The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in unlawful employment practices with regard to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Graham is a black male. He filed an employment application with Pier 1, a "chain retailer," on August 23, 1999. The application indicated that he applied for a position as a sales associate but in fact he was to be employed as a stockroom assistant. His employment application included a block denominated, "Work Availability." Graham completed this block indicating that he was available to work between 6:00 a.m., and 12 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The employment application stated in the block denominated, "Work Availability," the following: "Although an effort will be made to accommodate individual work schedule preferences and availability, work schedules such as start time, number of daily or weekly hours and assigned work days are subject to change at any time. Availability to work on weekends is required. Number of hours may vary based on business necessity and could change an individual's employment status." Graham was hired on August 30, 1999, as a full-time employee. He worked primarily in the back stockroom. A meeting of store personnel was scheduled at the store on Sunday, November 17, 1999, at 6:30 p.m. Graham was aware of the meeting. He was 20 minutes late because he was participating in a church service at Macedonia Primitive Baptist Church. As a result of his tardiness he was presented with an Associate Corrective Action Documentation, which is a confidential Pier 1 form. The form noted that this was his first "tardy." The form as completed took no action such as suspension or loss of pay. It merely informed him that further instances of tardiness could lead to disciplinary action. Graham testified that he was treated differently from a white woman employee, one Christy Musselwhite, who did not attend the meeting, because Musselwhite did not receive a counseling form. However, Graham's personal knowledge of Musselwhite's situation was insufficient to demonstrate that Musselwhite was treated differently from Graham because of race or gender. Graham felt humiliated because he received the Associate Corrective Action Documentation form. Graham resigned from Pier 1 effective November 12, 1999, so that he could begin employment with the Florida Department of Children and Family Services at a rate of pay in excess of that which he received at Pier 1.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission Human Relations enter a final dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Russell D. Cawyer, Esquire Kelly, Hart & Hallman 201 Main Street, Suite 2500 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Kenneth Terrell Graham 2811 Herring Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32303-2511 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Ronni Morrison Pier 1 Imports Post Office Box 961020 Fort Worth, Texas 76161-0020
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Linda Mae Krueger, a white female, became a manager at One Stop Oil's Riverview, Florida, store on April 1, 1986. Petitioner's first immediate supervisor was Mr. Tom McBeth, area supervisor for six stores. Mr. McBeth was replaced by Mr. John Richardson on January 26, 1987. Upon becoming area supervisor, Mr. Richardson implemented certain changes in the manner in which all store managers under his supervision were to perform their duties. Petitioner disagreed with Mr. Richardson's changes and failed to follow some of Mr. Richardson's instructions regarding these changes. Petitioner developed a great deal of hostility towards Mr. Richardson and refused to accept the fact that the changes in operation were within Mr. Richardson's managerial capacity. The basis of Petitioner's claim of discrimination was Mr. Richardson's attempt to implement operational changes which Petitioner disagreed with and which were clearly not sexually discriminatory in nature. At the hearing, Ms. Krueger testified that she felt like she was treated unfairly by Mr. Richardson, but admitted that Mr. Richardson placed the same requirements on all other store managers. Petitioner, in June of 1988, told Mr. Richardson that she was considering leaving employment during the beginning of July. Petitioner marked on her store's calendar that she was leaving employment on July 2, 1988. Petitioner, on August 12, 1988, again gave verbal notice to One Stop Oil that she was separating employment with the company on August 27, 1988. At the time the Petitioner gave One Stop Oil this verbal notice of separation, Petitioner was planning to move with her family to North Carolina. On August 17, 1988, Petitioner quit her position as store manager at One Stop Oil's Riverview store. She quit because of a pay dispute over the amount of her bonus check. Petitioner and her husband expected a larger check. When Petitioner's husband saw the actual amount of the check he called the Jacksonville office of Respondent and told them he was closing the store and they had "better get somebody down there." Petitioner and her husband then left the store. Respondent sent Mr. Richardson to the store. He called in Cheryl Chipman and began accounting for the store receipts. He discovered that $1,700 in deposits was missing. Petitioner had given the deposit money to her husband on the day the check dispute arose. Petitioner's husband could not adequately account for the missing money. 1/ Respondent obtained Petitioner's store keys from her without any discussion. The keys were voluntarily turned over by Petitioner. Petitioner never reported for work afterwards. Petitioner's position was filled by Ms. Cheryl Chipman, a white female.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the petition against Respondent be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of January, 1989. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1989.
