Findings Of Fact Respondent advertised for bids for work to be performed on the Statewide Regional Juvenile Detention Center located in Pasco County identified as Project Number HRS 85-300000. In response to this advertisements Petitioner and Intervenor timely submitted bids on January 23, 1966. According to calculations performed by Respondent, Petitioner was low bidder and Intervenor was the next lowest bidder. The construction budget for this job is $1.5 million, and both bids are considered by Respondent to be within budget. Depending on the alternatives chosen within each bid, Petitioner's bid is lower than Intervenor's by between approximately $6,000 and $40,000. Section B-14 of the advertisement for bids requires each bidder to submit a list of the subcontractors who will perform work on the job for him and specifies that only one subcontractor shall be listed for each phase of the work. Section D of the advertisement for bids specifies the work areas for which a subcontractor must be listed and states that said list is an integral part of each bid submitted. The subcontracting areas include electrical plumbing, mechanical, roofing security control systems, food service equipment and fire protection. Petitioner's bid was rejected on February 4, 1986, because its bid failed to include a roofing subcontractor's name as required in the advertisement for bids. Petitioner does not dispute that its bid was incomplete when submitted since it failed to identify a roofing subcontractor. However, Petitioner contends this omission was a result of clerical error in typing the bide and that, in fact, it had selected Republic Roofing as its subcontractor. John Breen, Petitioner's project manager, testified that it was his intent to use Republic Roofing when he submitted the bide that he had a firm bid from Republic Roofing, and that when this omission was brought to his attention after bids were opened, he identified Republic Roofing in writing on January 24 and 29, 1986, to Brian Seufert an intern architect working for Respondent's project architect. Seufert confirms Breen's testimony through affidavit jointly filed by the parties. Seufert indicates that the project architect has no reason to believe that Petitioner could not perform the work required by the project. By affidavit jointly filed by the parties, Joyce Kleja secretary for Petitioners also supports Breen's testimony about her clerical error in omitting the roofing subcontractor when she typed the bid. Ray Scerbo, an estimator for Republic Roofing, disputes the testimony of Breen through jointly filed affidavit. Scerbo indicates it was not until a couple of days after the bid opening that he was told by Petitioner that Republic Roofing "had the job" if Petitioner was awarded the contract. This conflicts with the first written notice from Breen to Seufert dated January 24, 1986, as well as Seufert's affidavit that Petitioner told Seufert on January 24, 1986, that Republic Roofing had been selected. Scerbo is no longer employed by Republic Roofing. After considering all of the evidence, it is specifically found that Petitioner's omission of Republic Roofing from its list of subcontractors was through clerical error and that Petitioner had firmly decided to use Republic Roofing for subcontracting work prior to submission of its bid. The advertisement for bid required all subcontractors to be listed in any bid in order to allow Respondent to review prior performance and licensure of subcontractors, and also to prevent "bid shopping". Bid shopping is a practice which inflates a general contractor's bid and therefore the actual award by encouraging subcontractors to initially submit high bids to the general contractor and then negotiate a lower price with the general contractor who has received the award. The general contractor's bid remains inflated however and in this way the cost to the state is increased.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order awarding Project Number HRS 85-300000 to Intervenor. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of April 1986, at Tallahassee Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April 1986. APPENDIX (DOAH CASE NO. 86-0495B1D) Petitioner has submitted a memorandum and a Proposed Recommended Order, both of which appear to set forth proposed findings of fact in unnumbered paragraphs. For purposes of ruling thereon, the unnumbered paragraphs which appear to set forth proposed findings have been consecutively numbered. Memorandum: Introductory material and not a proposed finding of fact. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 1, 2, 3, 4, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 7. Rejected as simply a summary of testimony and evidence and not a proposed finding of fact. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 5, 6. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4, but rejected in part in Finding of Fact 2 and otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Proposed Recommended Order: Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 1, 3, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 2, but otherwise rejected as contrary to Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rulings on Respondent's and Intervenor's jointly filed Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. , 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 7. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis R. Long Esquire 2101 U.S. Highway 19 North Suite 201 Palm Harbor, Florida 33563 Sam Powers Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee Florida 32301 William Page; Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John P. Fons Esquire Post Office Drawer 11307 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue presented in this case is whether the Respondent Department of Transportation's proposed award of District Contract Nos. E6548 and E6551 to the Intervenor, Florida Sweeping, Inc. ("Florida Sweeping,") should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: In the spring of 1993, FDOT's District Six office solicited bids for district contracts E6548 and E6551 (the "Contracts"). The Contracts call for the mechanical sweeping of certain segments of Interstate 95 in District Six. At a mandatory pre-bid conference, the bidders for the Contracts were provided with a packet which included a Notice to Contractors and Standard Specifications. The Notice to Contractors sets forth the procedures for submitting and opening the bids. The Standard Specifications are the same for all district construction and maintenance contracts. An addendum to the Standard Specifications (the "Special Provisions") was included in the bid package for all sweeping contracts. The Notice to Contractors for both of the Contracts required bidders to "provide with [their] bid, a copy of [their] occupational license issued in [the] company's name by the State of Florida." The Notice also provided that a [C]ontractor must possess a minimum of two [2] years' [sic] experience in providing the services specified. As proof, letters of reference must be included with the bid package indicating the contact person and the phone number of which [sic] the company has performed similar services in a satisfactorily [sic] manner. A contractor's bid may be rejected [emphasis in the original] if the reference letter(s) is not included in the bid package and/or does not specify that the contractor has the minimum experience required. The Special Provisions which were an addendum to the Standard Specifications included the following provision: M110-31-5 Equipment The Contractor must have proof of ownership, or a signed lease for the duration of the contract for equipment suitable for meeting the requirements of this contract. A list of equipment to be used must be enclosed with the Contractor's bid. Where new equipment will be purchased, the Contractor shall provide a signed quotation from an equipment dealer, with a guaranteed delivery date, in order to insure that work can begin on time . . . . On May 18, 1993, prior to the bid opening, the president of CSI contacted the FDOT personnel responsible for the bidding to inquire regarding the letters of reference. The president of CSI was told that anything that was a requirement of the bid package should be complied with. As a result, the president of CSI contacted the FDOT representatives that he had worked with in the past and obtained letters of reference. The reference letters from FDOT were submitted by CSI as part its bid proposals. The bids for the Contracts were opened on May 20, 1993 in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Bids were received on each contract from at least three bidders including CSI and Florida Sweeping, Inc. The submitted bids were reviewed by the District Six Contractual Services Office. The bids submitted by Florida Sweeping were the lowest for each of the two contracts. At issue in this case is Florida Sweeping's bid for Contract No. E6548 which was $116,178.33. Its bid for Contract No. E6551 was $126,975.81. CSI's bids for the Contracts were $124,073.95 and $143,746.20, respectively. There were several other sweeping contracts that were bid at the same time as the contracts at issue in this proceeding. On one of those other contracts, Contract E6550, CSI and Florida Sweeping submitted the exact same bid. The bid proposals submitted by Florida Sweeping failed to include letters of reference and copies of the applicable occupational licenses. CSI's proposals included these items. The evidence established that Florida Sweeping had successfully completed similar contracts for FDOT in the past and, therefore, FDOT was familiar with Florida Sweeping's work and knew that it had the necessary experience and equipment to perform the work required by the contracts. While it is not clear whether Florida Sweeping currently has the occupational licenses required to perform the work under the contracts, the evidence established that the licenses can be obtained simply by