The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Petitioner is entitled to arbitration under the Florida Lemon Law, concerning his 1994 Ford Explorer, purchased on May 17, 1994.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Respondent, DOA, was the state agency responsible for the receipt, evaluation and, when appropriate, forwarding of consumer RFAs to the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board conducted by the Attorney General of the State of Florida. On May 17, 1994, Petitioner, Kenneth P. Williamson, purchased a new 1994 Ford Explorer sport utility vehicle from Gator Ford in Tampa, Florida. Almost from the beginning, Petitioner experienced a vibration of the entire vehicle when a speed of more than fifty miles per hour was achieved. After several repair attempts, when the Petitioner had driven the vehicle for 12,000 miles without any relief from the problem, he took it back to Gator Ford for repairs. Gator’s efforts did not detect the cause of the problem or correct it. At some later point in time, when sought, no paper work relating to that service call could be found at Gator Ford. Thereafter, however, Petitioner took the vehicle to Carl Flammer Ford in Tarpon Springs for the same problem. Neither the problem’s cause nor a solution to it could be found. On or about June 23, 1995, the odometer on the vehicle in question indicated it had been driven 24,990 miles. Based on that fact, it is found that as of June 22, 1995, Petitioner had exceeded 24,000 miles of operation in the vehicle. This was recognized by Petitioner in his answer to question 17C on the RFA, when he indicated he had reached 24,000 miles on his vehicle in “5/95 OR 6/95.” On May 30, 1996, when the vehicle had 37,800 miles on it, Petitioner forwarded a motor Vehicle Defect Notification Form to Ford Motor Company advising of the vibration problem. That notice, sent by certified mail, was received by Ford on June 5, 1996. Petitioner claims, and Respondent admits, that his vehicle was out of service at least 21 days due to one or more substantial defects, and that there have been three or more repair attempts made to correct the same defect or condition. Because of these factors, and because Petitioner filed a notice of non-conformity with the manufacturer, albeit late in the proceedings, the DOA considered Petitioner to be entitled to the extension period within which his RFA may be filed. The times in this case pertinent under Florida’s Lemon Law are: Date of purchase of vehicle 5/17/94 Eighteen months from date of purchase 11/16/95 24,000 miles of operation reached 6/22/95 Initial Lemon Law limit reached 6/22/95 Six month extension due to Notice of Non-compliance filed 12/22/95 Six month deadline to file after expiration of 6 month extension 6/22/95 Date RFA filed with DOA 7/24/96 Excessive delay 32 days. On the basis of the above chronology, the DOA concluded that Petitioner’s RFA was not timely, and by letter dated August 23, 1996, rejected it. Petitioner submitted his Petition for Formal Proceedings on September 5, 1996, and it was received by the DOA on September 19, 1996. As of the date of this hearing, the unacceptable condition of the vehicle still exists. Ford Motor Company has contended that the condition is not serious, and when the vehicle had 16,000 miles on it, offered Petitioner $1,000 toward the purchase of a new vehicle. The dealer has now indicated it can do no more to correct the condition in issue. Petitioner claims he was misled by Ford Motor Company into waiting until the time limit for filing the Lemon Law RFA had expired. He did not know of the time constraints under the Lemon Law and believed Ford would correct the problem. He also claims that notwithstanding his signature appears on all the pertinent documents herein, his wife took care of all the paperwork. Ms. Williamson believes that the RFA was sent in on or around the time it was dated - June 5, 1996, but she cannot be sure. She is also not sure if it was sent by certified mail, but she has no receipt to demonstrate it was. She contends the RFA could not have been held by her as long as would be required for it to not be delivered until July 24, 1996, and suggests the DOA’s date stamp might be in error. The likelihood of that is remote. Petitioner and his wife admit to having been given a Lemon Law pamphlet when they bought the vehicle but also admit they did not study it timely to determine the criteria for filing a RFA. They want an opportunity to exercise their rights under the Lemon Law through arbitration and though they are not prepared to give this up because they cannot afford to replace the vehicle, they are very uncomfortable regarding its safety.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order denying Petitioner’s Request for Arbitration as untimely. DONE and ORDERED in Tallahassee, Florida this 14th day of January, 1997. