The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to interest on the subject medicaid reimbursement payment and, if so, the amount of the interest to which it is entitled.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Palm Springs General Hospital, Inc. (PSGH) is a hospital operating in the State of Florida that provides Medicaid services. In a separate administrative proceeding that was initially referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), PSGH and the Health Care Cost Containment Board (HCCB) litigated the method by which PSGH's entitlement for Medicaid disproportionate share reimbursement under Chapter 88-294, Laws of Florida, for the fiscal year 1987 should be calculated. In April 1989, while the litigation between PSGH and HCCB was pending before DOAH, the PSGH and HCCB entered a written settlement agreement which settled the dispute. Consequently, DOAH's file in that matter was closed and the matter was returned to HCCB for final disposition. Respondent, Department of Rehabilitative Services (DHRS), serves as the disbursing agency for medicaid payments to medicaid providers in the State of Florida. In the pending matter, PSGH initially raised the same issues with DHRS that it had raised in its dispute with HCCB - the manner by which PSGH's medicaid reimbursement entitlement had been calculated. At the request of the parties, the dispute between PSGH and DHRS was abated until the conclusion of the litigation between PSGH and HCCB. After the dispute between PSGH and HCCB had been returned to HCCB pursuant to the settlement agreement, HCCB reneged on the settlement agreement. PSGH thereafter appealed HCCB's decision not to honor the settlement agreement. In an opinion filed May 8, 1990, Florida's Third District Court of Appeal reversed the refusal by HCCB to honor the settlement agreement and remanded the cause to HCCB for the entry of a final order adopting the settlement agreement. The Court referred to the HCCB's action in attempting to renounce its agreement as a "gross abuse of the agency's discretion" and awarded appellate attorney's fees to PSGH against HCCB. Palm Springs General Hospital, Inc., v. Health Care Cost Containment Board, et al. 560 So.2d 1348, 1350 fn. 2 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1990). During the pendency of the litigation between HCCB and PSGH, counsel for PSGH became concerned that DHRS might disburse the medicaid funds in its possession before the extent of PSGH's entitlement was determined. To avoid additional litigation, PSGH and DHRS entered into a stipulation in the pending case on June 12, 1989. That stipulation provided as follows: The parties, by and through their undersigned attorneys, hereby stipulate and agree as follows: In a related administrative proceeding, Palm Springs General Hospital, Petitioner vs. Health Care Cost Containment Board (HCCB), Respondent, Case No. 89-0633H, Palm Springs and the HCCB are litigating an issue which might be described in general terms as the number of Medicaid patient days delivered by the hospital during 1987 to be used in calculating the amount of disproportionate share reimbursement as to which the hospital may be entitled under Section 30 of Chapter 88-294, Laws of Florida. The Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services is the agency which receives from the HCCB calculations of entitlement of hospitals to the trust funds described in Chapter 88-294. HRS gives administrative direction for distribution of the trust funds. Palm Springs and other qualifying hospitals have received three of the four partial disproportionate share distributions for the trust funds described in Section 30 of Chapter 88-294. The final distribution under the program is expected to be made in early July 1989. A dispute exists between HRS and HCCB on the one hand and Palm Springs on the other hand with respect to the disproportionate share distribution to which Palm Springs is entitled. The initial calculations made by HRS and the HCCB show that Palm Springs is entitled to a disproportionate share distri- bution of $201,366. Palm Springs has challenged this in the administrative proceeding set forth in paragraph 1 and in the captioned proceeding. Palm Springs claims that it is entitled to a dispropor- tionate share distribution of approximately $530,000, rather than the $201,366 presently calculated by the HCCB. As the disbursing agency, HRS agrees to retain in the trust fund sufficient monies to pay the full claim of Palm Springs General Hospital until completion of all litigation relating to the amount of the distribution to which Palm Springs is entitled. The purpose of entering into this stipu- lation is to eliminate any need for Palm Springs to file a court action seeking an injunction to assure availability of the disproportionate share distribution to which the hospital claims it is entitled, should it ultimately prevail on the issue. The parties enter into this stipulation to avoid litigation. It is not the purpose of the stipulation to prejudice or aid the position of either of the parties in connec- tion with the amount of money to which the hospital is entitled under the dispropor- tionate share program. The fact that HRS has agreed to retain the claimed money in trust in no fashion is an admission by HRS or the HCCB that Palm Springs is entitled to this money. There were no other written documents reflecting the agreement of counsel, other than the foregoing stipulation, and the stipulation was not modified by the parties. At the formal hearing, the parties agreed that the reference to "trust funds" or to maintaining the money "in trust" referred to the public medical assistance trust fund that is referred to in Chapter 88-294, Laws of Florida, and not to a separately established trust by which DHRS would hold the disputed funds. Consultec, Inc. is the Medicaid fiscal agent contractor for the State of Florida. It maintains an interest bearing bank account at Barnett Bank of Tallahassee in which it deposits sums entrusted to it by DHRS and from which it issues checks to Medicaid providers after the entitlement of each provider has been determined and appropriately processed. On July 20, 1989, Consultec, Inc. wrote check number 103077 made payable to PSGH in the amount of $391,028.50. Consultec, Inc. deposited into the Barnett Bank account the sum of $19,458,498.75 to cover checks written to Medicaid providers on July 20, 1989. Included in this deposit were the funds necessary to pay check number 103077. Had it not been for the dispute between PSGH and HCCB, check number 103077 would have been routinely delivered to PSGH. However, because of the dispute between PSGH and HCCB, check number 103077 was intercepted by DHRS. At the instruction of DHRS, check number 103077 was voided and two separate checks, both made payable to PSGH, were drafted by Consultec, Inc. The first check, in the amount of $48,684.50 was delivered to PSGH. The second check, in the amount of $342,345, represented the amount that was in dispute between PSGH and HCCB. The second check was held pending resolution of the dispute between PSGH and HCCB, and the funds necessary to cover that check remained in the Barnett Bank account between July 21, 1989, and June 21, 1990. This procedure was followed by DHRS to ensure that the disputed funds would be available for distribution consistent with its stipulation with PSGH dated June 12, 1989. After being advised by PSGH of the resolution of its dispute with HCCB by the Third District Court of Appeal, DHRS instructed Consultec, Inc. to remit to PSGH the sum of $342,345. On June 21, 1990, the sum of $342,345 was paid to PSGH. The Consultec, Inc. account at the Barnett Bank drew interest between July 21, 1989, and June 21, 1990, at the average daily rate of 7 1/4%. After the payment to PSGH of $342,345 on June 21, 1990, PSGH demanded, for the first time, interest on that sum. The appellate opinion that resolved the related litigation between PSGH and HCCB did not speak to the issue of whether PSGH was entitled to interest on the disputed funds. There was no evidence that the settlement agreement between HCCB and PSGH addressed that issue. The pleadings in the pending matter did not address the issue of interest until PSGH's "Motion to Compel HRS to Pay Interest" was filed on July 6, 1990. The stipulation between PSGH and DHRS dated June 12, 1989, resulted in the sum of $342,345 being held in the Consultec, Inc. account at the Barnett Bank and drawing interest between July 21, 1989 and June 21, 1990. However, the stipulation did not provide for the disposition of any interest that might be earned pending the resolution of the HCCB litigation and the stipulation was not intended to create an express or implied trust.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which dismisses the above-styled proceeding. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of January, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-2178 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-13 and 18 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 14-17 and 19-21 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-3, 5-7A, 8, 10-12 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 4 and 7B are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact which precede the semicolon in paragraph 9 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact subsequent to the semicolon in paragraph 9 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 13 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Siegel, Esquire Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. 1125 Alfred I. DuPont Building Miami, Florida 33131 Karen Baarslag, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building Six, Room 230 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Linda K. Harris, Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent engaged in sexual misconduct in the practice of medicine, in violation of section 458.331(1)(j), Florida Statutes; and, if so, what is the appropriate sanction.
