The Issue The issues are whether Respondent Francis Thompson's interests in the pension plan are forfeited under the law, whether he should be required to repay all monies received less accumulated contributions, and whether Respondent Patricia R. Thompson's interest in the plan is forfeited upon the forfeiture of the rights of her former husband.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The City of Daytona Beach (City) is a municipal corporation created as a political subdivision of the State of Florida. Petitioner, Board of Trustees of the City of Daytona Beach Police and Fire Department Pension Fund (Board), was established by Special Act of the Legislature in 1959, as amended in 1965. The Board is responsible for administering the City's police and fire department retirement plan (plan) and paying benefits to eligible participants subject, however, to the requirements of Chapter 112, Part VII, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Francis Thompson, is a plan participant, having retired as a police officer with the City of Daytona Beach Police Department on September 24, 1994. His dates of service are from July 31, 1972, to July 30, 1977, and from June 19, 1983, to September 24, 1994. Under the terms of the plan, upon retirement, Francis Thompson was entitled to $1439.84 per month in retirement benefits. Sometime prior to his retirement, however, his marriage to Patricia R. Thompson was dissolved. As a part of the settlement between the parties, Francis Thompson agreed to transfer a portion of his benefits (48.75% had he retired on January 31, 1992), but not to exceed a total liability of $31,000.000, plus twelve percent simple interest on the unpaid balance computed from January 31, 1992. This agreement is embodied in a Domestic Relations Order entered on March 30, 1993, by the Circuit Court, in and for Volusia County, Florida. Although the City was never given notice of this proceeding nor an opportunity to participate, the order reflects that a copy of the same was served upon the plan administrator. Notwithstanding the above action, Section 10 of Sub-Part D of the City Code provides that "the right of a person to a pension . . . shall be unassignable." In other words, Francis Thompson was prohibited from assigning his plan benefits to another person. Faced with a court order which directed the City to pay a portion of the benefits to a third party, the plan administrator consulted with the City's legal counsel, who advised the adminstrator to "follow the intent" of the court's order and begin paying a portion of the benefits to the former wife. It is noted, however, that Patricia R. Thompson did not receive an interest in the plan by the court's order; rather, she obtained entitlement to a portion of the benefits of a plan member. Between September 1995 and the end of November 1997, Patricia R. Thompson has received $24,199.32 in benefits. As of the same date, Francis Thompson received a total of $55,333.18 in benefits. Based upon a belief that Francis Thompson had been convicted of a specified offense related to conduct prior to his retirement, on August 5, 1997, the Board initiated this proceeding for the purpose of terminating all of his rights and benefits under the plan and requiring him to return $42,655.20, plus all distributions, if any, made subsequent to June 1997. Because Patricia R. Thompson is now receiving a portion of her former husband's benefits, she was also named as a party. Between 1987 and 1994, Francis Thompson was evidence custodian and in charge of the evidence and property room for the City of Daytona Beach Police Department. In that position of special trust, he was responsible for keeping all weapons, drugs, moneys, and other property seized or held by the Police Department. The position of evidence custodian was a position that required the City to trust that the custodian would properly perform his responsibilities and duties. It is undisputed that during his tenure as evidence custodian, Francis Thompson removed multiple firearms from the evidence and property room and shipped them to another person in the State of Pennsylvania for personal use. The Police Department could not find any evidence that the firearms had been properly logged or recorded for removal in accordance with proper protocol. By engaging in this conduct, Respondent violated the City's trust. On June 27, 1996, Francis Thompson was convicted of multiple felony violations of the United States Code in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Case No. 2:95CR00232-1. One of these offenses was "shipping stolen firearms in interstate commerce." Because the offense involved the commission of a theft by a public employee from his employer, it constituted a "specified offense" as defined by Sections 112.3173(2)(e)2. and 6., Florida Statutes (1997). The conviction for a specified offense calls for forfeiture of all retirement benefits under Section 112.3173(2)(e)2., Florida Statutes (1997). Finally, it is noted that the illicit activity occurred while Respondent was employed as evidence custodian with the City's Police Department. Throughout his term of employment with the City, Francis Thompson made accumulated contributions to the plan totaling $29,173.21. As of November 30, 1997, the plan administrator had distributed plan benefits in the amount of $79,532.50, or $50,359.29 more than contributions. At hearing, Respondent's present wife, Patricia B. Thompson, testified on his behalf. Her testimony was limited to a request that, due to financial and health problems incurred by her incarcerated husband, the undersigned appoint counsel on his behalf. That request was denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees of the City of Daytona Beach Police and Fire Department Pension Fund enter a final order determining that Francis Thompson's interest in the plan, including past payments made and future benefits payable by the plan, less accumulated contributions shall be forfeited by the Board pursuant to law; that all persons deriving an interest through his interest in the plan, including his present and former wife shall forfeit all future payments from the plan upon the issuance of a final order; and that Francis Thompson shall pay back to the Board all payments in excess of his accumulated contributions in such manner as the Board may determine. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret T. Roberts, Esquire Post Office Box 832 New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32170-0832 David D. Fuller, Esquire 220 South Ridgewood Avenue Suite 210 Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Francis Thompson Registry Number 17952-018 Eglin Air Force Base Prison Camp Post Office Box 600 Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 32542 James C. Maniak Plan Administrator City of Daytona Beach Post Office Box 2451 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115-2451
