The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner, Rene Delgado Leon, M.D., is eligible for examination for licensure to practice medicine in the state of Florida. The Petitioner, of course, contends that he is eligible. The Respondent, Board of Medical Examiners, contends that the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate eligibility, having previously advised him, inter alia: Your application and supporting documentation contained substantial omissions of material information relative to your medical education. Additionally, your application and supporting documentation does not provide sufficient information to demonstrate that you can practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety. See Section 458.301, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. The Petitioner, Dr. Rene Pedizo Delgado Leon, was born on November 26, 1936, in Cuba. All of his formal education prior to medical school was obtained in Cuba. He attended medical schools, off and on, at various times and places between 1955 and June of 1980. His medical education commenced in 1955 at the Medical School of the University of Havana and ended when he-was awarded his medical degree from the University of Dominica in June of 1980. The Petitioner's first language was Spanish and he is not completely fluent in the English language. When communicating in English he appears to have a tendency to interpret statements and questions in a very literal manner. The Petitioner does not appear to have intended to deceive the Board of Medical Examiners or to misrepresent information about his education and experience. Nevertheless, he has not been very clear about a number of details. Since receiving his degree from the University of Dominica in 1980, the Petitioner has completed a residency in pathology, has passed the FLEX exam in conjunction with his application for licensure in the state of Georgia, and has been licensed to practice medicine in the state of Georgia. There were several discrepancies between information given by the Petitioner to the Board of Medical Examiners and to the Hearing Officer concerning various aspects of his background, particularly concerning his medical education. With regard to his medical education, Petitioner listed on his first application that he attended medical school in Havana, Cuba, from April 1954 until December 1962. On his second application he stated that he attended medical school in Havana, Cuba, from September 1955 until September 1960. He testified before the Foreign Medical Graduate Committee that he attended medical school at the University of Havana from 1955 until 1962. At the final hearing he testified that he attended the University of Havana from 1955 until 1962. On his first application, in response to the direction that he list all universities or colleges where he attended classes and received training as a medical student, he stated only that he attended the University of Dominica from June of 1977 until June of 1980. He subsequently filed a form, received by the Board on October 26, 1983, stating that he had attended the University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain, and received training as a medical student from November of 1974 until April of 1975. On his second application, he stated that he had attended the University of Zaragoza as a medical student from November of 1974 until April of 1975. At the final hearing he testified that in 1973 while he was in Zaragoza he applied to revalidate old courses taken in Havana and that thereafter he took all examinations up to the third year. He stated that he took other courses in Zaragoza, but that he did not take the examinations for any of the medical courses taken in Zaragoza. He also testified that he was given credit for courses at Zaragoza even though he did not take the examinations. The next segment of his medical education was consistently testified to as having been had at the Universidad Central del Este in the Dominican Republic. He attended the Universidad Central del Este for only one semester, during which he took six or seven subjects. He testified that Universidad Central del Este did give him some credit for the third year of medical school; in spite of the fact that he did not take examinations in any of the third-year courses he took in Zaragoza. In January of 1979 he transferred to Universidad Nordestana and spent approximately one year there. Univeraidad Nordestana gave him two and one half to three years of credit. Although his initial application showed that he had attended the University of Dominica in the West Indies from June of 1977 until June of 1980, his subsequent written and oral testimony was that he was enrolled at the University of Dominica only from January of 1980 until June of 1980. He testified before the Foreign Medical Graduate Committee that at the time he transferred from Nordestana, he was basically finished with his medical education and he said he transferred to Dominica because they did not talk in English in Santo Domingo. He also testified that he transferred to Dominica so that he could get some exposure to how medicine was practiced in the United States. Petitioner testified that although he transferred to the University of Dominica and he received his degree from the University of Dominica six months after he transferred there, he did not pay any monies to the University of Dominica. His explanation of why he did not pay money to the University of Dominica is that he wrote things for them, like a pathology booklet. The application form which Petitioner completed requested that he specify all places of residence since beginning medical training. On his first application he showed that he resided in Dominica, West Indies, from January of 1980 until June of 1980. On his second application he listed as residences since initiation of medical training only the University of Miami, Jackson Memorial, VA Hospital, and the University of South Florida, Tampa. In August of 1983 he followed up the second application with a letter to Mrs. Faircloth which stated that his place of residence while attending medical school was the "students quarters and dormitories" at Portsmouth, University of Dominica, West Indies. However, at the hearing before the Foreign Medical Graduate Committee and at the final hearing, Petitioner admitted that he was, in fact, on the campus of the University of Dominica only one day, and that was on graduation day. In fact, when he testified before the Foreign Medical Graduate Committee, he was specifically asked, "When you left Nordestana, where did you go?" To that question he replied, "Oh, to Dominica." However, he later admitted that when he left Nordestana, he went to Miami and he did not go to Dominica until he went six months later in order to graduate. On both of his written applications, Petitioner was asked to list the degrees earned other than M.D. On neither application did he list a bachelor's degree. Yet, in testimony before the Committee and at the final hearing, he testified that he had earned the equivalent of a B.S. in chemistry at the University of Havana. He testified that the reason that he omitted it was that he thought the question referred to medical education. However; in response to the same question, he listed that he had obtained a Licensee in Science and a Doctor in Science from the University of Zaragoza. With regard to the matter of what clerkships, if any, Petitioner performed as part of his medical education, the record shows that he was enrolled at the University of Dominica, the school from which he received a medical degree, from January or February of 1980 until June of 1980. The record also shows that during that five- or six-month period he performed what purported to be clerkships at the VA Hospital and at Coral Gables Hospital, in Miami, and at the same time was an employee of the VA Hospital. He testified that his clerkship at the VA Hospital was in pathology and that he