Findings Of Fact The Palm Beach County School Board (Respondent) issued an invitation to bid (ITB) on February 16, 1993, requesting bids for the removal, preparation, and installation of carpet-glue down on project SB93C-216T. The ITB provided that all bids were to be submitted by March 31, 1993, at 2:00 p.m., at which time all bids were to be publicly opened. Pertinent sections of the ITB to the case at hand include a section entitled "Invitation To Bid" which provides in pertinent part: AWARDS: In the best interest of the School Board, the Board reserves the right to reject any and all bids and to waive any irregularity in bids received; to accept any item or group of items unless qualified by bidder; to acquire additional quantities at prices quoted on this invitation unless additional quantities are not acceptable, in which case the bid sheets must be noted "BID IS FOR SPECIFIED QUANTITY ONLY." All awards made as a result of this bid shall conform to applicable Florida Statutes. Another section entitled "General Conditions, Instructions and Information for Bidders" provides in pertinent part: 26. Any and all Special Conditions that may vary from these General Conditions shall have precedence. The section entitled "Special Conditions" provides in pertinent part: C. AWARD: Bid will be awarded to the lowest and best bidder meeting specifications, terms and conditions . . . The School Board shall elect to award to a primary and a secondary vendor . . . . * * * N. CONTRACTOR QUALIFICATIONS: The contractor must have at least three years of verifiable experience in the floor covering contracting business. The contractor must have in force the required occupational licenses from Palm Beach County and it's municipalities. All documentation of the above requirements must be submitted with the proposed bid by each bidding contractor. The contractor shall not sub-contract any portion of their work, outlined in this contract, to any person(s) or company, without advance written permission from the Carpentry Supervisor of the Department of Maintenance & Plant Operations. Another section of the ITB entitled "Additional Information" provides in pertinent part: Additional information will not be a determining part of the award of this bid except in the instance where the per square yard prices are too close to determine a clear awardee. In that instance we will look at the optional items in this section as the determining factor. (This usage is also based upon all other factors being equal.) . . . Cost of heavy patching. $ per sq. ft. . . . Cost of heavy patching. $ per sq. ft. . . . By March 31, 1993, eight bids were received. However, only seven bids were considered. Respondent's Department of Contracting & Procurement reviewed the bids. On April 12, 1993, the Department of Contracting & Procurement (Department) posted the bid tabulations, which showed, inter alia, that the apparent lowest bidder was Carpetech at $28,029.61, that the apparent second lowest bidder was Buy the Square Yard (Petitioner) at $32,107.32, and that the apparent highest bidder was Acousti Engineering of Florida (Intervenor). Additionally, the recommendation was that the bid be awarded to the "lowest and best bidder meeting specifications, terms, and conditions" with Carpetech being the "Primary" bidder and Petitioner being the "Secondary" bidder. Moreover, the bid tabulation sheet noted that the "price" of each bid was determined by using a "hypothetical" that was typical of a School Board project. This was the first time that the bidders were aware of a hypothetical being used. Respondent had not used a hypothetical in past bids for this type of work, and it was not included in the bid specifications At first, after the bids were opened, Respondent's Department used the base bid, which excluded any alternate work, to determine the apparent lowest bidder. The calculation showed Intervenor as the apparent lowest bidder at $11.03 sq. yd. and Petitioner as the apparent second lowest bidder at $11.08 sq. yd. Carpetech's base bid was $11.295 sq. yd. A discussion ensued as to whether the bids were "too close"; but, there was no consensus as to the meaning of "too close." However, the Department determined that, taking into consideration the alternate work which would have to be done, Intervenor was not the best bidder. The Department first considered recommending the rejection of all bids and readvertising, but decided upon using a hypothetical which included the base bid and the alternates in the calculations. As a result of using the hypothetical, Carpetech, not Intervenor, was the apparent lowest bidder. However, Carpetech, unlike any other bidder, changed one of the specifications in its bid from the "cost of heavy patching" to the "cost of light patching." Respondent admits that a clerical error had occurred and that particular specification should have been "light" patching, instead of "heavy" patching. Also, Carpetech failed to submit an occupational license with its bid. However, subsequent to the bid opening, Carpetech submitted an occupational license. Like Carpetech, Intervenor also failed to submit an occupational license with its bid. 2/ To the contrary, Petitioner submitted an occupational license with its bid. The occupational license forbade Petitioner to have employees at its location but allowed it to hire outside employees, which meant that it could hire contract labor to perform under the contract of the bid. 3/ Out of the three bidders--Carpetech, Petitioner and Intervenor--only Petitioner is a minority owned business. Initially, when Petitioner began its business in December 1991, it was owned by a minority female and a minority male. Subsequently, for financial purposes, the minority female became the sole shareholder/owner and the minority male became the business consultant (consultant), receiving consulting fees. On or about March 24, 1992, Petitioner was certified as a Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) by Palm Beach County, and on or about March 19, 1992, it was certified as a MBE by Respondent, with the certification effective from May 1992 to May 1993. Petitioner became incorporated in or around April 1992 and again in July 1992 when the minority female became the sole owner. Prior to Petitioner's formation, its consultant had his own flooring business (carpet and tile sales and insulation) for several years. The prior business had financial difficulties which resulted in court judgements against it. Petitioner's sole owner was never involved in the consultant's prior business. She provides Petitioner's financial security, and there have been no court judgments against Petitioner. Respondent's Department was familiar with flooring work of Petitioner's consultant before he became associated with Petitioner. He had performed flooring work for Respondent in the past, which was very satisfied with his work. The Department was not aware of the court judgements against the prior business of Petitioner's consultant. However, even if it was, the judgments would not have had a negative effect on Petitioner in the award process of the current contract. On or about April 14, 1993, Intervenor filed its written protest, which was timely. On or about April 22, 1993, Petitioner filed its written protest, which was timely. On April 28, 1993, Respondent held an informal meeting on the written protests. On May 3, 1993, Respondent's counsel issued its recommendation on the protests, which was to "reject all bids and rebid with new terms and conditions and specifications" in order for all bidders to be given "a fair playing field."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Palm Beach County School Board enter its final order rejecting all bids on project SB93C-216T and readvertise. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of December 1993. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December 1993.
