The Issue Did Respondent commit the offense alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, should Respondent's Correction Certificate No. 101468 be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent Beverly A. Morris was a certified correctional officer, having been certified by the Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission on October 13, 1986, and issued Correctional Certificate No. 101468. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was employed by the DeSoto Correctional Institution. On October 20, 1996, Respondent was assigned as supervisor in "A" Dormitory at the DeSoto Correctional Institution. On October 20, 1996, Inmate Richard Lloyd was assigned to, and a resident of, "H" Dormitory at the DeSoto Correctional Institution. At all times material to this proceeding, Correctional Officer Mark McFry was employed in security with the DeSoto Correctional Institution. On October 20, 1996, Officer McFry was assigned to east side patrol on the perimeter road. On October 20, 1996, between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m., Officer McFry observed Respondent with Inmate Richard Lloyd. During this same period of time, Officer McFry also observed Respondent repeatedly touch Inmate Richard Lloyd by rubbing her hand on his stomach, chest, and back. Officer McFry did not report the incident immediately but waited until October 25, 1996, some five days later to report the incident. At all times material to this proceeding, Officer Richard Wuest was employed in security with the DeSoto Correctional Institution. On October 20, 1996, Officer Wuest was assigned to west side patrol on the perimeter road. On October 20, 1996, between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m., Officer Wuest observed Respondent with Inmate Richard Lloyd. During this same period of time on October 20, 1996, Officer Wuest also observed Respondent repeatedly touch Inmate Lloyd by rubbing her hand on his stomach, chest, and back. Officer Wuest did not report the incident but was named as a witness in Officer McFry's report. There is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent advised Inmate Lloyd that she was not going to take a polygraph, notwithstanding the testimony of Darron Duval which I find lacks credibility. Subsequent to this incident, Inmate Lloyd was transferred from DeSoto Correction Institution to Hardee Correctional Institution. Respondent wrote Inmate Lloyd a letter dated July 7, 1997, and enclosed a photograph of herself and her daughter which was intercepted by the officials at Hardee Correctional Institution. There was no evidence that any other prior violation had been committed by the Respondent or that any other prior disciplinary action had been taken against the Respondent by the Commission. There was no evidence presented as to what, if any, disciplinary action had been taken against the Respondent for this incident by the DeSoto Correctional Institution.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a review of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances set out in Rule 11B-27.005(6), Florida Administrative Code, it is recommended that the Commission suspend Respondent's Correctional Certificate No. 101468 for a period of one year and, upon being reinstated, that Respondent be placed on probationary status for a period of six months subject to terms and conditions imposed by the Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Karen D. Simmons Assistant General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Beverly A. Morris 1811 Southwest Hendry Street Arcadia, Florida 34266
Findings Of Fact Douglas L. Adams is an inmate at Union Correctional Institution. On August 26, 1985, he was awakened early in the morning and brought before a disciplinary hearing for an alleged violation of institutional rules and regulations. Prior to the hearing, he was advised by a correctional officer to pack up all his personal property and to bring it with him to the hearing. Mr. Adams took with him as much as he could which included his clothing and other personal effects, but he was unable to carry all he owned with him at one time. He did not ask for either help in carrying his property or a cart to carry it in prior to leaving his cell area to go to the hearing. When he arrived at the movement center where the hearing was to be held, he advised the authorities there that he did not have all his property with him. At that point, he asked for help or the use of a cart to go get the rest of his property but he was refused because no cart was there. As a result, he went to the hearing leaving some of his property in his cell area and while in the hearing, contends he was required to leave his property in the control center. This property was secured in a storage room behind the control center which, while not locked, was not available for access to other inmates unless they were accompanied by a corrections officer. When the hearing was over and Mr. Adams, who had been directed to administrative confinement requested to go back to his former cell area to get the rest of his property, his request was refused. His property was inventoried by UCI personnel at that time, but because in his opinion the inventory was not complete, Mr. Adams refused to sign the form. When he was released from administrative confinement he claims he did not get all his property back. He relates that he was told he had forfeited whatever property he had not brought to the hearing. As a result, he filed a complaint on September 16, 1985, which was subsequently denied. Petitioner has been incarcerated in 7 or 8 institutions within the Department of Corrections including Florida State Prison, River Junction Correctional Institution, Baker Correctional Institution, Polk Correctional Institution, Old Unit, the Reception and Medical Center, and DeSoto Correctional Institution. At each one of these institutions a rule similar to this one was in existence. At Baker Correctional Institution, the inmate was required to bring his mattress as well. Robert Craig has been in prison for a total of 27 years and has been incarcerated in almost every major penal institution in the State of Florida that was built prior to the last five years. At Avon Park Correctional Institution he underwent a disciplinary hearing and was told at the time to bring all his personal property with him to the hearing. While in the hearing, he was required to leave all his property outside in the hall. At Cross City Correctional Institution the guards took him to the hearing without his property, bringing his property along afterwards. In essence, at all the institutions where he was incarcerated, there was some variation of the same procedure regarding his personal property. He either had to bring it to the hearing or it was packed up prior to the hearing. At no institution was his property inventoried prior to the hearing. As a result, he has lost personal property including a calculator for which he was subsequently reimbursed by the institution. According to Mr. Craig, if the inmate does not bring his personal property with him he either is given a deficiency report or is precluded from going back to get it when the hearing is over. Sgt. Denmark has worked for approximately 8 1/2 years with the Department of Corrections, all at UCI, where he formerly worked at the movement center. One of the functions he performed there was to handle prisoners coming for a disciplinary hearing. The rule as explained to him regarding the inmates' personal property is that the inmate is required to bring all of it with him to the hearing. Once the property is brought with the inmate to the hearing, the inmate is free to either take it into the hearing with him or to leave it in the storage room in back of the movement center during the hearing. If the inmate is sentenced to disciplinary confinement as a result of the hearing, in that case, and at that point, the inmate's property is inventoried. If the inmate is not sentenced to disciplinary confinement, the property is returned to the prisoner who is returned to his area. In the instant case, Mr. Denmark heard the Petitioner tell Sgt. Howe, when he arrived at the movement center, that he had left some of his property in his cell. However, when Adams went into his hearing, he neither took his property with him nor requested that it be secured. According to Mr. Cunningham, the Chief Classification Supervisor, the Union Correctional Institution Policy, (85-52.9 B1) requires inmates to bring all their property to disciplinary hearings. It is an old policy, and the reason for it is to protect the property from theft. In a disciplinary hearing, there is a chance that an inmate might not get back to his old cell to retrieve his property after the hearing. For security reasons, institution officials prefer not to take a prisoner back to his old cell after a hearing because, at that point, he is often angry as a result of the hearing and disruptive. All Department of Corrections' institutions in the region incorporating UCI, except Florida State Prison, have a similar policy. Inquiry of corrections personnel at the agency headquarters in Tallahassee reveals that most major DOC facilities have a similar policy. There are a total of 33 other facilities which hold less than 100 inmates each. These smaller institutions do not, generally, have a similar policy and Florida State Prison has a different situation because of the different security problems. It is the needs of the institution, however, which determine the use of the policy. Mr. Cunnningham is aware of Mr. Adams' hearing and the complaint filed as a result thereof. Upon inquiry it was determined that Mr. Adams had failed to establish a loss and the complaint was denied. Mr. Cunningham does not know whether there was an investigation into the loss of the property left in the cell. It is Mr. Cunningham's understanding that if the witness cannot carry all his property at one time, normally, if the inmate asks for permission to do so, he will be allowed to go back and get the balance before the hearing. This is not in the procedure approved by DOC, however, nor in the IOP at UCI. Corrections Officer Howe is also aware of the fact that Mr. Adams had a hearing on August 26, 1985. He, in fact, was called to the movement center to escort several prisoners, including Adams, to the confinement barracks after the hearings. A part of this duty involves inventorying the prisoners property. Howe told Adams to get his property and bring it in for inventory. At this point, after the hearing Adams said he did not have all his property with him and asked to be taken back to his old cell to get the rest. Howe declined to do this and explained the security reasons for his decision to Adams. He did advise Adams, however, that he would call down to Adams' old cell area and have his property packed which, in fact, he did. It is standard practice at UCI, according to Howe, that if an inmate has a large amount of property, he can request the use of a cart or wheelbarrow which is assigned to each housing area for carrying this excess property. This cart will be returned by a runner who can also help carry the excess. To his knowledge, inmates are not denied the use of these carts. Howe declined to return Adams to his old cell area after the hearing because, at the time, Adams was belligerent and unstable and presented a security risk in his opinion and also, because Adams had previously been advised to bring all his property with him and had failed to do this even though there was a way for him to accomplish it.