was employed full time in the same area as he was receiving clerkship credit. He arranged the clerkships himself and informed the university of the clerkships. He testified that he did the same activities as the other clerks did, but he worked approximately forty hours and they worked thirty to forty hours. He effected his transfer to the University of Dominica by writing to the New York office and by taking some "required" examinations in basic sciences and clinical studies. He took the examinations in Miami and passed everything but gynecology. He eventually passed gynecology, but not until May of 1980 after he had almost completed clerkships. He testified that when he did his "rotation" at the VA Hospital, he was told that he could "moonlight." He testified that he did all of the autopsies while the other medical students watched. He testified that he went in to work at about 7:00 a.m. and left around 4:00 p.m. and that the other residents did not arrive until about 8:00 a.m. However, he did testify that the clerks arrived at 6:00 a.m. Petitioner testified that he was doing a clerkship at the time, not a residency, and that it was the extra time that he put in that justified his being both paid and given credit for an educational experience. Dr. Robert M. Clark was Petitioner's supervisor during the period of approximately January of 1980 until June of 1980. Petitioner worked in the morgue as a Physician's Assistant and also did "resident physician work." Petitioner was paid at the same time as he was doing a rotation because there was a shortage of residents. Petitioner had the same exposure to pathology as the other residents, all of whom were from the University of Miami. None of the other students were paid employees. A Physician's Assistant requires two years of medical school. Dr. Clark was introduced to Petitioner by Dr. Kuhnhardt. Dr. Kuhnhardt was not connected in any way with the medical school at the University of Dominica. The only other purported clerkship about which there was testimony at the hearing related to a clerkship at Coral Gables Hospital. That clerkship was under Dr. Hurst. That clerkship was done from January of 1980 until June of 1980, the same period during which the clerkship at the VA Hospital was done. Petitioner testified that he went to Coral Gables Hospital after he left the VA Hospital, usually after 4:00 p.m., and stayed however long was necessary, possibly as late as 8:00 or midnight. Dr. Hurst only let the students observe medical procedures. That clerkship was conducted in a community hospital. As for the supervision by the school, the testimony was that the school played no role in arranging the clerkships. Petitioner testified that people from the school came for general meetings every once in a while during the clerkships. As for evaluation, Petitioner testified that the school sent evaluation forms to him and he distributed the forms to whoever was supervising him.
Recommendation Based upon all of the foregoing it is my recommendation, because of the contradictions and uncertainties on the record in this case regarding the nature of the Petitioner's medical education, that the Board of Medical Examiner issue a final order denying the Petitioner's application for licensure by examination without prejudice to the filing of any future application for licensure by examination or endorsement, unless; for reasons analogous to those set forth in the Lopez decision, supra, the Board is persuaded that the shortcomings in the application and its supporting evidence may be overlooked in light of the Petitioner's achievements since 1980. DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of January, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: M. Catherine Lannon, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Room LL-04, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jorge A. Sibila, Esquire 2751 Coral Way Miami, Florida 33145 Dorothy Faircloth; Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred Roche; Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on each of the proposed findings of fact submitted by each of the parties. Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings: The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact consist of a two- line introductory clause and six unnumbered indented paragraphs. The six unnumbered indented paragraphs are addressed below in the order in which they appear in the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. First Paragraph: Rejected. This paragraph is merely a commentary on the state of the record and does not contain any proposed finding of fact. Second Paragraph: Rejected for the same reason as the first paragraph. Third Paragraph: Rejected in part and accepted in part. Rejected portions are rejected for the most part for the same reason as the rejection of the first two paragraphs. The "fully explained" portion of this paragraph is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Findings have been made consistent with the portions of this paragraph relating to when Petitioner's medical education began and ended, his completion of a residency in pathology, and his passing of the FLEX examination. Fourth Paragraph: The first sentence of this paragraph is rejected in part because it is merely a commentary on the state of the record and in part because it is inconsistent with the evidence of record. Dr. Clark did not explain the Petitioner's work in detail: to the contrary, his testimony was rather vague about a number of the details and he failed to recall a number of specific details. The last sentence of this paragraph is rejected because it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. Fifth Paragraph: Rejected for the same reason as the first paragraph. Sixth paragraph: The first sentence of this paragraph is rejected because the Petitioner's explanations were incomplete. With regard to the second sentence of this paragraph, it is accepted that the Petitioner is "not fluent/native in the English language or in legal terminology," and that the Petitioner did not intend to deceive the Board or misrepresent information to the Board. m e remainder of the second sentence is rejected on the grounds that it is in part irrelevant and immaterial as well as on the grounds that the ultimate factual conclusion urged in the second sentence is not warranted by the evidence in the record. Rulings on Respondent's proposed findings: The Respondent's proposed findings of fact consist of seventeen separately numbered paragraphs. The paragraph numbers which follow correspond to the numbers of the paragraphs of the Respondent's proposed findings. Accepted in substance with certain gratuitous editorial material deleted. Accepted in substance. Accepted in substance with the exception of the sentence reading: "In contradiction, he testified at the final hearing, on both direct and cross-examination, that he furthered his medical education in Spain in 1970." The quoted sentence is rejected because it does not accurately reflect the totality of the Petitioner's testimony on this subject. Some other redundant material in this paragraph is also rejected. Rejected on the grounds that it consists of irrelevant and cumulative details which are not necessary to the disposition of this case. Accepted in substance with certain gratuitous editorial material deleted. The first sentence of this paragraph is accepted. The second sentence is accepted with the exception of the words ". . . at which time he needed three years." The quoted language is rejected as not being supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Accepted. The first two sentences of this paragraph are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as irrelevant in part, cumulative in part, and not supported by competent substantial evidence in part. Accepted in substance with certain gratuitous editorial material deleted. Accepted. Accepted in part and rejected in part. Reasons for rejection include the