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of discriminating against Petitioner in employment based on his age, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born on June 26, 1943. He has served as a city council member and mayor of Hialeah, which, during his three-year term as mayor, had 230,000 residents and nearly 1,200 city employees. Petitioner has served on the Dade League of Cities for seven or eight years, as well as the United States League of Cities and a committee of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. From October 1998 through November 27, 2000, Petitioner served as Park Director of Respondent, which is considerably less populated than Hialeah. On July 18, 2000, Yioset de la Cruz was elected Mayor of Respondent. Mayor de la Cruz had been employed by Respondent during the administration of Mayors Oliveros, Fatima, and Morejon. However, Mayor Morejon terminated the employment of Mr. de la Cruz, as well as several other employees who had served under Mayor Fatima. Running on the promise to clean up the city, Mr. de la Cruz won 57 percent of the vote and defeated then-Mayor Morejon. When he assumed office, Mayor de la Cruz had to address several pressing financial issues, including a projected deficit of $540,000 for the fiscal year and the cancellation of Respondent's insurance by the Florida League of Cities. At the same time, the people of Hialeah Gardens had become dissatisfied with the maintenance and operation of their city parks, which are the most visible reflection of the quality of their city government. Appointing Arturo Ruiz to oversee the parks and their maintenance and operation, Mayor de la Cruz nonetheless remained directly involved in parks administration by imposing new discipline upon parks workers to ensure public satisfaction with the maintenance and operation of city parks. Relations between Petitioner and Mr. Ruiz, who was the Director of Administration for Respondent, were often strained. Mr. Ruiz felt that Petitioner did not cooperate with him, but instead forced Mr. Ruiz to perform Petitioner's job by following through on parks projects until their completion. At the same time, Mayor de la Cruz felt that the condition of the parks was not improving. Mayor de la Cruz believed that Petitioner was at fault in failing to execute the Mayor's policies on maintaining and operating the parks. There is considerable dispute between Petitioner and his witnesses and Respondent and its witnesses as to whether the perceptions of Mayor de la Cruz and Mr. Ruiz were accurate concerning the inadequacies of Petitioner's job performance. For instance, Mayor de la Cruz testified to a long list of jobs, such as the erection of signage and repair of an air conditioning unit, that went undone or were finished too slowly under Petitioner. The Mayor also detailed dramatic improvement in the condition of the parks after the termination of Petitioner. On the other hand, Petitioner testified that Respondent did not have the funds for certain jobs, such as major drainage work, and that other work necessarily required a long time to complete. Petitioner also detailed dramatic deterioration in the condition of the parks after his termination. It is undisputed that Mayor de la Cruz fired Petitioner in late November 2000, a few days after firing Petitioner's Assistant Park Director, Rolanda Boada, for insubordination. It is not seriously disputed that Mayor de la Cruz did not fire Petitioner due to age discrimination. The Mayor claims that he fired Petitioner due to poor job performance. Petitioner claimed in a newspaper interview shortly after the termination that his termination was due to politics. While testifying, Petitioner repeated the same claim several times on direct until he finally--and unconvincingly--recalled that his age was also a reason for his termination. Whether Mayor de la Cruz fired Petitioner due to the Mayor's perception of poor job performance or insufficient loyalty is irrelevant to this case because the evidence fails to establish that the Mayor terminated Petitioner due to his age.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Request for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Gary A. Costales Law Office of Gary A. Costales, P.A. 2151 LeJeune Road Coral Gables, Florida 33134 J. Frost Walker, III Law Offices of J. Frost Walker, III 100 West Sunrise Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33133 Derick Daniel, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Violet D. Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether the Motions for Rule Challenge Proceedings (referred to as Petition(s)) filed in each of the above-cited cases meet the requirements both in form and substance, pursuant to Subsection 120.56(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2004); Whether Respondent, Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR), has inherent authority to reconsider a Final Order it has issued; and Whether FCHR should adopt a rule which would permit the granting of a motion to reconsider a Final Order.
Findings Of Fact From August 15, 1967, until his retirement on April 1, 1991, Jackson continued to serve as a game management specialist and a laboratory technician (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9). As part of his duties, Mr. Jackson would perform controlled burns and post wildlife areas. However, Col. Robert Brantly, the Executive Director of the Commission since 1977 and an employee of the Commission since 1957, stated that those duties were not law enforcement duties and were commonly done by biologists and other non-law enforcement personnel. James A. Carpenter testified that Mr. Jackson worked on controlled hunts and was responsible for the check stations. However, the Commission hired civilians to perform that job, and Col. Brantly stated that the operation of a check station was not a law enforcement function. Mr. Jackson's Commission ID card contained the statement as contained in the Recommended Order, Findings of Fact No. 9. The ID card shows that Mr. Jackson was an "employee" of the Commission and not a "law enforcement Officer". Col. Brantly, was and is a certified law enforcement officer, testified that he had two (2) identification cards (Respondent's Composite Exhibit 2). The first card stated as follows: This card identifies: Robert M. Brantly as a Certified Florida Law Enforcement Officer who has complied with Section 943.14(1) (2), Florida Statutes, and Section 11B-7, relating to Standards and Training Col. Brantly's second ID card contained the following statement: Certificate of Appointment Pursuant to Section 372.07 Florida Statutes State of Florida at Large Be it known that Colonel Robert M. Brantly is a regularly constituted officer of the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission with full arrest powers to bear arms and to execute and fulfill the duties of said office. This appointment is in full effect until revoked. Dated this 1st day of March, 1990 Col. Brantly's ID card states he is an "officer" with full police powers while the ID cards of Jackson and Carlton Chappel, a biologist employed by the Commission, state that they are "employees" with full authority to enforce the laws relating to protection of the environment and wildlife resources. In fact, the ID cards of Mr. Jackson and Mr. Chappel are identical. (Compare Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7 with Respondent's Exhibit No. 6) Col. Robert Brantly, Executive Director of the Commission, testified concerning Mr. Jackson's claim. Col. Brantly began his career with the Commission in 1957 as a wildlife officer, became the Deputy Director in 1974 and Director in 1977. He has been