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether respondent committed the offense charged in the administrative complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, respondent, Frank L. Hiler, was employed as a correctional officer at the Martin Correctional Institution (MCI). Although no direct proof was offered on the issue, it is inferred that, since respondent held such a position, he was appropriately certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. In April 1989, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), at the request of the Department of Corrections (DOC), commenced an investigation to address allegations that narcotics were being smuggled into MCI. During the course of such investigation, information was developed which implicated respondent in such illegal activity. Pertinent to this case, the proof demonstrates that in June 1989, respondent, on behalf of an inmate, picked up a package containing two ounces of cannabis, commonly known as marijuana, and one or two ounces of cocaine from the inmate's wife in Miami, Florida, for delivery to the inmate at MCI. At the time respondent took possession of the narcotics he was dressed in the uniform of a correctional officer and was driving a van with the DOC logo on the side. Such narcotics were not, however, delivered to the inmate because of events that were to have occurred a day or so later. Acting on a tip that respondent might be attempting to smuggle narcotics into MCI, FDLE stopped the vehicle in which he was riding outside the complex and conducted a search. Such search uncovered a "small quantity" of marijuana in the vehicle. 1/ Respondent was then offered the opportunity to give a urine sample to test for narcotics, which he declined, but offered to do so at a later date. Respondent did not, however, return to MCI, and his employment was terminated on June 28, 1989, premised on job abandonment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner render a final order revoking respondent's certification. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 22nd day of December 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December 1992.
The Issue The issue for determination at final hearing was whether Respondents committed the offenses set forth in the administrative complaints and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Scott R. Blair (Respondent Blair) was certified by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Petitioner) as a correctional officer, having been issued correctional certificate number 30982 on December 22, 1989. At all times material hereto, Charles A. Piazza (Respondent Piazza) was certified by Petitioner as a correctional officer, having been issued correctional certificate number 25166 on August 11, 1988. At all times material hereto, Robert C. Singleton, Sr. (Respondent Singleton), was certified by Petitioner as a correctional officer, having been issued correctional certificate number 71355 on August 24, 1988. At all times material hereto, Thomas A. Sayed (Respondent Sayed) was certified by Petitioner as a correctional officer, having been issued correctional certificate number 98281 on March 27, 1987. At all times material hereto, all of the Respondents were employed as correctional officers with the Martin County Sheriff's Department in the Martin County Detention Center. In or around December 1989, a new Detention Center was constructed and opened. Prior to that time, the old Detention Center, called the "stockade," was located in Indiantown approximately 19 miles from the site of the new facility. The stockade contained a commissary which was used by both inmates and correctional officers. The commissary was a separate area of the stockade, which contained a variety of snack foods, cigarettes, and sodas for the benefit of the inmates of the facility, who could purchase the items with monies maintained in their individual accounts controlled by the Detention Center. 3/ None of the inmates had unsupervised and continuous access to the commissary. Even though the commissary was for the benefit of the inmates, correctional officers from time to time would remove items from it. There existed an unwritten honor policy that any item removed by a correctional officer would have to be paid for by that officer. A container was placed in the commissary and a correctional officer would place money in the container for the item removed. If an officer was unable to pay for the item at the time of its removal, a supervising officer could approve payment at a later time. An inventory was performed on a weekly and monthly basis, with no shortage of money being reported. This honor policy was well known to and acquiesced in by the commanding officer of the stockage, Major Murphy. Respondent Singleton, who was employed at the stockade, frequently used this honor policy. He would remove items from the commissary and put money in the container for the items. At times, he would not be able to pay for an item until payday, and he was allowed to pay for the item at that time by his superior officer on duty at the time. Respondent Blair was also employed at the stockade and used this honor system. When the new facility opened in or around December 1989, the commissary structure and procedure pertaining to inmate use remained the same, but the procedure pertaining to correctional officer use was changed by Major Murphy. Although the commissary continued to be for the benefit of the inmates, no longer were the correctional officers suppose to utilize it. The container for payment by the correctional officers for items removed no longer existed. Now, the correctional officers were suppose to obtain their items from an area within the new Detention Center specifically set-aside for them, which was separate and some distance away from the commissary. This area contained coin-operated machines which contained a variety of snack foods, cigarettes and sodas. However, although there was suppose to be this new policy, no one, other than administrative personnel and high ranking correctional officers, were aware of the change. No written policy was issued for the new facility to countermand the unwritten policy used at the stockade. This nonaction resulted in no notification to the correctional officers of the new policy. Without the written policy, some correctional officers who worked at the stockade continued their practice in the new facility of removing items from the commissary even though no container existed in which the officers could pay for the items removed. In particular, at the new facility one correctional officer on the night shift had removed some items from the commissary. Being unsure as to how to pay or who to pay for the items, he waited the next morning, before going home, for the person who purchased items for the commissary, so that he could pay for the items. The commissary purchasing person worked only on the day shift. At that time, he was notified by the commissary purchasing person that he no longer could obtain items from the commissary, but she did accept his money for the items and informed the officer's superior of the incident. Then and only then did he become aware of the policy change. Major Murphy continued as the commanding officer at the new Detention Center. He too used the commissary and the honor policy. At the stockade he would order boxes of cigars through the commissary, either prepaying for them or paying for them when they came in. He continued this practice at the new facility, which was at odds with his new unwritten policy of prohibiting correctional officers from using the commissary. Everyone was aware of Major Murphy's practice. Approximately a year and a half after the new facility opened, on June 13, 1991, through an inmate informant, Major Murphy became aware of possible inmate theft of cigarettes from the commissary. The alleged theft occurred the night before on June 12, 1991, which was the usual periodic time that inmates' requests for commissary items were filled by other inmates under the supervision of correctional officers. The inmates who were assigned to fill inmate requests from the commissary were questioned by an officer assigned to the investigation by Major Murphy. Implicated by the inmates interviewed in the June 12, 1991 theft of cigarettes were themselves, other inmates and several correctional officers, including Respondents. Besides officers actually removing cigarettes, one inmate was allegedly directed by one officer to deliver some cigarettes to another room and by another officer, Respondent Piazza, to deliver some cigarettes to her. Possible officer theft was a surprising development. On the basis of only the inmates' statements, on June 13, 1991, Respondents were notified to report to Major Murphy without notifying them about the nature of the meeting. The written procedure for investigating officers was not followed. Major Murphy dictated the procedure to be followed in the investigation. Respondents Blair, Piazza and Sayed met with Major Murphy and two of his ranking officers. Major Murphy did all the talking at the meeting. He cited the theft statute, notified them of the allegation against them and instructed them to tell what they had done. Major Murphy further told the Respondents that, if they did take the cigarettes, it would be the most expensive pack of cigarettes that they had ever had. At least one of Major Murphy's ranking officers perceived this statement by Major Murphy as a threat to the Respondents. Only Respondent Blair admitted to removing, but not stealing, two packs of cigarettes after changing his story several times as to how many packs he had removed. Respondent Sayed denied taking anything but at the conclusion of the meeting requested to meet with Major Murphy privately. In that private meeting, with one of Major Murphy's ranking officers also present, Respondent Sayed admitted to removing, but not stealing, two packs of cigarettes and attempted to give Major Murphy the money for the cigarettes. Major Murphy refused to take the money. Respondent Piazza denied taking any cigarettes from the commissary. Respondent Singleton was late for the meeting because he had not received notification of it. Again, Major Murphy did all the talking. He gave Respondent Singleton the same introductory comments regarding the theft statute, what was alleged, and requested his story of what happened. When Major Murphy completed his comments, Respondent Singleton admitted that, during his night shift, he had taken, but not stolen, a pie to eat because he lacked change for the machines and had intended to pay for the pie later. Respondent Singleton also admitted that in the past he had removed snack items from the commissary but had paid the commissary purchasing person for them later. 