Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), is designated as the state agency responsible for the administration of federal and state Medicaid funds, and is authorized by statute to provide payments for medical services. Respondent, Marvin H. Ledbetter, is a doctor of osteopathy who is enrolled as a general practitioner provider in the Medicaid Program. His professional office is in Ormond Beach, Florida where he is engaged in family practice. Under the Program, Ledbetter is assigned a provider number (48220-0) which is used to bill Medicaid for services rendered to Medicaid recipients. During calendar year 1981, which is the only time period in question, Ledbetter received $42,809 in Medicaid reimbursements from HRS, of which $28,062 related to fees for Medicaid hospital patients. The latter category of fees is at issue. In order to qualify for federal matching Medicaid funds HRS must meet certain federally-imposed requirements, including the establishment of a program integrity section designed to insure that all Medicaid services are medically necessary. If they are not, HRS is obliged to seek recoupment of funds paid to the provider. This proceeding involves an attempt by HRS to recoup certain funds paid to Ledbetter for hospital services. After providing medical services to various hospital patients, Ledbetter completed and sent in the necessary forms to obtain payment. As noted earlier, these payments totaled $28,062 during 1981. Upon receipt of the forms, HRS input the information from the forms into a computer data base, along with similar information from other Medicaid providers throughout the State. This information included, among other things, the number of admissions, number of discharges, amount paid for hospital services and length of stay. The retention of such data is necessary so that possible overpayments may be detected by HRS through the statistical analysis of claims submitted by a group of providers of a given type. Because Ledbetter's total discharges exceeded the average of other family physicians throughout the State, the computer generated a report which flagged Ledbetter for further review and examination. An HRS analyst conducted such a review of Ledbetter's records, and found his average hospital length of stay for patients to be acceptable when compared to the average physician in the State. This report was forwarded to the HRS peer review coordinator who randomly selected thirty of Ledbetter's patients from the computer, and obtained their patient charts (numbering sixty-eight). Such a statistical calculation is authorized by Rule 10C-7.6(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code. A medical consultant employed by HRS then reviewed twelve of the sixty-eight charts and recommended the records be sent to a Peer Review Committee (PRC) for its review and recommendation. This committee is authorized by Rule 7C-7.61(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code serves under contract with HRS, and is composed of eight members of the Florida Osteopathic Medical Association. It is their responsibility to review the files of physicians whose Medicaid payments are questioned by HRS's program integrity section. When Ledbetter's records were forwarded to the PRC by HRS, the transmittal letter stated that a "study" of his records had been made, and that said study revealed "overutilization of inpatient hospital services" and "excessive lengths of stay." After a PRC review was conducted in early 1984, the records were returned to HRS with a notation that "mild overutilization" had occurred. According to informal guidelines used by the PRC, this meant that Ledbetter's overutilization fell within the range of 0 percent to 20 percent. HRS accepted these findings but for some reason initially determined that a 40 percent overutilization had occurred, and that Ledbetter was overpaid in 1981 by 40 percent for his hospital services. Finding this amount to be inconsistent with the mild overutilization guidelines, HRS arbitrarily added back two days to each patient's hospital stay, which decreased overutilization to 33.8 percent, or $9,505.06 in overpayments. By proposed agency action issued on May 18, 1984, it billed Ledbetter this amount, thereby precipitating the instant controversy. All of the patients in question were from the lower income category, and most were black. Their home conditions were generally less than desirable, and the ability of the parents to supply good nursing care to ill or sick children was in doubt. At the same time, in 1981 Ledbetter was working an average of 56 hours per week in the emergency room of a local hospital and devoted only minimal time to his family practice. Because of this Ledbetter's number of hospital admissions greatly exceeded the norm when compared to general practitioners who engaged in an office practice. Consequently, he received most of these patients through the emergency room rather than his office and was dealing with patients whose socioeconomic conditions were an important consideration. These factors must be taken into account in analyzing Ledbetter's patient records. HRS does not contend that Ledbetter failed to perform the services for which he was paid--rather, it questions only whether some of the admissions were medically necessary and whether some of the lengths of stay were too long. In this regard, conflicting expert testimony was offered by the parties concerning the amount of overutilization, if any. Expert testimony by two local doctors of osteopathy support a finding that only mild overutilization of admissions and lengths of stay occurred. This is corroborated by HRS's expert (Dr. Smith) and by the testimony of its "live" expert, Dr. Conn, who conceded that lengths of stay were only "a little bit too long." The more persuasive testimony also establishes that while mild overutilization falls within the range of 0 percent to 20 percent, 10 percent is an appropriate median in this proceeding. Using this yardstick, Ledbetter should reimburse HRS for 10 percent for his billings, or $2,806.20.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent repay petitioner $2,086.20 in excess Medicaid payments received for calendar year 1981 claims. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Based upon an agreement between the petitioner and the respondent, and a later addendum, petitioner received Certificate of Need Number 1460 in February of 1981 granting the petitioner the authority to construct 126 additional general medical/surgical beds but to only license and operate 72 of such beds. The instant proceeding involves petitioner's application for a Certificate of Need to license and operate the remaining 54 beds which have been previously constructed under Certificate of Need Number 1460. St. Joseph's Hospital is a 649-bed full service major referral hospital in Hillsborough County owned and operated by the Franciscan Sisters of Allegheny. Its services include a comprehensive community mental health center, a comprehensive pediatric unit with 88 beds, a radiation therapy center, a 60- bed community cancer center, cardiac catheterization, cardiac surgery and a large and active emergency room. It serves a considerable number of indigent patients and participates in the Medicaid and Medicare programs. Petitioner is now requesting permission to license the regaining 54 beds which were authorized to be constructed pursuant to Certificate of Need Number 1460. The project involves no additional construction or renovation inasmuch as all 126 beds previously authorized have been completed. No capital expenditure will be required in order to place the 54 beds into operation. If the Certificate of Need is granted, petitioner intends to create two specialty medical/surgical units: a 32-bed cardiac surgical unit to accommodate patients from the open heart surgical program and a 22-bed medical unit for psychiatric patients requiring medical treatment. There currently are no other beds available in the hospital to convert for use for the psychiatric patient or for the cardiac surgical unit. Petitioner has been operating, on occasion, at occupancy levels in excess of 90 percent. At times, it has been necessary to place non-emergency patients in the emergency room and have them remain there until beds become available. There are sometimes up to 40 patients on the waiting list for elective surgery. Due to the shortage of empty beds, petitioner cannot now admit new members to its medical staff. Steady operation of the hospital at occupancy levels exceeding 90 percent can have an adverse effect upon the efficiency of the nursing staff and the quality of care offered to patients. Because the bulk of projected growth in Hillsborough County is expected to occur in the center and northwestern area of the county, it is anticipated that the pattern of utilization of petitioner's facility will continue. While the licensing of the 54 additional beds involves no capital expenditure on petitioner's part, it is estimated that, if petitioner is not permitted to license these beds, a total yearly loss of over $3.8 million will be experienced. This figure is the sum of lost net revenues from the beds in the amount of $87,339 and lost net ancillary revenues in the amount of $2.36 million, as well as the absorption of $232,750 in yearly depreciation costs and $1.14 million in committed indirect costs. Petitioner anticipates a loss per patient day, calculated at 100 percent occupancy, of $16.82 if the licensing of the beds is not approved. This would result in an increase of current patient charges by 9.1 percent in order to maintain petitioner's budgeted profit margin. Petitioner is located in HRS District VI which, at the time of the hearing, was composed of Hillsborough and Manatee Counties. Some 81 percent of all beds in the District are located in Hillsborough County. As of the time of the hearing, the District had 3,899 licensed acute care beds, with 606 additional beds having been approved but not yet operational. The generally accepted optimum utilization rate for acute care beds is 80 to 85 percent. For District VI, the overall utilization rate is below the optimum level. In Manatee County, utilization of acute care beds is at 78.3 percent. In Hillsborough County, the utilization level is at 77.4 percent, with the major referral hospitals experiencing a higher level of utilization than the smaller community hospitals. Rule 10-5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, contains the governing methodology for determining acute care bed needs of the various Districts. Applications for new or additional acute care hospital beds in a District will not normally be approved if approval would cause the number of beds in that District to exceed the number of beds calculated to be needed. Application of the Rule's formula to District VI results in a total acute care bed need of 3,622 projected for the year 1988. Given the 4,505 existing and approved beds in the District, there are 883 excess beds in District VI under the Rule's formula methodology for projecting need. The 1982 Health Systems Plan adopted by the Florida Gulf Health Systems Agency makes no bed need projections for other specialty medical/surgical beds," but shows no need for medical/surgical beds. Rule 10-5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, provides that other criteria may result in a demonstration of bed need even when the formula approach illustrates no need for beds. When additional beds are approved pursuant to other criteria, those beds are counted in the inventory of existing and approved beds in the area when applying the bed need formula to review future projects. The formula methodology does account for the inflow and outflow of patients in a specific area. While Rule 10-5.11(23) permits the Local Health Councils to adopt subdistrict bed allocations by type of service, the Council for District VI had not adopted its local health plan as of the date of the hearing in this matter. The Rule itself simply addresses the need for general acute care bed needs in the future.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. for a Certificate of Need to license 54 acute care medical/surgical beds be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 10th day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Ivan Wood, Esquire David Pingree Wood, Lucksinger & Epstein Secretary One Houston Center Department of Health and Suite 1600 Rehabilitative Services Houston, Texas 77010 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven W. Huss, Esquire 1323 Winewood Boulevard, Suite 406 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration has a policy regarding the determination of the need for long term care beds which constitutes a rule and, if so, whether rulemaking is feasible and practicable.
Findings Of Fact Vencor Hospitals South, Inc. (Vencor), applied for a certificate of need (CON No. 8614) to establish a 60-bed long term care hospital in Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) District 8, for Fort Myers, Lee County, Florida. AHCA is the state agency authorized to administer the CON program for health care services and facilities in Florida. AHCA reviewed and preliminarily denied Vencor's application for CON No. 8614. The reasons for AHCA's actions on this or any other CON application are memorialized in documents called State Agency Action Reports (SAARs). Vencor alleges that the following statement generally describes AHCA's policy in regard to the review of CON applications for long term care hospitals: Long term care is not a separate category of health service, but is instead merely an allowable form of reimbursement pursuant to Medicare regulations. The care provided in acute care hospitals, hospital based skilled nursing beds, "subacute" care in nursing homes, and care at rehabilitation facilities, are all equivalent to the care provided at long term care hospitals. Therefore, in evaluating the need for long term care hospital beds, AHCA will assess the availability of other categories of beds and services to meet the need for the services proposed by the applicant for long term care hospital beds. Need for long term care beds is determined on a regional basis. Prior to 1994, long term care hospitals were not regulated separately and were considered comparable to general acute care hospitals. In 1994, AHCA amended the CON rules to establish long term care beds and hospitals as separate categories of health care providers. In 1994, AHCA defined and continues to the present to define long term care hospital as follows: "Long term care hospital" means a hospital licensed under Chapter 395, Part I, F.S., which meets the requirements of Part 412, subpart B, paragraph 412.23(e), [C]ode of Federal Regulations (1994), and seeks exclusion from the Medicare prospective payment system for inpatient hospital services. Rule 59C-1.002(29), Florida Administrative Code. In the federal regulations referenced by the AHCA rule, long term care hospital is more specifically defined as a hospital with an independent governing structure, an average length of stay greater than 25 days, referral of at least 75 percent of total patients from separate hospitals, and which meets the requirements for Medicare participation. 42 CFR Ch. IV, Subch. B, Pt. 412, Subpt. B, s. 412.23. AHCA also distinguishes long term care in its rules governing the conversions from one type of health care provider to another. The applicable conversion rules provide: "Conversion from one type of health care facility to another" means the reclassification of one licensed facility type to another licensed facility type, including reclassification from a general acute care hospital to a long term care hospital or specialty hospital or from a long term care hospital or specialty hospital to a general acute care hospital. Rule 59C-1.002(14), Florida Administrative Code (emphasis added); and "Conversion of beds" means the reclassification of licensed beds from one category to another including, for facilities licensed under Chapter 395, F.S., conversion to or from acute care beds, neonatal intensive care beds, hospital inpatient psychiatric beds, comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds, hospital inpatient substance abuse beds, distinct part skilled nursing facility beds, or beds in a long term care hospital; and, for facilities licensed under Chapter 400, Part I, F.S., conversion to or from skilled beds and intermediate care beds in a facility that is not certified for both skilled and intermediate nursing care if such conversion effects a change in the level of care of 10 beds or 10 percent of the total bed capacity of the facility within a 2-year period, or conversion to or from sheltered beds and community beds. Rule 59C-1.002 (15), Florida Administrative Code (emphasis added). AHCA also defined "substantial change in health services" to include: The conversion of a general acute care or specialty hospital licensed under Chapter 395, Part I, F.S., to a long term care hospital. Rule 59C-1.002(41)(c), Florida Administrative Code. Taken together AHCA's rules recognize long term care hospitals or beds as a separate and distinct category. Elfie Stamm was responsible for the development of the rules and is currently the chief of the CON and Budget Review Office at AHCA. Ms. Stamm testified in a 1994 rule challenge case, when AHCA was drafting a rule with a numeric need methodology for long term care beds, that: long term care hospitals serve patients who cannot be cost effectively treated in an acute care hospital, who do not have the same needs for the same types of service; it would not be fair for an applicant for the new construction of a long term care hospital to be compared to an acute care hospital; comprehensive medical rehabilitation (CMR) services are different than services in a long term care hospital; a long term care hospital with an average length of stay of 25 days or more is different from an acute care hospital that generally has a length of stay of 5 to 6 days but provides a full range of services; the patient populations in long term care hospitals are different from those in an acute care hospital in terms of overall patient characteristics, including older than average age, higher percentage of patients with particular diagnoses, such as ventilator dependency, higher overall mortality rates than acute care hospitals, and a much higher percentage of admissions by referrals from acute care hospitals. [T. 262-283]. See also Tarpon Springs Hospital Foundation, etc. v. AHCA, et al., DOAH Case No. 94-0958RU (R.O. 8/2/94). On behalf of AHCA, Ms. Stamm testified in this proceeding that: AHCA has changed its mind on whether or not it is appropriate to leave a patient in an acute care setting rather than transfer to long term care, specifically with regard to cost-effectiveness. [T. 373]. AHCA has not changed its mind and still says acute care hospitals and long term care hospitals should be reviewed separately, because if they would be reviewed comparatively, . . . there would be no chance for any [long term] beds ever because we don't show any need for acute care beds anywhere in the state. [T. 376]. But in evaluating Vencor's application for long term care hospitals in District 8 that would be located in Lee County, the Agency viewed hospital-based skilled nursing units, community nursing home subacute beds and comprehensive medical rehab beds throughout the entire district as existing and like potential alternatives to the proposed project. [T. 389]. AHCA does not necessarily agree that CMR services are different from long term care hospital services. [T. 265]. AHCA does not have a clearly identified population group for whom long term care would be more cost-effective, or to determine a numeric need methodology. [TR. 324]. Although there is a population that does need services that exceed 25 days or prolonged ventilator service, AHCA is not sure what is the most appropriate setting for their care because of inadequate data on comparative costs and outcomes. [TR. 327-8]. AHCA attributes its change in position to the publication titled Subacute Care: Policy Synthesis And Market Area Analysis, submitted to the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, on November 1, 1995, by Lewin-VHI, Inc. The document is commonly referred to as the Lewin Report. The Lewin Report concludes that long term care hospitals serve patients who are also served in other subacute settings, including CMR beds and hospitals, acute care hospital skilled nursing units, and skilled nursing units in freestanding nursing homes. As a result of the conclusions in the Lewin Report, AHCA maintains that it is unable to develop a numeric need methodology without an identifiable patient population. AHCA has not, however, repealed the rules establishing long term care as a separate type of health care service. Rather, the agency intends to wait for additional studies, including one being conducted for Vencor. The Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for acute care hospitals created the market for subacute and long term care. Under the PPS, acute care hospitals receive a fixed payment based on the patient's diagnosis or diagnostic related group (DRG). Upon discharge to a subacute or long term setting, the patient's care is no longer reimbursed on a fixed basis, but at actual, reasonable costs. AHCA maintains that financial pressures created the current system, but without cost/benefit or outcomes analyses to demonstrate the appropriateness of using long term care hospitals. Therefore, AHCA considered the occupancy levels of acute care hospitals and available nursing home beds in determining the need for Vencor's project. AHCA has no rule defining subacute care, no inventory of subacute care units in nursing homes, and no reporting requirements from which it can determine the level of care or services provided in hospital based skilled nursing units. AHCA has no reports on specific levels or types of services provided in CMR beds. AHCA, nevertheless, presumed that the services are like those provided in long term care beds based on the Lewin Report. In rejecting Vencor's attempts to distinguish itself from other types of health care providers, AHCA relied, in part, on its finding that 1995 District 8 acute care hospital occupancy averaged 47.69 percent and peaked at 60.26 percent. By not adopting rules for determining the numeric need for long term care, AHCA also failed to establish the appropriate service area for determining need. AHCA considers the need for long term care services on a regional basis. In support of AHCA's decision to deny a long term care hospital application in District 9, Ms. Stamm's predecessor, Elizabeth Dudek, testified that long term care is a regional service. As further evidence of AHCA's position, the SAARs issued by AHCA on long term care hospital applications, have examined available services beyond the limits of the district. AHCA contends that long term care is regional, but determines its need by comparison to available hospital based skilled nursing units and subacute beds in community nursing homes, which are evaluated on a subdistrict basis, and CMR services which are tertiary but evaluated on a district-wide basis. See Finding of Fact 22. Since November 1995, AHCA has preliminarily denied all CON applications for long term care hospitals. Its policy of comparing the need for long term care to available beds in nursing homes and other types of hospitals is consistently repeated in the portions of the SAARs which address need. In analyzing the need for long term care hospitals in AHCA District 1, the SAAR dated January 10, 1997, includes the following statements: Vencor Hospitals South, Inc. defines its patient population as those currently being treated in ICUs and belonging to roughly 10 DRGs (which account for approximately 83% of Vencor patients. . . .) However these DRGs could also [be] appropriate for acute care, hospital based freestanding skilled nursing care, skilled nursing facility care and comprehensive medical rehabilitation care and the applicant does not demonstrate that these services are not available to residents of District 1. and The applicant [Baptist Health Affiliates Inc.] also discusses the differences between its proposed patient population and that of an acute care hospital, nursing home and those treated at home. However, there is no documentation provided which demonstrates the applicant's potential patients could not receive appropriate care in the District's existing rehabilitation facility, hospital based or nursing home skilled subacute nursing units. . . . Vencor Exhibit 12, pages 3-4 and 8. AHCA reviewed a CON application filed by Columbia of Pinellas County, Inc., to convert acute care beds to a long term care hospital in District 5, and concluded: The patient population represented by the DRGs listed above (by the applicant) are typical of freestanding nursing home with subacute units and hospital based SNUs in the state. There appear to be strong similarities between the subacute patient population of nursing homes/units and those of a long term care hospital. Vencor Exhibit 13, page 8. The SAAR issued on the Columbia of Pinellas County CON application continued with an extensive discussion of the Lewin Report. The SAAR reported AHCA's finding that CMR hospitals are alternatives since they admit patients who do not fit federal guidelines for CMR admissions (being able to tolerate three hours of therapy a day), and who might otherwise be in long term care hospitals. In the SAAR issued after the review of long term care applications for District 7, the same statement appears: The patient population represented by the DRGs listed above [by Orlando Regional Hospital] are typical of freestanding nursing home with subacute units and hospital based SNUs in the state. There appear to be strong similarities between the subacute patient population of nursing homes/units and those of a long term care hospital. Vencor Exhibit 14, page 11. Finally, in reviewing applications from Palm Beach County in District 9, AHCA concluded again: The applicant states that generally speaking the long term care hospital patients have respiratory complications, . . . tracheostomies, . . . chronic diseases, an infectious process requiring antibiotic therapy, . . . skin complications . . . need a combination of rehabilitation and complex medical treatment or are technology dependent individuals requiring high levels of nursing care. However, these patients could also [be] appropriate for acute care, hospital based skilled nursing care, skilled nursing facility care and comprehensive medical rehabilitation care and the applicant does not demonstrate that these services are not available to the residents of District IX. Vencor Exhibit 15, page 4. AHCA relies on the statutory review criteria in Subsection 408.035(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as authority for its consideration of all beds and facilities which may serve the same patients. That provision requires consideration of: (b) The availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization, and adequacy of like and existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant. The expert witness for AHCA, however, distinguished between "like and existing" services for purposes of determining numeric need and the statutory criteria. She noted that once numeric need is established and published for nursing beds or CMR beds, for example, that same category of beds outside the appropriate health service planning subdistrict or district is not considered "like and existing." Similarly, within the district or subdistrict, there is a factual issue in each case but no presumption that beds of a different category are "like and existing." AHCA contends that it has no policy related to long term care and any comparable services. Since 1995, long term care CON applicants, according to AHCA, have failed to meet the requirements of Rule 59C-1.008(e), which provides in pertinent part: If no agency policy exists, the applicant will be responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory or rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. (Emphasis added). AHCA's argument ignores the fact that its expert witness provided competent, substantial evidence that it has redefined and expanded the meaning of "like services" for purposes of demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology. It also ignores the fact that AHCA has expanded the comparison of need beyond the geographical limits of the district. AHCA's argument that it is waiting for additional data before adopting a need methodology, including data from a Vencor study, is to no avail since AHCA has already changed its policy. After reviewing a total of eighteen CON applications for long term care hospitals, AHCA has issued two CONs, one as part of a settlement agreement and the other approving an application filed by St. Petersburg Health Care Management, Inc. (St. Petersburg), for CON 8213. The St. Petersburg application demonstrated need using an identical methodology prepared by the same health planner as Vencor in this case. Referring to CON 8213, AHCA's expert witness candidly admitted . . . "I want to make clear that particular application was actually submitted and approved prior to the Lewin study." (T. 393). Subsequent to the Lewin study, AHCA has consistently denied applications for long term care beds or hospitals.