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth P. Williamson 3732 Meridian Pace Land O’Lakes, Florida 34536 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether Petitioner's arbitration request was timely filed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner purchased his vehicle, a 1991 Ford F-350 Supercab XLT Lariat from Bartow Ford in Bartow, Florida on September 4, 1990. At the time of purchase, the odometer read less than 100 miles. Petitioner applied for arbitration on April 8, 1994. At the time of Petitioner's arbitration request, the vehicle had been driven approximately eighty-three thousand (83,000) miles. Petitioner's problems with his vehicle center around the automatic transmission. Respondent's vehicle reached twenty-four thousand (24,000) miles on or about December 15, 1991. On April 18, 1994, Respondent notified Petitioner that his arbitration request was untimely filed and was being denied. The Motor Vehicle Sales Warranty Enforcement Act a/k/a the "Lemon Law", which is set forth in Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, is administered jointly by the Respondent and the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board, Department of Legal Affairs. Respondent is responsible for initially reviewing an application to determine whether or not it is facially appropriate and to make a determination as to whether the applicant is, or is not, "potentially entitled to relief". Based on Respondent's determination that Petitioner's request was untimely filed, the request was denied on April 18, 1994. Petitioner's vehicle initially developed a transmission problem within six thousand seven hundred and seven (6,707) miles. The first service repair came on or about January 15, 1991. Petitioner returned the vehicle with the same problem on or about August 14, 1991 at which time the vehicle odometer read twenty-two thousand one hundred six (22,106) miles. Petitioner took the vehicle for repairs on three subsequent occasions and on each occasion the manufacturer rebuilt or replaced the transmission. Petitioner continues to have problems with his transmission and the manufacturer repairs the vehicle whenever it is brought in for service under the waranty. James D. Morrison, Respondent's supervisor for its "Lemon Law" section, reviewed Petitioner's file and acted on Petitioner's arbitration request. As noted, the request was filed on April 8, 1994. Morrison's review confirmed that Petitioner purchased his vehicle on September 4, 1990. Based on Morrison's calculations, Petitioner had to timely file his arbitration request within eighteen months of the date of purchase or twenty-four thousand (24,000) miles. Morrison used the most extended filing period by referring to the date of purchase and counting forward eighteen months which derived the date of March 6, 1992. Morrison granted Petitioner an additional extension of six months in compliance with extensions allowed if a defect occurs during the "lemon law" period. By granting Petitioner these extensions and the most extended allowable filing period within which the filing had to have been made, all arbitration requests by Petitioner, to be timely filed, had to occur on or before December 4, 1992.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for Lemon Law arbitration as it was untimely filed. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul G. LaPlaca Post Office Box 787 Valrico, Florida 33594 Barbara R. Edwards, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to arbitration under Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, Florida's "lemon law."
Findings Of Fact Petitioner took delivery of the motor vehicle at issue on December 31, 1996, at which time she received information on the requirements of Florida's "lemon law." Petitioner began to have trouble with the vehicle almost immediately. She notified the dealer that there was a serious problem, and Palm Kia in Ocala, Florida, performed some repairs. The Ocala dealer's repair shop did not inform her that the problem was a computer failure. Sometime during the next 18 months, there was a second period during which the car was in some repair shop. Petitioner first contacted the Department on January 8, 1999, by telephone. She was informed that the statutory time period for requesting arbitration under Florida's "lemon law" had expired, and the suggestion was made that she try contacting the Better Business Bureau. Petitioner testified that she would have filed a request for arbitration with the Department in January 1999, if the Department had not referred her to the Better Business Bureau. Petitioner signed her first and only written request for arbitration on February 2, 1999. This written request for arbitration by the Board was received by the Department on February 11, 1999. In her written arbitration request, Petitioner indicated that her vehicle had reached 24,000 miles "around the end" of 1997. However, at formal hearing, Petitioner confirmed that on January 19, 1998, the mileage on her vehicle was 32,763. In her written arbitration request, Petitioner did not provide proof that she had provided written notice of the alleged defect to the manufacturer, Kia Motors, within the "lemon law" rights period. Petitioner testified that sometime in the 18-month period specified by Florida's "lemon law" she had telephoned the manufacturer to complain about her car. However, Petitioner also testified that she did not notify the manufacturer by certified letter of the nonconformity until October 1998. Petitioner testified that on December 28, 1998, Gatorland Toyota in Gainesville, Florida, requested that the motor vehicle be towed to them. The motor vehicle had been towed the previous day, Sunday, December 27, 1998, to Billy Shell's Garage because Kia was closed and the motor vehicle could not be locked away. The motor vehicle was not diagnosed by Gatorland Toyota as having a computer problem until the first part of January 1999. Petitioner took possession of her vehicle in January 1999. At that time, she notified the dealer by telephone that the engine light was on. The car has continued to have difficulties.