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LINDA MAE KRUEGER vs. ONE STOP OIL COMPANY, 88-004063 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004063 Latest Update: Jan. 17, 1989

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Linda Mae Krueger, a white female, became a manager at One Stop Oil's Riverview, Florida, store on April 1, 1986. Petitioner's first immediate supervisor was Mr. Tom McBeth, area supervisor for six stores. Mr. McBeth was replaced by Mr. John Richardson on January 26, 1987. Upon becoming area supervisor, Mr. Richardson implemented certain changes in the manner in which all store managers under his supervision were to perform their duties. Petitioner disagreed with Mr. Richardson's changes and failed to follow some of Mr. Richardson's instructions regarding these changes. Petitioner developed a great deal of hostility towards Mr. Richardson and refused to accept the fact that the changes in operation were within Mr. Richardson's managerial capacity. The basis of Petitioner's claim of discrimination was Mr. Richardson's attempt to implement operational changes which Petitioner disagreed with and which were clearly not sexually discriminatory in nature. At the hearing, Ms. Krueger testified that she felt like she was treated unfairly by Mr. Richardson, but admitted that Mr. Richardson placed the same requirements on all other store managers. Petitioner, in June of 1988, told Mr. Richardson that she was considering leaving employment during the beginning of July. Petitioner marked on her store's calendar that she was leaving employment on July 2, 1988. Petitioner, on August 12, 1988, again gave verbal notice to One Stop Oil that she was separating employment with the company on August 27, 1988. At the time the Petitioner gave One Stop Oil this verbal notice of separation, Petitioner was planning to move with her family to North Carolina. On August 17, 1988, Petitioner quit her position as store manager at One Stop Oil's Riverview store. She quit because of a pay dispute over the amount of her bonus check. Petitioner and her husband expected a larger check. When Petitioner's husband saw the actual amount of the check he called the Jacksonville office of Respondent and told them he was closing the store and they had "better get somebody down there." Petitioner and her husband then left the store. Respondent sent Mr. Richardson to the store. He called in Cheryl Chipman and began accounting for the store receipts. He discovered that $1,700 in deposits was missing. Petitioner had given the deposit money to her husband on the day the check dispute arose. Petitioner's husband could not adequately account for the missing money. 1/ Respondent obtained Petitioner's store keys from her without any discussion. The keys were voluntarily turned over by Petitioner. Petitioner never reported for work afterwards. Petitioner's position was filled by Ms. Cheryl Chipman, a white female.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the petition against Respondent be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of January, 1989. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1989.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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FLORIDA TEACHING PROFESSION, NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, COLLIER COUNTY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, COLLIER SUPPORT PERSONNEL - NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION vs. COLLIER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 89-000320RX (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-000320RX Latest Update: Apr. 13, 1989

