The Issue Whether or not Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs.
Findings Of Fact On October 21, 1983, Derek and Lucy Lea entered into a sales contract to purchase the Wal-Mar Hotel that was listed for sale with the Petitioners. The Leas retained an attorney and the transaction closed on December 15, 1983. Three months later, due to low revenues, the Leas defaulted on the mortgage and the seller foreclosed. The Leas filed a civil action in circuit court against Petitioners for misrepresenting the property, which action was dismissed. Petitioners denied the allegations filed by the Leas. On July 29, 1986, Respondent, Florida Real Estate Commission, received a complaint filed by the Leas which was investigated. Following Respondent's investigation, the Lea's complaint was forwarded to a probable cause panel and the panel determined that probable cause did not exist to believe that a violation of the real estate licensing law had occurred and a closing order was entered on February 18, 1987, dismissing the complaint. The Leas refiled their civil complaint and alleged that Petitioners misrepresented and overstated the per night room rate, the past occupancy rates, the gross income rates and future reservations; that Petitioners knew or should have known that the acts and statements were false and incomplete at the time made and that the Leas acted in reliance of Petitioners representations in purchasing the Wal-Mar Motel. On or about August 5, 1987, the Leas obtained a final judgment for $5,250.00 against Petitioners, Dynamic Realty, Inc. and Jay H. Miller, which judgment was satisfied. A copy of the judgment, and satisfaction thereof was refiled with the Respondent which evidenced that the Petitioners paid the judgment. The Leas refiled their complaint with Respondent and on September 20, 1988, the Leas complaint was again reviewed by the probable cause panel. The probable cause panel determined that probable cause existed to believe that based on the documentation presented, including the civil judgment entered against Petitioners which was satisfied, and a review of the investigative report, adequate facts existed to support a charge of fraud through breach of trust in a business transaction and Respondent filed Administrative Complaints on October 4, 1988, alleging that Petitioners engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction, in violation of Subsections 475.25(1)(b), (d) and (k), Florida Statutes, by virtue of Petitioners' misrepresentation in overstating the various financial data relative to the Leas purchase of the Wal-Mar Hotel. Petitioners incurred legal fees and costs in the amount of $4,058.00 to litigate the Administrative Complaint filed by Respondent. The amount expended by Petitioners for legal fees and costs was reasonable.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses, the documentary evidence received at the hearing, and the record in DOAH case no. 88-6257, the following findings of fact are made: On October 24, 1988, the Department notified Sophie DeRuiter and Ann & Jan Retirement Villa that the license to operate an adult congregate living facility expired on October 23, 1988, and that the application for renewal was denied. The specific reasons listed as the grounds for such denial were a determination of confirmed medical neglect of residents and the inappropriate retention of residents. Thereafter, Petitioner timely sought an administrative review of the denial by filing a petition for administrative hearing with the Department which was subsequently forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings on December 16, 1988. That matter was assigned DOAH case no. 88- 6257. Hearing of case no. 88-6257 was originally scheduled for March 17, 1989, by notice of hearing dated January 18, 1989. Thereafter, Petitioner scheduled a number of depositions and requested a continuance in the case to accommodate Sophie DeRuiter. That motion was unopposed by the Department and was granted by order entered February 27, 1989. That order also rescheduled the hearing for April 14, 1989, and required the parties to file a prehearing statement no later than March 24, 1989. Neither party timely filed a prehearing statement. In fact, the parties were unable to agree on a statement due to their disagreement as to the issues of the case. The unilateral statements filed by the parties established that Petitioner sought review of all grounds for the denial of the license renewal. On the other hand, the Department took the position that since Sophie DeRuiter was listed on the Florida Abuse Registry for confirmed medical neglect of residents, that such listing precluded renewal of the license. The Department alleged that Petitioner had not timely challenged the abuse report, and that such record could not be challenged in the instant case. The Department's letter denying amendment or expungement of the medical neglect had been issued December 7, 1988. Given the confusion of the parties and their failure to file prehearing statements as required, the hearing scheduled for April 14, 1989, was cancelled. Subsequently, the Department moved to limit the issue to whether there was a confirmed record of an abuse report (and thereby presume the underlying report correct). Such motion was denied on June 1, 1989. On June 9, 1989, the hearing of this matter was convened. At that time, the Department moved to continue the case due to illness of counsel and her inability to review an amended witness list filed by Petitioner. The motion was granted