feet that although most of this paragraph is an accurate summary of portions of the Petitioner's testimony; some of the testimony on this subject was not persuasive and has not been used as the basis for findings of fact. The parenthetical mention of the pathology booklet is rejected because there is no competent substantial evidence as to when Petitioner wrote any pathology books Accepted in substance. Accepted in part and rejected in part. Reasons for rejection include the fact that although much of this paragraph is an accurate summary of portions of Dr. Clark's testimony, much of the testimony on this subject was not persuasive and has not been used as the basis for findings of fact. Portions of this paragraph have also been rejected on the grounds that they constitute commentary on the quality of the testimony or argument and are not proposed findings of fact. Accepted in part and rejected in part. Reasons for rejection include the fact that although most of this paragraph is an accurate summery of portions of the Petitioner's testimony, much of the testimony on this subject was not persuasive and has not been used as the basis for findings of fact. Accepted. Rejected as findings of fact because it constitutes argument rather than proposed findings of fact. [Much of the argument is well taken, but it is argument nevertheless and not appropriately part of the findings of fact.] Rejected for the same reason as Paragraph 16.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, William J. Gozza, was employed by the Respondent, Department, as a collection specialist II in the Department's Tampa office. The Department of Revenue was and is the state agency responsible for the collection of money due the state in taxes, with a branch office located in Tampa, Florida. Based on facts not described at the hearing, Petitioner was given a five day suspension from duty during the period September 11-15, 1989, and was scheduled to return to work on September 18, 1989. Petitioner did not return to work on that date and the Department was notified he was unable to do so because of a serious injury which was reportedly caused by Department employees. On September 13, 1989, however, Mr. J. D. Burrows, the Department's District Administrator supervising the office where Petitioner worked, by certified mail, confirmed to Mr. Gozza the substance of a telephone call between the parties of that same date in which Mr. Gozza was advised to report to work at 8:00 AM on September 18, 1989. This telephone call had culminated in Mr. Gozza's indicating that he "may or may not" report to work on September 18, 1989. In the September 13 letter, Mr. Burrows clearly advised Mr. Gozza that if he was ill or injured, a telephone call to that effect on September 18, as well as a certified medical certificate from the attending physician, "stating that you are unable to perform your duties" would be required. As was stated, Mr. Gozza did not return to work on September 18. However, on September 15, 1989, his physician, Dr. Kadosa, submitted a "disability statement" indicating that Petitioner was under his care for injuries received on September 11, 1989, and that these injuries "resulted in disability" from September 15, 1989 through October 16, 1989. On October 13, 1989, Dr. Kadosa submitted a second "disability statement" which indicated that the disability dates were extended from October 16, 1989 through November 16, 1989. Neither of these two statements contained the comment that Mr. Gozza was " unable to perform [his] duties." At hearing, however, Mr. Burrows indicated that his understanding of the word "disabled" or "disability" was that the individual so described was unable to perform his duties. On November 13, 1989, Dr. Kadosa submitted a third statement addressed to "To whom it may concern", advising that Mr. Gozza could return to work under light duty conditions on December 1, 1989, and that he was to work between two and four days a week, four to five hours per day. This third statement was accepted by Mr. Burrows as a certified medical excuse, but he also considered it as authority for Mr. Gozza to begin work again on December 1, 1989. Consistent with that conclusion, on November 15, 1989, Mr. Burrows wrote to the Petitioner by certified mail, tracing Petitioner's medical history from September 13, 1989, and advising him that the September and October medical certificates submitted by Dr. Kadosa were considered "not appropriate medical certifications to support the necessity for [him] to be off work" and that the Department considered him to be on unauthorized leave without pay during that period. Mr. Burrows also advised Mr. Gozza that prior to being able to return to work, he must obtain an appropriate medical certification from the doctor indicating that the doctor had determined that it was medically necessary that he not be at work for the period of time he was off from work since Monday, September 18, 1989. Mr. Gozza did not receive Mr. Burrows' November 15, 1989 letter until November 28, 1989. On that day he had a telephone call with Mr. Burrows the nature of which, if not the substance, is in dispute. Both parties agree that the topic of discussion was Mr. Gozza's prior and continuing absence from work, and both parties agree that Mr. Gozza was advised by Mr. Burrows that he was to report to work on December 1, 1989. Whereas Mr. Gozza indicates Mr. Burrows told him that when he reported, he must have an appropriate medical certificate and that he was not to report without it, Burrows denies this contending that when he advised Gozza to bring a medical certificate, Gozza advised him he would not be able to do so until at least December 4, 1989. Mr. Burrows contends that at no time did he indicate to Mr. Gozza that he was not to come back to work without the certificate, and both he and Ms. Dean, Mr. Gozza's immediate supervisor, indicated that had Mr. Gozza come to work without the certificate, but on time and as directed, some accommodation would have been made to allow him to return to work and to submit the required medical certificate at a later date when he was able to see his physician. Considering the evidence as a whole, it is found to be highly unlikely that either Mr. Burrows or Ms. Dean, who also spoke with Mr. Gozza on several occasions regarding his absence, told him that he could not come back to work without the certificate. The unalterable fact is that Mr. Gozza did not report to work, with or without a certificate, on December 1, 1989, the day he was directed to return, nor did he report on December 4, 5, or 6, 1989, the subsequent Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. On December 4, 1989, after Mr. Gozza failed to report as directed on December 1, 1989, Mr. Burrows recommended to Department personnel officials in Tallahassee, that Mr. Gozza's position be considered abandoned on the basis that he failed to come to work for three days and failed to provide the required medical backup, complicated by his failure to call in to the agency to explain. Thereafter, on December 7, 1989, Mr. Fritchman, Department personnel officer, advised Mr. Gozza by letter that the Department considered him to have abandoned his position of employment as of the close of business on December 6, 1989. This letter traces the Petitioner's absence history from September 18, 1989 through the date of the letter, and outlines the efforts made by Department personnel to explain to Mr. Gozza what was required of him to justify or excuse his absences, in addition to the regulatory provisions under which the excuse requirements were provided and under which this termination action was taken. Mr. Burrows and Ms. Dean both admit that at no time did they attempt to contact Mr. Gozza's physician to secure the medical certificate needed. Both claim it was not their responsibility to do so but that of the employee, and that this responsibility was impressed upon Mr. Gozza, directly, on several occasions. A Department