, Ltd. One of the general provisions of the bid specifications provided as follows: The Department of Corrections reserves the right to reject any and all bids, waive any minor informality or technicality in bids received and to accept that bid deemed to be the lowest and best. . . At or before 11:00 a.m. on April 19, 1983, DOC received sealed bids from Petitioner and Intervenors in response to the aforesaid advertisement, and at 11:00 a.m. on April 19, 1983, DOC opened, tabulated, and published each of the bids. The bid submitted by Petitioner was not responsive to the requirements of the Invitation to Bid and Specifications because the property offered by Petitioner in its response was outside the area indicated on the map annexed to the Invitation to Bid. The bid submitted by Intervenor, Blairstone Center Partners, failed to offer the full services specified in paragraph six of DOC's Bid Submittal Form; failed to offer the exclusive parking specified in the paragraph seven of the Bid Submittal Form; failed to supply the photographs specified in paragraph ten of Respondent's Bid Submittal Form; and failed to supply the information specified in paragraphs one through eight of the Bid Submittal Form. Accordingly, the record in this cause fully establishes that the bids submitted by Petitioner and by Intervenors Blairstone Center Partners, failed to comply with the requirements of the Invitation to Bid and Bid Submittal Form, and that the deficiencies in the bids of Petitioner and Intervenor, Blairstone Center Partners, were so material as to require their rejection. The Invitation to Bid and Bid Submittal Form required that bidders offer for lease 2,683 square feet, plus or minus three percent. The bid submitted by Intervenor, Washington Square, Ltd., offered 2,797 square feet, which is approximately 34 square feet more than allowed in the Invitation to Bid. After this fact was discovered upon opening the bid, DOC personnel contacted a representative of Washington Square, Ltd., and advised the net square footage offered in the bid submitted by Washington Square, Ltd., exceeded the net square footage of space that DOC was authorized to lease and pay for under the Invitation to Bid. Washington Square, Ltd., subsequently agreed to modify its proposal by relieving DOC from any obligation to pay for the extra 34 square feet, and reducing the annual rental for the first year from $26,012.10 to $25,695.90, and for the second year from $27,576.60 to $27,243.18. The record in this cause does not establish any misconduct or collusion between Washington Square, Ltd., and DOC personnel obtaining this modification, nor does the record in this cause establish that any actual or prospective bidders suffered any competitive disadvantage as a result of this modification. The effect of Washington Square, Ltd.'s modification of its proposal rendered that proposal the only bid which was responsive to the Invitation to Bid. On August 18, 1983, Washington Square, Ltd., executed a deed to the property which was the subject matter of its bid to Ben Grace. Washington Square also executed an assignment of the proposed bid award to Grace.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57243.18255.25
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THE URBAN GROUP vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 94-005967BID (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 25, 1994 Number: 94-005967BID Latest Update: Feb. 14, 1995

Findings Of Fact The Department issued an invitation to bid (ITB) and solicited bids for district-wide miscellaneous property management maintenance services pursuant to ITB-DOT-94-95-4004. Kemp Services, Inc. (Kemp), submitted the lowest bid for the subject ITB. Petitioner, Urban Group, Inc., submitted the second lowest bid for the subject ITB. Section 1.1 of the ITB provided: Invitation The State of Florida Department of Transport- ation requests written bids from qualified firms to MAINTAIN RIGHT-OF-WAY STRUCTURES AND VACANT LOTS BY PROVIDING CLEAN-UP SERVICES, LAWN SERVICES, LANDSCAPE SERVICES, SECURING OF BUILDINGS, AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS HANDYMAN AND SKILLED LABOR SERVICES. ALSO PROVIDE SERVICES FOR SIGN REMOVAL FOR STRUCTURES ILLEGALLY ON THE DEPARTMENT'S RIGHT-OF-WAY OR ILLEGALLY ON PRIVATE PROPERTY IN THE FOLLOWING FIVE COUNTY AREA: BROWARD, MARTIN, PALM BEACH, ST. LUCIE AND INDIAN RIVER COUNTIES. For the purpose of this document, the term "bidder" means the prime Consultant acting for itself and those individuals, partnerships, firms, or corporations comprising the bidder's team by joint venture or subcontract. The term "bid package" means the complete response of the bidder to the Invitation To Bid, including properly completed forms and supporting documentation. [Emphasis in text.] The services were to be provided on an as-needed basis for the term of the agreement, two years. Section 1.7.1 of the ITB provided: Qualifications 1.7.1 Bidders must meet the following minimum qualifications: BIDDERS MUST HAVE AT LEAST TWO YEARS EXPERIENCE PROVIDING AT LEAST TWO (2) OF THE SIX SERVICES OUTLINED IN THE SCOPE OF SERVICES IN EXHIBIT "A". BIDDERS MUST HAVE BEEN IN CONTINUOUS BUSINESS FOR THE PAST TWO (2) YEARS AND COMPLETE FORM "F" WITH THE INFORMATION REQUESTED REGARDING WORK EXPERIENCE AND REFERENCES. ALL REFERENCES WILL BE CHECKED. FAILURE TO PROVIDE FORM "F" AND THE WORK EXPERIENCE REQUESTED WILL CONSTITUTE A NON- RESPONSIVE BID. [Emphasis in text.] Section 1.7.4 of the ITB provided: Qualifications of Key Personnel Those individuals who will be directly involved in the project must have demonstrated experience in the areas delineated in the scope of work. Individuals whose qualifications are presented will be committed to the project for its duration unless otherwise accepted by the Department's Contract Manager. Where State of Florida registration or certification is deemed appropriate, a copy of the registration or certificate should be included in the bid package. Section 1.7.5 of the ITB provided: Authorizations and Licenses The Consultant must be authorized to do business in the State of Florida. Such authorization and/or licenses should be obtained by the bid due date and time, but in any case, will be required prior to award of the contract. For corporate authorization, contact: Florida Department of State Division of Corporations The Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904)487-6052 Other than the provisions above, no other licensure or authorization to do business was required by the ITB. Section 1.8.2 of the ITB provided: Responsiveness of Bids All bids must be in writing. A responsive bid is an offer to perform the scope of services called for in this Invitation to Bid. Bids found to be non-responsive shall not be considered. Bids may be rejected if found to be irregular or not in conformance with the requirements and instructions herein contained. A bid may be found to be irregular or non-responsive by reasons, including, but not limited to, failure to utilize or complete prescribed forms, conditional bids, incomplete bids, indefinite or ambiguous bids, improper undated or unsealed signatures (where applicable). Section 1.8.4 of the ITB provided: Other Conditions Other conditions which may cause rejection of bids include evidence of collusion among bidders, obvious lack of experience or expertise to perform the required work, or failure to perform or meet financial obligations on previous contracts, or in the event an individual, firm, partnership, or corporation is on the United States Comptroller General's List of Ineligible Contractors for Federally Financed or Assisted Projects. Bids will be rejected if not delivered or received on or before the date and time specified as the due date for submission. Section 1.8.5 of the ITB provided: Waivers The Department may waive minor informalities or irregularities in bids received where such is merely a matter of form and not substance, and the correction or waiver of which is not prejudicial to other bidders. Minor irregular- ities are defined as those that will not have an adverse effect on the Department's interest and will not affect the price of the Bids by giving a bidder an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other bidders. Section 1.18.1 of the ITB provided: Award of the Contract The Department intends to award a contract to the responsible and responsive bidder who bids the lowest cost as identified in Form "C", Bid Blank, attached hereto and made a part hereof. The ITB did not specify a minimum number of employees, vehicles or hours of service for a bidder to be deemed responsible or responsive. At all times material to this case, Kemp has been in continuous business for the past two (2) years, and completed form "F" with the information requested regarding work experience and references. The Department's agent, Mr. Gentile, checked with two of the references listed by Kemp to verify information relative to this bid requirement. At all times material to this case, Kemp had at least two years experience providing at least two (2) of the six services outlined in the scope of services. The Department's agent, Mr. Gentile, checked with two of the references listed by Kemp to verify information relative to this bid requirement. While Mr. Gentile was authorized to check with all references listed by Kemp, the failure to do so does not discount the information obtained from the sources that were checked. Kemp had an appropriate occupational license to perform work in the tricounty area, but did not have occupational licenses with the City of Hollywood or Broward County. At all times material to this case, Kemp maintained a warehouse to secure the equipment to be used such as lawnmowers, trimmers, and cleaning supplies/equipment. After the bid protest was filed, the Department verified that Kemp had used the warehouse as it claimed. No evidence to the contrary was presented. The mailing address Kemp listed on the first page of its bid response was 8637 S. Sutton Drive, Miramar, Florida. Mr. Faluade resides at that address. He listed that address for mail purposes. The business address for Kemp listed on the bid response was 6200 Johnson Street, Miramar, Florida. This address is a store-front facility with limited office equipment and furniture. Kemp maintains an office at this location but stores its equipment elsewhere as noted above. Kemp was the lowest responsive, responsible bid for ITB-DOT-94-95- 4004.