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ADALBERTO LOPEZ vs INSYNC STAFFING, INC., 17-002417 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Westbay, Florida Apr. 20, 2017 Number: 17-002417 Latest Update: Jan. 11, 2018

The Issue The issue in this case is whether, on the basis of Petitioner's age, Respondent (a staffing agency) unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner by having him terminated from his position with Respondent's client, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act.

Findings Of Fact Respondent inSync Staffing, Inc. ("inSync"), is a company that recruits for, and supplies employees to, its clients, including, as relevant here, NBTY, Inc. ("NBTY"). inSync is an "employment agency" as that term is used in the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 ("FCRA"). See ¶ 13, infra. inSync does not meet face-to-face with most of the candidates it places with clients. On or around August 19, 2015, a recruiter at inSync forwarded the résumé of Petitioner Adalberto Lopez ("Lopez"), then 75 years old, to NBTY in hopes that NBTY might hire Lopez to fill the position of "QA Floor Inspector – Shift 1," a job that paid $13.50 per hour. About a week later, NBTY interviewed Lopez, and, on September 2, 2015, inSync informed Lopez that NBTY was offering him the job. Lopez accepted the offer. NBTY, not inSync, made the decision to hire Lopez. At all times, inSync acted essentially as a go-between, introducing Lopez to NBTY and helping him apply for the job, informing Lopez of NBTY's training and drug test requirements for new employees, and providing him with documents that NBTY wanted completed and returned in the ordinary course of new-hire onboarding. One of the documents that Lopez was required to sign and submit was the Employment Eligibility Verification (Form I-9), which is used by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, administrator of the federal E-Verify program, to determine whether an employee is authorized to work in the United States. The E-Verify program provided NBTY with a result of Tentative Nonconfirmation ("TNC"), meaning that there was, at a minimum, some discrepancy between the information provided in Lopez's Form I-9 and that available in other public records. A TNC does not necessarily disqualify an employee from continuing to work, but it does need to be resolved to avoid the possibility of termination. In this instance, there is no persuasive evidence that the TNC led NBTY to take any adverse action against Lopez. There is, moreover, no evidence that inSync took any adverse action against Lopez as a result of the TNC. Lopez's first day of work at NBTY was September 14, 2015. The next day, NBTY terminated Lopez's employment. Nevertheless, Lopez showed up for work on September 16 and was told, again, that he no longer had a job. There is no persuasive evidence that inSync played any role in NBTY's decision to fire Lopez. inSync did, however, communicate this decision to Lopez, telling him that he had "been terminated due to not catching on fast enough." This was the reason for the termination given to inSync by NBTY. There is no persuasive evidence that this was not, in fact, NBTY's reason for firing Lopez. There is no persuasive evidence that NBTY eliminated Lopez's job, but there is, likewise, no evidence that NBTY filled the vacant position after Lopez's termination, nor (it obviously follows) any proof regarding the age of Lopez's successor (assuming NBTY hired someone to replace Lopez). There is no evidence concerning the candidates, if any, that inSync referred to NBTY after Lopez had been fired. Ultimate Factual Determinations There is no persuasive evidence that any of inSync's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Lopez, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by age-based discriminatory animus. Indeed, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of unlawful age discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that inSync did not discriminate unlawfully against Lopez on the basis of his age.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding inSync not liable for age discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of October, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 2017.

USC (1) 29 U.S.C 623 Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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D. PAUL SONDEL vs FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS, 93-006243 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 02, 1993 Number: 93-006243 Latest Update: Apr. 19, 1995

The Issue Whether Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent is guilty of unlawful employment practices as alleged in the Petition for Relief. AUTHORITY Chapters 120 and 760, Florida Statutes, and Rule 60Q, Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, D. Paul Sondel, was born August 13, 1928, and was, at the time of final hearing, 65 years of age. On April 11, 1993, Petitioner saw a newspaper advertisement for the position of Analyst I with the Florida Board of Bar Examiners (FBOBE). On April 12, 1993, Petitioner went to the office of the employment agency which the FBOBE was using to locate and screen applicants. Petitioner was told that he would not be allowed to apply or take the pre- employment test for the position because he had a graduate degree and only persons who have a Bachelor's degree but no graduate degree(s) were allowed to apply. On June 1, 1993, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations, in which he alleged that the FBOBE requirement that no one would be considered for the position of Analyst I who had a higher level degree than the minimum required Bachelor's degree, served the "intended purpose" of eliminating older applicants, especially those over Petitioner further alleged that the existence and implementation of such FBOBE policy was in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Respondent hired two persons to fill the April 1993 advertised position of Analyst I. One of the persons hired was 24 and the other was 23 years of age. The FBOBE is an administrative agency of the Supreme Court of Florida and charged by the court with the responsibility of evaluating the character, fitness and competence of each applicant for admission to the Florida Bar. Petitioner has established that he is a person in a protected group; that adverse employment action was taken against him; that the persons hired for the position in question were outside the protected group; and that, but for his graduate degree, he was qualified for the position in question. The FBOBE has a current staff of 29 full time employees. As of March 30, 1994, of those employees, three were 40 years or older at the time of employment. Nine of these employees are currently 40 or older. The employment application used by the FBOBE does not request any information regarding an applicant's age. The FBOBE have hired individuals in the past who were 40 years of age or older. The FBOBE uses the American Employment Agency, Inc. to advertise vacancies and to conduct preliminary screening. Kathryn E. Ressel has been employed by the Respondent for over 22 years and is currently the Deputy Executive Director of the FBOBE. Ms. Ressel is responsible for the instructions given to the employment agency concerning the qualifications for the position of Analyst I. Ms. Ressel testified that the reason for the FBOBE policy of excluding applicants with post graduate college or university degrees is not intended to restrict employment opportunities to younger persons and is not related to the age of any applicant. Ms. Ressel's testimony is that past experience in hiring persons with graduate degrees has indicated that such persons tend to stay in the Analyst positions for short periods of time and leave when an employment opportunity presents itself in the field for which the person is educated. Ms. Ressel testified that the Analyst I position is an entry level position and that the Analyst receives extensive on-the-job training to enable the newly hired employee to perform assigned duties and meet job related responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner. Therefore, according to Ms. Ressel, when Analyst I's leave the employment of the FBOBE after a short time on the job, the Respondent is unable to recoup the time, energy and expense involved in training such individuals. Ms. Ressel's testimony articulates a reasonable nondiscriminatory basis for the employment practice at issue. Ms. Ressel's testimony indicates that the employment policy at issue is age neutral in that it is applied to all individuals who apply for the position of Analyst I, regardless of age. Ms. Ressel's testimony in this regard is unrefuted. Official notice is taken that a given individual is generally older at the time such person receives a graduate degree than when the same individual receives a Bachelor's degree. It does not follow, however, and Petitioner has failed to prove (statistically or otherwise), that in any specific job applicant pool available to the Respondent to fill Analyst I positions, potential applicants with graduate degrees are older than potential applicants who possess only Bachelor's degrees. Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (statistical or otherwise) that the employment policy at issue has a disparate impact on persons 40 years of age or older. Petitioner has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason articulated by the FBOBE as the basis for rejecting Petitioner's application is in fact a pretext and/or that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the Respondent.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition for relief filed in this case be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES W. YORK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 904/488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 1994.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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ROBINSON NELSON vs ALUTIIQ-MELE, LLC, 08-001436 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Mar. 20, 2008 Number: 08-001436 Latest Update: Oct. 10, 2008