Findings Of Fact Harbour Shores Hospital is a 60-bed short-term psychiatric facility, with 36 adult beds and 24 adolescent beds. The facility opened in October 1985, and had an occupancy of 62 percent at the time of the final hearing in March 1986. T. 14, 20. The hospital is an integral part of Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc., located in Ft. Pierce, Florida, and Lawnwood is owned by Hospital Corporation of America. T. 13-14. Hospital Corporation of America now operates 5,000 psychiatric beds in the United States. T. 18. Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc. (Lawnwood), submitted an application for certificate of need number 3363 on June 14, 1984, for the conversion of 12 short-term psychiatric beds to 12 short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse beds. T. 15. No construction is needed to convert these 12 beds. T. 16. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) initially denied the application. T. 106. All references in this order to Harbour Shores Hospital shall include the Petitioner, Lawnwood, unless specifically stated otherwise. The parties stipulated that the only issue in this case is need and any ancillary issue which is based upon need. T. 4-5. HRS has a rule governing short and long-term hospital inpatient hospital substance abuse beds, which is rule 10-5.11(27), Florida Administrative Code. Subparagraph (f)1 of the rule contains what HRS calls bed allocations" and calculates need for a health service district as a whole. Harbour Shores Hospital is located in St. Lucie County in Health District IX. District IX is composed of St. Lucie, Indian River, Martin, Okeechobee, and Palm Beach Counties. HRS Ex. 2, p.7. The District IX Local Health Council has identified two subdistricts for purposes of allocating short term psychiatric and substance abuse beds. Subdistrict 1 is St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River, and Okeechobee Counties, and subdistrict 2 is Palm Beach County. HRS Exhibit 2, p. 7; T. 110. HRS proposes to determine need as of January 1989 using the date of the application as the starting point for the five year period specified in rule 10- 5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 107-6. The basis of this decision is a new policy by HRS to implement the Gulf Court decision. There is a need for only 1 additional short-term substance abuse bed in District IX by January 1989 based upon Rule 10-5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 109. HRS Exhibit 1. HRS proposes also to refer to such need for short term substance abuse beds as indicated by local health council plans, relying upon rule 10- 5.11(27)(h)3, Florida Administrative Code. T. 110. The local health plan for District IX allocates needed beds based upon the subdistricts described above. HRS Exhibit 2, p. 6. Further, the local health plan has adopted the method of HRS found in rule 10-5.11(27), supra, for calculating need, and calculates such need using the HRS rule factor of .06 substance 3. All references in this order to Harbour Shores Hospital shall include the Petitioner, Lawnwood, unless specifically stated otherwise. The parties stipulated that the only issue in this case is need and any ancillary issue which is based upon need. T. 4-5. HRS has a rule governing short and long term hospital inpatient hospital-substance abuse beds, which is Rule 10-5.11(27), Florida Administrative Code. Subparagraph (f)1 of the rule contains what HRS calls bed "allocations" and calculates need for a health service district as a whole. Harbour Shores Hospital is located in St. Lucie County in Health District IX. District IX is composed of St. Lucie, Indian River, Martin, Okeechobee, and Palm Beach Counties. HRS Ex. 2, p.7. The District IX Local Health Council has identified two subdistricts for purposes of allocating short-term psychiatric and substance abuse beds. Subdistrict 1 is St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River, and Okeechobee Counties, and subdistrict 2 is Palm Beach County. HRS Exhibit 2, p.7; T. 110. HRS proposes to determine need as of January 1989 using the date of the application as the starting point for the five-year period specified in Rule 10-5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 107-8. The basis of this decision is a new policy by HRS to implement the Gulf Court decision. There is a need for only 1 additional short-term substance abuse bed in District IX by January 1989 based upon Rule 10-5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 109. Exhibit 1. HRS proposes also to refer to such need for short term substance abuse beds as indicated by local health council plans, relying upon rule 10- 5.11(27)(h)3, Florida Administrative Code. T. 110. The local health plan for District IX allocates needed beds based upon the subdistricts described above. HRS Exhibit 2, p. 6. Further, the local health plan has adopted the method of HRS found in rule 10-5.11(27), supra, for calculating need, and calculates such need using the HRS rule factor of .06 substance abuse beds per 1,000 population in each of the two subdistricts. HRS Exhibit 2, pp. 5 and 8, paragraph II. Using current estimates of the populations of each subdistrict in January 1909, HRS projects that subdistrict 1 will have a surplus of 15 substance abuse beds in 1989, and all net need (16 beds) will be in subdistrict 2, which is Palm Beach County. T. 111; HRS Exhibit 1. HRS has not adopted these subdistricts by rule. T. 128-29. There was no evidence to substantiate the reasonableness of the subdistricts adopted in the local health plan. T. 131. The following is a summary of the existing and approved short-term substance abuse beds in District IX, showing county of location, and occupancy rates for 1985: Humana Hospital 16 Licensed Indian River 8509 Sebastian Lake Hospital 16 Licensed Palm Beach 3558 Palm Beaches Fair Oaks 17 Licensed Palm Beach 3807 Savannas 20 Approved St. Lucie Hospital Beds Status County Patient Days Occupancy 145.7% 60.7% 60.7% The number of patient days at Fair Oaks, however, is for four months, August, October, November, and December 1985. Thus, the actual number of patient days, 1269, has been multiplied by 3 to obtain an estimate for an entire year. T. 23- 24, 61-62. The occupancy rate is the number of patient days divided by the product of the number of days in the year (365) and the number of licensed beds. Using the statistics in paragraph 10, the average occupancy rate for the three existing facilities in District IX was 88.8 percent. If one assumes, as did Petitioner's expert, that the utilization rates for short-term substance abuse beds will at least remain the same as in 1935, with the addition of the 20 new beds at Savannas Hospital, District IX may have an occupancy rate of 63.8 percent and subdistrict 1 may have an occupancy rate of 64.8 percent . The 20 new beds at the Savannas Hospital are those granted to Indian River Community Mental Health Center, Inc., and are projected to open in November 1986. T. 83. As discussed above, Harbour Shores Hospital had been in operation about five months by the time of the March 1986 hearing, and its 60 short term psychiatric beds were averaging 62 percent occupancy, which is about 15 percent above the occupancy projected in its certificate of need application. T. 38. Harbour Shores serves patients from the four counties of subdistrict 1, St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River, and Okeechobee, and serves a significant number of patients from Palm Beach County as well; three to four percent of its patients also come from Brevard and Broward Counties. T. 19. About 80 percent of the patients at Harbour Shores in the first five months of its operation had a substance abuse problem secondary to the primary diagnosis of mental illness. T. 30, 50, 63. This is consistent with experience throughout Florida. T. 63. Most of these "dually diagnosed" patients have been through a detoxification program before entering Harbour Shores Hospital. T. 30. In its beginning months of operation, Harbour Shores has had patients referred from the courts, law enforcement agencies, community and social agencies, physicians, and from HRS. T. 21-22, 59. Harbour Shores can expect to obtain substance abuse referrals from these agencies. Staff at Harbour Shores works with the DWI Board, Students Against Drunk Driving, and school administrative personnel. T. 39-40. In October and November 1985, Harbour Shores received 38 requests from physicians, the courts, law enforcement agencies, and social agencies, for admission of patients for substance abuse treatment. T. 22, 49. There is no evidence that Harbour Shores had any such requests in December 1985 or January 1986. In February 1986, it had 14 such requests, and in March to the date of the hearing, it had 5 requests. T. 48. There is no evidence as to whether these requests were for short or long-term substance abuse services, or whether these were requests from different patients or multiple requests from the same patient. There is also no evidence that the persons requesting substance abuse treatment were not adequately treated at existing facilities. Thus, the data from these few months is not an adequate basis for determining future need for short term substance abuse beds. Ms. Peggy Cioffi is the coordinator for the Martin County Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program. Deposition, Ms. Peggy Cioffi, p. 2. Ms. Cioffi testified as to the need for substance abuse services in her area. She did not testify as an expert witness. Her program is primarily designed to assist the County Court in referrals of misdemeanants and others within the Court's jurisdiction who need substance abuse services. Id. Ms. Cioffi has difficulty placing persons needing inpatient or residential treatment. Id. at p. 3. She related an example of a county prisoner who asked to be detained in jail three months for lack of an alcohol program. Id. at p. 4. Ms. Cioffi did not state whether this person needed residential or inpatient hospital care. She also had recently reviewed a 14 page county court docket and determined that 67 percent of those charged represented alcohol or drug related offenses. Id. Ms. Cioffi did not clearly show how she was able to infer this fact. Further, Ms. Cioffi was unable to tell from this statistic how many of these defendants needed short term inpatient hospital substance abuse treatment. Id. at p. 6. She stated that a very high percentage of these could benefit from some kind of services, but did not separate the kinds of services, Id. at p.7. Ms. Cioffi stated that she often had to wait to find a place for a person in the following facilities: Dunklin, CARP, and Alcohope. Id. at p. 5. Ms. Cioffi stated that these were "residential" facilities, but she did not state whether these facilities were the equivalent of short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse facilities. These facilities are located in District IX, Id. at p. 7, but are not short-term in patient hospital substance abuse beds licensed as such. See paragraph 10 above. See also T. 96-99. In summary, although Ms. Cioffi identified a generalized need for residential or hospital substance abuse treatment, she did not draw any distinction between the two services. If there was a similarity, she did not provide evidence of the similarity. Lacking evidence in the record that need for residential treatment programs can be used to show need for inpatient hospital beds, Ms. Cioffi's testimony is insufficient to show need for the services sought by the Petitioner. The Honorable Marc Cianca is a County Judge in St. Lucie County. Deposition, Judge Marc Cianca, p. 2. Judge Cianca was of the opinion that his area attracted semi-young people with substance abuse problems in greater numbers than the retirement population. Id. at 17-18. He frequently was frustrated in his efforts to find substance abuse services for defendants in his Court. Id. at 3-5. Judge Cianca felt that most of the people he saw needed long-term therapy, beginning with inpatient services, followed by long-term follow-up programs. Id. at 12-14. Like the testimony of Ms. Cioffi (which concerned the same group of persons before the County Court), Judge Cianca did not clearly distinguish need for short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse services from need for all other forms of substance abuse treatment, and the record on this point is silent as well. For this reason, Judge Cianca's opinion that 100 short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse beds are needed must be rejected. The testimony of Ms. Cioffi and Judge Cianca is insufficient as a predicate for determining need for the inpatient hospital beds sought by the Petitioner for another reason, and that is the lack of evidence that the persons identified as needing substance abuse services will have the ability to pay for such services at Petitioner's facility, or that third party payment will be available for them. The people in need in Ms. Cioffi's testimony normally do not have funds to pay for treatment. Cioffi, p. 8. Similarly, a substantial number of the people in need seen by Judge Cianca do not have insurance coverage and would not be able to use Harbour Shores unless they qualified for Medicaid and unless Harbour Shores took all of those qualified for Medicaid. Id. at 7, 15-16. A substantial number of the persons needing substance abuse treatment do not have jobs or insurance and must rely upon "welfare" for services. Id. at 15, 17. These persons cannot afford certain programs, and must rely upon state aid through programs such as those provided by Indian River Community Mental Health Center, and for these programs there is always a waiting list. Id. at There is no evidence that any of these persons are eligible for Medicaid. Ms. Sharon Heinlen, Director of Planning and Development for Harbour Shores Hospital, who testified for the Petitioner as an expert in health planning and hospital administration, had not studied the Medicaid population in the area to determine need. T. 76. Although Harbour Shores had about 15 percent of its psychiatric patient days devoted to Medicaid patients, T. 33, the validity of this percentage for substance abuse patients, or for the reasonably near future, was not established by other evidence. Petitioner's formal application for this certificate of need projects 5 percent of its gross revenues from Medicaid and another 5 percent devoted to bad debt, indigents, and Baker Act cases. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 5. But the application does not state whether this percentage will be evenly distributed among psychiatric and substance abuse patients. In any event, the percentages of indigent care and Medicaid care are too small to satisfy the need identified by Judge Cianca and Ms. Cioffi. Stated another way, the need identified by those two witnesses is not relevant to Petitioner's application except with respect to a small percentage. Harbour Shores plans to have after care for substance abuse patients. T. 40. The Savannas Hospital is the name of the hospital to be completed in November 1986 to provide, among other services, 20 short term inpatient hospital substance abuse beds under the certificate of need granted to Indian River Community Mental Health Center, Inc. T. 82-83. The primary service area of the Savannas Hospital will be the same four counties as now served by Harbour Shores Hospital, as well as Palm Beach County. T. 84. The Savannas Hospital intends to be licensed. T. 84. The Savannas Hospital is located in Port St. Lucie, in St. Lucie County. T. 95-96. The service proposed is a comprehensive substance abuse service. T. 87. Five of the twenty substance abuse beds will be devoted to detoxification. T. 92. The Savannas Hospital will be operated by the Mediplex Group in partnership with Indian River Community Mental Health Center, Inc. T. 82. The land will be owned by Mediplex. T. 95. The Savannas Hospital will be a private, for profit, hospital, while the Mental Health Center will be a not-for- profit facility. T. 86. The Savannas Hospital publicly states that it will take five percent indigent patients, which does not include Medicare. T. 87. There is no commitment to provide more indigent care. T. 89. All other patients acre expected to be fully paying. T. 93. The actual figure for free or nonpaying patients has not yet been calculated. T. 94. The Savannas Hospital will not serve Medicaid substance abuse patients because it is a freestanding facility. T. 36, 86. Humana Hospital Sebastian is the closest facility to Harbour Shores currently in operation providing inpatient short-term hospital substance abuse services, and Humana Sebastian can accept Medicaid patients. T. 59. Ms. Elizabeth Dudek testified for HRS as an expert in health planning and certificate of need review in Florida. Ms. Dudek has reviewed all of the applications made in District IX for substance abuse beds since November 1983, and as a supervisor, has reviewed all of the applications in the state for substance abuse beds. T. 104. She has been in contact with the District Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Program Office and has attended public hearings, as well as administrative hearings, concerning substance abuse beds in District IX. T. 104-05. She also listened to all of the evidence presented at the final hearing. It was Ms. Dudek's opinion that there was no need for the substance abuse beds sought by the Petitioner. T. 127-28. Ms. Sharon Heinlen was also qualified as an expert in health planning, as well as hospital administration. T. 13. Ms. Heinlen has only recently moved to Florida, T. 11, 66, and stated that she did not know Florida well enough to know what might be the best thing to advocate in Florida with respect to whether all hospitals should provide all services. T. 65-66. She had conducted studies of District IX, however. T. 66. The average occupancy rates for District IX testified to by Ms. Heinlen were mathematically incorrect, and the correct lower rates do not support her opinion that additional short term substance abuse beds are needed. See FF 11. The fact that about 80 percent of the psychiatric patients now are at Harbour Shores Hospital also have a substance abuse problem does not necessarily support Ms. Heinlen's opinion as to need. See FF 12. This statistic is consistent with experience in all of Florida, and therefore should be accommodated by the HRS numeric need methodology. Moreover, it must be inferred that hospitalization of these patients as psychiatric patients was proper, rather than as substance abuse patients, and that even if additional substance abuse beds were available, these patients still would need to be in a psychiatric bed for treatment of the primary diagnosis. As discussed in FF 14, the data concerning recent requests for substance abuse services at Harbour Shores Hospital is not sufficient to conclude that a need exists for additional beds. As discussed in FF 17, Ms. Heinlen did not have an adequate basis for any opinion as to the need for short-term substance abuse beds for Medicaid patients in District IX. Finally, Ms. Heinlen testified that there was a waiting list for patients to be admitted to licensed short-term substance abuse beds at Fair Oaks and Lake Hospital, but the testimony was hearsay. T. 28. Since this evidence conflicts with the relatively low occupancy rates at these same facilities, and has not otherwise been corroborated by non-hearsay evidence, it must be rejected as a basis for a finding of fact. Further, due to the conflict with the low occupancy rates, it is rejected as a basis for Ms. Heinlen's expert opinion. In summary, Ms. Heinlen's expert opinion that there is a need for short-term, inpatient hospital substance abuse beds in District IX must be rejected. It is the position of HRS that even if the rule showed a need, the occupancy factor would be a factor in showing no need. T. 134. Conversely, if the rule showed no need, the occupancy factor would be one factor among others which night show need. Id.
The Issue This case arises out of a petition filed by Humana, Inc., Humedicenters, Inc., and Humhosco, Inc., challenging the validity of Respondent's Rule 10- 5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code. The challenged rule was promulgated by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to provide a uniform methodology for determining the need for acute care beds in the various IRS districts in Florida. Subsequent to the filing of the petition and the scheduling of this matter for hearing, the Intervenor, University Community Hospital, filed a petition to Intervene and was permitted to intervene upon the same issues raised by the original petition. At the formal hearing, the Petitioners Humana, Inc., Humedicenters, Inc., and Humhosco, Inc., called as witnesses Brad Sexauer, David Petersen, Ira Korman, Richard Alan Baehr, Frank Sloan and James Bruce Ryan. Petitioners offered and had admitted into evidence nine exhibits. The Intervenor, University Community Hospital, called as witnesses Warren Dacus and George Britton. The Intervenor offered and had admitted into evidence three exhibits. The Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, called as witnesses Stanley K. Smith, Stephen Williams and Phillip C. Rond. The Department offered and had admitted into evidence 36 exhibits. Respondent's Exhibits 5, 6, 14, 15, 16 and 17 were not admitted for all purposes but were admitted as hearsay for the purpose of corroborating or explaining other admissible evidence in the record. Counsel for each of the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that those proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law are inconsistent with this order, they were rejected as not being supported by the evidence or as unnecessary to the resolution of this cause.