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's challenge to the award of ITB-DOT-94-95-4004 to Kemp Services, Inc. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 14th day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5967 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 4, 6, and 8 are accepted. With regard to paragraphs 5, 7, and 16 noting that the additional emphasis is not in the text and that the citations are incomplete (and perhaps misleading), they are accepted. Paragraph 9 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 10 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 11 is rejected as incomplete, and therefore, misleading. Corporate documents may have been filed on that date, however, the weight of the credible evidence established that Kemp had been in business the requisite amount of time. Paragraph 12 is rejected as incomplete, and therefore, misleading. The business conducted by the Kemp personnel continued regardless of the business entity structure that was used. Paragraph 13 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 14 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence or irrelevant. Paragraph 15 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 16 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Moreover, no credible evidence was presented to establish that Kemp did not provide services as described in the ITB or that it was not in business the requisite time. Paragraph 17 is rejected as incomplete, and therefore, misleading. The mailing address listed by Kemp was a residential address. Paragraph 18 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 19 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 20 is rejected as irrelevant. Kemp probably does not have a Leon County occupational license either. It did have an appropriate occupational license at all times material to this case. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 29 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas H. Duffy Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Mitchell B. Polay Mark H. Klein 750 S.E. Third Avenue Suite 205 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450

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GREENHUT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES, 92-001297BID (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 24, 1992 Number: 92-001297BID Latest Update: Jun. 04, 1992

The Issue The issue for consideration herein is whether the Respondent's proposed award on BID No. HSMV - 90022010 to Dunn Construction Company, Inc., should be upheld.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department was the state agency responsible for the solicitation of bids for and award of contracts for the construction of state buildings in Florida. Both Greenhut and Dunn are qualified contractors who are certified to bid on state construction contracts in general and this procurement in particular. In December, 1991, the Department issued an advertisement for bids for the project in issue herein, the construction of the Kirkman Complex Addition Data Center in Tallahassee, Florida. According to the Advertisement for Bids, all bids "must be submitted in full accordance with the requirements of the Drawings, Specifications, Bidding Conditions and Contractual Conditions, which may be examined and obtained ..." from the Department's designated architect/engineer, Clemons, Rutherford and Associates, Inc. in Tallahassee. Section B-21 of the request for proposals (invitation to bid) reads, in pertinent part: The recommendation for contract award will be for the bidder qualified in accordance with Section B-2 and submitting the lowest bid provided his bid is responsible and it is in the best interest of the Owner to accept it. The Owner reserves the right to waive any informality in bids received when such waiver is in the interest of the owner. Bids received on this project were originally scheduled to be opened and read aloud on January 15, 1992 with the tabulation and Bid Award Recommendation to be posted the following days at the location where the bids were opened. The proposal as originally issued called for the submittal of a Base Bid with four Alternates, 1a, 1b, 2, and 3. Alternate 1a was a deduct for merely extending the existing Johnson Controls System to incorporate the new work instead of providing a totally new and independent control system. Alternate 1b called for adding furniture and landscaping for certain of the rooms shown on the drawings; Alternate 2 called for adding a "shelled" fourth floor as described in the proposal; and Alternate 3, as originally issued, called for: Add a complete fourth floor as indicated in drawings including the finished interior partitions with full HVAC, Plumbing and Electrical Service. Include furniture and landscaping for rooms 414 and 419. (Includes items in Alternate No. 2) As a result of questions received from prospective bidders at the pre-bid conference