4/ His statement pertaining to paying for the items later is found not to be credible. If he had engaged in this type of conduct, it is reasonable to assume that the commissary purchasing person would have informed him that he could no longer engage in such conduct, as she had done with the correctional officer discussed in Finding of Fact 15. Respondents were suspended from their positions that same day and subsequently terminated. Prior to the meeting with Major Murphy, there was nothing other than the statements by inmates to connect the Respondents to the theft of cigarettes from the commissary. Moreover, no inventory was performed on the commissary items. No evidence existed to show that any unauthorized items had been taken from the commissary or that Respondents had taken any items from the commissary. Even though Major Murphy found the inmates' statements, standing alone, credible to initiate an investigation against the Respondents and personally question them, he failed to find these same statements from these same inmates credible to investigate any of the other correctional officers named in the statements and question them. Furthermore, no other correctional officer named on that evening shift was disciplined by Major Murphy. One of the inmates from whom the so-called credible statements were taken testified at the hearing that, when he assisted in the new commissary, it was not uncommon for correctional officers to remove items from the commissary. 5/ At the hearing, the inmate refused to name correctional officers other than those named in his investigative statement, which included Respondents Blair, Piazza and Sayed, because he was fearful of what might happen to him at the new Detention Center at which he was now again incarcerated. Importantly, before he agreed to give a statement during the investigation in which he named officers, he was told by the investigating officer that other inmates had already given statements and named officers. The inmate's testimony at hearing is found to be credible. Regarding Respondent Piazza, this inmate was directed by Respondent Piazza to take some cigarettes to another room within the facility where other officers were located, but none of whom personally accepted or received the cigarettes. Approximately four days after the Respondents' meeting with Major Murphy, on June 17, 1991, he issued a written memo regarding correctional officers removing items from the commissary. Major Murphy indicated in the memo that through an investigation, without revealing the nature of the investigation, "apparently there was a practice of correctional employees removing items from the commissary, on all four shifts, without paying for them but that the practice would not be tolerated." Moreover, he further indicated that employees who had participated in the practice could remain anonymous and pay for the items, describing the procedure to follow, and that in the future a container would be placed in the commissary for the correctional employees who remove items to pay for them at the time they are removed. It is inferred from Major Murphy's memo that he believed, and it is found, that it was common practice for correctional officers to remove items from the commissary without paying for them as described by the Respondents. Even though other correctional officers who participated in the practice were provided an opportunity to pay for the items they had removed from the commissary, Major Murphy denied the Respondents this same opportunity. Prior to the memo of June 17, 1991, and after Major Murphy's meeting with the Respondents, another officer who was named in an inmate statement admitted to Major Murphy that he had removed a cigar from the commissary without paying for it. No disciplinary action was taken against that officer. Also, additional correctional officers were named in additional statements by one inmate. Major Murphy determined the extent of the investigation (limited only to the evening of June 12, 1991), and who would be investigated and disciplined (only Respondents and the inmates). Before issuing the memo of June 17, 1991, Major Murphy had decided not to pursue an investigation of any additional correctional officers because he believed that the disciplining of Respondents had sent a message to the other officers that the practice would not be tolerated and because he did not want to have to suspend and possibly terminate the majority of his staff. No criminal charges were recommended or filed against Respondents. The investigating officer recommended, and Major Murphy agreed, that the incident did not warrant theft charges. Respondents have not been employed as correction officers since June 13, 1991. Respondents have no prior history of disciplinary action. The inmates who stole cigarettes on the evening of June 12, 1991, were also disciplined.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order Reprimanding the Respondents. Placing the Respondents on probationary status for six months. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of June 1994. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June 1994.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a certified law enforcement officer and was issued certificate number 13-84-002-01 on July 14, 1984. On September 1, 1988, Respondent was employed as an investigator with the State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit working in the misdemeanor division. While on duty and driving his employment car on the evening of September 1, 1988, Respondent was in the area of Lee Street and 20th Street in Orlando, Florida. He was in the area attempting to locate a witness as part of a criminal investigation he was conducting. He had previously made the acquaintance of a person named Ruby Burk. He would on occasion drive past her house and stop and they would talk and once previously had engaged in a sex act. On the night of September 1, 1988, he went to Burk's house, talked with her and then left on a futile attempt to locate a witness. He then returned to Burk's residence, picked her up and proceeded to a dark secluded area on an unpaved street which borders an elementary school. Shortly thereafter, while on routine patrol, an Orange County Deputy Sheriff observed Respondent sitting behind the wheel of the state vehicle in a complete state of undress. When she shined her bright lights into the vehicle, the Deputy observed the head of a black female pop up from the direction of the Petitioner's lap. The Deputy recognized Burk and observed that she was fully clothed. The Deputy permitted Respondent to put his pants on before he exited his vehicle. Respondent and Burk were engaging in fellatio in the front seat of the state vehicle. At the time of the incident, Respondent was having marital problems which caused him to be despondent. In mitigation, Respondent demonstrated that he had been a certified law enforcement officer for over four years at the time of this incident and has had no prior disciplinary problems. He has performed his job in private security and as an investigator in an exemplarily capacity. In September 1988, Respondent was discharged by the State Attorney, but was given a favorable recommendation He is presently employed as a Child Protective Investigator with HRS. He is respected by his peers and in his community. The violation of the law and rules by the Respondent was an isolated incident.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of the following offense: Failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (1989). It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent's certification be suspended for a period of six months, followed by a probationary period of one year, subject to the successful completion of such career development training and counseling as the Commission may impose. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (in part), 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 (in part), 17, 18, 19 (in part), 21. Rejected as against the greater weight of the evidence or irrelevant: Paragraphs 7 (that Burk had been convicted of engaging in prostitution on Westmoreland Street), 11, 16 (in part), 19 (in part), 20, 22. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (in part), 6, 7. Rejected as irrelevant or as argument: Paragraphs 5, 8 and 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Elsa L. Whitehurst, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Leon B. Cheek, Esquire 101 Sunnytown Road Suite 306 Casselberry, FL 32707 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Tallahassee, FL 32302