The Issue Whether the Petitioners have standing to institute a rule challenge proceeding under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Whether a school board may delegate the authority to suspend an employee without pay to the superintendent in specific instances for a limited period of time.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, COLLIER COUNTY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, (hereinafter CCEA) is the instructional bargaining unit for teachers in the Collier County School District. The Petitioner, COLLIER SUPPORT PERSONNEL-NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, (hereinafter CSP-NEA) is the certified bargaining agent for the non-instructional employees of the Collier County School District. The above mentioned Petitioners are affiliates of the Petitioner, FLORIDA TEACHING PROFESSION NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (hereinafter FTPNEA). As a result of collective bargaining agreements which allow the Petitioners CCEA and CSP-NEA to represent specific categories of employees of the school district, sixty five to seventy per cent of these employees are represented by these associations.. The Respondent SCHOOL BOARD OF COLLIER COUNTY, (hereinafter SCHOOL BOARD) has a rule that delegates the authority to suspend employees wholly or partially without pay to the superintendent. Under Rule No. R-18/81, such a suspension cannot exceed a period of three days, and the superintendent's authority is limited to five situations which have been specifically set forth in the body of the rule. A suspension is authorized only if the superintendent finds that the employee has: a) been absent without leave, b) been insubordinate, c) endangered the health or well-being of a fellow employee or of a student or students, d) willfully neglected duty, e) been intoxicated, consumed an alcoholic beverage, or used a controlled substance (unless prescribed by a physician,) while working. The rule cites Sections 230.23 and 230.33, Florida Statutes, as the authority for the implementation of this delegation process. The rule was adopted can December 17, 1981. Rule No. R-18/81 requires that any employee suspended by the superintendent under this rule be given all due process rights under the Florida Statutes, including those authorized by the Administrative Procedures Act. Pursuant to Rule No. R-18/81, the superintendent has suspended at least two employees in 1988. One of these employees is Mr. Robert Koy, who is represented by the Petitioner, CSP-NEA, in a proceeding currently before the Division of Administrative Hearings in which the employee's substantial interests are being determined. The process and procedures utilized by the Respondent SCHOOL BOARD in its suspension of employees without pay falls within the general scope of interests and activities of all of the Petitioners in this case. A substantial number of the members of the Petitioners CCEA and CSP- NEA are substantially affected by the challenged rule as it involves the disciplinary procedures used by the Respondent SCHOOL BOARD to manage its employees. Such procedures are included in the agreement between the Collier County Public Schools and the Petitioner CSP-NEA, which is in effect from October 1, 1987 through June 30, 1990. This agreement has been admitted into evidence in this proceeding. The relief sought by all of the Petitioners in this proceeding is that Rule No. R-18/81 be declared invalid. This relief is an appropriate remedy for each of the Petitioners to seek on behalf of its members in a rule challenge proceeding.

Florida Laws (4) 120.52120.54120.56120.68
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DAVID ALAN JOHNSON vs THE INTOWN COMPANIES, INC., 08-001751 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida Apr. 10, 2008 Number: 08-001751 Latest Update: Nov. 25, 2008

The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner because of his race, sex or religion.

Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and operates the Valu-Lodge Motel located at 4810 West Highway 98, Panama City Beach, Florida. The motel offers rooms for rent to the public and is a "transient public lodging establishment" within the meaning of Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a white male. His national origin is American. Although Petitioner’s complaint and petition indicate that Petitioner espouses to be a member of the Church of Christ, there was no evidence presented at the hearing regarding Petitioner’s religion. On September 9, 2004, Petitioner rented a motel room from Respondent at its Panama City Beach motel. The rental term was week to week. At some point, Respondent felt Petitioner had become disruptive to the operation of the hotel and to its guests. On November 25, 2005, Respondent informed Petitioner that it would no longer rent a room to Petitioner and hand-delivered a Notice of Termination of Lease to Petitioner. The Notice stated that Petitioner must vacate the premises by December 1, 2005. Petitioner refused to vacate the motel premises. On December 9, 2005, Respondent hand-delivered a Fifteen Day Notice for Possession of Premises to Petitioner. The Notice indicated that no further rent would be accepted. Petitioner again refused to vacate the premises. Petitioner also did not pay any further rent to Respondent. Respondent filed an eviction proceeding against Petitioner. The first and second eviction proceedings appear to have been dismissed for procedural reasons. However, the third eviction proceeding was successful. During that proceeding, Petitioner had the opportunity to defend against eviction based on the claims of discrimination raised in this matter. However, on June 22, 2007, after hearing, Respondent received a final judgment, awarding the Intown Companies, Inc., $19,213.18 in unpaid rent, plus interest. Respondent also received a Final Judgment of Eviction awarding the Company possession of the premises and court costs. A Writ of Possession was issued on June 25, 2007, and Petitioner vacated the premises on June 27, 2008. There was no evidence presented by Petitioner that demonstrated Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in any manner. There was absolutely no evidence of any racial, nationalistic or religious bias on the part of Respondent. Apparently, Petitioner believes that he is entitled to rent a room from Respondent simply because he is a member of the public and desires to rent a room from Respondent. Neither the facts, nor the law supports Petitioner’s misinformed view of the view of the law. Given the utter lack of evidence presented by Petitioner, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Alan Johnson 20417 Panama City Beach Parkway No. 8 Panama City Beach, Florida 32413 Melton Harrell, Authorized Agent The Intown Companies, Inc. d/b/a Valu Lodge American Motel Management, Inc. 2200 Northlake Parkway S-277 Tucker, Georgia 30084-4023