applying and paying for them. The cost to obtain the licenses necessary to complete the work on these Contracts would not cost in excess of $178.00. Petitioner contends that Florida Sweeping's bid proposals also failed to include an equipment list. However, the evidence established that such a list was included in the proposals submitted by Florida Sweeping. Florida Sweeping's proposals also included a list of current and previous contracts completed by the company for FDOT. Florida Sweeping has obtained letters of reference from FDOT in the past and could have obtained such letters for the Contracts at issue in this case. Section 2.1 of the General Specifications in the bid package provides as follows: The Department will consider award of the contract to the lowest responsive and responsible bid which complies with all the requirements set forth in these specifications, and respective contract documents, and advertisement of bid. The Department reserves the right to award the work as determined to be in the best interest of the Department. The Department reserves the right to reject any or all bids or any single items of the bid, or waive any minor irregularity or technicality in proposals received. In reviewing the bid proposals submitted, FDOT deemed Florida Sweeping's failure to include occupational licenses and letters of reference to be minor technicalities that could be waived in evaluating the responsiveness of the bids pursuant to Section 2.1 of the General Specifications cited above. This decision was consistent with prior agency determinations to waive the failure to include these documents in awarding similar contracts in the past. It does not appear that Florida Sweeping has obtained any competitive advantage as a result of its failure to include occupational licenses and letters of reference in its bid proposals. With respect to Contract E6550, FDOT decided to award that contract to CSI even though Florida Sweeping submitted a bid for an identical contract amount. FDOT's decision was based in part upon FDOT's conclusion that Florida Sweeping's proposal was not complete due to the failure to include an occupational license and letters of reference. FDOT's decision to award that contract to the more complete of two equal bidders does not mandate the award of the Contracts at issue in this case to CSI when the bid amounts were not equal. The failure to include an occupational license and letters of reference rendered Florida Sweeping's bid proposals incomplete, but not necessarily nonresponsive. FDOT had the right under the bid documents to waive these minor omissions in order to receive a lower contract price. In the fall of 1991, the predecessor of CSI was the low bidder for two FDOT sweeping contracts in this district. Another bidder protested the award of those contracts on the grounds that the proposals submitted by CSI's predecessor were nonresponsive due to the failure to include proof of the ability to acquire a performance and payment bond. A hearing was conducted by the undersigned hearing officer on January 16, 1992 and, in a Recommended Order issued on March 24, 1992, the undersigned Hearing Officer recommended that the proposals submitted by CSI's predecessor be rejected as nonresponsive. The result reached in that case is not contrary to the result reached herein because the bid documents in that earlier case required proof that the bidder could acquire a performance and payment bond upon award of the contract. Such proof was not provided. The failure to include that proof did not qualify as a technical omission.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding the bids submitted by Florida Sweeping to be responsive and dismissing the challenges filed by Certified Sweeping. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of September 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September 1993.
The Issue Whether Respondent properly rejected Petitioner's bid on the grounds that the bid did not meet a fatal item requirement.
Findings Of Fact On April 24, 1992, Respondent published a Request for Proposals (RFP) for the provision of housekeeping services to South Florida State Hospital. Attached to the RFP as Appendix I was a blank copy of Respondent's "Standard Contract" which is also referred to as its "core model contract". Paragraph 1.a. of Section D of the RFP contains the following instructions to bidders: BIDDER RESPONSE a. State of Florida Request for Proposal Contractual Services Acknowledgment Form, Pur 7033 The State of Florida Request for Proposal, Contractual Services Acknowledgment Form, PUR 7033, Appendix II must be signed and returned ... with the proposal or submitted by itself if you choose not to submit a proposal and wish to remain on the department's active vendor list. Paragraph 1.g. of Section D of the RFP, contains the following instructions to bidders: Required Bidders Certification Contract Terms and Conditions The proposal must include a signed statement in response to the RFP indicating acceptance of the terms and conditions of provisions of service as specified in the RFP and contained in the core model contract. Bidders were provided a copy of the RFP rating sheet which contained the following under the heading of Fatal Items: The following criteria must be met in order for the proposal to be considered for evaluation, failure to receive a "Yes" response for any time [item] will result in automatic rejection of the proposal. * * * Does the proposal include a statement agreeing to terms and conditions set forth in the core model contract and the RFP? Petitioner was represented at a "Bidders' Conference" held May 15, 1992, at which the fatal items were discussed. Bidders were advised that it would be necessary for the responses to contain a statement agreeing to the terms and conditions set forth in the core model contract. The State of Florida Request for Proposal, Contractual Services Acknowledgment Form, PUR 7033, contains the following certification: I certify that this proposal is made without prior understanding, agreement, or connection with any corporation, firm, or person submitting a proposal for the same contractual services, and is in all respects fair and without collusion or fraud. I agree to abide by all conditions of this proposal and certify that I am authorized to sign this proposal for the proposer and that the proposer is in compliance with all requirements of the Request for Proposal, including but not limited to, certification requirements. In submitting a proposal to an agency for the State of Florida, the proposer offers and agrees that if the proposal is accepted, the proposer will convey, sell, assign or transfer to the State of Florida all rights, title and interest in and to all causes of action it may now or hereafter acquire under the Anti-trust laws of the United States and the State of Florida for price fixing relating to the particular commodities or services purchased or acquired by the State of Florida. At the State's discretion, such assignment shall be made and become effective at the time the purchasing agency tenders final payment to the proposer. The State of Florida Request for Proposal, Contractual Services Acknowledgment Form, PUR 7033, was signed by Richard A. Cosby on behalf of Petitioner and submitted as part of Petitioner's response to the RFP. Upon receipt of all responses, Respondent convened an evaluation committee to evaluate the responses. The evaluation committee determined that the response submitted by Petitioner did not contain the required statement agreeing to the terms and conditions set forth in the core model contract and the RFP. Consequently, the evaluation committee rejected Petitioner's proposal from further consideration. Petitioner does not challenge the specifications of the RFP, but, instead, asserts that Mr. Cosby's execution of the State of Florida Request for Proposal, Contractual Services Acknowledgment Form, PUR 7033, was sufficient to meet the requirement the evaluation committee found lacking. The language of the Contractual Services Acknowledgment Form, PUR 7033, that most closely approximates the certification that the bidder accepts the terms and conditions set forth in the core model contract and of the RFP is as follows: I agree to abide by all conditions of this proposal and certify that I am authorized to sign this proposal for the proposer and that the proposer is in compliance with all requirements of the Request for Proposal, including but not limited to, certification requirements. The proposal submitted by Petitioner did not contain any other statement which could be construed as accepting the terms and conditions set forth in the core model contract and the RFP. The broad language of the Contractual Services Acknowledgment Form, PUR 7033, upon which Petitioner relies does not state that the bidder accepts the terms and conditions set forth in the core model contract and the RFP. The evaluation committee properly determined that Petitioner's response failed to meet this fatal item. In this proceeding, there was evidence that the Respondent routinely inserts in its Request for Proposals the fatal item requirement that the bidders agree in writing to accept the terms and conditions set forth in the core model contract and the RFP, and that Respondent has never waived that fatal item requirement. There was no evidence that Respondent was using this fatal item requirement to discriminate against or in favor of any bidder.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusion of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Respondent dismiss Petitioner's bid protest. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1992. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-4311BID The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. 1. The proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner are accepted in material part by the Recommended Order. Petitioner's conclusions based on those facts are rejected for the reasons discussed in the Recommended Order. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent. 1. The proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard A. Cosby, Vice President National Cleaning of Florida, Inc. 1101 Holland Drive, #32 Boca Raton, Florida 33487 Colleen A. Donahue, Esquire District 10 Legal Office Room 513 201 West Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-1885 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact On December 24, 1986, respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT), gave notice to qualified and interested contracting firms that it was accepting bids from firms interested in providing construction and maintenance services on State Job No. 08150-3412. Such bids were due on or before January 21, 1987. The job description read as follows: At State Bridge Nos. 080025 and 000026 over the Withlacoochee River North of Tampa. Work consists of Furnish and Install Integral Pile Jackets (port. cement grout filled); Remove and Replace Sections of Bridge Deck; Floating Turbidity Barrier; and Incidental Items. Length 0.066 Mile. (B.I. 1144013) Stated in plainer language, the project called for repairs to two bridges on I-75 which span the Withlacoochee River southwest of Ocala in Hernando County. The bidders were also provided with a copy of the specifications and bid form dated November 4, 1986 regarding the contract. In response to this offer, petitioner, CSA Marine Services, Inc. (CSAMS), a contractor with offices at 759 Parkway Street, Jupiter, Florida, filed a bid proposal by the established deadline. Its bid totalled $123,347.59. Also filing a bid proposal was Seig and Ambachtsheer, Inc. (SAI), a contractor in Orange City, Florida. Its bid price was $137,209.50. The bid form itself was prepared by DOT and merely required the contractor to fill in the blanks where appropriate. The first two columns were labeled "item number" and "approximate quantities" and were already completed by DOT. For those items having a quantity of only one, the words "lump sum were written in the second column. Where quantities exceeded one, they were expressed in such terms as linear feet, cubic yards and pounds together with the approximate numerical quantities. The third column was labeled "item description and unit or lump price (written in words)." The fourth column read "unit price (in figures)" and required the bidder to indicate the unit price of each line item in figures. The fifth or final column was labeled "amounts" and required the bidder to reflect the lump sum price of each line item in figures. Columns three through five were filled in by CSAMS where necessary. The total price of the bid was to be listed on a bid blank which was attached to the bid form. On its face, the third column on the form offered petitioner the option of either using a unit or lump sum price. In addition, section 2-5.1 of the Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction, 1986 Edition, which governs the awarding of contracts and has been incorporated as a part of the bid documents, provides as follows: Proposals shall be submitted on the form described in 2-2. Unit or lump sum prices for all bid items shall be shown in words and figures, and all extensions shall be carried out. Notwithstanding the form and instructions, according to a DOT representative, a lump sum price may be used only when the quantity in column two is one item. If more than one item is reflected in column two, then DOT expects a contractor to use the unit price. However, there is no written rule, instruction or provision in the specifications that sets forth this requirement. CSAMS properly opted to use lump sum price under column three on at least two line items even though the quantities exceeded one. Of particular interest was line item 8400-3-4 which, according to column two, required 20.800 cubic yards of concrete for a "superstructure." Relying upon the optional language on the form, petitioner wrote the words seven thousand, one hundred, fifty five dollars and 00/100 cents" in column three (which was a lump sum price), and a unit price of $344.00 in column four. It then used the figure of $7,155 in the final column of that item, which is the approximate sum of $344 times the quantity (20.800). Because of the volume of bid lettings each month, DOT uses a computer to total the numbers in each line item for each bid. If the amount in column five does not agree with the figures in columns three and four, the computer flags the item, and a manual review of the line item is made. While reviewing line item 8400-3-4 of petitioner's bid form, the computer found the numbers did not agree. More specifically, when 20.800 in column two was multiplied times $344.00 in column four, it equalled $7,155.20 and not $7,155.00 as reflected in column five of petitioner's bid form. This twenty-cent disagreement arose because petitioner had rounded off the unit price from $343.99038 to $344.00 in column four. The disagreement prompted a manual review of petitioner's bid form and a recalculation of the line item. On January 30, 1987 DOT bureau chief J. Ted Barefield prepared a letter to CSAMS styled "Notice of Switch in Apparent Low Bidder" indicating in part: Due to mathematical error(s) on the bid of CSA Marine Services, Inc. and Continental Shelf Associates, Inc., the apparent low bidder, whose bid amount was $123,347.59 is now $265,016.59. Therefore, the apparent low bidder is Seig & Ambachtsheer, Inc. The change in amount was the result of DOT increasing the unit price in column four from $344 to $7,155 (to agree with column three) and multiplying the quantity (20.800) times the sum specified in words in column three ($7,155) to arrive at a total in column five of $148,824. This caused an increase of $141,669 over the original bid price. In making the above change, DOT relied on Section 3-1 of the 1986 Edition of the Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction. Section 3-1 provides in relevant part as follows: In the event of any discrepancy in the three entries for the price for any item, the unit price as shown in words shall govern unless the extension and the unit price shown in figures are in agreement with each other, in which case they shall govern over the unit price shown in words. (Emphasis added) Here, because of the twenty-cent discrepancy in the entries for line item 8400-3-4, DOT used the "unit price as shown in words" in column three to recalculate the item since the extension ($7,155.00) and the unit price shown in figures ($344.00)" did not agree. In doing so, DOT did not first evaluate the price written in words to see if it was a lump sum or unit price. After receiving the above letter, CSAMS and DOT representatives met in early February 1987 to discuss the CSAMS proposal. It was represented to CSAMS that it should have used a unit price in words in column three rather than a lump sum price. Petitioner was also provided with a copy of a letter previously sent to it on September 6, 1985 by DOT which noted the following irregularity on a bid: "Unit prices as written in words and figures do not agree (Item 8457- 70)." However, the letter did not contain explicit advice as to DOT's unwritten policy. On February 5, 1987 Barefield wrote a second letter to CSAMS indicating that there were several discrepancies in its bid proposal. These included: (a) the name on the cover sheet (CSAMS and Continental Shelf Associates, Inc.) did not agree with the name (CSAMS) in other parts of the bid, (b) unit prices as written in words and figures did not agree, (c) an incomplete affidavit was filed, and (d) an incorrect MBE Certification and incomplete Utilization Sheets were submitted. The latter two errors were related to the discrepancy in the names. However, the letter stated that "no further action is requested by you at this time," and that the letter was to serve as a reminder that in the future the irregularities could cause petitioner's bid to be rejected. Petitioner's bid was accepted as being appropriate but with the substantially higher bid price of $265,016.59. The error made by CSAMS is a common one. Indeed, it was stated the same mistake is made by contractors on "several bids during each letting." Even so, DOT has not considered providing some special instruction or rule to clarify this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner be awarded the contract on State Job No. 08150- 3412. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of April, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1987.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Respondent's intended award of a lease for office space to Intervenor, Anthony Abraham Enterprise, is arbitrary and capricious and whether the proposal of the Petitioner, Adlee Developers, the current lessor, is responsive.