after it was apparent counsel for the Department was unprepared to go forward on all issues of the case (she represented she had just received the order requiring her to go forward on all issues on June 8, 1989). The case was rescheduled for August 10, 1989. Subsequently, the matter was continued again at Petitioner's request. The case was finally scheduled for hearing for September 8, 1989. The Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment on August 14, 1989. On September 7, 1989, the Department filed a notice of dismissal which was construed as an assent, in whole or in part, to the relief requested by the Petitioner. Consequently, the hearing was cancelled and jurisdiction was relinquished to the Department for such further action as would be appropriate. It was presumed that the abuse record would be expunged which would result in the reinstatement of the license. The Petitioner in the instant case has not, however, established the final resolution of DOAH case no. 88-6257. Petitioner did not comply with Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code by attaching the documents on which the claim that the small business party prevailed was predicated nor was proof of such document offered at the hearing of this matter. Sophie DeRuiter is the administrator and owner of Ann & Jan Retirement Villa which is located at 3486 Rostan Lane, Lake Worth, Florida. According to the style of the initial pleading filed by Petitioner in the instant case, Ann & Jan Retirement Villa has been incorporated. The proof offered at hearing suggested that Sophie DeRuiter is the sole proprietor of a business known as "Ann & Jan Retirement Villa." In August, 1988, Ms. DeRuiter employed approximately four full-time employees. In the three years she has owned and operated the facility, Ms. DeRuiter has never employed more than twenty-five full-time employees. The net worth of Ann & Jan Retirement Villa is less than two million dollars. Ms. DeRuiter's personal net worth is less than two million dollars. The combined worth of Ann & Jan Retirement Villa and Ms. DeRuiter is less than two million dollars. Ms. DeRuiter employed the law firm of Weissman and Chernay, P.A. to represent her in connection with the allegations in DOAH case no. 88-6257. In connection with that case, Ms. DeRuiter incurred legal fees in the amount of $8587.50 together with costs in the amount of $897.59. The reasonableness of those amounts was not disputed.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to recover attorneys fees and costs.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, B.R., is the sole proprietor of an adult congregate living facility known as Rona's Retirement Home located in Perrine, Dade County, Florida. Petitioner has a net worth less than two million dollars and employs one part-time worker at the six bed facility. At the time of hearing, Petitioner had four clients residing at the home for whom she provides room and board, snacks, and cleaning. Petitioner receives compensation from each at the rate of $575.00 per month. Petitioner hired her attorney of record and agreed to pay her $200.00 per hour to represent her in connection with the underlying case (DOAH case no. 92-1889C) and the present cause. Petitioner's attorney has been practicing since 1977 and has expended 38.4 hours representing Petitioner in these matters. Petitioner incurred $1,203.46 for costs in connection with Case no. 92- 1889C. The formal hearing in DOAH case no. 92-1889C was conducted by Hearing Officer Michael Parrish on December 15, 1992. During that formal hearing the Department presented testimony from one witness, the investigator, and offered one exhibit, the FPSS report at issue. The Petitioner testified at the formal hearing on her own behalf and presented the testimony of one lay witness and one expert witness, a physician. Two exhibits regarding care given to the alleged victim (S.T.) were introduced on behalf of Petitioner. Pertinent findings reached in DOAH case no. 92-1889C are: During the period of S.T.'s residence at Rona's Retirement Home, the Respondent was a caregiver for S.T. within the meaning of the definition at Section 415.102(4), Florida Statutes (1991). At the time of S.T.'s arrival at Rona's Retirement Home, his legs were swollen. S.T. had been transferred from the hospital to Rona's Retirement Home without any medical documentation or release papers. Upon inquiry by B.R., it was determined that S.T. was a diabetic. Arrangements were made by Rona's Retire- ment Home for a medical service to provide a nurse to administer insulin to S.T. on a daily basis. S.T. refused to allow the nurse to administer insulin to him during his stay at Rona's Retirement Home. S.T. was an uncooperative resident during his entire stay at Rona's Retirement Home. The retirement home specially prepared food for S.T. consistent with dietary guide- lines for diabetics. He refused to eat the specially prepared food and requested to be fed the same food as other residents. During his entire stay at Rona's Retirement Home, S.T. constantly made requests to go to the hospital. There was no medical basis for S.T.'s requests to go to the hospital. On August 29, 1991, Dr. Mark Caruso made his regular monthly visit to Rona's Retirement Home to examine the residents. On that day, Dr. Mark Caruso observed S.T. and asked B.R. if he should examine S.T. B.R. told Dr. Caruso that S.T. was a guardianship placement and that there was not, as yet, any approval by his guardian for any regular medical care. Dr. Caruso