The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency of the State of Florida responsible for the administration of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, including the licensure of Class "D" Security Officers. Petitioner applied for licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer. Pending the processing of that application, Petitioner became employed as a security guard for approximately five months. By letter dated February 21, 1996, Petitioner was notified by Respondent that his application for a Class "D" license was, subject to his due process rights, going to be denied based on his conviction of battery in St. Lucie County in September 1993. Respondent asserted that the conviction was of a crime directly related to the business for which the license is sought within the meaning of Section 493.6118(1)(c), Florida Statutes. Respondent also asserted that the facts relating to that conviction establish that Petitioner had committed an act of violence or used force on another person which was not for the lawful protection of himself or another within the meaning of Section 493.6118(1)(j), Florida Statutes. On September 14, 1993, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of a misdemeanor count of battery. The victim of the battery was Thomas Coburn. Petitioner was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to 15 days in the county jail, one year probation, and 50 hours of community service. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Thomas Coburn was employed by the City of Port St. Lucie, Florida, as a city code enforcement officer. The code enforcement division is administered by the City of Port St. Lucie Police Department. Mr. Coburn was not a sworn law enforcement officer. On Sunday, May 16, 1993, Mr. Coburn was acting in his official capacity as a city code enforcement officer. He was wearing a badge, name plate, and collar pins with the initials P.S.L. He was in an official uniform that had patches with the inscription "Port St. Lucie, Fla. Police." He was driving a marked vehicle that reflected he was with the city code enforcement department. Shortly after noon on May 16, 1993, Mr. Coburn went to the personal residence of the Petitioner for the purpose of serving upon Petitioner a notice to appear pertaining to several alleged code violations. Petitioner was home with his wife, his teenage stepson, and his five year old son. When Mr. Coburn arrived, Petitioner was about to begin a barbecue. When the stepson came to the door in response to Mr. Coburn knock on the door, Mr. Coburn asked to speak to Petitioner. The teenage stepson went inside to get the Petitioner. Mr. Coburn did not see the stepson or another member of Petitioner's family after the Petitioner came to the door. When Petitioner came to the door, Mr. Coburn identified himself as a code enforcement officer and told Petitioner he was there to deliver the notice to appear. Mr. Coburn's vehicle was parked on the street so that Petitioner could see the markings on the vehicle. Petitioner became irate and shouted profanities at Mr. Coburn. Petitioner told Mr. Coburn that he could not serve official papers on a Sunday and ordered him off his property. There is a conflict in the evidence as to what next occurred. Petitioner testified that Mr. Coburn bumped him in the chest as the two of them argued. Mr. Coburn testified that he backed away from Petitioner and began to leave the premises. The more credible version of the events is that given by Mr. Coburn. Consequently, it is found that there was no physical contact initiated by Mr. Coburn. As he was backing away and preparing to leave the premises, Mr. Coburn placed the notice to appear on the barbecue grill that was in the area where the two men were standing. After he placed the notice to appear on the barbecue grill, Mr. Coburn turned to walk away. Petitioner then kicked Mr. Coburn in the buttocks. It was Petitioner's act of kicking Mr. Coburn that resulted in his subsequent arrest and conviction. There was no one else in the area around Petitioner's front door at the time of this incident. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Petitioner was acting in defense of himself or of others when he kicked Mr. Coburn. Petitioner has not been convicted of any other crime. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was an approved process server within the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida. Petitioner worked as a security guard for the five months preceding the denial of his application. There were no incidents of violence during that five month period.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. It is further recommended that the final order deny Petitioner's application for a Class "D" license. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Michele Guy, Esquire Department of State, Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station No. 