memorandum, dated May 24, 1989, dealing with approval of leave without pay, such as medical leave in excess of sick leave, specifically states at paragraph 7, that "the employee is responsible for obtaining appropriate medical certification when requesting leave without pay for medical reasons." Mr. Gozza pointed out that the memorandum was addressed to all supervisors and that he was not personally provided with a copy and, therefore, did not know of the agency policy. This is clearly an ingenuous argument. Both Mr. Burrows and Ms. Dean were quite clear in their statements that they had advised Mr. Gozza directly that it was his responsibility to get the proper medical certification. This position was supported by Mr. Fritchman, and none of the three could recall any case where in a situation such as here, wherein an employee needed certification for an absence due to a medical condition, that Department employees assumed the absentee's responsibility for procuring his medical certificate. It is so found. Mr. Gozza also repeatedly alleged that the current action was not based on valid factual grounds but was taken as retaliation against him for his prior report of discrimination and corruption within the Department. Mr. Gozza presented no evidence of what the discriminatory activity to which he referred was or the nature of the corruption to which he alluded. However, both Mr. Fritchman and Mr. Burrows admitted that such a complaint was filed and was forwarded to Department officials in Tallahassee. Further, the evidence tends to suggest that as a result of "complaints" and "grievances" filed, including that of the Petitioner, Mr. Fritchman, along with others on an inspection team, came to Tampa to look into these allegations. No evidence was presented as to what the result of this investigation was and what corrective or other action, if any, was taken. The allegation of retaliation, which was unequivocally denied by Mr. Burrows, Ms. Dean, and Mr. Fritchman, is not supported by any evidence, and it cannot be found that this personnel action is based on anything other than Mr. Gozza's unexcused failure to come to work on December 1, 4, 5, and 6, 1989. Findings of Fact cannot be based on allegation alone. Evidence to support the allegations is required if they are to result in a positive finding. Here, there is no more than an allegation without supporting evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a final Order be entered finding that Petitioner, William Gozza, abandoned his position with the Department of Administration and resigned from the Career Service when, on December 1, and 4-6, 1989, without authority, he absented himself from his work place for three consecutive days. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-0403 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to S. 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed findings of Fact Submitted by the parties to this case. BY THE PETITIONER: None submitted. BY THE RESPONDENT: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Ultimate fact accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. First sentence accepted and incorporated herein. Balance is no more than comment on the sufficiency of the evidence. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and second sentence is incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but more a statement of the pertinent regulatory provisions. COPIES FURNISHED: William J. Gozza 1777 Rosewall Drive Land O'Lakes, Florida 34639 Gene T. Sellers, Esquire 204 Carlton Building Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Aletta Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 J. Thomas Herndon Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 William D. Moore General Counsel Department of Revenue 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to a medical license in the State of Florida by examination?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a graduate of a foreign medical school. She graduated from the University of Ceylon, Colombo, Sri Lanka. The Petitioner was licensed in Sri Lanka on March 8, 1976. From March 8, 1976, through May, 1979, the Petitioner was employed as a physician at a government hospital located in Galle, Sri Lanka. From May, 1979, until January 24, 1981, the Petitioner was employed as a physician at a government hospital located in Colombo, Sri Lanka. While employed at the government hospitals in Galle and Colombo, Sri Lanka, the Petitioner earned 21 days of vacation time and 24 days of "casual" leave a year. Upon the termination of her employment at the government hospital in Colombo, Sri Lanka, the Petitioner was paid for 21 days of her accrued vacation and casual leave. If the 21 days for which the Petitioner was paid for upon her departure from the government hospital at Colombo, Sri Lanka are counted as time during which the Petitioner worked as a licensed physician, the Petitioner's employment during this period of time would run from March 8, 1976, to February 14, 1981. This is a total of 4 years and 343 days. If the 21 days are not counted, the Petitioner's employment would run from March 8, 1976, to January 24, 1981. This is a total of 4 years and 322 days. On January 24, 1981, the Petitioner traveled from Sri Lanka to the United Kingdom to be with her husband. Therefore, the Petitioner did not practice medicine as a physician after January 23, 1981. The Petitioner remained in the United Kingdom from January 24, 1981, to July 11, 1982. The Petitioner was issued a Certificate of Limited Registration as a Medical Practitioner by the General Medical Council in the United Kingdom which authorized her to practice medicine. The Certificate limited the Petitioner's "employment" as a physician to the following: Any supervised employment in hospitals within the National Health Service excluding employment in casualty or in accident and emergency departments except to give a second opinion with a view to management or to assist a casualty officer in treatment or to administer anesthetics. The Certificate also provided the following "period of limited registration": 9 Oct. 981 to 8 Oct. 1982. In substance the Petitioner's practice as a physician in the United Kingdom was limited only as to where she could work (National Health Service hospitals) and the period during which she could practice (9 Oct. 1981 to 8 Oct. 1982). The requirement that her employment be supervised was consistent with the manner in which all physicians in the hospitals of the National Health Service are treated; "consultants" supervise all other physicians. The exclusion of the Petitioner's employment in casualty or in accident and emergency departments was included on the certificate only because the Petitioner did not choose to pay an additional 15 Pounds Sterling. While in the United Kingdom, the Petitioner worked as a physician from October 1, 1981 until July 10, 1982, a total of 283 days. On July 11, 1982, the Petitioner returned to Sri Lanka to visit with her son and her family before joining her husband in the United States. The Petitioner remained in Sri Lanka from approximately July 11, 1982, until October 30, 1982. In August of 1982 the Petitioner took over the practice of Dr. S. H. M. Kaleel, on 7 intermittent days. Dr. Kaleel's practice consisted of a general-family practice. Dr. Kaleel was in the United Kingdom from September 1, 1982, to October 7, 1982. This was a period of 37 days. During this period the Petitioner operated Dr. Kaleel's office for him. On October 30, 1982, the Petitioner left Sri Lanka to join her husband in the United States. She arrived in New York, New York, on October 31, 1982. The Petitioner and her husband initially lived in Athens, Georgia, where her husband attended the University of Georgia. The Petitioner and her husband subsequently moved to Gainesville, Florida. The Petitioner still resides in Gainesville. The Petitioner has more than 5 years of licensed practice if her employment