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner herein, Michael J. Hunter, was employed by the Apalachee Correctional Institution (ACI) in Sneads, Florida in November, 1979. Immediately after his employment he was given five weeks training at Raiford, Florida and served as a correctional officer at ACI from that point until July 7, 1983. The four performance reports rendered on him during the period of employment were all satisfactory or above and other than the instant case, he was subject to no disciplinary action during the entire period he worked for the Respondent. His function as a corrections officer was to maintain order in the dormitories, security for the area, and to protect inmates' safety. He worked the evening shift from 4 pm to midnight for three years and on the midnight shift from midnight to 8 am for 6 months. During the period of his employment he was instructed, and it was his understanding, that a corrections officer may touch a prisoner in the line of duty only to maintain order, to break up a fight, and to protect the safety of himself, the prisoner, or others but not to abuse a prisoner or to administer punishment. On June 3, 1983, he was instructed by his supervisor, Sgt. Hines, to proceed to the basement of the dormitory in which he was working to open up the TV room and the clothing line. When he arrived there, he found that the people assigned to operate the clothing line had not shown up yet so he went to the TV area to check on it. When he came back to the clothing room, he saw that two inmates, Wilkins and Ashbury, had broken into the room and stolen some underwear. He apprehended them and told all the prisoners in the area to go upstairs. All did except prisoner Watkins, the victim of the alleged assault in issue here who refused to go. It has been Petitioner's experience that some inmates refuse to obey the directions of anyone holding a rank less than sergeant. In any case, Petitioner was able to convince Watkins to go to the guard room upstairs and while there, Watkins and Petitioner got into a verbal dispute. Just as they were arguing, Petitioner's supervisor, Sgt. Hyatt, came into the office. At this point, Watkins jumped up and yelled at him and accused Petitioner of hitting him. Petitioner categorically denied striking Watkins. He admits telling Watkins he could have his "ass" for this but he does not believe that in the context of which that statement was used and the circumstances under which the situation took place, use of that word was necessarily inappropriate. It is Mr. Hunter's belief that a corrections officer such as he was would be ineffective and ignored if from time to time he did not use this type of language. He based this on his knowledge of the background and character of the inmates as well as their education level for the most part. According to Hunter, when Hyatt came in, Watkins jumped up and moved off to the side and yelled at Sgt. Hyatt to get Hunter "out of his face." Though Mr. Hunter denies intentionally touching Watkins, he admits it is possible that his finger may have touched Watkins' nose because at the time, they were very close. Young John Allen, another corrections officer at ACI, was on duty in the general area of this incident on the night in question. He overheard a disturbance downstairs and thereafter walked into the dormitory office. When he did, he saw 15 inmates come up from downstairs, excited, to see the duty sergeant. In response, Allen called Sgt. Hyatt who came into the room and started talking to the inmates. Just then, according to Allen, Hunter came in. At this point Hunter and Watkins started arguing. Hunter walked up to Watkins and talked to him in strong terms. Allen overheard Hunter say, "Boy, I want you bad." and put his finger in Watkins' face. During this time, the other inmates surrounding the individuals were becoming more and more excited. At this point, according to Allen, Hyatt called Hunter but Hunter did not respond. Notwithstanding Hunter's denial that he hit Watkins, Allen indicates that he saw Hunter hit Watkins with a short, quick punch to the left side of abdomen. Admittedly, this punch was not hard enough to knock Watkins down. While this was all going on, Allen heard Hyatt call to the Petitioner several times to no avail. Finally, Hyatt told Watkins to go outside and sit down. He also got Hunter to come back to the rear of the office. Once this was done, Petitioner again went out to where Watkins was sitting and again called him "Boy" and put his finger in Watkins' face. At this point, another officer came up and prevailed upon the Petitioner to leave. Allen contends that he was in the room with Hunter and Watkins at the time of the incident. Hunter contends that Allen was standing outside the room in the dormitory looking in through a wide glass window. He says that though he was at all times looking directly at Watkins, his peripheral vision is such that he was able to see Allen off to the side where he was standing. Allen contends he was approximately 6 to 8 feet away, slightly off to the side, and there were no obstructions to his view of the incident even though there were a lot of people in the room. Allen also contends that throughout this entire fracas, Watkins never jumped at Petitioner as is claimed but was trying to break away at all times. Watkins was sent for medical evaluation immediately after the incident as a part of standard procedure and it was determined that he received no injuries as a result of it. Watkins, sometime after the incident, but within a short time, came to Allen indicating his displeasure with the way Allen had handled the situation. In this conversation, Watkins indicated to Allen he did not want to see Petitioner fired on the basis of this incident. The structure of the guard force at ACI is quite similar to that of a military organization. The guards do wear uniform but do not carry weapons inside the prisoner area because of the volatile situation that can rapidly develop into a confrontational situation. While the use of bad language is not unusual, corrections officers generally have to, if at all possible, maintain their equilibrium because when an officer is upset and becomes involved in a scene, inmates also get upset. Because no weapons are carried, therefore, the officers have to be careful not to create, encourage, or maintain an explosive situation wherein they or someone else could get hurt. Within the guard structure the lowest or first level is that held by both Petitioner and Mr. Allen, corrections officer 1. Hyatt is a corrections officer 2, equivalent to the rank of sergeant, and in a lead worker position. Both CO 1 and CO 2 positions are in the same collective bargaining unit. A CO 2 has no disciplinary action authority and is not considered to be management. As such, a CO 2 can neither hire nor fire but may recommend either discipline or termination of employment. The supervisory level starts with CO 3, a grade equivalent to that of a lieutenant. This individual can approve leave, assign personnel, and effectively recommend disciplinary action which, ordinarily, is taken by the superintendent of the facility. Al Cook has been the superintendent of ACI for 9 years and as such has the authority to discipline and terminate employees in accordance with Department of Corrections rules and the appropriate statutes. After an investigation into the incident in issue here, he ultimately discharged Petitioner for striking an inmate. During his 15 years as a superintendent at one institution or another he has discharged one other corrections officer for physical abuse. Petitioner here was, he believes, however, the first. The other, a white officer, was discharged for kicking an inmate. Race was not in issue in the dispute here. Hunter and Watkins are both black. After the incident in question, Hyatt allowed Hunter to go see the lieutenant who gave him the opportunity to either go back to work or go home for the evening. Because he did not wish to work with Hyatt any more that evening, Petitioner chose to go home and report the following morning. When he did he was again told to go home, this time for several days, and return the following Tuesday. At this time he was interviewed by Colonel Jones who advised him to come back and see the superintendent on Wednesday, which he did. After waiting all day on Wednesday to see the superintendent, he was told to come back on Thursday. When he did, after waiting another hour, he was interviewed by Mr. Cook who heard his story. When he was finished, Cook indicated that he believed the other officers' stories over Hunter's and gave him the option to either resign or be fired. When Hunter refused to resign, he was discharged on July 7, 1983. Later that day he was shown the statements signed by 5 inmates and the other officers including Hyatt who said they saw him hit Watkins. These statements were not introduced into evidence at the hearing. However, Petitioner admits in his testimony that he saw them and that they exist. He also admits having come close to Watkins in an altercation which involved the use of bad language and which resulted from high feeling. Though he admits that his finger may have touched Watkins' nose, he denies punching him. However, the testimony of Mr. Allen, if believed, tends to indicate that he did. The inconsistency between the testimony of Petitioner and that of Allen as to where Allen was standing can be resolved easily in favor of Mr. Allen because, in light of the circumstances involving high feeling and the fact that Petitioner admits he saw Allen only out of the corner of his eye, it is most probably that Allen was in the room and not outside as Petitioner contends. In any case, in this specific as in the specific as to whether or not Watkins was hit by Petitioner, the resolution of the dispute if not clear from the evidence must be made on an analysis of the evidence on the basis of, inter alia, who has the most to gain or lose by telling the truth or a falsehood. In this case, it is clear that Petitioner has the most to lose by telling the truth because under the statute in question, if he did in fact unlawfully strike Watkins, he is subject to termination. Another factor to consider is the demeanor of the witnesses while on the stand. Here both Allen and Petitioner appeared to know what it was they were saying and did not appear to be rehearsed. Their testimony appeared spontaneous and was believable. In light of the above, it can be concluded, therefore, considering the nature of the altercation and the high feeling involved, that Petitioner did in fact strike Watkins.