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his race in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act, when Petitioner was an employee of Respondent.

Findings Of Fact From November 2004 until early 2008, which period includes all times relevant to this case, Petitioner Robinson Nelson ("Nelson") worked for Respondent Alutiiq-Mele, LLC ("AML") as a security guard. Nelson, who is black, alleges that on two discrete occasions, AML unlawfully discriminated against him based on race, once denying him an overtime shift which he requested, and the other time refusing to assign him "equal work hours." The first incident allegedly took place on "or about March 1, 2005." According to Nelson, he called his supervisor that day, using a telephone at his workstation, to ask that he be scheduled to work overtime on his day off. The supervisor, Nelson claims, told him that overtime had been "eliminated" and denied Nelson's request. Shortly thereafter, as Nelson tells it, the supervisor called Nelson's coworker, Nadja Abreu, and offered her the overtime that Nelson had just been denied. Nelson's story cannot be squared with AML's records, which the undersigned considers reliable and truthful and hence credits. Nelson's timesheet for the week of February 27 through March 5, 2005, shows (and it is found) that he worked all seven days that week, putting in 40 regular hours and 26 overtime hours. Ms. Abreu's timesheet for the same period shows (and it is found) that she worked four days, accruing 40 regular hours and four overtime hours. At hearing, Nelson claimed (apparently for the first time) that the telephone conversation with his supervisor regarding overtime had not occurred on or about March 1, 2005—— as he had alleged originally in his Charge of Discrimination (signed on November 20, 2005) and maintained as recently as the Joint Prehearing Stipulation (dated May 30, 2008)——but rather some two weeks later, on or about March 15, 2005. Again, however, credible contemporaneous records belie Nelson's claim. A payroll document shows (and it is found) that Nelson and Ms. Abreu each worked 40 regular hours during the week of March 13, 2005——and neither put in overtime. (Moreover, Nelson did not work on March 15 and 16, 2005, which means that, if Nelson called his supervisor on March 15, as he asserted at hearing, then he likely would not have been at his workstation at the time, which is inconsistent with his testimony that he placed the call while at work.) Regarding the second alleged incident of discrimination, Nelson claims that on Monday, October 31, 2005, shortly before 9:00 a.m., he received a telephone call at home from his supervisor, who wanted to know why Nelson had failed to report for work that morning. Nelson says he told his supervisor that he had not been scheduled to work that day, and he could not work because he was babysitting. Nelson complains that, in connection with this situation, AML "denied" him regular work hours because of his race. In addition to being facially illogical, Nelson's claim of discrimination is contradicted by reliable and persuasive documentary evidence. First, AML's payroll record shows (and it is found) that Nelson worked four hours on Sunday, October 30, and seven-and-a-half hours each day the next Tuesday through Friday, making a total 34 regular hours during the week of October 30, 2005. While this was not quite a full-time workweek, that Nelson worked fewer than 40 hours one week is not, of itself, proof that AML "denied" him six hours of work. In fact, AML did not "deny" Nelson a work opportunity, as other contemporaneous documents——not to mention Nelson's own testimony——show. In evidence are two work schedules pertaining to the week of October 30, 2005. One was printed on October 28, 2005, and the other on October 30, 2005. There are a number of differences between them; each, however, notes that "scheduled hours are subject to change as needed." On the earlier schedule, Nelson was to be off on Monday, October 31, 2005. On the subsequent schedule, he was to work from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. that day. Had Nelson reported to work on October 31, 2005, as (ultimately) scheduled——and as he was asked to do——Nelson would have worked more than 40 hours the week of October 30, 2005. Ultimate Factual Determinations Taken as a whole, the evidence in this case is either insufficient to establish that AML discriminated unlawfully against Nelson on the basis of his race; or it proves, affirmatively, that AML did not, in all likelihood, unlawfully discriminate against him. Either way, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that AML did not violate the civil rights laws in its treatment of Nelson while he was an employee of AML.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding AML not liable to Nelson for racial discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Erwin Rosenberg, Esquire Post Office Box 416433 Miami Beach, Florida 33141 Christine L. Wilson, Esquire Jennifer A. Schwartz, Esquire Jackson Lewis LLP One Biscayne Tower, Suite 3500 2 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.01760.10760.11
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GABRIEL C. GAUDIO vs AAR AIRLIFT GROUP, 13-000091 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Jan. 08, 2013 Number: 13-000091 Latest Update: Aug. 19, 2013