and is currently a law enforcement officer and has had special risk membership in FRS. He stated that Mr. Jackson and several others classified as game management specialists had been given law enforcement powers in the mid-1960's and had certain limited duties with respect to enforcement of the state fish and game laws. When the Police Standards Commission was established in 1972, Mr. Jackson and the others were "grandfathered" by Police Standards as law enforcement officers. He testified that the Commission had two (2) classes of law enforcement officers in the 1960's and 1970's. Wildlife officers were full time law enforcement officers whose primary duties were law enforcement. Game management specialists were not considered to be law enforcement officers and had no duties in law enforcement. As an exception to that rule were Mr. Jackson and some other game management specialists who had been "grandfathered" in as law enforcement officers by the Police Standards Commission in 1972. These individuals had law enforcement authority but were considered by the Commission to be part-time law enforcement officers. Col. Brantly stated that law enforcement was not a part of their primary or essential duties. The amount of law enforcement that each of the game management specialists performed was up to each individual, but law enforcement was not a duty required of any of them. For example, one of the above specialists could perform no law enforcement activities if he did not want to. Col. Brantly testified that controlled burning was a wildlife management practice and not a law enforcement activity. He stated that the operation of hunt check stations was not a law enforcement activity, and the check stations were manned by citizens of the area. Likewise, posting of the management areas was not a law enforcement activity. Jackson introduced Exhibit No. 10 from the Commission clarifying the Police Standards Board ruling. Field personnel other than those in the Law Enforcement Bureau were "auxiliary officers" who were to call a wildlife officer to the scene of the violation for the arrest, if possible. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11 makes it even clearer and also explains the policy and the attachment thereto. The attachment, Administrative Directive No. 25, clearly states that "(w)ildlife management duties will remain the first priority job for Division personnel", with clear guidelines for open and closed hunting seasons. The work week was 40 hours with no deviation permitted. Thus, the primary duty of Jackson was game management and not law enforcement. In September, 1979, a number of problems concerning the law enforcement powers of the game management specialists forced Col. Brantly as the agency head to remove the certification (law enforcement powers) from the game management specialists with such power such as Mr. Jackson. The removal of the certification was effective September 6, 1979 (Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, letter to Don Dowling). In Petitioner's Exhibit No. 14, the memorandum from Col. Brantly of September 27, 1979, he made it abundantly clear that the wildlife (game) management specialists were part-time law enforcement personnel. Toby Harris, the personnel officer for the Commission since December, 1979, also testified on both State and Commission personnel practices. He had previous service with the Pay and Classification Section of the Department of Administration and had worked in pay and classification for a state agency for 25 years. He was admitted as an expert in the area of state pay and personnel classification. Mr. Harris stated that at the time Jackson's position questionnaires or descriptions were prepared, it was a requirement that the employee himself prepare the section on "duties and responsibilities" and assign the percentages of time on the form. These forms were not mass produced by the agency but were individually crafted for each job and for each employee. Mr. Harris stated quite emphatically that the position description is (and was for the period in question) the most important document in a state employee's personnel file. It is only on the basis of that position description that the employee knew what his duties were and knew the criteria upon which he would be evaluated. He identified the letter of October 10, 1975, from Brantley Goodson, Director, Division of Law Enforcement, concerning Jackson's status as a grandfathered law enforcement officer in a part-time position. Harris also stated that the evaluations for Jackson up to the early 1970's were above average and that after that date, they were average. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Police Standards Commission, kept the files for the Police Standards Commission for all state agencies with law enforcement officers. The records showed whether or not a law enforcement officer was considered full-time, part-time or an auxiliary officer. According to the records of the Commission , Mr. Jackson was considered a full- time law enforcement officer from March 1, 1965, until August 15, 1967, and a part-time law enforcement officer from August 15, 1967, until September 27, 1979, when he was removed from any law enforcement activities by the Commission. Carlton Chappel, an employee of the Commission, testified that in the late 1960's and during the 1970's, he and all field personnel of the Commission, including game management specialists, were issued the same uniforms, badges and identification cards as wildlife officers. On an "as needed basis", the field personnel would be assigned to field duty and had the power to make arrests and enforce the game and fish laws of the State; however, during this time, he did not consider himself to be a law enforcement officer and never had applied for such status. His identification card was identical to the ID card of Mr. Jackson. He further stated that all game management specialists had to prepare work plans for each management area to explain the work that was to be done during the upcoming fiscal year. These work plans included both State and federal projects. (Respondent's Exhibit No. 7) The work plans for the fiscal years 1969-70 and 1970-71 for Mr. Jackson were introduced (Respondent's Exhibit No. 7) and show for FY 1969-70 that Mr. Jackson spent his time in the following projects: PROJECT NO. OF PAY PERIODS Wildlife Research Project 2 No. W-48-4 No. W-35 Mgt. Area Develop. 18 Apalachee Mgt. Area 10 Robert Brent Mgt. Area 4 Point Washington Mgt. Area 2 The work plans for the 1970-71 fiscal year show that Mr. Jackson spent his time on the following projects: PROJECT NO. OF PAY PERIODS Fed. Statistical Harvest & Inventory 1 Fed. Statewide Mgt. Area Development 10 State Hunts 8 State-General Game Management 7 TOTAL PAY PERIODS 26 SPECIFIC PROJECTS NO. OF PAY PERIODS Wildlife Inventory, Harvest & Economic Survey (Project No. W-33-21) 1 Development and Operations (Project No. W-35-20) 10 State-Apalachee Wildlife Mgt. Area 10 Carolyn McGlamery, an employee of the Division, testified that Jackson had transferred from SCOERS to the FRS during the initial transfer period effective December 1, 1970. She further testified about the statutes and the various changes over the years and the administrative rules that concerned high hazard membership under SCOERS and then special risk membership under FRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for high hazard or special risk membership in either SCORES or FRS. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April 1992.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in refusing to hire him.