Findings Of Fact The Department and Board of Medicine are charged with regulating the practice of medicine in the State of Florida, pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Dr. Pena-Sanchez is licensed to practice medicine in areas of critical need within the State of Florida, having been issued license number ACN 232. Dr. Pena-Sanchez went to medical school in Colombia, was first licensed in Puerto Rico, and has been licensed to practice medicine in Florida in areas of critical need since 2006. Dr. Pena-Sanchez is subject to the jurisdiction of the Board of Medicine. He worked for the Florida Department of Corrections in a St. Lucie Health Clinic from 2008 to 2010, and in a clinic in Okeechobee until June of 2012, when he joined FoundCare, a federally qualified health center, in West Palm Beach. In August of 2013, FoundCare instituted a Medical Provider Chaperone Policy. The policy provided, among other things, that any clinical provider conducting a physical examination of a patient of the opposite sex had to have a chaperone present during the exam and that the medical assistant had to be present until the physical examination was complete. Dr. Bonaparte, Dr. Pena-Sanchez's supervising physician, counseled him on the policy. Over a period of approximately five years, Patient H.P.-B., a 47-year-old female, saw Dr. Pena-Sanchez for treatment at FoundCare. In early 2017, FoundCare issued a standing order to staff requiring routine testing for HIV and hepatitis C under Center for Disease Control guidelines in order to comply with the terms of a focus grant FoundCare had received through the Gilead Foundation. On April 24, 2017, Patient H.P.-B. presented at FoundCare for a well-woman examination, including a PAP smear and other routine testing for laboratory analysis. Patient H.P.-B. had specifically requested that Dr. Pena-Sanchez conduct these tests, even though usual FoundCare practice was to have a female doctor conduct them. She testified that she requested him because he had been her doctor for several years, she believed he was a good doctor, and she trusted him. Dr. Pena-Sanchez conducted the tests in the presence of Ms. Yvette Ortiz, his medical assistant. Patient H.P.-B. was scheduled for a follow-up appointment a few weeks later. On or about May 15, 2017, Patient H.P.-B. presented to Dr. Pena-Sanchez at a scheduled appointment to discuss the blood work and procedure results. Ms. Ortiz checked H.P.-B.'s vital signs and then left the room. Then Dr. Pena-Sanchez came in and informed Patient H.P.-B. of the test results, telling her first that she was not HIV positive. This upset her, because she had not specifically authorized that test and believed Dr. Pena- Sanchez had no authority to conduct it. No one had informed Patient H.P.-B. that FoundCare had implemented the new policy requiring AIDS/HIV testing as part of a well-woman examination. During the appointment, Patient H.P.-B. informed Dr. Pena-Sanchez that she had pain in her side and requested that he examine the area. Patient H.P.-B. testified that at first, Dr. Pena-Sanchez did not respond and she had to ask him several times what he was going to do about her pain. Dr. Pena-Sanchez, sitting on a stool, then asked Patient H.P.-B. to stand in front of him and indicate the location of the pain. Patient H.P.-B. stood in front of Dr. Pena-Sanchez and indicated her side. Patient H.P.-B. testified that she was facing away from Dr. Pena-Sanchez, as he had directed, when he reached up and grabbed her above the hips on each side and pulled her down to sit on his lap. She testified that he began rubbing her back and that she tried to get up, but he pulled her back down. She said he then moved his hands around and started to rub her breasts, so she spanked his hands, jumped up, and asked him where the nurse was. She said that she then went back to sit in her chair. She testified that he came over to her, unzipped his pants, pulled out his penis, and told her that she was going to have sex with him or give him oral sex. She said that she told him no, but that Dr. Pena-Sanchez took her hand, made her touch his penis, and asked her if his penis was big enough, or something similar. She said she clearly saw the color of his boxers, which were navy blue with white, black, and red or maroon colored designs. She testified that she asked for his phone number twice, wanting to later call his wife, but he would not give it to her. She testified he then suddenly stopped his behavior, went back to his chair, and acted as if nothing had happened, saying he was going to order refills on her prescriptions. Patient H.P.-B. testified that she left without reporting the incident to anyone at FoundCare, but called her sister and told her what had happened as soon as she got to her car. She said she went to her job as a home health care aide, where the wife of her patient told her she needed to report the incident to the Palm Beach County Division of Victim Services hotline, which she did the next morning. She reported the incident to Detective Carpentier at the Palm Springs Police Department that same day, but did not write a statement, preferring to be recorded. About a week later, she returned to the police station to provide a sworn taped statement to Detectives Milow and Hudson. She was referred by the police for counseling and began talking with Ms. Gonzalez, a therapist at the Palm Beach County Division of Victim Services, on June 15, 2017. After the Palm Springs Police Department found no probable cause for criminal charges, Patient H.P.-B. contacted a civil attorney, who later sent a letter to FoundCare asking them to preserve evidence. She filed a written statement with the Department on September 1, 2017, and was interviewed later that month by Investigator Cox. When Patient H.P.-B. told her story to these various people, she was not always consistent.1/ It is not easy to communicate with Patient H.P.-B. Even during the final hearing, questions addressed to her needed to be repeated and answers she gave were sometimes unclear. Some inconsistencies involved minor details, others more substantial points. Patient H.P.-B. was clearly confused as to some of the details about which she was absolutely adamant at hearing, including the date of her examination prior to the lab tests. Detective Milow recorded that she told him that the appointment was the week of May 8. She repeatedly insisted at hearing that the date was May 2. FoundCare records indicate that it was in fact on April 24. While a mistake as to the date something occurred is not in itself either unusual or significant, her unshakeable conviction on the point detracts from the weight that her own confidence might otherwise have given to other portions of her testimony about which she was equally certain. After Patient H.P.-B.'s initial telephone call to the hotline and counseling service a day after the examination, Ms. Earlene Boone wrote that Patient H.P.-B. reported that she had asked Dr. Pena-Sanchez to examine her left side. Detective Milow's report also said she had experienced pain on her left side. Investigator Cox wrote in his report that she told Dr. Pena-Sanchez that the pain was on her right side. In her testimony at hearing, she was absolutely sure that the pain was on her right side and that she never told Ms. Boone or anyone else otherwise. In her initial intake assessment for counseling, Patient H.P.-B. told Ms. Gonzalez that Dr. Pena-Sanchez "pulled down his pants" and then pulled out his penis. At hearing, she testified that he unzipped his pants to pull out his penis. Patient H.P.-B. told Detective Milow that she could not get the incident out of her mind and kept seeing his boxers and his penis, and told Ms. Gonzalez that she kept having "visions" of his penis and boxers. Later, however, she could not tell Investigator Cox if Dr. Pena-Sanchez was circumcised or not, saying, "I didn't see it [his penis] that good." Patient H.P.-B. told Ms. Gonzalez that when the incident was over, Dr. Pena-Sanchez said, "I'm done with you," and that a nurse walked in and that is when Dr. Pena-Sanchez suddenly acted like nothing had happened. But Patient H.P.-B. never again said that anyone came into the room in her report to Detective Milow or at hearing. Ms. Ortiz testified that she did not go back into the room. Patient H.P.-B. told Investigator Cox that after the assault, "I ran out of the room." However, she testified at hearing that she stayed in the room after the assault because she wanted to make sure Dr. Pena-Sanchez was going to send her prescriptions. Patient H.P.-B. testified that she did not see anyone when she left the room and that she was crying. She reiterated later in her testimony that "tears was rolling." Ms. Ortiz testified that when Patient H.P.-B. left, she saw her in the hallway, that they made eye contact, and that Patient H.P.-B. was not crying and did not seem upset. Patient H.P.-B. told Detective Milow on May 25, 2017, ten days after the appointment, "When I left there I went to the pharmacy" to pick up her medications, including the pain pills, but the pharmacy informed her that no pain pills had been prescribed. Later, at hearing, Patient H.P.-B. testified that when she left FoundCare, she immediately called her sister. She testified that after that, she went to work and picked up the prescriptions the following day or the day after. Although Patient H.P.-B. was consistent in her allegations that Dr. Pena-Sanchez groped her, exposed himself, and demanded sex from her, these many discrepancies in Patient H.P.-B.'s testimony as to the details and timing of the surrounding events raise troublesome questions as to her testimony. While it may be only that Patient H.P.-B. was confused or no longer remembered the exact course of events, the lack of precision in her accounts significantly detracts from the weight of the evidence. Dr. Pena-Sanchez testified that before the date of the incident, Patient H.P.-B. had flirted with him and made him uncomfortable. He said that he told his assistant, Ms. Ortiz, about this and asked her to always be present when he was seeing Patient H.P.-B. He stated that Patient H.P.-B. had specifically requested he perform the PAP smear. He testified that on May 15, 2017, he gave Patient H.P.