Findings Of Fact The parties agreed that on April 7, 1991, the Department issued an Invitation to Bid entitled, "Invitation To Bid For Existing Facilities State Of Florida Lease Number 590:2286, Dade County" This procurement was for the provision of 30,086 net rentable square feet to be used for office space in Dade County. A 3% variance was permitted. The facility was to house the District's Aging and Adult Services office which has been a tenant in Petitioner's building for several years and remained there during the pendancy of this protest process. According to the published advertisement, a pre-proposal conference was to be held on April 22, 1991, with all bids due by the bid opening to be held at 10:00 AM on May 30, 1991. The pre-bid conference was conducted by Philip A. Davis, then the District's facilities service manager and included not only a written agenda but also a review of the evaluation process by which each responsive bid would be examined. Petitioner asserts that the potential bidders were told, at that conference, that annual rental increases for the ten year lease period could not exceed five per cent (5%) and claims that Abraham's bid exceeded those guidelines. Thorough examination of the documentary evidence presented and the transcript of the proceedings, including a search for the reference thereto in Petitioner's counsel's Proposed Findings of Fact, fails to reveal any support for that assertion as to an increase limitation. The ITB for this procurement, in the section related to the evaluation of bids, indicated that pursuant to the provisions of Sections 5-3 and 5-11 of HRSM 70-1, dealing with the procurement of leased space, the responsive bids would be reviewed by an evaluation committee which would visit each proposed facility and apply the evaluation criteria to it in order to determine the lowest and best bidder. The evaluation criteria award factors listed in the ITB defined a successful bid as that one determined to be the lowest and best. That listing of evaluation criteria outlined among its categories associated fiscal costs, location, and facility. As to the first, the committee was to look at rental rates for both the basic term of the lease and the optional renewal period. The rates were to be evaluated using present value methodology applying the present value discount rate of 8.08% and rates proposed were to be within projected budgeting restraints of the Department. The total weight for the rental rate category was to be no more than 40 points with 35 points being the maximum for the basic term and 5 points for the option. Evaluation of the location was to be based on the effect of environmental factors including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the operations planned therefor. This included the proximity of the facility to a preferred area such as a co-location, a courthouse, or main traffic areas. This item carried a maximum weight of 10 points. Also included in location were the frequency and availability of public transportation, (5 points); the proximity of the facility to the clients to be served, (5 points); the aesthetics of not only the building but the surrounding neighborhood, (10 points); and security issues, (10 points). The third major factor for evaluation was the facility itself and here the committee was to examine the susceptibility of the offered space to efficient layout and good utilization, (15 points), and the susceptibility of the building, parking area and property as a whole to possible future expansion, (5 points). In that regard, the Bid Submittal Form attached to the ITB called for the successful bidder whose property did not have appropriate zoning at the time of award to promptly seek zoning appropriate to the use classification of the property so that it might be used for the purposes contemplated by the department within 30 days. In the event that could not be done, the award could be rescinded by the department without liability. The committee could award up to 100 points. The basic philosophy of this procurement was found in paragraph 1 of the Bid Award section of the ITB which provided: The department agrees to enter into a lease agreement based on submission and acceptance of the bid in the best interest of the department and the state. After the bid opening, three of the four bids received, excluding Petitioner's which was initially determined to be non-responsive, were evaluated by the Department's bid evaluation committee according to the above point system which allowed no discretion or deviation from the formula in comparing rental rates between bidders. Once Petitioner's bid was thereafter determined to be responsive, it, too was evaluated by the committee. At this second evaluation session, relating to Adlee's bid only, the committee scored the bid and added its scores to the original score sheets upon which the other three bidders' scores had been placed. Abraham had the lowest rental rates for the basic term of the lease and received the maximum award of 35 points for that category while Adlee received points. Abraham received an additional 2.29 points for the optional period rates while Adlee got 0. In the other categories, "location" and "facility", which comprised 60% of the points, Adlee's facility was routinely rated superior to Abraham's except for the area related to susceptibility for future expansion in which Abraham was rated higher by a small amount. Overall, however, Adlee was awarded 620.41 points and Abraham 571.03 points and as a result, Adlee was rated by the committee to be the lowest and best bidder. RCL, another bidder, was rated second, with Abraham third and DCIC fourth. Thereafter, the committee chairman, Mr. VanWerne, forwarded the new (and complete) evaluation results to the District Administrator on June 14, 1991 by an addendum dated June 27, 1991 which recommended award of the bid to Petitioner, Adlee Developers. No award was made at the time. Several factors not pertinent to the issues here caused that delay. Among the major of these was pending legislation which would have transferred the operation needing this space to another agency. This transfer was never consummated, however. On or before March 20, 1992, the new District Administrator, Mr. Towey, who had been appointed to his office in December, 1991, and who was made aware that this procurement had not been finalized, requested all available material on it so that he could study it and make his decision based on his own review of the submission. As a part of his determination process, he visited and inspected both the Adlee and the Abraham sites. One of the factors he considered was what appeared to be the significant monetary discrepancy between the two pertinent bids. Initial calculations indicated that Abraham's bid was approximately $835,000.00 lower than Adlee's over the ten year basic term of the lease. This amount was subsequently determined to be somewhat lower but the discrepancy is still significant. Nonetheless, because of that difference, Mr. Towey called a meeting with the members of the evaluation committee which had evaluated the bidders and had recommended Adlee. His stated reason for calling that meeting was to allow him to hear their reasons for rating the submissions as they had done and to take that information into consideration when he made his final decision. None of the committee members who testified at the hearing at Petitioner's behest indicated any feelings of pressure or intimidation by Mr. Towey. During his meeting with the committee members, Mr. Towey went over several of the evaluation criteria award factors to determine the committee's rationale. Of major importance was the issue of cost, of the availability of the facility to transportation to and from the building, employee security and the ability to control access to the facility, and the availability of on-site parking without cost to both employees and clients. It appears the Adlee facility is a multistory building with some parking available on site and would be easier to control. In addition, it is closer to public transportation access points. There is, however, some indication that on-site parking for clients would not be free and the closest free parking is some distance away. According to Adlee's representative, this matter would not be a problem, however, as adequate, free on site parking, which apparently was not initially identified as a problem, could be provided in any new lease. The Abraham facility is a one story building surrounded by on-site parking. In that regard, however, at hearing, Petitioner raised the claim that the Abraham site did not, in actuality, provide adequate parking because the zoning requirements of the City of South Miami, the municipality in which the facility is located, did not permit the required number of parking spaces to accommodate the prospective need. Petitioner sought and received permission to depose the Building and Zoning Director for the city, Sonia Lama, who ultimately indicated that the Abraham site was grandfathered in under the old zoning rule and, thereby, had adequate parking available. In any case, had this not been true, under the terms of the ITB, any zoning deficiencies could have been corrected after award, or the award rescinded without penalty to the Department. After the meeting with the committee, Mr. Towey indicated he would probably go against the committee's recommendation. One of his reasons for doing so, as he indicated to them, was the appearance certain amenities in the facility would give. In the period between the time the committee met and Mr. Towey was ready to decide, there were several newspaper articles published in the Miami area which were negative in their approach to Department leasing policies and this publicity had an effect on him. In his response to a reporter's question, in fact, Mr. Towey indicated he would not permit the lease of any property which contained such amenities while he was District Director. There is some evidence that the wet bar referred to here was a sink and counter used by agency employees to make coffee. However, before making his decision, Mr. Towey also met with Herbert Adler of Adlee. Mr. Towey advised him he was concerned about the fact that the Adlee property provided a wet bar, a private bathroom and some other amenities in that suite of offices occupied by the Department. Mr. Towey was adamant in his public and private pronouncements on the subject that there would be no such amenities in HRS offices in his District while he was in charge. At the meeting in issue, Mr. Adler made it very clear he was willing to remove all the offending amenities to bring the space into conformity with Mr. Towey's standards. Mr. Towey obviously took Adler at his word as he did not consider this matter to be an issue when he evaluated the bids. Based on his independent evaluation of the proposals, and considering all the pertinent factors, Mr. Towey decided not to concur with the committee's recommendation and instead recommended to the Department's Office of General Services that the bid be awarded to Abraham. Because his recommendation differed from that of the evaluation committee, under the provisions of