Findings Of Fact STANDING The Petitioners and Intervenor are corporations engaged in the business of constructing and operating hospitals in the State of Florida. Humedicenters, Inc. and Humhosco, Inc., are wholly owned subsidiaries of Humana, Inc. Humana, Inc., and its corporate subsidiaries presently have seven (7) pending applications for Certificates of Need for acute care hospital facilities. At least one of those applications for a facility in Jacksonville, Florida, was denied by HRS on the basis that no need existed under the challenged rule methodology. The Intervenor, University Community Hospital, is located in HRS Service District 6A in northern Hillsborough County. On June 29, 1982, University Community Hospital applied for a Certificate of Need for additional medical surgical beds and on December 1, 1982, HRS denied that application. HRS has taken the position that the challenged rule is applicable to that application and under the rule, there is no need for additional medical-surgical beds in District 6. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE As early as 1976, the Department began its effort to identify alternative approaches to acute care bed need determinations and at that time, the Department contracted with a consultant to review and assess various bed need approaches. An analysis was made of the then current methods or models used for projecting short-term bed requirements. This analysis was provided to a Bed Need Task Force which had been formed to consider appropriate bed-need methodologies. In early 1977, the Bed Need Task Force was appointed to review current bed-need methodologies and to recommend necessary changes to the methodologies in use. The Bed Need Task Force was formed for the primary purpose of recommending a general approach to be used in bed need determinations and to identify key policies to be followed in development of an acute care methodology for the State of Florida. This task force was composed of a variety of representatives from various groups including local planning agencies, hospital associations, the statewide health council, and the health industry itself. An outside consultant was used by the Task Force to aid them in their review. In February 1978, the Final Report of the Bed Need Task Force was issued. Subsequent to the Bed Need Task Force, the Task Force on Institutional Needs, (hereafter TFIN) was established. The purpose of the TFIN was to present a recommended methodology and policies related to that methodology for purposes of the initiation of implementation activities. The TFIN issued its final report in December 1978. This report contained a number of policies to be used in conjunction with the methodology. These policies stated that: The population composition should not include tourists but should include seasonal residents who reside in Florida greater than six months and these migrants who were in Florida on April 1, the date of each census. The methodology should deal with the differences in need for acute care services by age and sex. The use rates utilized should be based on a statewide normative standard. These standards should be based on statewide use rates for which data can be obtained and should be subject to periodic review. Methodology should eventually address need for various levels of care. Need determinations should be for specific geographical areas, the area of the Health Systems Agency (hereafter HSA). These areas are new the HRS districts. Patient flows should be taken into account but should not be binding on future determination in terms of expansion or addition of new facilities. The hospital service area concept should be rejected and a temporal accessibility criterion utilized. At the HSA level, a minimum volume standard should be developed for each service. The standards within the methodology should be applied uniformly all over the state in all HRS districts or service areas. The standards should not be applied to individual facilities. In terms of role and responsibility, the Department of HRS should be responsible for the need methodology with the local health agencies having responsibility for the facilities configuration model for its district. Having developed a recommended methodology and a set of policies to be used in conjunction with that methodology, the Department contracted with Research Triangle Institute (RTI) to develop a sampling design to be used in the data collection activity so that the methodology could be operationalized. A second contract was let to implement the data collection necessary to the methodology and to develop statewide estimates based on the data collected. The 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 State Health Plans each discussed the objective of achieving a certain ratio of nonfederal licensed acute care beds per 1,000 population in Florida. The 1981 State Health Plan adopted a goal to ensure a supply of licensed nonfederal, short-stay beds (including psychiatric beds) in Florida equivalent to 4.24 beds per 1,000 residents. Also, in 1981, the State Health Council adopted a "normative" bed-to-population ratio of 4.24 beds per 1,000 population. "Normative" means a statement of what "ought to be" as opposed to some historical standard. In the Spring of 1982, HRS actually began drafting the rule and in the September 3, 1982, issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly, HRS gave notice of its intent to adopt Rule 10-5.11(23) relating to acute care hospital beds. That notice also set a time, date and place for a public hearing on that proposed rule. Before a public hearing on that proposed rule was held, however, Petitioners Humana of Florida, Inc., Humedicenters, Inc., and Humhosco, Inc., and others, challenged it in D.O.A.H. Case 82-2561R. The intervenor in this proceeding was also an intervenor in that challenge. A public hearing on that initial rule was held September 20, 1982. Neither the Petitioner nor the Intervenor made any statement at the public hearing in opposition to the rule or in opposition to the expected economic impact. No written comment was submitted by these two parties following the public hearing. At the public hearing, there were eight oral presentations made by interested parties and 14 written comments were received. From the time the initial rule was promulgated until the time it was finally adopted, there were numerous other comments that were received. Two sets of changes were subsequently made to the proposed rule which reflected discussion and input the Department received both from the public hearing process and from challenges to the rule. The first set of changes was published April 1, 1983 in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Several issues were raised which were dealt with by the Department. Psychiatric bed need was removed and placed in a separate rule, the methodology was incorporated into the rule, language regarding the use of the formula was clarified, data updating provisions were added, a provision was made to consider peak demand, the district utilization adjustment procedure was changed and subdistrict bed allocation procedures were changed. Although there was also objection to the use of statewide use rates, the Department because of strong policy considerations, made no change in the statewide use rates. These changes were made in response to the comments at the public hearing, written comments submitted, and other input from the health industry. After the Department published its first set of changes to the initial rule, but before the publication of the second set of changes, Petitioners voluntarily dismissed their rule challenge in D.O.A.H. Case No. 82-2561R. The second set of changes was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on May 13, 1983. At the time of their voluntary dismissal of their rule challenge and prior to the adoption of the challenged rule, Humana, Inc., and its subsidiaries, Humedicenters, Inc. and Humhosco, Inc. were aware of the economic impact the proposed rule would have on their operations in Florida. THE RULE Rule 10-5.11(23), Florida Administrative Code, is founded on a basic methodological approach to projecting the need for health care services which is commonly accepted and utilized among health planners. In its most generic form, this methodological approach may be expressed as follows: The population of the geographic planning unit is projected for some point in the future (usually five years); i.e., how many people will live in the planning area at the end of five years. The projected population is multiplied by a utilization rate in order to project how many days of hospital care the projected population is likely to need during the target year. A utilization rate is the measure by which hospital services are consumed within a given geographic entity and is determined by dividing the total number of hospital patient days in a year in a given area by the total population of that area for that year. Restated, a utilization rate is equivalent to the ratio of the number of days of care received by the population to the population as a whole. As noted above, multiplying a projected population by a utilization rate produces the projected number of-patient days during the target year. This number is then divided by 365 to derive an average daily census i.e., the average number of patients which one would expect to be in area hospitals on any given day of the year. The average daily census is then converted into beds by dividing the average daily census by an optimal occupancy standard for a given service. The optimal occupancy standard contemplates that hospitals cannot and should not operate at 100 percent occupancy in that some reserve capacity is necessary to meet seasonal or even weekly fluctuations and variations in patient characteristics and mix. The product of this generic methodology is the total number of beds needed in the planning area at the end of the planning horizon. Application of the methodology set forth in the rule is basically a three-step process. The initial step is the forecast of the District Bed Allocation (DBA), which is accomplished as follows: The population of each Department service district is forecast by age cohort (a cohort is a given subgroup of the total population) five years into the future. The age cohorts utilized in the rule are: (1) under 65; (2) 65 and older; (3) under 15; and (4) females 15-44. Total patient days are then forecast for each age cohort. Patient days are forecast by applying statewide, service-specific discharge rates and average lengths of stay to the age cohort projections. The specific hospital services included in the Rule are medical/surgical, intensive care, coronary care, obstetrical and pediatric. Projected patient days for persons age 65 and older are adjusted to account for the migration flew of elderly patients both to and from Florida and to and from Department districts within Florida. This flew adjustment is based upon historical migration patterns derived from 1977 Medicare data. The service-specific patient days by age cohort is then converted to projected bed need by dividing each component by 365 to arrive at an average daily census and then by applying a service-specific occupancy standard to derive the total bed need for each given service and age cohort. The sum of the bed need forecasts for each service/cohort is the DBA. The second step is an adjustment to the DBA under certain circumstances based on the projected occupancy of the beds allocated to a given district. This is known as the Adjusted District Bed Allocation (ADBA), and it is composed of the following steps: A Projected Occupancy Rate (FOR) for each district is calculated by multiplying the entire forecast population of the district by a Historic Utilization Rate (HUR), which is derived over the most recent three year period. The product is then divided by 365 times the DBA. The product of this computation is the POR which would result if the district contained the number of beds projected by the DBA and the population continued to utilize hospital services in accordance with the HUR. If the POR is less than 75 percent, the ADBA is determined by substituting a 90 percent occupancy standard in the formulation of DBA instead of the service-specific occupancy standards which would otherwise be applied (ranging from 65 percent for obstetrics to 80 percent for medical/surgical). If the POR is greater than 90 percent, the ADBA is determined by substituting a 75 percent occupancy standard in the calculation of DBA instead of such service- specific standards. In other words, when the POR is less than 75 percent, a a downward bed need adjustment results. When POR is greater than 90 percent, an upward need adjustment results. This part of the methodology is used to make an adjustment for those districts which for whatever reason lie outside the range of-expected utilization. The 75 percent and 90 percent thresholds are based upon an ideal operating range of 80 to 85 percent. The actual standard utilized by HRS is 80 percent, at the low or conservative end of that range. The third step involves the calculation of a Peak Demand Adjustment (PDA) which is accomplished as fellows: The average daily census for a given district is calculated by dividing the total number of projected days by 365. Peak demand is calculated by adding the average daily census to the square root of tic average daily census multiplied by a given standard deviation (1.65 for low peak demand districts or 2.33 for high peak demand districts) referred to as a "Z" value in the methodology: Peak demands utilized as the projected district acute care bed need if it is greater than the bed need for the district reflected by DBA or ADBA as calculated in steps one and two above. The purpose of this peak demand adjustment is to ensure that each district will have sufficient bed capacity to meet service-specific peak demands. Each subdistrict is to be identified by the Local Health Council as having high or low peak demand. These designated as high peak demand utilize a "Z" value; of 2.33 in the methodology in order to assure sufficient capacity to meet 99 percent of their peak capacity. These subdistricts designated as low peak demand areas utilize a "Z" value in the methodology of 1.65 and this assures sufficient total bed capacity to meet 95 percent of the peak demand. The rule also includes an accessibility standard which provides that in each district acute care hospital beds should be available and accessible to 90 percent of the residents within 30 minutes driving time and 45 minutes driving time in urban and rural areas respectively. The rule provides for periodic updating of the statewide discharge rates, average lengths of stay and patient flow factors as data becomes available. The historical use rate used in arriving at the adjusted district bed allocation is updated annually through the use of the most recent three years. Although the rule provides that a Certificate of Need will not "normally" be granted unless need is shown to exist under the methodology in the rule, this need calculation is not determinative of the issue of whether a Certificate of Need should be granted. The rule also provides that even if no bed need is shown to exist under the methodology a Certificate of Need may still be granted if the criteria, other than bed need, under Section 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes, demonstrate need. Likewise, the rule states that a Certificate of Need may be denied, where bed need is shown to exist under the rule, but other criteria in Section 381.494(6) are not met. The rule also specifically permits the approval of additional beds in a subdistrict where the accessibility requirements of the rule are not being met. Additional beds may also be approved where there is a need in a subdistrict but a surplus in the district as a whole. The rule utilizes population projections by age cohort in determining the number of hospital patient days by service which will be needed five years in the future. These population projections are based upon the projections made by the Bureau of Economic and Business Research (hereafter BEBR) at the University of Florida. BEBR makes three projections--low, midrange, and high-- for each year. The rule utilizes the midrange projection and the inherent margin of error in these projections is typically plus or minus 5 percent. Although these projections have systematically been low in the past, BEBR now uses a different method which utilizes six different techniques in arriving at ten projections which are then averaged. The flow adjustment used in arriving at the DBA is based upon 1977 MEDPAR data. This data was for Medicare recipients 65 years of age and elder and therefore the flow adjustment is only for that portion of the population over 65 years of age. No data was available from which flow factors could be determined for age cohorts or groups from o to 64 years of age. No data for either age group was available after 1977. ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT An economic impact statement (EIS) was prepared for the challenged rule. The EIS contains an estimate of the Department's printing and distribution cost. The EIS was-- prepared by Phillip Rond, an employee of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In preparing the EIS, Mr. Rond did a comparison of the health system plans (HSP) with the results under the rule. This comparison was for projected need for the year 1987 and was done for each HRS District. The comparison generated the following results: HRS DISTRICT HSP RULE 1 0 0 2 3 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 6 0 0 7 0 0 8 0 87 9 0 137 10 0 0 11 0 0 3 224 The need calculations under the rule do not change substantially the short term projections under prior methodologies. The rule calculations for 1987 showed need for 221 more beds than was shown to exist under the methodologies used in the health systems plans. Mr. Rond also reviewed the background literature that led to the analysis contained in the state health plan as well as the reports from the Hospital Cost Containment Board. With regard to the rule's affect on competition and the open market the EIS notes that the rule will restrain the development of costly excess acute care bed capacity and in doing so will foster cost containment. Where need is indicated by the methodology or other criteria within the rule then competitive new beds will be allowed. In terms of economic benefit to persons directly affected the EIS points out that there will be a positive impact for some facilities and a negative impact for others. The rule will negatively impact facilities which wish to expand or add new beds if no need for those beds exists under the methodology of the rule. Existing facilities, however, will not be exposed to expansion of the bed supply in those districts where no need for additional beds exist. This benefit will be particularly positive for those facilities providing indigent care. It is a general estimate that operating costs for a health facility will be approximately 22 cents for each dollar of capital expenditure. The rule is intended to support a supply of beds to meet need while preventing excess or unused beds, thus reducing annual operating costs. The EIS notes that by reducing operating costs, the operating cost per bed will be lower and should result in a slower escalation of costs to consumers as well as third party payers such as insurers, taxpayers, and employers. Prior to adoption of the challenged rule, the Department considered and evaluated each of the factors listed in Section 120.54(2), Florida Statutes. There has been traditionally in Florida a surplus of acute care beds. The 1977 medical facilities plan indicated a surplus of beds ever need of 7,253 beds. Using the rule methodology and projecting to 1987, there is a surplus ? 5,562 beds and for 1988, a surplus of 4,044 beds. In both 1980 and 1982, there were significant numbers of licensed beds in the state which were not in use. In 1980, there were 4,923 beds out of the total bed stock in acute care hospitals not in use. This was about 10.7 percent of the total licensed in bed stock. In 1982, there were 5,093 or about 10.6 percent of such beds licensed and not in use. In 1976, the occupancy rate for acute care hospitals in Florida was 60.3 percent. In 1982, the occupancy rate in such facilities was 67 percent. The target occupancy rate under the challenged rule and its methodology is 80 percent.
The Issue The issues in this case are set forth in 11 separate counts within the four consolidated cases: Case No. 09-5360 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to properly monitor and care for a patient in restraints. Count II--Whether Respondent failed to ensure the physician's plan of care for patient was implemented. Case No. 09-5363 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to properly implement the physician's plan of care for patient. Case No. 09-5364 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to ensure a patients' right to privacy. Count II--Whether Respondent failed to ensure that food was served in the prescribed safe temperature zone. Count III--Whether Respondent failed to ensure that only authorized personnel had access to locked areas where medications were stored. Count IV--Whether Respondent failed to perform proper nursing assessments of a patient. Count V--Dismissed. Count VI--Whether Respondent failed to maintain patient care equipment in a safe operating condition. Case No. 09-5365 Count I--Whether Respondent failed to triage a patient with stroke-like symptoms in a timely fashion. Count II--Whether Respondent's nursing staff failed to assess and intervene for patients or ensure implementation of the physician's plan of care.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for, inter alia, monitoring health care facilities in the state to ensure compliance with all governing statutes, rules and regulations. It is the responsibility of AHCA to regularly inspect facilities upon unannounced visits. Often AHCA will inspect facilities for the purpose of licensure renewal, certification, or in conjunction with federal surveys. AHCA will also inspect facilities on the basis of complaints filed by members of the general public. Respondent, Gulf Coast Medical Center ("Gulf Coast" or "GCH") is a hospital within the Lee Memorial Health System. South West Florida Regional Medical Center ("SWF") was another hospital within the Lee Memorial Health System. SWF closed in March 2009, when it was consolidated with Gulf Coast. On October 15, 2008, the Agency conducted a complaint investigation at SWF; a follow-up complaint investigation was done on November 13, 2008. SWF filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in each of the investigations. The November investigation resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing two counts. On December 16, 2008, AHCA performed another complaint investigation at Gulf Coast. Gulf Coast filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in the investigation. The investigation resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing one count. On January 5 through 9, 2009, AHCA conducted a routine licensure survey at Gulf Coast. The hospital filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in the survey. The survey resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing six counts (although Count V was dismissed during the course of the final hearing). On February 18, 2009, AHCA did its follow-up survey to the previous licensure survey. Gulf Coast filed and implemented a plan of correction for the issues raised in the survey. The survey resulted in an Administrative Complaint containing two counts. Case 09-5360 The complaint investigation at SWF on November 13, 2008, was conducted under the supervision of Charlene Fisher. Count I in this case addresses findings by the Agency concerning a patient who was placed in restraints at the hospital on August 28, 2008. The patient, A.D., came into the hospital emergency department under the Baker Act seeking medical clearance to a facility. The patient presented at approximately 4:00 p.m., with back pain. He had a history of drug abuse, so there was concern by the hospital regarding the use of narcotics or certain other medications to treat the patient. The patient engaged in some scuffling with police. A physician signed and dated a four-point restraint (one on each limb) order, resulting in the patient being physically restrained. The restraint was deemed a medical/surgical restraint, rather than a behavioral restraint. AHCA had concerns about the restraint, specifically whether there was a notation for Q 15 (or every 15 minutes) monitoring of the restrained patient. However, medical/surgical restraints only require monitoring every two hours. The restraint worksheet for the patient confirms monitoring every two hours. The patient was ultimately admitted to the hospital at 9:37 p.m., and, thereafter, began complaining of left shoulder pain. The hospital responded to the patient's complaints about back pain and began treating the pain with analgesics. However, the patient continued to complain about the pain. An X-ray of the patient's shoulder was finally done the next morning. Shoulder dislocation was confirmed by the X-ray, and the hospital (four hours later) began a more substantive regimen of treatment for pain. Surgery occurred the following morning, and the shoulder problem was resolved. It is clear the patient had a shoulder injury, but it is unclear as to when that injury became more painful than the back injury with which the patient had initially presented. The evidence is unclear whether or when the shoulder injury became obvious to hospital staff. During its course of treating this patient, the hospital provided Motrin, Tylenol, Morphine, Percocet and other medications to treat the patient's pain. Count II in this case also involved a restrained patient, M.D., who had presented to the emergency department under the Baker Act. The patient was released from handcuffs upon arrival at the hospital. After subsequently fighting with a deputy, this patient was also placed in a medical/surgical restraint pursuant to a physician's order. The doctor signed and dated, but did not put a time on, the restraint order. A time is important because there are monitoring requirements for patients in restraints. However, the time of 0050 (12:50 a.m.) appears on the patient's chart and is the approximate time the restraints were initiated. The proper procedure is to monitor a restrained patient every two hours. This patient, however, was removed from his restraints prior to the end of the first two-hour period. Thus, there are no records of monitoring for the patient (nor would any be necessary). The evidence presented by AHCA was insufficient to establish definitively whether the hospital nursing staff failed to properly respond to the aforementioned patients' needs. It is clear the patients could have received more care, but there is not enough evidence to prove the care provided was inadequate. Case No. 09-5363 On December 16, 2008, AHCA conducted a complaint investigation at SWF. The Agency had received a complaint that the hospital did not properly implement a physician's plan of care. Count I in this complaint addresses alleged errors relating to two of four patients reviewed by the surveyors. Both of the patients came to the hospital from a nursing home. One patient, I.A., had presented to the emergency department complaining of chest pains. The medication list sent to the hospital by the nursing home for I.A. actually belonged to someone other than I.A. I.A.'s name was not on the medication list. The drugs listed on the patient chart were different than the drugs I.A. had been taking at the skilled nursing facility from which she came. The skilled nursing facility actually sent I.A.'s roommate's medication list. The erroneous medications were then ordered by the admitting physician and administered to the patient. The hospital