-B. the test results and that she complained of pain. He testified he did rub her back through her clothing for diagnostic purposes, but never touched her breasts. He said that she was standing the entire time and he never pulled her onto his lap. He said she asked for his cell phone number, but he would not give it to her. He denied ever exposing himself, asking her for sex, or making her touch his penis. He testified that he did not own any boxer shorts that were navy blue with black and white and red or maroon colored designs. He completely denied that he ever acted unprofessionally. The testimony of Dr. Pena-Sanchez was difficult to understand at times because he is not fluent in English. His testimony did not hold together well, and he was not completely credible. There were inconsistencies between the records of his interview by Detective Milow, his deposition testimony, and his testimony at hearing. One thread in the testimony of Dr. Pena-Sanchez involved flirtatious behavior on the part of Patient H.P.-B. In his interview with Detective Milow, and at hearing, Dr. Pena- Sanchez said that Patient H.P.-B. had been acting "in a sexual attitude" towards him prior to the laboratory tests appointment and that this made him uncomfortable. He testified that he told Ms. Ortiz about this and directed her always to be present whenever he was with Patient H.P.-B. Yet Ms. Ortiz had only the vaguest recollection of anything like this, and it is undisputed that Ms. Ortiz was not in the room during the results appointment. It seems curious, if Dr. Pena-Sanchez was concerned enough about this flirtation to identify Patient H.P.-B. to Ms. Ortiz and direct that she not leave them alone together, that when later asked by Detective Hudson, he initially claimed he did not even recognize Patient H.P.-B.'s name. After seeing Patient H.P.-B.'s picture, he described the results appointment in detail. He told Detective Milow that she was laughing and flirting with him when she asked for his phone number at the results appointment. Yet at hearing, he testified that she was not flirting with him at that time. While Dr. Pena-Sanchez maintained that he was completely professional throughout the results appointment, his testimony as to certain details varied. He indicated at one point that he was sitting on the stool during the examination, and, at another point, that he was standing when he examined Patient H.P.-B. At hearing (perhaps, as Petitioner suggests, aware of his prior statements), he testified he was both sitting and standing during the examination. At one point during the hearing, he testified that Patient H.P.-B. never lifted her shirt during the appointment, and said that if she had done so, he would have had to bring in a medical assistant, while later he indicated she did lift up her shirt, but that he palpated the area only through her clothing: "She lift, but I didn't – when – look -- and then go down and I touch over her -– the clothes." He testified consistently that he owned no paisley underwear, but indicated at one point that he had only gray and black, while at another point that he owned only gray and blue. Ms. Vasquez also testified that her husband owned only black and gray boxers. However, she fails to provide the impartial, independent perspective that sometimes serves to corroborate one side or the other between two completely irreconcilable versions of events. In the end, the color of the underwear simply becomes another parallel, but peripheral, dispute of fact between the parties, and provides no basis for resolution. There is no evidence that Dr. Pena-Sanchez has ever had discipline imposed on him in connection with his professional license in Florida or any other state. Revocation or suspension of Dr. Pena-Sanchez's professional license would have a great effect upon his livelihood.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Health, Board of Medicine, enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Dr. Orly Pena-Sanchez. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 2018.
The Issue The issues for resolution, as provided in an Order Finding Probable Cause dated March 11, 1992, are whether Respondent, as a member of the State Board of Acupuncture: violated section 112.313(7)(a), F.S., by having an employment or contractual relationship with The Healing Center which created a continuing or frequently recurring conflict between his private interest and the performance of his public duties; and violated section 112.3143(2), F.S. by voting on a measure which inured to his or his wife's special private gain without disclosing the nature of his interest in the matter.
Findings Of Fact Harvey Kaltsas served on the Board of Acupuncture from February, 1987 through April 3, 1991. As a member of the Board of Acupuncture, his duties included regulation of the practice of acupuncture, and the promulgation of rules to implement Chapters 455, 457, and 120, Florida Statutes. Mr. Kaltsas has been a licensed acupuncturist in the State of Florida since 1984, and was registered as an apprentice prior to licensure. Since 1989, Harvey Kaltsas has been married to Cynthia O'Donnell, who is the sole officer and shareholder of a business, The Healing Center, Inc., which was incorporated in April of 1989. In addition to providing other health services, The Healing Center, Inc. has sold sterile, disposable acupuncture needles since October, 1990. Gross sales of needles have averaged one to two thousand dollars per month from October 1990 until the present. Harvey Kaltsas was not and is not a shareholder or stockholder in The Healing Center, Inc. Harvey Kaltsas has had no interest in The Healing Center, Inc. At all times pertinent to the complaints at issue, The Healing Center, Inc. was located at 430 North Tamiami Trail, Suite C, Sarasota, Florida 34236. The lease for such property remained in the name of Harvey Kaltsas during this period. Although Harvey Kaltsas was ultimately responsible for lease payments on the property, lease payments were made by The Healing Center, Inc. to the landlord. Harvey Kaltsas, as well as other tenants of the property, paid rent to The Healing Center, Inc. The utilities account for the leased property was in the name of Harvey Kaltsas. Although he was ultimately responsible for utilities payments, such payments were made by The Healing Center, Inc. From April, 1989 through December 1990, Harvey Kaltsas was both a tenant of and an independent contractor with The Healing Center, Inc. As a tenant, Mr. Kaltsas paid rent of approximately $300.00 per month to The Healing Center, Inc. As an independent contractor, Mr. Kaltsas performed thermographic examinations on several patients of The Healing Center, Inc. These services were performed from time to time on an ad hoc basis. For these services, Mr. Kaltsas received $3625.00. No contract existed between Mr. Kaltsas and the Healing Center, Inc., regarding performance of these services. Other individuals provided similar thermographic services. On January 1, 1991, Harvey Kaltsas became a salaried employee of The Healing Center, Inc. At the time he vacated his seat on the Board of Acupuncture in April 1991, he was still a salaried employee of The Healing Center, Inc. On December 14, 1990, Harvey Kaltsas moved for consideration of, and voted for, an amendment to Rule 21AA-8.002, Florida Administrative Code, which would have required all licensed acupuncturists in the State of Florida to use only sterile, disposable acupuncture needles. The matter had been raised in an earlier meeting of the board by Luis Celpa, another acupuncturist member. The proposed amendment to Rule 21AA-8.002, Florida Administrative Code, was noticed and published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on February 15, 1991 (Vol. 17, No. 7, p.645). The proposed amendment deleted existing language with regard to sterilization procedures and substituted language requiring disposable needles for one-time use only. The proposed ruled was subsequently withdrawn by the Board of Acupuncture and never became effective. The Joint Administrative Procedures Committee challenged the authority for the rule since Chapter 457, F.S. provides for resterilization of needles. Prior to voting on the measure to amend Rule 21AA-8.002, Florida Administrative Code, Mr. Kaltsas did not disclose to the Board of Acupuncture his interests in or relationship with The Healing Center, Inc. On or about March 7, 1991, The Healing Center, Inc. mailed a letter signed by Cynthia O'Donnell-Kaltsas to licensed Florida acupuncturists advising them of the proposed rule change requiring the use of sterile, disposable needles and offering such needles for sale at a discounted price. Ms. O'Donnell was aware of the board's action, and the letter was mailed after publication of the proposed rule change in The Florida Administrative Weekly. After the rule was withdrawn Ms. O'Donnell sent a follow up letter stating that the rule did not go through and apologizing for any misinformation. Even though she does not use the husband's name, Ms. O'Donnell signed the letters, "O'Donnell-Kaltsas", as her husband had been president of the Florida Acupuncture Association and she was raising money for the association with a 2 percent contribution from needle sales. There are a significant number of potential vendors offering sterile, disposable needles for sale to Florida practitioners of acupuncture. There are a minimum of at least fifteen such vendors in Florida, as well as a minimum of eleven practitioners who sell needles. In addition, Chinese practitioners have direct access to needle suppliers in China from whom they can purchase needles. Florida practitioners receive solicitations from needle vendors across the country and from needle vendors located in Canada, England, Taiwan and Hong Kong. There are no barriers to interstate sale and shipment of needles into the State of Florida by any company or person. The Board of Acupuncture does not regulate the sellers of acupuncture needles. No barriers to entering this market have been established by the Board of Acupuncture. The Board does not license persons or entities which sell needles, nor does it inspect facilities of such persons or entities. The Board does not regulate the types of needles which can be sold, nor does it subject sellers of needles to any kind of disciplinary