USC (2) 42 U.S.C 198142 U.S.C 2000a Florida Laws (3) 120.57509.092760.08
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LICENSING vs. MARIA DESILLERS, 88-000832 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-000832 Latest Update: Jun. 20, 1988

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Maria DeSillers, is the mother of Ronald David DeSillers, Jr. (Ronnie), a minor, now deceased. Because of an illness suffered by her son, respondent solicited, either directly or indirectly, funds for the benefit of her son. On January 29, 1987 respondent opened an account in the Coral Gables Federal Savings and Loan Association under the name "Maria DeSillers as Custodian for Ronald David DeSillers, Jr. under the Florida Uniform Transfers to Minors Act" (custodial account). A deposit of approximately $660,000 was made into the custodial account the same day. The establishment of the account was made under the authority of Chapter 710, Florida Statutes (1987), which governs the transfer of property by gift to minors. Under the statutory scheme set forth in Chapter 496, Florida Statutes (1987), charitable organizations, subject to certain exceptions, must register with petitioner, Department of State, Division of Licensing (Division). Although respondent acknowledges that her actions of soliciting funds constituted a charitable organization as defined by Subsection 496.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), the parties have stipulated that respondent has never registered as a charitable organization with the Division. On April 29, 1987 Ronnie died intestate (without a will). The balance in the custodial account on the day of his death was $509,912.50. The parties have stipulated that, after Ronnie's death, the following transfers and expenditures were made by respondent from Ronnie's custodial account: On May 13, 1987 respondent transferred $227,971 from the custodial account into a Maria DeSillers account which stated it was in trust for her parents, Manuela and Jose Marchante. On June 20, 1987 respondent paid $400 from the custodial account to Plaza Venetia as a deposit on a rental unit. On June 27, 1987 respondent paid $1,350 from the custodial account to Plaza Venetia. The stipulation does not disclose the purpose of this payment. On July 9 and 10, 1987 respondent made cash withdrawals from the custodial account in the amounts of $7,000 and $3,000, respectively. On July 10, 1987 respondent transferred $158,132 from the account in trust for her parents into a Barnett Bank Account entitled "Maria DeSillers." On January 19, 1988 respondent withdrew $25,000 from the custodial account to pay attorney fees. On December 31, 1987 petitioner subpoenaed the bank records of the custodial account and commenced an investigation into the matter. The investigation culminated in the issuance of an administrative complaint against respondent on January 29, 1988 alleging she had violated Subsection 496.04(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), by failing to register with petitioner as a charitable organization after having lost her exemption from registration. That prompted this proceeding. The parties have stipulated that the balance in the custodial account was $262,015.37 on November 18, 1987 and $239,287.93 on February 17, 1988. On March 7, 1988 the circuit court in and for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Probate Division, appointed Karen Gievers, Esquire, as curator to protect the remaining assets of Ronnie's estate.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint filed against Maria DeSillers be DISMISSED with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1988.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57710.123732.101
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, REGULATORY COUNCIL OF COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION OF MANAGERS vs CHRISTINA MARIE RESTAURI, 03-002462PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jul. 07, 2003 Number: 03-002462PL Latest Update: May 04, 2006