Findings Of Fact One of some 10,000 American-born Sikhs, Harimandir Kaur Khalsa originally became involved with Sikhism, said to be one of the eight major religions of the world, in 1979. Several years ago she took vows to cover her hair, not to cut her hair, and to adhere to a daily spiritual practice called sadhana. An Armidary Sikh, she was ordained a Sikh minister Christmas Day 1991. The parties stipulated to the sincerity of petitioner's religious beliefs. In part, her religious beliefs find expression in her attire. Orthodox Sikhs wear turbans and churidars, a type of legging; and their clothing is white. This mode of dress has symbolic religious significance for Sikhs generally. Turbans are "mandatory." T.93. Dressed as an orthodox Sikh, petitioner Khalsa appeared for a job interview with Putnam County's sanitation director, Joseph Battillo, on or about August 23, 1990. The interview had been arranged after Mrs. Khalsa responded to a newspaper advertisement seeking a "Recycling Director for Putnam County." T.119. Even before she saw the advertisement, she had read about the job and telephoned to inquire. In the interview, Mrs. Khalsa did not tell Mr. Battillo that all the clothes she owned were white, but she did tell him that the way she was dressed was "always the way I dress." T.41. One of Ms. Khalsa's references told the young lady in the Putnam County personnel department who called to inquire about her that "Harimandir always dresses in white . . . because of her religion." T.22. Mr. Battillo understood that Mr. Khalsa wore a turban for religious reasons, although he originally testified that he did not understand (T.122) that the remainder of her outfit was also religiously compelled. (T.111) He eventually conceded that she indicated she wore mostly white "in the context of the conversation that she was a Sikh." T.132. Asked whether it was his "reasonable understanding that the reason she wore white is because she was a Sikh," he answered, "I guess you could assume that." Id. The day after the interview she was surprised to be told over the telephone that the job was hers. (Of six interviewees, she was Mr. Battillo's second choice for the position.) Her experience with graphic arts was an important qualification. Mr. Battillo felt there was some urgency in filling the position: certain deadlines had to be met if grant moneys available to Putnam County were not to be forfeited. Petitioner started working for respondent on August 30, 1990, at an annual salary of $14,400. On her first day on the job, Mr. Battillo summoned her to his office, asked her to shut the door, and told her she would "have to make a few changes" (T.45) in her appearance because "people would have a problem with the way," id., she looked. She told him she did not believe it would be a problem. In her job interview, she had suggested she "would have instant recognition and people would be reminded when they saw [her] to recycle." T.41. When she was hired, Mrs. Khalsa bought an off-white suit, which she wore the second day on the job. The following day, Mr. Battillo thanked her for not wearing all white, again after summoning her to his office and ordering the door closed. He told her she "look[ed] fine from the knees up . . . [but] that the leggins had to go." T.48. He said that she needed to wear colors and that "if you don't change the way you dress, you're not going to be allowed to do your job." T.49. She told him she planned to get new shoes. After leaving his office, she cried. Mrs. Khalsa worked closely with Diane Shoeman, a high school teacher who served as an educational consultant, for about ten hours, developing curriculum on recycling for the Putnam County schools. They enjoyed a good working relationship, which Mrs. Shoeman told Mr. Battillo at the time. On September 18, 1990, when she was in his office on business, Mr. Battillo told her she could not continue dressing as she had been, that it was the same "as if an employee didn't wear a bra to work and he had to tell her to wear a bra." T.52. He told her that, when he had worked in Sarasota, the Mennonite women dressed plainly "but that they wore pastel colors. And couldn't [petitioner] dress that way?" T.53. Mr. Battillo was adamant, and petitioner left his office in tears. He granted her request for a half day off to shop for clothes. The day after she acquired a new pair of shoes, white hose and a blue dress, Mrs. Khalsa wore them to work. When Mr. Battillo asked her if she was comfortable dressed like that, she said