action. For all intents and purposes, Mr. Kaltsas and his wife maintain separate financial identities. They maintain separate bank accounts, with the exception of a $30.00 credit union account. They do not have signing privileges on each other's banking accounts. In business transactions involving The Healing Center, Inc., Mr. Kaltsas did not receive any special consideration with respect to the amount of rent or with respect to making of rent payments. Although the couple resides in a house owned by Ms. O'Donnell, Harvey Kaltsas makes payments to her to offset the household expenses. There is no evidence that the vote of December 14, 1990 regarding the proposed attachment to Rule 21AA-8.002, Florida Administrative Code, inured to the special private gain of Mr. Kaltsas or to the special private gain of Cynthia O'Donnell. There is no evidence that any matter came before the Board of Acupuncture on a continuing or frequently recurring basis which created a conflict between Mr. Kaltsas' private interests and the performance of his public duties. The sterile, disposable needle rule was formally addressed on two occasions while Mr. Kaltsas was on the Board; it was approved by the Board on December 14, 1990; and it was subsequently withdrawn by the Board on April 3, 1991. Most acupuncturists use disposable needles already. The low cost of such needles compared to the cost of effective sterilization created a legitimate concern for the safety and welfare of the needle handlers and their patients. This concern, rather than any private interest or benefit motivated Harvey Kaltsas' action as a board member.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Commission on Ethics enter its final order and public report finding that Harvey Kaltsas did not violate Sections 112.3143(2), Florida Statutes (1989) and 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes, as alleged, and dismissing the complaints. DONE AND ORDERED this 31st day of August, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1993.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Ernesto Sinda Colina, M.D., violated Section 458.33(1)(t) and (v), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license to practice medicine.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Ernesto Sinda Colina, M.D. (Respondent), is and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued License No. ME-0031020. Respondent's last known address is 4002 West Thonotosassa Road, Plant City, Florida 33565-8593. On or about December 1, 1993, Patient E.C., a 61-year- old male, presented to the Orlando Vascular Clinic (Clinic) for evaluation of impotence. Respondent was the physician at the Clinic who treated Patient E.C. The evaluation included three visits, beginning with laboratory studies, physical examination, and concluding on December 7, 1993, with the injection of Prostaglandin E-1 into the corpora of Patient E.C.'s penis by order of Respondent. The injection of Prostaglandin E-1 produced an immediate erection which did not subside and became painful. On December 9, 1993, Patient E.C. contacted the Clinic complaining of an erection and discomfort and was advised to take Ibuprofen and pack the penis in ice. However, the rigidity persisted. Later on December 9, 1993, Patient E.C. presented to the South Seminole Hospital Emergency Room for further evaluation of a priapism (persistent erection of the penis, accompanied by pain and tenderness, resulting from a pathologic condition rather than sexual desire) of approximately 56 hours' duration. On December 9, 1993, Patient E.C. was seen by Elias Jacobo, M.D., who irrigated Patient E.C.'s corpora with normal saline and Heparin, evacuating old clots under sterile conditions and with antibiotic coverage. On December 10, 1993, Patient E.C. was re-evaluated because the priapism was continuing. On January 17, 1994, Patient E.C. returned to Dr. Jacobo due to recurrence of the priapism with tenderness and evidence of infection. That same day Patient E.C. was admitted to South Seminole Hospital (hospital) in Longwood, Florida. After Patient E.C.'s admission to the hospital, he was taken to the operating room where his corpora was drained, explored, and irrigated with alpha agonist ephedrine. The surgical procedure was performed by Dr. Jacobo. Patient E.C. was seen in consultation by an infectious disease specialist and maintained on antibiotics. The diagnosis was corporitis, which gradually resolved with proper drainage and antibiotic therapy. An injection of Prostaglandin E-1 may be used for the treatment of impotence. However, once the injection is given, the physician should monitor the patient's progress to determine what degree of rigidity is achieved over a given period of time and then make dosage adjustments. Moreover, the patient should be advised of the potential complications of procedures, such as priapism and infection. Finally, the patient should be instructed to return for an evaluation if the rigidity persists longer than four to six hours. Respondent failed to inform Patient E.C. of the risks of iatrogenic priapism, and failed to instruct Patient E.C. to return for immediate evaluation within four to six hours of persistent rigidity. Ibuprofen has no effect on reversing the effects of the Prostaglandin E-1. Recommending Ibuprofen and ice packs is inadequate treatment and is below that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances in the treatment of Patient E.C. The management of impotence with pharmacologic erection programs with injectible agents should be performed by or under the supervision of a specialist trained in the treatment of impotence, such as urology. Respondent had no such specialized training and the treatment of Patient E.C. without training was below the standard of care. Patient E.C. suffered permanent damage as a result of Respondent's treatment, which fell below the standard of care.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Kristy M. Johnson, Esquire Department of Health Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Ernesto Sinda Colina, M.D. 4002 West Thonotosassa Road Plant City, Florida 33565-8593 Tanya Williams, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast BIN A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William Large, General Counsel Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast BIN A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issues in this case, as set forth in the Prehearing Stipulation, are as follows: Whether Respondent was terminated from the State Medicaid Program; [Case No. 14-2488, Count I] Whether Respondent failed to update his practitioner profile within fifteen days of the filing of the order terminating him from the State Medicaid Program; [Case No. 14-2488, Count II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with T.J.[1/] for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with T.J.; [Case No. 14-1342, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with M.B. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with M.B.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with C.J. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with C.J.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with D.K. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with D.K.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with A.H. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with A.H.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] and Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with S.D. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with S.D. [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II]
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Medicine (the “Department”) is the State agency responsible for licensing and monitoring physicians in the State of Florida. The Department regulates the practice of medicine in accordance with section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Unless specifically stated otherwise herein, all references to Florida Statutes will be to the 2014 codification. Respondent is a licensed Florida physician, certified in the area of pain management, holding license number ME 97134. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was practicing medicine at one of two locations: the Back Authority for Contemporary Knowledge, (a pain management clinic known as the “Back Center” located in Melbourne, Florida); and Advantacare (in its Altamonte Springs and Daytona Beach offices). Respondent was employed at the Back Center from January 2008 through September 2011, and at Advantacare from March 2012 through April 2013. Respondent provided pain management services for numerous patients during his tenure at each of the clinics. While at the Back Center, he saw 50 to 60 patients per day in an 8-hour workday, doing about 15 medication injections per day. At Advantacare he was seeing about 30 patients per day. By all accounts, Respondent is a skilled and proficient pain management physician. At Advantacare, Respondent would see patients for regular office visits at the Altamonte Springs office on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday; Wednesday would be set aside for administering injections under a fluoroscope, described as sort of a C-shaped X-ray machine, performed at the Daytona Beach office. None of the sexual behavior alleged in the Administrative Complaints occurred during injections performed under fluoroscope. A general policy existed at the Back Center that required physicians to have another facility employee (medical technician, nurse, other) present in an examination room when a physician was providing care to a patient not of the same gender as the doctor. This “chaperone” policy is standard in the health care industry. There is no credible evidence that Respondent was ever shown the Back Center’s policy in writing, although it is probable the policy was accessible on the website of the entity (Osler Corporation) that owned the Back Center for a period of time. As a practicing physician, Respondent was also presumed to be aware of and to follow the chaperone policy and he admitted knowing about the policy in general. Respondent was, however, verbally apprised of the policy by his