The Issue Is Petitioner lawfully entitled to work in a position of trust in an assisted living facility licensed by the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for receiving, evaluating, and approving or denying applications for exemptions from disqualification to hold a position of trust, with regard to certain assisted living facilities. Petitioner worked in one of Ms. Weaver's assisted living facilities for a short period in late 2000. Ms. Weaver's facilities were licensed by the Department. Petitioner was required to undergo Level 2 screening pursuant to Section 435.04, Florida Statutes, in order to hold a position of trust in the facility. The screening revealed, among other things, that Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere on October 17, 1994, to theft of a firearm, pursuant to Section 812.014(2)(c)3 (1993), Florida Statutes, and carrying a concealed firearm, pursuant to Section 790.01, Florida Statutes. Both of these offenses are third degree felonies. Adjudication was withheld and he was sentenced to three years probation. On March 7, 1996, Petitioner was arrested on a charge of aggravated battery with a firearm and discharge of a firearm within the city limits, in violation of a city ordinance. These allegations were not prosecuted. Petitioner asserted that the incident of March 7, 1996, occurred as a result of a dispute with his brother and stated that he did not assault anyone. Petitioner further stated that it was not he who discharged a firearm within the city limits. Petitioner's version of the events of March 7, 1996, was not rebutted and his testimony in this regard is considered to be factual. Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere, on December 23, 1996, to domestic battery, a felony, pursuant to Section 784.03(2), Florida Statutes. He was adjudicated guilty. Petitioner's previously imposed probation was extended for a year as a result. Petitioner asserted that the incident which occurred on December 23, 1996, was occasioned as the result of a dispute with the mother of his children. The dispute concerned his children. He is not married to the mother of his children. Petitioner stated that he was angry and that he grabbed the woman's arm but that he did not hurt her. He stated that the woman complained to the law enforcement authorities with the result that he was thereafter arrested. This version of the events which transpired were not rebutted and his testimony in this regard is considered to be factual. Petitioner successfully completed his probation. During his probation he attended an anger management class. Pursuant to an invitation by Ms. Ware, his probation officer, he gave a presentation on anger management to a class in Tampa. During the time Petitioner worked in Ms. Weaver's facility he was in charge of bookkeeping and helped with the clients of the facility. He helped clients learn skills such as tying their shoes. The clients with whom he interacted were classified from level one to level six. Those that are classified as level four to level six are severely retarded. Those classified as level one to level three are less retarded. Petitioner enjoyed working with the facility's clients. He noted that they appreciated the attention that he gave to them. During the short time that Petitioner worked at the facility, someone filed an allegation to the effect that a client had been abused. Petitioner stated that Ms. Weaver was having a physical confrontation with a client and that he got involved in order to ensure that neither the client nor Ms. Weaver received injuries. Petitioner was not charged as a result of this incident and no evidence was presented which indicated that he engaged in unacceptable conduct. Petitioner currently attends Tallahassee Community College. He has been a student there for a year and a semester. He has not received his grades for the current semester at the time of the hearing but so far he has attained a 3.8 grade point average. He was on the dean's list. He is studying business and psychology. When he completes his associate of arts degree he plans to attend either Florida State University or the University of Central Florida. Petitioner's purpose in studying psychology is to gain the skills he needs to work in Ms. Weaver's assisted living facilities. He wants to eventually run the assisted living facility with Ms. Weaver and to open up more facilities. Petitioner has been licensed as a cosmetologist for five years. He currently works at Clipper's Hair Fashions in Tallahassee and manages a staff of 15 persons. Petitioner testified that he believed that he had been rehabilitated and that he had "learned his lesson." Curtiss D. Robbins, who serves as Chief of Police of Howey-in-the Hills, Florida, stated that he had previously been a deputy sheriff in Lake County and that he had become Petitioner's friend subsequent to the three incidents in which Petitioner ran afoul of law enforcement authorities. Chief Robbins opined that Petitioner was a fine young man. Petitioner had discussed with Chief Robbins his interest in working with mentally handicapped persons. Chief Robbins said that Petitioner was a patient person and that he had never observed him become angry. He described Petitioner as being honest, open, and respectful. He said that Petitioner attended church and that he had observed him interact with Petitioner's children and with his own children. Marland Bluhm is employed by the Department. He has a master's degree in psychology and had done post-masters work. He has worked in the field of mental retardation for over 45 years. Mr. Bluhm sat on a three-person committee appointed by the Department to review Petitioner's application for an exemption. Mr. Bluhm stated that the Petitioner appeared before this committee. He stated that he believed that it would be best to administer a Minnesota Multi-phasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) to determine Petitioner's fitness for working in an assisted living facility. However, he joined the rest of the committee in recommending to their superiors that an exemption be granted. Mr. Bluhm also said that working with mentally ill and mentally retarded persons required specific skills. He noted that mentally retarded persons could exhibit aberrant behavior and could try the patience of staff who were charged with taking care of them. He testified that the Petitioner was not a "fit," in his opinion. As noted before, the results of an MMPI could change his opinion.