Findings Of Fact On July 24, 1991, Respondent posted a Job Posting for the job of Fire Coordinator at an annual salary of $24,566 to $34,619. The County advertised the job in general runs of the Orlando Sentinel and Tampa Tribune, as well as local newspapers. The application deadline was August 14, 1991. Learning of the job opening, Petitioner submitted an application. Based on background and experience, Petitioner was well qualified for the job. Consistent with County practice, either the County Commission or the County Administrator had appointed a Selection Committee. The purpose of the Selection Committee was to interview qualified applicants, rate the applicants, and forward their scores to the County Commission. Because the Fire Coordinator is a department head, only the County Commission had the authority to hire the person for the job. The Selection Committee included the chief of the Avon Park Fire Department, the chiefs of either a volunteer or another municipal fire department within the County, the County Administrator, the County Personnel Director, and the Director of the County Office of Management and Budget. The Selection Committee chose five persons to interview, including Petitioner. During the interviews, the Personnel Director asked Petitioner about his relationship with the City of Avon Park. Petitioner admitted that he was preparing to file a job discrimination complaint against the City because he believed that he had been unfairly terminated due to some legal problems that his wife had had. The Selection Committee rated the applicants after the interviews. Petitioner rated the highest. He was tied for the highest on the Personnel Director's tally sheet. The Selection Committee then forwarded the three top applicants to the County Commission for further action. These were Petitioner, Mr. Larry Butler, and Mr. Paul Goddard. The County Commission is free to disregard the recommendations and recommence advertising for the position. Expressing some discontent with the selections, the County Commission unanimously voted to do just that when it considered the recommendations on September 3, 1991. The Commission directed that advertisements should be placed locally and in a regional edition of the Tampa Tribune, following which the applicants should be reduced to five and brought to the County Commission for interviews. There is little evidence of the reasoning for the County's action. One Commissioner is a former Mayor of the City of Avon Park, and she may have expressed some reservations about Petitioner and another former employee of the City. In any event, the County, on September 4, 1991, again posted the Job Posting for the Fire Coordinator's job. The ads were run as directed by the County Commission. The application deadline was September 20, 1991, which was a Friday. On this round, the job of determining what applicants were sufficiently qualified to be granted interviews was borne by the County Administrator and the County Personnel Director. Receiving 14 applications, they determined that two of the new applicants were qualified to be interviewed. These persons were Mr. Mike McCann and Mr. Tim Eures, who was the son of an applicant from the prior round. However, others were entitled to interviews due to County custom. One custom was that whenever the County Commission rejects the recommendations of a Selection Committee and readvertises the position, the persons earlier recommended are entitled to be interviewed during the second round. This meant that Petitioner was entitled to an interview, as were the two other persons recommended by the Selection Committee during the first round. In this case, Mr. Goddard affirmatively indicated that he did not want to submit to an interview with the County Commission, and Mr. Butler presumably showed no interest in the interview. The other relevant custom in the County required that current County employees be allowed a full interview when they applied for a job. Mr. McCann was in this category, although he also was sufficiently qualified to earn an interview without regard to his current employment by the County. Also, Mr. Hank Eures, the father of Tim Eures and an unsuccessful candidate the first time, was extended an offer to interview with the County Commission because he was a current County employee. The County Administrator and County Personnel Director decided on Monday, September 23, 1991, that Mr. McCann, Mr. Tim Eures, Petitioner, and Mr. Hank Eures were entitled to interviews with the Board of County Commissioners. Following the custom of setting the interview schedule at its next regularly scheduled Commissioners meeting, the Board, on September 24, chose the date and set aside time for the interviews to take place. It chose Tuesday, October 1, 1991. On September 26, 1991, (September 27 for Mr. Hank Eures), the County mailed letters to each of the persons to be interviewed informing them of the date, time, and location of the interviews. The County Personnel Director normally telephones the candidates and gives them the same information, but it is unclear if he did so, or was able to do so, with respect to Petitioner. Petitioner received the September 26 letter on Saturday, September 28. He had since become employed as a long- distance tractor-trailer operator and was booked for a long haul on October 1. He was unable to find a substitute for this job. On Monday, September 30, Petitioner's wife called a County employee and informed her of Petitioner's scheduling problem. She explained that Petitioner could not attend the interviews and asked that his interview be rescheduled for another date. As is customary with interviews, the County Commission refused to accommodate Petitioner, so the interviews proceeded without him as scheduled. Following the interviews, the Commissioners selected Mr. Tim Eures as the new Fire Coordinator. The record does not permit a determination as to Mr. Tim Eures' relative qualifications as compared to those of Petitioner. There is no evidence that Petitioner failed to be hired for the Fire Coordinator position due either to legal problems that his wife was having at the time or due to the filing of a charge of discrimination against Petitioner's prior employer, the City of Avon Park.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. ENTERED on April 20, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on April 20, 1993. APPENDIX Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Respondent 1-2: rejected as not findings of fact. 3-5: adopted or adopted in substance. 6: rejected as subordinate. 7: adopted or adopted in substance. 8: rejected as subordinate and recitation of evidence. 9-15 (second sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 15 (third and fourth sentences)-17: rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Margaret Jones, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Robert H. Grizzard, II P.O. Box 992 Lakeland, FL 33802-0992 J. Ross Macbeth County Attorney Highlands County P.O. Box 1926 Sebring, FL 33871-1926