supervisor, Dr. Hynes, by the clinic operations manager, Mr. Pachkoski, and by the chief administrative officer, Cathy Bird. Respondent acknowledged that it was best to have another person in the examination room if he was providing treatment to a female patient. If no chaperone was available, it was his stated practice to keep the door open. Respondent did not feel like assistants were always available to chaperone, but neither his supervisor (Dr. Hynes) nor a co-physician (Dr. Zaidi) remembers Respondent complaining that staff was not available at the Back Center. The testimony of all six complainants in this case contradicts Respondent’s contention; each of them said they were treated by Respondent (alone) in a room with the door closed. When asked directly whether he ever treated female patients at the Back Center in a room with the door closed, Respondent admitted that it happened on occasion. The best and most persuasive evidence in this case is that a chaperone policy did exist and that Respondent did not follow the policy. Between September 2008 and January 2013, Respondent treated six female patients who are the subjects of the Department’s Administrative Complaint. Each of the patients is identified only by their initials in an attempt to maintain their confidentiality and privacy. The six patients will be addressed in chronological order based on the dates of their alleged mistreatment by Respondent. Patient S.D. Patient S.D. was a patient of Respondent between September and December 2008. S.D.’s status as a patient was stipulated to by the parties.2/ While she was Respondent’s patient, S.D. was also an employee of the Back Center. During the period of time Respondent was treating S.D., they engaged in a series of emails which could be construed as very sexual in nature. For example, on September 23, 2008, Respondent and S.D. had the following email exchange: S.D. – “You buying Dinner….Or am I your [f***ing] dinner????”Respondent – “What do you think? I want u as breakfast, lunch and dinner. My precious love.” S.D. – Ok so what am I going to eat LOL??? Let me guess a protein shake”Respondent – “If I shake it hard enough yes.” Then, on September 25, the two had this email exchange:Respondent – “NO I WANT U TO FEED ME!!! AND NO YOU R NOT GOING THERE!!! ABSOLUTELY NOT!!! I’M UR MAN AND I SAY NO.”S.D. – “Then act like it and stop flirting with the [f***ing] skank!”Respondent – “WHY? GETTING JEALOUS SWEETHEART?”S.D. - “No I guess I have no reason to be.” Respondent – “EXACTLY, YOU HAD ME AT LUNCH AND LEFT TO GO TO WORK. SO YOU CAN’T SAY ANYTHING, PRECIOUS.” Respondent denies that the exchange of emails with S.D. suggests anything of a sexual nature. He said, e.g., that in his Iranian culture, talking about eating someone was tantamount to saying you cared deeply for them. Respondent’s denial of the sexual nature of the emails is not persuasive. S.D. did not testify at final hearing nor was her testimony preserved by way of a deposition transcript. The Department offered into evidence an exhibit comprised of various emails between S.D. and Respondent, two of which were discussed above. At least one co-worker, Lizamar Korfhage (a physician’s assistant at the Back Center), heard S.D. yell loudly in the office--as S.D. was being terminated from employment--that she (S.D.) and Respondent were having sexual relations. Cathy Bird, former chief administrative officer at the Back Center, had discussed the alleged affair with S.D. during several conversations before S.D.'s employment with the Back Center ended. Bird also talked with Respondent about the situation after S.D. was fired from the Back Center. Respondent was concerned that S.D. would tell Respondent’s wife about the affair and sought Bird’s guidance in the matter. Based upon the entirety of the clear and convincing evidence presented, Respondent was involved in a sexual relationship with S.D. at some point in time when S.D. was also a patient of the Back Center. Patient T.J. Patient T.J. was a 37-year-old patient when she saw Respondent at the Back Center on October 29, 2010. T.J. had seen Respondent professionally some 16 or so times previously. No inappropriate conduct had occurred on any of those visits. On the October 29 visit, T.J. was escorted into an examination room by a nurse as usual. Respondent came in and, after examining her, suggested that trigger point injections might help alleviate her pain, which she described as being a “2” on a scale of 1 to 10.3/ She agreed to the plan of treatment. Respondent had T.J. sit on an armless stool and lean her arms and head onto a desk. Respondent stood on her left side and began administering injections into her neck. As he leaned against her body, T.J. felt what she described as Respondent’s erect penis rubbing on her upper arm or shoulder. She felt like Respondent was intentionally rubbing her in what she later concluded to be a sexual manner. When he finished the injections, Respondent did not act any differently than usual. T.J. felt like something “weird” had just happened, but decided not to report it because she was not completely sure about her perceptions. Respondent, in contradiction to T.J.’s testimony, said he generally stayed four to five inches away from his patient when administering the injections, but would sometimes come into contact with them. T.J. returned for a follow up visit on November 24, 2010, receiving another injection by Respondent. She reported no misconduct by Respondent on that date. On December 23, 2010, T.J. returned to the Back Center for additional treatment. This time, her pain was radiating all the way down to her buttocks area and was described as a “3” out of 10. She was again escorted to an examination room to wait for Respondent. Respondent came in and closed the door, as was his usual practice during T.J.’s visits. After examining her, Respondent suggested injections for sacroiliac joint pain. T.J. was told to lie on the examination table on her left side. Respondent had T.J. lower her jeans to just below her knees. She had her left leg out straight and her right leg bent at the knee and across her left leg. Respondent then began to press his fingers on different parts of her inner thigh searching for the source of her pain. The pain was centered between her knee and buttocks area, and Respondent made an injection in that area. Respondent then had T.J. roll over to her right side as he pulled the table slightly away from the wall and placed himself between the wall and the table. Respondent began pushing on her inner thigh again, starting at her knee and moving upward toward her buttocks. As he did that, his tone of voice changed and he began panting. He continued to touch and probe her thighs as his hands went higher until he ultimately touched her vagina. T.J. immediately said, “That’s it” and quickly got off the examination table and pulled up her jeans. Respondent appeared sweaty and red-faced, looking to T.J. like a person who had just engaged in sex. T.J. then began to consider whether Respondent’s behavior during the October 29, 2010, visit had indeed been sexual in nature as well. She concluded that it was, and decided not to see Respondent for treatment in the future. She did not, however, report either of the incidents to the Back Center immediately. She ultimately did so, telling physician's assistant Korfhage about the incident some 10 months later. After seeing a report on television in 2013 that Respondent had been accused by another patient of sexual misconduct, she decided to make a report to the police about her own experiences with Respondent. When the police did not prosecute, she contacted an attorney in order to file a civil action against Respondent. T.J. appeared to be honest and forthright during her appearance at final hearing. Her testimony about her version of the events was credible, clear, and convincing. In his testimony at final hearing, Respondent did not specifically refute T.J.’s testimony so much as he explained how his normal process would not allow for the kind of touching T.J. alleged to have occurred. Respondent did not specifically or directly deny touching patient T.J.’s vagina, saying only that there would be no reason to do so. Patient D.K. (also known as D.W.) D.K. was a regular patient of Respondent and the Back Center. She had an appointment on January 13, 2011, to see Respondent for pain she was experiencing in her lower back and sides. On previous visits to the Back Center, Respondent had done localized injections to help D.K. deal with the pain. On those visits, she had simply rolled her pants down below her waist and leaned against the examination table in order for Respondent to do the injections. On the January 13 visit, she was told to lie on the table and pull her jeans down to her knees while Respondent went to prepare the medications. Respondent returned, closing the door as he came into the room. Respondent began injecting medications into her back and both sides. He then moved lower and administered injections into her thighs although she had not complained about any pain in that area. Respondent then moved her jeans down to her ankles and began administering injections into her calves. While he was injecting her, she felt him rubbing his erect penis against her thighs and heard his breathing get heavier. She could also feel Respondent lean closer to her and felt his breath on her thighs as he injected her calves. After the injections were complete, D.K. said Respondent was sweating, flushed, and “looked like my husband after we’ve had intercourse.” D.K. left the office and returned to her car. She immediately began to mentally process what had occurred to her, but did not immediately tell anyone at the Back Center. She was shocked and upset by the event but waited a few days before telling her husband what had happened. She then reported the events to someone at the Back Center. The Back Center asked her to come in so she could discuss the situation with Dr. Hynes, medical director of the Back Center. Later, D.K. made a complaint to local law enforcement about the incident. D.K. has also contacted an attorney to look into filing a civil lawsuit against Respondent. In response to the complaint by