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, therefore, it is RECOMMENDED THAT the Petition of Michael Hunter, to be reinstated to his position of employment and to be awarded back and front pay, benefits, and costs and attorney's fees be denied. Recommended in Tallahassee, Florida, this 19th day of February, 1985. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Preston T. Everett, Esquire Asst. General Counsel Dept. of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32315 Dana Baird, Esquire 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Bldg. F Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire O. Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315 Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY REMAND ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA COMMISSION OF HUMAN RELATIONS MICHAEL HUNTER, EEOC Case No. 046842030 Petitioner, FCHR Case No. 84-0316 DOAH Case No. 84-2891 vs. FCHR Order No. 86-015 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. / ORDER REMANDING PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM AN UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE Panel of Commissioners The following three Commissioners participated in the disposition of this matter: Commissioner John J. Sulik, Panel Chairperson, Commissioner Robert L. Billingslea; and Commissioner Robert R. Joyce. APPEARANCES For Petitioner Michael Hunter: Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32325 For Respondent State of Florida, Department of Corrections: Ernest L. Reddick, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Preliminary Matters Michael Hunter, Petitioner herein, filed a complaint of discrimination with this Commission pursuant to the Human Rights Act of 197, as amended, Sections 760.01-760.10, Florida Statutes (1985), alleging that State of Florida, Department of Corrections, Respondent herein, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of race (black). In accordance with the Commission's rules, the allegations of discrimination set forth in the complaint of discrimination were investigated and a report of said investigation was submitted to the Executive Director. On June 29, 1984, the Executive Director issued his Determination finding no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice occurred. On July 31, 1984, the petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice. The petition was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for the conduct of a formal proceeding pursuant to Rule 22T-8.16(1). The formal proceeding was held on January 3, 1985, in Chattahoochee, Florida, before Arnold H. Pollock, DOAH Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer entered a Recommended Order in this matter on February 19, 1985. Petitioner filed exceptions to the Recommended Order. Respondent filed a response. Pursuant to notice, oral argument was originally held on April 19, 1985, at which time the parties were advised that the Commission was unable to locate the record in this proceeding. The parties ultimately produced a copy of the record 2 and the deliberation was rescheduled to February 28, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida before the aforementioned Panel of Commissioners. After oral argument was presented by counsel for the respective parties, the Panel conducted its deliberation in this matter and determined the action to be taken upon the petition. Petitioner's Exceptions and Respondent's Response Petitioner excepts to the Hearing Officer's failure to find that confrontations with inmates involving Correctional Officers Foran and Mayo were not comparable to Petitioner's confrontation. Petitioner further excepts to the Hearing Officer's failure to consider Petitioner's statistical evidence showing that 17 percent of Respondent's workforce is black, whereas 75 percent of the individuals terminated in 1982 through 1984 at Petitioner's worksite, Apalachee Correctional Institution, were black. Respondent counters by asserting that the confrontations involving Correctional Officer's Foran and Mayo were not comparable to the confrontation involving Petitioner inasmuch as Respondent's internal investigations supported the respective disciplinary actions taken. Respondent further asserts that Petitioner's statistical computations, based upon only four terminations, were meaningless. Analysis and Discussion The record reveals that the Hearing Officer limited the scope of the proceeding to incidents which had occurred at Respondent's Apalachee Correctional Institution where Petitioner was employed at the time of termination. In his findings of fact, the Hearing Officer found that Petitioner was one of two correctional officers to be terminated by the superintendent of the institution for abuse to inmates. Petitioner was the first correctional officer discharged by the superintendent for such offense. The other correctional officer was white. We believe that the Hearing Officer improperly limited the evidence to incidents of like nature at Apalachee Correctional Institution. Petitioner claimed that white correctional officers had engaged in behavior similar to that with which Petitioner was terminated, but the white correctional officers were not similarly punished. If white correctional officers had been engaged in similar improper conduct known to Respondent and those correctional officers were not similarly punished, an inference is raised that Petitioner was disciplined for reasons other than improper conduct. Petitioner should have been allowed to present such evidence before the Hearing Officer because it would have tended to indicate that Respondent's reasons were pretextual. Support for this conclusion is derived from McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 972, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the black plaintiff had been accused of illegal activity against the employer. The employer cited such unlawful conduct as a legitimate, nondis- criminatory reason for the adverse employment action. The supreme Court accepted this reason, but then held that the plaintiff had to be given the opportunity to rebut the legitimate reason. Plaintiff must be afforded a fair opportunity to show that petitioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection was in fact pretext. Especially relevant to such a showing would be evidence that white employees involved in acts against petitioner of comparable seriousness to the "stall-in" were nevertheless retained or rehired. Petitioner may justifiably refuse to rehire one who is engaged in unlawful, disruptive acts against it, but only if this criterion is applied alike to members of all races. Id. at 804. In this cause, Petitioner should similarly be afforded a fair opportunity to show that Respondent's stated reason for Petitioner's termination, corporal punishment of an inmate, was a pretext. The statutory provision governing corporal punishment of inmates which had been in effect from 1957 through the date of Petitioner's termination reads: Corporal punishment prohibited; penalty. It is unlawful for any corporal punishment, any cruel or inhuman punishment, or any punishment by which the flesh of the body is broken, bruised, or lacerated to be inflicted upon any prisoner at any time. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be discharged immediately and shall not again be employed in any capacity in connection with the correctional system and shall be punished as provided by law for whatever offense he may have committed in perpetrating the act. No prisoner shall be punished because of any report or represen- tation which he may have made to any inspector. Section 944.35, Fla. Stat. (1983). Inasmuch as this statutory provision had statewide application, the discipline given for corporal punishment of inmates should have been evenhandedly applied at Respondent's various correctional institutions. Moreover, evidence of Respondent's application of this statutory provision throughout its various institutions becomes especially relevant where the terminations at Apalachee Correctional Institution reflect a proportionately greater number of blacks being terminated at the institution than whites, but where Petitioner was the first person terminated at such institution for that particular offense. Therefore, petitioner should be afforded the opportunity to present evidence that white employees violated the above-cited statutory provision but were nevertheless retained. Remand Accordingly, the panel remands this cause to the Hearing Officer for further evidentiary proceedings consistent with this Order. It is so ORDERED. DATED this 24th day of September, 1986. FOR THE FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS: BY: Commissioner Robert L. Billingslea; and Commissioner Robert R. Joyce. Commissioner John J. Sulik, Panel Chairperson, dissenting. I would limit the scope of the evidentiary inquiry to Apalachee Correctional Institution and/or its superintendent and adopt the Hearing Officer's recommendation of dismissal. FILED this 30th day of September, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. Betsy Howard, Clerk of the Commission