The Issue The issue presented is whether the Department should award the contract for State Project numbered DOH 95209100 to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact State Project numbered DOH 95209100 commenced with an invitation to bid on a construction project which involved the restoration and adaptive use of the Gato Cigar Factory in Key West, Florida. The construction would rehabilitate that existing historic structure and construct internal office and clinic spaces for both Monroe County and the Department of Health. Since both agencies would use the building, the project was divided between them. Monroe County and the Department issued separate invitations to bid for their portions of the structure, and each will enter into its own contract with the winning bidder or bidders. It was not required that a bidder submit a bid for both the Monroe County and the Department portions of the work. Any bidder could bid on one or the other or both. Although the invitations to bid and the contracts to result therefrom were not interrelated, some of the construction work was interrelated as some of the systems being installed under one contract would directly affect the other contract. For example, both the air conditioning system and the roofing system, although being performed under one entity's contract, would be applicable to both projects. The Department's invitation to bid required bidders to submit a base price, plus specific prices on particular items. Alternate numbered 1 added to the base price the cost of a second air conditioning chiller. The base price plus alternate numbered 1, taken together, included all work to be performed under the Department's scope of work. Alternates numbered 2 through 5 were deductions from the work included in the base price. Alternates numbered 2 through 5 were included in the Department's invitation to bid to cover the possibility that all bids might come in over budget. In that event the Department could select Alternates numbered 2 through 5, sequentially, until sufficient items had been deducted from the Department's scope of work to result in bids under the amount budgeted by the Department for the project. Section 01030 of the bid specifications is entitled "Alternates." Section 1.2E of Part 1 provides, in part, as follows: Include as part of each Alternate, miscellaneous devices, accessory objects and similar items incidental to or required for a complete installation whether or not mentioned as part of the Alternate. Each Alternate Bid must interface with the work being constructed under a separate contract with Monroe County. Each Alternate Bid item is also applicable to the Monroe County work. An alternate which is deducted from one project will be added to the other. If bidding both projects, the Deductive Alternate price for one project must match the Add Alternate price for the other project. The prospective bidders were also given this information in the pre-bid meetings. The Department received a number of bids for less than the amount budgeted for its portion of the work. Accordingly, the Department was able to select Alternate numbered l, which taken together with the base bid, covered the entire scope of work allocated to the Department. The lowest bids through Petitioner's bid were as follows: Bidder Total Bid D. L. Porter Construction, Inc. $1,418,744. McTeague Construction Co., Inc. $1,454,500. Lodge Construction, Inc. $1,501,500. Rovel Construction, Inc. $1,559,000. Neither McTeague Construction Co., Inc., nor Lodge Construction, Inc., participated in this proceeding to challenge the Department's intended bid award. For the lowest bidder, Intervenor Porter, discrepancies occurred in its first, third, and fifth alternative prices of $3,500, $375, and $l,497, respectively. For the second lowest bidder, McTeague, a discrepancy of $9,000 occurred in its first alternate price. For the third lowest bidder, Lodge, a discrepancy of $3,165 occurred in its fifth alternate price. For the fourth lowest bidder, Petitioner Rovel, there were no discrepancies in any of its alternate prices. Porter's bid on Alternate numbered 1 for the Department was $38,500. Porter's bid on Alternate numbered 1 for Monroe County was $35,000. Porter's estimating staff overlooked the instruction that the two numbers should match. The reason for the difference between the two Alternate numbered 1 amounts is that the bidders were instructed to prepare the two bids as two separate contracts. Alternate numbered 1 required moving one of two chillers from the Monroe County project to the Department's project. Porter could not assume that it could use the crane from the contractor on Monroe County's portion of the project to install this chiller in the Department's portion of the project. Therefore, the cost of a crane had to be added to the Department's project, but the cost of the crane could not be deducted on the Monroe County bid. Porter was the fourth highest bidder on the Monroe County project. Monroe County has not yet awarded its contract. If the Monroe County project is awarded based upon the bids submitted, Porter will not be awarded the Monroe County project. The Department's bid tabulation and notice of intended award were prepared without any reference to the bid opening for the Monroe County project and before the contents of the Monroe County bids were known by the Department. The deviation in price between Porter's Alternate numbered 1 bids did not give Porter an advantage over the other bidders, several of whom made the same error. It was a minor deviation, not a material one. The price submitted on the Department's bid reflected the actual cost of performing that portion of the work. Petitioner's bid listed Florida Keys Electric, Inc., as its electrical subcontractor, its fire alarm subcontractor, and its lightening protection subcontractor. That company is not certified by the State of Florida, but it is registered. The bid specifications provide in section B-14, in part, as follows: Any bidder who lists a subcontractor not certified and/or registered by the State to perform the work of his trade if, such certification or registration is required for the trade by Florida Laws, will be rejected as non-responsive. No change shall be made in the list of subcontractors, before or after the award of a contract, unless agreed to in writing by the Owner. Section 16010, Part 1, section 1.9, subsection A., of the technical specifications which form a part of the bid specifications involves supervision of the construction and provides, in part, that "At least one member of the Electrical Contracting Firm shall hold a State Master Certificate of Competency." Florida Keys Electric, Inc., would use Delor J. Ellis as its qualifying agent. Although Ellis is certified by the State, at the time of the bid submittal and through the date of the final hearing in this cause, Ellis' license was in an inactive status, and no application to activate his license was pending with the State of Florida. Fire alarm work and lightening protection work require a specialty license in the State of Florida. Florida Keys Electric, Inc., is not licensed to perform either type of work. When Florida Keys Electric, Inc., contracts to perform such work, it does so through its own subcontractor. Although the requirement for certification and/or registration contained in the bid specifications is not consistent with the requirement for State certification contained in the technical specifications portion of the bid specifications, Petitioner did not comply with either provision. Accordingly, Petitioner's bid is not responsive to the bid specifications. Porter, which submitted the lowest bid, is responsive to the bid specifications and is, therefore, the lowest responsive bidder.