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order upholding the February 25, 1999 denial of Petitioner's request for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1999.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Polk County Work Force Development Board (Respondent) discriminated against David J. Sedivi (Petitioner) on the basis of disability when the Respondent terminated the Petitioner's employment. The Petitioner asserts that the termination was based on a disability. The Respondent asserts that the position for which the Petitioner was employed was eliminated for budgetary reasons and due to concerns expressed by program auditors that the Petitioner's job function was statutorily prohibited.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a regional workforce board created pursuant to Section 445.007, Florida Statutes (2004). The Respondent contracts with, and monitors the performance of, vendors who provide various employment-related services to qualified persons. At all times material to this case, the Respondent was annually audited by KPMG, an accounting firm contracted with a State of Florida agency responsible for oversight of the regional workforce boards. One of the programs for which the Respondent was responsible was the "Citrus Cars" program. Citrus Cars provided economical used vehicles to persons for whom lack of transportation was an obstacle to employment. The used vehicles were obtained and rehabilitated by Citrus Cars, and then leased to qualified individuals who eventually own the vehicles. The Respondent owns the non-profit corporation, Citrus Cars of Polk County, Inc., responsible for operation of the Citrus Cars program. In January 2003, KPMG auditors advised the Respondent that its operation of the Citrus Cars program was contrary to a statutory prohibition against the provision by regional workforce boards of direct services to clients. KPMG specifically cited the issue in the 2003 audit report. The Respondent disagreed with the KPMG opinion related to operation of Citrus Cars, and attempted unsuccessfully to convince the auditors that the Respondent's operation of the program was permissible under the statute. The Respondent had an existing contract with a private vendor ("A.C.S.") involved with the Citrus Cars program, but KPMG auditors apparently believe that the Respondent's relationship with the program was contrary to the statute. Nonetheless, the Respondent continued to operate the Citrus Cars program during 2003. In May 2003, the Petitioner began employment with the Respondent as a customer service officer for the Citrus Cars program. Prior to accepting employment with the Respondent, the Petitioner was employed by A.C.S. At all times material to the case, the Petitioner suffered from health issues which resulted in significant absence from the workplace. A three-month probationary period was extended for an additional three months by memorandum dated August 1, 2003, and written by Tom Hornack, the Respondent's Assistant Director. A primary reason for the extension was that Mr. Hornack had assumed supervisory responsibilities for the Citrus Cars program shortly before the end of the probationary period and wanted additional time to evaluate the Petitioner's performance. Although the memorandum includes a very positive evaluation of the Petitioner's efforts, the memo states as follows: In all fairness to you and Polk Works, there has not been ample time for you to work unaided without the assistance of Cecelia and Mitch to allow you to be able to demonstrate sole control of the program overall. The Petitioner's health issues and absence from the workplace apparently continued to be of concern to the Respondent. By letter dated September 19, 2003, Mr. Hornack advised that "your frequent absences from July 15 to present have resulted in a programmatic hardships [sic]." The letter stated that "due to high rate of absenteeism and the demands of your position" the Respondent requested a statement from the Petitioner's physician "as to your fitness for continued employment as the Citrus Cars Customer Services Officer." The Respondent also requested that the Petitioner create a "corrective action plan" indicating the date upon which the Petitioner would return to work and the "action items that you will take to actualize the plan." Towards the end of September 2003, as the result of an infection, the Petitioner underwent amputation of a foot and portion of a leg. Thereafter, the Petitioner had a disability due to amputation of the leg and the resulting inability to walk without a prosthetic device. By letter dated October 29, 2003, Nancy Thompson, the Respondent's Executive Director, advised the Petitioner that his employment position was being eliminated. The letter indicated that the Respondent's decision was related to budgetary issues and operational costs, and stated that the responsibilities of the Petitioner's employment position would be absorbed by other staff. Ms. Thompson's testimony also indicated that the Petitioner's absence from the workplace was a factor in her decision, and was seemingly reflected in the letter's reference to other employees assuming the Petitioner's job duties. The Petitioner obtained