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding Petitioner to be qualified to work in an assisted living facility licensed by Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Candace A. Hawthorne, Esquire 319 East Main Street Tavares, Florida 32778 Ralph McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785-8158 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact On June 1, 1988, Petitioner Higuero, who is from the country of Columbia, visited one of Respondent's truck terminals and expressed an interest in working for the company as a driver of a tractor-trailer combination. He spoke with the Orlando terminal manager, Brad Schneider, who gave Petitioner an application. In the course of their brief conversation, Petitioner told Mr. Schneider that Petitioner had recently completed a course at Mid-Florida Technical Institute in commercial vehicle driving. Mr. Schneider informed him that Respondent's policy was to require that all new drivers have at least one year's verifiable prior experience or certification of completion of a truck- driving course. Petitioner expressed some concern that he might not have passed the Mid-Florida Tech course. He explained that he had ground the transmission gears several times during the driving test. Shortly after this visit, Petitioner received from Mid-Florida Technical Institute a certificate of competency for having satisfactorily completed a program in commercial vehicle driving. The reverse side of the certificate contained Petitioner's grades. The five-point grading scale ranged from "5," which signifies that the student can perform without supervision and exceeds minimum industry standards, to "1," which signifies that the student has not performed the skill. A "3" means that the student "can perform this skill satisfactorily but requires some assistance and/or supervision. Meets minimum industry standard." A "2" means that the student "can perform parts of this skill satisfactorily, but requires considerable assistance and/or supervision. Does not meet minimum industry [sic] for entry into this occupation." Petitioner received an overall score of "3." He received no grades of "4" and received eight grades of "2" out of a total of 33 grades. He received grades of "2" in coupling and uncoupling a set of double trailers, backing into a parking space on the blind side, and knowledge of applicable laws and load characteristics. During the road test at Mid-Florida Technical Institute, Petitioner's unsteadiness resulted in a minor mishap. While attempting to allow the steering wheel to spin so as to straighten the wheels, Petitioner injured his finger when it became caught in the spinning spokes. Having obtained the certificate and filled in the application, Petitioner visited the Orlando terminal on June 8, 1988. Mr. Schneider accepted the materials and informed Petitioner that Respondent would begin without delay processing the paperwork. Petitioner requested a road test, but Mr. Schneider told him that Respondent did not administer road tests until the personnel department had reviewed the application and checked, among other things, references for three years of past employment. As he had done when giving the application to Petitioner, Mr. Schneider underscored the importance that the application be filled-in completely and, after quickly reviewing Petitioner's application, told him that he would need to document the three years that he claimed he had been self-employed. About a week later, Petitioner returned to the Orlando terminal and demanded to know why he had not yet been contacted. In a somewhat agitated state, he insisted upon a road test. When Mr. Schneider asked him if he had brought with him the documentation concerning the period of his self-employment, Petitioner became more agitated, began to speak more loudly, and raised his demands from a road test to a job. Mr. Schneider told Petitioner to leave, but Petitioner refused until Mr. Schneider threatened to call the Sheriff's Office. Respondent's personnel office in Auburndale, Florida ultimately rejected the application, which was sworn to and notarized, because of numerous falsifications contained within it. The misrepresentations include statements that Petitioner had never received workers' compensation benefits when he had on several occasions; Petitioner had never suffered from, or been treated for, a mental ailment when he had, on both counts; and Petitioner had never been known by another name when, quite recently, he had worked at Disney World under an assumed name. Material omissions include the failure to note the Disney World employment and service in the U.S. Navy. On June 21, 1988, Petitioner submitted an application to be a tractor- trailer operator with an affiliate of Respondent. The application contained the same misrepresentations contained in the above-described application dated June Another application to Respondent dated July 7, 1988, contained the same misrepresentations and added a new one. The application stated that the duration of his service in the U.S. Navy had been from 1984 to 1985. In fact, Petitioner served for only one month, at which time he separated from the service due to unsuitable temperament.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner be dismissed. ENTERED this 16th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on the 16th day of June, 1989 COPIES FURNISHED: Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Margaret Agerton, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1925 Jenaro P. Higuero, pro se 1099 Leeway Court Orlando, FL 32810 Samuel L. Bare, III Bare & Parsons 6601 S.W. 80th Street Suite 109 Miami, FL 33143
The Issue The issue is whether, pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2015),1/ Petitioner forfeited his Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) Investment Plan account by entering a nolo contendere plea to two counts of violating section 893.13(2)(a)1., Florida Statutes, a second-degree felony.
Findings Of Fact The Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding Mr. Combs began working for DOC on May 25, 2001, as a Correctional Officer Level 1 at the Union Correctional Institution (“Union Correctional”) in Raiford, Florida. Union Correctional is a maximum security facility housing approximately 2,000 inmates, and Mr. Combs assisted with their care and custody. In January of 2006, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Sergeant. While his responsibilities were very similar to those of his previous position, Mr. Combs was now supervising other correctional officers. In October of 2011, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Lieutenant, and was responsible for supervising 50 to 70 correctional officers at Union Correctional. In April of 2013, Mr. Combs earned a promotion to Correctional Officer, Captain, and transferred to Florida State Prison in Starke, Florida. A captain is the highest ranking correctional officer on a given shift, and Mr. Combs supervised approximately 50 correctional officers at a time, including sergeants and lieutenants. Like Union Correctional, Florida State Prison is a maximum security facility housing approximately 2,000 prisoners. A colonel manages Florida State Prison, and it has two separate units. One of those units is a work camp housing lower- custody inmates who may work outside the facility, and the main prison is the other unit. Each of the units is run by its own major. In February of 2015, Mr. Combs was promoted to Major and took charge of the work camp at Florida State Prison. At some point in 2014 and prior to his promotion to Major, Mr. Combs had begun taking Oxycodone