is supposed to review the medication list it receives and then enter the medications into the hospital system. The person reviewing the medication list does not necessarily have to be a nurse, and there is no evidence that the person making the error in this case was a nurse or was some other employee. It is clear, however, that the person reviewing the medication list did not properly ascertain that the list belonged to patient I.A. The other patient from the nursing home had been admitted for surgery at SWF. Again, the nursing home from whence she came sent a medication list that was incorrect. The medications on the incorrect list were entered into the system by a SWF employee. The erroneous medications were ultimately ordered by the attending physician for the patient, but there is no evidence the patient was ever administered those medications. Neither of the residents was harmed by the incorrect medications as far as could be determined. Case 09-5364 From January 5 through 8, 2009, AHCA conducted a licensure survey at Gulf Coast and SWF in conjunction with a federal certification survey. Count I of the complaint resulting from this survey addressed the right of privacy for two residents. In one instance, a patient was observed in her bed with her breasts exposed to plain view. In the other instance, a patient's personal records were found in a "public" place, i.e., hanging on the rail of a hallway in the hospital. AHCA's surveyor, Nancy Furdell, saw a female patient who was apparently asleep lying in her bed. The patient's breasts were exposed as she slept. Furdell observed this fact at approximately 1:15 p.m., on January 7, 2009. Furdell did not see a Posey vest on the patient. She did not know if anyone else saw the exposed breasts. Furdell continued with her survey duties, and at approximately 5:00 p.m., notified a staff member as to what she had seen. Furdell did not attempt to cover the patient or wake the patient to tell her to cover up. The female patient with exposed breasts was in the intensive care unit (ICU) of the hospital. Visiting hours in ICU at that time were 10:00 to 10:30 a.m., and again from 2:00 till 2:30 p.m. Thus, at the time Furdell was present, no outside visitors would have been in the ICU. ICU patients are checked on by nursing staff every half-hour to an hour, depending on their needs. This particular patient would be visited more frequently due to her medical condition. On the day in question, the patient was supposed to be wearing a Posey vest in an effort to stop the patient from removing her tubing. The patient had been agitated and very restless earlier, necessitating the Posey vest. Also on January 7, 2009, a surveyor observed some "papers" rolled up and stuffed inside a hand-rail in the hospital corridor. This occurred at 1:15 p.m., on the fourth floor of the south wing of the hospital. A review of the papers revealed them to be patient records for a patient on that floor. The surveyor could not state at final hearing whether there were hospital personnel in the vicinity of the handrail where she found the patient records, nor could she say how long the patient records had been in the handrail. Rather, the evidence is simply that the records were seen in the handrail and were not in anyone's possession at that moment in time. Count II of the complaint was concerned with the temperature of certain foods being prepared for distribution to patients. Foods for patients are supposed to be kept at certain required temperatures. There is a "danger zone" for foods which starts at 40 degrees Fahrenheit and ends at 141 degrees Fahrenheit. Temperature, along with time, food and environment, is an important factor in preventing contamination of food and the development of bacteria. Surveyor Mary Ruth Pinto took part in the survey. As part of her duties, she asked hospital staff to measure the temperature of foods on the serving line. She found some peaches at 44 degrees, yogurt at 50 degrees, and cranberry juice at 66 degrees Fahrenheit. According to Pinto, the hospital's refrigerator temperatures were appropriate, so it was only food out on the line that was at issue. Pinto remembers talking to the hospital dietary manager and remembers the dietary manager agreeing to destroy the aforementioned food items. The hospital policies and procedures in place on the date of the survey were consistent with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Food Code concerning the storage, handling and serving of food. The policies acknowledge the danger zone for foods, but allow foods to stay within the danger zone for up to four hours. In the case of the peaches and yogurt, neither had been in the danger zone for very long (not more than two hours). The cranberry juice was "shelf stable," meaning that it could be stored at room temperature. The food services director for the hospital remembers the peaches and yogurt being re-chilled in a chill blaster. She does not believe any of the food was destroyed. Count III of the complaint addressed whether an unauthorized person had access to a room where medications were being stored. A state surveyor, Gary Furdell, was part of the survey team on January 5, 2009. Furdell was touring the second floor of the hospital when he noticed a locked door. Furdell asked a hospital medical technician who was standing nearby about the door. The medical technician gave Furdell the code to unlock the door. Furdell peeked inside and noticed bottles that he presumed were medications. It would be a violation for a medical technician to have access to medications, because medical technicians cannot distribute drugs. The room Furdell looked into is a "mixed use" room located behind a nursing station. A mixed use room is used to store medical supplies, including medications, as long as there is a locked cabinet in the room for that purpose. This particular mixed use room had a locked cabinet. The room is used for the preparation of medications and for other purposes. No narcotics were stored in this particular mixed use room. The room contained locked cabinets used to store other medications. The evidence presented was insufficient to determine what "medications" Furdell may have seen in the room. Count IV of the complaint concerned the nursing assessment of a patient, and whether the assessment was properly and timely performed. A patient, M.S., had been admitted to the hospital on June 18, 2008, for lung surgery. Following the surgery, Amiodarone (a very toxic drug which can cause clots and other complications) was administered to treat M.S. for heart arrhythmia. The Amiodarone was administered intravenously and M.S. developed blisters and irritation at the intravenous site. That is not an uncommon complication with Amiodarone. M.S.'s attending physician was notified about the irritation and prescribed a treatment. He also ordered a consult with an infectious disease specialist who ultimately changed M.S.'s antibiotics. Although M.S. was seen daily by her physicians, the nursing notes do not reflect the assessment and treatment of her blisters. It appears that proper care was rendered, but the care was not documented properly. Another patient was admitted to the hospital on December 15, 2008, with End Stage Renal Disease and diabetes mellitus for which she began dialysis treatment. The patient was not weighed before and after a particular dialysis treatment on January 5, 2009. However, the patient had been moved to an air mattress bed on that date for comfort. The air mattress bed did not allow for a weight to be taken as it could be on a regular bed. There is an allegation in the Administrative Complaint concerning the discontinuation of the calorie count for a patient. This issue was not discussed in AHCA's Proposed Recommended Order, nor was sufficient evidence of any wrong- doing concerning this matter presented at final hearing. During the survey, the hospital was found to be storing the medication Mannitol in blanket warmers, rather than in warmers specifically designed for the drug. The blanket warmers maintained the Mannitol at 100-to-110 degrees Fahrenheit. The manufacturer's label on the drug calls for it to be dispensed (injected) at between 86 and 98.5 degrees Fahrenheit. In order to meet this requirement, the hospital takes the drug out of the blanket warmer in time for it to cool sufficiently before it is injected. There is nothing inherently wrong with using a blanket warmer to store Mannitol. On January 5, 2009, a surveyor found two vials of Thrombin, one vial of half-percent Lidocaine and Epi, and one vial of Bacitracin in operating room No. 4. The operating room is within the secured and locked suite of surgical rooms on the second floor. Two of the vials had syringes stuck in them and one of them was spiked. Whoever had mixed the medications was not attending to them at the time the surveyor made her observation. There were two unlicensed technicians in the room preparing for the next surgery. A registered nurse anesthetist was present as well. There was no identifying patient information on the medications. The hospital's policies and procedures do not require the patient's name to be on the label of medications prepared for impending surgery. That is because the procedures for the operating room include a process for ensuring that only the correct patient can be in the designated operating room. There is a fail-safe process for ensuring that only the proper patient can receive the medications that are set out. At around 2:45 p.m. on January 5, 2009, there were patient records in the emergency department showing that several drugs had been administered to a patient. The surveyor did not see a written order signed by a physician authorizing the drugs. When the surveyor returned the next morning, the order had been signed by the physician. The hospital policy is that such orders may be carried out in the emergency department without a doctor's signature, but that a physician must sign the order before the end of their shift. AHCA cannot say whether the physician signed the order at the end of his shift or early the next day. Count V of the complaint was voluntarily dismissed by the Agency. Count VI of the complaint concerned the status of certain patient care equipment, and whether such equipment was being maintained in a safe operating condition. A patient was weighed at the hospital upon admission on December 27, 2008, and found to weigh 130 pounds using a bed scale. Six days later, on January 2, 2009, the patient's weight was recorded as 134 pounds. Two days later, in the same unit, the patient weighed 147 pounds and the next day was recorded as weighing 166 pounds. During the survey process, the patient was weighed and recorded at 123 pounds on a chair scale. The hospital does not dispute the weights which were recorded, but suggests there are many factors other than calibration of the equipment that could explain the discrepant weights. For example, the AHCA surveyor could not say whether the patient sometimes had necessary medical equipment on his bed while being weighed, whether different beds were involved, or whether any other factors existed. AHCA relies solely on the weight records of this single patient to conclude that the hospital scales were inaccurate. Case No. 09-5365 On February 18, 2009, AHCA conducted a licensure survey at Gulf Coast. Count I of the complaint from this survey concerned the timeliness of triage for a patient who presented at the hospital emergency department with stroke-like symptoms. AHCA surveyors witnessed two patients on stretchers in the ambulance entrance hallway leading to the emergency department. Each of the two patients had been brought in by a separate emergency medical service (EMS) team and was awaiting triage. One patient was taken to an emergency department room (ER room) 50 minutes after his/her arrival at the hospital. The other patient waited 45 minutes after arrival before being admitted to an ER room. Meanwhile, a third patient arrived at 2:20 p.m., and was awaiting triage 25 minutes later. During their observation, the surveyors saw several nursing staff in the desk area of the emergency department, i.e., they did not appear to be performing triage duties. The emergency department on that date was quite busy. That is not unusual during February, as census tends to rise during the winter months due to the influx of seasonal residents. A summary of the action within the emergency department from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., on the day of the survey shows the following: Patient L.G., 74 years old with stable vital signs, was radioed in by her EMS team at 1:08; L.G. was processed into the ER at 1:21 (which is not an unreasonable time; EMS teams call in when they arrive at or near the hospital. By the time they gain access, wait their turn if multiple ambulances are present, and get the patient inside, several minutes may lapse). L.G. was stabilized and quickly reviewed by ER staff, then officially triaged at 2:04. Patient H.M., an 89-year-old male residing in a nursing home, arrived at 1:20 and was processed in at 1:59. He was triaged at 2:01, but ultimately signed out of the hospital against medical advice. Patient E.M. arrived at 2:18 and was processed at 2:25. Triage occurred one minute later. This patient presented as a stroke alert, and hospital protocol for that type patient was followed. Patient C.J. arrived at 1:08 and was processed at 2:38. Triage occurred immediately after C.J. was processed. This patient was not stroke alert, but had some stroke-like symptoms.1 C.J. had not been transported to the hospital as emergent, because the symptoms had been going on for 24 hours. Patient W.M., an auto accident victim, arrived at 1:40 and was processed at 1:49. Triage occurred within six minutes. Patient M.M., W.M.'s wife (who had been with M.M. in the automobile accident, but was placed in a separate ambulance), arrived at 2:06 and was triaged at 2:34. There is no record of when M.M. was processed. Patient L.M. came to the hospital from a nursing home. She arrived at 1:43 and was processed at 2:35. L.M. was triaged at 2:37. Patient K.M. arrived at 2:45 and was processed within three minutes. Triage occurred at 2:52. Her triage was done very quickly due to the condition in which she arrived, i.e., shortness of breath and low oxygen saturation. Patient R.S. arrived at 1:00 and was triaged at 1:15. The aforementioned patients represent the patients presenting to the emergency department by ambulance during a two-hour period on a very busy day. It is the customary procedure for ER staff to make a quick visual review (rapid triage) of patients as they come into the hospital. Those with obvious distress or life-threatening conditions are officially triaged first. Others, as long as they are stable, are allowed to wait until staff is available for them. As part of their duties, nurses necessarily have to be in the desk area (nursing station) in order to field phone calls from physicians concerning treatment of the patients who present. It is not unusual or improper for nurses to be in the nursing station while residents are waiting in the processing area. It is clear that some patients waited a much longer time for triage than others. However, without a complete record of all patients who presented that day and a complete review of each of their conditions, it is impossible to say whether the hospital was dilatory in triaging any of them. Count II of the complaint addressed the nursing staff and whether it failed to assess and intervene in the care of a patient or failed to implement a physician's plan of care for the patient. Patient D.W. was a 67-year-old female who was morbidly obese, diabetic, debilitated, had end stage renal disease, and was receiving dialysis. Upon admission, D.W. had a Stage 3 pressure ulcer to her sacrum and a Stage 4 ulcer on her left calf. A wound care protocol was initiated immediately, and a Clinitron bed was obtained for her on the day of admission. Due to the seriousness of her condition, the wound care physician declined to accept her case at first. He later ordered Panafil, and it became part of the protocol for treating the patient. The nursing documentation for D.W. was only minimally sufficient, but it does indicate that care was provided. Patient R.H. was an 83-year-old male who presented on February 10, 2009, in critical condition. R.H. was suffering from congestive heart failure, pneumonia, and respiratory failure. Due to the critical nature of his respiratory problems, R.H. was placed on a ventilator. As a ventilator patient, he did not fit the profile for obtaining wound care. Nonetheless, the hospital implemented various other measures to deal with R.H.'s pressure wounds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Agency for Health Care Administration, imposing a fine in the amount of $500.00 in DOAH Case No. 09-5363 and a fine in the amount of $500.00 in DOAH Case No. 09-5364, Count VI. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2010.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), should grant the application of the Petitioner, RHPC, Inc., d/b/a Riverside Hospital (Riverside), for a certificate of need, CON Action No. 6582, for the addition of 31 acute care beds.
Findings Of Fact The Applicant and the Application. The applicant, the Petitioner, RHPC, Inc., d/b/a Riverside Hospital (Riverside), is a 102 bed acute care hospital 1/ located at 6600 Madison Street, New Port Richey, Florida, in the West Pasco County Subdistrict of HRS Service District 5, which also includes Pinellas County and East Pasco County. Included among its complement of beds are 14 obstetrical (OB) beds. There are no existing pediatric beds. Riverside's application is for a certificate of need to spend approximately $2,000,000 to renovate its existing OB unit, add 14 beds to the OB unit, add 11 medical/surgical beds and add six pediatric beds. The addition of the pediatric unit will be accomplished by relatively minor alterations to existing space and existing beds, and the cost attributable to this phase of the application is negligible. Similarly, the 11 additional med/surg beds will be accomplished by adding beds to existing private rooms, to create semi-private rooms, at a cost of only approximately $44,000. (Gas and electric lines for the additional beds already have been run to the headwall of these rooms and can be connected without difficulty or much expense.) Most of the $2 million total capital expenditure proposed in the application is attributable to the cost of modernizing the OB unit, with the addition of 14 beds in the process. The addition of 14 beds to the unit does not add significantly to what the modernization effort would cost without the addition of the 14 beds. The proposed new OB unit would include private rooms, to go along with the semi-private rooms that make up the existing 14-bed unit. In addition, the proposed modernized 28-bed OB unit would consist of the combined labor/delivery/recovery/post-partum (LDRP) rooms now preferred by most patients. Pertinent State Health Plan Provision. The 1989 State of Florida Health Plan states at the outset of a list of preferences to be utilized in comparing applications for additional acute care beds: No additional acute care beds should generally be approved unless the subdistrict occupancy rate is at or exceeds 75 percent, or, in the event of an existing facility, an applicant shall demonstrate that the occupancy rate for the most recent 12 months is at or exceeds 80 percent. The Need Methodology. Using the F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038 methodology, the district and subdistrict would show numeric need of approximately 201 and 230, respectively. See F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(5). Regardless of the calculated bed need, HRS does not normally approve additional beds in a subdistrict unless the annual average acute care bed occupancy rate is 75 percent or higher during the 12-month base period of July, 1989, through June, 1990. See F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(7)(d). The 670 licensed beds in the West Pasco Subdistrict reported only 68.92% occupancy during the 12- month base period, resulting in no projected need for additional acute care beds in the subdistrict for the applicable 1996 planning horizon. Even when a subdistricts's need for additional acute care beds projected by the methodology is zero, an application by an existing hospital still may be approved where that hospital's annual average occupancy rate exceeds 75 percent for the 12-month base period (again, in this case, from July, 1989, through June, 1990.) See F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(7)(e). During the 12-month base period from July, 1989, through June, 1990, Riverside's occupancy averaged 72.40%, not high enough to be approved under F.A.C. Rule 10-5.038(7)(e). Observation Bed Days. Three types of beds days are included in a category of so-called "outpatient observation bed days." First, "twenty-three hour patients" are patients who are not eligible for inpatient services under the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) criteria for the Medicare program. Second, "observation patients" are similar non-Medicare patients. Third, some outpatients (or ambulatory surgery patients) also use beds for part of a day. With new cost containment and review/regulation developments in hospital care, more patients are spending up to 23 hours in the hospital before a decision is made that further hospitalization in not needed. As a result, "observation" bed use has increased. Outpatient observation services have been recognized and defined by HCFA. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida (the Medicare intermediary) and the Health Care Cost Containment Board (HCCCB) have addressed issues such as reimbursement, billing and reporting of observation beds. Services are provided to "observation bed" patients under doctor's orders, including diagnostic services, observation and monitoring by nursing personnel and/or medical intervention or treatment. Calculation of occupancy rates under the HRS need methodology does not take into account the so-called "observation bed days." 2/ There was no evidence that any part of District V or the West Pasco Subdistrict are inaccessible geographically. Other Need Factors. The evidence showed that there is a seasonal peak utilization and occupancy of acute care beds in District V and in the West Pasco Subdistrict during approximately October or November through March or April each year. This seasonal peak is reflected by the statistics. As previously stated, Riverside's occupancy averaged 72.40% during the period from July, 1989, through June, 1990. During the first quarter of 1990, occupancy was 86.83%. Riverside's average occupancy for calendar year 1990 was 73.87%. For the period from March, 1990, through February, 1991, average occupancy for Riverside's acute care beds was 71.2%. 3/ For the period from March, 1990, through February, 1991, occupancy for Riverside's obstetrics beds was 92.9%. There is no acute care pediatric unit in the West Pasco subdistrict. Subdistrict residents (as well as others in Riverside's general service area) needing level II pediatric services generally go to a Pinellas County or East Pasco County hospital for them. Given the choice, some but not all of these patients likely would prefer to get these services at Riverside, depending primarily on the severity of the particular medical needs. But the evidence did not quantify the number predicted to switch to Riverside. Also, occupancy of pediatric beds in Pasco county was less than 15% during 1987 and 1988. Medical Care for the Poor. The State Health Plan also notes that the uncompensated care burden on hospitals has grown during the 1980s because of a growing number of low-income persons; simultaneously, the proportion of persons covered by Medicaid has dropped. Numerous statewide studies, moreover, have shown that hospitals' uncompensated care is increasing at the same time that their ability to absorb the cost of care is decreasing. Riverside's predecessor bought the hospital from Pasco County in 1982. As a condition to the purchase, Riverside's predecessor agreed to provide Medicaid and indigent care for Pasco County in perpetuity. When Riverside purchased the hospital on December 29, 1983, it assumed the contractual obligation to provide Medicaid and indigent care in perpetuity. Riverside is a disproportionate share provider within the meaning of the State and local health plans. Approximately, 13% of Riverside's total annual patient days are for Medicaid patients. In 1990, 2,647 of Riverside's obstetrical, and 4,272 of its non-obstetrical patient days, were Medicaid. Riverside's charity care deduction from gross patient revenue for fiscal year 1990 was 1.07% of gross patient revenue. Riverside's Medicaid deduction from gross patient revenue for fiscal year 1990 was 5.96% of gross patient revenue. Approximately, 14.8% of Riversides's services go to Medicaid and indigent patients. Although Riverside has only 14% of the beds in the West Pasco subdistrict, it does more than 90% of the non-emergency, non-OB Medicaid care. Approval of the Riverside application would enable Riverside to spread its administrative and overhead costs over a larger base, thereby reducing average charges. Approval of the Riverside application also would make Riverside more profitable and thereby better able to absorb the cost of the Medicaid and indigent care it provides. If Riverside converts existing acute care beds to pediatric or OB beds, it probably would have to squeeze out paying patients during seasonal occupancy peaks, thereby losing more revenue and profits. Competition. If the Riverside application is approved, Riverside's share of the market represented by the West Pasco subdistrict will rise from approximately 14% to approximately 18%. HCA controls the rest of the market. There are no existing OB beds in the West Pasco subdistrict other than at Riverside. The HCA hospital in New Port Richey had an OB unit which it recently abandoned. As a result of the grant of Bayonet Point's application, CON Action No. 6583, with which Riverside had been in direct competition in this application review cycle, Bayonet Point now is approved for a seven-bed OB unit as part of its bed complement. Upgrading its existing OB unit and adding 14 more OB beds will enable Riverside to capture more private paying patients, which will better enable it to compete with the HCA hospitals. At present, Riverside's OB unit is utilized almost exclusively by indigent and Medicaid patients because of the hospital's contract with Pasco County. This unit now is operating at close to absolute capacity. With the upgrades and additional beds, Riverside can work to capture some private pay patients; without them, Bayonet Point will capture the private pay patients. Financial Feasibility. Riverside operated at a deficit from 1983 essentially to the present. By the end of 1990, Riverside had accumulated a deficit of $8.8 million. Riverside's corporate parent, American Healthcare Management, Inc. (AHM), was funding the deficit. From 1985 through December, 1989, AHM was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. During that time period, there was legitimate concern whether AHM would be able to continue to fund Riverside deficits. AHM emerged from bankruptcy in December, 1989, stronger financially. It has since become stronger still. AHM reduced its debt by approximately $88 million. Part of the debt reduction was achieved by the sale of $43 million of underperforming assets. In addition, $45 million of bond debt was exchanged for common stock on September 30, 1991. The interest savings on the bond-for-stock exchange is $6 million a year. As a result, AHM's current debt-to-equity ratio is approximately $160 million to $130 million. AHM's corporate staff has been reduced from about 102 to 65. Its corporate office were transferred from expensive quarters in Dallas, Texas, to less expensive quarters in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. Corporate expenses have been greatly reduced as a result. Accounts receivable have been reduced by better collection methods, and the $43 million of assets sold to reduce corporate debt had been underperforming. AHM had $21 million cash and short-term investments as of December 31, 1989. As of the date of the final hearing, it had $18 million cash and short- term investments. Riverside's gross margin (profit) for the first nine months of 1991 was $4 million. After depreciation, amortization, and interest and home office costs, Riverside generated approximately $1.2 million for the first nine months of 1991. Internal cash flow generated by AHM and Riverside would be sufficient to finance Riverside's application project. Since the capital costs of Riverside's proposed project are relatively small, financial feasibility is relatively easy to achieve. Besides costing relatively little, the 31 new beds will not increase intercompany interest or management fees significantly. In addition, the 31 new beds would enable Riverside to better compete for private pay patients. Given the expected utilization of the new beds, the proposed project will be to the financial benefit of the applicant. The pro forma bears this out. It projects 75.11% occupancy for the 31 new beds in the second year of operation (July, 1994, to June, 1995). (This projection does not include expected "observation bed days.") A profit of $2,477,199 for the 31 beds is projected for the second year of operation (not counting any portion of the preexisting intercompany interest or management fees).