which indicated some confusion as to the meaning and intent of the Department regarding Alternate No. 3, by letter to all prospective bidders, dated January 8, 1992 the Department's architect indicated: Alternate #3 shall be the fourth floor complete, as shown on drawings, which includes items in Alternate #2. Addendum #1 to the request for bids, dated January 10, 1992, clarified Item 1-3.6), PROPOSAL FORM, of the PROJECT MANUAL to ADD to "Alternate #3", "(Include items in Alternate #2)". Item #2-1 of Addendum #2, dated January 16, 1992, deleted the sentence changed by Item #1- 3.6, and revised the sentence to read as follows: This includes any items required in addition to Alternate #2 to complete the remainder of the work for the Fourth Floor. Information contained at the beginning of each Addendum calls the bidders' attention to the change and indicates that failure to incorporate it may result in disqualification. The due date for bids was extended at the instance of the Department. Both Petitioner and Intervenor submitted bids for this project as did several other concerns on January 23, 1992. Greenhut's base bid was $4,139,000 with a deduct of $63,600 for Alternate 1a, and additions for Alternates 1b, 2, and 3 of $69,500, $239,000, and $209,000 respectively. Greenhut's total bid, therefore, through Alternate 3, was $4,592,900. Dunn's base bid was $4,079,000 with a zero deduct for Alternate 1a, and additions for Alternates 1b through 3 of $67,000, and $428,000. Dunn's total bid, therefore, was $4,574,000 for a difference of $18,900. Greenhut's bid was submitted on a form which provided for the base bid, the deduct for 1a, and the additions for 1b. 2 and 3 with the figure for 3 being those costs in addition to those identified in Dunn's bid was submitted on a prior form which provided for a base bid, a 1a deduction if any, (there was none), and additions for 1b, 2, and 3 with the figure for 3 including the figure listed for 2. An initial review of Dunn's bid form, then, showed a base bid of $4,079,000, no 1a deduction, a 1b addition of $67,000, a 2 addition of $311,000, and a 3 addition of $428,000. This letter figure included the $311,000 figure for Alternate 2, which should have been deducted from the bid during tabulation. When the bids were opened on January 23, 1992 by Mr. Everline, each figure on each bid was read off and listed on the bid tabulation form in the appropriate area. No attention was given at that time to the appropriateness or correctness of the figures listed on each bid form, nor was any attention paid to any other technical requirement of the procurement. This was merely a transfer of figures from the bid form to the tabulation form, and when this was done, Mr. Everline announced to all in attendance, including many contractor representatives, that the "apparent low bidder" was Greenhut. In arriving at that conclusion, Mr. Everline added all of Dunn's figures together without deducting the $311,000 listed for Alternate 2, a figure which was included in the $428,000 figure listed for Alternate 3. This resulted in an incorrectly large total bid for Dunn. Sometime later that day, a representative of Dunn contacted Mr. Everline to indicate that Dunn had inadvertently bid on the wrong form which precipitated its misleading presentation. Mr. Everline properly declined to discuss the matter and referred the Dunn representative to the Department's legal counsel. Sometime thereafter, when the bids had been tabulated and reviewed for responsiveness and legal qualification of bidders, Mr. Everline suggested to representatives of DHSMV that in order to forestall a protest, only so much of the project as extended through Alternate 2 be awarded. DHSMV officials, however, had sufficient funds available for the entire project, including some additional funds, if necessary, for cabling, and insisted they wanted the entire project awarded. The Department's legal counsel, upon review of the situation, concluded that the Dunn's actual bid intent was clear to include the amount listed for Alternate 2 within that listed for Alternate 3, and not to consider the two as additives to each other. It further concluded that Dunn's use of the improper form on which to submit its bid was immaterial and afforded it no improper competitive edge over other bidders. Therefore, it was concluded that Dunn was the low responsive bidder and, on February 4, 1992, the Department issued a Notice of Award to Dunn. Thereafter, Greenhut filed its Petition For Hearing taken as a protest to the award. Both the Department and Dunn agreed that Greenhut had standing to protest the award and that the protest was timely filed. It is so found.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of General Services enter a Final Order in this case dismissing the protest of Greenhut Construction Company, Inc., in regard to the proposed award of contact in bid number HSMV - 90022010 to Dunn Construction Company, Inc. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 21st day of April, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-1297 BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. - 9. Accepted. Accepted. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 22. Accepted and incorporated herein. Argument and not Finding of Fact except for 1st sentence which is accepted. & 25. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. - 3. Accepted. 4. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. & 8. Accepted. 9. - 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 17. Accepted and incorporated herein. Irrelevant but accepted as true. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Irrelevant but accepted as true. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Irrelevant. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. FOR THE INTERVENOR: Accepted. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 15. Accepted. 16. - 19. Accepted. 20. & 21. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 24. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Emmanuel, Esquire 30 South Spring Street Post Office Drawer 1271 Pensacola, Florida 32596 Sylvan Strickland, Esquire Suite 309, Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Harry R. Detwiler, Jr., Esquire 315 S. Calhoun Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald W. Thomas Executive Director Department of General Services Suite 307, Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Susan Kirkland General Counsel Department of General Services Suite 309, knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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POWER SWEEPING SERVICE, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 91-007592BID (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Nov. 26, 1991 Number: 91-007592BID Latest Update: May 01, 1992

Findings Of Fact By Joint Prehearing Stipulation filed at the time of hearing, the parties agree that bids for contract No. E-4450, the contract in issue here, were opened by the Respondent in Fort Lauderdale on October 11, 1991. Bids were received from five bidders including the Petitioner, Power, and the low bidder, Certified. Based on its evaluation of the bids submitted, on October 18, 1991, Respondent posted an intent to award the contract to Power Sweeping Services, Inc., Petitioner herein. However, thereafter, on October 22, 1991, the Department received a formal protest from the low bidder, Certified, challenging the intent to award. After review of the substance of Certified's protest, Respondent notified all bidders that it would be reposting its intent to award on November 5, 1991, and on that date, did repost, indicating an intent to award the contract in question to Certified, the low bidder. Thereafter, on November 14, 1991, Petitioner timely filed its formal protest, having filed its initial intent to protest on November 6, 1991. The bid blank, which was issued to all prospective bidders at the pre- bid conference held in this matter for a contract to involve mechanical sweeping on Interstate Highway 595 from its eastern terminus to Southwest 136th Avenue, including interchange ramps at I-95, I-595, and State Road 84, contained as a part thereof a notice to contractors which, at page 1 of 4, (page 1 of the 36 page bid package), contained a notation that for contracts of $150,000.00 or less, the bidder would be required to submit, as proof of ability to acquire a performance and payments bond: a notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating they intend to issue a performance and payment bond in the amount of your bid, should your firm be awarded the project; in lieu of a notarized letter the following may be substituted: a bid guarantee of five percent (5%); or a copy of the contractor's certificate of qualification issued by the Department. This note specifically states that "failure to provide the following required evidence of bonding", as indicated above, with the bid proposal would result in rejection of the contractor's bid. Petitioner submitted a notarized "letter of commitment to issue bond" dated October 8, 1991, by Burton Harris, attorney in fact and resident agent for American Bonding Company. Certified submitted with its bid an un-notarized letter from Mark A. Latini, bond manager with Bonina - McCutchen - Bradshaw Insurance to the effect that "Amwest Surety Insurance Company is the surety for the above referenced contractor and stands ready to provide the necessary performance and payment bond for the referenced bid should CPM be low and awarded the referenced contract." Five bidders submitted bids. Certified was the low bidder with a bid price of $61,474.85. Florida Sweeping, Incorporated was second low bidder with a bid of $67,388.16, but that bid was rejected because an addendum was not noted. Petitioner was third lowest bidder with a bid of $72,290.65. Because Certified's bid as initially submitted did not contain the required notarized letter from the bonding company, its bid was initially rejected. Thereafter, however, Certified's president, Mr. Hanousek, who prepared Certified's bid, and who attended the pre-bid meeting, called the Department's District office the day the bids were opened and was informed that his company's bid was low, but was rejected because its bond commitment letter