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: l. The Petitioner, Terry Wooden, a black male, was hired by the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Corrections, on December 5, 1980 as a Correctional Officer I at River Junction Correctional Institution. River Junction Correctional Institution (RJCI) is a secure facility responsible for the care, custody and control of certain inmates. Correctional Officers are assigned to security posts which are located throughout the facility. Some "inside" security posts are located within inmate dormitories. Outside perimeter security posts, which are small tower-like buildings, are located along the perimeter fence and are the last observation posts between containment and possible inmate escape. For security reasons, the Respondent prohibits sleeping on the job and requires its correctional officers to remain alert at all times. Supervisors (generally employees holding the rank of sergeant) often make "rounds" of the facility wherein security posts are visited to ensure that the officer on, duty at that post is alert. RJCI procedure requires that an officer on duty at a security post "challenge" a supervisor or other correctional officer who approaches the security post. When a supervisor enters a dormitory, the officer assigned to that post is required to challenge that person by immediately leaving the officer's station (located within the dormitory) to meet the approaching person. If the officer is on the telephone or engaged in some activity, it is acceptable for the officer to wave his hand to the approaching person or indicate in some other manner that he is aware that someone has entered the area. When a supervisor approaches an outside security post, the officer on duty is required to meet the approaching individual at the door of the building. Discipline of employees at RJCI is based on a progressive system. During the time the Petitioner was employed at RJCI, a sergeant was required to report a sleeping/unalertness violation by a correctional officer to the shift lieutenant (supervisor of all employees on a particular shift). There were no written guidelines and the reporting officer was required to exercise some discretion in determining whether he believed that an offense had been committed. On the first incident, the shift lieutenant would counsel the employee about the infraction, but no written report was made. On the second report of an offense to the shift lieutenant, a written report of the incident would be prepared by either the reporting officer or the shift lieutenant. The shift lieutenant would interview the employee about the alleged violation and refer the report to the department head (correctional officer chief). The department head would then submit the written report to the personnel manager with recommendations. Upon receiving a written report of an infraction from the department head, the personnel manager would gather information pertaining to the offense and give it to the superintendent, along with recommendations for disposing of the case. The superintendent would then schedule a "predetermination conference", confront the employee with the allegations and determine the disciplinary action to be taken. Prior to 1979 and until June 1982, L. C. McAllister, a white male, was superintendent at RJCI; from June 1982 to December 10, 1982, George Ragans, a white male, was acting superintendent at RJCI; from December 13, 1982 through August 1983, Ken Snover, a white male, was superintendent at RJCI. Each superintendent was responsible for determining the particular penalty to be imposed using guidelines set forth in Chapter 33, Section 9 of the Rules of Personnel. Generally, the employee's first sleeping/unalertness violation reported to the personnel manager, and ultimately, the superintendent, would result in counseling (oral reprimand); the second violation would result in a written reprimand; the third violation would result in a suspension; the fourth violation would result in a longer suspension or dismissal; and, the fifth violation would result in dismissal. Major Miles, a white male, is a department head and functions as the overall supervisor of correctional officers at RJCI. Miles assigns posts and shifts to correctional officers. Major Miles usually assigns new correctional officers to midnight shift after they complete orientation. After Petitioner completed his orientation period, he was placed on midnight shift (12:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m.) and assigned to Post 23 in "G" dormitory. The Petitioner completed his one year probationary period on December 5, 1981. The Petitioner was assigned an overall rating of "satisfactory" by his shift supervisor, Lieutenant Carter, a black male. The evaluation stated that Petitioner got along well with supervisors and fellow employees. In December of 1981, Lieutenant Childs, a white male, became the Petitioner's shift supervisor. Initially, the Petitioner and Lieutenant Childs enjoyed a friendly relationship. Lieutenant Childs drove the Petitioner to work on several occasions and both men shared a common interest in sports. On December 13, 1981 an officer made a routine check of "G" dormitory and found Petitioner asleep in the officer's station. The Petitioner was counseled about this first infraction. Shortly after Petitioner's sleeping incident of December 13, 1981, Major Miles changed Petitioner's post assignment from dormitory to Perimeter Post 3. Major Miles changed Petitioner's post because several inmates had complained to him that a lot of stealing was taking place and that Petitioner was not watchful enough to prevent it. The inmates also complained that Petitioner's counseling style seemed like harassment. After Petitioner's post was changed from "G" dormitory to Perimeter Post 3, his relationship with Lieutenant Childs began to turn sour. The Petitioner was "concerned" because he believed that Lieutenant Childs had input into Major Miles' decision to reassign him. On May 10, 1982, Lieutenant Childs found the Petitioner unalert at Perimeter Post 3. The Petitioner received a written reprimand for this second infraction. On August 19, 1982, Sergeant Pollock, a black male, found Petitioner unalert while on duty at Perimeter Post 3. Sergeant Pollock reported the incident to Lieutenant Childs but suggested that Petitioner be counseled rather than "written-up". Sergeant Pollock believed that a lesser punishment might encourage Petitioner's improvement. Lieutenant Childs told Pollock to think about it for a couple of days. On August 21, 1982, Sergeant Parks and Sergeant Tharpe found Petitioner unalert at his post. When Sergeant Pollock discovered this incident, he changed his mind about his previous recommendation to Lieutenant Childs. Childs told Pollock to submit a written report. The Petitioner was suspended for 3 days for these third and fourth sleeping/unalertness infractions. On September 2, 1982, Lieutenant Childs completed an employee rating evaluation on Petitioner for the period September 1, 1981 to September 2, 1982. Petitioner was given an overall rating of "satisfactory", but Lieutenant Childs noted several areas of concern. Lieutenant Childs mentioned that Petitioner seemed to interpret counseling sessions "as personal threats conspired, for no bonafide reason to harass him." However, Lieutenant Childs went on to note that Petitioner's attitude and work performance was improving and that Petitioner was "making a definite and positive effort to correct his shortcomings." On October 28, 1982 an inmate escaped from RJCI. At the time of the inmate's escape, Petitioner was on duty at Perimeter Post-3 and William Chessher, a white correctional officer, was on duty on Perimeter Post 2. Major Miles, the department head, recommended that both men be disciplined for being unalert. Because the inmate's escape route took him through Perimeter Post 3's primary area of responsibility, Major Miles recommended that Petitioner be dismissed; Miles recommended that Chessher be reprimanded or suspended because the escape route was along Perimeter Post 2's secondary area of responsibility. On November 18, 1982, Acting Superintendent George Ragans held a predetermination conference concerning Petitioner's October 28, 1982 unalertness charge. Mr. Ragans found that the offense was substantiated but did not follow Major Miles' recommendation that Petitioner be dismissed. Ragans suspended the Petitioner for fifteen (15) days for this fifth sleeping/unalertness violation. Immediately following the November 18, 1982 predetermination conference, Ragans suggested to Petitioner that Petitioner should request a shift change. However, Petitioner explained to Ragans that he had a new baby at home, was taking college courses and did not want a shift change at that time. When Petitioner returned to work on December 16, 1982 after his fifteen (15) day suspension he had decided that he wanted a shift change. Petitioner went to the control room to find out how to submit a shift change request. In the control room, Petitioner spoke with a female officer concerning the procedures for requesting a shift change. The female officer agreed to type a shift change request for Petitioner. The female officer typed the request and gave Petitioner a copy. Shift change requests are directed to the shift lieutenant, in this instance, Lieutenant Childs, who then passes the request to Major Miles for final action. The female officer told Petitioner that she would put the original request for shift change in Lieutenant Childs' box in the control room. For some reason, Lieutenant Childs never received Petitioner's written request for shift change. In January 1983, the Petitioner spoke with the new superintendent, Ken Snover, regarding a shift change. Mr. Snover told Petitioner to proceed through the change of command and if he was still not satisfied, to return and speak with him again. One night, while on duty sometime after December 16, 1982 Petitioner asked Lieutenant Childs about a shift change. Lieutenant Childs told Petitioner that there were going to be a lot of changes made. Petitioner spoke to Major Miles on one occasion after December 16, 1982 and asked about a shift change. Major Miles told Petitioner to submit a written request. Major Miles never received a written request for shift change from Petitioner. Sometime prior to August 1, 1983, Petitioner was temporarily assigned to "G" dormitory and worked with officer Gano, a white male. Gano complained to Lieutenant Childs that Petitioner was sleeping on duty. Before Gano complained to Childs, Childs had received allegations of Petitioner being asleep from other correctional officers. Because of those complaints, Childs had instructed two sergeants to closely review Petitioner's dormitory work habits. On one occasion, the sergeants told Lieutenant Childs that Petitioner appeared to be asleep while on duty. On August 1, 1983, Lieutenant Childs instructed officer Gano to let him know if Petitioner was sleeping by giving a pre-arranged signal. Officer Gano found Petitioner asleep or "non-alert" and gave the pre-arranged signal. Lieutenant Childs entered the dormitory without Petitioner challenging him and found Petitioner unalert. Lieutenant Childs wrote a report on Petitioner's sixth sleeping infraction. Superintendent Ken Snover held a predetermination conference concerning Petitioner's August 1, 1983 unalertness charge. Snover ordered the Petitioner's dismissal, effective August 18, 1983. Steve Williams, a white Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping on April 20, 1981 and was given an oral reprimand for this first offense. Williams was caught sleeping again on June 21, 28, and July 31, 1981. Because of the personnel manager's vacation a predetermination conference letter could not be sent until after the third occurrence and all three