she "could live with it" (T.69) even though she felt she was compromising her practice as a Sikh. From then on, she wore white hose rather than churidars as long as she worked for Putnam County, afraid she would lose her job otherwise. The blue dress she wore every few days, even though her mother-in-law was shocked when she first saw it. Mrs. Khalsa met her September 30, 1990, deadline for purchasing certain audiovisual equipment, and for completing numerous other assignments. She drew on her experience as a graphic artist in designing or doing the layout for bookcovers for school children, an educational activities book on recycling, sun visors, bookmarks, decals, magnets, information posters and brochures for which she both wrote the text and "d[id] the art work." T.64. On October 2, 1990, the Monday after meeting the deadline (so avoiding forfeiture of the grant), she was fired by Mr. Battillo, who explained, "I don't like you and I don't like your turban." T.71 Mrs. Khalsa's manner of dress was an important motivating factor for her discharge. During calendar year 1991, Petitioner and her husband together earned approximately $6,000. When he terminated her employment, Mr. Battillo also mentioned friction with the printers with whom Mrs. Khalsa had been dealing. They supposedly resented her asking for proofs, apparently a departure from past practice under County contracts; and were perhaps embarrassed when she pointed out that they had billed for work never done. T.94 When she began work, she was told she "had six months to learn procedures." T.100. Mrs. Khalsa conscientiously sought to comply with County purchasing policies, despite some confusion about just what the policies were in certain particulars. The only "changes" she insisted on without processing change orders were to assure that the county received what the printer had originally agreed to supply, or the equivalent. T.105, 108-9. At hearing, Mr. Battillo testified to complaints about music Mrs. Khalsa listened to at work, but other employees listened to radios at work, and the only other employee in the building where Mrs. Khalsa worked told her at the time that he could not hear music from her office. Mr. Battillo once entered her office to find incense burning, which she extinguished at his request, never to rekindle on the premises. Once, she and her building mate disagreed on the thermostat's setting, she closed her door, shut the cooling vents and opened her windows, until told not to, when she promptly complied.
Recommendation It is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations order Putnam County to reinstate petitioner and pay her back wages, along with reasonable attorney's fees and costs. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of February, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1993. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of facts Nos. 1-11, 13, 15, 33 and 34 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 12, 14 and 35 pertain to subordinate matters. Respondent's proposed findings of fact were not numbered. COPIES FURNISHED: Matthew P. Farmer, Esquire Farmer & Fitzgerald, P.A. 2910 Bay to Bay Boulevard Suite 214 Tampa, FL 33629 Ronald E. Clark, Esquire P.O. Box 2138 Palatka, FL 32178-2138 Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F. Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149
The Issue This case was initiated by a letter dated October 22, 1984, from the Department of Revenue ("Department") to National Christian Network, Inc. ("NCN") informing the organization that its Consumer Certificate of Exemption Number 05- 00852-00-15 would be revoked effective November 22, 1984, in accordance with Section 212.084(3) Florida Statutes. John Fox, Executive Vice president, responded with a timely request for an administrative hearing. The Department contends that NCN, as a radio and television network, does not qualify for a religious exemption under Subsection 212.08(7)(a) Florida Statutes and regulations interpreting that law. NCN argues that it is entitled to the certificate as a religious, charitable or educational organization. The only witness produced by either party was Raymond Kassis, and the facts elicited through his testimony are uncontroverted. One exhibit, the Articles of Incorporation, was placed into evidence by stipulation. The Department submitted its Proposed Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order; these have been considered and the proposed findings of fact have been incorporated below.