The Issue Whether a final order dismissing the Petitioner's rule challenge should be entered because Respondent, United Safety Council, Inc., doing business as Florida Safety Council (United Safety Council), is not an "agency" within the Florida Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and there is no claim challenging a rule enacted by Respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department). HOLDINGS United Safety Council is not an “agency” within the definition of section 120.52(1), Florida Statutes (2010); thus Project Refocus' rule challenge against United Safety Council is not subject to the APA. Consequently, United Safety Council's Motion for Summary Final Order is Granted. Project Refocus' petition in the instant case does not challenge a Department rule or action, and the Department was never added or served as a party. Therefore, the Department's motion to remove it as a party is Granted.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed as a fire inspector by the City of Clearwater with permanent status in the civil service system. Respondent has approximately nine years experience with the City of Clearwater as a fire inspector, and prior to this incident had never been the subject of disciplinary action. As a permanent civil service employee, Ordinance 1831 of the City of Clearwater, Guidelines of Disciplinary Action dated October 23, 1978, and Civil Service Rule 14 dealing with Suspensions, Demotions and Dismissals are applicable to the facts of this case and govern disciplinary action taken against Respondent. On September 17, 1985, Respondent was suspended for three (3) working days, without pay, and given forty (40) disciplinary points. In the Notice of Suspension the grounds for this action are stated as follows: Inspector Christopher Kingsley violated Rule 14, Section 1, Paragraph (k) of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations: "Has violated any lawful and reasonable official regulation or order or failed to obey any lawful and reasonable direction made and given to him by his superior officer when such violation or failure to obey amounts to insubordination or serious breach of discipline which may reasonably be expected to result in a lower morale in the department or to result in loss, inconvenience, or injury to the City or to the public. * * * On June 15, Captain Yaudes dispatched Inspector Kingsley to 1468 Belleair Road to observe and assist Inspector Mattheus with the fire investigation. When Inspector Kingsley arrived at the fire scene he more or less worked independently. He did not provide the assistance or opinion to Inspector Mattheus when requested. This is further violation of the Guidelines for Disciplinary Action, Level 4, #3 offense: "Insubordination by refusal to perform work assigned or by failure to comply with written or verbal instructions of the supervisory force." Based upon the testimony and documentary evidence presented, the following findings of fact are made about Respondent's actions relative to the fire at 1468 Belleair Road on June 15, 1985: Between approximately 7:30 a.m. and 7:40 a.m. on June 15, 1985 Respondent arrived at work, although his shift did not begin until 8:00 a.m. When Respondent arrived, Captain Gordan Yaudes was talking with Captain Coleman about a radio transmission they had just overheard indicating that Inspector Harry Mattheus had been dispatched to investigate the Belleair Road fire. Since neither Captain Yaudes or Captain Coleman knew Inspector Mattheus, Captain Yaudes called Respondent into the office to see if Respondent knew anything about Mattheus' qualifications or background. Although Respondent and Mattheus had been working out of the same office for two months at the time, Respondent had only a brief acquaintance with Mattheus. They had never been introduced after Mattheus had been hired, their shifts and assignments were different and Mattheus had not yet done a fire scene investigation in the City of Clearwater. Therefore, Respondent told Captain Yaudes he did not know about Mattheus' qualifications. Captain Yaudes ordered Respondent to go to the Belleair fire scene, find out what was going on, and assist Inspector Mattheus, if necessary. Captain Yaudes testified that he wanted Respondent to take command of the investigation if Respondent determined that Mattheus was not properly certified. He specifically denied that he ordered Respondent to do a joint investigation with Mattheus. This order was given prior to 8:00 a.m., and thus prior to either Respondent or Captain Yaudes being on duty. Captain Coleman, who was on duty at the time, concurred in the order. Mattheus had been on the scene for thirty minutes before Respondent arrived. When Respondent arrived he put on protective pants, boots and gloves and entered the premises, a small flower shop. The fire had already been extinguished. Fire damage was confined to a twelve foot by twelve foot area at the front of the store where the cash register had been. Mattheus was not wearing protective gear since he had not been issued any at the time, although he was wearing his own steel reinforced boots. Upon approaching Mattheus at the scene, Respondent asked why he was there and on whose authority. Mattheus indicated he had been placed on the "call list" the night before by Fire Marshal Nic Lewis, and he was responding to a call to investigate the scene he received that morning at home. In making this inquiry, Respondent was responsive to Captain Yaudes' order that he go to the scene, find out what was going on and assume command of the investigation if he determined Mattheus was not qualified. Inspector Mattheus had been employed as a life safety inspector approximately two months prior to this incident. He is a certified fire inspector and was therefore qualified to be on the "call list" and to investigate fires. This was his first investigation for the City of Clearwater. After determining what was going on at the scene and that Mattheus was qualified to do the investigation, Respondent proceeded to assist Mattheus in several ways, including: surveying and discussing the scene together examining electrical wire and sockets, as well as the floor at the scene for possible causes of the fire clearing the area where the cash register had been and suggesting initially that Mattheus keep an aerosol can that had been punctured by a nail as possible evidence. Later, when arson was ruled out, he concurred in Mattheus' decision to discard the can. Respondent also helped clean up the scene since he was wearing protective clothing and Mattheus was not, and discussed an early morning thunderstorm with Mattheus as a possible cause of the fire. In this manner Respondent was responsive to Captain Yaudes' order that he render assistance, if necessary. On several occasions during the approximately thirty minutes when Respondent was at the fire scene, Inspector Mattheus asked him his opinion on the cause of the fire. Respondent responded by saying he did not know, or by shrugging his shoulders. He told Mattheus to list the cause as "unknown" if Mattheus could not determine a cause. Respondent also said to Mattheus on several occasions, "This is your fire." When Mattheus asked if Respondent was going to write a report on this fire, Respondent