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Edward B. Galante, Esquire 789 South Federal Highway, No. 103 Stuart, Florida 34994 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Findings Of Fact William B. Barker, Jr., is certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida employed by the Walton County Sheriff's Department and stationed at DeFuniak Springs, Florida. On or about 20 June 1981, Diana Marie Preston was driving her automobile west on Interstate Highway 10, in Walton County, Florida, on her way to her grandparents' home in Gulf Breeze, Florida. She had just completed the Law School Admissions Test in Tallahassee that morning and was on her way back home. Due to heavy rain in the area, she was driving carefully and was not exceeding the speed limit. At approximately 3 to 4 p.m., she was hailed by a police officer in a county police car. When she pulled over to the roadside at his request, the officer advised her she had been speeding and requested to see her driver's license. Since her license was in her purse which was in the trunk of her car, she had to get out of her car and open the trunk, at which time the officer noticed a pair of high-heeled shoes she had in there and asked her to take them out, indicating he had been looking at a pair like that for his wife. When Ms. Preston got her license out, the officer requested that she accompany him to his car, get in on the passenger side and close the passenger door. She complied, though she did not close the door completely. During this period, she noticed that though the officer was in uniform, he was not wearing either a name tag or a badge with a number on it. She does not recall whether he was wearing a pistol, but states there was a rifle in the vehicle on which he placed his hand several times while talking to her. The officer took Ms. Preston's driver's license and reached across her to the glove compartment for his ticket book, but at no time did he use his radio to call in either her driver's license number or her car tag number. Before writing out the ticket, the officer indicated he would not issue a ticket to her if she would put on her high heels (she had been driving barefoot) and let him try to guess her shoe size. He stated that for every size he was off in his guess, he would kiss her foot a certain number of times. Ms. Preston repeatedly refused, but because the officer was insistent and she felt she was in a difficult position due to the fact that she was alone on a lightly travelled (at the time) section of highway, she ultimately acquiesced. Though the officer had ample opportunity to see the shoe size when he examined the shoes, he guessed wrong on the size by several sizes. At this time, her left foot was in his lap, and he picked it up and kissed it several times. When he was finished, in the course of conversation, the officer asked her what she had been doing in Tallahassee. She told him she had been taking the LSAT, and his attitude changed immediately. He told her to go on with her trip, but cautioned her not to tell anyone what had happened, as he could get into trouble. Upon being released by the officer, Ms. Preston proceeded on to Gulf Breeze to the home of her grandparents, whom she told about the incident the following day. She did not report the incident to the police nor discuss it until several weeks later when she was contacted by two investigators who showed her a large photograph of individuals who, it was represented to her, were members of the Walton County Sheriff's Department. From this group, she identified the Respondent, Barker, and subsequently again identified him at the hearing as the officer in question, describing him as a heavyset man with a mustache and wearing tinted glasses. Respondent, upon graduation from high school, attended O. W. Junior College and then went on to the University of West Florida where he received his bachelor's degree in criminal justice. He unequivocally denies the allegations against him, stating he had never seen Ms. Preston until the day of the hearing at the hearing room. In fact, his shift was over, and he signed out just prior to 3 p.m. on 20 June 1981. In his opinion and that of his mother, the allegations against him are attributable to his stated position in a political dispute during which he sided against the incumbent sheriff for whom he was working. There is no evidence bearing on this issue other than the testimony of the Respondent and his mother.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in this Administrative Complaint. It is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. ENTERED this 24th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1983.
The Issue Whether the Appellee's suspension of Appellant was in compliance with Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 22A-7.10F and G(2), Florida Administrative Code. Whether the Appellee's suspension of Appellant should be sustained.