did not observe any indication that S.T. was in medical distress. On August 30, 1991, another resident at Rona's Retirement Home slipped and fell at the facility and an ambulance was called to transport that resident to the hospital. Upon arrival of the ambulance, S.T. asked one of the ambulance attendants to take him to the hospital. B.R. refused to allow S.T. to be taken to the hospital. As a result of a report of abuse or neglect, on the morning of August 30, 1991, Lourdes Paneda, a Protective Investigator with the Department of Health and Rehabilita- tive Services, visited Rona's Retirement Home where she interviewed S.T. At that time S.T. complained to Investigator Paneda of having chest pains. Investigator Paneda also observed that S.T. had swollen legs and that he seemed to be breathing heavily. Investigator Paneda was of the view that S.T. was suffering from medical distress, including the possibility of congestive heart failure. Accordingly, she contacted Dr. Mark Caruso and, following Investigator Paneda's description of her observations and concerns, Dr. Caruso said that if Investigator Paneda thought that S.T. was really sick, she should have him taken to Baptist Hospital. Investigator Paneda immediately called for rescue service. Shortly thereafter, the rescue service came and, for reasons not revealed in the record in this case, took S.T. to Deering Hospital. S.T. was seen and treated by emergency room physicians as soon as he got to the hospital. A few hours after his admis- sion to the hospital, S.T. was examined by Dr. Caruso. Based on his examination of S.T. and on the results of tests performed on S.T. at the hospital, Dr. Caruso was of the opinion that S.T. was not suffering from any acute medical distress. Dr. Caruso was also of the opinion that S.T. was not at any time in danger of death and that the conduct of B.R. did not place S.T. in danger of death or cause any harm to S.T. During the time S.T. was a resident at Rona's Retirement Home, B.R. exercised reasonable judgment in her care of S.T. All of her actions regarding the care of S.T. were reasonable. B.R. did not medically neglect S.T., nor did she neglect him in any other way. B.R. did not at any time put S.T. in any life-threatening situation. The final order entered by the Department adopted each of the foregoing findings without exception and accepted the Hearing Officer's recommendation that the FPSS report be classified as unfounded with the Petitioner's name being expunged from the registry. Petitioner was a prevailing party as defined in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, in the underlying matter. The Respondent did not present any evidence in this cause to support allegations that an award of fees would be unjust or that the agency's actions were substantially justified. The Respondent presented no evidence. Moreover, the attorney representing the Department at the formal hearing in this case did not attend the hearing of nor investigate the Department's case in the underlying matter. No conflicting medical evidence was presented in the underlying case which required resolution. A reasonable attorney's fee for 38.4 hours in an administrative proceeding such as the instant case is $7,680.00.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to fees as a prevailing small business party pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency charged with the authority to oversee and govern the Medicaid Program in Florida. To that end the Agency has established a Medicaid Program Integrity Bureau that seeks to detect and prevent fraud and abuse by Medicaid providers. The Petitioner is a pharmacy provider within the purview of the Florida Medicaid Program. As such, it is accountable to the Agency for its accounting practices and records. At all times material to the underlying case in this matter (DOAH Case No. 00-4708) the Agency employed auditors who routinely review the records of Medicaid providers being reimbursed through the Medicaid Program. In DOAH Case No. 00-4708 such auditors determined that the records maintained by the Petitioner did not accurately reflect information needed to verify and support the billings for which the Medicaid Program had reimbursed the Petitioner. In one instance, the Petitioner did not produce authorizations for a substitution of a prescribed drug. In a separate claim, the Agency maintained that the records indicated an invoice shortage for a prescribed medication. In other words, the provider had allegedly billed for a certain amount of drugs but the acquisition records and invoice records did not establish that quantities in a corresponding amount had been purchased for dispensing. The Agency hired Heritage Information Systems to perform an independent audit of the Petitioner. That audit supported findings unfavorable to the Petitioner in that it identified a substitution problem. The substitution of a more expensive drug for a less expensive prescribed drug is not permissible under the Medicaid Program guidelines without authority from the prescribing physician. As it relates to this case, the prescribing physician was Dr. Sachs. Coincidentally, Dr. Sachs owns the Petitioner. At all times material to the auditing period, the Agency interviewed Dr. Sachs, reviewed all records provided to it at the Petitioner's office, and believed that Dr. Sachs had not authorized the substitution of the more expensive drug for the drug prescribed. Thus, when the records indicated the Petitioner had substituted and billed Medicaid for the more