The Issue Whether Respondent, AAR Airlift Group, Inc. (Respondent), committed the unlawful employment practice as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner, Gabriel C. Gaudio (Petitioner), be granted.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a male over 50 years of age. On or about May 9, 2009, a company located in North Carolina hired Petitioner to work as a Technical Publications Clerk. Petitioner was over 40 years of age at the time of his employment. Prior to March 2012, Petitioner relocated to Florida to continue employment with the company that then became known as AAR Airlift Group, Inc. Respondent does business in Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida, and has over 15 employees, one of whom was Petitioner. At all times material to this matter, Respondent employed Steve Lane (Lane) and Melvin Zahn (Zahn) as supervisors with the company. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent had policies that prohibit discrimination on the basis of age, disability, and any other reason prohibited by law. Any employee who believed discrimination had occurred was directed to report to the local Human Resources Department or to the Corporate Vice President of Human Resources. Respondent’s employees are considered “at will.” Respondent reserves the right to involuntarily terminate any employee for any reason or for no reason unless to do so would violate law. Petitioner maintains he was terminated in retaliation for a complaint he submitted because of his age, or because of his disability. All of the actions complained of occurred between March 2012 and June 2012 (when Petitioner was terminated). It is undisputed that Petitioner’s age would establish he is a member of a protected class. It is undisputed that Petitioner was terminated after he submitted a complaint against his co-workers. Although Petitioner asserted he is disabled, Petitioner presented no evidence to establish the nature of his disability or that Respondent required him to perform tasks contrary to his physical or mental limitations. There is no evidence that Respondent failed to accommodate any claimed limitation Petitioner might have had. In April 2012, Respondent issued a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) to Petitioner to outline areas of his job performance that needed improvement. It was anticipated that Petitioner would address the areas of concern and make improvement within 90 days. Upon receipt of the PIP Petitioner filed a claim of hostile work environment with the company’s human resources office. More specifically, Petitioner claimed two employees, Zahn , technical publications manager, and Rachel Grygier (Grygier), a technical publications librarian, had disparaged him regarding his age and disability. To address Petitioner’s complaint, Respondent initiated an internal investigation of the claim. As part of the investigation process, Respondent directed Petitioner not to disclose or discuss the accusations of his claim with anyone. Respondent sought to resolve the matter without having the allegations discussed among employees before individual statements could be taken. Contrary to the directive, Petitioner discussed his complaint against Zahn and Grygier with at least one other employee. That employee (Barnett) e-mailed support for Petitioner to JoAnne Paul (Paul), Respondent’s human resources compliance manager. When Paul confronted Petitioner as to whether he had discussed his complaint with Barnett, Petitioner falsely denied knowing Barnett. Paul took Petitioner’s failure to maintain confidentiality regarding his complaint to Lane, Respondent’s director of quality assurance and internal evaluations. Together, Paul and Lane decided to terminate Petitioner. The basis for the termination was two-fold: the failure to follow a directive not to discuss the complaint; and the lack of truthfulness when asked about knowing Barnett. Petitioner maintains that his termination was in retaliation for his complaint against Zahn and Grygier and that the company wanted him out. Petitioner presented no evidence that after his termination he was replaced with a younger employee. Even though Petitioner did not establish the nature of his disability, Petitioner presented no evidence that he was replaced by a non-disabled person or that his handicap caused Respondent to terminate him. Further, Petitioner did not establish that any area of concern noted in his PIP related to his disability. Neither Zahn or Grygier had anything to do with Petitioner’s termination. Finally, Petitioner failed to present credible evidence that filing a complaint against Zahn and Grygier was the genesis for his termination. Petitioner was a long-time employee with the company. He had started in North Carolina and moved to Melbourne with the company. Had Respondent wanted to terminate him for any reason it could have done so prior to the move or after the move. Petitioner’s claim that his complaint against Zahn and Grygier caused the termination is not supported by the weight of persuasive evidence.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding no cause for an unlawful employment practice as alleged by Petitioner, and dismissing his employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gabriel Gaudio 259 Abernathy Circle, Southeast Palm Bay, Florida 32909 Chelsie J. Flynn, Esquire Ford and Harrison, LLP Suite 1300 300 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Michelle Wilson, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (2) 42 U.S.C 20009 U.S.C 623 Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.68760.01760.10760.11
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JOSEPH ROLLERSON vs WYCLIFFE GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, 14-005114 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Oct. 28, 2014 Number: 14-005114 Latest Update: Jul. 09, 2015