Section 5-13, HRS Manual 70-1, he was required to forward additional justification for his position. In his forwarding memorandum dated March 20, 1992 to Mr. King Davis of the Department's Office of General Services, Mr. Towey listed as his reasons for disagreement with the committee's recommendation, (1) the lower term cost of Abraham's bid, (2) his opinion that the one story floor plan of Abraham was more convenient and accessible to clients, and (3) the provision for ample free parking at the Abraham site as opposed to the limited parking at the Adlee building. Petitioner claims that Mr. Towey's justification for disagreement was improper because, (a) the rental difference he cited was not based on the ITB formula and did not consider the difference in square footage offered; (b) the rental rate comparison compared a proposed lease with an existing lease, not with a proposal; and (c) the reference to on-site parking referred to the situation under the existing lease with Adlee and not to what could occur under a new lease. The major factor in Mr. Towey's decision was the price differential between the two offerings. While the difference may not have been as great as presented initially by the department staff, even taken in its most conservative light of about half that amount, and considering the appropriate figures, the difference was still considerable and significant. In the continuing period of budgetary austerity under which state operations have been and must continue to be conducted, the financial consideration loomed large in his thinking. As for the parking situation, no change for the better was provided for in Adlee's proposal and even if it were, it was but one of several factors. When Mr. Towey's March 20, 1992 memorandum in justification of his disagreement was evaluated at the Office of General services, it was determined that his decision was rational and objectively justified. Thereafter, by letter dated April 2, 1992, the Office of General Services authorized District 11 to award the lease to Abraham and this decision was transmitted to all responsive bidders by letter dated April 7, 1992. It was this action which prompted Petitioner's protest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the protest by Adlee Developers, Inc., of the award of procurement No. 590:2286 to Anthony Abraham Enterprises. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-2798 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: - 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted that the pre-bid conference was held but reject the finding that a 5% limit was mentioned. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted except for the next to last sentence which is rejected. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted but not probative of any material issue. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 30. Rejected. - 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. - 5. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. & 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 25. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Melinda S. Gentile, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell 200 East Broward Blvd. P.O. Box 1900 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Paul J. Martin, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol - Suite 1501 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Peter W. Homer, Esquire Greer, Homer & Bonner, P.A. 3400 International Place 100 S.E. 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131 John Slye General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power Agency Clerk DHRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The dispute in this case arises from various policy decisions of Respondent that underlie and inform a request for proposals that Respondent has issued for the purchase, through competitive bidding, of durable medical equipment and related services. The ultimate issue is whether Respondent’s decisions in connection with the competitive bidding process at the heart of this controversy have complied with state and federal law governing the Medicaid program.
Findings Of Fact Setting the Stage Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program in which Florida has voluntarily elected to participate in partnership with the national government. Medicaid provides medically necessary health care——including, relevantly, durable medical equipment (“DME”)——to lower income persons. In addition to shouldering administrative and regulatory responsibilities, Florida partially funds the Medicaid program, contributing about 42 percent of the money budgeted for the program’s operation in this state. Federal funds make up the balance. In Special Appropriation 252 of the General Appropriations Act of 2001, the Florida Legislature appropriated an amount for Medicaid compensable home health services, such as DME, that reflected a budget cut of approximately $1.3 million. By way of explanation, the legislature wrote: Funds in Specific Appropriation 252 reflect [an overall] reduction of [about $1.3 million] as a result of implementing a policy to pay for specific durable medical equipment products on a competitively bid basis, effective October 1, 2001. Ch. 2001-253, Section 3, Laws of Florida. As a cost containment measure, competitive bidding for publicly funded healthcare is a subject that academics and policy makers have been studying and debating for some years. Proponents view competitive bidding as a means of bringing market forces to bear on possibly inflated, predetermined fees, exposing providers’ true costs and producing lower prices as competition trims the fat. Critics fear that competitive bidding will result in a diminution of the quality of available healthcare because the relatively few providers who win contracts will thereafter have little or no incentive to innovate or otherwise exceed minimum contractual requirements—— and, indeed, will be rewarded for cutting costs to the bone. To decide the instant case does not, however, require a finding or conclusion that competitive bidding is either a good policy choice or a bad one under the circumstances. Without reaching that issue, it is determined that, once made, the broad policy decision to use competitive bidding as a means of purchasing healthcare for Medicaid recipients entails the considerable challenge of devising a detailed competitive bidding model that balances the interest of cost containment, on one side, against competing interests such as the continued availability of quality care, on the other. At bottom, because the course of performance under the resulting contracts can be expected to exert a regulatory effect on providers and recipients alike, competitive procurement in this particular environment demands that significant policy choices be made. One substantial impact that competitive bidding can have on recipients——which impact happens to be pertinent here—— is the abridgement of their freedom to choose a provider. Federal law requires, as a general principle, that Medicaid recipients be granted the freedom to obtain medical assistance from any authorized provider. This general rule yields under certain circumstances, as will be discussed in detail in the Conclusions of Law below, but the fact is that federal Medicaid policy expresses a preference for allowing recipients the freedom of choice. Consonant with that preference, this state’s policy prior to the present dispute was to allow each Medicaid recipient to obtain DME from any willing, Medicaid-enrolled provider. (To serve the Medicaid population, a DME provider must “enroll” in the program by agreeing to comply with the prescribed terms and conditions of coverage and to accept payment from Medicaid at predetermined rates set forth in fee schedules.) The Players The Agency is the state agency charged with administering the Medicaid program in Florida. At the federal level, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services is the agency authorized to administer Medicaid. The Agency administers Medicaid in Florida pursuant to a State Medicaid Plan (the “State Plan”). In whole or in part, the State Plan is incorporated by reference, and thereby adopted as rules, in the Florida Administrative Code. FAMES is a trade association whose members are providers of DME and related services. FAMES represents its members’ interests before state and federal administrative and legislative bodies. Policy Decisions The Agency construed the explanatory language of Specific Appropriation 252 as a binding legislative directive to initiate a competitive bidding process for the procurement of DME and related services. In response to this perceived mandate, the Agency prepared a Request for Proposals——identified as RFP – AHCA 0203 (the “RFP”)——which, according to its terms, “establishes the requirements for the durable medical equipment and medical supplies program.” In choosing which particular items to put out for bids1——a function that necessarily required important underlying policy decisions to be made——the Agency considered fungibility to be a weighty criterion; however, the Agency was strongly motivated, as well, to select things that were thought to offer the greatest potential for cost savings.2 Consequently, while the RFP states that the “procurement [hereunder] is limited to hospital beds, and respiratory equipment and supplies,” the procurement is not quite as limited as this description might suggest. For in addition to goods the Agency is also seeking to purchase services, as the RFP itself discloses: “The purpose of this document is to request proposals from qualified organizations to provide quality, selected Medicaid services to Medicaid recipients.” (Emphasis added). The most significant of these services are those provided by respiratory therapists. As licensed health care practitioners, respiratory therapists are an integral part of the delivery of respiratory equipment, particularly the ventilators which are