recreationally. Mr. Combs typically purchased one Oxycodone pill three to four times a week, and Dylan Hilliard (a Correctional Officer 1 at Florida State Prison) was Mr. Combs’ primary source of Oxycodone. Mr. Hilliard usually worked at the main prison, but he occasionally worked at the work camp. Mr. Combs knew Mr. Hilliard because of their employment with DOC. Mr. Combs purchased Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard at the latter’s home in Lawtey, Florida. However, some transactions occurred in Mr. Combs’ state-issued housing on the grounds of Florida State Prison. Mr. Hilliard charged Mr. Combs $35 for an Oxycodone pill, and that was a discount from the $38 price Mr. Hilliard charged others. Mr. Combs allowed his subordinates (Sergeants Jesse Oleveros and Evan Williams) to leave Florida State Prison during their shifts in order to purchase illegal drugs from Mr. Hilliard. After returning from their transactions with Mr. Hilliard, Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams would give Mr. Combs an Oxycodone pill free of charge. Operation Checkered Flag was a joint task force led by the Bradford County Sheriff’s Office, and its purpose was to arrest individuals involved with the distribution and use of illegal drugs. The authorities arrested Mr. Hilliard after he engaged in an illegal drug transaction with an undercover agent from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. A subsequent search of Mr. Hilliard’s cell phone revealed text messages between Mr. Hilliard and several other DOC employees, including Mr. Combs. Mr. Hilliard referred to Mr. Combs as “Chicken-Hawk” or “Hawk” in those text messages, and the two of them used car part terminology as a code for different milligram sizes of Oxycodone. Operation Checkered Flag ultimately resulted in the arrest of 10 DOC employees. The authorities arrested Mr. Combs on July 1, 2015, based on allegations that he had committed six felonies relating to the alleged unlawful and illegal purchase and distribution of Oxycodone. DOC fired Mr. Combs on approximately July 1, 2015. Mr. Combs initially denied all of the allegations. However, after spending nearly 56 days in jail, Mr. Combs reached an agreement with the State Attorney’s Office in Bradford County that called for his criminal charges to be reduced in exchange for his cooperation with Operation Checkered Flag. During an interview on August 20, 2015, with members of Operation Checkered Flag, Mr. Combs admitted that he had purchased Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. In addition, Mr. Combs admitted that on six or seven occasions he allowed Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams to leave the prison grounds so that they could purchase Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. The State Attorney’s Office in Bradford County chose to dismiss most of the charges against Mr. Combs. The Information ultimately filed against Mr. Combs set forth two counts alleging that he violated section 893.13(2)(a)1., by illegally purchasing Oxycodone on March 23, 2015, and March 31, 2015. Those purchases occurred approximately 10 miles from Florida State Prison at Mr. Hilliard’s residence in Lawtey, Florida. Neither Mr. Combs nor Mr. Hilliard was on duty during those transactions. On August 25, 2015, Mr. Combs pled nolo contendere. The Bradford County Circuit Court entered judgment against Mr. Combs based on the two violations of section 893.13(2)(a)1., but withheld adjudication. All of the conduct underlying Mr. Combs’ nolo contendere plea occurred while he was employed by DOC. The SBA Determines that Mr. Combs Forfeited his FRS Benefits At all times relevant to the instant case, Mr. Combs was a member of the FRS. The FRS is the legislatively-created general retirement system established by chapter 121, Florida Statutes. See § 121.021(3), Fla. Stat. The SBA is the governmental entity that administers the FRS Investment Plan, a defined retirement benefits contribution plan. § 121.4501(1), Fla. Stat. Via a letter dated August 3, 2015, the SBA notified Mr. Combs that a hold had been placed on his FRS account due to the criminal charges. As a result, no distribution of employer contributions from Mr. Combs’ account would be permitted until the SBA had evaluated the final disposition of those criminal charges. Via a letter dated September 3, 2015, the SBA notified Mr. Combs that he had forfeited his FRS benefits as a result of his nolo contendere plea. In support thereof, the SBA cited section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, which provides for the forfeiture of a public employee’s FRS retirement benefits upon the entry of a nolo contendere plea to certain types of offenses. The SBA’s letter closed by notifying Mr. Combs of his right to challenge the SBA’s proposed action through an administrative hearing. Mr. Combs requested a formal administrative hearing and asserted that the crimes for which he was convicted did not fall within the scope of section 112.3173(2)(e). In other words, Mr. Combs argued that his convictions were not associated with his employment at DOC and thus did not amount to a violation of the public trust. Testimony Adduced at the Final Hearing Mr. Combs testified that he was responsible for the work camp and the supervision of the correctional officers assigned there. He also testified that he would occasionally supervise correctional officers who normally worked in the main prison. Mr. Combs testified that Mr. Hilliard was his primary source of Oxycodone and that Mr. Hilliard occasionally worked at the work camp. Mr. Combs was aware that two Florida State Prison employees who worked directly under him (Sergeant Jesse Oleveros and Sergeant Evan Williams) were purchasing Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs testified that he allowed Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams to leave Florida State Prison grounds six or seven times in order to purchase Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs testified that Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams would give him an Oxycodone pill after returning from their transactions with Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs acknowledged during his testimony that DOC policy prohibits correctional officers from leaving prison grounds during their shift. Mr. Combs acknowledged that it was a violation of DOC policy and Florida law to allow a correctional officer to leave prison grounds during a shift for the purpose of purchasing illegal narcotics. Mr. Combs also acknowledged that it was a violation of DOC policy and Florida law to allow a correctional officer to be on prison grounds with illegal narcotics. Finally, Mr. Combs acknowledged that as a sworn officer with the Department of Corrections, he had an obligation to report any criminal activity committed by a correctional officer working at Florida State Prison, regardless of whether that correctional officer reported to him. Findings of Ultimate Fact An examination of the circumstances associated with Mr. Combs’ Oxycodone purchases