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Petitioner's bid to be non-responsive, dismissing Petitioner's bid protest, and awarding to D. L. Porter Construction, Inc., the contract for the restoration of the Gato Cigar Factory. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast BIN A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Pete Peterson, General Counsel Department of Health 2020 Capital Circle, Southeast BIN A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Robert A. Hingston, Esquire Welbaum, Guernsey, Hingston, Greenleaf & Gregory, L.L.P. 901 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Penthouse Suite Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Michael E. Cover, Esquire Morton R. Laitner, Esquire Department of Health Miami-Dade County Health Department 1350 Northwest 14th Street Miami, Florida 33125 William G. Christopher, Esquire Brown Clark, A Professional Association 1819 Main Street, Suite 1100 Sarasota, Florida 34236
The Issue Whether Respondent has acted acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, capriciously, illegally, or dishonestly with regard to the intended award of ITB 93/94-040- LOT/P.
Findings Of Fact By correspondence filed July 18, 1994, this bid protest was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings from the Department of Lottery for the conduct of formal proceedings pursuant to Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. The formal bid protest document consists solely of a single page letter signed by Petitioner's president, C. Whitside-Curry, basically stating that the letter is to serve as Petitioner's formal written protest to Respondent's "Notice of Award - Notice of Non-Responsiveness - ITB 93/94-040-LOT/P - Invitation To Bid for Painting the Interior of the Lottery Central Building. Final hearing in the matter was scheduled for August 2, 1994, in compliance with requirements of Section 120.53(5)(e), Florida Statutes, that bid protests be set for hearing within 15 days absent stipulation of the parties waiving that statutory time frame. By motion filed July 29, 1994, counsel for Petitioner sought a continuance of the final hearing for a period of one week. Counsel had just been retained by Petitioner. As reflected in Petitioner's motion, counsel's request for a one week delay was acceptable to counsel for Respondent, provided that: the 30 day time frame governing issuance of recommended orders in bid challenge cases was not waived. that deposition of a principal of Petitioner, C. Whitside-Curry, be held on August 3, 1994 at 11:30 a.m. and that certain documents also be produced. A telephone hearing on Petitioner's continuance motion was held on August 1, 1994, to clarify the hearing officer's understanding that a one week continuance of the final hearing would not subtract a period of one week from the 30 day time frame following the final hearing within which to prepare a recommended order in the case. Thereafter the motion was granted and final hearing rescheduled, as agreed in the telephone conference, for August 9, 1994, one week after the initial hearing date. By notice filed on August 3, 1994 (transmitted to Petitioner's counsel by facsimile transmission on July 29, 1994), Respondent documented the agreed upon deposition of C. Whitside-Curry and documents to be produced. By motion filed on August 3, 1994, subsequent to Respondent's notice, Petitioner's counsel sought a further continuance of the final hearing and noticed the unavailability of Petitioner's principal, C. Whitside-Curry, for the scheduled deposition on August 3 or the final hearing scheduled for August 9, 1994. By motion filed on August 3, 1994, subsequent to Petitioner's second motion for continuance, Respondent moved for imposition of sanctions, including the dismissal of the bid protest on the basis that Petitioner had not complied with conditions agreed to by the parties as a part of the one week continuance, i.e., C. Whitside-Curry did not appear for deposition and documents were not produced. The motion further related that Respondent's notice of the deposition and request to produce documents (filed on August 3, 1994) had been transmitted, as noted above, to Petitioner's counsel by facsimile transmission on July 29, 1994. In the course of telephone conference with the parties on August 8, 1994, Petitioner's counsel agreed to payment of costs related to court reporter expense incurred by Respondent at the deposition where Petitioner's principal failed to appear. Respondent's counsel refused to consent to further continuance of the final hearing and Petitioner's request for a second continuance was denied. At final hearing, consideration was given to an Petitioner's Amended Second Motion For Continuance. The motion differed from previous motions to the extent that an attached copy of a letter dated April 21, 1994, appeared to indicate that a mediation meeting in another legal proceeding required the Petitioners' presence in Tampa, Florida, on the afternoon of August 9, 1994. No direct admissible evidence of Petitioner's inability to attend the hearing was presented. Upon denial of the amended motion for continuance, counsel for Petitioner announced that he could not go forward.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the formal bid protest filed in response to Respondent's intent to award ITB 93/94-040-LOT/P, be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Curley R. Doltie, Esquire 1103 Hays Street P.O. Box 1325 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriot Drive Capitol Complex Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4011 Marcia Mann Secretary Department of Lottery Capitol Complex Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4002 Ken Hart General Counsel Department of Lottery Capitol Complex Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4011 NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this recommended order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should consult with the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning their rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this recommended order. Any exceptions to this recommended order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case. ================================================================= DISTRICT COURT OPINION ================================================================= IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA J C & C ASSOCIATES, INC., NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND Petitioner, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED vs. CASE NO. 94-3185 DOAH CASE NO. 94-3955BID DEPARTMENT OF LOTTERY, Respondent. / Opinion filed January 22, 1996. An Appeal from Order of the Department of Lottery. Curley R. Doltie, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Louisa H. Warren of Department of the Lottery, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. ALLEN and KAHN, JJ., and SMITH, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCUR. MANDATE From DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA FIRST DISTRICT To the Honorable Don W. Davis, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings WHEREAS, in that certain cause filed in this Court styled: J C & C ASSOCIATES, INC., Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 94-3185 DOAH CASE NO. 94-3955BID DEPARTMENT OF LOTTERY, Respondent. The attached opinion was rendered on January 22, 1996. YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that further proceedings be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of this Court and the laws of the State of Florida. WITNESS the Honorable E. Earle Zehmer Chief Judge of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District and the Seal of said court at Tallahassee, the Capitol, on this 11th day of March, 1996. (SEAL) Jon S. Wheeler Clerk, District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District
Findings Of Fact Introduction In February, 1988 respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), issued a Request for Proposal and Bid Proposal Submittal Form (RFP) inviting qualified and interested vendors to submit proposals for providing approximately 19,300 square fee of office space in the central area of Broward County for DOR's district office. The contract was identified as Lease Bid No. 730-0083. The space was to be made available on July 1, 1988 or 30 days after the bid was awarded, whichever was later. According to the RFP, the term of the lease was five years with an option to renew for a second five year period. Sealed bids were to be filed in Tallahassee no later than 2:00 p.m. on May 2, 1988. The RFP scheduled a "preproposal conference" on April 4, 1988 at DOR's district office. It stated further, that any questions concerning the specifications should be directed to Thomas D. Cooper, DOR's assistant director of administration. Under DOR's bidding process, a four person evaluation committee made up of DOR district employees was assigned the responsibility of reviewing all bids and inspecting the proposed office sites. Using twelve prescribed evaluation criteria, one of which was the rental rate, the committee assigned numerical scores to the top seven bids. Its report was then forwarded to Tallahassee as a nonbinding recommendation. There, the assistant director of administration was charged with the responsibility of reviewing the committee's recommendations and to make a further recommendation to the executive director. As always, the final decision rested with DOR's then acting executive director, Sam D. Alexander. It was DOR's intention to ultimately award the contract to the vendor submitting the lowest and best proposal. Fifteen proposals were timely filed by various vendors, including petitioners, Intercontinental Properties, Inc. (Intercontinental) and Nu-West Florida, Inc. (Nu-West) , and intervenor, 241 East 76th Street Company d/b/a Fountains of Plantation (Plantation). After reviewing the proposals and office sites, the DOR evaluation committee assigned the following numerical scores to the top three bidders: Intercontinental-87 percent; Nu-West - 87 percent, and Plantation - 85 percent. However, it recommended that the bid not be awarded to Intercontinental because of its unfavorable site location and because no local government permits had been obtained to construct a drive-through facility. The committee characterized Nu-West's proposal as a "class operation" and noted that 1the committee is unanimous in it's (sic) recommendation that Nu-West Florida Inc.'s bid offers more for the Department when all factors are considered." Finally, the committee criticized Plantation's site location and anticipated delays in remodeling its building. This evaluation was forwarded to DOR's acting executive director on May 17, 1988. On Wednesday, June 1, 1988 DOR's assistant purchasing director, Barbie Foster, gave telephonic notice to all bidders that the contract would be awarded to Intercontinental and that other bidders had 72 hours in which to file a protest. At 11:30 a.m. that same day, DOR posted a "bid tabulation sheet" reflecting the unit cost (per square foot) of office space submitted by twelve vendors and recommending that the contract be awarded to Intercontinental. The tabulation sheet indicated also that unless the parties "file(d) a protest within the time prescribed in section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes," they waived their right to a hearing under chapter 120. Nu-West filed its protest on June 3, 1988. By June 6, two other protests had been filed, including that of Plantation. On June 9, 1988 DOR issued its first written advice on the subject to the parties. The advice, which was in the form of a letter from Foster to the president of Intercontinental, read as follows: This letter is to notify you that as of 11:30 A.M., June 6, 1988, the Department has received three (3) letters of Intent to protest the recommended contract submitted for office space in Ft. Lauderdale, Bid No.: 87/88-238. Enclosed please find copies of the (3) letters submitted. As you are aware, the awarding process on this lease is now at a stand still until the protests are resolved. The Department's legal counsel will be in touch with you in the very near future. Should you wish to contact Mr. Bill Townsend, Director of Technical Assistance, please feel free to do so, he can be reached at (904) 488-0712. A settlement conference was held in Fort Lauderdale on June 17 in an effort to informally resolve the matter. At that time, or shortly thereafter, DOR learned that the proposals of Intercontinental and Nu-West allegedly did not conform to specifications. On June 22, 1988 DOR issued its second notice of intent to award the contract and advised all vendors that the contract was being awarded to Plantation, the third ranked vendor, and that the proposals of Intercontinental and Nu-West were rejected as being nonresponsive. Such notice was in the form of a letter to each bidder advising the name of the successful bidder, giving a short summation of the reason why a particular vendor had been rejected and offering a clear point of entry to a formal hearing. In the case of Intercontinental, DOR advised that Intercontinental's bid was "non- responsive" since it failed "to comply with paragraph D4A, p. 14," it was "not the owner of record of the subject project," and it had not furnished its "authority to offer the facility." As to Nu-West, DOR found its bid "nonresponsive in the requirement of two drive-in stations as set forth in paragraph B14D, p. 14 of the Request for Proposal" because Nu-West had "indicated (it) would provide only one window and a drop box." These letters prompted the filing of formal protests by petitioners. Bid Requirements Pertinent