legal representation and Ms. Thompson withdrew the proposed termination of the Petitioner's employment. By letter dated December 16, 2003, Ms. Thompson requested that the Petitioner obtain an assessment of work abilities from his physician, including a statement of any restrictions and an anticipated date of return to employment, clearly indicating that the Petitioner's return to work was possible. In January 2004, KPMG auditors again advised the Respondent that operation of Citrus Cars was contrary to the statutory prohibition against provision of direct client services by regional workforce boards, and again specifically cited the issue in the audit report. Additionally, the Respondent learned that its budget for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2004, was reduced. By letter dated February 17, 2004, Ms. Thompson advised the Petitioner that although the information previously provided was sufficient to extend non-paid leave status for 90 days, "before I can consider your returning to work," the Petitioner was directed to provide a physician's statement identifying a "specific date" upon which the Petitioner could return to work and including a "detailed assessment" of the Petitioner's abilities and limitations as related to his position description. The letter stated that the information was required at least two weeks prior to the anticipated date of return. According to a work status form from the Petitioner's rehabilitation physician dated March 30, 2004, the Petitioner could return to regular duty on May 17, 2004. The only restriction noted on the form is the use of an assistive device for ambulation. By letter to Nancy Thompson dated April 9, 2004, the Petitioner's rehabilitation physician indicated that the Petitioner could "perform his activities at work in approximately 30-60 days time, once his physical therapy and prosthetic training is completed." By letter dated May 13, 2004, Nancy Thompson advised the Petitioner that operation of the Citrus Cars program had been "much modified," that the Respondent's role in the program was "purely finance and oversight" pursuant to the KPMG opinion, and that the responsibilities of the Citrus Cars Customer Service Officer position had been eliminated or absorbed by other staff. Ms. Thompson testified credibly that continued failure to heed the auditor's advice could have had negative repercussions on the board, and therefore total operational responsibility for the Citrus Cars program was transferred to A.C.S., and the in-house position of "Customer Service Officer" was eliminated. At the time of the hearing, the Respondent had a vacant and funded employment position. At the hearing, the Petitioner testified that he was uncertain as to the relief he was seeking, stating that "it ought to be something that's fair," but indicated that it was "difficult for me to think that I would even trust them if I went back to work because of all the things that have gone down and everything else."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by David J. Sedivi in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Craig A. McCarthy, Esquire 361 River Chase Drive Orlando, Florida 32807 Charles W. Sell, Esquire Shuffield Lowman Gateway Center 1000 Legion Place, Suite 1700 Orlando, Florida 32801 Stacy L. Wilde, Esquire Shuffield Lowman Gateway Center 1000 Legion Place, Suite 1700 Orlando, Florida 32801 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, is estopped from denying Petitioners' request for arbitration under Florida's Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act, Chapter 681, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioners, William and Margarent Newell, are husband and wife. The Newells reside in Lake City, Florida. Respondent, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. Among other things, the Department is responsible for the receipt and evaluation of complaints and requests for arbitration involving disputes between automobile dealers and manufacturers doing business in Florida and the citizens of the State of Florida. See Chapter 681, Florida Statutes. The Newells' Automobile Purchase. On August 6, 1993, the Newells took possession of a new Dodge Colt (hereinafter referred to as the "Colt"). The date the contract of purchase was signed, and, therefore, the date of purchase, was August 9, 1993. Stipulated Facts. The Colt was purchased from Sunbelt Chrysler (hereinafter referred to as the "Dealer"), in Lake City, Florida. The Newell's Experience with the Colt and the Department's Advice. During the first week after taking possession of the Colt, Ms. Newell began to experience trouble with the automatic transmission. The transmission would "slip" resulting in the engine "winding out". On August 14, 1993, Ms. Newell took the Colt to the Dealer and reported the transmission problems. An employee of the Dealer took the Colt for a test ride and told Ms. Newell that he found nothing wrong with the transmission. Ms. Newell was told to bring the Colt back if she continued to experience trouble with the transmission. No documentation of the August 14, 1993 visit with the Dealer was provided to Ms. Newell by the Dealer. Ms. Newell's testimony concerning the date and incident was unrefutted. The Newells continued to experience problems with the transmission. On September 23, 1993, Mr. Newell took the Colt back to the Dealer and reported the transmission problem