from Mr. Hilliard demonstrates that there is a nexus between Mr. Combs’ employment as a correctional officer with DOC and his commission of the crimes to which he pled nolo contendere. For instance, Mr. Combs came to know his primary source of Oxycodone (Mr. Hilliard) through their mutual employment with DOC. Indeed, Mr. Combs supervised Mr. Hilliard when the latter was assigned to the work camp at Florida State Prison. Also, Mr. Combs knew that these transactions were illegal. As noted above, he and Mr. Hilliard used a code based on car part references to disguise the actual subject of their communications. Contrary to DOC policy and Florida Law, Mr. Combs allowed two of his subordinates (Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams) to leave Florida State Prison during their duty shifts in order to purchase illegal drugs from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs would then receive a free pill from Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams. Mr. Hilliard sold Oxycodone to Mr. Combs at a reduced price. It is reasonable to infer that Mr. Combs received this discount due to his high-ranking position at Mr. Hilliard’s place of employment and because Mr. Combs facilitated Mr. Oleveros and Mr. Williams’ purchases of Oxycodone from Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs willfully violated DOC policy and Florida law by allowing correctional officers to leave prison grounds during a shift for the purpose of purchasing illegal narcotics. Mr. Combs knowingly violated his obligation as a sworn correctional officer by not reporting the criminal activity committed by Mr. Hilliard. Mr. Combs defrauded the public from receiving the faithful performance of his duties as a correctional officer. The public had a right to expect that one of its employees would not purchase drugs from someone he supervised. The public also had a right to expect that Mr. Combs would not use his authority at Florida State Prison to facilitate Mr. Hilliard’s illegal drug sales to other DOC employees. In addition, the public had a right to expect that Mr. Combs would not engage in illegal transactions on the grounds of Florida State Prison. Mr. Combs realized a profit, gain, or advantage through the power or duties associated with his position as a Major at DOC. Specifically, Mr. Combs satisfied his Oxycodone habit through purchases made from a DOC employee who he supervised. Also, Mr. Combs used his position to facilitate other sales by Mr. Hilliard, and Mr. Combs’ assistance led to him receiving free Oxycodone and a discounted price on his Oxycodone purchases. The findings set forth above in paragraphs 49 through 57 are the only ones needed to establish a nexus between Mr. Combs’ public employment and the two counts to which he pled nolo contendere. That nexus is evident from Mr. Combs’ testimony, Mr. Combs’ Responses to the SBA’s Requests for Admissions, and the Stipulated Facts. It was not necessary to consider the exhibits to which Mr. Combs raised objections, i.e., the arrest warrant, the warrant affidavit, and the audio recordings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration issue a final order finding that Petitioner was a public employee convicted of specified offenses that were committed prior to retirement, and that pursuant to section 112.3173 he has forfeited all of his rights and benefits in his Florida Retirement System Investment Plan account, except for the return of his accumulated contributions as of the date of his termination. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 2016.
The Issue Whether respondent FGCIA should reinstate petitioner as its director or acting director and give her back pay from August 31, 1978, because FGCIA terminated her employment as of that date on account of her race?
Findings Of Fact Jan Marie Tuveson, became the third person to go to work for the FGCIA, although she is not an Indian herself. In February of 1974, she began doing secretarial work and generally assisting Osley Saunooke and John L. Chaves, at the time the FGCIA's director and assistant director, respectively. With Mr. Saunooke's resignation later the same year and Mr. Chaves' resignation in May of 1975, all of the Council's staff work fell to Ms. Tuveson and a secretary whom she hired after consulting the cochairmen of FGCIA's Board of Directors. CODIRECTOR About four months after Mr. Chaves' departure, Ms. Tuveson assumed one of two newly created program coordinator positions. She was seen as "representing" the Miccosukee Tribe, while the other program coordinator, originally Steve Bowers, was seen as representing the Seminole Tribe. Together the program coordinators were to act as codirectors of the FGCIA. In September or October of 1975, Joe Billie succeeded Steve Bowers as codirector. An extremely likeable person, Joe Billie, a Seminole Indian for whom English is a second language, did not spend much time at FGCIA's Tallahassee headquarters. As a result, Ms. Tuveson had almost full responsibility for the staff work of the FGCIA, after Joe Billie became codirector. During this period, she worked on behalf of and dealt with not only Buffalo Tiger and the Miccosukee Tribe, but also the Seminole Tribe, Mike Tiger, Joe Dan Osceola and other Seminole Indians. According to uncontroverted testimony, she treated the tribes "equally." CETA PROGRAM DIRECTOR Shortly after becoming program coordinator, Ms. Tuveson proposed to FGCIA's Board of Directors that FGCIA apply for funds under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). With Howard Tommie, chairman of the Seminole Tribe and cochairman of the FGCIA, dissenting, the Board approved the suggestion, Ms. Tuveson went forward with preparation of a grant application, and a CETA grant was awarded. Ms. Tuveson established and, as CETA program director, oversaw the program funded by the grant. Mr. Tommie's objection to the proposal was that money which, at least in his view, might otherwise have been routed to the Seminole and Miccosukee tribes exclusively was not being administered by the tribes and was being made available to other American Indians, as well. Later Mike Tiger came to share this view as did Joe Billie, who had originally said a CETA grant would be a good idea. Mr. Tommie also felt that administration of a CETA grant would be "a hectic responsibility," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 12, p. 42, for FGCIA. JOE BILLIE RESIGNS At a special meeting of the Board of Directors on November 21, 1977, Joe Billie resigned his position with the FGCIA effective November 25, 1977. Expense account irregularities occasioned the resignation, but Howard Tommie resented Mr. Billie's leaving. According to the minutes of the special meeting: The meeting was then directed to the discussion of the appointment of a new Codirector. Howard Tommie ... felt there should not be a designated Codirector for the Miccosukees or the Seminoles. Bob Travis agreed that each Codirector should be obligated to work for both Tribes. Howard Tommie stated the struc- ture should be changed to suit a state agency because of the fact that the Council now works with all Indians in the State of Florida, not just the Tribes. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Other board members expressed other views, but the position Joe Billie left vacant was not filled, and a board member "directed the staff to prepare alternative organization structures and job descriptions." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. REORGANIZATION At its December 6, 1977, meeting, the FGCIA Board decided on organizing staff into an executive director, a deputy director, two program coordinators and a "Secretary III/Bookkeeper," Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 4 and 5, but the positions were not filled at that time. Although "on the same level as the Deputy Director," the program coordinators were to report to the deputy director, as well as "to the tribes and [were to] be located at the Tribal headquarters most of the time." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. On the subject of job descriptions, Joe Wilson, who "was present at the [November 25, 1977] meeting for the Department of Community Affairs as a representative of Mr. Robert Guttman instructed the staff . . . to add the Indian preference in order not to discriminate." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. Among the policy changes effected at the December 6, 1977, meeting, was addition of a personnel policy in these words: Preferential consideration will be given to federally recognized Native American appli- cants and/or those with experience in Native American programs. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. The Board did not adopt specific job descriptions for the positions decided upon at the December 6, 1977 meeting. ACTING DIRECTOR When the FGCIA Board met on June 23, 1978, it was generally acknowledged that Ms. Tuveson had been FGCIA's acting director for some time. Board member Robert Mitchell, for example, remarked, "Up to the present time you could say that Jan is the real Director, or Executive Director . . . ," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7, and another board member thought it might be official: "I think we may have given Jan the title of Director. I don't remember." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. But, after further deliberations by the board, member Robert Travis' motion to "unhire" Jan as Director and place the [executive director's] position vacant and then Jan would apply for the position along with everybody else," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7, carried. Later in the same meeting, according to the minutes, Joe Dan Osceola directed the meeting to clarifying whether or not Jan Tuveson would remain as Acting Director for the Council until someone is hired permanently. Ms. Tuveson stated that she would. Joe Dan Osceola made a motion to make Jan Tuveson Acting Director. Cochairman Tiger seconded the motion and it carried unanimously. Although she had acted as FGCIA's director for almost two years and was officially named acting director when the board met on June 23, 1978, it was at this same meeting that Ms. Tuveson first began to fear for her continued employment. Several members of the board expressed the view that FGCIA should hire staff, including CETA program staff, who were of American Indian extraction. Ms. Tuveson herself remarked, during the meeting, "I think that is the intention of the personnel committee that any position that is vacated should be filled with a Native American . . ." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Board member Joe Dan Osceola explained his position: So I say with the Indian programs any Indian program which is designed for the Indians in the law states that it should be run as such, meaning Indians should be in that position. The non Indians, no matter what color it is, there is going to be a time when you all are going to have to switch over to another job. . . . So I believe in Indian movement, I mean if we don't who is going to do it. It has to be the Indians who do it. So, I wish Jan was an Indian, really. Because she has done a good job. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Board member Jo Ann Jones stated, "Any program now in our area should be all Indians." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. NATIVE AMERICAN DIRECTOR At its next meeting the FGCIA Board of Directors chose Joe Allen Quetone as executive director of the FGCIA, and voted him a starting salary of $20,000 per year. Mr. Quetone, who is a Native American and a member of the Kiowa tribe of Oklahoma, began as executive director on September 1, 1978, a week after his selection. He has held the position since, and nothing in the evidence suggests that he has done anything other than an exemplary job as executive director. Beginning March 17, 1977, he had worked at FGCIA's headquarters in a CETA position for which Ms. Tuveson had recruited him. A 1973 graduate of Florida State University in philosophy, he began, but did not finish, some graduate public administration courses, before starting at FGCIA. He served as a noncommissioned officer in the U.S. Army, was a paid assistant to a student body president while in college, worked at a car wash and a pizza parlor, tended bar, worked at the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board as a mail clerk; and, for the year and a half or two year period next preceding the move to FGCIA, worked for the Florida Human Relations Commission. INDIAN PREFERENCE The board went forward with the selection on August 25, 1978, despite the suggestions of Cochairman Mike Tiger and board member Robert Travis that the decision be put off. Cochairman Tiger reported Bob Mitchell's request for deferment, and Jim Hutchinson's request for a postponement, which was stated in a letter and related to the board in his absence, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 91, also proved unavailing. A three-member personnel committee had recommended Jan Tuveson, Joe Quetone and Henry A. Williams, Jr., as "highly qualified" to serve as Executive Director. Robert Travis reported on the personnel committee's work to the eight board members present, on August 25, 1978, and described the committee's criteria or "formula" as basically the same thing we've always been talking about; one dealing with the educa- tional background of the person, experience factors, and an Indian preference. Those are the three, or at least the three major things that the committee considered..... Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 94. The board first voted to eliminate Mr. Williams from consideration, them voted to promote Joe Quetone to Executive Director. The FGCIA board chose Mr. Quetone over Ms. Tuveson on the basis of their respective racial origins. Other factors may have entered in, as well. Published reports of the possibility of a lawsuit on race discrimination grounds did not endear Ms. Tuveson to certain board members, see, e.g., Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 108-111; and Howard Tommie, among others, seemed still to harbor resentment over the establishment of the CETA program. At least one board member feared a schism between the Seminole and Miccosukee tribes. Mr. Travis remarked: I think Jan kept the Council together. My preference is I would prefer to vote for her; but, if that vote will cause a split between the S[e]minoles and Miccosukees, and the organizations, the staff she is supposed to help, then my overall concern is for the Indian people. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 144. Mr. Travis was one of six board members who voted for Mr. Quetone. Two members abstained. Joe Dan Osceola explained his position: I'm not against white people, believe me; black, or anybody, even other Indians.... There's Indian programs--there's such a law as Indian Preference Law. There used to be a policy; but it's a law as of 1967.... I know a lot of you don't share my opinion. ... Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 122. Mr. Osceola may have been referring to an informal legal opinion which John Chaves, himself raised as an American Indian, had given as legal counsel to the FGCIA's CETA program, to the effect that the FGCIA could not lawfully implement an Indian preference. FGCIA had nevertheless adopted such a policy, although, over objection of the Seminole and some other board members, the phrase "and/or those with experience in Native American programs" had been added. (During the federal trial, Mr. Tommie testified that he did not think Ms. Tuveson had such experience. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 12, p. 52) At least one other board member adhered to the FGCIA's preference policy in the course of the selection process on August 25, 1978. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 135. Ms. Tuveson testified that jokes about her race that various Seminole members of the FGCIA's board had made from time to time seemed much less amusing in retrospect, after the August 25, 1978 vote. NO OFFER After it was decided that Mr. Quetone would begin work on September 1, the Board began to turn to other matters, when an "Unidentified Female Voice" inquired: Mr. Chairman? Before we start discussing the future business, do you think it's possible we could get some clarification as to Jan's termination date? Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 176. The cochairmen responded and Joe Dan Osceola expressed his views: COCHAIRMAN TIGER: All right. They need that, too; otherwise, we'd have to do something, because--I mean, she's still on the payroll. COCHAIRMAN TOMMIE: I think one takes care of the other. Do you want to go on record as terminating Jan Tuve- son as our director? ... Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 176. JOE DAN OSCEOLA: ... You have a certain day that when somebody has come in that you are supposed to move out of their office ... You clean out your table and desk and everything else because another guy is taking your place. I really can't see all this question on this. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 177. After a confusing colloquy, Joe Dan Osceola raised the question whether Ms. Tuveson was "quitting the Council": JO ANN JONES: I know what you're saying. She's going to get the pay for those two weeks. COCHAIRMAN TOMMIE: Yes, if she wants to stay on the payroll for an extra two weeks, then we've just got to make the provisions... Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 180. COCHAIRMAN TIGER: I think we understand where we stand. ... JAN TUVESON: Effective September 1st, I am on two weeks' notice; right? CO-CHAIRMAN TIGER: No. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 181. JOE DAN OSCEOLA: Is she quitting the Council? That's one part I'm not familiar with, if she's quitting. That's one thing I haven't heard from Jan, that she's not going to be (inaudible) for Miccosukee or (inaudible). That's one thing I don't know. JAN TUVESON: (Inaudible) I'm not (inaudible) coordinator right now, Joe, and I'm acting director. JOE DAN OSCEOLA: Yes, that's what I know. JAN TUVESON: And I haven't been offered the position of coordinator, which would be ludicrous in my opinion, anyway, since it would be a backward step for me. But, the point is, I think, on September 1st, am I to be given two weeks' paid notice? Or am I not to be given any notice at all? Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, p. 183. Neither the Board of Directors as a whole nor any individual board member offered Ms. Tuveson employment in any capacity beyond August 31, 1978. EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT A 1972 graduate of the University of Texas, with a major in English, Ms. Tuveson also attended Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C. as an undergraduate. After graduation, she worked as assistant manager and advertising director for "Hook'm Horns Night Club" in Austin, Texas. In Tallahassee, she worked as public relations assistant to the Sesquicentennial Committee and then for a department store, also in public relations; at Gayfer's, she had supervisory responsibilities, worked on a budget, and wrote copy for radio, television and newspapers, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 8, at a salary of $8,000 to $10,000 a year. She began taking graduate courses at Florida State University after she went to work for FGCIA, first in mass communications then in public administration, but did not earn a degree in either field. After she left the employ of the FGCIA, Ms. Tuveson sent out 25 to 30 applications for jobs and had several interviews. In every interview the matter of her losing her job at the FGCIA arose. Receiving no job offers, she applied to law school in October of 1978, and began in January of 1979. She graduated from law school at Western State University in June of 1981, finishing an accelerated program which left little time for gainful employment. She did not work the whole of the year 1982 partly because she was ill and partly because she took time off to study for a bar examination, which she has never succeeded in passing. She was employed in 1983 in the legal department of the Alamo Savings & Loan Association in San Antonio, Texas. In May of 1984 she moved back to Tallahassee and found work at Electronic Communications. During 1977, the last full year Ms. Tuveson worked for FGCIA, she was paid $18,736.23. The following year FGCIA paid her $15,948.70 for the work she did from January 1, 1978 through August 31, 1978, representing an annual rate of $21,264.93. Her 1979 income totalled $1,818.97. In 1980, Ms. Tuveson's income fell almost to nothing. She earned approximately $2,500 in 1981, and about the same in 1982. Her 1983 income was $10,832.38 and she made $11,526.87 in 1984. At the time of the hearing she was still working for Electronic Communications. Petitioner's proposed recommended order and respondent's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended order were filed on August 12 and 13 1985, respectively. Proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance, to the extent they are supported by the weight of the evidence, except where they are cumulative, subordinate or immaterial.