to this controversy are two items in the RFP which formed the basis for DOR's rejection of petitioners' bids. First, Item B14 sets forth various miscellaneous requirements imposed on the bidder. Paragraph D. of that item provided as follows: The Department requires a drive-through teller facility similar to banking and savings and loan institutions. This may be located within the office or may be connected to the office by a pneumatic tube system (minimum of two stations required) (Emphasis added) This item was required because of a recently instituted DOR policy that all district offices have drive-in facilities for taxpayers. As old office buildings are vacated and new ones occupied, DOR requires that the new landlord provide teller facilities. At present, only three district offices in the state (Miami, Tampa and Tallahassee) have teller facilities but DOR plans eventually to install such facilities at all district offices. In this case, DOR envisioned a facility that would be similar to a small banking facility with two work stations that could handle two taxpayers simultaneously. It was necessary that teller facilities be provided since taxpayers often submit money and documentation and pose questions that must be answered by the tellers. As an alternative to two teller stations, DOR considered accepting one teller station and a drop box connected by a pneumatic tube to the main building. However, the use of a drop box without a pneumatic tube was unacceptable since DOR would "lose control" over deposits and lack the necessary security for handling taxpayer money. This item was considered to be material by the agency. Secondly, Item D.4.A. provided that: 4.A. Each proposal shall be signed by the owner(s) , corporate officers, or legal representative(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an Agent, written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal. If the Bid Submittal is offered by anyone other than the owner or owner's agent, proof of the bidder's authority to offer the facility; i.e., copy of bidder's Option to Purchase, must accompany the proposal. This option must be valid through the validity date established for bids. If a corporation foreign to the State of Florida is the owner of record, written evidence of authority to conduct business in Florida must accompany the Bid Submittal. (Emphasis added) The purpose of this item was to give DOR proof that the bidder was authorized to act for the property owner, or, if the bidder was not an agent, to give DOR written assurance that the bidder had an option to purchase, leasehold interest or some other form of interest in the subject property. This was because DOR could not be expected to sign a lease if it was unsure whether it would have the legal right to occupy the property. DOR considered this item to be a material item within the specifications. The first page of the RFP contained the following admonition to bidders: It is the bidder's responsibility to be familiar with all aspects of the bid package outlined below and attached hereto. Finally, page 14 of the RFP contained the following certification to be executed by the bidder when the bid was filed: I hereby certify as owner, officer, or authorized agent, that I have read the request for proposal package and all its attachments and acknowledge my understanding of and agreement to abide by all requirements and conditions contained therein. Intercontinental's Bid Intercontinental was not the owner of the property that was offered to DOR in Intercontinental's bid submission. This was confirmed at hearing by Intercontinental's leasing agent, Nestor Mendoza. According to Mendoza, the property was owned by a partnership using the name "441 South Partnership" but was leased to Intercontinental prior to the bid being submitted. Intercontinental filed its bid in Tallahassee on May 2, 1988. The certification on page 14 of Intercontinental's submission was signed in the following manner: Intercontinental Properties, Inc. Bidder's Name (typewritten) 59-1508950 Bidder's F.E.I.D. or S.S. Number (Illegible) Authorized Signature (manual)(Seal) Caroline Weiss Authorized Signature (typewritten) President Title (typewritten) Notwithstanding the requirement in item D.4.A., there was no documentation attached to Intercontinental's proposal reflecting that Intercontinental had authorization from the true owner to submit a bid or that it had a legal interest in the property. Therefore, DOR assumed that Intercontinental was the legal owner of the property. According to Mendoza, he carried documentation to Tallahassee on May 2 confirming Intercontinental's interest in the property but did not attach it to the proposal because he was under the impression that such documentation was necessary only if Intercontinental was "acting as an agent." Even though this "impression" was contrary to the requirements of the specifications, Mendoza maintained that he understood all RFP requirements. Mendoza was elated after receiving a telephone call on June 1, 1988 from Foster, who advised that Intercontinental had received the award. He was told also that, unless protests were filed within 72 hours, the firm would win the contract. In giving its preliminary intent to award the bid to Intercontinental, DOR overrode its committee's contrary recommendation. After a closer examination of Intercontinental's submission was made, DOR learned that, while Caroline Weiss, Intercontinental's president, had executed the bid submission, Intercontinental was not the legal owner of the property that was described in the proposal. DOR noted also that there was no documentation attached to the proposal, as required by item D.4.A. At a settlement conference held on June 17, 1988 Intercontinental maintained it had a leasehold interest in the property but declined, for whatever reason, to give DOR representatives any proof of this assertion. Because of this, DOR concluded properly that Intercontinental's bid was nonresponsive. During final hearing, Mendoza pointed out that, prior to the bid being submitted, DOR representatives had never questioned him concerning who was the true owner of the property and that he never made representations that Intercontinental owned the property. Intercontinental twice attempted to offer into evidence at hearing what purported to be a copy of a lease agreement in which Intercontinental had leased the property in question from another party. However, the document was never properly authenticated. Even if it had been authenticated, it was too late for Intercontinental to modify its bid submission since the documentation was required with Intercontinental's original submission filed on May 2, 1988. Nu-West's Bid Nu-West first learned of DOR's interest in new office space in February, 1988. After obtaining an RFP, Philip Saia, Nu-West's director of marketing and leasing, telephoned DOR's assistant director of administration to get clarification on several items in the specifications. Saia was told by Cooper to attend a prebid conference on April 4, 1988 in Fort Lauderdale. Also, he was told to telephone John Driggers, the author of the RFP and a district employee. Saia telephoned Driggers