Findings Of Fact C. W. Mathis was on January 22, 1977, a state trooper, employed by Appellee, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Florida Highway Patrol, in Orlando, Florida. By letter dated February 22, 1977, Trooper Mathis, the Appellant, was notified that he was being suspended for eight (8) hours without pay by the Appellee, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Florida Highway Patrol for: "Leaving the workstation without authori- zation and negligence, in violation of Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Personnel Rules and Regulations 2.lC, willful violation of statutory authority, rules, regulations or policies, and General Order 43, l.A.(4), pages 43-2 and 43-4, Florida Highway Patrol Manual." Trooper Mathis appealed this suspension which is the subject of the bearing. The Division of Administrative Hearings, Department of Administration, has jurisdiction of the cause. On January 22, 1977, Trooper Mathis was on State Road 400, out of his assigned authority, and running radar at approximately 8:50 A.M. He pursued and stopped a car which was clocked at speeding 75 miles per hour. Trooper Mathis asked the driver for a drivers license and when the driver stated he had none, Trooper Mathis told him to get out of the vehicle and asked the driver's name and proof of ownership of the vehicle. The driver indicated that his information was in the glove compartment and both Trooper Mathis and the driver obtained an instrument from the glove compartment of the driver's automobile. In the stopped vehicle was a white male passenger. Trooper Mathis returned to the patrol car and had the driver sit in the right front seat of the patrol car. Mathis then left the left front seat of the patrol car to obtain the vehicle identification number from the automobile and returned to the patrol car where the driver or violator was sitting. Mathis then called the radio dispatcher for a "check for wanted" personal (10-29). Trooper Mathis was looking down and when he looked up the automobile he had stopped was gone, driven obviously by the passenger who was left seated in the stopped vehicle. The driver of the automobile seated in the patrol car with Trooper Mathis told Trooper Mathis that he didn't see his car leave and that he had picked up the white male passenger hitchhiking on State Road 400 at the Turnpike. Trooper Mathis then proceeded west on State Road 400 in hopes of finding the car. He also called the station and asked radio operator Roundtree to copy a vehicle identification number without asking for a "check for wanted" 10-29. Radio operator Roundtree ran the first vehicle identification number (1Y27D 57106363) given by Trooper Mathis and it came back nothing on file. (The second vehicle identification number (1Y27D5T1O6367) later came back registered to the following: Eva Kuhn, 25 North Westview Avenue, Feasterville, Pennsylvania, on a 1975 Chevrolet, license number A02326.) Radio operator Roundtree then ran the tag number for 10-29 thinking that both vehicle identification numbers he had run were negative for wanted. The tag came back negative. After a search of the area and not locating the vehicle Trooper Mathis asked to meet with a deputy sheriff. The meeting with the deputy was for his passenger to make a "stolen car" report. When the violator finished his report with the deputy he advised Trooper Mathis that he had relatives visiting at Disney World and would like to be dropped off there. Trooper Mathis then brought him to Disney World and left him there. It was later found that the driver-violator had stolen the vehicle. Appellee, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, contends: Trooper Mathis was negligent and should be Punished for (1) failing to ask for a proper 10-29 ("check for wanted") on the vehicle identification number; (2) failing to keep the stopped vehicle under surveilance so that the passenger was able to drive it away unnoticed; (3) failing to require identification from the violator-driver before believing the violator's story. Appellant, C. W. Mathis, contends: (l) that under the circumstances it was excuseable that he failed to immediately ask for a proper 10-29 "check for wanted"; (2) that the traffic was very heavy and he was obliged to go very fast if he were to properly find the violator and do the job for which he was paid; (3) that the radio operator was inexperienced and should have made the proper calls which would have notified Trooper. Mathis that the driver-violator was not the owner of the stopped vehicle.