Findings Of Fact National Christian Network, Inc. was incorporated as a Florida nonprofit corporation on October 11, 1978. Its purposes, as stated in Article II, Articles of Incorporation include the following: * * * To establish, operate and maintain television and/or radio networks and/or stations. To produce and broadcast to the general public religious, charitable and/or educational programs either by television or radio, or both, for the purpose of educating and instructing the general public in religious, charitable or educational matters; to promote, extend and improve religion, charity and education and to participate in religious, charitable and/or educational programs in the united states, [sic] including but not limited to the State of Florida; to promote programs designed to increase public awareness and understanding of the needs and activities of religion, charity and/or education in the several states, including the State of Florida, and to encourage the public to give support, financial and otherwise, to such purposes. To acquire, take, receive, purchase, own, hold, use, manage, lease, mortgage, pledge, encumber, sell and convey, or otherwise dispose of any property, including but not limited to real, personal and mixed, tangible and intangible; to issue bonds, notes, evidences of indebtedness, receipts and obligation; to receive donations, subscriptions and contributions; to make donations to organizations created for similar or like purposes, and to have and exercise all other corporate rights and powers, to do all lawful acts necessary or desirable to carry out its purposes consistent with the laws of the State of Florida (as they now exist or from time to time may be amended), and Sec. 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (as it now exists or from time to time may be amended) and not inconsistent with these Articles of Incorporation. * * * The primary purpose of NCN, in the words of its President, is to operate a national television network. Transcript, p. 10. NCN maintains status as an organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and holds non-commercial, educational, F.C.C. licenses for radio and television. The network activities are conducted at NCN's facility in Cocoa, Florida, twenty-four hours a day, and consist primarily of religious services by its seventy-eight multi-denominational member churches. Members include Protestant, Catholic and Jewish organizations. Some, but not all, of the church services are produced directly in the studio. The facility does not include a chapel. NCN maintains a cost share plan which pays for the broadcasts. Member organizations who can afford to pay, contribute their share; the others are given free air time. Funds for the network are solicited over the air. Funds are also solicited for charitable, educational and religious projects of the member churches. Free air time is provided to a wide variety of charitable organizations for fund raising activities. Some educational programs are aired; however, the network is not part of the system established by the Florida Department of Education pursuant to Sections 229.805 or 229.8051 Florida Statutes. The essence of NCN is that of a conduit, a medium for other organizations to transmit religious worship services into the homes of its viewers and listeners. It also, to a lesser degree, provides the medium for organizations to conduct charitable and educational activities.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing, I recommend that the intended agency action be upheld and that Consumer Certificate of Exemption No. 05-00852-00-25 be revoked in accordance with Section 212.084(3) Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 1985.