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Ana Caos, M.D., is a applicant for a restricted license to practice Medicine in the State of Florida pursuant to the provisions of Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes. Successful completion of the Florida Board Examination is a prerequisite to licensure under Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes. The Florida Board Examination is also known as the FLEX examination. In an effort to meet that prerequisite, the Petitioner has already taken the FLEX examination six times since October 1, 1966. The Petitioner has passed portions of the licensure examination, but thus far she has not received a passing grade on the Basic Sciences portion of that examination. The Petitioner seeks to continue taking the licensure examination until she achieves a passing grade on all portions of the examination. The issue of whether Section 458.311(2), Florida Statutes, had the effect of limiting the number of times the Petitioner could take the FLEX exam was first considered by the Board of Medicine in 1992. In response to an earlier application by the Petitioner, by letter dated March 11, 1992, the Petitioner was advised by Board staff that Section 458.311(2), Florida Statutes, appeared to apply to her application and that the matter would be considered by the Board at the next meeting of the Board. Thereafter, by letter dated May 7, 1992, Board staff advised the Petitioner that her application would be considered by the Board's Credentials Committee, and that the Petitioner was required to attend the meeting of that committee on May 27, 1992. At the May 27, 1992, meeting, the Board's Credentials Committee, following perfunctory advice of counsel, and without discussion by the committee members, voted to recommend that the Petitioner be allowed to take the FLEX exam a sixth time after 1986, even though she had previously failed the exam five times since 1986. The committee recommendation was adopted by a majority of the Board of Medicine, and the Petitioner was allowed to take the FLEX examination for a sixth time since 1986. The Petitioner failed the FLEX examination for a sixth time since 1986. The Petitioner has reapplied for licensure under Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.), and seeks to take the FLEX exam for a seventh time since 1986. On January 19, 1993, the Board of Medicine filed and served an order regarding the Petitioner's pending licensure application. The order reads as follows, in pertinent part: You are hereby notified pursuant to Section 120.60(3), Florida Statutes, that the Board of Medicine voted to DENY your application for licensure as a physician by examination. The Board of Medicine reviewed and considered your application for licensure by examination on November 19, 1992, in a telephone conference call originating in Tallahassee, Florida and has determined that said licensure by examinatiion be denied, stating as grounds therefore: That you have failed to pass the FLEX examination six times since October 1986. Subsection 458.311(2), Florida Statutes, prohibits licensure of any individual who has failed the FLEX examination five times after October 1, 1986. Although the Board previously permitted you to sit for the FLEX examination for a sixth time in 1992, it has since that time determined that this provision applies to all applicants for licensure. The Board of Medicine has an existing rule that interprets several provisions of Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes (1991). (See Rule 21M-22.020 (1), Florida Administrative Code.) At the Board meeting on July 11 and 12, 1992, the Board of Medicine discussed proposed amendments to the existing rule and voted to initiate rulemaking to amend Rule 21M-22.020(1), Florida Administrative Code, by adding to it new subsections specifically addressing the issue of how many times applicants under subsections (8) and (10) of Section 458.311, Florida Statutes, may take the licensure examination. At its meeting on July 11 and 12, 1992, the Board of Medicine instructed its legal counsel to initiate rulemaking to adopt the rule amendments described above. For reasons unknown to the Board's Executive Director, the Board's legal counsel did not file the proposed rule amendment for adoption until March of 1993. The March 12, 1993, issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly contains notice of the Board's intention to adopt the rule amendments described above. The full text of the proposed rule is as follows: 21M-22020 Western Hemisphere Exile Requirements. For purposes of interpreting Section 458.311, Florida Statutes, as amended by Section 6, Chapter 86-245, Laws of Florida, (codified at Subsection 458.311(8)(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp))(1988 Supp), the following shall apply: (a) - (c) No change (d) The phrase "successfully completes the Florida Board Examination" is interpreted as requiring obtaining a passing score as defined by Rule 21M-29.001(2) within the time frame set forth in Section 458.311(2), Florida Statutes. Specifically, if the applicant has failed the examination five times after October 1, 1986, the applicant is no longer eligible for licensure. For purposes of interpreting Section 458.311, Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 89-266, Chapter 89-541 and Chapter 92- 53, Laws of Florida, (codified at Subsection 458.311(10), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.) (1991)), the following shall apply: (a) - (g) No change. (h) The phrase "successful completion of the licensure examination" is interpreted as requiring obtaining a passing score as defined by Rule 21M-29.001(2) within the time frame set forth in Section 458.311(2), Florida Statutes. Specifically, if the applicant has failed the examination five times after October 1, 1986, the applicant is no longer eligible for licensure. The proposed rule amendments quoted immediately above are presently being challenged in Case No. 93-2166RP. It is the consistent practice of the Board of Medicine to apply the provisions of Section 458.311(1)(a)-(d), (4), and (5), Florida Statutes, to all applicants seeking licensure under Section 458.311(8), which last-mentioned section is also known as the "Cuban Exile Program."