Recommendation Dismiss appeal; the suspension was for just cause. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Carlton Building, Room 530 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Department of Administration Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 C. W. Mathis 1409 Lukay Street Ocoee, Florida 32761 Enoch J. Whitney, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkmam Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether two policy statements issued by Respondent, TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18, are unadopted rules, as defined in section 120.52(20), Florida Statutes, that violate section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.3/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a co-trustee of the Sparkhill Trust (the "Trust"), which was created in July 2009. Opinicus Sentinel, LLC ("Opinicus Sentinel") currently is a co-trustee of the Trust, and has been a trustee of the Trust since its creation. Barbara Williams is the manager of Opinicus Sentinel, and has served in that capacity since its creation.8/ Petitioner was appointed as a trustee of the Trust on October 11, 2016.9/ The Trust owns a 2001 Porsche 996/911 Turbo motor vehicle (hereinafter, "Vehicle"). Solely for purposes of this proceeding,10/ the Vehicle Identification Number ("VIN") of the Vehicle is WP0ZZZ99Z1S682830, as alleged in the Amended Petition. As of the final hearing, the Vehicle was located in Germany. During all times relevant to this proceeding, the Vehicle was located in a foreign country. Respondent is the state agency responsible for, among other things, implementing and administering chapter 319, Florida Statutes, governing the issuance of certificates of title for motor vehicles. See § 319.17, Fla. Stat. Background and Events Giving Rise to This Proceeding On or about September 30, 2014, Opinicus Sentinel——at that time, the sole trustee of the Trust——submitted an application consisting of completed Form 8204011/ and supporting documentation to the Lee County Tax Collector ("Tax Collector")12/ on behalf of the Trust, requesting issuance of a certificate of title for the Vehicle in the name of the Trust. The application included a letter from a motor vehicle dealer in London, Ontario, Canada, stating that the dealer had inspected the Vehicle and that the Vehicle's VIN is WP0ZZZ99Z1S682830. On or about October 22, 2014, the Tax Collector sent a letter to Ms. Williams, as manager of Opinicus Sentinel, stating that the application for certificate of title could not be processed "because all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country must have the Vehicle Identification Number verified by a Division of Motorist Services Compliance Examiner." When asked for further explanation, the Tax Collector responded by electronic mail ("email"): The Lee County Tax Collector is a Constitutional Office that provides the services of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). As such, we are bound by both statutory and department procedural guidance. Procedures often are entitled Technical Advisories. The technical advisory relied upon by this office indicates that all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country must have the VIN verified by a Division of Motorist Services Compliance Examiner as referenced in TL-10 in effect on the date the correspondence was drafted. Email from Tax Collector to Barbara Williams, dated October 27, 2014 (emphasis added). This email directed Ms. Williams to contact Respondent if the trustee wished to challenge the denial of the application for certificate of title for the Vehicle. On November 3, 2014, Ms. Williams contacted Respondent, asserting that the Tax Collector's denial of the application for a certificate of title violated section 319.23(3)(a)2, Florida Statutes. Also on that date, Ms. Williams filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing with Respondent on behalf of Opinicus Sentinel, challenging TL-10 as an invalid and unadopted rule pursuant to section 120.56(4).13/ On November 24, 2014, Respondent sent a letter to Ms. Williams, refusing to issue the requested certificate of title. The letter stated: After researching the issue identified in your letter, the Department stands by the decision made by . . . [the Lee County Tax Collector]. Section 319.23(a)(2), Florida Statutes, states that, '[a]n appropriate departmental form evidencing that a physical examination has been made of the motor vehicle by the owner and by a duly constituted law enforcement officer in any state, a licensed motor vehicle dealer, a license inspector as provided by s. 320.58, or a notary public commissioned by this state and that the vehicle identification number shown on such form is identical to the vehicle identification number shown on the motor vehicle. Letter from Respondent to Barbara Williams, dated November 24, 2014 (emphasis added). The letter further stated: However, section 319.23(11), Florida Statutes, states that, '[t]he Department shall use security procedures, processes, and materials in the preparation and issuance of each certificate of title to prohibit to the extent possible a person's ability to alter, counterfeit, duplicate, or modify the certificate of title.' In the case at bar, the Department is choosing to implement the language found in 319.23(11) to ensure that the certificate of title is issued correctly. The Department has the authority to require VIN verifications on vehicles entering the state of Florida from a foreign country before a title can be issued. In subsequent correspondence to Ms. Williams, dated December 18, 2014, Respondent stated: I can only again point you to s. 319.23(11). Since April of 2000 the Department's policy is to require all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country to have the VIN verified by a Motor Vehicle Field Office Compliance Examiner prior to being titled. * * * I have included a copy of the Department's Technical Advisory, TL 14-18, which explains the Department's policy in depth.