again. This time the Colt was left with the Dealer. The Dealer returned the Colt to the Newells on September 23, 1993 and told them that no problem was experienced or discovered with the transmission. Again, the Dealer told the Newells to bring the Colt back if they experienced further trouble. No documentation of the September 23, 1993 visit with the Dealer was provided to the Newells by the Dealer. The Newells' testimony concerning the date and incident was unrefutted. Mr. Newell took the Colt back to the Dealer for the third time on September 27, 1993. This time the Colt was kept overnight by the Dealer. The Colt was returned September 28, 1993. Again, no problem with the transmission was found by the Dealer. The Dealer provided documentation to the Newells of the September 27, 1993 effort at repair. On April 8, 1994, after continuing to experience problems with the Colt's transmission, Mr. Newell contacted a representative of the Department in an effort to gather information about how to file a claim under Florida's Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act, Chapter 681, Florida Statutes. The Department's representative told Mr. Newell that he would need "documentation" of a minimum of three repair attempts on the Colt by the Dealer before a claim could be filed. What constituted "documentation" was not explained, but it was resonable for Mr. Newell to conclude that written documentation from the Dealer of three attempts was required. Mr. Newell only had documentation of one repair attempt from the Dealer as of April 8, 1994. Mr. Newell was not told that the two undocumented repair attempts of August 14, 1993 and September 23, 1993, could also qualify as repair attempts if Mr. Newell provided an affidavit stating that repair attempts were made on those dates. In reasonasble reliance on the information provided by the Department to Mr. Newell on April 8, 1993, the Newells did not file a claim with the Department. On May 25, 1994, the Colt had been driven 24,000 miles. This constituted the end of the "Lemon Law rights period" as used in Section 681.109, Florida Statutes, and as defined in Section 681.102(9), Florida Statutes. (Stipulated Facts). The transmission continued to malfunction after April 8, 1993. On July 21, 1994, the Newells had the Colt serviced for the transmission problem. They received their second "documentation" at this time from the Dealer. On October 12, 1994, the Newells had the Colt serviced again for the same problem. The transmission had to be rebuilt on this occassion. The Newells received their third "documentation" at this time from the Dealer. Despite having three "documentations" of repair attempts as of October 12, 1994, the Newells did not file a claim with the Department at that time. The Newells' reliance on the representations of the Department made on April 8, 1994, would not, therefore, reasonably explain why they did not file a claim upon receiving the documentation that they believed was necessary on October 12, 1994. Reliance on the Department's representations of April 8, 1994, does not explain or justify the Newells lack of complaince with the time requirements for filing a request for arbitration. On or about January 6, 1995, Mr. Newell again spoke with a representative of the Department concerning this matter. Mr. Newell explained that he had the three repair documents that he had been told he needed. He had also completed a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board which he intended to file with the Department. Mr. Newell was incorrectly told, however, that the time for filing the request had expired. In reliance upon this representation, Mr. Newell again failed to file the request for arbitration. On January 25, 1995, the Newells sent notice to the manufacturer of their problem with the Colt. On February 14, 1995, a representative from the manufacturer inspected the Colt. Again, nothing was found wrong with the rebuilt transmission. On May 25, 1995, the statutory period for requesting arbitration expired. The Newells were entitled to a six-month extension from May 25, 1994, to November 25, 1994, pursuant to Section 681.104(3)(b), Florida Statutes, because they had reported the problem with the transmission during the original Lemon Law rights period and it had not been cured. Pursuant to Section 681.109(4), Florida Statutes, the Newells had six-months after the end of the extended Lemon Law rights period, or from November 25, 1994 to May 25, 1995, to file their request for arbtiration. On September 1, 1995, the rebuilt transmission on the Colt again burned up. The Colt has remained parked since that date through the date of the hearing in this case. The Newells' Request for Arbitration. On September 28, 1995, after again speaking to a representative from the Department, the Newells filed a Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board with the Department. This request was filed just over four months after the deadline for filing the request expired. The Department denied the request by letter dated October 11, 1995, based upon the Department's determination that the request was untimely.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department accepting the request for arbitration filed by William and Margaret Newell. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5938 The Department has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Mr. Fahami did not file a proposed order. The Newells' Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1. Accepted in 2. Accepted in 3. Accepted in 5. Accepted in 6-7. Accepted in 8-9. Accepted in 11-12. Accepted in 14. 9-10 Accepted in 15. Accepted in 16. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 17. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 19-20. See 22. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 24. Accepted in 25. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 27. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 2. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 3 and 18. Accepted in 18 and 24. 5-6 Accepted in 24. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Petitioners' testimony constitutes unrefutted, credible evidence that they made repair attempts priot to September 27, 1993. See 14. Not relevant. The publication was not offered into evidence. Therefore, the evidence failed to prove what information the publication included. The significant phone conversation took place on April 8, 1994. While the phone bills were not offered into evidence, Petitioners' unrefutted, credible testimony was sufficient to prove that the phone call took place. 11 See 14-16. 12 Accepted in 15-17. 13-14 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 23. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 17-18 Hereby accepted. But see 17 and 22. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 27. COPIES FURNISHED: John K. McPherson, Esquire 703 North Main Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Rhonda Long Bass, Esquire Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether Petitioner qualified for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board (hereinafter the "Board") pursuant to Chapter 681, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner, Michael Boudreau, was a resident of the State of Florida. Pursuant to Section 681, Florida Statutes, the Respondent's Division of Consumer Services is the state agency in Florida charged with the responsibility to receive, screen, and evaluate requests for arbitration before the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board and to determine eligibility for arbitration. Respondent has the authority to reject a dispute that the Respondent determines to be outside the scope of the Board's authority. On May 17, 1996, Petitioner purchased and took possession of a new 1996 Dodge Ram 3500 Truck from Dodge Country in Duluth, Georgia. Dodge is a division of the Chrysler Corporation, a Michigan corporation. The consideration for the motor vehicle was paid to Dodge Country in Duluth, Georgia. The truck was driven to Florida. It was titled in Florida, and the sales and use tax, registration fee, and title fees paid to the State of Florida. Petitioner made numerous reports of problems with the vehicle. The manufacturer's authorized service agent in Florida was given more than three attempts to correct the same problem without success. On May 8, 1997, Petitioner filed his Request for arbitration by the Florida New Vehicle arbitration Board. By letter dated May 9, 1997, the Respondent rejected Petitioner's Request for Arbitration because the vehicle was purchased in Duluth, Georgia, and not sold in the State of Florida. Petitioner testified that he attempted to purchase the vehicle in Florida. However, the make and model of his choice was not available from any dealer in Florida. He was forced to purchase the vehicle out-of-state, but he drove it immediately thereafter to Florida and titled it in this state.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order denying the Petitioner's Request for Arbitration before the Board. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Boudreau, pro se 1209 Alton Drive Apopka, Florida 32703 DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1997. Rhonda Long Bass, Senior Attorney Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether Petitioner's request for arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board pursuant to Chapter 681, Florida Statutes, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact On October 12, 1994, Petitioner signed a "Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board" (hereinafter referred to as the application). This application was received by Respondent on October 14, 1994. Petitioner's application represented the following: He took delivery of the subject automobile on October 6, 1992. The automobile mileage at the time of delivery was 14 miles. The approximate date he put 24,000 miles on the automobile was August 25, 1993. There was no appearance by or on behalf of the Petitioner at the formal hearing. The notice of hearing accurately set forth the date, time, and location of the formal hearing. This notice was duly mailed to the address that the Petitioner had provided and contained the following warning: "Failure to appear at this hearing shall be grounds for entry of an order of dismissal or recommended order of dismissal, as appropriate."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's "Request for Arbitration by the Florida New Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board" be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: John S. Koda, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Mr. Carlos M. R. Romeo 9977 Westview Drive #114 Coral Springs, Florida 33076 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