expensive drug, a substitution issue was documented. This claim formed the basis for DOAH Case No. 00-4708. Dr. Sachs appeared before the auditors on more than one occasion and did not indicate that he had authorized any substitution for the prescribed item. At all meetings with Dr. Sachs the Agency believed that the doctor had written prescriptions for IVIg. In fact, Dr. Sachs wrote prescriptions for IVIg, Dr. Sachs did not write prescriptions for CytoGam. As to all prescriptions written for IVIg, the Medicaid Program was billed for a drug known as CytoGam. The substitution of CytoGam for IVIg formed the crux of the auditing dispute. Based upon the substitution issue, the Agency elected to attempt recovery against the Petitioner for the unauthorized substitution of the more expensive drug. Not once during the auditing process did the Petitioner or Dr. Sachs allege that the substitution had been authorized. No records were produced during the audit to support the substitution. Nevertheless, in anticipation of trial and within a short time before hearing on the underlying case, the Petitioner produced documents that supported the Petitioner's claim that Dr. Sachs had authorized the substitution. This assertion was directly opposite of the position formerly held by the doctor. Moreover, given the short time remaining until hearing, the Agency had no opportunity to verify the authenticity of the exculpatory documents. Rather than proceed to hearing on the unauthorized substitution claim, the Agency filed a Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction based upon its decision to rescind the action against the Petitioner. Such motion was treated as a voluntary dismissal. Subsequently, the hearing was canceled and the Division of Administrative Hearings relinquished jurisdiction to the Agency. A final order was entered by the Agency on July 19, 2001. The Agency has not contested the timeliness of the Petitioner's claim for fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The Agency does not dispute that the Petitioner is a small business as defined by Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The Agency maintains its actions were substantially justified in the underlying case and that the Petitioner is not a prevailing party as a matter of law. The Petitioner argues that had the Agency done its job of auditing more thoroughly the actions against the Petitioner would have been avoided. As such, the Petitioner maintains it is entitled to recover fees and costs in the amount of $15,000. The Agency does not dispute that the Petitioner incurred fees and costs in excess of the statutory cap in defense of the underlying case. One of the complicating factors in the case was the issue of whether CytoGam was a permissible substitution to fill a prescription written for IVIg. The issue of permissible substitution then was clouded by the fact that until preparations for hearing were being finalized the Agency did not know that Dr. Sachs had authorized the substitution. Presumably, had there been no authorizations, the question of permissible substitution of the drugs would have been the focus for trial. Once the exculpatory documents were produced by the Petitioner, the Agency's theory of the case was left questionable. Permissible or not, the doctor had authorized the substitution. Because the Petitioner had dispensed the drug billed to the Medicaid Program, the billing of the substituted more expensive drug would have been authorized. Additionally, had Dr. Sachs written prescriptions for CytoGam, the auditing process would have supported the records initially produced by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Bobbie G. Scheffer was one of two respondents in Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate v. Scheffer and Ecoff, No. 89-4699, administrative proceedings respondent Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) initiated by filing an administrative complaint alleging, as summarized in the recommended order: that respondent Scheffer "[a]t all times material . . . licensed and operating as qualifying broker for Rivard Realty, Inc." and respondent Ecoff "a licensed real estate salesman . . . provided a copy of MLS computer print out sheet pertaining to certain residential property . . . to Daniel H. and Dorothy M. Stacy . . . [to verify] that the house was eight years old and on a commercial sewer system", that respondent "Ecoff was the owner of the property and the listing salesman"; that the Stacys "entered into a contract to purchase the property . . . relying upon the representations made by the [r]espondents"; that "Scheffer was the broker who handled the sale while Ralph S. Ecoff was licensed as a salesman in her employ"; that respondents "failed to disclose or point out to the buyers the true age of the house being 14 years or that the house was actually on a septic system"; that "the buyers closed on the house believing the age of the house to be eight years old and having a commercial sewer system"; that respondent "Ecoff admitted knowing that the house was on a septic tank"; and that respondents are therefore both guilty of "misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes" and of "having placed or caused to be placed an advertisement which is false, deceptive or misleading in violation of Rule 21V-10.025," Florida Administrative Code. But the recommended order concluded that "the evidence did not clearly and convincingly show that respondent Scheffer actually knew or had reason to know the listing was inaccurate." At page 7. The final order adopted this conclusion. By stipulation, petitioner qualifies as a prevailing small business party who meets all rule and statutory requirements under the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act and Rule 22I-6.035, Florida Administrative Code. In successfully defending against the administrative complaint, Ms. Scheffer incurred reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $1,980 and costs in the amount of $219.75, for a total of $2,199.75. She incurred additional reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $330 in the present proceeding. 