[14/] On December 18, 2014, Respondent referred Opinicus Sentinel's Petition for Administrative Hearing to DOAH. The case was assigned DOAH Case No. 14-6005. On March 3, 2015, Opinicus Sentinel withdrew the petition, and the DOAH case file for Case No. 14-6005 was closed. Notwithstanding that Case No. 14-6005 was pending at DOAH, on February 25, 2015, Respondent sent Ms. Williams a letter dismissing the previously-filed petition for administrative hearing with leave to file an amended petition. The letter also asserted an additional basis15/ for Respondent's denial of the certificate of title for the Vehicle, specifically: Because the vehicle to be titled is not currently in Florida, clearly the vehicle will not be operated on the roads of Florida. Accordingly, the vehicle cannot be registered in Florida and the titling provisions of Chapter 319, Fla. Stat., do not apply. Therefore, the application for title you submitted to the Lee County Tax Collector pursuant to section 319.23, Fla. Stat. will not be approved. While DOAH Case No. 14-6005 was pending, Stephen J. Williams, as beneficiary of the Trust, filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing challenging both TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted and invalid rules pursuant to section 120.56(4). That case was assigned DOAH Case No. 15-0484 and ultimately was dismissed by Final Order dated March 25, 2015.16/ As previously noted, on October 11, 2016, Petitioner was appointed as a co-trustee of the Trust. On October 17, 2016, Petitioner, as a trustee of the Trust, initiated this proceeding by filing a Petition for Administrative Hearing, again challenging both TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted and invalid rules. As noted above, the scope of this proceeding subsequently was narrowed to eliminate the challenge to the substantive invalidity of TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18, so that the sole issue in this proceeding is whether TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 are unadopted rules that violate section 120.54(1)(a). The Challenged Statements: TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 TL-10, identified by the Tax Collector as the original basis for denial of issuance of the certification of title for the Vehicle, went into effect on April 30, 2014. The portion of TL-10 pertinent to this proceeding states: IV. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION * * * B. Vehicle identification number (VIN) verifications are to be completed by the applicant. * * * 2. VIN verification may be done by one of the following: * * * c. Florida Division of Motorist Services (DMS) Compliance Examiner, DMS or tax collector employees. * * * NOTE: All USED vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country, including dealer transactions, MUST have the VIN verified by a DMS Compliance Examiner. Technical Advisory RS/TL 14-18 is titled "Motor Vehicles Coming Into Florida from a Foreign Country." It states in pertinent part: All used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country (including dealer transactions) must have the vehicle identification number verified by a Motor Vehicle Field Office Compliance Examiner prior to being titled. * * * The Regional Motor Vehicle Field Office staff will perform an inspection of the vehicle that includes verification of the public VIN, confidential VIN or secondary VIN, manufacturer’s label or letterhead letter that states compliance with US vehicle standards, computer checks of NMVTIS/NICB data-bases, and a review of documentation showing vehicle clearance through US Customs (if applicable). Copies of these documents, including a copy of the completed form HSMV 84044, will be maintained in the regional office. The VIN verification will be completed by the compliance examiner on a form HSMV 84044, in lieu of a form HSMV 82040 or HSMV 82042. The compliance examiner will give the customer the original required documentation (including the original complete form HSMV 84044). The customer must submit all documentation to a tax collector’s office or license plate agency in order for him/her to apply for a Florida Certificate of Title. The undisputed evidence establishes that neither TL-10 nor RS/TL 14-18 have been adopted as rules pursuant to the procedures prescribed in section 120.54. Respondent did not present any evidence showing that rulemaking was not practicable or feasible. Respondent's Position Respondent admitted, in its Amended Responses to Requests to Admissions served on Petitioner on November 21, 