Conclusions This case came before me for the purpose of issuing a final agency order. The Administrative Law Judge, Stephen F. Dean, assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) to the above-styled case, entered his Recommended Order dated June 4, 2004. In the Recommended Order, the Administrative Law Judge explained that the Division of Retirement could not process the Petitioner’s Petition for Benefits absent a judicial order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction determining heirs and a judicial order of guardianship of minor heirs. At the time the Recommended Order was issued, the Petitioner had not submitted either order to the Division of Retirement. The Administrative Law Judge recommended that the Division of Retirement allow the Petitioner to submit the required judicial orders within 45 days of the date of the order. In addition, the Administrative Law Judge recommended the Division’s dismissal of the Petition for Benefits, upon Petitioner's failure to provide the judicial orders within the 45 day time period. Prior to the Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended Order, the Petitioner submitted an Order Determining Beneficiaries to the Division of Retirement. Rather than submit the judicial orders identified by the Administrative Law Judge in response to the Recommended Order, the Petitioner filed a Notice of Exception stating that documents submitted prior to the Recommended Order fulfilled the requirements of the Recommended Order. Those documents were part of the application for benefits that the Administrative Law Judge determined are inadequate to support the Petition for Benefits. Because the exception is not responsive to the Recommended Order, it is rejected. The Division hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the Recommended Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on June 4, 2004. A copy of that Recommended Order is attached hereto and made a part hereof as “Exhibit A.” Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED and DIRECTED that the application filed by Lavondra Steadman o/b/o John Steadman is rejected and the request for retirement benefits is hereby Denied. DONE and ORDERED this A k day of l , 2004, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Soult. Serra SARABETH SNUGGS ~~ State Retirement Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 (850) 488-5541
The Issue Whether Petitioner qualifies for the renewal of a consumer certificate of exemption as a qualified religious organization pursuant to Section 212.08(7)(o), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an active not-for-profit corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida. It maintains exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Respondent is the state agency charged with the administration of the tax laws of the State of Florida, including those dealing with the grant or denial of consumer certificates of exemption to qualified organizations. Reverend Roy Harthern is an ordained Assembly of God minister who previously had a career as a minister in several churches in Texas and Florida, as well as founding a Christian magazine and a Christian television station in Florida. The Reverend and Mrs. Harthern are evangelists and Bible teachers. In 1983, Reverend Harthern and his wife, Pauline, founded the organization from which the Reverend and Mrs. Harthern practice an itinerant ministry. They preach in different established churches each week, both inside and outside of the State of Florida and the United States. In the past, Reverend Harthern has had a regular religious show on television. Reverend Harthern also writes, records religious tapes and has a weekly radio program on a station owned by others. Petitioner does not have an established physical place of worship at which nonprofit religious services are regularly held; does not provide transportation for church members or other services; and does not provide services to state prisoners. There has been no substantial change in the type or nature of Petitioner's ministry since its founding in 1983. Respondent issued a certificate of exemption to Petitioner in 1983 as a "religious organization." Petitioner has renewed the exemption, in five-year intervals, ever since. Respondent has never sought to revoke or suspend Petitioner's exempt status since 1983. On July 18, 1997, Petitioner applied to renew its consumer certificate of exemption as a "religious organization." Its previous certificate was issued on October 6, 1992, and was due to expire on October 5, 1997 There has been no substantive changes to the implementing statute during the relevant time period. On October 13, 1997, Respondent issued its Notice of Intent to Deny to Petitioner on the grounds that Petitioner did not have an established physical place of worship at which nonprofit religious services and activities were regularly conducted.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's renewal application for exemption, and the provisions of Section 212.08(7)(o)2.1., Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of April, 1998, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Roy Harthern, President Roy Harthern Ministries, Inc. Post Office Box 915971 Longwood, Florida 32791 Rex D. Ware, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Manuel Angel Huerta (Huerta), was a real estate broker licensed by the Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. He was the broker/officer for M A Huerta & Company, a broker corporation located in Miami, Florida. M A Huerta & Company had listed a house for sale on Granda Boulevard, Coral Gables, Florida. The house was offered through multiple listing, and the advertised commission was three percent of the selling price. Pedro Garay (Garay), a real estate broker with another company, showed the house to Andrew Labbie, a prospective buyer. Mr. Labbie indicated that he would make an offer for the house through his