covered by the RFP. When a ventilator is placed in a patient’s home, a respiratory therapist must periodically visit the patient to monitor the patient’s oxygen levels and adjust the equipment as needed. In this, the respiratory therapist makes clinical assessments and exercises independent judgment. There is no doubt that, through the provision of such services, a professional relationship is established between the therapist and the patient. Obviously, respiratory therapists are not fungible in the way that, for example, hospital beds might be. Another set of important decisions that shaped the design of this competitive procurement concerned the number of contracts to be let and their nature and scope. In this regard, the Agency decided to award a single prime contract for each of the areas served by the Agency’s 11 regional offices. It determined that the same contractor may be selected for more than one regional area. And it announced that, once selected, the prime contractor——and only the prime contractor——will be responsible for serving all of the Medicaid eligible recipients in the specified region; all other providers will be precluded from delivering the same DME goods and services in that area. The upshot of these decisions is that 11 DME providers, at most, will hold prime contracts. Even after accounting for subcontracting, which is allowed, it is clear that the number of eligible providers of the subject DME——which is around 1,500 under the prevailing “any willing and authorized provider” policy——will be dramatically reduced. Like the decisions that led to the selection of the specific items covered by the RFP, the decisions that will, if fully implemented, overhaul the existing delivery system for the specified DME are matters of policy committed to the Agency’s discretion. While FAMES has raised legitimate concerns about the wisdom and efficacy of these decisions, establishing that reasonable people could disagree with the Agency’s solutions, the evidence does not show that the Agency abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in formulating the RFP. That said, it cannot seriously be disputed——and is hereby found——that if the Agency completes the competitive process contemplated by the RFP, the outcome will substantially affect, and indeed will regulate, both providers and Medicaid patients.3 It is clear, in other words, that there are substantive Medicaid policies embedded in, and articulated through, the RFP. The Agency has not yet amended the State Plan or any Medicaid handbook to account for the changes in Florida Medicaid policy being effected through the competitive bidding process established in the RFP. An Important Negative Decision As mentioned, federal law requires as a general rule that Medicaid recipients be guaranteed the right to choose their own providers. Without getting into the legal details at this point, federal law further provides that, under certain circumstances, a state may be granted a waiver of, or fall within an exception to, this freedom of choice requirement. At the time it was devising the competitive bidding model reflected in the RFP, the Agency believed that it could proceed with the subject procurement in the absence of any formal approval from the federal government, notwithstanding the fact that the project will, if implemented, curtail recipients’ freedom of choice. This belief was based on a single telephone conversation between Florida Medicaid Director Robert Sharpe and an unnamed employee of CMS, which had taken place prior to the 2001 legislative session. The federal official apparently had told Mr. Sharpe that a state does not need to obtain from CMS a waiver of the freedom of choice requirement in order to purchase DME on a competitive-bids basis because DME providers are vendors whose relationships with recipients are not “personal.” This opinion was never reduced to writing. Because the only evidence of the substance of the aforementioned telephone conversation is Mr. Sharpe’s testimony, it is impossible to make a finding of fact as to whether the preceding paragraph contains an accurate and complete statement of CMS’s policy; there is, simply, no admissible nonhearsay evidence in the record to support such a finding. Although the undersigned accepts Mr. Sharpe’s testimony and finds that such a discussion occurred, this fact has little or no probative value because the Agency must comply with federal law, not the informal advice of an employee of CMS. In any event, it is undisputed that the Agency decided not to ask CMS to approve either a waiver of, or an exception to, the freedom of choice requirement. Consequently, neither the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services nor CMS has made a finding that adequate services or devices will be available to Medicaid recipients under the competitive bidding process that the Agency has initiated through the RFP. Though negative in nature, the Agency’s decision not to seek and obtain federal approval, in the form of a waiver or exception, was as important as other, positive decisions regarding the purchase of DME through competitive bidding. As will be seen, federal law requires a waiver or an approved exception in these circumstances. The Agency does not have the discretion to circumvent the federal requirements. The Notices The Agency caused the first notice of the RFP to be published in the February 22, 2002, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly. This notice described the contract, advised that the RFP would be issued on February 28, 2002, provided instructions for obtaining a copy of the RFP, and established March 7, 2002, as both the deadline for responses and the proposal opening date. A second notice, similar to the first one, was published in the March 8, 2002, Florida Administrative Weekly. It changed the response deadline/opening date from March 7 to March 11, 2002. A third notice, published in the March 22, 2002, Florida Administrative Weekly, changed the deadline for proposal submission yet again, from March 7 to April 5, 2002. (Although this third notice did not mention the proposal opening date, presumably it, too, was changed to April 5, 2002.) The Agency did not directly notify DME providers or FAMES about the RFP. Factual Determinations Regarding FAMES’s Standing Members of FAMES are providers of DME goods and services, including those that are the subject of the RFP. DME providers, such as FAMES’s members, are not necessarily Medicaid providers, however. If a DME provider wants to participate in Medicaid and supply goods to Medicaid recipients, it must become enrolled in the Medicaid program. It is not possible to make a finding, based on the evidence in this case, as to how many (or what percentage) of FAMES’s members are enrolled Medicaid providers of DME. The Agency’s decision to award contracts, through competition, for Medicaid reimbursable DME poses an immediate threat of harm only to existing Medicaid providers, not to all DME providers. DME providers who are not presently participating in the Medicaid program might be interested in the outcome of this proceeding, but the resulting final agency action will not immediately affect their substantial interests one way or the other.4 As a result, FAMES’s standing must be predicated on its representation of members who are enrolled Medicaid providers of DME. FAMES’s vice president, Robert Lichtenstein, testified that at least 25 to 50 of FAMES’s 300 or so members provide DME to Medicaid recipients. Mr. Lichtenstein’s understanding of this asserted fact was based not on personal knowledge, he explained, but on conversations with members who had contacted him to discuss the RFP. Because Mr. Lichtenstein had not spoken with all of FAMES’s members, he was unable to state, with any degree of certainty, the total number of Medicaid-enrolled DME providers that belong to FAMES. Mr. Lichtenstein’s testimony about the minimum number of enrolled providers in FAMES’s ranks rested on statements of declarants (the members) made outside the hearing room, which statements were apparently offered as proof of the matters asserted. Mr. Lichtenstein’s testimony that no fewer than 25 to 50 of FAMES’s members are enrolled Medicaid providers was based, in other words, on hearsay and cannot, for that reason, support a finding of fact on its own.5 On the other hand, Mr. Lichtenstein’s testimony that he personally had talked to some 25 to 50 members about what was happening with the RFP is not hearsay to the extent that fact is relevant without reference to the truth of the matters discussed. Thus, this testimony is admissible, and has been credited, for the relevant, nonhearsay purpose of establishing that at least 25 to 50 of FAMES’s members were sufficiently interested in the RFP to share their views about it with Mr. Lichtenstein.6 The testimony of Mr. Lichtenstein, which was not contradicted or impeached, establishes, at least inferentially, that FAMES represents a number of members who, as enrolled Medicaid providers of DME, have a substantial interest in being reimbursed under state and federal law pursuant to rule-based methodologies.7 The proposed switch to a methodology of reimbursement based on competitive bidding, which methodology allegedly fails to comply with these criteria, impinges upon this interest. While more and better evidence regarding the number of affected members should have been adduced, the fact that a noticeable percentage (roughly 8 to 16 percent) of FAMES’s members happened to speak with Mr. Lichtenstein about the Agency’s competitive bidding process shows a level of interest within the organization from which it reasonably can be inferred, and is hereby found, that the Agency’s decision to competitively award at most 11 exclusive contracts for certain DME goods and services would directly impact a considerable number of FAMES’s members. The Agency’s proposed procurement scheme promises to affect these members in two substantial ways. First, under the competitive bidding