1/ The facts proven at hearing are set out in detail in the attached recommended order entered in Case No. 89-4699 and are adopted by reference in their entirety here. No evidence adduced in the present proceeding proved respondent had materially different or additional information when it decided to file the administrative complaint. 2/
Findings Of Fact Vause is in partnership with his brother and has a principal office at 100 Hamilton Avenue, Panama City, Florida. Vause's business has two full-time employees and has a net worth of less than $100,000.00. In DOAH Case No. 88-5988, Vause applied for a special activity license to use mechanical harvesting devices on his oyster leases. DNR denied the application by "Final Order" dated October 17, 1988, and this "Final Order" provided the clear point of entry. Vause availed himself of this point of entry and requested a formal hearing. After a formal hearing, a Recommended Order was entered on March 13, 1989, wherein it was concluded that the application was valid and adequate and that Vause had met all conditions precedent to be entitled to the permit sought. DNR had denied the permit based on legally insufficient and incorrect grounds and authority. Vause has incurred attorney's fees at the rate of $125.00 per hour. A total of 19.20 hours were expended by Vause's attorney in the underlying proceeding and in this proceeding. The number of hours is reasonable and they were necessary. The hourly rate is reasonable. Hence, Vause has incurred $2400.00 in fees.
Findings Of Fact Bernard M. Tully, M.D. served by mail his Motion to Tax Attorney's Fees and Costs pursuant to Chapter 57, Florida Statutes, on May 19, 1987; same was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on May 21, 1987 and was assigned DOAH Case No. 87-2265F. This instant cause is a fee and costs case pursuant to Chapter 57, Florida Statutes, arising out of Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners v. Bernard M. Tully, M.D.; DOAH Case No. 85-3175. The Department of Professional Regulation has moved to dismiss Tully's Motion to Tax Attorney's and Costs, (hereafter, "Fees and Costs Petition") upon allegations that the claim was not filed in a timely manner pursuant to Section 57.111(4)(b)2, Florida Statutes, and upon allegations that the Fees and Costs Petition did not comply with the requirements of Section 57.111(4)(b), Florida Statutes, in that the claimant had not submitted an itemized affidavit of the nature and extent of the services rendered as well as the costs incurred. A Voluntary Dismissal was served by mail by Petitioner Department of Professional Regulation in DOAH Case No. 85-3175 on March 6, 1987, and filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on March 10, 1987. The Order closing the Division file in that case was entered March 18, 1987, but is largely superfluous since a Voluntary Dismissal by the party bearing the burden of proof dismisses a cause by operation of law as of the date of filing of the Voluntary Dismissal. Tully's Fees and Costs Petition was served (May 19, 1987) and filed (May 21, 1987) well beyond the 60 day timeframe (May 11, 1987) provided in Section 57.111(4)(b)2, Florida Statutes, for the filing of such claims. Tully's Fees and Costs Petition attached schedules itemizing costs incurred and pleadings filed in DOAH Case No. 85-3175. The Petition was not verified and no affidavits are attached. In these respects, the Fees and Costs Petition failed to comply with Section 57.111(4)(b)1, Florida Statutes, and Rule 22I-6.35, Florida Administrative Code. Neither does the Fees and Costs Petition or any accompanying affidavit allege whether or not Tully requests an evidentiary hearing; that he is a small business party; where his domicile and principal office are located; how many employees he has; whether or not he is a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, and, if so, whether or not his net worth exceeds $2,000,000; whether or not he operates as a partnership or corporation i.e. professional practice, and, if so, whether or not the net worth exceeds $2,000,000; whether the agency's actions were substantially unjustified; and whether or not circumstances exist that would make the award unjust; or whether or not the agency was a nominal party only. There were also no documents upon which the claim was predicated attached to the Fees and Costs Petition. in these respects, the Petition failed to comply with virtually all of Section 57.111(4)(b), Florida Statutes, and Rule 22I-6.035(1)(2), and (3), Florida Administrative Code. Tully timely filed a Response to Order to Show Cause wherein he acknowledged as true and accurate the dates as found in Finding of Fact 4, supra. Moreover, his Response concedes that pursuant to Section 57.111(4)(b)2, Florida Statutes, the application for an award of attorney's fees must be made within 60 days after the date that a small business party becomes a prevailing small business party, but his Response asserts that nothing in the applicable statute provides that an application for costs must be made within 60 days, and therefore at least his application for costs must be deemed timely. The Response further sets out an itemization of costs incurred and is sworn to by Tully's attorney of record. No leave to amend the Petition was granted by the Order to Show Cause.