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine issue a Final Order in this case concluding that the Petitioner is ineligible to seek licensure pursuant to Section 458.311, Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.), by reason of having already failed the FLEX examination more than five times since 1986. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of September, 1993, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1801 The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7: Accepted in substance with some subordinate and unnecessary details omitted. Paragraph 8: Rejected as not fully supported by the evidence of record and as, in any event, subordinate and unnecessary details in view of later Board action. Paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13: Accepted in substance with some subordinate and unnecessary details omitted. Paragraph 14: Rejected as irrelevant. Findings submitted by Respondent: Paragraph 1: Covered in Preliminary Statement Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: Covered in Preliminary Statement. Paragraph 4: Covered in Conclusions of Law. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert S. Turk, Esquire Valdes-Fauli, Cobb, Bischoff & Kriss, P.A. One Biscayne Tower, Suite 3400 Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-1897 Claire D. Dryfuss, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Office of the Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Liz Cloud, Chief Bureau of Administrative Code The Capitol, Room 1802 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee Holland Building, Room 120 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Ana Caos, M.D., is a applicant for a restricted license to practice Medicine in the State of Florida pursuant to the provisions of Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes. Successful completion of the Florida Board Examination is a prerequisite to licensure under Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes. The Florida Board Examination is also known as the FLEX examination. In an effort to meet that prerequisite, the Petitioner has already taken the FLEX examination six times since October 1, 1966. The Petitioner has passed portions of the licensure examination, but thus far she has not received a passing grade on the Basic Sciences portion of that examination. The Petitioner seeks to continue taking the licensure examination until she achieves a passing grade on all portions of the examination. The issue of whether Section 458.311(2), Florida Statutes, had the effect of limiting the number of times the Petitioner could take the FLEX exam was first considered by the Board of Medicine in 1992. In response to an earlier application by the Petitioner, by letter dated March 11, 1992, the Petitioner was advised by Board staff that Section 458.311(2), Florida Statutes, appeared to apply to her application and that the matter would be considered by the Board at the next meeting of the Board. Thereafter, by letter dated May 7, 1992, Board staff advised the Petitioner that her application would be considered by the Board's Credentials Committee, and that the Petitioner was required to attend the meeting of that committee on May 27, 1992. At the May 27, 1992, meeting, the Board's Credentials Committee, following perfunctory advice of counsel, and without discussion by the committee members, voted to recommend that the Petitioner be allowed to take the FLEX exam a sixth time after 1986, even though she had previously failed the exam five times since 1986. The committee recommendation was adopted by a majority of the Board of Medicine, and the Petitioner was allowed to take the FLEX examination for a sixth time since 1986. The Petitioner failed the FLEX examination for a sixth time since 1986. The Petitioner has reapplied for licensure under Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.), and seeks to take the FLEX exam for a seventh time since 1986. On January 19, 1993, the Board of Medicine filed and served an order regarding the Petitioner's pending licensure application. The order reads as follows, in pertinent part: You are hereby notified pursuant to Section 120.60(3), Florida Statutes, that the Board of Medicine voted to DENY your application for licensure as a physician by examination. The Board of Medicine reviewed and considered your application for licensure by examination on November 19, 1992, in a telephone conference call originating in Tallahassee, Florida and has determined that said licensure by examinatiion be denied, stating as grounds therefore: That you have failed to pass the FLEX examination six times since October 1986. Subsection 458.311(2), Florida Statutes, prohibits licensure of any individual who has failed the FLEX examination five times after October 1, 1986. Although the Board previously permitted you to sit for the the FLEX examination for a sixth time in 1992, it has since that time determined that this provision applies to all applicants for licensure. The Board of Medicine has an existing rule that interprets several provisions of Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes (1991). (See Rule 21M-22.020 (1), Florida Administrative Code.) At the Board meeting on July 11 and 12, 1992, the Board of Medicine discussed proposed amendments to the existing rule and voted to initiate rulemaking to amend Rule 21M-22.020(1), Florida Administrative Code, by adding to it new subsections specifically addressing the issue of how many times applicants under subsections (8) and (10) of Section 458.311, Florida Statutes, may take the licensure examination. At its meeting on July 11 and 12, 1992, the Board of Medicine instructed its legal counsel to initiate rulemaking to adopt the rule amendments described above. For reasons unknown to the Board's Executive Director, the Board's legal counsel did not file the proposed rule amendment for adoption until March of 1993. The March 12, 1993, issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly contains notice of the Board's intention to adopt the rule amendments described above. The full text of the proposed rule is as follows: 21M-22020 Western Hemisphere Exile Requirements. For purposes of interpreting Section 458.311, Florida Statutes, as amended by Section 6, Chapter 86-245, Laws of Florida, (codified at Subsection 458.311(8)(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp))(1988 Supp), the following shall apply: (a) - (c) No change (d) The phrase "successfully completes the Florida Board Examination" is interpreted as requiring obtaining a passing score as defined by Rule 21M-29.001(2) within the time frame set forth in Section 458.311(2), Florida Statutes. Specifically, if the applicant has failed the examination five times after October 1, 1986, the applicant is no longer eligible for licensure. For purposes of interpreting Section 458.311, Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 89-266, Chapter 89-541 and Chapter 92-53, Laws of Florida, (codified at Subsection 458.311(10), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.)(1991)), the following shall apply: (a) - (g) No change. (h) The phrase "successful completion of the licensure examination" is interpreted as requiring obtaining a passing score as defined by Rule 21M-29.001(2) within the time frame set forth in Section 458.311(2), Florida Statutes. Specifically, if the applicant has failed the examination five times after October 1, 1986, the applicant is no longer eligible for licensure. It is the consistent practice of the Board of Medicine to apply the provisions of Section 458.311(1)(a)-(d), (4), and (5), Florida Statutes, to all applicants seeking licensure under Section 458.311(8), which last-mentioned section is also known as the "Cuban Exile Program."