process, all of FAMES’s members who are Medicaid providers of DME must compete for the Agency’s favor, whereas before they competed for the business of individual recipients. Because, moreover, the Agency plans to select no more than 11 providers, most (if not all) of FAMES’s members who presently serve the relevant market stand to lose existing business and hence suffer economic loss. The injuries threatened here are not, however, solely economic. The other substantial effect on the Medicaid providers is the violation of their right to be reimbursed in accordance with state and federal law pursuant to methodologies prescribed in lawful rules. To the extent, as FAMES contends, that the Agency is not following either federal law or duly promulgated rules, such unlawful conduct affects FAMES’s members in a way that differs from the effect of such conduct on the public at large. In short, the substantial interests of a substantial number of FAMES’s members would be determined by the proposed agency action at issue. Further, there is no real dispute, and it is hereby found, that the substance of the Agency’s decision to award exclusive contracts for DME goods and services on a competitive- bids basis is within FAMES’s general scope of interest and activity. Finally, the relief requested is appropriate for FAMES to receive on behalf of its members because if the Agency’s decision is rescinded and the proposed competitive procurement abandoned or substantially modified, it is reasonable to suppose that the ultimate remedy will inure to the benefit of FAMES’s injured members.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a Final Order that stops the procurement under the RFP until after (1) the Agency has submitted the certification required under 42 C.F.R. § 431.51(d) and CMS has notified the Agency that all of the requirements for an exception under 42 C.F.R. § 431.54(d) have been met or, alternatively, (2) CMS has granted the Agency a waiver of the freedom of choice requirement in connection with this procurement. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Agency update its DME Handbook to reflect or accommodate any new competitive reimbursement methodologies that might be put into effect, and to adopt such amendments as a rule, as soon as feasible and practicable, to avoid violating Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 2002.
Findings Of Fact On August 31, 1994, the Respondent received and opened bids for its Project No. HSMV 92044000, Repairs, Art Sutton Drivers' License Office, Miami, Florida (the Project). The bid specification documents (the Specifications) for the Project included requirements for a Base Bid and for specific alternate proposals with respect to three defined items of alternate work. Section 01100 of the Specifications stated that "[a]ll Alternates described in this Section are required to be reflected on the Bid Form as submitted by the bidder." Part 2 of that section provided: ALTERNATE NO. 1 A. Provide a deductive price to the base bid for the removal of existing window units and the installation of new units as indicated in plans and specification Section 08520. ALTERNATE NO. 2 A. Provide a deductive price to the base bid for the provision of communications conductors see specification Section 16400. ALTERNATE No. 3 A. Provide a deductive price to the base bid for the installation of all landscape materials as indicated on plans and as per specification Section 02960. Also included in the Specifications as Exhibit 4 was a Proposal Form. The Specifications required each bidder to submit this form in triplicate on the bidder's letterhead. With respect to alternates, the Proposal Form required: With the foregoing as a Base Bid, the following costs of alternate proposals are submitted in accordance with the drawings and specifications. Alternate No. 1 Add or Deduct $ Alternate No. 2 Add or Deduct $ Alternate No. 3 Add or Deduct $ The Respondent's architect received four bids on August 31, 1994. As recorded on the Bid Tabulation and Notice of Award Recommendation, three bidders provided specific prices for the three alternates, as well as a Base Bid. The Bid Tabulation shows that two bidders provided specific prices for the three alternates and included the alternate prices in their Base Bids. The Petitioner provided specific prices for the three alternates, but excluded the alternate prices from its Base Bid. The fourth bidder provided a specific price for only one alternate and excluded that alternate price from its Base Bid. (The fourth bidder was disqualified as non-responsive for failing to submit prices on all three alternates.) In pertinent part, the Petitioner's proposal read: With the foregoing as a Base Bid, the following costs of alternate proposals are submitted in accordance with the drawings and specifications: Alternate No. 1 Add or Deduct . . . $4,400.00 Alternate No. 2 Add or Deduct . . . $1,158.00 Alternate No. 3 Add or Deduct . . . $2,084.00 These Alternates were in addition to the Petitioner's Base bid of $204,322.00. The proposal form submitted by the Petitioner comports with Exhibit 4 to the Specifications, which was the mandatory Proposal Form. On August 31, 1994, William Phillip Austin, Peitioner's President, wrote the architect: Per our telephone conversation this date regard- ing the confusion relating to the Add/Deduct for Alternates 1, 2 and 3 for the above project, please be advised that our base bid did not include the work described in the Alternates. As stated if you want work described in Alternates 1, 2 and 3, you must add the cost to our base bid. The base bid including Alternates 1, 2 and 3 would, therefore, be $211,964.00. If we can provide additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us. The Respondent's architect completed and submitted the bid Tabulation and Notice of Award Recommendation to the Respondent in early September. The document clearly discloses the amounts of each bidder's Base Bid and Alternate proposals. Using plus (+) and minus (-) signs, the Bid Tabulation further shows each bidder's method of calculation. The record is devoid of evidence that the Respondent had any problem in evaluating the bids and identifying the lowest bidder. The Petitioner was the lowest bidder on any combination of base bid plus or minus any or all alternates. Subsequently the Petitioner received a NOTICE OF AWARD RECOMMENDATION dated October 4, 1994. The Notice informed the Petitioner that the Respondent "has recommended that the contract be awarded to your firm in the total amount of $211,964.00, accepting the Base Bid and Alternates #1, #2 & #3. The Administrator of Contracts Design and Permitting, Division of Building Construction, Department of Management Services, State of Florida will consider this recommendation." Larry R. Coleman, Construction Projects Administrator, signed the letter. The Petitioner acknowledged receipt. A representative of the second lowest bidder, Kalex Construction, then contacted the Respondent, complaining of the Award Recommendation. The grounds for the Kalex complaint are not in the record. However, on October 14, 1994, H. R. Hough, the Respondent's Contracts Administrator, sent the Petitioner a letter "to notify you of the State's decision to reject all bids on the above referenced project due to ambiguities in the specifications." Mr. Hough's reasons for the rejection are "other than those stated by the protestor," Kalex. The Respondent's Rule 60D-5.007, Florida Administrative Code, states: Determination of Successful Bidder. All projects except where competitive bidding is waived under the provisions of Rule 60D-5.008 will be publicly bid in accordance with the provisions in the project specifications bidding documents. Award of contract will be made to the responsive bidder, determined to be qualified in accordance with the provisions herein and meeting the requirements of the bidding documents, that submits the lowest valid bid for the work. The lowest bid will be determined as follows: The lowest bid will be the bid from the responsive bidder that has submitted the lowest price for the base bid or the base bid plus the additive alternates or less the deductive alternates chosen by the Agency to be included in or excluded from the proposed contract, taken in numerical order listed in the bid documents. The order of the alternates may be selected by the Agency in any sequence so long as such acceptance out of order does not alter the designation of the low bidder. Under the above-quoted rule, the Respondent compares bids beginning with the lowest "base bid." The Respondent is of the view that for this comparison to be fair and equal, all bidders must include the same scope of work in the "base bid." The Respondent does not interpret the above-quoted rule to allow deductive alternates from some bidders and additive alternates from others. (For reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law which follow, the Respondent's interpretation and application of the above-quoted rule is erroneous.) The Specifications contain some ambiguous and inconsistent language regarding whether alternates should be treated as additive or deductive. The ambiguous and inconsistent language did not provide any bidder with an advantage or a disadvantage, nor did it otherwise affect the fairness of the bidding process.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services issue a Final Order in this case awarding a contract for the subject project to the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of December 1994. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December 1994. APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner Paragraph 1: This is primarily a statement of position and is addressed in the Preliminary Statement. Paragraphs 2 through 10: Accepted in substance with a few unnecessary details omitted. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent Paragraphs 1 through 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as constituting a conclusion which is not warranted by the evidence. Third sentence is accepted as an accurate statement of how Respondent has been interpreting the subject rule, but is not accepted as constituting a correct interpretation of the rule. Paragraph 8: Rejected as misleading and confusing because the "scope of work" to be performed under the contract can only be determined after the Respondent decides which alternates to include and which to exclude. Paragraph 9: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as constituting a conclusion which is not warranted by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Timothy J. Armstrong, Esquire Armstrong & Mejer Suite 1111 Douglas Centre 2600 Douglas Road Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Department of General Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of General Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of General Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner Restat's response to the Respondent Department of Administration's Invitation to Bid (ITB) 92-08 was responsive and is the lowest and best response.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Department of Administration enter a final order dismissing Restat's Protest/ Petition and ratifying its intended award of ITB 92-08 to Consultec. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of February, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 1992.