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order denying the Riverside application for a certificate of need, CON Action No. 6582, for the addition of 31 acute care beds. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1992.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Applicant, LMHS The applicant, LMHS, is a public, not-for-profit health care system, created in 1968 by special act of the Legislature. A ten-member publicly elected board of directors is responsible for overseeing LMHS on behalf of the citizens of Lee County. LMHS does not have taxing power. LMHS is the dominant provider of hospital services in Lee County. LMHS operates four hospital facilities under three separate hospital licenses. The four hospital campuses are dispersed throughout Lee County: borrowing the sub-county area descriptors adopted by LMHS’s health planning expert, LMHS operates one hospital in northwest Lee County, one hospital in central Lee County, and two hospitals in south Lee County.1/ At present, the four hospital campuses are licensed to operate a total of 1,423 hospital beds. The only non-LMHS hospital in Lee County is 88-bed Lehigh Regional Medical Center (Lehigh Regional) in northeast Lee County, owned and operated by a for-profit hospital corporation, Health Management Associates, Inc. (HMA). LMHS has a best-practice strategy of increasing and concentrating clinical specialties at each of its existing hospitals. The LMHS board has already approved which specialty service lines will be the focus at each of its four hospitals. Although there is still some duplication of specialty areas, LMHS has tried to move more to clinical specialization concentrated at a specific hospital to lower costs, better utilize resources, and also to concentrate talent and repetitions, leading to improved clinical outcomes. Currently licensed to operate 415 hospital beds, Lee Memorial Hospital (Lee Memorial) is located in downtown Fort Myers in central Lee County. The hospital was initially founded in 1916 and established at its current location in the 1930s. In the 1960s, a five-story clinical tower was constructed on the campus, to which three more stories were added in the 1970s. The original 1930s building was demolished and its site became surface parking. Today, Lee Memorial provides a full array of acute care services, plus clinical specialties in such areas as orthopedics, neurology, oncology, and infectious diseases. Lee Memorial’s licensed bed complement includes 15 adult inpatient psychiatric beds (not in operation), and 60 beds for comprehensive medical rehabilitation (CMR), a tertiary health service.2/ Lee Memorial is a designated stroke center, meaning it is a destination to which EMS providers generally seek to transport stroke patients, bypassing any closer hospital that lacks stroke center designation. Lee Memorial operates the only verified level II adult trauma center in the seven-county region designated AHCA district 8. Lee Memorial also is home to a new residency program for medical school graduates. At its peak, Lee Memorial operated as many as 600 licensed beds at the single downtown Fort Myers location. In 1990, when hospital beds were still regulated under the CON program, Lee Memorial transferred its right to operate 220 beds to establish a new hospital facility to the south, HealthPark Medical Center (HealthPark). One reason to shift some of its regulated hospital beds to the south was because of the growing population in the southern half of Lee County. Another reason was to ensure a paying patient population by moving beds away from Lee Memorial to a more affluent area. That way, LMHS would have better system balance, and be better able to bear the financial burden of caring for disproportionately high numbers of Medicaid and charity care patients at the downtown safety-net hospital. That was a reasonable and appropriate objective. HealthPark, located in south Lee County ZIP code 33908, to the south and a little to the west of Lee Memorial, now operates 368 licensed beds--320 general acute care and 48 neonatal intensive care beds. HealthPark’s specialty programs and services include cardiac care, open heart surgery, and urology. HealthPark is a designated STEMI3/ (heart attack) center, a destination to which EMS providers generally seek to transport heart attack patients, bypassing any closer hospital lacking STEMI center designation. HealthPark also concentrates in specialty women’s and children’s services, offering obstetrics, neonatal intensive care, perinatal intensive care, and pediatrics. HealthPark is a state-designated children’s cancer center. HealthPark’s open heart surgery, neonatal and perinatal intensive care, and pediatric oncology services are all tertiary health services. In 1996, LMHS acquired its third hospital, Cape Coral Medical Center (Cape Coral), from another entity.4/ The acquisition of Cape Coral was another step in furtherance of the strategy to improve LMHS’s overall payer mix by establishing hospitals in affluent areas. Cape Coral is located in northwest Lee County, and is licensed to operate 291 general acute care beds. Cape Coral’s specialty concentrations include obstetrics, orthopedics, gastroenterology, urology, and stroke treatment. Cape Coral recently achieved primary stroke center designation, making it an appropriate destination for EMS transport of stroke patients, according to Lee County EMS transport guidelines. The newest LMHS hospital, built in 2007-2008 and opened in 2009, is Gulf Coast Medical Center (Gulf Coast) in south Lee County ZIP code 33912.5/ With 349 licensed beds, Gulf Coast offers tertiary services including kidney transplantation and open heart surgery, and specialty services including obstetrics, stroke treatment, surgical oncology, and neurology. Gulf Coast is both a designated primary stroke center and a STEMI center. NCH NCH is a not-for-profit system operating two hospital facilities with a combined 715 licensed beds in Collier County, directly to the south of Lee County. Naples Community Hospital (Naples Community) is in downtown Naples. NCH North Naples Hospital Campus (North Naples) is located in the northernmost part of Collier County, near the Collier-Lee County line.6/ The Petitioner in this case is NCH doing business as North Naples. North Naples is licensed to operate 262 acute care beds. It provides an array of acute care hospital services, specialty services including obstetrics and pediatrics, and tertiary health services including neonatal intensive care and CMR. AHCA AHCA is the state health planning agency charged with administering the CON program pursuant to the Health Facility and Services Development Act, sections 408.031-408.0455, Florida Statutes (2013).7/ AHCA is responsible for the coordinated planning of health care services in the state. To carry out its responsibilities for health planning and CON determinations, AHCA maintains a comprehensive health care database, with information that health care facilities are required to submit, such as utilization data. See § 408.033(3), Fla. Stat. AHCA conducts its health planning and CON review based on “health planning service district[s]” defined by statute. See § 408.032(5), Fla. Stat. Relevant in this case is district 8, which includes Sarasota, DeSoto, Charlotte, Lee, Glades, Hendry, and Collier Counties. Additionally, by rule, AHCA has adopted acute care sub-districts, originally utilized in conjunction with an acute care bed need methodology codified as Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.038. The acute care bed need rule was repealed in 2005, following the deregulation of acute care beds from CON review. However, AHCA has maintained its acute care sub-district rule, in which Lee County is designated sub-district 8-5. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-2.100(3)(h)5. The Proposed Project LMHS proposes to establish a new 80-bed general hospital on the southeast corner of U.S. Highway 41 and Coconut Road in Bonita Springs (ZIP code 34135),8/ in south Lee County. The CON application described the hospital services to be offered at the proposed new hospital in only the most general fashion--medical- surgical services, emergency services, intensive care, and telemetry services. Also planned for the proposed hospital are outpatient care, community education, and chronic care management --all non-hospital, non-CON-regulated services. At hearing, LMHS did not elaborate on the planned hospital services for the proposed new facility. Instead, no firm decisions have been made by the health system regarding what types of services will be offered at the new hospital. The proposed site consists of three contiguous parcels, totaling approximately 31 acres. LMHS purchased a 21-acre parcel in 2004, with a view to building a hospital there someday. LMHS later added to its holdings when additional parcels became available. At present, the site’s development of regional impact (DRI) development order does not permit a hospital, but would allow the establishment of a freestanding emergency department. The proposed hospital site is adjacent to the Bonita Community Health Center (BCHC). Jointly owned by LMHS and NCH, BCHC is a substantial health care complex described by LMHS President James Nathan as a “hospital without walls.” This 100,000 square-foot complex includes an urgent care center, ambulatory surgery center, and physicians’ offices. A wide variety of outpatient health care services are provided within the BCHC complex, including radiology/diagnostic imaging, endoscopy, rehabilitation, pain management, and lab services. Although LMHS purchased the adjacent parcels with the intent of establishing a hospital there someday, representatives of LMHS expressed their doubt that “someday” has arrived; they have candidly admitted that this application may be premature. CON Application Filing LMHS did not intend to file a CON application when it did, in the first hospital-project review cycle of 2013. LMHS did not file a letter of intent (LOI) by the initial LOI deadline to signify its intent to file a CON application. However, LMHS’s only Lee County hospital competitor, HMA, filed an LOI on the deadline day. LMHS learned that the project planned by HMA was to replace Lehigh Regional with a new hospital, which would be relocated to south Lee County, a little to the north of the Estero/Bonita Springs area. LMHS was concerned that if the HMA application went forward and was approved, that project would block LMHS’s ability to pursue a hospital in Bonita Springs for many years to come. Therefore, in reaction to HMA’s LOI, LMHS filed a “grace period” LOI, authorized under AHCA’s rules, to submit a competing proposal for a new hospital in south Lee County. But for the HMA LOI, there would have been no grace period for a competing proposal, and LMHS would not have been able to apply when it did. Two weeks later, on the initial application filing deadline, LMHS submitted a “shell” application. LMHS proceeded to quickly prepare the bulk of its application to file five weeks later by the omissions response deadline of April 10, 2013. Shortly before the omissions response deadline, Mr. Nathan met with Jeffrey Gregg, who is in charge of the CON program as director of AHCA’s Florida Center for Health Information and Policy Analysis, and Elizabeth Dudek, AHCA Secretary, to discuss the LMHS application. Mr. Nathan told the AHCA representatives that LMHS was not really ready to file a CON application, but felt cornered and forced into it to respond to the HMA proposal. Mr. Nathan also discussed with AHCA representatives the plan to transfer 80 beds from Lee Memorial, but AHCA told Mr. Nathan not to make such a proposal. Since beds are no longer subject to CON regulation, hospitals are free to add or delicense beds as they deem appropriate, and therefore, an offer to delicense beds adds nothing to a CON proposal. LMHS’s CON application was timely filed on the omissions deadline. A major focus of the application was on why LMHS’s proposal was better than the expected competing HMA proposal. However, HMA did not follow through on its LOI by filing a competing CON application. The LMHS CON application met the technical content requirements for a general hospital CON application, including an assessment of need for the proposed project. LMHS highlighted the following themes to show need for its proposed new hospital: South Lee County “should have its own acute care hospital” because it is a fast-growing area with an older population; by 2018, the southern ZIP codes of Lee County will contain nearly a third of the county’s total population. The Estero/Bonita Springs community strongly supports the proposed new hospital. Approval of the proposed new hospital “will significantly reduce travel times for the service area’s residents and will thereby significantly improve access to acute care services,” as shown by estimated travel times to local hospitals for residents in the proposed primary service area and by Lee County EMS transport logs. LMHS will agree to a CON condition to delicense 80 beds at Lee Memorial, which are underutilized, so that there will be no net addition of acute care beds to the sub-district’s licensed bed complement. AHCA’s Preliminary Review and Denial AHCA conducted its preliminary review of the CON application in accordance with its standard procedures. As part of the preliminary review process for general hospital applications, the CON law now permits existing health care facilities whose established programs may be substantially affected by a proposed project to submit a detailed statement in opposition. Indeed, such a detailed statement is a condition precedent to the existing provider being allowed to participate as a party in any subsequent administrative proceedings conducted with respect to the CON application. See § 408.037(2), Fla. Stat. North Naples timely filed a detailed statement in opposition to LMHS’s proposed new hospital. LMHS timely filed a response to North Naples’ opposition submittal, pursuant to the same law. After considering the CON application, the North Naples opposition submittal, and the LMHS response, AHCA prepared its SAAR in accordance with its standard procedures. A first draft of the SAAR was prepared by the CON reviewer; the primary editor of the SAAR was AHCA CON unit manager James McLemore; and then a second edit was done by Mr. Gregg. Before the SAAR was finalized, Mr. Gregg met with the AHCA Secretary to discuss the proposed decision. The SAAR sets forth AHCA’s preliminary findings and preliminary decision to deny the LMHS application. Mr. Gregg testified at hearing as AHCA’s representative, as well as in his capacity as an expert in health planning and CON review. Through Mr. Gregg’s testimony, AHCA reaffirmed its position in opposition to the LMHS application, and Mr. Gregg offered his opinions to support that position. Statutory and Rule Review Criteria The framework for consideration of LMHS’s proposed project is dictated by the statutory and rule criteria that apply to general hospital CON applications. The applicable statutory review criteria, as amended in 2008 for general hospital CON applications, are as follows: The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed. The availability, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant. * * * (e) The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district. * * * (g) The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness. * * * (i) The applicant’s past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. § 408.035(1), Fla. Stat.; § 408.035(2), Fla. Stat. (identifying review criteria that apply to general hospital applications). AHCA has not promulgated a numeric need methodology to calculate need for new hospital facilities. In the absence of a numeric need methodology promulgated by AHCA for the project at issue, Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(2)(e) applies. This rule provides that the applicant is responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory and rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.030 also applies. This rule elaborates on “health care access criteria” to be considered in reviewing CON applications, with a focus on the needs of medically underserved groups such as low income persons. LMHS’s Needs Assessment LMHS set forth its assessment of need for the proposed new hospital, highlighting the population demographics of the area proposed to be served. Theme: South Lee County’s substantial population The main theme of LMHS’s need argument is that south Lee County “should have its own acute care hospital” because it is a fast-growing area with a substantial and older population. (LMHS Exh. 3, p. 37). LMHS asserts that south Lee County’s population is sufficient to demonstrate the need for a new hospital because “by 2018, the southern ZIP codes of Lee County will contain nearly a third of the county’s total population.” Id. LMHS identified eight ZIP codes--33908, 33912, 33913, 33928, 33931, 33967, 34134, and 34135--that constitute “south Lee County.” (LMHS Exh. 3, Table 4). Claritas population projections, reasonably relied on by the applicant, project that by 2018 these eight ZIP codes will have a total population of 200,492 persons, approximately 29 percent of the projected population of 687,795 for all of Lee County. The age 65-and-older population in south Lee County is projected to be 75,150, approximately 40 percent of the projected 65+ population of 185,655 for all of Lee County. A glaring flaw in LMHS’s primary need theme is that the eight-ZIP-code “south Lee County” identified by LMHS is not without its own hospital. That area already has two of the county’s five existing hospitals: Gulf Coast and HealthPark. In advancing its need argument, LMHS selectively uses different meanings of “south Lee County.” When describing the “south Lee County” that deserves a hospital of its own, LMHS means the local Estero/Bonita Springs community in and immediately surrounding the proposed hospital site in the southernmost part of south Lee County. However, when offering up a sufficient population to demonstrate need for a new hospital, “south Lee County” expands to encompass an area that appears to be half, if not more, of the entire county. The total population of the Estero/Bonita Springs community is 76,753, projected to grow to 83,517 by 2018--much more modest population numbers compared to those highlighted by the applicant for the expanded version of south Lee County. While the rate of growth for Estero/Bonita Springs is indeed fast compared to the state and county growth rates, this observation is misleading because the actual numbers are not large. LMHS also emphasizes the larger proportion of elderly in the Estero/Bonita Springs community, which is also expected to continue to grow at a fast clip. Although no specifics were offered, it is accepted as a generic proposition that elderly persons are more frequent consumers of acute care hospital services. By the same token, elderly persons who require hospitalization tend to be sicker, and to present greater risks of potential complications from comorbidities, than non-elderly patients. As a result, for example, as discussed below, Lee County EMS’s emergency transport guidelines steer certain elderly patients to hospitals with greater breadth of services than the very basic hospital planned by LMHS, “as a reasonable precaution.” Projections of a Well-Utilized Proposed Hospital Mr. Davidson, LMHS’s health planning consultant, was provided with the proposed hospital’s location and number of beds, and was asked to develop the need assessment and projections. No evidence was offered regarding who determined that the proposed hospital should have 80 beds, or how that determination was made. Mr. Davidson set about to define the proposed primary and secondary service areas, keeping in mind that section 408.037(2) now requires a general hospital CON application to specifically identify, by ZIP codes, the primary service area from which the proposed hospital is expected to receive 75 percent of its patients, and the secondary service area from which 25 percent of the hospital’s patients are expected. Mr. Davidson selected six ZIP codes for the primary service area. He included the three ZIP codes comprising the Estero/Bonita Springs community. He also included two ZIP codes that are closer to existing hospitals than to the proposed site, according to the drive-time information he compiled. In addition, he included one ZIP code in which there is already a hospital (Gulf Coast, in 33912). Mr. Davidson’s opinion that this was a reasonable, and not overly aggressive, primary service area was not persuasive;9/ the criticisms by the other expert health planning witnesses were more persuasive and are credited. Mr. Davidson selected six more ZIP codes for the secondary service area. These include: two south Lee County ZIP codes that are HealthPark’s home ZIP code (33908) and a ZIP code to the west of HealthPark (33931); three central Lee County ZIP codes to the north of HealthPark and Gulf Coast; and one Collier County ZIP code that is North Naples’ home ZIP code. Mr. Davidson’s opinion that this was a reasonable, and not overly aggressive, secondary service area was not persuasive; the criticisms by the other expert health planning witnesses were more persuasive and are credited. As noted above, the existing LMHS hospitals provide tertiary-level care and a number of specialty service lines and designations that have not been planned for the proposed new hospital. Conversely, there are no services proposed for the new hospital that are not already provided by the existing LMHS hospitals. In the absence of evidence that the proposed new hospital will offer services not available at closer hospitals, it is not reasonable to project that any appreciable numbers of patients will travel farther, and in some instances, bypass one or more larger existing hospitals with greater breadth of services, to obtain the same services at the substantially smaller proposed new hospital. As aptly observed by AHCA’s representative, Mr. Gregg, the evidence to justify such an ambitious service area for a small hospital providing basic services was lacking: So if we were to have been given more detail[:] here’s the way we’re going to fit this into our system, here’s -- you know, here’s why we can design this service area as big as we did, even though it would require a lot of people to drive right by HealthPark or right by Gulf Coast to go to this tiny basic hospital for some reason. I mean, there are fundamental basics about this that just make us scratch our head. (Tr. 1457). The next step after defining the service area was to develop utilization projections, based on historic utilization data for service area residents who obtained the types of services to be offered by the proposed hospital. In this case, the utilization projections suffer from a planning void. Mr. Nathan testified that no decisions have been made regarding what types of services, other than general medical- surgical services, will be provided at the proposed new hospital. In lieu of information regarding the service lines actually planned for the proposed hospital, Mr. Davidson used a subtractive process, eliminating “15 or so” service lines that the proposed hospital either “absolutely wasn’t going to provide,” or that, in his judgment, a small hospital of this type would not provide. The service lines he excluded were: open heart surgery; trauma; neonatal intensive care; inpatient psychiatric, rehabilitation, and substance abuse; and unnamed “others.” His objective was to “narrow the scope of available admissions down to those that a smaller hospital could reasonably aspire to care for.” (Tr. 671-672). That objective is different from identifying the types of services expected because they have been planned for this particular proposed hospital. The testimony of NCH’s health planner, as well as Mr. Gregg, was persuasive on the point that Mr. Davidson’s approach was over-inclusive. The historic data he used included a number of service lines that are not planned for the proposed hospital and, thus, should have been subtracted from the historic utilization base. These include clinical specialties that are the focus of other LMHS hospitals, such as infectious diseases, neurology, neurosurgery, orthopedics, and urology; cardiac care, such as cardiac catheterization and angioplasty that are not planned for the proposed hospital; emergency stroke cases that will be directed to designated stroke centers; pediatric cases that will be referred to HealthPark; and obstetrics, which is not contemplated for the proposed hospital according to the more credible evidence.10/ Mr. Davidson’s market share projections suffer from some of the same flaws as the service area projections: there is no credible evidence to support the assumption that the small proposed new hospital, which has planned to offer only the most basic hospital services, will garner substantial market shares in ZIP codes that are closer to larger existing hospitals providing a greater breadth of services. In addition, variations in market share projections by ZIP code raise questions that were not adequately explained.11/ Overall, the “high-level” theme offered by LMHS’s health planner--that it is unnecessary to know what types of services will be provided at the new hospital in order to reasonably project utilization and market share--was not persuasive. While it is possible that utilization of the proposed new hospital would be sufficient to suggest it is filling a need, LMHS did not offer credible evidence that that is so. Bed Need Methodology for Proposed Service Area Mr. Davidson projected bed need for the proposed service area based on the historic utilization by residents of the 12 ZIP codes in the service lines remaining after his subtractive process, described above. Other than using an over-inclusive base (as described above), Mr. Davidson followed a reasonable approach to determine the average daily census generated by the proposed service area residents, and then applying a 75 percent occupancy standard to convert the average daily census into the number of beds supported by that population. The results of this methodology show that utilization generated by residents of the six-ZIP code primary service area would support 163 hospital beds; and utilization generated by residents of the six-ZIP code secondary service area would support 