replied in the negative since this was Mattheus' fire. It is standard operating procedure for the first inspector on the scene to be the primary investigator who writes the report, and for other inspectors to assist the primary investigator. Mattheus was the primary investigator in this fire, and was in charge of the investigation. The terminology, "It's your fire," is commonly understood among firefighters and inspectors to mean that "you are in charge and will write the report." Respondent's use of this phrase in responding to Mattheus was therefore accurate and in recognition of standard operating procedures, and does not indicate any lack of cooperation on his part. Respondent was not ordered to conduct a "joint investigation," according to Captain Yaudes. When the term "joint investigation" is used, it is understood by firefighters and inspectors to mean an investigation which involves another agency, such as the State Fire Marshal's Office or the Electrical Department, in which the other department assists the Fire Department in trying to determine the cause of a fire. On June 14, 1985, the day prior to the Belleair fire, Respondent had called Inspector Jeff Daniels and expressed concern that life safety inspectors would be used to investigate fires since he felt they were not qualified. He also expressed concern about Inspector Mattheus' qualifications. Despite this prior expression of concern, when Respondent was ordered to the fire scene the next day, he did determine that Mattheus was qualified and assisted him as ordered. The testimony of Lieutenant Frank Hill and Firefighters John Milano and Charles Daniels, who were all at the scene on June 15, 1985, specifically confirms that Respondent and Mattheus worked together on the investigation without discord.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the disciplinary charge against Respondent be dismissed, and that Respondent receive three days back-pay and the removal of all disciplinary points in his record arising from this charge. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of January, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Miles Lance, Esquire Assistant City Attorney Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Stuart M. Rosenblum, Esquire, 220 South Garden Avenue.C3 Clearwater, Florida 33516 APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4(c) and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 4(g). Adopted in Finding of Fact 4(a). Adopted in Finding of Fact 4(f). 4-6 Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 8, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4(h) and 6. Rejected in Finding of Fact 4(g). 10,11 Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4(h), but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4(i). Rejected in Finding of Fact 4. Respondent did cooperate and assist as necessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4(h) and 6, but otherwise rejected as erroneously stating Respondent failed to aid Inspector Mattheus. 15,16 Rejected as simply a summation of testimony rather than a proposed finding of fact. 17 Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4(e), but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 18,19 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 8 but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact, as contained in Sections A and B of Respondent's Memorandum, Proposed Findings and Conclusions of Law: Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4 but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 4,5 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 1 and 2. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 8-12 Adopted in Findings of Fact 4(a)-(e). Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4(g), but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4(h), (i). Adopted in Finding of Fact 6, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3.
The Issue This case is presented for consideration based upon a claim by the Petitioner, E. R. Brannon, Sr. against the Respondent, Brevard County Sheriff's Department, contending that the Respondent, by its employment practices, has unlawfully discriminated against the petitioner Brannon related to an alleged handicap, in violation of Subsection 23.167(1)(a), Florida Statutes. In view of this purported violation, Petitioner Brannon requests money damages in the way of back salary payments and benefits, together with attorney's fees, in keeping with Subsection 23.167(13), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner Brannon declines the opportunity for any reinstatement in his former employment with the Brevard Sheriff's Office. In defending against these accusations, the Respondent has plead certain affirmative defenses and contends that its action dismissing the Petitioner Brannon was lawful in view of the provision, Subsection 23.167(8)(a), Florida Statutes, specifically related to the portion of that provision dealing with taking action based upon the need for an absence of a particular handicap as related to a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary for the performance of the particular employment to which such action or inaction is related."
Findings Of Fact Case History On April 2, 1979, the Petitioner, F. R. Brannon, Sr., executed a form complaint of discrimination with the Petitioner, Florida Commission on Human elations, which challenged his dismissal by the Brevard County Sheriff's Department, which occurred on January 5, 1979. After reviewing the complaint, the Petitioner Commission, by action of September 11, 1980, as filed on September 16, 1980, made its determination of case, i.e., reasonable cause to believe an unlawful employment practice had occurred reference the Brevard County Sheriff's Department's dismissal of the Petitioner Brannon. A separate notice of the determination of cause was forwarded to the complainant Brannon and the Respondent, Brevard County Sheriff's Department, on September 16, 1980. Efforts were then made to reach conciliation between the contesting parties and these efforts were unsuccessful and notification of this failure of conciliation was forwarded by the Commission on October 21, 1980. On November 21, 1980, counsel for the Petitioner Brannon made known his appearance before the Commission through written Notice of Appearance and filed a Petition for Relief on the subject of the aforementioned claim brought by the Petitioner Brannon. By document dated November 25, 1990, and placed on file November 26, 1980, the Commissioners of the Florida Commission on Human Relations were notified of the filing of Brannon's Petition for Relief from alleged unlawful employment practice. Subsequent to that notification, Brannon's Petition was transmitted to the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings for consideration of the claim. This transmittal was made on November 26, 1980, and received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 1, 1980. On December 1, 1980, counsel for the Respondent, Brevard County Sheriff's Department, filed its answer to the Petition and statement of affirmative defenses. The Respondent also, by motion of that date, moved to dismiss the Petition. The Motion to Dismiss was denied on December 12, 1980. On December 31 1980, the Respondent, in the person