violations were addressed at the same conference. Williams was given a written reprimand for this second sleeping infraction. Thomas Jackson, a black Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping on October 29, 1982 and was given an oral reprimand for this first offense. On May 13, 1983, Jackson was caught sleeping a second time and was given an official reprimand. On August 10, 1983, Jackson was caught sleeping a third time and was suspended for one week (5 working days). Jackson was offered and accepted a shift change, from midnight to evening shift. Dennis Edwards, a white Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping in July 1982 and was counseled for this first offense. In Apri1 1983, he was caught sleeping again and was given a written reprimand. In July 1983, Edwards was suspended for 5 working days because of his third offense of sleeping while on duty. Larry Garrett, a black Correctional Officer I, was counseled for sleeping on duty for his first offense, but no documentation was made to his personnel file. On September 5, 1981 Garrett was caught sleeping a second time and was given a written reprimand. On December 3, 1981, Garrett was caught sleeping a third time and was suspended for three days. Garrett was offered a shift change, but declined because he was taking classes and had a newborn baby. On December 16, 1981, Garrett was caught sleeping for the fourth time and was terminated. Michae1 Weeks, a white Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping on June 9, 1981 and was given a written reprimand for this first offense. On May 10, 1982 he was caught sleeping a second time and was given a written reprimand. Weeks was caught sleeping again on August 1, 8 and 10, 1982. Weeks was given a predetermination conference letter, but before the hearing was held, he was caught sleeping again on August 18, 1982. Weeks voluntarily resigned on August 18, 1982. Warren Harris, a black Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping on November 29, 1979 and was given a written reprimand for this first offense. On June 13, 1981, Harris was caught sleeping again and was given another written reprimand. On September 9, 1981, Harris was caught sleeping for the third time and was suspended for three days. Harris was caught sleeping again on October 28 and 29, 1981 for his fourth offense. Harris was given a letter of termination, but resigned before the termination took effect. Harold Bailey, a white Correctional Officer I, was caught sleeping on June 14, 1982 and was counseled for this first offense. Bailey was caught sleeping again on July 17, 1982 and was given a written reprimand. On January 5, 1983 Bailey was caught sleeping on duty for the third time and was suspended for five days. On April 2, 1983, Bailey was charged with a fourth offense but Superintendent Snover found the allegations "unsubstantiated." Nevertheless, Bailey was counseled and documentation of the incident was placed in his personnel file. Bailey was offered a shift change but he refused it. Bailey's shift was later changed. In an effort to assist employees who were working midnight shift and having problems staying awake, the personnel manager and the superintendent would sometimes offer the employee a shift change or encourage the employee to seek a shift change. At various times, both black and white employees were offered, or encouraged to seek shift changes when they were having trouble on midnight shift. From time to time, correctional officers would submit requests for shift and/or post changes. Major Miles, the department head, usually made shift or post changes based on an individual's written request and the needs of the institution to have certain security posts staffed. Major Miles made some shift and post changes without a written request and over the objection of the employee if it was required by the needs of the institution. Shift and post changes at RJCI were given to both white and black employees in a substantially similar manner. Lieutenant Childs, upon receiving a request for a shift or post change, was required to forward the request to Major Miles for final action. Lieutenant Childs would forward a request for shift or post change with a favorable recommendation only if he believed the employee "earned" the recommendation by good performance on his current shift or post. As shift lieutenant, Childs was authorized to make some temporary post re-assignments for employees on his shift. During the last several months of Petitioner's employment, Petitioner was permanently assigned to Perimeter Post 3, but Lieutenant Childs temporarily assigned him to a post in "G" dormitory. While Petitioner was temporarily assigned to "G" dormitory, Lieutenant Childs became aware through "the grapevine" that Petitioner wanted to have Mondays and Tuesdays off, rather than Tuesdays and Wednesdays. Because different post assignments, carried different days off, a change in days off would have required a post change. Lieutenant Childs told Sergeant Pollock to tell Petitioner that he would arrange for Petitioner to have the desired days off as soon as possible if Petitioner's work performance improved. In January 1983 a new Department of Corrections directive required that certain correctional officers receive 160 supplementary hours of training. A majority of the staff at RJCI was required to complete the supplemental training. From January 1983 through August 1983, personnel at RJCI were engaged in the on-going training program. One set of training classes were scheduled from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.mand another set of classes were scheduled from 6:30 p.m. until 10:30 p.m., five days a week. During the period from January 1983 through August 1983, shift and post changes were made primarily to allow correctional officers the opportunity to attend the training sessions as required. As superintendent of RJCI, Ken Snover conducted "predetermination conferences" wherein he was required to review allegations, determine whether or not the charges were substantiated and then decide what disciplinary action to take. Superintendent Snover did not apply a lesser standard of proof at predetermination conferences where Petitioner was charged with sleeping/unalertness violations than he applied when white officers were involved. On one occasion Snover found that the allegations of sleeping were not sufficient to warrant disciplinary action against two white employees, Harold Bailey and Walter Dean, where the allegation was made by one sergeant but denied by both correctional officers. At the predetermination conferences that Snover conducted where Petitioner was charged, the allegations were all substantiated by one or more individuals and denied only by Petitioner. Perimeter Post 3 as well as other perimeter posts, are isolated outside security posts and are generally not considered to be the most desirable security post assignments. Both black and white officers were assigned to Perimeter Post 3 and other perimeter posts. A slight majority of the correctional officers permanently assigned to perimeter posts were black. There was no indication that correctional officers were assigned to Perimeter Post 3 on a racial basis nor as a "set up" to achieve dismissal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the complaint and the petition for relief filed by Mr. Terry Wooden. DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of September, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day September, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED::: Drucilla E. Bell, Esq. Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32301 Marva Davis, Esq. 379 E. Jefferson Street P. O. Drawer 551 Quincy, FL 32351 Louie L. Wainwright Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32301 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303 Dana Baird, Esq. General Counsel Florida Commission on. Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 3230 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. The first sentence is rejected as a recitation of testimony. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by Competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 31 and 32. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 20 and 30. Matters not contained therein are rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Matters not contained therein are rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence and/or misleading. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. 14A. Rejected as subordinate. 14B. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. 15A. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 22 and 23. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. 15B. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. 16A. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. 16B. Rejected as misleading and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or misleading. Rejected as misleading and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Findings of Fact 25 and 26. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 27,^ 28 and 29. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 26, 27, 28 and 29. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as misleading and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 39, and 41. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate, misleading and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. (No paragraph 34). Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 43. Matters not contained therein are rejected as a recitation of testimony. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 48. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate and/or not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12 and 15. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 16 and 17. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. - Adopted in Findings of Fact 19 and 20. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 22 and 23. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27, 28 and 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 48. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 31 and 32. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Findings of Fact 39 and 47. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 41. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 41. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38.