2016, that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 are intended to be, and are, of general application; that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy and/or describe the procedure or practice requirements of Respondent; and that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 have not been, and are not published in the Florida Administrative Code. Additionally, Respondent acknowledges that neither TL-10 nor RS/TL 14-18 have been adopted as rules. Respondent takes the position that Petitioner lacks standing to challenge TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted rules. Specifically, Respondent asserts that Petitioner has not suffered a "real or immediate injury in fact" for purposes of having standing because although the Tax Collector and Respondent referred the Trust to TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as grounds for denial of the certificate of title, they were not the "ultimate grounds" on which the Trust was denied a certificate of title. On this basis, Respondent asserts that it did not apply TL-10 or RS/TL 14-18 to Petitioner, so Petitioner did not suffer injury as a result of application of these statements. Respondent further asserts that because Petitioner cannot meet the requirements in section 319.23 to be entitled to issuance of a certificate of title for the Vehicle, Petitioner's claimed injury in this proceeding is speculative and hypothetical. To this point, Respondent argues that Petitioner's alleged injury in this proceeding is speculative because the Trust has not satisfied the requirements of section 319.23 for purposes of being entitled to issuance of a certificate of title. Specifically, Respondent argues that because the Vehicle is not physically present in the state of Florida, it is not being operated on the roads of Florida, and because it is not being operated on the roads of Florida, it is not required to be registered or to obtain a certificate of title——and, indeed, cannot be registered and a certificate of title issued until it is physically present in Florida. Accordingly, Respondent reasons, until the Vehicle is physically present in Florida and thus subject to registration and licensure requirements, TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 were not, and cannot be, applied to determine whether the certificate of title for the Vehicle should be issued. Also on this point, Respondent argues that Petitioner's alleged injury is speculative because Petitioner did not meet the requirement in section 319.23 that a physical examination of the Vehicle be made by the owner and a motor vehicle dealer licensed in the state of Florida. Respondent further asserts that Petitioner's alleged interest does not fall within the zone of interest of this proceeding. Specifically, Respondent argues that because the Vehicle is located in a foreign country, Petitioner is unable to establish that the Vehicle must be registered and a certificate of title issued in Florida. Respondent concludes: Because Petitioner cannot meet the burden of establishing that the motor vehicle in question is required to be licensed and registered in Florida, and because he failed to satisfy the application requirements of section 319.23(3)(a)(2), he cannot meet the burden of establishing that any interest in obtaining a certificate of title for the vehicle in question is within the 'zone of interests' to be protected and regulated.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Thomas K. Morgan was a trooper with the Florida Highway Patrol and was certified as a law enforcement officer by Respondent. On April 28, 1984, Brenda Liles, a 22-year-old woman, was returning to her home in Ruskin when she ran out of gas and pulled off on the shoulder of U.S. 41 in a rural area. Before leaving from her departure point, she realized her gas gauge was on empty and she called her father to ask him to come look for her if she was not home in 15 minutes. Trooper Morgan saw the AMC Concord parked along U.S. 41 and pulled up behind the car. Miss Liles was in the car with the doors locked and the windows rolled up. When Respondent approached her car he shined his flashlight inside the car to look for weapons or anything suspicious. Seeing the trooper, Miss Liles lowered the window to tell him she had run out of gas but her father would be along momentarily. Respondent stayed alongside Miss Liles' car and they held a general conversation for several minutes before Mr. Liles arrived. Miss Liles was dressed in shorts and tee shirt. When her father arrived he found his daughter calm and he suggested she get into his pickup truck and he would return for the AMC the following day. Respondent told Liles that he (Morgan) had a gas can he could borrow to get gas and the car could then be driven away rather than be left alongside the highway all night. Liles took the gas can and departed. He planned to stop by his home for a funnel but, even so, the round-trip for gas was expected to take no more than ten minutes. When