with the government hospitals in Sri Lanka (March 8, 1976 to February 14, 1981), her employment in the United Kingdom (October 1, 1981 to July 10, 1982), and her employment by Dr. Kaleel (7 days in August, 1982, and from September 1, 1982 to October 7, 1982) are counted. If the period from January 24, 1981 to February 14, 1981, and the Petitioner's employment in the United Kingdom are not counted, the Petitioner still has more than 5 years of licensed practice. If the period from January 24, 1981 to February 14, 1981, the Petitioner's employment in the United Kingdom and her employment by Dr. Kaleel are not counted the Petitioner has less than 5 years of licensed practice. The Petitioner filed an Application for licensure by examination which was received by the Respondent on February 13, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the "First Application"). In the First Application the Petitioner listed her current address as Gainesville, Florida. On the second page of the First Application, when requested to list "all places of residence since initiation of medical training," the Petitioner failed to list her residence in Athens, Georgia or Gainesville, Florida. The Petitioner also did not indicate that she had been in Sri Lanka from July 11, 1982, until October 30, 1982. Finally, the Petitioner indicated that she had resided in Sri Lanka until February, 1981. In completing this portion of the First Application the Petitioner did not list her residences. Instead, the Petitioner listed places of employment. Her failure to list all of her residences was caused by sloppiness and carelessness. The Petitioner was also requested to list her places of employment on the First Application. In doing so, the Petitioner indicated that she had been employed in Sri Lanka until February of 1981. This was consistent with the position she has taken in this proceeding. The Petitioner also failed to list her employment in Sri Lanka after leaving the United Kingdom in July of 1982. She failed to list this employment because she forgot about this period of employment. The Petitioner also filed a Professional Biodata dated February 9, 1985. Again she indicated that she worked in Sri Lanka until February, 1981, that she left for the United Kingdom in February, 1981, and failed to indicate that she had worked in Sri Lanka during 1982. Two routine certifications of personal knowledge of the Petitioner's practice were filed with the Respondent by a Dr. Yogasakaran and a Dr. de Lanerllore. By letter dated August 23, 1985, the Respondent informed the Petitioner that the affidavits submitted by Drs. Yogasakaran and de Lanerllore contain erroneous information about her Sri Lanka practice. The affidavits refer to her practice being from February 15, 1976 through February 14, 1981. The letter states that the Petitioner had stated in her letter to the Board that she was in the United Kingdom from February through October, 1981. The letter further advises that the practice in the United Kingdom is unacceptable toward the 5 years of licensed practice, because it was under a limited license. In a letter dated October 2, 1985, the Petitioner informed the Respondent for the first time that she had worked as a physician from September 1, 1982 to October 7, 1982, at Dr. Kaleel's clinic. She enclosed affidavits from Drs. Devacaanthan and Yogasarkara indicating that she had practiced as a physician from March 8, 1976, to February 14, 1981 and from September 1, 1982 to October 7, 19.82. She also enclosed a letter from Dr. Kaleel indicating that she had practiced from September 1, 1982 to October 7, 1982. In September, 1986, the Petitioner filed a second application for licensure by examination (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Application") pursuant to Section 458.311, Florida Statutes (1985), seeking a license based upon taking the FLEX examination and completing 5 years of licensed practice. In the Second Application the Petitioner again listed her current residence as Gainesville, Florida. She left off her residence in Athens, Georgia, and Gainesville on the second page of the Second Application, however, and again indicated that she had resided in Sri Lanka until February, 1981. Again the Petitioner listed her places of employment instead of her residence on the Second Application. Her failure to properly list her residences was caused by her sloppiness and carelessness. The Petitioner also listed her places of employment on the Second Application. Although the Petitioner had informed the Respondent about her employment in Sri Lanka during 1982, the Petitioner again failed to list this employment. By Order filed June 19, 1987, the Respondent denied the Petitioner's Second Application. The Petitioner incorrectly answered the question, "[h]ave you ever had to discontinue practice for any reason for a period of one month or longer," on the First and Second Applications. She did so because she was sloppy and careless in completing these Applications. Since at least 1978 the Respondent has interpreted Section 458.311(1)(c), Florida Statutes, to exclude practice by a physician pursuant to a limited or restricted license issued by a foreign jurisdiction for purposes of determining whether a physician has 5 years of licensed practice. Therefore, the Respondent did not accept the period during which the Petitioner practiced in the United Kingdom. The position of the Respondent set out in Finding of Fact 34 has not been adopted as a rule. It has been consistently applied by the Respondent. The Respondent has taken this position because it believes that it is unable to determine what actual restrictions apply to a limited or restricted license issued by a foreign jurisdiction. The evidence in this proceeding proved, however, that the actual restrictions which apply to a limited or restricted license can be determined and are a matter of proof. The Petitioner's testimony concerning the affidavits submitted by various physicians in support of the Petitioner's applications was not credible. The Petitioner testified that the dates of employment included by physicians who submitted affidavits were not provided to those physicians by the Petitioner and that she did not know where they got the dates. This testimony defies logic. Only one of those physicians, Dr. Kaleel, had any personal knowledge of the exact dates that the Petitioner engaged in the licensed practice of medicine. One of the physicians, Dr. Yogasakaran filed one affidavit with dates consistent with those supplied by the Petitioner. When the Respondent questioned those dates, Dr. Yogasakaran submitted a second affidavit with the new dates supplied by the Petitioner. The Petitioner's testimony on other matters was credible and her position that she has completed 5 years of licensed practice was substantiated by other credible evidence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued GRANTING the Petitioner's application for licensure by examination. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3004 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1-9 These proposed findings of fact were stipulated to by the parties. They are hereby accepted. 10 3, 4 and 21. The first sentence is accepted in paragraph 5. The rest of these proposed findings of fact are rejected as irrelevant. 5-8. The Petitioner did not resign from her employment effective February 14, 1981. Although the last sentence is true, it is not relevant to these proceedings. 13 8, 9, 14 and 16-18. 14 18. 15 These proposed findings of fact are summaries of testimony. See 34. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 1 and 22. 2 29. 3 24 and 31. 4 21 and 24. 5 25. 6-7 28. 8-16 and 18 These proposed findings of fact are generally correct. They have been taken into account in weighing all of the evidence in this case. See 26-28. 17 2-4 and 8. 19 9-10 and 13. 20 34. See 34 and 35. Irrelevant. 23 10. 24 1. 25-26 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 27-28 33. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Watson Lambert, Esquire Taylor, Brion, Buker & Greene Post Office Box 11189 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Allen R. Grossman, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Suite 1601, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Ms. Dorothy Faircloth, Director Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Walker L. Whaley, is a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0025950. On February 7, 1984, Respondent was convicted, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, of conspiracy, to wit: Between at least on or about June 1982, and on or about April 7, 1983, Respondent did unlawfully, willfully, willingly, and intentionally combine, conspire, confederate and agree together with persons known or unknown to manufacture cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1) Initially, Dr. Whaley was indicted on three counts. He was acquitted of two of the three counts appearing in the indictment against him. There was a mistrial because of the jury's inability to reach a verdict on the remaining count. He was ultimately convicted on the remaining count after a second trial. Respondent's criminal conviction is currently on direct appeal. The matters alleged in the indictment against Dr. Whaley pertain to alleged personal activities and were not alleged to have occurred as part of the conduct of his medical practice.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon consideration of the exhibits presented by the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medical Examiners enter a final order finding Dr. Whaley guilty of the act set forth in Section 458.331(1)(c) and imposing the following penalty: suspension of Dr. Whaley's license for one year, followed by five years of probation subject to such conditions as the board may specify. It is further recommended, in accordance with the parties' stipulation, that the imposition of the penalty be stayed until the direct appeal of the criminal conviction has been decided and that, if the criminal conviction is reversed, this case be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of December, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1985. APPENDIX Petitioner's and Respondent's
The Issue Whether Respondent abused its discretion in withdrawing its certification of eligibility which had authorized Petitioner, a physician who was educated and trained in Nicaragua, to enroll in a course at the University of Miami that is necessary for his licensure to practice medicine in the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact On October 19, 1989, Petitioner submitted to the Board of Medicine an application for licensure as a physician in the State of Florida. This application sought licensure by examination pursuant to Section 458.311(10), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a physician who received his education and training in Nicaragua and who had practiced medicine in Nicaragua for approximately twenty years before moving to Florida. At no time pertinent to these proceedings was Petitioner licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. Petitioner's application sought the Board of Medicine's certification that Petitioner was eligible to enroll in a physician training course offered by the University of Miami. Petitioner needed to successfully complete this course as part of the licensure by examination process. Petitioner enrolled in this class after his eligibility was certified by the Board of Medicine on February 19, 1990. In April of 1990, a joint investigation of the L.A. Surgical Medical Center in Miami, Florida, (L.A. Center) was undertaken by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the Florida Department of Professional Regulation (DPR). While those agencies had reason to believe that an unlicensed physician was operating out of that facility, Petitioner was not initially a target of the investigation. Petitioner was, at the times pertinent hereto, the administrator of the L.A. Center. At the times pertinent to this proceeding Ramon Prieto was an undercover investigator employed by DPR. On April 25, 1990, Mr. Prieto presented himself to the L.A. Center complaining of severe back pains and asked to see a doctor. There was no licensed physician on the premises of the L.A. Center even though Mr. Prieto presented himself at approximately 1:00 p.m., which is during the L.A. Center's normal business hours. Mr. Prieto was seated in the waiting area where he waited for approximately twenty minutes. Petitioner came into the area in which Mr. Prieto had been waiting, told Mr. Prieto to come with him, and escorted Mr. Prieto into a doctor's office. In connection with Mr. Prieto's visit on April 25, 1990, Petitioner performed a medical examination, made a medical diagnosis, prescribed and dispensed medication, ordered x-rays, and created medical records. Petitioner also prescribed and provided medication for Mr. Prieto's wife based on Mr. Prieto's description of her symptoms even though Petitioner had not examined her or talked to her. Mr. Prieto requested that Petitioner give to him medication for himself and for his wife. While Mr. Prieto pretended to be in considerable pain, the evidence does not establish that his condition was treated by Petitioner as an emergency. On April 26, 1990, Mr. Prieto returned to the L.A. Center where he was again prescribed medication by Petitioner. Mr. Prieto was billed for Petitioner's services and for the medication that Petitioner gave to Mr. Prieto for himself and for his wife. On April 26, 1990, after Mr. Prieto's return visit, Petitioner was arrested by agents of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. An information was filed against Petitioner charging him with two counts of practicing medicine without a license, which are third degree felony charges. On August 16, 1990, the Board of Medicine withdrew its certification of Petitioner's eligibility to continue the course at the University of Miami. Thereafter Petitioner filed his request for a formal administrative hearing. On September 24, 1990, the Board of Medicine entered an order which stayed its Order entered August 16, 1990, pending the resolution of this administrative proceeding. On September 10, 1990, in the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the criminal charges that had been filed against him. The plea was accepted, adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Petitioner was sentenced to two days of time served. There was no evidence that Petitioner had engaged in the practice of medicine in the State of Florida without a license before or after April 25-26, 1990. The Board of Medicine had received no complaints regarding Petitioner other than those related to the events of April 25-26, 1990. Petitioner knew that his conduct with Mr. Prieto was wrong and that it constituted the unlicensed practice of medicine.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which upholds the Board of Medicine's withdrawal of its certification of Jose M. Bermudez's eligibility to take the subject University of Miami course. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 25th day of March, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1991. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-5894 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 2 - 6 are rejected as being the recitation of testimony that is either subordinate to the findings made or unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent. 1. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1 - 10 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Allen R. Grossman, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1603 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Stephen H. Rosen, Esquire 2600 Douglas Road, Penthouse #2 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Jorge Macedo, M. D., has been licensed as a medical doctor under the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent graduated from medical school in Brazil in 1954, and practiced in Brazil for one year thereafter. He then came to the United States, where he has practiced from 1956 until the present date. On February 13, 1976, Maury Braga came to Respondent's office in Hialeah, Florida. Respondent had never before met Braga and had never heard of him. Braga advised Respondent that he was a medical doctor from Brazil, that he had attended and graduated from the Faculdade de Ciencias Medicas de Santos, Brazil, that he had practiced the profession of medicine in Brazil during the years of 1967 through 1972, that he was in the process of obtaining his medical license in Florida, and that to complete his Florida medical application he needed statements from local doctors acknowledging that Braga was a Brazilian medical doctor. Braga showed to Respondent documentation concerning his education and practice, including his medical diploma. Based upon his interview of Braga and his examination of Braga's documents, Respondent signed a form utilized by Petitioner, which form is entitled "Affidavit" and which reads, in pertinent part, as follows: I, Jorge Macedo, M. D., of 1060 E. 4th Ave., Hialeah, Florida, do hereby swear and affirm by my personal knowledge, that Maury Braga attended and graduated from Falcudade de Ciencias Medicas de Santos and did lawfully practice the pro- fession of medicine, in Brazil during the years of 1967 through 1972, and that I also practiced the same profession in Brazil. When Respondent signed the "affidavit," it was not notarized. Respondent had no personal knowledge regarding whether Braga had ever attended or graduated from medical school or regarding whether Braga had ever practiced medicine in Brazil. Respondent relied totally on the information contained in the documents Braga showed to him and upon what Braga told him. After Braga left Respondent's office, he had the "affidavit" signed by Respondent notarized. He attached the "affidavit" to an Application for Examination and Course in Continuing Medical Education, which application he then submitted to the Florida Board of Medical Examiners. On February 26, 1976, the same day that Braga's application was received, the Executive Director of the Board of Medical Examiners wrote to Braga advising him that his application was received after the deadline of January 26, 1976, and was therefore rejected. The application was not returned to Braga, but rather was placed in a file opened under Braga's name to be retained in the event that Braga again applied within the next three years to take the course in continuing medical education and the examination for licensure. On January 17, 1977, Braga filed a second application to take the course in continuing medical education which would then qualify him to take the examination for licensure. The second application included "affidavits" from medical doctors other than Respondent. One of Braga's two applications was approved; Braga completed the course in continuing medical education; Braga took and passed the examination for licensure; and Braga was licensed as a medical doctor in the State of Florida on March 10, 1978. Maury Braga did not attend or graduate from the Faculdade de Ciencias Medicas de Santos, and did not lawfully practice the profession of medicine in Brazil during the years 1967 through 1972. Braga's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida has been revoked. At least prior to the revocation of his license, Braga's file with the Petitioner contained both the application he filed in 1976 and the application he filed in 1977. No evidence was introduced to show which application was reviewed when Braga's application to take the educational course and examination for licensure was approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the violation charged in Count Two of the Administrative Complaint, dismissing Counts One, Three and Four of the Administrative Complaint, and placing Respondent's license on probation for a period of one year, subject to terms and conditions set forth by the Board. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of February, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee7 Florida 32301 Jack E. Thompson, Esquire Ingraham Building, Suite 516 25 SE Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dorothy J. Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 82-114 JORGE MACEDO, M.D. License Number: 10095 Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact James C. Loranger is a licensed medical doctor having been issued license No. ME0011235 and he was so licensed at all times here relevant. Since opening his office in Dunnellon, Respondent has primarily practiced Bariatrics, or weight reduction. He has generally treated these patients with thyroid pills, appetite depressants, diuretics, and amphetamines. Prior to commencing the weight reduction program for thee patterns, a physical examination was conducted. However, the thyroid medication was prescribed for patients having normal thyroid levels. The complaint against Respondent was made by a secretary who had worked for Respondent for several years. No complaint was ever made by a patient and no evidence was presented that any patient was contacted during the investigation which began in 1979. Following the initiation of the investigation, earlier charges were preferred against Respondent; Respondent was ordered by the Board of Examiners to proceed to Shands Hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, which he did; Respondent has reduced his DEA license to write prescriptions for Class 3, 4 and 5 drugs only; when told by the Board to stop prescribing amphetamines and thyroid pills, Respondent ceased doing so; and Respondent was represented by an attorney. Evidence regarding disposition of those stipulations was not presented. Respondent's psychiatric evaluation showed evidence of generalized cortical impairment (Exhibit 24). His physical appearance at the hearing is that of a man older than his 68 years with some locomotive impairment. Respondent occupies his office on a lease that expires in January, 1985, and he plans, if permitted, to continue his one day per week practice he now engages in until December, 1984, at which time he will voluntarily surrender his license and retire from any further medical practice. This admission was made by Respondent near the end of the hearing, at which time Petitioner's attorney appeared willing to accept such a stipulation from Respondent to settle this case. The parties were then directed by the Hearing Officer to present a stipulation in settlement of this case which would include a provision that Respondent continue his limited practice until December, 1984, at which time he would voluntarily surrender his license to the Board and cease any further practice of medicine. No such stipulation has been received; however, Respondent's willingness to surrender his license at the end of December, 1984, is contained in the transcript and is accepted by the Hearing Officer as a specific condition to the recommendation contained herein. The evidence was unrebutted that Respondent treated the 19 patients listed in the Administrative Complaint by prescribing substances not medically indicated by patient's symptoms, that this treatment was not in accordance with accepted medical practices, and that this treatment was not rendered in good faith.