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment discrimination practices alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male. At all times pertinent to this case, Petitioner was employed by Respondent as an equipment operator in the golf course maintenance department. Respondent has been employed by Respondent for approximately 20 years. Respondent is a golf and country club.1/ Respondent's employment policies are contained in its "Employee Handbook."2/ The Employee Handbook provides that a "[v]iolation of any of the rules or policies set forth in this Handbook may lead to discipline, up to and including immediate discharge." Respondent's Employee Handbook contains a section on absenteeism and tardiness, which provides in pertinent part as follows: Excessive absenteeism or tardiness can result in discipline up to and including discharge. If you are going to be late or absent from work for any reason, you must personally notify your Supervisor as far in advance as possible (but no later than 2 hours before your scheduled start time) so proper arrangements can be made to handle your work during your absence. Of course, some situations may arise in which prior notice cannot be given. In those cases we expect you to notify your Supervisor as soon as possible. Leaving a message, sending a text, or having someone else call on your behalf, does not qualify as notifying your Supervisor- you must personally contact your Supervisor. If you are required to leave work early, you must also personally contact your Supervisor and obtain his/her permission. Absences of more than one day should be reported daily, unless you have made other arrangements with your Supervisor or the Human Resources Office. (emphasis in original). * * * Although an employee may be terminated at any time for failing to report to work without contacting the Club, if an employee fails to report for work or call in for three (3) consecutive calendar days they will be considered to have abandoned their job and will be terminated. Respondent's Employee Handbook also contains a provision concerning workplace violence. Employees are notified that, "[v]iolations of this policy may result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment." The workplace violence policy provides in pertinent part: The Club has a zero tolerance policy regarding violent acts or threats of violence against our employees, applicants, members, vendors, or other third parties. We do not allow fighting or threatening words or conduct. We also do not allow the possession of weapons of any kind on the Club's premises, except as required by law. No employee should commit or threaten to commit any violent act against a co-worker, applicant, member, vendor, or other third party. This includes discussions of the use of the dangerous weapons, even in a joking manner. May 3, 2013, Incident On May 3, 2013, Petitioner was not at work, but rather, performing work for a resident in the community. Petitioner's vehicle was apparently parked on the wrong side of the road. Mike Jones, a security guard, advised Petitioner to move his vehicle or he was going to receive a ticket. Petitioner informed Mr. Jones that he was not going to receive a ticket, and followed Mr. Jones back to the guard gate. Thereafter, Petitioner and Mr. Jones became engaged in "some words." According to Petitioner, after the verbal altercation he left the guard gate. On May 4, 2013, Petitioner presented to work and performed his duties. The following day, May 5, 2013, Petitioner was arrested for the May 3, 2013, incident and charged with battery on a security officer. Petitioner testified that the arrest occurred in Mike Ballard's office.3/ Mr. Ballard was Petitioner's superintendent at some point in his employment. Beth Sandham, Respondent's Human Resources Director, was not present at the time of arrest. Petitioner remained in custody throughout May 6, 2013. When Petitioner did not appear for work on May 6, 2013, Ms. Sandham credibly testified that the Human Resources department, as well as his supervisors, attempted to contact Petitioner. After several attempts to reach him by phone, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner via Federal Express.4/ Petitioner testified that he contacted his supervisor on May 6, 2013, and was advised that he had been terminated. Petitioner contends that his termination was racial in origin because Respondent did not obtain his account of the altercation prior to his termination. On this point, Petitioner testified as follows: That why I say this is a racist thing because they listen to what their two security guards say, but they never gave me the chance to explain myself. On May 6, 2013, Ms. Sandham terminated Petitioner's employment on the grounds of failing to report to work and the alleged violent behavior. As an additional basis for alleging racial discrimination, Petitioner testified that Mike Ballard was a racist. Specifically, Petitioner testified that on one occasion he overheard Mr. Ballard advise another employee, Jeff Beneclas, to "[t]ell that nigger mind his own f***en business." Petitioner explained that Mr. Ballard was referring to him. Mr. Beneclas was terminated on June 25, 2010. Addressing this allegation, Ms. Sandham explained that, if the alleged statement had been made over Respondent's radio system, said statement would have been heard by the tennis department, the golf professionals, facilities maintenance, the superintendents, and golf course maintenance. Ms. Sandham credibly testified that neither Petitioner nor any other employee notified her of such a statement or made a complaint. Additionally, Ms. Sandham credibly testified that Petitioner never made a complaint to her regarding Mr. Ballard.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the Petition for Relief against Wycliffe Golf and Country Club. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 2015.