of its former counsel, Charles F. Broome, Esquire, wrote to the Hearing Officer to advise that there had been a change in administration in the Brevard County Sheriff's Office and that the newly elected sheriff wished to have a substitution of counsel. There ensued a series of contacts on the part of this Hearing Officer to establish a hearing date which would accommodate the change in administration and substitution of counsel. After consultation with the parties, the month of March, 1981, was tentatively selected as a time for hearing. This determination was made upon consultation with counsel for the parties, to include Catherine Riley, Esquire, the substituted counsel for the Brevard County Sheriff's Office. The case was subsequently scheduled for hearing on March 9, 1981. Prior to the time for hearing, a letter was written by counsel for the Respondent on January 16, 1981, to advise that one of her witnesses was unable to attend the hearing until after March 30, 1981. By correspondence dated January 22, 1981, in response to the letter of January 16, 1981, which had been addressed to counsel for the Petitioner, counsel for the Petitioner acquiesced in the continuance of the hearing and asked that the matter be set at the first available date beyond March 29, 1981. The correspondence was treated as a motion to continue the case on behalf of the Brevard County Sheriff's office, and the matter was reset for hearing on April 9, 1981. The Respondent, Brevard County Sheriff's Department, had also moved to file an additional affirmative defense, and this motion was granted on February 2, 1981. The initial session of the hearing was held on April 9, 1981, and continued until May 29, 1981, allow the hearing to be concluded. The hearing was concluded on May 29, 1981, and this Recommended Order is being entered after such hearing. In the way of argument, the parties have submitted written memoranda through counsel and have suggested proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended disposition in this matter. To the extent that those proposals, conclusions and recommendations are consistent with the Recommended Order, they have been utilized. To the extent that the proposals, conclusions and recommendations are inconsistent with this Recommended Order, they are hereby rejected. Material Facts The Petitioner, E. R. Brannon, Sr., is an individual who was forty- three (43) years of age at the time of the formal hearing. In the course of his adult life he has worked primarily in law enforcement for a period of sixteen (16) to seventeen (17) years, to include service to the Lake City, Florida, police Department; Eau Gallie, Florida, Police Department: Melbourne, Florida, Police Department; two periods of service with the Brevard County, Florida, Sheriff's Office; the Orange County, Florida, Sheriff's Office and the Marion County, Florida, Sheriff's Office. On July 4, 1974, while working for the Marion County Sheriff's Office as a line deputy, the Petitioner Brannon was shot in his left side and left hand in an attempt to apprehend a felon. He was given a period of convalescence by his employer and then returned as an investigator for the Marion County Sheriff's Office. In September, 1976, after being returned to duty, the condition in his left hand was exacerbated by another job related injury, leading to the eventual amputation of his left hand on November 9, 1980, after the hand had become gangrenous. This final treatment intervention followed a series of approximately twenty (20) operations over the period of time following the initial gunshot wound. The Petitioner Brannon left his employment with Marion County and in January of 1977, took employment with the Brevard County Sheriff's Office where he was hired as a Lieutenant in charge of the division dealing with communications and vehicle maintenance. At all pertinent times to this inquiry, his employer, the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, was an employer with fifteen (15) or more persons working for that entity, for a period of twenty (20) weeks or more during the year. While Brannon was working for the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, he was placed in the position of Captain, awaiting pay adjustment to that grade. At the time of his dismissal from the Brevard County Sheriff's Office on January 5, 1979, he was receiving a salary of approximately $1,260.00 per month, with an additional $175.77 per month contributed for the benefit of his retirement. While serving as the Division Commander of the Communications and Maintenance Unit of the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, Brannon had as many as thirty (30) persons under his supervision. Brannon bad been hired by Sheriff Ronald W. Zimmerman and worked for that individual until September, 1978, when Zimmerman was suspended. Following Zimmerman's suspension from September, 1978, until January 5, 1979, the date of his discharge, Brannon worked for Sheriff David U. Strawn. During the course of Brannon's service under the command of Sheriff Strawn, the problem with Brannon's hand caused him mild to severe pain and led to frequent usage of Demerol and Vistaril to accommodate this problem. Although the visits were not made during working hours per se, Brannon made numerous visits to a local hospital during the September, 1978, to January 5, 1979, time frame, for purposes of treatment. The degree of his discomfort and the effect on Brannon was such that by January 30, 1979, his treating physician, Dr. Maurice Hodge, was of the opinion that Brannon was "totally disabled because he is unable [sic] to use his hand for any gainful purpose. See Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, admitted into evidence and attachment identified as Respondent's No. 1. Notwithstanding the physical discomfort, Brannon attempted to perform his role as Deputy Sheriff and supervisor; however, there were numerous absences from duty during the time of the Strawn administration, to include a period December 18, 1978, through December 30, 1978. All of these absences were accounted for as authorized holidays, annual leave or sick leave. James H. Garvin, presently a Captain in the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, in the position of Jail Supervisor, was emoloyed with that Sheriff's Office during Sheriff Strawn's tenure. At that time, his office in the Sheriff's complex building was located adjacent to that of Brannon and to the extent that the two officers had contact, Garvin did not have difficulty with work coordination involving Brannon. Other officers who had association with Brannon during the time of Strawn's service as Sheriff, included Johnny L. Manis, who was a Captain in 1978, in the Brevard County Sheriff's Office. The communication section was included in his area of responsibility and upon Brannon's dismissal, Manis took over the responsibilities which Brannon had fulfilled in the communications section. Upon taking over, Captain, now Lieutenant, Manis, found the morale in that section to be less than acceptable and the turnover rate to be, in his estimation, excessive. Captain Charles Tenvooren who served as a Major in the Strawn administration, had supervisory responsibility for Brannon in that time period and recalls that Brannon was in the hospital at