The Issue Whether the Respondent, Christina M. Restauri, committed the violations alleged and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating licensed community association managers pursuant to Florida law. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was licensed as a community association manager, license number CAM 0019553. In May 1998, the Respondent became the community association manager for the Association. As such, the Respondent had duties and responsibilities in connection with the day-to-day management of the Association's business. In exchange for the performance of her manager duties, the Association paid the Respondent a salary, provided her with a condominium unit for her residence, paid her utilities, and covered her local telephone service. The Respondent's managerial duties included all office management for the Association, including the collection of fees owed to the Association, the payment of monies owed to vendors by the Association, and the accounting associated with payroll for salaries owed to employees of the Association. The Respondent and the Association entered into a written management agreement that outlined the terms of her employment. The agreement (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) did not require the Association to pay for the Respondent's family health insurance. Additionally, the agreement did not provide for paid sick leave in excess of four days per year. In connection with her responsibilities for payroll, the Respondent controlled the amount of checks made payable to herself for salary owed during the course of her employment. This authority also allowed her to control the amount of monies withheld from her salary to cover her family medical insurance and for the monies payable for federal withholding taxes and social security. On at least two occasions, the Respondent altered her withholding such that no monies were withheld for federal taxes. The Respondent failed or refused to produce a W-4 form that would have supported the change in withholding. Moreover, the Respondent did not produce a W-2 form that would have supported, after-the-fact, that the withholding forms had been modified to support the altered withholding amount. The Respondent failed or refused to produce documentation to establish that she repaid the Association for family medical benefits she received. Initially, the amount to cover the family health benefit was reportedly withheld from the Respondent's paycheck. The adequacy of the withheld amount came into question. Under the terms of her employment, the Respondent was to remit the monthly family health premium to the Association. She did not do so. In fact, copies of checks that were purportedly offered in support of her claim that she had made the payments were never deposited into the Association's account. When the Respondent was challenged as to the amounts owed for health premiums and the matter was to be further investigated, she tendered her resignation. She never produced any of the financial records requested to document any of the matters contested in this proceeding. In addition to the foregoing payroll discrepancies, the Respondent caused herself to be overpaid $125.00 for sick leave. On or about October 12, 2000, the Respondent took $700.00 from the Association's petty cash and loaned it to Sandy Schwenn. Ms. Schwenn was employed by the Association as a secretary and had agreed to repay the funds. The loan was never repaid. The Respondent was not authorized to loan monies from the Association's petty cash fund and admitted the error during a board of directors' meeting on November 15, 2000. Whether the Respondent made good on her promise to repay the loan herself is unknown. Clearly, at hearing the Respondent did not make such representation.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a Final Order against the Respondent that imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $2500.00, and revokes her license as a community association manager. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Julie Malone, Executive Director Regulatory Council of Community Association of Managers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Nancy Campiglia, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Christina Marie Restauri 4640 Northwest 30th Street Coconut Creek, Florida 33063 Jennifer Westermann Qualified Representative Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2022 Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57468.436
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DONOVAN HARGRETT, II vs GRANDVIEW FAMILY COMMUNITIES, LLC, ET AL, 20-003198 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 14, 2020 Number: 20-003198 Latest Update: Jul. 03, 2024
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TEDDY NADEL vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, 08-005416 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Oct. 28, 2008 Number: 08-005416 Latest Update: May 01, 2009