CFR (1) 29 CFR 1601.70 Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68509.092760.01760.10760.11
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CRISTINA QUINTERO vs CITY OF CORAL GABLES, 06-000413 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Feb. 01, 2006 Number: 06-000413 Latest Update: Apr. 23, 2007

The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2004), popularly known as the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (Florida Civil Rights Act).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an Hispanic female. Petitioner was employed by Respondent in records for almost 15 years prior to July 16, 2004, when she was terminated. Respondent is a municipal corporation located in Miami- Dade County, Florida, and an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Respondent provides a variety of public services generally associated with cities of comparable size, including a full service police department. At all relevant times, Hispanics comprised approximately half of the police department's workforce. Many of these individuals were employed in supervisory capacities. Four Hispanics were supervisors in Petitioner's chain of command. In her position in records, Petitioner was responsible to timely and accurately process official police documents. Such processing included the completion of forms and transmittal documents and timely copying, filing and production of such documents to appropriate individuals and authorities (document processing). Failure to discharge any of the foregoing responsibilities is reasonably deemed by Respondent to be incompetence, and a firing offense(s). In her position in records, Petitioner was also responsible to comply with all directives of supervisors and to cooperate in internal affairs investigations. Cooperation in this context includes providing sworn statements and/or answering questions under oath as may be required by Respondent. Failure to comply with directives and to cooperate in internal affairs investigations are reasonably deemed by Respondent to be insubordination, and firing offenses. On April 29, 2004, a member of the public presented himself to records and requested a copy of an official police record to which he was entitled to access, specifically a traffic ticket. Records could not locate the document because it had not been properly processed by Petitioner, who was responsible for doing so. Having become aware of a problem with this particular document processing, Respondent thereupon took reasonable steps to determine whether this was an isolated error by Petitioner. In so doing, Respondent discovered and documented a high volume of document processing errors with respect to official police records for which Petitioner was responsible. In February 2004, one of Petitioner's supervisors – one who happened to be Hispanic -- issued a written directive (the February directive) to all records employees which required that they disclose, on a weekly basis, any "backlogs" of document processing work. In direct violation of the directive, Petitioner never disclosed existence of her backlog, which was, by April 29, 2004, extremely large. Now on notice of the backlog and deeply concerned about its potential effects on the police department and the public it serves, and pursuant to police department policy, an internal affairs investigation was initiated under the leadership of the same Hispanic supervisor. Over the course of the investigation, Respondent learned that the problem(s) revealed on April 29, 2004, were only the "tip of the iceberg." The internal affairs investigation uncovered “hundreds and hundreds” of additional document processing errors. Virtually all of the errors discovered involved official police records for which Petitioner was responsible. In the course of the internal affairs investigation, Petitioner was directed to give a sworn statement, and refused to do so, which refusal was deemed to constitute insubordination. Petitioner’s errors as documented in the internal investigation demonstrated incompetence. Her failure to comply with the February directive and to provide a sworn statement to internal affairs investigators constituted insubordination. At the conclusion of the internal affairs investigation, Petitioner was terminated for incompetence in the performance of her document processing responsibilities and for insubordination. Petitioner failed to discredit the factual underpinnings of Respondent’s decision to terminate her employment; neither did she establish any discriminatory basis upon which Respondent terminated her employment. Respondent replaced Petitioner with an Hispanic, who remained employed by Respondent through and including the time of the hearing.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter its final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Christina Quintero 4780 Northwest 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33126 David C. Miller, Esquire Akerman Senterfitt Sun Trust International Center, 28th Floor One Southeast Third Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.02760.10
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CARYL ZOOK vs BENADA ALUMINUM FLORIDA, INC., 15-005538 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Oct. 01, 2015 Number: 15-005538 Latest Update: Apr. 07, 2016