225 beds in the secondary service area. The total gross bed need for the proposed service area adds up to 388 beds. However, the critical next step was missing: subtract from the gross number of needed beds the number of existing beds, to arrive at the net bed need (or surplus). In the primary service area, 163 beds are needed, but there are already 349 beds at Gulf Coast. Thus, in the primary service area, there is a surplus of 186 beds, according to the applicant’s methodology. In the secondary service area, 225 beds are needed, but there are already 320 acute care beds at HealthPark and 262 acute care beds at North Naples. Thus, in the secondary service area, there is a surplus of 357 beds, according to the applicant’s methodology. While it is true that Gulf Coast and HealthPark use some of their beds to provide some tertiary and specialty services that were subtracted out of this methodology, and all three hospitals presumably provide services to residents outside the proposed service area, Mr. Davidson made no attempt to measure these components. Instead, the LMHS bed need methodology ignores completely the fact that there is substantial existing bed capacity--931 acute care beds--within the proposed service area. Availability and Utilization of Existing Hospitals LMHS offered utilization data for the 12-month period ending June 30, 2012, for Lee County hospitals. Cape Coral’s average annual occupancy rate was 57.6 percent; HealthPark’s was 77.5 percent; Lee Memorial’s was 55.9 percent; Lehigh Regional’s was 44 percent; and Gulf Coast’s was 79.8 percent. Mr. Davidson acknowledged that a reasonable occupancy standard to plan for a small hospital the size of the proposed hospital is 75 percent. For a larger operational hospital, 80 percent is a good standard to use, indicating it is well-utilized. Judged by these standards, only HealthPark and Gulf Coast come near the standard for a well-utilized hospital. As noted in the CON application, these annual averages do not reflect the higher utilization during peak season. According to the application, HealthPark’s occupancy was 88.2 percent and Gulf Coast’s was 86.8 percent for the peak quarter of January-March 2012. LMHS did not present utilization information for North Naples, even though that hospital is closest to the proposed hospital site and is within the proposed service area targeted by the applicant. For the same 12-month period used for the LMHS hospitals, North Naples’ average annual occupancy rate was 50.97 percent and for the January-March 2012 “peak season” quarter, North Naples’ occupancy was 60.68 percent. At the final hearing, LMHS did not present more recent utilization data, choosing instead to rely on the older information in the application. Based on the record evidence, need is not demonstrated by reference to the availability and utilization of existing hospitals in the proposed service area or in the sub-district. Community Support LMHS argued that the strong support by the Estero/Bonita Springs community should be viewed as evidence of need for the proposed new hospital. As summarized in the SAAR, approximately 2,200 letters of support were submitted by local government entities and elected officials, community groups, and area residents, voicing their support for the proposed hospital. LMHS chose not to submit these voluminous support letters in the record. The AHCA reviewer noted in the SAAR that none of the support letters documented instances in which residents of the proposed service area needed acute care hospital services but were unable to obtain them, or suffered poor or undesirable health outcomes due to the current availability of hospital services. Two community members testified at the final hearing to repeat the theme of support by Estero/Bonita Springs community residents and groups. These witnesses offered anecdotal testimony about traffic congestion during season, population growth, and development activity they have seen or heard about. They acknowledged the role their community organization has played in advocating for a neighborhood hospital, including developing and disseminating form letters for persons to express their support. Consistent with the AHCA reviewer’s characterization of the support letters, neither witness attested to any experiences needing acute care hospital services that they were unable to obtain, or any experiences in which they had poor or undesirable outcomes due to the currently available hospital services. There was no such evidence offered by any witness at the final hearing. Mr. Gregg characterized the expression of community support by the Estero/Bonita Springs community as typical “for an upper income, kind of retiree-oriented community where, number one, people anticipate needing to use hospitals, and number two, people have more time on their hands to get involved with things like this.” (Tr. 1433). Mr. Gregg described an extreme example of community support for a prior new hospital CON application, in which AHCA received 21,000 letters of support delivered in two chartered buses that were filled with community residents who wanted to meet with AHCA representatives. Mr. Gregg identified the project as the proposed hospital for North Port, which was ultimately denied following an administrative hearing. In the North Port case, the Administrative Law Judge made this apt observation with regard to the probative value of the overwhelming community support offered there: “A community’s desire for a new hospital does not mean there is a ‘need’ for a new hospital. Under the CON program, the determination of need for a new hospital must be based upon sound health planning principles, not the desires of a particular local government or its citizens.” Manatee Memorial Hospital, L.P. v. Ag. for Health Care Admin., et al., Case Nos. 04-2723CON, 04-3027CON, and 04- 3147CON (Fla. DOAH Dec. 15, 2005; Fla. AHCA April 11, 2006), RO at 26, ¶ 104, adopted in FO. That finding, which was adopted by AHCA in its final order, remains true today, and is adopted herein. Access The statutory review criteria consider access issues from two opposing perspectives: from the perspective of the proposed project, consideration is given to the extent to which the proposal will enhance access to health care services for the applicant’s service district; without the proposed project, consideration is given to the accessibility of existing providers of the health care services proposed by the applicant. Addressing this two-part access inquiry, LMHS contends that the proposed hospital would significantly reduce travel times and significantly enhance access to acute care services. Three kinds of access are routinely considered in CON cases: geographic access, in this case the drive times by individuals to hospitals; emergency access, i.e., the time it takes for emergency ground transport (ambulances) to deliver patients to hospitals; and economic access, i.e., the extent to which hospital services are provided to Medicaid and charity care patients. Geographic Access (drive times to hospitals) For nearly all residents of the applicable service district, district 8, the proposed new hospital was not shown to enhance access to health care at all. The same is true for nearly all residents of sub-district 8-5, Lee County. LMHS was substantially less ambitious in its effort to show access enhancement, limiting its focus on attempting to prove that access to acute care services would be enhanced for residents of the primary service area. LMHS did not attempt to prove that there would be any access enhancement to acute care services for residents of the six-ZIP code secondary service area. As set forth in the CON application, Mr. Davidson used online mapping software to estimate the drive time from each ZIP code in the primary service area to the four existing LMHS hospitals, the two NCH hospitals, and another hospital in north Collier County, Physicians Regional-Pine Ridge. The drive-time information offered by the applicant showed the following: the drive time from ZIP code 33912 was less to three different existing LMHS hospitals than to the proposed new hospital; the drive time from ZIP code 33913 was less to two different existing LMHS hospitals than to the proposed new hospital; and the drive time from ZIP code 33967 was less to one existing LMHS hospital than to the proposed hospital site. Thus, according to LMHS’s own information, drive times would not be reduced at all for three of the six ZIP codes in the primary service area. Not surprisingly, according to LMHS’s information, the three Estero/Bonita Springs ZIP codes are shown to have slightly shorter drive times to the proposed neighborhood hospital than to any existing hospital. However, the same information also suggests that those residents already enjoy very reasonable access of 20-minutes’ drive time or less to one or more existing hospitals: the drive time from ZIP code 33928 is between 14 and 20 minutes to three different existing hospitals; the drive time from ZIP code 34134 is between 18 and 20 minutes to two different existing hospitals; and the drive time from ZIP code 34135 is 19 minutes to one existing hospital. In terms of the extent of drive time enhancement, the LMHS information shows that drive time would be shortened from 14 minutes to seven minutes for ZIP code 33928; from 18 minutes to 12 minutes for ZIP code 34134; and from 19 minutes to 17 minutes for ZIP code 34135. There used to be an access standard codified in the (now-repealed) acute care bed need rule, providing that acute care services should be accessible within a 30-minute drive time under normal conditions to 90 percent of the service area’s population. Mr. Davidson’s opinion is that the former rule’s 30-minute drive time standard remains a reasonable access standard for acute care services. Here, LMHS’s drive time information shows very reasonable access now, meeting an even more rigorous drive-time standard of 20 minutes. The establishment of a new hospital facility will always enhance geographic access by shortening drive times for some residents. For example, if LMHS’s proposed hospital were established, another proposed hospital could demonstrate enhanced access by reducing drive times from seven minutes to four minutes for residents of Estero’s ZIP code 33928. But the question is not whether there is any enhanced access, no matter how insignificant. Instead, the appropriate consideration is the “extent” of enhanced access for residents of the service district or sub-district. Here, the only travel time information offered by LMHS shows nothing more than insignificant reductions of already reasonable travel times for residents of only three of six ZIP codes in the primary service area. The drive-time information offered in the application and at hearing was far from precise, but it was the only evidence offered by the applicant in an attempt to prove its claim that there would be a significant reduction in drive times for residents of the primary service area ZIP codes. No travel time expert or traffic engineer offered his or her expertise to the subject of geographic accessibility in this case. No evidence was presented regarding measured traffic conditions or planned roadway improvements. Anecdotal testimony regarding “congested” roads during “season” was general in nature and insufficient to prove that there is not reasonable access now to basic acute care hospital services for all residents of the proposed service area. The proposed new hospital is not needed to address a geographic access problem. Consideration of the extent of access enhancement does not weigh in favor of the proposed new hospital. Emergency Access LMHS also sought to establish that emergency access via EMS ambulance transport was becoming problematic during the season because of traffic congestion. In its CON application, LMHS offered Lee County EMS transport logs as evidence that ambulance transport times from the Estero/Bonita Springs community to an existing hospital were higher during season than in the off-season months. LMHS represented in its CON application that the voluminous Lee County EMS transport logs show average transport times of over 22 minutes from Bonita Springs to a hospital in March 2012 compared to 15 minutes for June 2012, and average transport times of just under 22 minutes from Estero to a hospital in March 2012 compared to over 17 minutes for June 2012. LMHS suggested that these times were not reasonable because these were all emergency transports at high speeds with flashing lights and sirens. LMHS did not prove the accuracy of this statement. The Lee County EMS ordinance limits the use of sirens and flashing lights to emergency transports, defined to mean transports of patients with life- or limb-threatening conditions. According to Lee County EMS Deputy Chief Panem, 90 to 95 percent of ambulance transports do not involve such conditions. Contrary to the conclusion that LMHS urges should be drawn from the EMS transport logs, the ambulance transport times summarized by LMHS in its application do not demonstrate unreasonable emergency access for residents of Estero/Bonita Springs. The logs do not demonstrate an emergency access problem for the local residents during the season, as contended by LMHS; nor did LMHS offer sufficient evidence to prove that the proposed new hospital would materially improve ambulance transport times. LMHS’s opinion that the ambulance logs show a seasonal emergency access problem for Estero/Bonita Springs residents cannot be credited unless the travel times on the logs reflect patient transports to the nearest hospital, such that establishing a new hospital in Bonita Springs would result in faster ambulance transports for Estero/Bonita Springs residents. Deputy Chief Panem testified that ambulance transport destination is dictated in the first instance by patient choice. In addition, for the “most serious calls,” the destination is dictated by emergency transport guidelines with a matrix identifying the most “appropriate” hospitals to direct patients. For example, as Deputy Chief Panem explained: In the case of a stroke or heart attack, we want them to go to a stroke facility or a heart attack facility[;] or trauma, we have a trauma center in Lee County as well . . . Lee Memorial Hospital downtown is a level II trauma center. (Tr. 378). The emergency transport matrix identifies the hospitals qualified to handle emergency heart attack, stroke, or trauma patients. In addition, the matrix identifies the “most appropriate facility” for emergency pediatrics, obstetrics, pediatric orthopedic emergencies, and other categories involving the “most serious calls.” Of comparable size to the proposed new hospital, 88-bed Lehigh Regional is not identified as an “appropriate facility” to transport patients with any of the serious conditions shown in the matrix. Similar to Lehigh Regional, the slightly smaller proposed new hospital is not expected to be identified as an appropriate facility destination for patients with any of the conditions designated in the Lee County EMS emergency transport matrix. The Lee County EMS transport guidelines clarify that all trauma alert patients “will be” transported to Lee Memorial as the Level II Trauma Center. In addition, the guidelines provide as follows: “Non-trauma alert patients with a high index of suspicion (elderly, etc.) should preferentially be transported to the Trauma Center as a reasonable precaution.” (emphasis added). For the elderly, then, a condition that would not normally be considered one of the most serious cases to be steered to the most appropriate hospital may be reclassified as such, as a reasonable precaution because the patient is elderly. The Lee County EMS transport logs do not reflect the reason for the chosen destination. The patients may have requested transport to distant facilities instead of to the nearest facilities. Patients with the most serious conditions may have accepted the advice of ambulance crews that they should be transported to the “most appropriate facility” with special resources to treat their serious conditions; or those patients may have been unable to express their choice due to the seriousness of their condition, in which case the patients would be taken to the most appropriate facility, bypassing closer facilities. Elderly patients may have been convinced to take the reasonable precaution to go to an appropriate facility even if their condition did not fall into the most serious categories. Since the transport times on the EMS logs do not necessarily reflect transport times to the closest hospital, it is not reasonable to conclude that the transport times would be shorter if there were an even closer hospital, particularly where the closer hospital is not likely to be designated as an appropriate destination in the transport guidelines matrix. The most serious cases, categorized in the EMS transport matrix, are the ones for which minutes matter. For those cases, a new hospital in Estero/Bonita Springs, which has not planned to be a STEMI receiving center, a stroke center, or a trauma center, is not going to enhance access to emergency care, even for the neighborhood residents. The evidence at hearing did not establish that ambulance transport times are excessive or cause an emergency access problem now.12/ In fact, Deputy Chief Panem did not offer the opinion, or offer any evidence to prove, that the drive time for ambulances transporting patients to area hospitals is unreasonable or contrary to any standard for reasonable emergency access. Instead, Lee County EMS recently opposed an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Bonita Springs Fire District to provide emergency ground transportation to hospitals, because Lee County EMS believed then, and believes now, that it is providing efficient and effective emergency transport services to the Bonita Springs area residents. At hearing, LMHS tried a different approach by attempting to prove an emergency access problem during season, not because of the ambulance drive times, but because of delays at the emergency departments themselves after patients are transported there. The new focus at hearing was on EMS “offload” times, described as the time between ambulance arrival at the hospital and the time the ambulance crews hand over responsibility for a patient to the emergency department staff. According to Deputy Chief Panem, Lee County hospitals rarely go on “bypass,” a status that informs EMS providers not to transport patients to a hospital because additional emergency patients cannot be accommodated. No “bypass” evidence was offered, suggesting that “bypass” status is not a problem in Lee County and that Lee County emergency departments are available to EMS providers. Deputy Chief Panem also confirmed that North Naples does not go on bypass. The North Naples emergency department consistently has been available to receive patients transported by Lee County EMS ambulances, during seasonal and off- season months. Offload times are a function of a variety of factors. Reasons for delays in offloading patients can include inadequate capacity or functionality of the emergency department, or inadequate staffing in the emergency department such that there may be empty treatment bays, but the bays cannot be filled with patients because there is no staff to tend to the patients. Individual instances of offload delays can occur when emergency department personnel prioritize incoming cases, and less-emergent cases might have to wait while more-emergent cases are taken first, even if they arrived later. Offload times are also a function of “throughput” issues. Approximately 20 to 25 percent of emergency department patients require admission to the hospital, but there can be delays in the admission process, causing the patient to be held in a treatment bay that could otherwise be filled by the next emergency patient. There can be many reasons for throughput delays, including the lack of an available acute care bed, or inadequate staffing that prevents available acute care beds from being filled. No evidence was offered to prove the actual causes of any offload delays. Moreover, the evidence failed to establish that offload times were unreasonable or excessive. Deputy Chief Panem offered offload time data summaries that reflect very good performance by LMHS hospitals and by North Naples. Deputy Chief Panem understandably advocates the shortest possible offload time, so that Lee County EMS ambulances are back in service more quickly. Lee County EMS persuaded the LMHS emergency departments to agree to a goal for offload times of 30 minutes or less 90 percent of the time, and that is the goal he tracks. Both Lee Memorial and North Naples have consistently met or exceeded that goal in almost every month over the last five years, including during peak seasonal months. Cape Coral and Gulf Coast sometimes fall below the goal in peak seasonal months, but the evidence did not establish offload times that are excessive or unreasonable during peak months. HealthPark is the one LMHS hospital that appears to consistently fall below Lee County EMS’s offload time goal; in peak seasonal months, HealthPark’s offload times were less than 30 minutes in approximately 70 percent of the cases. No evidence was offered to prove the extent of offload delays at HealthPark for the other 30 percent of emergency cases, nor was evidence offered to prove the extent of offload delays at any other hospital. Deputy Chief Panem referred anecdotally to offload times that can sometimes reach as high as two to three hours during season, but he did not provide specifics. Without documentation of the extent and magnitude of offload delays, it is impossible to conclude that they are unreasonable or excessive. There is no persuasive evidence suggesting that this facet of emergency care would be helped by approval of the proposed new hospital, especially given the complicated array of possible reasons for each case in which there was a delayed offload.13/ Staffing/professional coverage issues likely would be exacerbated by approving another hospital venue for LMHS. Pure physical plant issues, such as emergency department capacity and acute care bed availability, might be helped to some degree, at least in theory, by a new hospital, but to a lesser degree than directly addressing any capacity issues at the existing hospitals. For example, HealthPark’s emergency department has served as a combined destination for a wide array of adult and pediatric emergencies. However, HealthPark is about to break ground on a new on-campus children’s hospital with its own dedicated emergency department. There will be substantially expanded capacity both within the new dedicated pediatric emergency department, and in the existing emergency department, where vacated space used for pediatric patients will be freed up for adults. Beyond the emergency departments themselves, there will be substantial additional acute care bed capacity, with space built to accommodate 160 dedicated pediatric beds in the new children’s hospital. The existing hospital will have the ability to add more than the 80 acute care beds proposed for the new hospital. This additional bed capacity could be in place within roughly the same timeframe projected for opening the proposed new hospital. To the extent additional capacity would improve emergency department performance, Cape Coral is completing an expansion project that increases its treatment bays from 24 to 42, and Lee Memorial is adding nine observation beds to its emergency department. No current expansion projects were identified for Gulf Coast, which just began operations in 2009, but LMHS has already invested in design and construction features to enable that facility to expand by an additional 252 beds. In Mr. Kistel’s words, Gulf Coast has a “tremendous platform for growth[.]” (Tr. 259). Mr. Gregg summarized AHCA’s perspective in considering the applicant’s arguments of geographic and emergency access enhancement, as follows: [I]n our view, this community is already well served by existing hospitals, either within the applicant’s system or from the competing Naples system, and we don’t think that the situation would be improved by adding another very small, extremely basic hospital. And to the extent that that would mislead people into thinking that it’s a full-service hospital that handles time-sensitive emergencies in the way that the larger hospitals do, that’s another concern. (Tr. 1425). * * * The fact that this hospital does not plan to offer those most time-sensitive services means that any – on the surface, as I said earlier, the possible improvement in emergency access offered by any new hospital is at least partially negated in this case because it has been proposed as such a basic hospital, when the more sophisticated services are located not far away. (Tr. 1431). Mr. Gregg’s opinion is reasonable and is credited. Economic Access The Estero/Bonita Springs community is a very affluent area, known for its golf courses and gated communities. As a result of the demographics of the proposed hospital’s projected service area, LMHS’s application offers to accept as a CON condition a commitment to provide 10 percent of the total annual patient days to a combination of Medicaid, charity, and self-pay patients. This commitment is less than the 2011-2012 experience for the primary service area, where patient days attributable to residents in these three payer classes was a combined 16.3 percent; and the commitment is less than the 2011- 2012 experience for the total proposed service area, where patient days in these three categories was a combined 14.4 percent. Nonetheless, LMHS’s experts reasonably explained that the commitment was established on the low side, taking into account the uncertainties of changes in the health care environment, to ensure that the commitment could be achieved. In contrast with the 10 percent commitment and the historic level of Medicaid/charity/self-pay patient days in the proposed service area, Lee Memorial historically has provided the highest combined level of Medicaid and charity patient days in district 8. According to LMHS’s financial expert, in 2012, Lee Memorial downtown and HealthPark, combined for reporting purposes under the same license, provided 31.5 percent of their patient days to Medicaid and charity patients--a percentage that would be even higher, it is safe to assume, if patient days in the “self- pay/other” payer category were added. At hearing, Mr. Gregg reasonably expressed concern with LMHS shifting its resources from the low-income downtown area where there is great need for economic access to a very affluent area where comparable levels of service to the medically needy would be impossible to achieve. Mr. Gregg acknowledged that AHCA has approved proposals in the past that help systems with safety-net hospitals achieve balance by moving some of the safety net’s resources to an affluent area. As previously noted, that sort of rationale was at play in the LMHS project to establish HealthPark, and again in the acquisitions of Cape Coral and Gulf Coast. However, LMHS now has three of its four hospitals thriving in relatively affluent areas. To move more LMHS resources from the downtown safety-net hospital to another affluent area would not be a move towards system balance, but rather, system imbalance, and would be contrary to the economic access CON review criteria in statute and rule. Missing Needs Assessment Factor: Medical Treatment Trends The consistent testimony of all witnesses with expertise to address this subject was that the trend in medical treatment continues to be in the direction of outpatient care in lieu of inpatient hospital care. The expected result will be that inpatient hospital usage will narrow to the most highly specialized services provided to patients with more serious conditions requiring more complex, specialized treatments. Mr. Gregg described this trend as follows: “[O]nly those services that are very expensive, operated by very extensive personnel” will be offered to