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is of good moral character, which must be affirmatively determined by Respondent before Petitioner can be issued a license to operate as a community association manager.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("Department") has jurisdiction to regulate the practice of community association management. In June 2008, Petitioner Teddy Nadel ("Nadel") submitted to the Department an application for licensure as a community association manager. In August 2008, the Department notified Nadel that it intended to deny his application on the ground that he had failed to demonstrate good moral character. Nadel's Relevant Personal History For decades, from the mid-1960s through 2005, Nadel was a certified general contractor in the state of Florida. During most of this period, Nadel apparently engaged in the business of contracting without incident. In recent years, however, Nadel on several occasions was disciplined administratively for alleged misconduct in connection with his contracting business. The first disciplinary proceeding arose from Nadel's alleged failure timely to pay a civil judgment. In August 2001, the Department issued an Administrative Complaint accusing Nadel of having failed "to satisfy[,] within a reasonable time, the terms of a civil judgment obtained against the licensee . . . relating to the practice of the licensee's profession," which is an offense under Section 489.129(1)(q), Florida Statutes. Without admitting or denying the allegations, Nadel agreed to entry of a Final Order, in August 2002, whereby he was directed to satisfy the judgment, pay a fine of $500, and reimburse the Department $333.37 in costs. In March 2003, the Department again issued an Administrative Complaint against Nadel. The multiple charges included failure timely to satisfy a civil judgment, mismanagement,1 incompetence,2 and helping an unlicensed person engage in the business of contracting.3 In December 2003, pursuant to a stipulation under which Nadel elected not to dispute (or admit) the charges, the Construction Industry Licensing Board ("Board") entered a Final Order requiring Nadel to pay a fine and costs totaling approximately $4,000, satisfy the final judgment against him, and serve two years' probation. On March 7, 2005, the Board entered a Final Order Approving Voluntary Relinquishment of Licensure, which permanently stripped Nadel of his general contractor license. This action brought to an end certain disciplinary proceedings which were then pending against Nadel, who had been charged with helping four separate unlicensed individuals engage unlawfully in the business of contracting. Nadel neither admitted nor denied the allegations. At the final hearing, Nadel was afforded a full opportunity to explain the circumstances surrounding the multiple disciplinary actions that had been brought against him. To the rather limited extent Nadel testified about the facts underlying the numerous administrative charges described above, he failed persuasively and credibly to rebut the reasonable inference that naturally arises from the undisputed facts concerning his willingness repeatedly to accept punishment (including, ultimately, the loss of his license) without a contest in the respective disciplinary cases: namely that he had committed the unlawful acts as alleged. The undersigned therefore infers that, in the relatively recent past, Nadel exhibited a troubling pattern of behavior demonstrating a disregard of the laws regulating the business of contracting. On January 4, 2007, Nadel was convicted in the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit on charges of engaging in the unlicensed practice of contracting during a state of emergency, which is a third degree felony4; and grand theft in the third degree, which is also a felony of the third degree.5 (Nadel had pleaded no contest to these charges, and the court had withheld adjudication.) Following this conviction, the court sentenced Nadel to 18 months' probation, imposed some small fines, and assessed costs. In his application for licensure as a community association manager, Nadel disclosed his criminal conviction and the fact that he had voluntarily relinquished his general contractor license. He denied, however, having been "involved in any civil lawsuits or administrative actions in this or any other state . . . ." This denial was false, as Nadel must have known. After all, in the previous six years at least two administrative actions had been brought against Nadel in whole or in part because of his failure to pay two separate civil judgments. Ultimate Factual Determination Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the evidence in support of which is clear and convincing, it is determined that Nadel does not possess the good moral character required for issuance of a community association manager license.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order denying Nadel's application for licensure as a community association manager. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 2009.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57468.433489.127489.129775.16 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61-20.001
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THOMAS C. PLUTO AND KATHLEEN M. PLUTO vs. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 89-002132F (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-002132F Latest Update: Aug. 15, 1989

Findings Of Fact On December 22, 1987, the undersigned held a formal hearing in the underlying case, (DOAH Case No. 87-3084), and on February 4, 1988, issued a Recommended Order to the Florida Real Estate Commission in which it was concluded that the Petitioners had violated various provisions of the Florida Statutes and that disciplinary action was appropriate. Specific disciplinary action was recommended as to each Petitioner. In its Final Order, predicated upon the above mentioned Recommended Order, the Commission adopted the undersigned's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law but found the recommendation for punishment as to both Petitioners was inadequate. The Commission increased each period of suspension, rejected the recommendation for stay and automatic remission as to the suspensions, and imposed an administrative fine on each Petitioner. Thereafter, Petitioners appealed the Final Order to the Second District Court of Appeal which, in an opinion filed February 17, 1989 affirmed the Commission's findings of guilt but reversed the penalties imposed by the Commission and remanded with instructions to approve the Hearing Officer's recommended penalties. It is on the basis of this appellate action that Petitioners, claiming to be prevailing small business parties, initiated the instant action. Petitioners are requesting attorney's fees in the amount of $5,261.28 for the appellate action which resulted in the District Court of Appeals reducing the penalty imposed by the Commission to that recommended by the Hearing Officer. This fee and cost figure is the cumulative of charges incurred and represented on 11 monthly billing statements starting 06-01-88 and extending through 04-01-89. Only the last eight, starting with the 09-01-88 billing, state the hours spent providing service. The Florida Legislature has defined a "prevailing small business party" at Section 57.111(3)(c), Florida Statutes.

Florida Laws (2) 120.5757.111
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