and was advised that all questions would be answered at the conference on April 4. Early on the morning of April 4, Saia met with Driggers and Bernard Fox, DOR district administrator, to discuss the item relating to the drive-through tellers and to show them Nu-West's facility. Saia's concern was that, due to space limitations and the cost of a pneumatic tube system, Nu-West would be priced "out of the ballpark" and would be unable to submit a bid. The three discussed other alternatives but reached no agreement. Driggers denied telling Saia that his proposal would comply with specifications but conceded he "probably led them to believe" that Saia's proposal would be "acceptable." Fox's principal concern was whether sufficient security could be provided for an unattached drop box. He voiced this concern to Saia. At the prebid conference later that day, another vendor queried the two DOR representatives (Driggers and Fox) about the drive-through teller requirement. Saia asked no questions. However, Saia contended that, in response to the other vendor's question, DOR representatives were "vague" and left the matter "very open." The actual dialogue between the vendor and Driggers is reflected in the transcript of the meeting received in evidence as DOR exhibit 1. According to the transcript the following exchange on the subject took place: (by unidentified vendor) On the drive through facility you asked about the pneumatic . . . you have a requirement for pneumatic tubes. (by John Driggers) Okay. On the drive through facility what we are trying to reflect there is we would prefer a facility for security purposes that would be contiguous with the office so that it would not be located away from the office. We would entertain a remote type facility that was connected with the office by pneumatic tubes or something that would be feasible. We don't necessarily kick out the possibility that we might use a facility that would not be contiguous to the office itself. However, we would look at that very carefully to make sure that it did meet requirements and that we could feel that it would be a secure place to use for the employees and for the . . . We do accept cash in these offices. What I'm trying to do is to give you some options there because there is no telling what kind of facility that you could come up with that would be acceptable. (Emphasis added) Driggers also advised vendors that if they had any further questions, they should be addressed to Fox. Saia concluded that, given the space limitations in Nu-West's building and the need for a local government site approval plan, the most cost-effective way to meet the requirement was to have one drive-through teller "adjacent to the building" and a drop-box in a separate location not contiguous to or connected with the main building. The use of a drop box was based on Saia's impression that DOR wanted the capability of receiving customer deposits after regular business hours and that a "facility" was not necessarily a teller window. He reasoned that this was comparable to the type of facilities used by banks and would be "a good solution to the problem." To reinforce his idea, Saia met with Fox a second time on April 19, 1988 and showed Fox his proposed plans. According to Saia, Fox told him the plans were "very acceptable." However, Fox's recollection of the conversation was different, and he remembered making no such commitment that the plans were acceptable. Instead, Fox told Saia that a drop-box with one window was better than only one window but that his overall concern was with security. In any event, Saia relied on this meeting to formalize the drop box plan in his bid submission. He went so far as to submit the plans to the City of Lauderdale Lakes for site review approval. Nu-West's submission was timely received by DOR. On page 8 of 14 of the RFP, Nu-West responded to the drive-through teller requirement with the following statement: Drive through teller window and one outside drop box will be provided in the manner shown on the enclosed site plan, subject to final approval by the City of Lauderdale Lakes, which has been applied for. (Preliminary approval has been obtained). The attached site plan is depicted on Joint Exhibit 3A and reflects a single drive-through teller facility. The drop box did not have a pneumatic tube system connecting the box to the main facility. This constituted a material deviation from the specifications. It is noted that of the fifteen vendors filing proposals, only Nu-West failed to provide for two drive-through tellers. A week or so after Nu-West's bid was submitted, the DOR evaluation committee visited Nu-West's office site. The team stayed on the premises for two hours. Saia recalled that even though the team discussed the proposed single drive-in teller facility idea and was shown its proposed location, he heard no objections. In its written evaluation report of Nu- West's bid dated May 17, the committee made no mention of any deficiency in the drive-through teller proposal and described Nu- West's proposed site as "a class operation." Nu-West was also given a grade of 87 and unanimously recommended for award of the contract. On June 2 Saia was advised by telephone that Intercontinental had been awarded the bid. Thereafter, Nu-West timely filed its protest. At the settlement conference held on June 17, Saia was not told his bid had been rejected because it was nonresponsive. He did not learn this until he received a telephone call a few days later from DOR's acting executive director. This was followed by DOR's letter of June 22 advising that Plantation had been awarded the bid and that Nu-West's bid had been rejected on the ground the proposal did not provide for two drive-through tellers. When this final decision was made by DOR, neither Cooper or Alexander were aware of any representations that might have been made to Saia by Fox or Driggers. Nu-West is willing to modify its proposal to provide a second drive- through teller. According to Saia, it can be accomplished with a $72,000 allowance Nu-West set aside to cover any deficiencies incurred during renovation. However, these modifications should have been filed with the original bid package in order to conform to specifications. Plantation's Bid Plantation was ranked number three numerically by the evaluation committee but, after the disqualification of Intercontinental and Nu-West, it had the highest numerical score and was considered the lowest and most responsive bid. Although Nu-West's proposed location in Plantation was questioned by another vendor as being in an inaccessible area of the county, DOR representatives concluded the office site was satisfactory. All material specifications were met by this bidder. 2/ Using a present value of lease payments, Plantation's bid was $1.23 per square feet cheaper than Nu-West's bid proposal but was slightly higher than Intercontinental's proposal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered awarding Lease Bid No. 730-0083 to 241 East 76th Street Company d/b/a Fountains of Plantation. DONE AND ORDERED this 5th day of October, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings 5th day of October, 1988.