Liles left, Respondent continued talking to Miss Liles and suddenly started shining his flashlight over her body and said, "Pussy, pussy, let me see that pussy," or "I want that pussy; open it up," or words of similar import. Miss Liles initially did not understand him and asked him what he had said. He repeated the words while shining his flashlight over her body. She immediately rolled up the window through which they had been talking (the doors had remained locked) and became very frightened and started crying. Respondent returned to his patrol car and started filling out reports. Approximately five minutes later Mr. Liles returned with the gas, saw his daughter was crying, and that she was visibly upset. After putting gas in the car, he returned the gas can to Respondent and asked his name and badge number. When the AMC was started Liles told his daughter to follow him and he drove to the sheriff's substation in Ruskin. Although Liles did not ask his daughter what had happened, he sensed it had something to do with Respondent. Upon arrival at the Sheriff's Office they encountered Trooper Donna L. Middleton who was told by Liles that they wanted to make a complaint. At this time Miss Liles was either still crying or showed visible evidence of having been crying and was quite upset. Trooper Middleton took father and daughter into an office to inquire as to the nature of the complaint. Miss Liles was having some difficulty getting the words out so Mr. Liles excused himself and went outside. Trooper Middleton gave Miss Liles complaint forms and asked her to write down what had happened. She assisted Miss Liles in the correct spelling of some of the words. As soon as she realized the nature of the complaint, Middleton called her supervisor to come to the Ruskin office. The Lileses remained at the substation until the then-Corporal Shriver arrived approximately one hour after the Lileses had arrived. At this time Miss Liles still gave the appearance of being upset and of earlier crying. Shriver took custody of the statement and the Lileses returned home. The complaint was duly processed by the Florida Highway Patrol, referred to the investigation branch, and investigated by Lieutenant Brown. Brown interviewed all the parties above named including Respondent. Following this investigation Respondent was dismissed from his employment with the Florida Highway Patrol. Respondent presented his wife and a female friend of his wife to testify that they had never heard Respondent make comments about the anatomical parts of the female body, and that such comments would be inconsistent with their impression of Respondent's character. In his testimony Respondent confirmed all of the testimony of the Lileses except Respondent's use of the language complained of, which he denied. Although all witnesses had testified that the weather was mild on the evening in question, Respondent testified Miss Liles rolled up her window because she was cold and he then returned to the patrol car. Respondent also testified that he had always been interested in work as a law enforcement officer and was very proud of his position as a trooper in the Florida Highway Patrol.
The Issue Whether Respondent, the holder of a Class "D" Security Officer License, committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds Class "D" Security Officer License Number D94-17752, which was issued pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, effective October 17, 1996, to October 17, 1998. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was employed by Navarro Security. On February 11 and 12, 1997, Respondent was on duty at a security post, during the evening hours, at William Lehman car dealership located in Broward County, Florida.1 That car dealership was a client of Navarro Security. Respondent's duties at this security post included patrolling the premises in a motorized golf cart. Respondent was not permitted to sleep while on duty. On February 11, 1997, Respondent was found by Corey Targia, a supervisor (captain) employed by Navarro Security, to be asleep in his own vehicle at approximately 3:34 a.m. Respondent was supposed to be on duty at that time. Respondent did not wake up until Mr. Targia knocked on the window of the vehicle. On February 12, 1997, Respondent was again found by Mr. Targia to be asleep while he was on duty. On this occasion, Mr. Targia found Respondent at approximately 3:52 a.m. sleeping in a car owned by the dealership. A sign advertising the sale of the car was positioned in a manner to obscure Respondent's presence in the vehicle. Mr. Targia called by radio Mike Crutcher, another supervisor (lieutenant) employed by Navarro Security, and asked Mr. Crutcher come to the site with a camera. Mr. Crutcher arrived at the site and observed Respondent sleeping. Respondent awakened before Mr. Crutcher could photograph him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's Class "D" Security Licensed be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1998.