The Issue The issues remaining to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the above-named Petitioner is a "small business party" as described in Section 57.111(3)(d)1.a. b. and c., Florida Statutes (2007); whether the action of the above-named Agency in the underlying case was substantially justified in law and fact and whether an award of attorney's fees and costs would be unjust.
Findings Of Fact In the instant case the Respondent Agency (Department) does not dispute the amount of attorney's fees and costs sought in this proceeding and does not contest that the Petitioner is a prevailing party. Moreover, the Department admits that it was a real party in interest in the underlying proceeding involving the Administrative Complaint and was not merely a nominal party. The parties also waived an evidentiary hearing in this attorney fee proceeding. The parties, rather, submitted memoranda and affidavits in support of their respective positions. The present Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs is based upon the above-referenced Administrative Complaint action brought against Wittmer and JR. Wittmer's Remodeling, Inc., by the Department, which came before the Division of Administrative Hearings by a request for formal hearing filed by Wittmer. Prior to filing that Administrative Complaint the Department performed an investigation related to the Complaint which had been filed by Kenneth Hatin of Palm Coast, Florida, against Wittmer. The Complaint by Hatin alleged that on August 10, 2005, he and Wittmer had entered into a contract for the building of an addition to the complainant's home in Palm Coast, Florida. Hatin had alleged and testified at hearing that Wittmer was unlicensed to perform the work under the contract and had been paid in excess of $30,000.00 for the project. Hatin maintained that Wittmer had abandoned the job before completion and that he had to hire another person or entity to complete the work, at further expense. The Department considered the results of its investigation, in the form of an investigative report, and considered the investigative file it had developed concerning Hatin's complaint. This included the original contract on JR. Wittmer's Remodeling, Inc.'s, stationary, signed by Wittmer, as well as copies of original checks amounting to approximately $30,000.00 written to Wittmer and/or his company or business. It also considered a copy of the local licensing records concerning Wittmer, revealing an expired occupational license, as well as records of the Department showing that Wittmer was unlicensed as any sort of contractor in the State of Florida. The Department also considered various invoices and receipts regarding the work contracted by complainant Hatin with another person or entity, to finish the job purportedly abandoned by Wittmer. During the investigation, the complainant and the complainant's fiancée were interviewed and made no mention of any familial relationship or friendship relationship between Wittmer and the complainant and his family members at the time of the investigation. Wittmer himself was interviewed by the investigator and did not mention any familial or personal relationship he had with the complainant or the complainant's family. The familial or friendship relationship between Wittmer and the complainant and the complainant's family only arose through the evidence adduced at the hearing. That evidence became a significant portion of the reason for the Findings of Fact and Conclusions which resulted in the Complaint against Wittmer being ultimately dismissed. JR. Wittmer's Remodeling, Inc., was dissolved by the State of Florida, Department of State, Division of Corporations on September 16, 2005, for failure to file required annual reports or Uniform Business Report. This fact was confirmed by Wittmer's affidavit submitted on January 18, 2008, in this proceeding, attesting that his corporation was dissolved and that it ceased business due to "financial hardship of the business." As a result of the hearing it was determined in the Recommended Order (with Findings of Fact adopted in the Final Order) that Wittmer performed work on the subject construction project without making any profit. It was performed, in essence, as a cooperative project between family and friends of Wittmer, in the sense that Wittmer's fiancée was related to the complaining witness's family and/or they were close friends. The circumstances established by preponderant evidence did not show that Wittmer was actually performing contracting, as defined in the above-referenced statutory authority underlying the charges in the Administrative Complaint. It was also determined, based upon the preponderant evidence at that hearing, that Wittmer made no profit on the project after paying all the subcontractors. The Department, in essence, adopted the Recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge (with non-dispositive modifications of several Conclusions of Law) and entered a Final Order dismissing the charges in the Administrative Complaint. The subject Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs was thereafter filed and this case ensued. The Department proceeded against Wittmer by naming as Respondents, in the underlying, case JR Wittmer's Remodeling, Inc., which corporation had actually already been dissolved at the time of the filing of the Administrative Complaint. It also named in that Complaint, and proceeded against, Willis Wittmer, Jr., personally. The Petitioners herein have established that Wittmer never had more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth in excess of two million dollars, whether functioning as JR Wittmer, Jr., an individual or as JR Wittmer's Remodeling, Inc. The Petitioner has also established that the construction contract at issue in the underlying case was entered into by the Petitioner herein under the name "JR Wittmer's Remodeling" and not "JR Wittmer's Remodeling, Inc." Moreover, that contact was not signed by Mr. Wittmer as president of JR Wittmer Remodeling, Inc. Aside from the fact that the Department filed the original Administrative Complaint against JR Wittmer Remodeling, Inc., it also named JR Wittmer individually as a Respondent in that Administrative Complaint, so he had defend against the action personally, regardless of the question of whether the corporation was in legal existence at the time of the filing of the Administrative Complaint. The evidence, as referenced above, shows that he met the requirements of having less than 25 full- time employees and a net worth of less than two million dollars. Thus, the totality of the evidence shows that Mr. Wittmer has standing, as the sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, to pursue the subject attorney's fee claim as a sole proprietor, even if not as a corporation or the president of the originally named, but now dissolved corporation. The Petitioner contends that the Department should have recognized the lack of a factual basis for the Administrative Complaint and, before finding probable cause, should have been able to determine that the construction arrangement between Wittmer and Hatin did not meet the legal definition of contracting or contracting services based upon the familial/friendship relationship of the protagonists. The Department, however, conducted a reasonable investigation and has been shown to have had a reasonable basis to determine, before hearing, that contracting and contracting services had been, in a legal sense, performed by Wittmer, based upon the results of its investigation (interviews, etc.). This is especially the case since Wittmer himself, when interviewed, had not revealed such exculpatory facts to the Department.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Effective July 1, 1997, the Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine through the Board of Medicine ("Board"). Section 20.43, Florida Statutes; Chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 20.43(3), Florida Statutes, the Department has contracted with the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") to provide consumer complaint, investigative, and prosecutorial services required by the Board of Medicine. Dr. Carida is, and was at all times material to this action, licensed to practice medicine in Florida, having been issued license number ME 0019622. Since January 1, 1996, Dr. Carida has practiced medicine as an employee of D.R.C. & Associates, Inc. ("D.R.C."), and he is paid an hourly wage by the company. D.R.C. is a medical management company owned by Diane Carida, Dr. Carida's daughter, who is the company's president. D.R.C. is not a professional association, and Dr. Carida has no ownership interest in the corporation. In November 1998, Dr. Carida was the only doctor employed by D.R.C.; the company's only other employees were an echo technician, a billing clerk, and a phlebotomist who also acted as Dr. Carida's medical assistant. In November 1998, the company's net worth was approximately $10,000.00. On October 30, 1998, the Board's Probable Cause Panel considered the results of an investigation into a complaint filed against Dr. Carida by the family of patient J.M. In accordance with its contract with the Department, the investigation was conducted by AHCA, and an attorney employed by AHCA presented the case against Dr. Carida to the Probable Cause Panel. The investigative file included the medical records of patient J.M. and the report of Leonard S. Williams, M.D., a physician employed by AHCA to render an expert opinion regarding Dr. Carida's care and treatment of the patient. AHCA's attorney also presented to the Probable Cause Panel a draft administrative complaint outlining the proposed charges against Dr. Carida, and AHCA's attorney recommended to the panel that the penalty of license revocation or suspension be sought as the maximum penalty against Dr. Carida. In his report, Dr. Williams presented a summary of the medical records he had reviewed and his conclusions regarding Dr. Carida's care and treatment of patient J.M. Dr. Williams stated in the report that it was his opinion that Dr. Carida had failed to meet the applicable standard of care in his care and treatment of patient J.M. and that the medical records maintained by Dr. Carida failed to document accurately and completely his care and treatment of the patient. Two members of the Probable Cause Panel, a physician and a lay member of the Board, were present and voting at the October 30, 1998, meeting. The Probable Cause Panel was represented by an attorney employed by the Florida Attorney General. Both members of the Probable Cause Panel present at