D.K., Dr. Hynes mandated that Respondent have a medical assistant with him during any contact with female patients. Despite the prohibition, Respondent continued to see female patients in an examination room without others present. He was confronted several times by the site operations manager about this violation, but Respondent did not change his behavior. D.K. was a credible witness. She provided a clear and unequivocal description of what transpired during her visit to the Back Center on January 13, 2011. Patient C.J. Patient C.J. presented to the Back Center experiencing pain as a result of shrapnel wounds received while she was serving in the U.S. Army in Afghanistan. C.J. did not testify at final hearing so her physical demeanor could not be assessed. Her deposition transcript was admitted into evidence over objection. In May 2011, C.J. was referred to the Back Center by her treating physician at Patrick Air Force Base. She took the referral, called the Back Center, and was assigned to Respondent for pain management services. C.J. went to the Back Center on May 4, 2011. She was experiencing significant pain and was physically uncomfortable. C.J. was processed in by a receptionist and then led to an examination room by a female employee. The employee took C.J.’s blood pressure, gathered some personal information, and left the room. On that date, C.J. was wearing jeans, a blouse, and open- toed shoes. She had on “full underwear” that day. Respondent came into the room and examined C.J. as she sat on the examining table. He advised C.J. that an injection might benefit her. As C.J. remembered it, the injection was to be in the side of her neck, and then in her back or hip. Respondent left the room to obtain the medications as C.J. waited. Upon his return to the room, Respondent injected Depo- Medrol 40 mg, Toradol 30 mg, Lidocaine 2% 0.5 mL, and Marcaine 0.5 mL into the left side of her neck. After the initial injection, Respondent left the room while the medication took effect. C.J. began to feel very relaxed and sleepy. Respondent recollects that C.J. complained of feeling light-headed, but does not believe any medication he injected would have caused that to happen. Respondent later returned to the room and prepared to give C.J. another injection into her hip area. She sat up on the table as Respondent pulled one end of the table slightly away from the wall.4/ After moving the table, Respondent had C.J. lie down on her side, lift her blouse, and unbuckle her jeans. She then slid her jeans and underwear down past her hips as directed. At that point, Respondent began injecting a solution into C.J.’s hip. As the injection was proceeding, she felt Respondent slide his hand over her hip and “in my groin area.” While doing that, Respondent’s crotch was pressed against C.J.’s buttocks. C.J. felt what she believed to be Respondent’s erect penis pushing against her buttocks as he administered the injection. After the injection was completed, Respondent came around from behind the table and told C.J. she would need to come see him again in a few weeks. C.J. got up from the table and began to realize that “something was not right” about the treatment she had just received. When C.J. went to the front desk to check out, she asked a nurse to identify the medications which had been injected but was unable to get that information. C.J. then left the Back Center and immediately called her nurse case manager at Patrick Air Force Base to report what had occurred. Her nurse advised C.J. to call 911 to report the incident; C.J. did so as she walked out to her car in the parking lot. A policeman arrived some 20 minutes later and took her statement. The officer then went inside to talk to Respondent. He said Respondent appeared to be surprised and shocked by C.J.’s allegation. The police decided not to file any charges against Respondent based on C.J.’s complaint. The reporting police officer (Middendorf) seemed to question C.J.’s veracity or truthfulness on the day of the incident. He said C.J. was upset and seemed lethargic, except when she was talking on the telephone to “one of her superiors.” According to Middendorf, C.J. acted consistent with someone who may be under the influence of drugs. He did acknowledge that C.J. had just come out of a pain management clinic. Middendorf also felt C.J. was either confused or not telling the truth concerning where Respondent had allegedly touched her. C.J., who was obviously distraught at the time, indicated both her pubic area and her outer thigh when she told Middendorf that Respondent had touched her “groin.” Middendorf challenged her about that and C.J. became defensive and argumentative. He did not provide any credible testimony as to why he believed she might be lying to him. His statement that C.J.’s voice changed when she was talking to her office on the phone is not conclusive evidence that she was not telling him the truth. C.J. never returned to the Back Center. She obtained pain management treatment elsewhere. Inasmuch as C.J.’s demeanor could not be judged because she did not appear in person, her testimony must be considered using other factors. In this case, the testimony was very similar to the facts described by other patients of Respondent concerning their treatment by him. The events as described by C.J. were believable and convincing, especially when compared to the allegations by other alleged victims. Neither C.J. nor any of the other alleged victims/complainants has talked to other alleged victims about their experiences, so there does not appear to be any collusion between the victims. Patient M.B. Patient M.B. was already a regular patient at the Back Center when she first saw Respondent on July 7, 2011. Respondent’s notes in M.B.’s chart indicate the patient was presenting for “initial evaluation” that day, but that was not correct; she had already been seen several times by other physicians at the Back Center. M.B. had chronic lumbalgia (low back pain) and lower extremity dysesthesia (a burning sensation) which was increasing progressively. Respondent examined M.B., discussed his findings, and scheduled a follow-up appointment for August 2, 2011, at which time he gave her an injection of 1% Xylocaine with approximately 30 ml of Lidocaine 1% on both of her side hips. He also injected a block with a solution containing 2 ml of Marcaine 0.5%, 2 ml of Lidocaine 2%, and 2 ml of Depo- Medrol 80 mg into M.B.’s joints. M.B. reported no suspicious or untoward behavior by Respondent during the July 7 and August 2 appointments. On August 29, 2011, M.B. returned to see Respondent. She presented with pain in her hips and left side. Nurse Bobbi McDonald escorted M.B. to the examination room and took her vital signs before leaving. Respondent came into the room, alone, and closed the door. At that visit, M.B. was wearing khaki mid-thigh cargo shorts, a blouse that tied around her neck, and bikini underwear. Respondent asked about her pain, touched points on her body to identify the exact pain locations, and adjusted her back manually. He then suggested injection of a steroid as a stop-gap measure prior to scheduling her for a fluoroscope injection later. M.B. agreed to the plan. Respondent left the examination room to get the medication. When he returned, he was alone and again he closed the door. Respondent told M.B. to pull her shorts down below her waist and to cover herself with a paper gown. She pulled her shorts and underwear down about halfway across her buttocks, which was lower than she would normally pull them for fluoroscope injections. Respondent began to clean the area for the injection and asked M.B. to pull her garments down further, below her buttocks. Respondent then pulled the table out from the wall and he went between the table and the wall. He injected M.B.’s hip about five times with a solution containing Depo Medrol 80, Toradol 60, Lidocaine, and Marcaine 1 ml. As he injected her, M.B. could feel Respondent’s groin touching her hip. She could feel what she believed to be Respondent’s erect penis rubbing against her in a back and forth motion. By this time, her paper gown had fallen off, exposing her buttocks and vaginal area. After the last injection, M.B. felt Respondent’s fingers touching her vagina. As she pushed upward to get off the table, M.B. felt Respondent touch her vagina again. She got off the table, pulled up her pants, and sat down as the doctor began talking to her. M.B. did not say anything to Respondent. She immediately believed that she had been sexually assaulted, but was too confused and shocked to say anything to anyone. M.B. did not initially report Respondent’s behavior to the Back Center. She later reported her allegations to the Melbourne Police Department and also filed a civil lawsuit against Respondent and the Back Center. (M.B. would continue to return to the Back Center, but did not see Respondent again for any of her treatments.) M.B.’s testimony was not as immediately believable as that of some of the other witnesses. Based on her personality, fear of the process, or some other factor, she seemed to be fairly emotionless in describing the incident. However, inasmuch as her testimony was corroborated by what other patients had experienced, her clearly enunciated statements are convincing. Further, M.B. exhibited extreme visual cues as to her intense dislike for Respondent at the final hearing. The testimony of M.B. alone would not be clear and convincing evidence of any wrongdoing by Respondent. However, her testimony is corroboration of and support for the testimony of other victims. Respondent's employment at the Back Center was terminated shortly after M.B.'s appointment with him. There is no evidence as to Respondent's employment from September 2011 until he went to Advantacare in March 2012. Patient A.H. Patient A.H. presented to Advantacare (Daytona Beach office) on January 9, 2013, in an effort to address pain she was suffering as a result of an automobile accident that occurred in October 2012. She wanted to reduce her pain while also reducing the amount of medications she was taking. A.H. had a job which required driving, so she needed to be as drug-free as possible. A.H. was escorted to the examination room. She