times. Tenvooren knew that Brannon was being treated for the condition related to his arm and hand and observed impairment in Brannon's job function. As supervisor, he spoke with Sheriff Strawn about the medication that Brannon was taking. Tenvooren also spoke with Brannon about the problem of impairment related to the injury to the arm, as described by the witness Tenvooren. Brannon, in talking with Tenvooren, mentioned the pain which he was experiencing. Lieutenant Harmon B. Wisby testified in the course of the hearing. When Strawn was Sheriff, Lieutenant Wisby was the coordinator of the reserve auxiliary group of the Sheriff's Department. During that time sequence, Wisby was aware of the fact that Brannon was under medication, information he gained from conversations he had with Brannon. Brannon indicated ythat he was having pain and that he was to go back to the hospital. Brannon also indicated to Wisby that he had been given medication to assist him in coping with the pain. Wisby recalls several times when Brannon did not seem aware of his surroundings while he was in the office building, in that Brannon would not respond to him when spoken to in the form of a greeting. Alice Alderman who is a Communications Officer with the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, who worked in the communications section while Brannon was supervisor during the Strawn administration, testified at the hearing. She admits that she had a personality conflict with Brannon. Nonetheless, she testified that during this time sequence he seemed to be "distant." Another employee within the communications section who testified at the hearing was Debbie Walden who was a Communications Dispatcher in the Brevard Sheriff's Office at the time that Strawn was Sheriff. Brannon was her shift supervisor and she recalls numerous absences by Brannon, who from her recollection worked on the same shift on which she was employed. She also indicated that morale was a problem at the time that Brannon was in charge of the section. On January 5, 1979, through correspondence, Sheriff Strawn dismissed Brannon. A copy of the dismissal may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5, admitted into evidence. In the course of the hearing, Strawn indicated that his decision to dismiss no basis for the correspondence was premised on evidence gained from other personnel in the Sheriff's Office; the medical reports pertaining to the Petitioner's physical condition related to his hand; the prognosis on that condition; the uses of pain medication; a few personal observations of the Petitioner in which Strawn felt the Petitioner to be "spacey"; the belief that the Petitioner was not capable of line duty, i.e., responsibilities as an armed deputy; the problem which Brannon appeared to have approaching his job with a "clear head"; the high turnover in the communications section, indicating a problem with management by Brannon; a property control problem related to equipment which Brannon had in his charge and Brannon's lack of ability as an administrator and supervisor. All of Strawn's background reasons and observations were an accurate depiction of the circumstance with the exception that there was insufficient proof in the course of the hearing to demonstrate that Brannon had acted inappropriately on the subject of property control of equipment in the communications section. Likewise, reported observations by coworkers are correct. In particular, the use of pain medication for the handicap related to the injured arm and hand was such that Brannon was incapable of performing the duty of a line officer charged with the direct protection of the public and the possibility of use of force to effect that purpose. This medication also compounded Brannon's problems as an administrator. When the dismissal letter was drafted, the prime focus of that letter was to the effect that the Sheriff's Office was concerned about Brannon's return to employment duties because of the belief by the Department that there would be exposure for liability in terms of workmen's Compensation claims by Brannon, in that the Sheriff's office believed that they would be entirely liable for physical disability if Brannon suffered an "industrial accident" while acting in the scope and capacity of his position within the Department. In further explanation, it was stated that the Department believed the health circumstance of Brannon was intense in view of the pain and associated use of special medications. For these reasons, Strawn was concerned that any negligent act by Brannon could result in liability for the Department, apparently from claims by third parties. The letter of dismissal went on to say that his duties were not being performed as well as expected because of Brannon's physical condition and the necessity for taking drugs to cope with those problems and further concern for fellow officers and members of the public. This statement can be related to Brannon's potential abilities as a lane officer and his primary function as supervisor of the communications and maintenance section. (Notwithstanding the fact that Brannon was not serving on a day-to-day capacity as a line officer, as a Deputy Sheriff he could reasonably be expected to be pressed into service in the eventuality of some emergency which called upon all appointees within the Sheriff's Office who are deputies to serve in that capacity, and as Brannon himself stated at the hearing, Sheriff's deputies are technically on duty twenty-four (24) hours a day.) Finally, the impression was created in the hearing process that the Strawn administration had been concerned about Brannon's absenteeism and morale in his section. Although this is not expressly stated in the letter of dismissal, the facts presented in evidence bear out the contention that Brannon was absent an inordinate number of times, notwithstanding the fact that the absences were taken under legitimate leave principles, and there were problems related to morale in the communications section. In addressing Strawn's worries, there was no procedure undertaken for formal evaluation of Brannon's performance. Sheriff Strawn did discuss Brannon's physical condition with him and what the Sheriff perceived to be a problem with the communications equipment inventory control system. On January 8, 1979, Brannon began to look for alternative employment and gained such employment with the Brevard County Public Safety Division, within the Brevard County Board of County Commissioners on march 26, 1979, and was employed by them until January 14, 1981. During the course of his employment, he received $16,812.40 in gross earnings, and was provided life insurance commensurate with his annual salary, as well as health insurance. In addition, this employer "paid-in" at the rate of 9.1 percent of annual salary, into a retirement system. This payment to the retirement system was not made during leave without pay between July 1, 1980, and August, 1980. Following his employment with the Brevard Counts' Public Safety Division, Brannon worked for the Sheriff of Lake County, Florida, eighteen (18) to twenty (20) days, a month maximum. Following Brannon's dismissal from the Brevard County Sheriff's Office, he also requested social security disability benefits in the summer of 1980, and that claim is now pending.