was not notarized. As a result, he submitted a notice of protest and a subsequent protest to the denial of Certified's bid. A hearing on Certified's protest was not held. When Joseph Yesbeck, the District's director of planning and programs, who was at the time serving as acting district secretary in the absence of the appointed secretary, was contacted by Mr. Hanousek. He reviewed the file and met with Ms. Martin, the District's contract administrator for construction and maintenance contracts and the contracting staff to see what was happening. At that point Ms. Martin explained why Certified's bid had been disqualified, and the matter was thereafter discussed with the District and Department attorneys. When the District secretary came back, Mr. Yesbeck briefed him and recommended that based on the information he had received from the District and Department attorneys, the failure to submit the notarized letter should be considered a non-material deviation and the Certified bid be determined the low responsive bidder. The reasons for this were that the absence of the notary did not really give any competitive advantage to Certified and that ordinarily defects of this nature are routinely allowed to be cured. When the District secretary, on the basis of the information provided by Mr. Yesbeck, decided to repost the contract, Mr. Yesbeck prepared a joint letter of reposting which removed Certified's disqualification and left it as the low bidder. None of the other rejected bidders, including Florida Sweeping and bidder Number 5, which was rejected because its bond proposal was not of a proper character, were advised that they could come in and correct the defects with their bond letters. According to Ms. Martin, the notice to contractors requiring a notarized letter from a bonding company as an alternative to the requirement to post a 5% bid guarantee was designed to promote participation in state contracting by small business and minority business enterprise applicants, so that the bidder does not actually have to post the bond in question. The notarization requirement was put in by the Department but neither Ms. Martin nor any other witness testifying on behalf of the Department was able to indicate why the bond certification had to be notarized. Historically, when the Department has gotten a bid without a notarized bond letter it has been rejected, and in Ms. Martin's experience, she has never known of a protest based on such a denial since she began working with contracts in July, 1988. When she reviews the bids, she reviews the bonding letter for its content as well as seeing whether it is notarized. Here, her reason for initially rejecting certified's bid was solely that the bond commitment letter was not notarized. The decision to reject was not hers alone, however, since she also checked with the District General Counsel who initially advised her that Certified's bond commitment letter was no good. Apparently, counsel changed his position upon discussion of the matter with Mr. Yesbeck and the Department's General Counsel since, according to Mr. Yesbeck, both counsel recommended subsequently that the absence of the notarization not be a disqualification. Further, according to Ms. Martin the requirement for the notarization has been utilized by District 4 since 1987 with all bids requiring it notwithstanding Mr. Hanousek's testimony that he has never seen the requirement before in any of the 6 successful contract's he has had with the Department before. In that regard, however, he admits this is the only contract he has had with District 4. Ms. Martin does not know if the notarization requirement is used in other Districts and no evidence as presented by any party to clarify that issue.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered setting aside the determination that Certified Property Maintenance's bid on Contract No. E4450, Job No. 869069108 was the low responsive bid. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 28th day of January, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-7592BID The following constitute my ruling on all Proposed Findings of Fact pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes submitted by the parties hereto. FOR THE PETITIONER: None submitted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein except for the finding that Certified's bid complied in every respect except the notarization. The assurance by the bonding company was not unqualified but conditioned upon Certified being awarded the contract. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein except for last sentence regarding which see 3., supra. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE INTERVENOR: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce M. Cease, Esquire 2720 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33135 Susan P. Stephens, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Ray Hanousek President Certified Property Maintenance 3203 Robbins Road Pompano Beach, Florida 33062 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

Florida Laws (3) 120.53120.57337.11
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