Findings Of Fact The findings of fact stipulated to by the parties are as follows: The Respondent's license was suspended for a period of three years by Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners filed on or about June 25, 1985. The Respondent filed a timely Notice of Appeal of the foregoing Final Order. The Respondent filed a Motion to Stay the Final Order with the Board of Medical Examiners, through appellate counsel, but said motion was not ruled upon by the Board of Medical Examiners at any time pertinent to the dates related to the Administrative Complaint. No petition for stay was filed by the Respondent until August 6, 1985, with the appellate court having jurisdiction of the direct appeal, when said motion was filed by appellate counsel. The District Court of Appeal, First District, entered a temporary stay of the Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners on August 6, 1985, but dissolved the stay on August 9, 1995, upon written response from the Department of Professional Regulation. No other stay was in effect at any time pertinent to the times material to the matters raised in the Administrative Complaint filed herein. The Respondent continued to practice medicine subsequent to the filing of the Motion to Stay filed with the Board of Medical Examiners until contacted in person by investigators of the Department of Professional Regulation who informed the Respondent, on August 12, 1985, that no stay of the Final Order was in effect. At that point, the Respondent immediately surrendered his medical license to the investigators of the Department of Professional Regulation and informed said investigators that the investigators should contact his appellate Counsel because of the "Confusion." The Respondent believed, and was specifically advised by appellate Counsel, that the Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners filed June 25, 1985, was stayed automatically by the District Court of Appeal, First District, notwithstanding the fact that the only stay entered by the District Court of Appeal, First District, was from August 6 to August 9, 1985. Not only was the Respondent advised by appellate counsel orally that such a stay was automatically effected by the filing of the Notice of Appeal with the District Court of Appeal, First District, but appellate counsel provided written confirmation of the alleged existence of such a stay to Jacksonville hospitals providing medical privileges to the Respondent. An example of such written confirmation is a letter dated July 30, 1985, to the President, Board of Trustees of St. Vincent's Medical Center advising St. Vincent's Medical Center that the Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners was automatically stayed by operation of Section 120.68(3), Florida Statutes. In that letter, appellate counsel not only advised St. Vincent's Medical Center of the existence of an alleged automatic stay, but copied the Respondent with said advice, confirming to the Respondent that the Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners had in fact been stayed.
The Issue Whether Petitioner has met the requirements for licensure by examination as set forth in Chapter 458, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner is 48 years old and resides at 210 Tibet Avenue, No.L-2, Savannah, Georgia 312406. Petitioner attended City College of Medicine, Cebu City, Philippines during the 1962-63 school year. While at City College, Petitioner failed four out of the five courses he was taking which, along with his father's financial hardship, forced Petitioner to drop out of medical school. Petitioner enrolled in medical school at Southwestern University, Matias H. Azklnar, Memorial College of Medicine, Inc., Villa Aznar, Cebu City, Philippines (Southwestern) for the school year 1965-66. During the 1965-66 school year at Southwestern Petitioner passed, among others, those courses which he had failed at City College during the 1962-63 school year. During the 1966-67 school year Petitioner failed pharmacology 2 and physical diagnosis but passed those courses during the 1967-68 school year, while failing surgical pathology which he passed during the 1968-69 school year. During the 1968-69 school year Petitioner failed pharmacology 3 in the first and second semester. Although Petitioner testified that he passed pharmacology 3, Petitioner's transcript from Southwestern does not indicate that Petitioner passed pharmacology 3 before graduating from Southwestern University in 1971. Petitioner graduated from and received his medical degree from Southwestern in 1971. Southwestern is registered by the World Health Organization. Petitioner served an internship at Detroit-Macomb Hospital Association from July 1, 1982 until June 30, 1983. Petitioner received an overall evaluation of "good" on his internship and was recommended as qualified and competent. Petitioner took the Federation Licensing Examination (FLEX) in December 1982, June 1983, December 1983 and December 1984, and failed the examination each time. In June 1985, Petitioner took the FLEX examination again and passed Component 2 but failed Component 1 by one point. In December 1985, Petitioner took Component 1 again and passed. Petitioner successfully passed the medical examination portion of the Educational Commission For Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG) examination on January 21, 1981 and the English examination portion on July 22, 1981 and was issued certificate number 245-840-4 on January 8, 1982. That ECFMG has remained valid since that date. Before passing the ECFMG examination in 1981, Petitioner had failed that examination six times. Petitioner is licensed to practice medicine in the states of Michigan and Georgia, and has been licensed in those states since March 3, 1986 and June 11, 1986, respectively. However, other than serving an internship, Petitioner has never practiced medicine in the state of Michigan. Petitioner's licenses to practice medicine in the state of Michigan and Georgia have never had any disciplinary action taken against them. Petitioner practiced medicine at Central State Hospital (a mental institution) at Milledgville, Georgia as a general physician in family practice, working also in the area of psychiatry, from April 1, 1988 until his resignation on October 24, 1988. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner had been practicing medicine as an emergency room physician for approximately 8 months at Stattanall Memorial Hospital near Savannah, Georgia, and had been working as the physician in charge at the Immediate Med Clinic near Savannah, Georgia for a couple of months. Petitioner also practiced medicine for a brief period at Folkston Memorial Hospital in Folkston, Georgia, but terminated this employment due to the long distance from Savannah, Georgia where Petitioner resided. Although Petitioner was a staff member at Central State Hospital, he did not have staff privileges in that he was not authorized to admit patients to Central State Hospital. Petitioner did not have staff privileges at any other hospital or clinic where he practiced medicine in that he was not authorized to admit patients. Petitioner is an active member of the American Medical Association (AMA) in good standing. Petitioner has never been a defendant in a medical malpractice suit. Petitioner has established facts to show that he is qualified and competent to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety, notwithstanding that it took him 7 years to complete a five-year medical curriculum, that it took him 6 tries before passing the ECFMG examination, that it took him 5 tries before passing the FLEX examination, that he has practiced in Georgia for only approximately 2 years mainly in general practice and, his performance in his medical education and training. There was no evidence that Petitioner had "exhibited a consistent pattern of less than successful or borderline performance" in his "medical education and training". Respondent Board did not present any evidence from an expert or "person with special expertise" or anyone else to show a rational relation between Petitioner taking 7 years to complete a 5-year medical school curriculum, Petitioner failing the ECFMG examination 6 times before passing, Petitioner failing the FLEX examination 5 times before passing, Petitioner's practice in Georgia and his medical school education and training performance; and the ability of Petitioner to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety.