The Issue Whether the petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with Section 120.53(5)(b), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner filed bids for ITB No. 4-600-370-K which, if responsive, were the apparent low bid for the Class 3 bid and next to lowest for Class 4 and 5 categories of copier equipment listed in the ITB. [Petition, page 8] On October 16, 1995, the Department posted the intended awards and disqualified all three of Petitioner's bids as nonresponsive. [Petitioner's memorandum in opposition to Respondent's motion for summary recommended order (MEMO), paragraph 1] The Petitioner filed a notice of protest against the disqualification of its bids on October 19, 1995. [MEMO, paragraph 1] The petition for formal hearing was filed with the Department on October 30, 1995. [MEMO, paragraph 1] The petition for formal hearing alleged, in part: SUMMARY OF GROUNDS FOR PROTEST ...The Division of Purchasing ("Division") disqualified all three of Petitioner's bids on vague grounds identified by three words: "Disquality -- Manufacturers Certification. " See Ex. 3 hereto at 1. There are two provisions in the ITB that require the "certification" of the Original Equipment Manufacturer ("OEM"). See Ex. 1 hereto at 3 and 32. Since the State has not seen fit to adequately identify which provision(s) are at issue, Petitioner is required to address both provisions that might apply. Both of these requirements are completely arbitrary, irrational and, most importantly, anticompeti- tive, for the reasons described further in Section 3 below. The "certification" require- ments are arbitrary and irrational because they are not designed to obtain the equipment at issue for the lowest price. Indeed, they ensure that the State will pay higher prices than it would without the requirements. Neither are the "certification" requirements rationally related to the quality of the equip- ment that was bid by Petitioner or the other bidders, including the OEMs. Finally, these requirements are blatantly anticompetitive be- cause they place the right to exclude all other competitors in the hands of the OEMs, which can deny such certification with impunity, ensuring that only those OEM bidders will prevail, as was the outcome here. This preferential treat- ment not only runs counter to the express intent of the legislature to promote free and open competition, it also raises serious anti- trust concerns. Disqualification of Petitioner's bids on the grounds presented by the Division should be reversed and the contract awards should be adjusted accordingly. * * * The preferential treatment provided to Xerox, Kodak, and other OEMs by insertion of the "certification" requirements in this ITB is consistent with a longstanding history of such anticompetitive treatment of independent providers of the equipment and service at issue, resulting in higher prices (but not necessarily higher quality) for the State's taxpayers. Petitioner's recent experience in dealing with the State on these matters is also consistent with this pattern of bias toward OEMs. * * * 3. BASIS OF PROTEST A. The Division of Purchasing Has Acted Arbitrarily and in Restraint of Trade * * * Petitioner has identified two potentially applicable provisions that the Division could be relying on for its disqualification decision. First, in the ITB's definition of "acceptable equipment" it states that bids for classes 3, 4, 5 and 6 shall be for "new and newly remanu- factured equipment only," and that "newly remanufactured equipment must be certified by the manufacturer." Ex. 1 at 3. This pro- vision also states that "remanufactured" equip- ment is not acceptable. Second, the ITB requires certification by the manufacturer as to the copy speed, recommended monthly copy volume, and other basic specifications of the equipment models being bid. Ex. 1 at 32. Both of these provisions are irrational, arbitrary, and clearly anticompetitive. * * * The Division's definition of acceptable equipment bears no relationship to the actual remanufacturing processes used by Petitioner or Xerox. Even if Xerox certifies its own "remanufactured" equipment, the State only receives assurances that the remanufacturing process used by Xerox meets certain standards. Petitioner certifies that its equipment meets certain quality and performance standards, just like Xerox does. There is no rational reason why self-certification of the equipment at issue would provide any different assurances of quality for the State. * * * 2. Certification by the OEM of Copy Speed and Other Basic Specifications Petitioner provided a sworn verification that its equipment meets the copy speed, recommended monthly copy volume, and other minimum specifications for each category of equipment for which it submitted bids. Its certification is based on the same procedures used by Xerox to certify its own equipment. There is no rational reason why that certifi- cation cannot meet the needs of the State. To insist upon certification only from the OEM is an arbitrary and anticompetitive requirement not related to quality or designed to achieve the lowest price. * * * This requirement also is blatantly anticompet- itive. Petitioner is in direct competition with Xerox for the sale and maintenance of the equipment at issue. It is irrational for the Division to expect Xerox to provide such certification to its competitors, even as to this type of uncontroversial information unless award to Xerox is the intended goal. The ITB required a manufacturer's certification which specified a notarized certification of the copy speed, recommended monthly copy volume, and other minimum specifications for the equipment bid. [Exhibit 1 to the Petition] The bids submitted by Petitioner included a certification executed by Advantage's president, Jane Beekmann. [MEMO, paragraph 3] The equipment specified by Advantage was manufactured by Xerox but was remanufactured by Advantage. [MEMO, paragraph 3, and as represented by Petitioner's counsel] Advantage maintains it may certify its remanufactured equipment in the same manner that Xerox certified its equipment. [MEMO, paragraph 5] The ITB provided, in pertinent part: ACCEPTABLE EQUIPMENT ...Bids for Classes 3, 4, 5 and 6 shall be for new and newly remanufactured equipment only. In Classes 3, 4, 5 and 6 newly remanu- factured equipment must be certified by the manufacturer. The ITB further provided, at page 32: This is to certify the manufacturer's recommended monthly volumes and certified copy speed (specify from the glass or document feeder) for the machines listed below. Monthly volume indicates the number of copies which can be made per month by the machine without causing excessive downtime. It does not necessarily denote the maximum number of copies that can be made by that particular machine. NOTE: This must be executed by the manu- facturer and must be notarized. Dealers are not authorized to sign this certification form. Failure to submit this certification with your bid shall result in disqualification of bid. The certifications provided by Petitioner identified the machines proposed by Advantage as the Xerox 5100, the Xerox 1090 w/finisher; and the Xerox 1075 w/finisher. Each of these certifications identified Advantage as the name of the manufacturer. [Exhibit C to the motion not disputed by Petitioner] Petitioner did not manufacture the Xerox 5100, the Xerox 1090 w/finisher; or the Xerox 1075 w/finisher. [Petitioner represents it is the remanufacturer, MEMO, paragraph 2] Petitioner maintains, and for purposes of this order it is accepted, that Advantage is the remanufacturer of the Xerox 5100, the Xerox 1090 w/finisher; or the Xerox 1075 w/finisher. [MEMO, paragraph 2] Petitioner did not timely challenge the specifications for ITB No. 4- 600-370-K.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of General Services enter a final order dismissing the petition of Advantage as an untimely challenge to the ITB specifications. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: William H. Lindner, Secretary Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 312 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Cindy Horne Assistant General Counsel Department of General Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 J. Daniel Leftwich Berry & Leftwich 2000 K Street, Northwest. Suite 450 Washington, D.C. 20006 James Leech Post Office Box 7473 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33338 Lawrence P. Stevenson Hume F. Coleman HOLLAND & KNIGHT Post Office Drawer 810 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