remembers that Respondent came in, closed the door, and propped it shut. Respondent remembers the door to that room being open, that it would open by itself unless something was placed against it. The medical technician assigned to Respondent said the door did not have any problems, but it would always be half open. There is no corroborated evidence as to whether the door to the room was open, closed, or ajar when A.H. was being examined. Respondent examined A.H. and began to show her some exercises and stretches that he thought might alleviate some of her pain. As she was sitting in a chair being shown how to stretch, A.H. felt Respondent’s erect penis pushing against her back. She quickly told Respondent “I’ve got it” in order to stop his actions. She got up quickly and moved to another chair in the office. A.H. clearly described what she had felt and had no confusion or doubt about what happened. Her testimony about the incident was credible. Respondent then told A.H. to lie on the table on her side with her arms stretched out in front of her. Despite what had just happened, A.H. complied with his directions.5/ When she got into position, Respondent had A.H. move her body over to the very edge of the table and began to manipulate her back. As his hands continued down her back, she felt his hands go down inside her panties. As this happened, she could feel Respondent “humping” her, grinding his groin area against her backside. Respondent then told A.H. to change positions on the table, moving her feet to the opposite end. Amazingly, she again complied with his instructions. Respondent began touching her upper thigh near her vagina and “did the same thing he had done before.” At that, A.H. quickly moved off the table and onto a chair, where she sat rigid and refused to move. Respondent seemed calm and relaxed, showing no sign of having acted inappropriately. A.H. did not tell anyone at Advantacare about the incident on that day because she could not fully grasp what had happened. As she began to understand the situation better, she was worried about reporting the incident because it would be her word against the doctor’s. A.H. did tell another doctor (Dr. Jacobson) about the incident when she saw him the next day for a regularly scheduled appointment. Dr. Jacobson had been an employee with Advantacare and presumably relayed A.H.’s allegations to the center. A.H. also reported the incident to the Board of Health and to law enforcement. She later contacted an attorney about filing a civil lawsuit against Respondent. A.H. did not return to Advantacare for treatment after this event because of the traumatic impact of the incident. Respondent has no independent recollection of A.H. as a patient, but said he did not touch her inappropriately. A.H.’s testimony was believable. She was a credible witness and articulated her testimony clearly. It is strange that A.H. would continue to obey Respondent even after he had touched her inappropriately, but she was obviously a compliant person, especially as it relates to physicians. Respondent’s defenses to allegations by patients Respondent claims he never saw a written chaperone policy at the Back Center but that he knew that it existed. According to him, there was insufficient staff available to make it possible to comply with the policy. Respondent’s testimony in this regard is rejected as being contrary to better, more persuasive evidence. Respondent said he was on several medications for “five or six years” prior to the final hearing, including Zoloft for mild depression, Lisinopril for hypertension, and Toprol for hypertension. One of the possible side effects of those medications is impotence or erectile dysfunction. However, during the time he was taking these drugs, Respondent fathered his two children. There is no competent evidence that Respondent suffered from impotence or erectile dysfunction during the time of any of the allegations about sexual misconduct. Respondent usually wore a lab coat when treating patients. The coat is long and had large pockets in the front, at about groin level. Respondent would keep empty syringes in his coat pocket. He suggests that female patients who said they felt his erect penis were actually feeling the syringes. His suggestion is not very plausible or persuasive. Respondent demonstrated at final hearing the normal physical stance he took when doing an injection of a patient in an examination room setting. He suggested that his body would be turned at a 45-degree angle from the patient rather than facing them directly, thus eliminating the possibility of full frontal contact with the patient. He also said that he generally stood four or five inches away from the patient, but might come into contact with the patient occasionally. Neither the statements nor his demonstration were persuasive. Respondent’s contention is that each and every one of the patients who alleged sexual misconduct was lying. He suggests that patient D.K. was overweight and thus would not have sexually aroused him. Also, he maintains that her description of the injections being performed while Respondent was rubbing against her would have necessarily resulted in horrible pain at best or a broken needle at worst. He claims that since patient M.B. was married to a policeman, she would have necessarily taken photographs of her numerous injections to preserve a record and she would have complained immediately. Her failure to do so, he suggests, impugns her testimony. Respondent contends that patient T.J.’s tardiness in reporting her allegations suggests the allegations were false. Respondent refutes A.H.’s allegations on the basis that there was a disagreement as to the physical layout of the medical office. Respondent contends there is no evidence that patient S.D. (his alleged lover) was his patient, even though there is a stipulation to that effect. Despite these speculative defenses, the evidence presented by the alleged victims is credible and accepted as fact. Failure to update practitioner profile A letter dated March 27, 2013, advising Respondent of his termination from participation in the Medicaid Program, was mailed to Respondent at two separate addresses: 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard, Suite 610, Melbourne, Florida 32901, i.e., the address of the Back Center, and 930 South Harbor City Boulevard, Melbourne, Florida 32901, the address for Osler (the company with whom the Back Center merged at some point in time). The letter to 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard was received on April 1, 2013, and an acknowledgement was signed by Chandra Carrender, a Back Center employee. Respondent’s employment with the Back Center had been terminated some 16 months previously, i.e., in August 2011. The letter mailed to 930 Harbor City Boulevard was returned as undeliverable. The termination letter provided Respondent notice of his right to contest the decision. He was given 21 days from receipt of the letter to file a Petition if he wanted to challenge the termination. Respondent did not file a challenge, so on or about June 21, 2013, a Termination Final Order was filed by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), setting forth Respondent’s termination from participation in the Florida Medicaid Program. The termination was issued pursuant to section 409.913, Florida Statutes. By law, Respondent was required to update his Florida practitioner profile within 15 days of receipt of the Termination Final Order. The Termination Final Order was mailed to Respondent, return receipt requested, at two different addresses: The 930 South Harbor City Boulevard address and the 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard address. Respondent denies having received the letter or TFO until just prior to the formal administrative hearing in this matter. Licensed physicians in the State of Florida are required to maintain a current address of record with the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) and the Department of Health. Neither Respondent nor the Department provided evidence as to what Respondent’s official address of record was at the time the TFO and the letter were sent to Respondent at the two Harbor City Boulevard addresses. According to the deposition testimony of Michael West of the AHCA Medicaid Program Integrity office, the notices were sent to Respondent’s “address of record” per section 409.913(6), Florida Statutes. West’s testimony, however, did not specify what address that was. It might be logically presumed that one or both of the Harbor City Boulevard addresses were the “address of record,” because that is where the notices were mailed. However, there is no clear and convincing evidence as to Respondent’s official address of record at the time the Termination Final Order was mailed. The statutory section referred to by West states: Any notice required to be given to a provider under this section is presumed to be sufficient notice if sent to the address last shown on the provider enrollment file. It is the responsibility of the provider to furnish and keep the agency informed of the provider’s current address. United States Postal Service proof of mailing or certified or registered mailing of such notice to the provider at the address shown on the provider enrollment file constitutes sufficient proof of notice. Any notice required to be given to the agency by this section must be sent to the agency at an address designated by rule. Respondent did not update his Florida practitioner profile because he claims never to have received a copy of the TFO or the letter. Neither Respondent nor the Department provided direct evidence of Respondent’s “address last shown on the provider enrollment file” as of March 27, 2013.6/ Other factual considerations Respondent was terminated from employment at the Back Center in September 2011. The termination occurred as follows: T.J. reported the alleged October 29, 2010 incident in April 2011. Dr. Hynes was already aware of another incident (from D.K. in January 2011). Dr. Hynes met with Respondent to discuss his alleged behavior. Respondent denied the allegations, saying that people just seem to like him and take advantage of him. He said