Findings Of Fact On or about June 3, 1987, DOT advertised that it would receive bids on State Project No. 97870-334, etc. in Dade, Broward and Palm Beach Counties to improve portions of the Florida Turnpike. On June 24, 1987, bids were received by DOT from Gilbert, State Paving and Archer Western Contractors. The apparent low bidder at bid opening on June 24, 1987, was Gilbert and State Paving was apparent second low bidder. DOT was informally advised by John Beck, an attorney representing State Paving, that Gilbert's bid was believed to be unbalanced and the appropriate officials referred the issue to the DOT Bureau of Estimates to look into the low bid to see if it was unbalanced to the detriment of the State. Review of the Gilbert bid began with an internal analysis of the bid prices in comparison to the DOT Estimate of the Work. All bid prices above or below a certain percent of the engineer's estimate of costs were prepared in a computer printout and those items were checked by the consultants on the project. Basically, the major items in the project, which comprises some 400 bid items, were broken down to 10 groupings and the bids for each item in these groups was prepared for the three bidders and tabulated in Exhibit 2. The DOT Technical Committee reviewed the bids and concluded there was no unbalancing in Gilbert's bid which was detrimental to the State. This recommendation was approved by the Awards Committee which had also been furnished the information in Exhibit 2 by the consulting engineer for the project. Based upon this information, the Awards Committee concluded that the awards should go to Gilbert as no unbalancing detrimental to the State was found. Specification made a part of all DOT bid proposals provide that DOT may reject an unbalanced bid. As a matter of policy, DOT only rejects unbalanced bids deemed contrary to the interests of the State. Bids may be unbalanced in numerous ways. One significant method is known as front loading where the bidder submits a high bid for the work to be done at the beginning of the project such as clearing and grubbing and low bids for the work done later in the project. If successful in getting the award, this bidder would have excess profits on the clearing and grubbing which could draw interest while the less profitable later work was being done. Another variant is to study the plans and specifications to see if the quantities listed in the bid proposal are accurately reflected in the plans and specifications. If not, those items for which the bid proposal shows more than the plans and specifications reasonably required can be bid low, and for those items by which the bid proposal shows less than actually will be required can be bid high. Since the contractor is paid by the units used, those excess units at a higher price would result in more profit for the contractor yet allow him to submit an overall lower bid. For example, if the bid proposal contains two similar items for which the request for proposal estimates 100 each will be required, and the bidder concludes that only 50 will be required at Site A and 150 at Site B, he submits a low bid for Site A and a high bid for Site B. If the fair price for these units is $10 each, and the bidder bids $5 per unit for Site A or $500, and $15 for Site B or $1500, the total bid price is $2000, but if the bidder only installs 50 at Site A he would be paid $250 and install $150 at Site B for which he would be paid $2250. His total compensation would be $2500. In competitively bid contracts, such as the instant project, contractors modify their prices by taking a calculated risk that certain items bid on will not need to be accomplished and submit a nominal bid of $1 or 1 cent for such an item. By definition, such a bid is unbalanced, but if the item so bid has to be provided, the contractor has to provide this service at the bid price. The only evidence submitted by Petitioner tending to show Gilbert's bid was unbalanced to the detriment of the State was testimony, objected to and sustained, that the plans and specifications showed more of certain units would be needed than the estimated quantities on the bid proposal, which constituted the basis for the bids submitted. Such evidence constitutes a challenge to the bid specifications and is untimely. Gilbert's witness who prepared the bid submitted by Gilbert adequately explained the basis for bids submitted by Gilbert on the challenged items. The document entitled "This is Not an Addendum," clearly states on its face that "an addendum may follow containing the following information." No bids are solicited thereby and for no item contained thereon is the State obligated to contract. This document was provided all bidders before bids were open and no unfair advantage to anyone or detriment to the State was shown. In a project containing some 400 bid items, many modifications of the contract during construction is required to cover unforeseen circumstances that arise. While it would be better to get competitive bids on every bit of work done on this project, in this imperfect world unforeseen items will appear. The document complained of attempts to alert the bidders to some anticipated work not foreseen when the bid proposal was prepared, but it is not a part of the bid solicitation.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent properly rejected the bid of Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent issued on February 28, 1990, an invitation to bid concerning the installation of bleachers at a high school ("ITB"). The ITB was duly advertised. Among the bidders was Interkal, Inc., which is a manufacturer of bleachers. The Interkal bid, which was timely submitted, was executed by its president. The Interkal bid contained a bid bond naming Interkal as principal and a certification from the secretary of Interkal reflecting a corporate resolution authorizing the execution of all bid documents on behalf of Interkal by its corporate officers. The Interkal bid disclosed two subcontractors. The supplier was shown as Interkal, and the erector was shown as Petitioner. Petitioner is the authorized factory representative for Interkal in Florida. As such, Petitioner solicits business and installs and removes bleachers on behalf of Interkal. As compensation, Petitioner receives commissions for such work from Interkal. However, the shareholder and chief executive officer of Petitioner is not a shareholder or officer of Interkal. In addition, Petitioner is not authorized to execute bid documents on behalf of Interkal. Petitioner is no more than a Subcontrator of Interkal. The bidder in this case was Interkal, not Petitioner, even though Petitioner handled much of the paperwork or its manufacturer. When an unrelated bidder was awarded the contract, Petitioner filed a formal written protest in its name. Interkal has not participated as a party in the subject proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing the petition of Diversified Design Enterprises. ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT D. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Ned N. Julian Stenstrom, McIntosh, et al. P.O. Box 1330 Sanford, FL 32772-1330 William Merkel, President Diversified Design Enterprises 321 N.E. Second Avenue Delray Beach, FL 33444 Robert W. Hughes, Superintendent Seminole County School Board 1211 Mellonville Avenue Sanford, FL 32771
The Issue The issue in this cause is whether costs and attorney's fees are due Petitioner, hereinafter PROCTOR, from Respondent, hereinafter HRS, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, as a result of Division of Administrative Hearings Case Number 91-5963-BID, and, if so, the amount of costs and fees.