inpatients in the future. (Tr. 1412). A basic acute care hospital without planned specialty or tertiary services is inconsistent with the type of hospital dictated by this medical treatment trend. Mr. Gregg reasonably opined that “the ability of a hospital system to sprinkle about small little satellite facilities is drawing to a close.” (Tr. 1413). Small hospitals will no longer be able to add specialized and tertiary services, because these will be concentrated in fewer hospitals. LMHS’s move to clinical specialization at its hospitals bears this out. Another trend expected to impact services within the timeframe at issue is the development of telemedicine as an alternative to inpatient hospital care. For patients who cannot be treated in an outpatient setting and released, an option will be for patients to recover at home in their own beds, with close monitoring options such as visual monitoring by video linking the patient with medical professionals, and use of devices to constantly measure and report vital signs monitored by a practitioner at a remote location. Telemedicine offers advantages over inpatient hospitalization with regard to infection control and patient comfort, as well as overall health care cost control by reducing the need for capital-intensive traditional bricks-and- mortar hospitals. A medical treatment trend being actively pursued by both LMHS and NCH is for better, more efficient management of inpatient care so as to reduce the average length of patient stays. A ten-year master planning process recently undertaken by LMHS included a goal to further reduce average lengths of stay by 0.65 days by 2021, and thereby reduce the number of hospital beds needed system-wide by 128 beds. LMHS did not address the subject of medical treatment trends as part of its needs assessment. The persuasive evidence demonstrated that medical treatment trends do not support the need for the proposed new facility; consideration of these trends weighs against approval. Competition; Market Conditions The proposed new hospital will not foster competition; it will diminish competition by expanding LMHS’s market dominance of acute care services in Lee County. AHCA voiced its reasonable concerns about Lee Memorial’s “unprecedented” market dominance of acute care services in a county as large as Lee, which recently ranked as the eighth most populous county in Florida. LMHS already provides a majority of hospital care being obtained by residents of the primary service area. LMHS will increase its market share if the proposed new hospital is approved. This increase will come both directly, via basic medical-surgical services provided to patients at the new hospital, and indirectly, via LMHS’s plan for the proposed new hospital to serve as a feeder system to direct patients to other LMHS hospitals for more specialized care.14/ The evidence did not establish that LMHS historically has used its market power as leverage to demand higher charges from private insurers. However, as LMHS’s financial expert acknowledged, the health care environment is undergoing changes, making the past less predictive of the future. The changing environment was cited as the reason for LMHS’s low commitment to Medicaid and charity care for the proposed project. There is evidence of LMHS’s market power in its high operating margin, more than six percent higher than NCH’s operating margin between 2009 and 2012. LMHS’s financial expert’s opinion that total margin should be considered instead of operating margin when looking at market power was not persuasive. Of concern is the market power in the field of hospital operations, making operating margin the appropriate measure. Overall, Mr. Gregg reasonably explained the lack of competitive benefit from the proposed project: I think that this proposal does less for competition than virtually any acute care hospital proposal that we’ve seen. As I said, it led the Agency to somewhat scratch [its] head in disbelief. There is no other situation like it. . . . This is the most basic of satellites. This hospital will be referring patients to the rest of the Lee Memorial system in diverse abundance because they are not going to be able to offer specialized services. And economies of scale are not going to allow it in the future. People will not be able to duplicate the expensive services that hospitals offer. So we do not see this as enhancing competition in any way at all. (Tr. 1416-1417). The proposed hospital’s inclusion of outpatient services, community education, and chronic care management presents an awkward dimension of direct competition with adjacent BCHC, the joint venture between LMHS and NCH. BCHC has been a money-losing proposition in a direct sense, but both systems remain committed to the venture, in part because of the indirect benefit they now share in the form of referrals of patients to both systems’ hospitals. Duplication of BCHC’s services, which are already struggling financially, would not appear to be beneficial competition. While this is not a significant factor, to the extent LMHS makes a point of the non-hospital outpatient services that will be available at the proposed new hospital, it must be noted that that dimension of the project does nothing to enhance beneficial competition. Adverse Impact NCH would suffer a substantial adverse financial impact caused by the establishment of the proposed hospital, if approved. A large part of the adverse financial impact would be attributable to lost patient volume at North Naples, an established hospital which is not well-utilized now, without a new hospital targeting residents of North Naples’ home zip code. The expected adverse financial impact of the proposed new hospital was reasonably estimated to be $6.4 million annually. Just as LMHS cited concerns about the unpredictability of the health care environment as a reason to lower its Medicaid/charity commitment for the proposed project, NCH has concerns with whether the substantial adverse impact from the proposed hospital will do serious harm to NCH’s viability, when added to the uncertain impacts of the Affordable Care Act, sequestration, Medicaid reimbursement, and other changes. LMHS counters with the view that if the proposed hospital is approved, in time population growth will offset the proposed hospital’s adverse impact. While consideration of medical treatment trends may dictate that an increasing amount of future population growth will be treated in settings other than a traditional hospital, Mr. Gregg opined that over time, the area’s population growth will still tend to drive hospital usage up. However, future hospital usage will be by a narrower class of more complex patients. Considering all of the competing factors established in this record, the likely adverse impact that NCH would experience if the proposed hospital is established, though substantial enough to support the standing of Petitioner North Naples, is not viewed as extreme enough to pose a threat to NCH’s viability. Institution/System-Specific Interests LMHS’s proposed condition to transfer 80 beds from Lee Memorial downtown is not a factor weighing in favor of approval of its proposed hospital. At hearing, LMHS defended the proposed CON condition as a helpful way to allow LMHS to address facility challenges at Lee Memorial. The evidence showed that to some extent, this issue is overstated in that, by all accounts, Lee Memorial provides excellent, award-winning care that meets all credentialing requirements for full accreditation. The evidence also suggested that to some extent, there are serious system issues facing LMHS that will need to be confronted at some point to answer the unanswered question posed by Mr. Gregg: What will become of Lee Memorial? Recognizing this, LMHS began a ten-year master planning process in 2011, to take a look at LMHS’s four hospitals in the context of the needs of Lee County over a ten-year horizon, and determine how LMHS could meet those needs. A team of outside and in-house experts were involved in the ten-year master planning process. LMHS’s strategic planning team looked at projected volumes and population information for all of Lee County over the next ten years and determined the number of beds needed to address projected needs. Recommendations were then developed regarding how LMHS would meet the needs identified for Lee County through 2021 by rearranging, adding, and subtracting beds among the four existing hospital campuses. A cornerstone of the master plan assessment by numerous outside experts and LMHS experts was that Lee Memorial’s existing physical plant was approaching the end of its useful life. Options considered were: replace the hospital building on the existing campus; downsize the hospital and relocate some of the beds and services to Gulf Coast; and the favored option, discontinue operations of Lee Memorial as an acute care hospital, removing all acute care beds and reestablishing those beds and services primarily at the Gulf Coast campus, with some beds possibly placed at Cape Coral. All of these options addressed the projected needs for Lee County through 2021 within the existing expansion capabilities of Gulf Coast and Cape Coral, and the expansion capabilities that HealthPark will have with the addition of its new on-campus children’s hospital. Somewhat confusingly, the CON application referred several times to LMHS’s “ten-year master plan for our long-term facility needs, which considers the changing geographic population trends of our region, the need for additional capacity during the seasonal months, and facility challenges at Lee Memorial[.]” (LMHS Exh. 3, pp. 12, 57). The implication given by these references was that the new hospital project was being proposed in furtherance of the ten-year master plan, as the product of careful, studied consideration in a long-range planning process to address the future needs of Lee County. To the contrary, although the referenced ten-year master plan process was, indeed, a long- range deliberative planning process to assess and plan for the future needs of Lee County, the ten-year master plan did not contemplate the proposed new hospital as a way to meet the needs in Lee County identified through 2021.15/ The ten-year master planning process was halted because of concerns about the options identified for Lee Memorial. Further investigation was to be undertaken for Lee Memorial and what services needed to be maintained there. No evidence was presented to suggest that this investigation had taken place as of the final hearing. The proposed CON condition to transfer 80 beds from Lee Memorial does nothing to address the big picture issues that LMHS faces regarding the Lee Memorial campus. According to different LMHS witnesses, either some or nearly all of those licensed beds are not operational or available to be put in service, so the license is meaningless and delicensing them would accomplish nothing. To the extent any of those beds are operational, delicensing them might cause Lee Memorial to suddenly have throughput problems and drop below the EMS offload time goal, when it has been one of the system’s best performers. The proposed piecemeal dismantling of Lee Memorial, without a plan to address the bigger picture, reasonably causes AHCA great concern. As Mr. Gregg explained, “[I]t raises a fundamental concern for us, in that the area around Lee Memorial, the area of downtown Fort Myers is the lower income area of Lee County. The area around the proposed facility, Estero, Bonita, is one of the upper income areas of Lee County.” (Tr. 1410). The plan to shift resources away from downtown caused Mr. Gregg to pose the unanswered question: “[W]hat is to become of Lee Memorial?” Id. Recognizing the physical plant challenges faced there, nonetheless AHCA was left to ask, “[W]hat about that population and how does [the proposed new hospital] relate? How does this proposed facility fit into the multihospital system that might exist in the future?” (Tr. 1410-1411). These are not only reasonable, unanswered questions, they are the same questions left hanging when LMHS interrupted the ten-year master planning process to react to HMA’s LOI with the CON application at issue here. Balanced Review of Pertinent Criteria In AHCA’s initial review, when it came time to weigh and balance the pertinent criteria, “It was difficult for us to come up with the positive about this proposal.” (Tr. 1432). In this case, AHCA’s initial review assessment was borne out by the evidence at hearing. The undersigned must agree with AHCA that the balance of factors weighs heavily, if not entirely, against approval of the application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration issue a Final Order denying CON application no. 10185. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2014.
The Issue Whether Rule 59C-1.038, the acute care bed need rule, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Whether this rule challenge should be dismissed as an untimely attack on a published fixed need pool.
Findings Of Fact In August 1994, the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") published a numeric need of zero for additional acute care beds in AHCA District 9, Subdistrict 5, for southern Palm Beach County. Pursuant to Subsection 408.034(3), Florida Statutes, AHCA is the state agency responsible for establishing, by rule, uniform need methodologies for health services and facilities. In September 1994, NME Hospitals, Inc. d/b/a Delray Community Hospital, Inc. ("Delray") applied for a certificate of need ("CON") to add 24 acute care beds for a total construction cost of $4,608,260. AHCA published its intent to approve the application on January 20, 1995, in Volume 21, No. 3 of the Florida Administrative Weekly. By timely filing a petition, Bethesda Memorial Hospital, Inc. ("Bethesda") challenged AHCA's preliminary decision in DOAH Case No. 95-0730. Bethesda is also located in AHCA District 9, Subdistrict 5. On May 24, 1995, Bethesda also filed the petition in this case challenging Rule 59C-1.038, Florida Administrative Code, the acute care bed need rule. Pursuant to the acute care bed need rule, AHCA's August 1994 notice published its finding that zero additional acute care beds will be needed in the southern Palm Beach County subdistrict by July, 1999. The data, formulas, and calculations used in arriving at the number zero were not published. AHCA and Delray argue that the publication put persons on notice to inquire into the population data, occupancy rates, or the calculations leading to the published need number. An AHCA rule bars a person from seeking, and AHCA from making, any adjustments to the fixed need pool number if the person failed to notify AHCA of errors within ten days of publication. Still another rule defines "fixed need pool" as the " . . . numerical number, as published. " Bethesda is not contesting and, in fact, agrees that the fixed need pool number as published, zero, is correct. Using AHCA's definition of the fixed need pool, Bethesda's challenge is not barred because it failed to notify AHCA of an error in the fixed need pool number within 10 days of publication. Bethesda is challenging as irrational and invalid subsections (5), (6), and (7) of the acute care bed need rule. Subsection (5) directs the local health councils to determine subdistrict bed need consistent with the methodology for determining district bed need. Under that provision, total projected patient days of acute care needed in a district is calculated by adding together the projected patient care days needed in medical/surgical, intensive care, coronary care, obstetric, and pediatric beds. Each of these separate bed need projections is computed, in general, by multiplying projected population in the district for the appropriate age or gender group times a factor which is the product of the statewide discharge rate and the average length of stay for that particular type of care. After the total projected acute care patient days for district residents is computed, the number is adjusted to reflect historical patient flow patterns for acute care services, for out-of-state residents served in the district, for residents of other districts served in the district, and for residents of the district served outside the district. The rule includes specific percentages to apply for each patient flow group for each of the eleven districts. After the total number of beds needed in the district is derived, that number is decreased by the number of existing licensed or approved beds to get the number of additional acute care beds needed in the district, if any. Bethesda is challenging subsections (7)(a), (b), and (c) of the acute care rule, which authorize adjustments to the calculations from subsections (5) and (6) to achieve desired occupancy levels, based on historic utilization of acute care beds in a district. Bethesda is also seeking a determination that subsections 7(d) and (e) are invalid. Each of those subsections of the rule refer to (5)(b), although AHCA's expert witness testified that they should refer to (6)(b). Subsection (7)(d) requires at least 75 percent occupancy in all hospitals in the district before new acute care beds normally are approved, regardless of the net need projected by the formulas. Subsection (7)(e) allows approvals under special circumstances if net need is projected by the formulas and the applicant facility's occupancy rate equals or exceeds 75 percent. Subsection (7)(e), the provision directly related to the Delray application, is as follows: (e) Approval Under Special Circumstances. Regardless of the subdistrict's average annual occupancy rate, need for additional acute care beds at an existing hospital is demonstrated if a net need for beds is shown based on the formula described in paragraphs (5)(b), (7)(a), (b), (c), and (8)(a), (b), (c), and provided that the hospital's average occupancy rate for all licensed acute care beds is at or exceeds 75 percent. The determination of the average occupancy rate shall be made based on the average 12 months occupancy rate made available by the local health council two months prior to the beginning of the respective acute care hospital batching cycle. Phillip C. Rond, III, Ph.D., was the primary architect of the rule, beginning in 1981. The rule was initially published in 1982, and adopted in 1983. Constants in the rule formulas, including use rates, average lengths of stay, occupancy standards and patient flow patterns were taken from a 1979 survey of some state hospitals. Because data used for the constants in the formulas was expected to change, subsection (6) also provides, in pertinent part, that: Periodic updating of the statewide discharge rates, average lengths of stay and patient flow factors will be done as data becomes available through the institution of statewide utilization reporting mechanisms. Patient flow factors were updated in March 1984 to reflect a change in the realignment of counties in Districts 5 and 8. No other constants have been updated since the rule was adopted in June 1983. More current data is available. The Hospital Cost Containment Board ("HCCB") began collecting statewide hospital inpatient discharge data in the fourth quarter of 1987, which became available by the fall of 1988. AHCA now collects the data. Using the rule, the projected net need for acute care beds in 1999 in District 9 is 1,442 additional beds. By contrast, with the factors updated by Dr. Rond, the projected net need is a negative 723 or, in other words, District 9 has 723 more acute care beds than it will need in 1999. The updated formulas show a need for a total of 3,676 beds in District 9, which already has 4,399 licensed or approved acute care beds. Since 1983, hospital utilization has declined in both rates of admissions or discharges, and in average lengths of stay. Although the occupancy goals in the rule are 75 to 80 percent, depending on the type of hospital service, the occupancy rate achieved by using the number of beds projected by the rule methodology is 45 to 52 percent. The statewide occupancy rate in acute beds is approximately 50 percent in 49,215 licensed beds. The formulas in the rule show a statewide net need for 6,000 more beds in 1999, but updated constants in the same formulas result in a total statewide need for approximately 36,000 acute care beds in 1999, or 13,000 fewer beds than currently exist. Statewide utilization of acute care hospital beds declined from 1187.2 days per 1000 population in 1983 to 730.5 days per 1,000 in 1993, despite increases in the percentage of the elderly population. By 1987, AHCA's predecessor realized that the need methodology in the rule was grossly overestimating need and inconsistent with its health planning objectives. Subsection (7)(d) was added to the rule to avoid having a published fixed need based on the outdated methodology in subsections (5), (6) and 7(a)- (c). The occupancy data is also, as the 1987 amendment requires, that reported for the most recent 12 months, available 2 months before the scheduled application cycle. In August 1994, AHCA published a numeric need of zero for District 9, Subdistrict 5, rather than 1,442, the calculated net need predicted by the formulas in the rule, because all subdistrict hospital occupancy rates did not equal or exceed 75 percent. Elfie Stamm of AHCA, who is responsible for the publication of fixed need pools, confirmed that the 1987 amendment to the rule was an efficient and cost-effective way to avoid publishing need where there was no actual need. She confirmed Dr. Rond's conclusions that the formulas are no longer valid and produce excessive need numbers, as in projecting a need for 6,000 or 7,000 more acute care beds in the state. She also confirmed that none of the constants in the formula have been updated as required by subsection 6. Ms. Stamm claims that the information needed to update the formulas cannot be obtained easily from any statewide utilization reporting mechanism. One problem, according to Ms. Stamm, is the possibility of including patients in acute care beds with comprehensive rehabilitation, psychiatric, or substance abuse problems, although it is not lawful for acute care providers to place patients with these primary diagnoses in licensed acute care beds and all data bases have some miscoding of diagnoses. She also testified that some factors required in the formulas are not included in HCCB data base. In addition, she testified that AHCA is in the process of filing a notice to repeal the acute care bed need rule. The filing of the notice of repeal, published in Volume 21, Florida Administrative Week, pp. 4179-4180 (6/23/95) was confirmed by Bethesda's Request For Official Recognition, which was filed on July 20, 1995, and is granted. Ms. Stamm also noted that rules for other need-based health services have facility-specific special circumstances provisions, which are not tied to numerical need, otherwise the special circumstances are not really facility- specific. Need rules make no sense, according to Ms. Stamm, without an exception in the absence of a determination of need. Subsection (7)(e) of the acute care rule requires a finding of numeric need and a 75 percent occupancy rate at the applicant facility. Ms. Stamm's records indicate that AHCA's predecessor adopted the facility-specific provisions tied to net need at the same time it adopted the 75 percent average district occupancy standard to overcome the problems with the net need formula. AHCA asserts that the admittedly irrational need methodology when combined with the 1987 amendment achieves a rational result. Because the need methodology always over estimates numeric need, facilities exceeding 75 percent occupancy have an opportunity to demonstrate special circumstances. Daniel Sullivan, Delray's expert, also testified that problems exist in extracting acute care bed from specialty bed utilization data, in hospitals which have both. He also agreed with Ms. Stamm that the 1987 amendment corrects the erroneous projections of the formula to give a rational outcome from the rule as a whole when not all hospitals in a subdistrict equal or exceed 75 percent occupancy and when one hospital, over 75 percent occupancy, attempts to establish a special circumstance, despite the fact that the need methodology itself is always wrong in projecting numeric need. Ms. Stamm testified that one district is approaching 75 percent occupancy in all hospitals. Mr. Sullivan testified that, if and when that occurs, then the formula is intended to, but does not, reflect the number of additional beds needed. An alternative methodology is required to determine bed need. AHCA, with its responsibility for the data base formerly collected by the HCCB, receives discharge data and financial worksheets from every hospital in the state. The claim that AHCA cannot update the formulas because its data may be unreliable is rejected as not credible. The data now available is more reliable than the 1979 data used in developing the rule, which was not collected from a formalized statewide reporting system, but from a sample of hospitals. The claim that AHCA cannot use its data base from mandatory statewide reporting mechanisms to extract the data needed to update the formulas is also rejected. The rule contemplated ". . .the institution of statewide utilization reporting mechanisms." Dr. Rond's work to update the formulas before the final hearing began on May 23, 1995. Dr. Rond used a total of approximately 1.5 million acute care discharges from the AHCA (formerly, HCCB) data base for the 1992 calendar year. At the time of the final hearing, Dr. Rond had not separated days of care for medical/surgical, intensive and coronary care. The data can be taken from hospital financial data, including detailed budget worksheets which are submitted to AHCA. Separate data are anticipated in the formula because the computation of need for the different bed categories is based on different occupancy goals. For medical/surgical and intensive care beds, the goal is 80 percent occupancy, but it is 75 percent for coronary care for persons age 0 to 64. For persons 65 and older, the rule applies a combined occupancy standard of 79.7 percent for all three bed categories, which assumes that approximately 4 percent of the combined days of older patients will be spent in coronary care. Dr. Rond reasonably applied the 79.7 percent occupancy standard to the combined days for persons under 65, in arriving at the total district bed need for 3,676 beds. To check these results and to assume a worse case scenario of all patient days attributable to coronary care beds, for which more beds are needed to maintain a lower occupancy, Dr. Rond worked the formula using 75 percent occupancy as the goal for medical/surgical, intensive and care coronary care beds combined. Although the base number increased by 100, the calculations and adjustments in the rule yielded the same number of total acute care beds needed in the district, 3,676. That reliably confirms that the maximum number of acute care beds needed in District 9 is 3,676 by 1999. AHCA could use its data base to update formulas and achieve rational results in the rule by using the hospital financial data to distinguish coronary care days for patients 0-64 to include in the formula, or by using a rational blended occupancy standard in a rule amending the existing methodology. AHCA demonstrated that the 1987 amendment overrides the exaggerated numeric need number to yield a rational published fixed need pool in the absence of 75 percent occupancy in all acute care beds in a subdistrict. AHCA also demonstrated that because the projected need is always excessive under the formula, hospitals are allowed to demonstrate special circumstances, although it is absurd to include a requirement of numeric need in a provision for special circumstances. AHCA's claim that the excessive need projection is, therefore, irrelevant is rejected. Net need under the rule formula fails to give any rational indication of the number of beds needed when all hospitals in a subdistrict reach 75 percent occupancy.