the patients were lying about the incidents. Dr. Hynes mandated at that time that Respondent have a chaperone in the examining room with every female patient. Rather than being allowed to exercise “medical judgment” like other doctors in the clinic, Respondent was ordered to always use a chaperone with all female patients. After patient C.J.’s allegations came to light in May 2011, Dr. Hynes told Respondent that three times was enough; something had to be done. The Back Center commenced preparation of a termination letter. The letter was to tell Respondent that, pursuant to his Employment Agreement, the Back Center was providing him the 180-day notice of termination of employment “without cause.” The purpose of that letter was to allow Respondent time to find a job and not have a blemish on his record. One of the bases for the termination letter was that Respondent had been referred to the Physicians Recovery Network (PRN) for counseling to address his behavior. Dr. Hynes presumed Respondent was obtaining that counseling. However, when C.J. reported the incident on May 4, 2011, Dr. Hynes found out that Respondent had not been going to PRN as he had previously indicated. At about the time the 180-day letter was being drafted, another incident (by patient M.B.) was reported to the Back Center. Upon hearing of that allegation, Dr. Hynes verbally fired Respondent, effective immediately, with cause. The 180-day letter was not actually delivered to Respondent until after the verbal termination, so the letter was moot when it arrived. Respondent did not tell his next employer, Advantacare, that he had been terminated from employment by the Back Center. He also did not advise Advantacare about the sexual allegations made by patients at the Back Center. In summary, Respondent engaged in activities of a sexual nature with patients at the Back Center in December 2010, January 2011, May 2011, and August 2011 (in addition to his relations with S.D. in 2008–2010). He engaged in sexually related touching of a patient at Advantacare in January 2013. His employment with the Back Center was terminated in September 2011; his employment with Advantacare was terminated in April 2013. Former patients of Respondent expressed dismay that he was being charged with the violations set forth in the Administrative Complaint. They found Respondent to be a caring and professional doctor. It is clear Respondent did not treat all his patients the same way he treated the victims identified herein. Some of his co-workers said they did not see Respondent engage in any of the alleged actions. They did not receive any complaints from other patients. Respondent obviously has a stellar reputation with some of his patients and co-workers. That status, however, does not excuse his behavior with the victims in the present cases. It is also alleged that Bobbi McDonald was a rumor-mongerer and a liar. She appeared credible at final hearing and there is no competent, substantial evidence to support the dispersions cast by others. It should be noted that several witnesses identified by Respondent were displeased with the manner in which they were questioned by Department personnel prior to the final hearing. The witnesses expressed extreme discomfort when Department employees (attorneys) suggested that Respondent was “an addict” or a sociopath. While a state agency is bound to pursue all claims against individuals which it is responsible for licensing and monitoring, it is improper to harangue or disparage such persons in order to sway potential witnesses’ testimony. Upon full review of the evidence in this case, the potential witnesses who complained about the Department’s aggressive nature did not provide substantive testimony on the issues of this case. Thus, any harm which may have resulted from the Department’s statements would not affect the final decision herein.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Health revoking Respondent, Albert Esmailzadeh, M.D.’s license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order assess the cost of investigating and prosecuting this case, and that payment of such costs be assessed against Respondent, Albert Esmailzadeh, M.D. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2014.
Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Respondent pursuant to Chapter 408, Part Il, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 400, Part X, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement, (Ex. 2). Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1. The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The facility’s Certificate of Exemption is deemed surrendered and is cancelled and of no further effect. 3. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney’s fees. Any requests for administrative hearings are dismissed and the above-styled case is closed. 4, In accordance with Florida law, the Respondent is responsible for retaining and appropriately distributing all client records within the timeframes prescribed in the authorizing statutes and applicable administrative code provisions. The Respondent is advised of Section 408.810, Florida Statutes. 5. In accordance with Florida law, the Respondent is responsible for any refunds that may have to be made to the clients. Filed December 24, 2014 3:11 PM Division of Administrative Hearings 6. The Respondent is given notice of Florida law regarding unlicensed activity. The Respondent is advised of Section 408.804 and Section 408.812, Florida Statutes. The Respondent should also consult the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. The Respondent is notified that the cancellation of an Agency license may have ramifications potentially affecting accrediting, third party billing including but not limited to the Florida Medicaid program, and private contracts. ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this 25” day of htaewnboer , 2014. , Secretary th Care Administration NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct of this Final Order was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this eis of , 2014. Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Thomas Jones, Unit Manager Facilities Intake Unit Licensure Unit Agency for Health Care Administration Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Katrina Derico-Harris Medicaid Accounts Receivable Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Shawn McCauley Medicaid Contract Management Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Arlene Mayo-Davis, Field Office Manager Local Field Office Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Daniel A. Johnson, Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail) Dagmar Llaudy, Esquire Law Office of Dagmar Llaudy, P.A. 814 Ponce De Leon Blvd, Suite 513 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (U.S. Mail) NOTICE OF FLORIDA LAW 408.804 License required; display.-- (1) It is unlawful to provide services that require licensure, or operate or maintain a provider that offers or provides services that require licensure, without first obtaining from the agency a license authorizing the provision of such services or the operation or maintenance of such provider. (2) A license must be displayed in a conspicuous place readily visible to clients who enter at the address that appears on the license and is valid only in the hands of the licensee to whom it is issued and may not be sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily. The license is valid only for the licensee, provider, and location for which the license is issued. 408.812 Unlicensed activity. -- (1) A person or entity may not offer or advertise services that require licensure as defined by this part, authorizing statutes, or applicable rules to the public without obtaining a valid license from the agency. A licenseholder may not advertise or hold out to the public that he or she holds a license for other than that for which he or she actually holds the license. (2) The operation or maintenance of an unlicensed provider or the performance of any services that require licensure without proper licensure is a violation of this part and authorizing statutes. Unlicensed activity constitutes harm that materially affects the health, safety, and welfare of clients. The agency or any state attorney may, in addition to other remedies provided in this part, bring an action for an injunction to restrain such violation, or to enjoin the future operation or maintenance of the unlicensed provider or the performance of any services in violation of this part and authorizing statutes, until compliance with this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the agency. (3) It is unlawful for any person or entity to own, operate, or maintain an unlicensed provider. If after receiving notification from the agency, such person or entity fails to cease operation and apply for a license under this part and authorizing statutes, the person or entity shall be subject to penalties as prescribed by authorizing statutes and applicable rules. Each day of continued operation is a separate offense. (4) Any person or entity that fails to cease operation after agency notification may be fined $1,000 for each day of noncompliance. (5) When a controlling interest or licensee has an interest in more than one provider and fails to license a provider rendering services that require licensure, the agency may revoke all licenses and impose actions under s. 408.814 and a fine of $1,000 per day, unless otherwise specified by authorizing statutes, against each licensee until such time as the appropriate license is obtained for the unlicensed operation. (6) In addition to granting injunctive relief pursuant to subsection (2), if the agency determines that a person or entity is operating or maintaining a provider without obtaining a license and determines that a condition exists that poses a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of a client of the provider, the person or entity is subject to the same actions and fines imposed against a licensee as specified in this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules. (7) Any person aware of the operation of an unlicensed provider must report that provider to the agency.