attorney. Garay was to pick up the offer when it was put together. Garay called Huerta to schedule a meeting with the sellers, but Huerta told him that he did not want Garay to present the offer to the sellers. Huerta called Garay the day after the offer was presented to the sellers and told Garay that the house was being withdrawn from the market. The house was later sold to Mr. Labbie on November 8, 1993. Garay learned of the sale and called Huerta, who stated that the sale had been between the sellers and buyer and that he had not been involved in the transaction. Huerta said that his office had received a real estate commission in the mail for $16,000 and that he was surprised that the commission had been sent to him. Garay demanded part of the commission. Garay was a member of the Miami Board of Realtors, which had a procedure to arbitrate disputes among realtors. Garay requested that the dispute over the commission be arbitrated. Garay and Huerta participated in the arbitration and were represented by counsel at the arbitration. On April 18, 1994, the Award of Arbitrators was entered, awarding $16,000 to Garay. The award was to be paid within 30 days. Garay demanded that Huerta pay the $16,000, but Huerta refused. Garay retained counsel and went to circuit court to enforce the arbitration. On January 17, 1996, a final judgement was entered enforcing the arbitration award and awarding $16,800 to Garay. After the final judgement was entered, Huerta still did not pay Garay. Counsel for Garay attempted to collect the judgment. In October, 1996, Garay filed a complaint with Petitioner based on Huerta's failure to pay the commission. Petitioner assigned one of its investigators, Kenneth Rehm, to investigate the complaint. Mr. Rehm interviewed Huerta, who stated that he was not going to pay Garay because Garay did not deserve it and he did not care if the court had ordered him to pay. Apparently Huerta changed his mind about paying because on February 10, 1998, Garay and Huerta entered into a Stipulation Regarding Execution. Huerta agreed to pay the judgment amount with interest in monthly installments of $1,056.72 for 24 months beginning February 17, 1998. Huerta began making payments in February 1998 and continued to do so through December 1998. Huerta sent Garay a check for the January 1999 payment, but the check was returned for insufficient funds. As of the date of the final hearing no further payments had been made.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Manuel Angel Huerta violated Section 475.25(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes, imposing an administrative fine of $500, placing Respondent on probation for two years, and suspending Respondent's license during the probation period until such time Respondent pays Pedro Garay the portion of the judgment still outstanding. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Herbert S. Fecker, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Geoffrey Kirk, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Robert Flavell, Esquire First Union Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Suite 4600 Miami, Florida 33131-2310
Findings Of Fact At all times here involved Bernard L. Barker was a real estate broker registered by the Florida Real Estate Commission. The facts involved herein were undisputed. Bernard L. Barker was one of the famous, or infamous, "plumbers" involved in the break-in of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel in Washington, D. C. prior to the 1972 presidential election. Exhibit 1, Judgment of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia shows he pleaded guilty and was so adjudicated on March 23, 1973 of the offenses of conspiracy, burglary, unlawful endeavor to intercept oral and wire communications, and unlawful possession of intercepting devices. Exhibit 2, Bench Docket of the Criminal Court of Record, Dade County, shows that on November 1, 1972 Respondent was convicted of unlawful use of a notary seal and sentenced to 60 days imprisonment which was suspended upon 60 days probation. Respondent freely admitted his part in the Watergate caper and that in so doing he was working under the direction and supervision of U.S. Governmental officials. He has worked for the C.I.A. off and on for many years and was instrumental in organizing the forces involved in the Bay of Pigs invasion. During this period Barker met Howard Hunt who was his, Barker's, superior in the C.I.A. Respondent was contacted by Hunt around 1970 to organize a group for a national security mission to discover the source of leaks of classified information believed to be reaching the Soviets. When this group was organized Barker was in contact with Gordon Liddy who had an office in the White House. He met and talked to Liddy in his White House office. At the time of the Watergate break-in Respondent believed he was engaged in undercover work for the U.S. Government and he was certainly working under the direction of an employee of the U.S. Government. With respect to the deposit of checks in his escrow account that were not connected to a real estate transaction, Respondent freely admitted the deposit, not only of the $25,000 check alleged in the Information, but also four additional checks drawn on a Mexican bank with the total amount deposited amounting to $118,000. The purpose of the deposit was to "launder" the funds that were used in the break-in of the psychiatrist's office in California in the Ellsberg affair, as well as funds for the Watergate caper. It was in connection with the deposit of the $25,000 check that Respondent, after being assured by Liddy that the check was good and would be honored when presented for payment, placed the notary seal on the check. This resulted in his being convicted (Exhibit 2) of a misdemeanor in the second degree and placed on probation for 60 days. In these operations Respondent was operating under the direction and supervision of Hunt and Liddy.