The Issue Should Petitioner discipline Respondent for her acts as a correctional officer in association with an inmate?
Findings Of Fact In response to requests for admissions, Respondent admitted the following: The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on July 6, 1992, and was issued correctional number 94229. Between June 1 and July 31, 1994, the Respondent was employed as a Correctional Officer with the North Florida Reception Center. On October 16, 1995, during an interview with Inspector H. McBride, the Respondent denied knowing Inmate Dean Richardson. (D) On October 16, 1995, during an interview with Inspector H. McBride, the Respondent denied knowing Toyia Kelly. E) On March 6, 1996, Respondent resigned her position at North Florida Reception Center. Between June 1, 1994 and July 31, 1994, Inmate Dean Richardson was committed to the North Florida Reception Center as a permanent inmate. In that period Respondent came in contact with Mr. Richardson in her capacity as a correctional officer and his capacity as an inmate at North Florida Reception Center. Their contacts occurred while Respondent was on duty as a correctional officer. In a conversation that took place between Respondent and Mr. Richardson in a recreation room within the prison, Respondent told Mr. Richardson that she was "having a problem moving." Mr. Richardson responded by offering to give Respondent money. At first Respondent declined the offer. A week to two weeks later after Mr. Richardson "pushed the issue," Respondent agreed to accept the money. Mr. Richardson had approached Respondent about a dozen times before Respondent was willing to accept the money. Under the terms of their arrangement, Respondent gave Mr. Richardson a post office box address to send the money and a name at that address. The name was Toyia Kelly. In furtherance of the agreement between Mr. Richardson and the Respondent, Mr. Richardson caused a $200 draft from his inmate bank fund to be sent to Toyia Kelly on June 8, 1994, at the address Respondent had provided . After Mr. Richardson sent the $200, he asked Respondent if Respondent had received the money. She answered "no." This conversation took place within the institution where Mr. Richardson was housed. When Respondent told Mr. Richardson she did not receive the $200, Mr. Richardson told Respondent that he would send more money. Mr. Richardson did send more money, but this time he sent the money to a different post office box than before. Respondent had provided Mr. Richardson the new post office box address. On June 24, 1994, Mr. Richardson withdrew $150 by draft from his inmate bank fund and paid it to the order of Toyia Kelly at the new post office box address. Mr. Richardson did not confirm with Respondent whether Respondent had received this $150 that had been paid directly to Toyia Kelly. Of his own volition Mr. Richardson determined to send an additional $150 by a draft from his inmate bank fund. Again this was paid to the order of Toyia Kelly at the second post office box address that had been provided by Respondent. This draft was made on July 11, 1994. On this occasion Mr. Richardson asked Respondent if she had received the second $150 draft. In response Respondent nodded her head in the affirmative.
Recommendation Upon consideration the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which revokes Respondent's correctional certificate number 94299. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen D. Simmons, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sandra Griffin 2852 Wayne Drive Lake City, Florida 32055 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Incorporated in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as a Conclusion of Law and not a Finding of Fact. 3-4. Incorporated in Finding of Facts 2-4. Incorporated in Finding of Facts 9-10. Incorporated in Finding of Facts 5-6. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 7. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 11. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as argument and not a Finding of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Stanley Blanding, #036207 Liz Cloud, Chief Mark Dingle, #073356 Bureau of Administrative Code William Roberts, #908378 1802 The Capitol Virgil Page, #073743 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Union Correctional Institution P. O. Box 221 Raiford, Florida 32803 William Joel Keel, #060263 Carroll Webb, Exec. Director Union Correctional Institution Administrative Procedures P. O. Box 221 Committee Raiford, Florida 32083 120 Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Julia Forrester, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louis A. Vargas, Esquire General Counsel Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louie Wainwright Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on February 11, 1983, and issued certificate number 19-82-502-08, which he still holds. For approximately the past eight years, Respondent has been employed by the Metro-Dade County Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department). During the first six years of his employment with the Department, he held the position of Correctional Officer I. His duties as a Correctional Officer I included supervising crews of inmates performing lawn maintenance work on public grounds outside the correctional facility in which they were housed. One of Respondent's supervisors was Jerry Meese, the Director of the Department's Operations Division. On September 26, 1986, while returning to his office from a lunchtime excursion, Meese observed a Department truck used to transport inmate work crews parked outside a private residence. The truck's presence in the residential area aroused Meese's suspicion. He therefore stopped to investigate. He soon discovered that Respondent and some inmates were in the area. One of the inmates was found to have some chewing gum in his possession. The inmate told Meese that Respondent had given him money to purchase the gum at a nearby store. A short walking distance from where Meese had encountered the inmate was a bag containing seven containers of beer. The containers were cold to the touch. Meese went to the store to which the inmate had referred and spoke to the store clerk. The store clerk advised Meese that the inmate, a short time before, had bought the beer that Meese had found in the bag. Meese discussed the matter with Respondent. It appeared to Meese that Respondent's speech was slurred and that his eyes were red. Upon his return to the office, Meese was provided with statements from inmates supervised by Respondent in which the inmates indicated that they had drank beer and smoked marijuana with Respondent. Shortly thereafter Meese learned that the inmates had tested positive for drugs. The Department had a policy which required a correctional officer to submit to drug testing if there existed a reasonable suspicion that the officer was involved in the illicit use of drugs. Based upon what had occurred that afternoon, Meese justifiably believed that he had grounds to invoke this policy and he therefore directed Respondent to submit to a drug test. He gave Respondent until Monday, September 29, 1986, to take the test. On September 29, 1986, prior to submitting to the test, Respondent was interviewed by Robert Sobel, an investigator with the Department's Internal Affairs Unit. Respondent freely admitted to Sobel that he "smok[ed] marijuana on a regular basis" and that he "would like to enroll in a program to overcome this problem." Later that day, at 3:10 p.m., in compliance with Meese's directive, Respondent went to the Consulab facility at the Cedars Medical Center in Miami and gave a urine specimen. The sample was screened by the use of an enzyme immunoassay testing procedure. The screening test was performed twice. On both occasions, the sample tested presumptively positive for cocaine and marijuana. The sample was then subjected to confirmatory testing. The thin layer chromatography (TLC) method was used. When performed by a competent technologist, TLC testing is accurate 95 to 99 percent of the time. The two technologists who tested Respondent's urine sample using the TLC method were highly competent. Their tests, which were completed at about 4:50 p.m., revealed the presence of cocaine metabolites 1/ and cannabinoids (marijuana). 15. The tests were accurate. Respondent had knowingly used cocaine and marijuana on or about the date of the testing. Notwithstanding the results of the testing, Respondent was not terminated by the Department. Instead, he was suspended. As a condition of continued employment, he was required to participate in a drug rehabilitation program and to remain drug-free. Respondent has met these requirements to the satisfaction of the Department. Not only has Respondent remained in the employ of the Department, he how occupies the position of corporal, a supervisory position to which he was promoted approximately two years ago. His post-September, 1986, employment record reveals that he has taken full advantage of the opportunity given him by the Department to rehabilitate himself.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order (1) finding Respondent guilty of having failed to maintain "good moral character" in violation of Section 943.1395(5), Florida Statutes, by virtue of his unlawful use of cocaine and marijuana on or about September 26, 1986; and (2) based upon such a finding, (a) suspend Respondent's certification for 30 days, (b) place Respondent on probation for a period of two years to commence upon the expiration of this 30-day suspension, and (c) include among the terms and conditions of his probation the requirements that Respondent submit to scheduled and monthly drug testing and that he agree to release the results of such testing to the Commission or its designee. DONE and ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of May 1990. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May 1990.