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”) on or about September 9, 2014, and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the undersigned makes the following findings of material and probative facts: TESTIMONY OF PETITIONER, CARYL ZOOK Petitioner, a 61-year-old female born in 1954, worked as a private chef for Mr. Friedkin, owner of Respondent. She began in 2007 and was an “at will” employee, there being no written employment contract. Her duties included providing dinners and other meals at Mr. Friedkin’s residence, catering or assisting him with some events, and overseeing some of the other staff members at his residence. Petitioner was in an auto accident in 2011 and suffered neck injuries. Petitioner required physical therapy, acupuncture, steroid injections, and several x-rays. After Petitioner was terminated from Respondent in September 2013, she underwent surgery to remove several bad vertebrae from her neck area. Due to her neck injury and pain, Petitioner testified that she needed to park close to Mr. Friedkin’s house to carry groceries as a reasonable accommodation. Other than the inference drawn from this scant evidence, there was little, if any, direct or circumstantial evidence presented to prove that Respondent had knowledge of a qualifying disability by Petitioner.1/ Petitioner characterized Mr. Friedkin’s behavior over the years as insulting and abusive, and she endured it for many years. There was an arrangement between Petitioner and Friedkin for him to purchase a home for her to live in. She would repair or remodel the home, and at some point, he would transfer the mortgage and home to her.2/ For the Yom Kippur holiday, Mr. Friedkin contacted Petitioner and instructed her to prepare a dinner for his family and to have it ready at 3:00 p.m. that day. Typically, meals were prepared by Petitioner at Mr. Friedkin’s home. However, this one was prepared at Petitioner’s home because, as she testified, it “needed to be brined” in her refrigerator in advance. Petitioner was admittedly running late and did not have the meal prepared by 3:00 p.m. Mr. Friedkin called her while she was driving to his house but she did not answer the phone. When she arrived at his house, Mr. Friedkin was in his vehicle blocking the driveway. After she parked on the street, Mr. Friedkin got out of his vehicle and began ranting and raving at her, accusing her of being late. He was very upset. He continued yelling and told her that, “Next week you better start looking for a new job.” Petitioner went into the house and left the food in the refrigerator. It was undisputed that the food (a turkey breast) was not given to Mr. Friedkin outside the home because it was not carved or ready for consumption. TESTIMONY OF SHEREE FREIDKIN Mr. Friedkin’s wife testified that Mr. Friedkin had made it clear to Petitioner that he wanted her to prepare a turkey meal and that they would pick it up at 3:00 p.m. at the residence. When she and her husband arrived at their home at 3:00 p.m., Petitioner was not there. They went inside, looked in the refrigerator, and saw that the food was not there. They called Petitioner on her cell phone but she did not answer. They waited for some period of time for her, all the while getting very frustrated and agitated.3/ After waiting more than 30 minutes for Petitioner to arrive, they decided to go to Whole Foods to buy a turkey meal at around 3:40 p.m. On their way, Petitioner phoned them. She said she would be at the house soon, and so, they decided to drive back and meet her. After they arrived back at their residence they had to continue to wait for her to arrive. She finally arrived, sometime after 3:40 p.m., and got out of her vehicle eventually. (Apparently, Petitioner waited in her car for some period of time.) When she got out, Petitioner was in shorts, a sloppy shirt, and her hair was in curlers. Mr. and Mrs. Friedkin found this inappropriate, particularly since Petitioner usually wore an apron and dressed more appropriately in their presence. Mr. Friedkin was very upset and demanded that she give him the food because they were running late to their family function. Petitioner refused, claiming the turkey needed to be sliced. Mr. Friedkin was very angry and used several unnecessary expletives during the course of his conversation with Petitioner. Mr. Friedkin told her something like, “you’re fired” and “don’t show up Monday for work.” Mrs. Friedkin overheard no age, disability, or retaliation-related comments during this heated exchange. TESTIMONY OF MONTE FRIEDKIN He confirmed that Petitioner was his chef and also did some assorted chores and supervision around his house. He directed Petitioner to make a meal and have it ready for them to pick up at his residence by 3:00 p.m. on the day in question. He testified that Petitioner always cooked any food for his family at his residence. When they arrived around 3:00 p.m. at the house, Petitioner was not there, and there was no food. He tried to call her and had to leave a message. They decided to go to Whole Foods to buy the meal. They departed for Whole Foods around 3:40 p.m. His description of the event was consistent with his wife’s testimony. In addition to the delay caused by Petitioner, Mr. Friedkin testified that it was important to him that she was presentable at all times around him and his family. During the confrontation in the driveway, he terminated her employment. He testified that he had experienced some other performance issues with her over the months preceding this event and that she had begun to respond to questions and directives from him in increasingly insubordinate ways. As far as her termination was concerned, he unequivocally denied that her age, a disability, or retaliation was ever considered or motivated his decision. He admitted that Petitioner told him that she had a car accident in one of their vehicles sometime in 2011. However, she continued to work for him for approximately two years after the accident without incident. She did complain to him, at some point, of some neck pain. He denied that Petitioner ever gave him any medical documents verifying or stating that she was disabled. On cross-examination by Petitioner, Mr. Friedkin elaborated that, during the months preceding the food incident, she had become more and more insubordinate, and there was a growing problem with her not following instructions he gave her. In his words, the incident at his residence involving the turkey dinner was the proverbial “straw that broke the camel’s back.” On redirect, Mr. Friedkin denied ever considering any disability and said he did not even know she was “disabled.”4/ TESTIMONY OF ROSARIO DIAZ Another witness, Mrs. Diaz, testified that Mr. and Mrs. Friedkin arrived at the residence at around 3:00 p.m. and came into her office. They wanted to know whether or not Petitioner was there with the food, and whether or not she had called. Diaz told him that she was not there and did not call. Mr. and Mrs. Friedkin then departed. Approximately 30 minutes later, Petitioner came into her office upset and said that she could not believe what had just happened and that Mr. Friedkin had just fired her. Ms. Diaz commented to her that maybe they were upset because she was late. Mrs. Diaz had worked for Mr. Friedkin for nearly 30 years. She interacted with Petitioner at the residence frequently. She testified that Petitioner never complained to her about age, disability, or other discriminatory remarks or comments by Mr. Friedkin. She also testified that she never overheard any comments by Mr. Friedkin about Petitioner’s age or disability, or how either may have affected Petitioner’s work performance. At Petitioner’s request, recorded portions of an unemployment compensation hearing, conducted by an appeals referee from the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity (DEO), were played. Petitioner represented that the purpose was to show that Mr. Friedkin had made several statements during that hearing that were inconsistent with his present testimony. The DEO hearing was to determine whether or not Petitioner was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. DEO ruled in Petitioner’s favor and found that she was not disqualified from receiving benefits and that no “misconduct” occurred on the job as a result of the Yom Kippur meal incident.5/ The undersigned finds that Mr. Friedkin did not make any materially inconsistent statements during the DEO hearing bearing upon his credibility as a witnesses in this case. There was insufficient proof offered by Petitioner to show that Respondent’s proffered explanation for her termination (poor work performance) was not true, or was only a pretext for discrimination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief and find in Respondent’s favor. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Robert L. Kilbride Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2016.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 12102 Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.68760.10760.11
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SHARON SINGLETON vs ESCAMBIA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 15-001800 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Apr. 01, 2015 Number: 15-001800 Latest Update: Feb. 17, 2016