The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether Respondent should be subjected to discipline for the violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner on July 28, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine in the State of Florida, pursuant to Section 20.43, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license no. ME 0031639 on October 26, 1977. Respondent is board certified in general surgery and has worked and trained as a general and vascular surgeon. Respondent has practiced medicine in Tampa since 1988. Respondent offered testimony establishing that his peers respect his ability as a surgeon. Until 1996, Respondent had not been the subject of disciplinary action by the Board of Medicine or by any other licensing entity. On January 26, 1996, the Board of Medicine issued a final order in Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 95-3925, imposing discipline on Respondent’s license to practice medicine. Case No. 95-3925 involved two separate incidents in which Respondent performed surgical procedures that had not been specifically consented to by the patients. In the first incident, Respondent removed the severely diseased left leg of the patient when the signed consent to surgery was for removal of the right leg. The patient was well known to Respondent, and it was understood between Respondent and the patient that both legs would eventually require amputation. In the second incident, Respondent removed a toe that had become dislocated during a debridement of the patient’s foot. The toe was connected only by ligament and necrotic tissue, and Respondent removed it during the debridement procedure rather than waiting to obtain specific consent for its removal. In the final order, the Board of Medicine concluded that Respondent had violated Sections 458.331(1)(p) and (t), Florida Statutes, by failing to obtain proper consent from a patient and by practicing medicine below the standard of care. Based on these conclusions, the Board of Medicine imposed the following relevant disciplinary measures: Respondent’s license to practice medicine is REPRIMANDED. Respondent shall pay an administrative fine in the amount of $10,000 to the Board of Medicine, within one year of the date this Final Order is filed. Respondent’s license to practice medicine in the State of Florida is SUSPENDED for a period of 6 months including the time served under the emergency suspension. Respondent shall submit a practice plan prior to reinstatement to be approved by the Board’s probation committee. Within 6 months of the effective date of this Final Order, Respondent shall have an independent, certified risk manager review Respondent’s practice. Specifically, this independent consultant shall review the Respondent’s practice concerning preoperative procedures including patient consent. This consultant will prepare a written report addressing Respondent’s practice. Such report, if necessary, will include suggested improvements of the quality assurance of Respondent’s practice. Respondent will submit this report to the Board’s Probation Committee with documentation that demonstrates compliance with the suggestions enumerated in the consultant’s report. Upon reinstatement, Respondent’s license to practice medicine in the State of Florida shall be placed on PROBATION for a period of two years, subject to the following terms and conditions: Respondent shall comply with all state and federal statutes, rules and regulations pertaining to the practice of medicine, including Chapters 455, 458, 893, Florida Statutes, and Rules 59R, Florida Administrative Code. Respondent shall appear before the Probation Committee at the first meeting after said probation commences, at the last meeting of the Probation Committee preceding termination of probation, quarterly, and at such other times requested by the committee. Respondent shall be noticed by the Board staff of the date, time and place of the Board’s Probation Committee whereat Respondent’s appearance is required. Failure of the Respondent to appear as requested or directed shall be considered a violation of the terms of this Probation, and shall subject the Respondent to disciplinary action. * * * 6. Respondent shall not practice except under the indirect supervision of a physician fully licensed under Chapter 458 to be approved by the Board’s Probation Committee.... The responsibilities of a monitoring physician shall include: Submit quarterly reports, in affidavit form, which shall include: Brief statement of why physician is on probation. Description of probationer’s practice. Brief statement of probationer’s compliance with terms of probation. Brief description of probationer’s relationship with monitoring physician. Detail any problems which may have arisen with probationer. * * * Respondent shall submit quarterly reports in affidavit form, the contents of which shall be specified by the Board. The reports shall include: Brief statement of why physician is on probation. Practice location. Describe current practice (type and composition). Brief statement of compliance with probationary terms. Describe relationship with monitoring/supervising physician. Advise Board of any problems. * * * 11. Respondent understands that during this period of probation, semi-annual investigative reports will be compiled by the Agency for Health Care Administration concerning his compliance with the terms and conditions of probation and the rules and statutes regulating the practice of medicine. On January 31, 1996, Respondent submitted to the Board of Medicine the practice plan required by the final order. The practice plan named Joseph Diaco, M.D., as Respondent’s monitoring physician, and stated that Dr. Diaco would review twenty percent of Respondent’s patient charts. The practice plan stated that Respondent would comply specifically with all the terms and conditions of the final order, and with the recommendations of the certified risk manager. The practice plan further stated: ... Dr. Sanchez will have specific discussions with his surgical patients prior to any anesthesia being administered, wherein he will discuss the intended surgical procedure again, and will have the intended surgical site marked with indelible ink. The record does not document that the Board of Medicine’s Probation Committee formally approved Respondent’s practice plan, or addressed the terms of the practice plan in any way. Such approval is presumed from the fact that Respondent appeared before the Probation Committee on several occasions subsequent to filing the practice plan, and the record does not indicate that the Probation Committee registered any objection or suggested any modifications to the practice plan. Respondent made the required appearances before the Probation Committee. Respondent and Dr. Diaco submitted the required quarterly reports to the Board of Medicine, and Dr. Diaco fulfilled the monitoring requirements of the practice plan. Periodically during the probation period, Mr. Richard Hess, an investigator with the Agency for Health Care Administration, would contact Respondent and Dr. Diaco to inquire as to Respondent’s practice and compliance with the terms of probation. Mr. Hess would inquire regarding such matters as the submission of quarterly reports, the payment of the administrative fine, and the current locations at which Respondent was practicing. Mr. Hess would submit his reports to the Agency for Health Care Administration and to the Board of Medicine, and these reports were used to supplement the information submitted directly by Respondent and Dr. Diaco. Based upon the information he was provided by Respondent and Dr. Diaco, Mr. Hess never found Respondent out of compliance with the terms of his probation. On the morning of November 2, 1997, an order was entered at Vencor Hospital by the primary treating physician for placement of a central venous line for patient D.M., an 80 year- old female patient. A central venous line is most often placed for access to the circulatory system for the provision of medications and/or fluids when the peripheral venous system is not available for such use. A central venous line may be ordered if the patient has no veins remaining for the insertion of a peripheral catheter, or for extended access, such as when a patient requires a long-term cycle of antibiotics for a bone infection. Patient D.M. required the central line for antibiotics to treat infected ulcerations on her lower extremities. The placement of a central line may be performed by any licensed physician, though surgeons are often called in to perform the procedure for primary physicians. Two physicians who teach at the University of Miami testified that third-year residents are allowed to perform the procedure with only indirect supervision. Dr. Diaco testified that nurse practitioners may perform the procedure under the supervision of a physician. The procedure is performed at the patient’s bedside, not in an operating room. No general anesthesia is required. A local anesthetic is administered at the point of insertion. The entire procedure takes two to three minutes to perform. The central line may be placed in at least three locations in the body: the leg, the neck, or the collarbone. In the case of D.M., Respondent placed the line by way of the collarbone. A needle is inserted under the clavicle and into the vein that unites with the jugular vein to form the second largest vein in the human body, the superior vena cava. Using a guide wire, a catheter is threaded through the subclavian vein and placed inside the superior vena cava. Prior to performance of the procedure, the patient’s head is typically placed lower than her feet in what is called the Trendelenburg position. If the patient has a feeding tube, it is typically turned off prior to the procedure to prevent aspiration of tube material. Proper placement of the central line is confirmed by X- ray taken immediately after the procedure. Such confirmation of placement is necessary due to the risks associated with incorrect placement. The most immediate risk is pneumothorax, the puncturing of the patient’s lung. Other less common complications are blood loss, cardiac arrest, infection, and irregular heartbeat. The consensus of the experts who testified at hearing was that the procedure poses no greater risk of complication for elderly patients such as D.M., but that elderly patients who do suffer complications may have a harder time recovering than would younger, more robust patients. D.M. was an 80 year-old female patient who shared Room 218 at Vencor Hospital with J.P., an 89 year-old female patient. D.M. and J.P. were of the same general age, ethnic origin, and gender. They had similar medical problems, including bilateral lower extremity decubiti and ulcerations. D.M. was able to understand conversation and could verbally communicate with staff. D.M. signed on her own behalf the consent form for the insertion of the central venous line. The signature on the consent form was obtained by and witnessed by Elizabeth Rood, a registered nurse on duty during the day of November 2, 1997. Ms. Rood testified that she believed D.M. was rational enough to sign the form on her own behalf. Vencor Hospital policy dictated that informed consent be obtained from the patient by the surgeon who was to perform the procedure. The nursing employees of Vencor Hospital and Respondent all testified that, despite the stated policy, it was common practice at the time for nurses to obtain the signatures of patients on the consent forms. The express terms of Respondent’s practice plan also required Respondent to have “specific discussions with his surgical patients prior to any anesthesia being administered. ” J.P. suffered from organic brain syndrome and was generally unable to communicate verbally. J.P. was unable to give consent for surgical procedures on her own behalf. Ms. Rood obtained D.M.’s signature on the informed consent form at about 10:00 a.m. Shortly thereafter, hospital staff contacted Respondent to inform him of the order and request that he perform the placement of the central line. Respondent replied that he was unable to perform the procedure at that time because of a more urgent consultation at St. Joseph’s Hospital, but would come to Vencor Hospital later to perform the procedure. Shortly before the start of the nursing night shift, the central line cart with supplies for the procedure was brought by the day supervisor to the second floor of Vencor Hospital and placed outside Room 218. Lisa Cotroneo was the night charge nurse. When she arrived for her shift, she received report from the day charge nurse. That report indicated that D.M. was to receive a central line placement at some time during the evening. The nursing staff at Vencor was divided into teams of two or three nurses assigned to particular rooms on the floor. Team three was responsible for Room 218. At the start of the night shift, Nurse Cotroneo informed two of the three nurse on team three, Donna Maranto and Fortune Ndukwe, that a central line was to be placed on patient D.M. that evening. Nurse Cotroneo did not inform the third nurse, Mary Shogreen, because Nurse Shogreen was a pool nurse called in to work on short notice and had not yet arrived for her shift. Nurse Shogreen was the nurse on team three who was assigned primary care duties for the patients in Room 218. Nurse Shogreen was later informed by Nurse Ndukwe that one of her patients would be receiving a central line placement that evening. Nurse Shogreen testified that she intended to check with the charge nurse to confirm the order for a central line placement, but that she never did so. At around 8:00 p.m., Respondent telephoned the nursing unit to inform the charge nurse that he was on his way to perform the placement of the central line. Nurse Cotroneo conveyed this information to Nurses Maranto and Ndukwe, and told them to be sure everything was ready for Respondent’s arrival. Respondent arrived at Vencor Hospital shortly after 8:00 p.m. and proceeded to the second floor nursing station, where he asked for and received the chart for patient D.M. He reviewed the chart, which contained the signed consent form and the order for placement of the central line. After reviewing the chart, Respondent inquired as to the location of D.M. and the nurse who would assist him in the procedure. Respondent was told that D.M.’s nurse was down the hall. Respondent walked down the hall and approached a group of three or four nurses. Respondent did not know any of them. He informed the group that he was Dr. Sanchez and was there to perform the central line placement. One of the nurses, later identified as Mary Shogreen, told him she was ready for him. She led him down the hall toward Room 218. Respondent paused at the central line cart outside Room 218 to pick up a pair of surgical gloves and the kit used for the central line placement. When Respondent entered the room, he observed Nurse Shogreen already at the bedside. The room was dark, save for a single light over the bed of the patient where Nurse Shogreen was working. Respondent saw that Nurse Shogreen was turning off the feeding tube to the patient, a common precursor to performance of a central line placement. Respondent walked to the other side of the patient’s bed and addressed the patient by the name of D.M. He told her that he was Dr. Sanchez and that her physician had asked him to insert a central venous catheter in her. Respondent looked into the patient’s eyes and realized she was not comprehending what he said. Nurse Shogreen was standing directly across the bed and could hear Respondent’s efforts to talk to the patient, including his addressing that patient as “D.M.” Respondent asked Nurse Shogreen if the patient was “always like this,” i.e., unresponsive. Nurse Shogreen answered that she had never had the patient before, but believed that was the usual condition of the patient. It would not be unusual for an elderly patient such as D.M. to be communicative and able to understand and sign a consent form at 10:00 a.m., but then be uncommunicative in the evening. The medical community informally refers to this phenomenon as "sundown syndrome." Respondent told Nurse Shogreen to assist him in placing the patient in the Trendelenburg position, and to get a rolled towel to place between the patient’s shoulder blades. While Nurse Shogreen was getting the towel, Respondent examined the patient’s neck and chest. Nurse Shogreen returned with the towel, but was unable to adjust the bed into Trendelenburg position. Respondent told her to go get another nurse who knew how to work the bed. She brought in Nurse Ndukwe, who was also unable to get the bed into the proper position. At length, they found a certified nurse assistant who was able to place the bed into position. Neither Nurse Shogreen nor Nurse Ndukwe expressed any concern to Respondent regarding the identity of the patient. Nurse Ndukwe had received an explicit report concerning the fact that patient D.M. was to receive a central line placement. Nurse Shogreen had heard Respondent address the patient as D.M. Respondent completed the procedure, which took about one minute. He proceeded to the nurse’s station and ordered the standard X-ray to confirm the proper placement of the central line, completed the consult form, and dicated both his consultation report and operative report. Nurse Shogreen remained behind in the room to clean up after the procedure. She made notations in the bedside chart of patient J.P., the mistaken recipient of the central line. Even at this point, Nurse Shogreen did not realize that the wrong patient had received the central line. The findings as to events in Room 218 on the evening of November 2, 1997, were based on the testimony of Respondent. Nurse Shogreen testified that it was Respondent who led the way into the room, Respondent who proceeded to the wrong bed, and Respondent who prevented Nurse Shogreen from going out to get the patient’s chart to confirm her mental condition after questioning by Respondent. Nurse Shogreen agreed with Respondent’s version of the problems with getting the bed into proper position, but testified that Respondent was so angry and in such a hurry that he performed the central line placement before the staff was able to place the bed in the proper position. Based on both the substance of the testimony and the demeanor of the witnesses, it is found that Respondent’s version of events is more believable, and that Respondent is a more credible witness than Nurse Shogreen. The undersigned is unable to credit testimony that a physician of Respondent’s skill and experience would plunge ahead into the room and commence a procedure on a patient he had never seen, without doing anything to ascertain her identity. The undersigned finds it more plausible that Respondent followed Nurse Shogreen’s lead, observed the visual cues she was providing, and assumed that the patient to whom Nurse Shogreen attended was in fact patient D.M. Respondent's proffer of testimony regarding inconsistencies in Nurse Mary Shogreen's testimony before the Peer Review Committee was disregarded in formulating these findings of fact. Several physicians offered expert testimony as to whether it is within the standard of practice for a surgeon to rely on his assisting nurse for patient identification. Dr. David Shatz, an associate professor of surgery at the University of Miami, testified that any surgeon must be absolutely sure he is working on the right person. He testified that once Respondent was unable to get a verbal response from the patient, he should have asked the nurse if he was speaking to patient D.M. Dr. Shatz concluded that it is a deviation from the standard of care to perform a procedure on a noncommunicative patient without checking the patient’s identification bracelet. Dr. Stephen Michel agreed that Respondent failed to meet the standard of care by placing the central line in the wrong patient. Dr. Michel’s other conclusions regarding the events in question cannot be credited because he admitted he was assuming that Dr. Sanchez was not permitted by the terms of his probation to be working in Vencor Hospital at all. This assumption was incorrect, and colored the remainder of his conclusions. Dr. Enrique Ginzburg, also an associate professor of surgery at the University of Miami, testified that a surgeon is usually unfamiliar with the patient in a central line placement, and stated that he could not remember the last time he checked an identification bracelet when the nurses were in the room with him. He agreed that it would be easy to check the armband, but that physicians simply do not check the armband if nurses are present to identify the patients. Dr. Jerry Diehr, an anesthesiologist at St. Josephs Hospital in Tampa, testified that a reasonably prudent physician would do what Respondent did. He stated that he relies on nurse identifications in similar circumstances, and that it is common practice for physicians to do so. Dr. Diehr testified that physicians rely on nurses for all manner of patient identification. He noted that care is often dictated by telephone calls. When a nurse calls him and tells him about the condition of his patient, the underlying assumption is that the nurse has correctly identified the patient and adequately reported the condition. Physicians may base their entire course of treatment on such reports from nurses, and must be able to rely on the nurses for such identification and reporting. Dr. Diaco strongly opined that physicians must be able to rely on nurses for patient identification. It is the nurse’s responsibility to identify the correct patient when the physician does not know the patient. Dr. Diaco testified that if physicians cannot rely on nurses for such basic information as the identity of their patients, they may as well live in the hospital and administer their own medications. Peter Shute, an expert in general nursing practice, opined that the three nurses on duty at Vencor Hospital on the evening of November 2, 1997, were negligent in their duty to know the patients on their assigned unit. He testified that Nurse Shogreen was particularly negligent, because she had not received full report on her patients, found out that one of her patients was to receive a central line placement that evening, but did not immediately obtain a full report and take steps to ensure that all preparations had been made. The weight of the evidence is that it was within the standard of care under the conditions and circumstances for Respondent to rely on Nurse Shogreen’s identification of the patient. This finding does not minimize the fact that Respondent bears ultimate responsibility for the performance of an invasive procedure on a patient who did not give informed consent. After Respondent dictated his notes and left the hospital, David Vallejo, the X-ray technician, came to the floor to obtain the X-ray ordered by Respondent. He discovered that the patient who received the central line was J.P., not D.M. Mr. Vallejo went to the nurse’s station and informed Nurse Cotroneo, who called the nursing supervisor to come to the room with her. Nurse Cotroneo and the supervisor confirmed that both patients in Room 218 were wearing their identification bracelets. The nursing supervisor called J.P.’s primary physician, who ordered an X-ray, which confirmed that J.P. suffered no ill effects from the placement of the central line. He also ordered removal of the central line, which was accomplished without incident. Respondent was informed of the error by telephone. He came to Vencor Hospital the next day, November 3, 1997, and documented the error in the medical records of both D.M. and J.P. On that day, a different surgeon performed the central line placement on D.M. All of the expert witnesses agreed that Respondent’s charting and recording of the incident, both before and after he learned of the error, were adequate and indicated no effort to conceal the facts of the situation. The experts also agreed that marking the intended surgical site with indelible ink serves no purpose in a central line placement. Petitioner's own expert, Dr. Shatz, stated that marking the site of a central line placement would be "silly." On November 3, 1997, Vencor Hospital suspended Respondent’s hospital staff privileges pending an investigation of the incident. Respondent immediately contacted Dr. Diaco, his indirect supervisor, as soon as he learned of the error. Respondent fully informed Dr. Diaco of the facts of the situation. Dr. Diaco told Respondent that he did nothing wrong and that “the nurse is in big trouble.” Respondent also sought the counsel of his attorney, Michael Blazicek. Mr. Blazicek conferred with Dr. Diaco, and also concluded that this was a nursing problem, not a standard of care problem for Respondent. The results of the hospital’s internal Peer Review Committee review seemed to bear out the opinions of Dr. Diaco and Mr. Blazicek. On November 26, 1997, Respondent was restored to full privileges at Vencor Hospital. Nurse Shogreen received verbal counseling and a one-day suspension for failure to render proper treatment to the correct patient. Vencor Hospital’s “Root Cause Analysis Team” found that nursing protocols should be changed to prevent a recurrence of patient misidentification. Patients would henceforth be identified by bed letter designation. Identification of the patient and consent to treatment would be verified by two people, one of whom must be a hospital employee. On November 17, 1997, the quality review manager of Vencor Hospital submitted an Adverse or Untoward Incident Report (Code 15) regarding the incident, pursuant to Sections 395.0197(6) and 641.55(6), Florida Statutes. A Code 15 Report is a report of serious adverse incidents in licensed facilities. The Code 15 Report identifies the physicians and nurses involved by their license numbers, and identifies the patient and facility. It describes the nature of the incident and all actions taken by the hospital in response to the incident. The purpose of the Code 15 Report is to notify the Agency for Health Care Administration and the Department of Health within 15 days of a serious adverse incident so the Agency may review the incident and begin an investigation. Respondent appeared before his Probation Committee on November 13, 1997. At this time, Respondent knew that the hospital would be filing a Code 15 Report, though it had not actually done so. Respondent was still on summary suspension at Vencor Hospital, pending review. Prior to his Probation Committee appearance, Respondent conferred with his attorney, Mr. Blazicek, who counseled him to answer any questions forthrightly, but not to volunteer information about the incident to the Probation Committee. This advice was based on the facts that the incident was still under investigation, that there had been no finding of wrongdoing by Respondent, and that summary suspension was a standard procedure for such incidents indicating no conclusions as to ultimate responsibility. Mr. Blazicek testified that he knew Respondent still had one more written quarterly report to file in January 1998. He reasoned that if the hospital's investigation resulted in adverse findings, Respondent could report the incident in that later filing. The Probation Committee raised no questions as to the Vencor Hospital incident, and determined that Respondent’s probation would terminate as scheduled upon payment of the administrative fine. Respondent did not volunteer information about the incident or the summary suspension. Respondent and Dr. Diaco filed their final quarterly reports in January 1998. Neither of them reported the Vencor Hospital incident. Respondent reported that he was in full compliance with all probationary terms. By the time the final quarterly reports were received, the Department of Health was aware of the Code 15 Report. Nonetheless, the Department issued an Order of Termination on February 2, 1998, finding that Respondent had satisfactorily completed the term of his probation as of January 26, 1998.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Health, Board of Medicine enter a final order determining that Rolando R. Sanchez has violated Section 458.331(1)(p), Florida Statutes, and suspending his license for a period of nine months from the date of the Order of Emergency Suspension of License, imposing a fine of $2,500.00 and placing Respondent on probation for a period of two years from the date the suspension expires. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert Peacock, Esquire John E. Terrel, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Grover C. Freeman, Esquire Jon M. Pellett, Esquire Freeman, Hunter & Malloy 201 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1950 Tampa, Florida 33602 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Pete Peterson, General Counsel Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast Bin A-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Tanya Williams, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