the October 98, 2000, meeting acknowledged receiving the investigative file on Dr. Carida prior to the meeting, and both determined that probable cause existed to support AHCA's charges against Dr. Carida. On November 2, 1998, as a result of the decision of the Probable Cause Panel, AHCA served on Dr. Carida a two-count Administrative Complaint charging that, with respect to patient J.M., he had practiced medicine below an acceptable standard of care and that he had failed to maintain adequate written medical records relating to his care and treatment of the patient. Dr. Carida disputed the facts asserted in the Administrative Complaint, and AHCA sent the file to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an administrative law judge. A formal hearing was held, and a Recommended Order was entered, in which it was concluded, first, that AHCA had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Dr. Carida practiced medicine below an acceptable standard of care with respect to the care and treatment of patient J.M. and, second, that AHCA had met its burden of proving that Dr. Carida failed to maintain adequate medical records regarding the care and treatment he provided to patient J.M. The Recommended Order was forwarded to the Board for final agency action, and, in its Final Order, the Board dismissed the charge that Dr. Carida practiced medicine below an acceptable standard of care and concluded that Dr. Carida was guilty of the charge that he had failed to maintain adequate written medical records related to patient J.M. On the basis of this violation, the Board imposed an administrative fine on Dr. Carida in the amount of $250.00 and required that he attend an approved course on proper maintenance of medical records. The evidence presented by Dr. Carida is sufficient to establish that he was the prevailing party in the proceeding styled Department of Health, Board of Medicine v. Robert V. Carida, M.D., DOAH Case No. 99-2997, DOH Case No. 95-03135. The more serious charge brought against Dr. Carida in the Administrative Complaint was that he had practiced medicine below an acceptable standard of care, and AHCA contended before the Probable Cause Panel that the appropriate penalty to be imposed against Dr. Carida for this violation was the revocation or suspension of his license. This charge against Dr. Carida was, however, dismissed by the Board in its Final Order, and Dr. Carida was found guilty only of having failed to keep adequate medical records. The penalty imposed on Dr. Carida in the Board's Final Order for this violation clearly indicates that the Board considered the medical records charge to be a minor one. The evidence presented by Dr. Carida is not, however, sufficient to establish that he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs as a small business party. Rather, at the time the action against Dr. Carida was initiated, he was an employee of a medical management corporation, which was not a party to the disciplinary proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Raul Romaguera, is a small business party within the meaning of Subsection 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1985). When the underlying action herein occurred, he was licensed as a medical doctor by respondent, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners (Board). On October 27, 1986, respondent filed an administrative complaint against Dr. Romaguera alleging that he had violated Subsection 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (1985), by committing gross malpractice or failing to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The alleged violation related to Dr. Romaguera's inspection and diagnosis of a patient's tissue in December, 1980 while supervising a pathology department at a Lake Worth hospital. After an evidentiary hearing was conducted on March 24 and 25, 1987, a Recommended Order was entered by the undersigned on May 12, 1987, finding that the charge was unsubstantiated and recommending that the complaint be dismissed. The Recommended Order was adopted by the Board in its entirety by Final Order dated June 19, 1987. A timely petition for attorney's fees and costs was thereafter filed by petitioner on August 18, 1987. The parties have stipulated that, as a result of the Board's Final Order, Dr. Romaguera is a prevailing small business party within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1985). They have also stipulated that, in order to defend against the agency's action, Dr. Romaguera incurred at least $15,000 in attorney's fees and costs. There is no evidence as to what information, oral or written, the probable cause panel had before it when voting to initiate this action. The agency does stipulate that, at some point in the probable cause phase of the proceeding, the panel requested more information on the matter before taking a vote. This is corroborated by an agency memorandum dated April 8, 1986 and introduced into evidence as petitioner's exhibit 1. At the final hearing on the merits of the administrative complaint, the agency presented a number of expert witnesses who concurred in the Board's assessment that Dr. Romaguera had failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment required of a reasonably prudent similar practicing physician in the Lake Worth area. Doctor Romaguera also presented the testimony of an expert who disagreed with this assessment. Hence, the validity of the charges turned on the credibility and weight to be given the various experts by the undersigned.