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner was terminated from her employment with Respondent for a discriminatory reason.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Sharon Singleton, was employed by Respondent in the Information Technology (IT) Department. Petitioner served, as did other IT employees, under an annual contract. Respondent is the administrative government entity for the public schools of Escambia County, Florida. Contracts of employment are with the Escambia County School Board. Mr. Johnnie Odom supervised Petitioner until the last eight months of her employment. Her supervisor was Kathy Cooper during the last eight months of her employment. For many years, Petitioner and the other technicians used a software program that supported the management of school records that was known as “TERMS.” During the last few years of Petitioner’s employment, the District changed the supporting software program from TERMS to a program known as “FOCUS.” This was a major conversion of software programs that took place over an extended period of time. When the FOCUS program was initiated, Respondent hired three additional technicians to support FOCUS. Petitioner disagreed with the hiring of new technicians to support FOCUS, but acknowledges she was not treated any differently from the other Tech III support staff. Her disagreement was over the hiring of the new technicians, rather than allowing the existing ones to serve as primary support for FOCUS. Petitioner sought a promotion to a higher level position in 2011. The promotion process was administered by a selection committee that interviewed and evaluated candidates. As a result of the competitive selection, Petitioner was not recommended or selected for the promotion. On two prior occasions, Petitioner had sought a promotion, and on both occasions a selection committee ranked and evaluated the candidates. Petitioner was not successful in being selected or promoted on those two prior occasions. For the 2011-2012 school year, Petitioner received unsatisfactory ratings for her administrative/professional techniques and skills, as well as for her professional relationships with staff. The evaluation contained a note stating that Petitioner has difficulty in resolving conflicts with her co-workers and that her supervisor would like to see her resolve conflicts with her co-workers in a more diplomatic manner. Petitioner had received some unsatisfactory or needs improvement marks in her previous years’ evaluations, so 2011- 2012 was not the first time she had received less than satisfactory marks. Nevertheless, following the 2011-2012 annual evaluation, Petitioner received an annual employment contract for the next school year. At the end of the next school year, Petitioner again received an unsatisfactory mark for her professional techniques and skills. She also was cited for needing improvement in other areas. The notes to that evaluation stated Petitioner had improved her relationships with co-workers, but was still having problems adjusting to the new programs that required modernizing her skill set. Despite a few negative marks on her evaluation, Petitioner received an annual contract for the 2013-2014 school year. Petitioner did not dispute the fact that her evaluator and supervisor, Mr. Odom, believed her performance was unsatisfactory. She disagreed, however, with his assessment of her performance. Petitioner believed she had been demoted in the 2013-2014 school year and testified she signed a paper acknowledging a demotion in a disciplinary meeting with the IT department director, Tom Ingram. She did not receive a reduction in salary or benefits, however. Mr. Ingram classified the action taken against Petitioner as a restriction of her duties to Level I telephone support, rather than the more challenging Level II telephone support duties that she had performed in the past. He did not consider this a demotion, but more of a recognition of assigning Petitioner to duties that he believed she could better handle with her skill set. Petitioner testified that Ms. Cooper told her on several occasions she should consider retirement. Petitioner took this as evidence of Ms. Cooper’s belief she was too old to perform her job. Ms. Cooper testified she made the suggestion because Petitioner had an elderly mother who lived in a nursing home and needed assistance. Ms. Cooper was responding to Petitioner having told her she was left with little time to care for her mother when she finished with work. Petitioner acknowledged that her mother was elderly and needed help and that she had told this to Ms. Cooper. During Petitioner’s final eight months of employment, she worked mainly telephone support under the direction of Ms. Cooper, the support manager for the District. Ms. Cooper manages the help desk and IT support staff. She manages two levels of support. Level I support involves matters that can be resolved by telephone, while Level II support is for matters that cannot be resolved in five minutes or less and require more expertise to cure. Ms. Cooper developed concerns about Petitioner’s support performance. She took her concerns to the Director of IT, Mr. Ingram. Similar concerns with Petitioner’s performance had been raised by another support technician, as well. That technician reported that one of the schools to which he and Petitioner had both been assigned, asked that Petitioner not be allowed to return there for support in the future. When Ms. Cooper brought her concerns about Petitioner to Mr. Ingram, he asked that she bring him documentation of her concerns evidencing recent issues concerning Petitioner’s performance. Mr. Ingram met with Petitioner on September 3, 2013, to review her performance. Mr. Ingram’s notes from that meeting document his concern with Petitioner’s performance and he restricted her duties at that time to telephone support because he did not believe she could independently provide on-site support to more schools. His notes further indicate that Petitioner was not satisfied with his conclusions regarding her performance. Mr. Ingram conducted a follow-up interview with Petitioner on September 4, 2013, because Petitioner wanted to share with him the evaluation she had received from Mr. Odom for the 2012-2013 school year. Mr. Ingram told Petitioner he agreed with the evaluation conducted and recorded by Mr. Odom. Mr. Ingram had yet another meeting with Petitioner in March 2014 regarding her performance. With Ms. Cooper present, Mr. Ingram reviewed documentation concerning Petitioner’s unsatisfactory performance. The meeting was held pursuant to a Notice of Consideration of Disciplinary Action served on Petitioner. As a result of the meeting, Mr. Ingram was not confident Petitioner could satisfactorily improve her performance. He believed that Petitioner refused to accept the representative examples he gave her of her unsatisfactory performance. After concluding at the March meeting that Petitioner’s performance would not sufficiently improve, Mr. Ingram decided not to renew Petitioner’s annual contract when it expired in June 2014. Petitioner believed she had been marginalized by her perceived demotion to a Level I telephone support technician. She also was removed from ZENworks, a scheduling program she had previously been involved with over the years, becoming the only employee on the support team that was not allowed to participate in that program. Petitioner believed that all the criticisms of her work by management were hyper-technical, and that she received little, if any, feedback or training during the period for which she was evaluated when the unsatisfactory findings were made. She also attempted to show that others who made errors similar to hers were given promotions. The evidence presented on this point was insufficient to support her claim of disparate treatment. Several retired or long-serving District employees testified that their interaction over the years with Petitioner resulted in responsive and high-quality service from Petitioner. None of these witnesses testified about specific support they received from Petitioner during the last three years of her employment, employing the new FOCUS system, which served as the basis for the non-renewal of her contract. Petitioner testified she should receive damages in the amount of $384,000 as the result of her employment being terminated while she was a participant in the midst of D.R.O.P.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding Respondent did not commit the “unlawful employment practice” alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner’s employment discrimination charge. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Ryan M. Barnett, Esquire Whibbs and Stone, P.A. 801 West Romana Street, Unit C Pensacola, Florida 32502 (eServed) Joseph L. Hammons, Esquire The Hammons Law Firm, P.A. 17 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501-3125 (eServed) Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000 Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.68760.01760.02760.10760.11
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MONICA SCOPEL vs EVENTS BY PREMIER, 17-000445 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Jan. 19, 2017 Number: 17-000445 Latest Update: Jul. 13, 2017

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged by Petitioner in her Employment Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") on May 3, 2016; and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.

Findings Of Fact Based on the record as a whole and the evidence presented, the undersigned makes the following findings of material and relevant facts: Petitioner started her employment in July 2002 with Events by Premier. The company provides exclusive catering services for the Jewish Center in Aventura, Florida.3/ Petitioner's employment in 2002 followed her marriage to Michael Pollak, a co-owner of Events by Premier. Petitioner became a full-time employee in 2013 and was assigned to the position of kitchen manager. At that point, her husband was the chef and supervised her work in the kitchen. Their work relationship continued in this manner until she was terminated from employment in late July 2015. Petitioner's performance was satisfactory, and there was no evidence to suggest that she was unable to adequately perform her duties as kitchen manager. The evidence was largely undisputed that the position of kitchen manager was created specifically to accommodate Petitioner and her husband, a co-owner of the business. There had been no prior kitchen manager positions at Events by Premier, and the title and position were not needed to operate the business. Another owner of Events by Premier, and its president, was Steven Pollak. He is the brother of Michael Pollak and was Petitioner's brother-in-law. During the weeks leading up to her termination in July 2015, her relationship with her husband, Michael Pollak, became openly strained and tense due to marital problems. Steven Pollak described the work environment between Petitioner and her husband as not a good one, and it created, as he described, a "toxic" work environment. There was screaming, hollering, and profanity exchanged between Petitioner and her husband at work. It was decided that Petitioner needed to be terminated for the best interests of the company and also due to the unprofitability of the company in the first half of 2015.4/ As a result of the poor working environment existing between Petitioner and her husband, and Respondent's unprofitable performance in the first half of the year 2015, Steven Pollak informed Petitioner on July 26, 2015, that he was letting her go.5/ After she was fired, Petitioner filed a Complaint with FCHR. The basis of her Complaint was that she was terminated because of her "marital status." At the hearing, Petitioner explained her opinion regarding the basis for her termination. She felt that her termination occurred because the company feared that she knew things about the company, including improper unemployment claims and other financial information.6/ It was clear to the undersigned that Petitioner had serious emotional and relational issues with her husband that made it difficult, if not impossible, for her to work harmoniously with him. She testified at the hearing and characterized her relationship with her husband after her termination as "out of control." Based upon the evidence presented and the record as a whole, Petitioner was not terminated because of her "marital status." Rather, the evidence demonstrated that there were legitimate and non-discriminatory business reasons for terminating Petitioner. Similarly, her termination was based upon the hostile relationship which existed between Petitioner and her husband, Michael Pollak, in the weeks and months leading up to her filing a petition for divorce--not because of her marital status (e.g., not because she was married, separated, or divorced).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief and find in Respondent's favor. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2017.

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.68509.092760.01760.02760.10760.11
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ROBERT JOHNSON vs TREE OF LIFE, INC., 04-002659 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine, Florida Jul. 28, 2004 Number: 04-002659 Latest Update: Jul. 13, 2005

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice based on his age.

Findings Of Fact Currently, Petitioner is a retired, 68-year-old male. He retired from Respondent at the age of 66. Petitioner began his employment with Respondent as a truck driver. The position of truck driver, involves many long hours of driving (sometimes over 56 hours) various interstate and intrastate truck routes, along with some lifting and exposure to diesel fumes. Petitioner attributed a variety of illnesses and health problems to his work as a truck driver. Some of the illnesses and health problems are hypertension and heart blockage and failure, which resulted in the implantation of a pacemaker, carpal tunnel syndrome, polyneuropathy, muscular and autonomic system problems and pathological hyper-insomnia. Petitioner offered no evidence that any of these conditions resulted from his employment with Respondent. Prior to September 9 or 10, 2000, at the age of 64, Petitioner was hospitalized for heart problems. Around September 9 or 10, 2000, Petitioner was released from the hospital. Upon his return to work, he gave his employer a physician’s note indicating that his work duties be limited to 40 hours a week. Petitioner met with Respondent’s transportation manager regarding whether less lengthy routes were available or whether his schedule or work duties could be adjusted. The employer did not have the ability to adjust the length of the routes, but added a second driver to ride and help with the driving on any route that Petitioner drove. Petitioner inquired about office work and was told that if he was interested in such work he needed to apply at the main office to see what was available. In part, because Petitioner liked driving and in part because the lesser number of hours involved in office work would cause Petitioner to earn less, Petitioner elected not to pursue and did not apply for such office work. No adverse employment action was taken against Petitioner, and Petitioner continued to work for Respondent. At some point during this meeting, Petitioner alleges that the transportation manager said, “Why don’t you just retire.” Petitioner offered no specific context for this statement other than it was a general conversation about his health and closeness to retirement age relative to the adjustments that could be made to his driving duties. One isolated statement such as the one above does not demonstrate any intent to discriminate on Respondent’s part based on Petitioner’s age, especially since no adverse employment action was taken against Petitioner and Petitioner continued to work for Respondent. Around January 1, 2001, for medical reasons, Respondent approved a Leave of Absence with pay for Petitioner. In June or July, 2002, Petitioner filed his first workers compensation claim with Respondent. Petitioner’s claim was turned over to Respondent’s workers' compensation insurer, Kemper Insurance Company. Petitioner did not offer any evidence that Kemper was under the direction or control of Respondent in any decisions Kemper made regarding paying or litigating Petitioner’s claim. In any event, Petitioner’s claim was contested. The main reason the claim was contested was that Kemper alleged that Petitioner’s “injuries” were not work-related. Over the years, Petitioner has amended his claim to include, among other health claims, the health problems listed above. Kemper has maintained its defense. During a mediation session on December 11, 2002, at which the employer was not present and in response to an inquiry regarding Kemper’s defense, Kemper’s representative stated that except for the carpal tunnel claim, all of Petitioner’s medical conditions were due to the natural aging process. Petitioner claims this statement demonstrates an intent on his employer’s part to discriminate against him based on his age. Such an isolated statement does not demonstrate such an intent especially since such conditions can be age related, there was no expert medical evidence demonstrating the cause of Petitioner’s health problems, the statement did not come from the employer, and there was no evidence that the insurer was under the direction or control of the employer regarding decisions to litigate or the factual basis for the defenses that the insurer would raise. The workers' compensation litigation continues to date. In the interim, Petitioner remained on a leave of absence with pay until January 1, 2003. He retired thereafter. There was no evidence that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner or that Petitioner suffered any adverse employment action based on his age. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relation 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Glynda Copeland Qualified Representative Tree of Life, Inc. Post Office Box 410 St. Augustine, Florida 32095-0410 Robert C. Johnson 560 Florida Club Boulevard, Suite 112 St. Augustine, Florida 32084

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.10760.11
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