Findings Of Fact The petition for fees and costs herein is brought exclusively under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and relates back to a bid protest wherein PROCTOR and TCC #3 LTD., INC., hereafter TCC, were the only bidders on HRS lease 590.236. PROCTOR was the protestant/Petitioner and TCC was the apparent successful bidder/Intervenor in Derick Proctor v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 91-5963BID. HRS' Invitation to Bid (ITB) for lease 590:236 required bidders to submit evidence of control of the property being offered, including the parking areas. Evidence of control could take the form of a deed for the property, an option to purchase the property, or a lease or option to lease showing a right to sublease. TCC did not submit a document labelled "deed," "option to purchase," "lease," or "option to lease" with its bid. TCC submitted as its evidence of control a contract for sale and purchase of the property with Hernando Plaza, Ltd., executed by Edward M. Strawgate and Harold Brown representing themselves to be general partners of the limited partnership. At all times material, the actual record title of the property submitted by TCC for the bid was in the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation. At the times of the bid opening, evaluation, and August 27, 1991 notice of intended award, HRS had no reliable information as to what entity actually owned the property offered by TCC, and TCC had not disclosed to HRS that its contract to purchase the property was with an entity other than the record owner. Up to then, at least, Hernando Plaza, Ltd. had represented itself to TCC as being the owner of the property. The ITB did not require an abstract of title to be submitted with the bid. HRS normally does not require an abstract from successful bidders, although the ITB contained provisions for future disclosures from successful bidders. Absent some reason to "go behind" facial evidence of control, HRS' ITB attempted at the time to protect HRS by requiring successful bidders to post an irrevocable letter of credit to be forfeited in the event a successful bidder could not perform and for future disclosures concerning the chain of title. (See the recommended order in the underlying case). HRS accepted the contract to purchase the property from Hernando Plaza, Ltd. as TCC's required evidence of control, believing it to constitute an option to purchase. (See Findings of Fact 15-17 infra, this final order). On August 27, 1991, PROCTOR received from HRS a notice of intent to award the bid to TCC. This notice constituted the "window" for protests, if any, to be filed. PROCTOR then timely filed a notice of intent to protest and a formal written protest of the award to TCC. The filing of this protest resulted in an automatic suspension of the bid solicitation and contract award process and referral of the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Section 120.53(5)(c), Florida Statutes. This protest formed the basis of the underlying bid case, DOAH Case No. 91-5963BID. No later than the time of the Prehearing Order of September 23, 1991 in Case No. 91-5963BID, the law firm of Gibbs and Rudzik had made known to the hearing officer and counsel for both PROCTOR and HRS its retention as counsel for TCC. TCC moved for leave to intervene in a motion filed September 30, 1991, which was granted in an order of October 4, 1991. In a letter of October 10, 1991, counsel for PROCTOR made counsel for HRS aware of a question of whether TCC could obtain good title to the property. Counsel for PROCTOR proposed in a letter of October 14, 1991 to counsel for HRS that HRS reject both PROCTOR's and TCC's bids and rebid the lease, but this letter was primarily devoted to determining if HRS wished to interpose a new defense that PROCTOR's bid was unresponsive. In the instant fees and costs case, PROCTOR relies on its October 14, 1991 letter as the point from which HRS should have acted to avoid incurring attorney's fees and costs. After the receipt of the two letters, HRS did not reject both bids and rebid the contract but proceeded to formal hearing on October 30, 1991. PROCTOR and HRS share the mutual impression that had HRS accepted PROCTOR's proposal to reject both bids, HRS would have to have allowed TCC an opportunity to protest that decision. At the final hearing in Case No. 91-5963BID, evidence was offered that Hernando Plaza, Ltd. had a conditional option to purchase the property from the record title owner, the Brown Foundation. However, it was not established at the hearing that the conditions of the option had been fulfilled or that TCC or Hernando Plaza, Ltd. could otherwise gain good title to the property through a valid option. It was concluded as a matter of law in Case No. 91-5963BID, that on its face, the ITB stated that control could be evidenced merely by attachment of an "option to purchase," that the ITB stated no further requirements concerning the internal provisions of the option to purchase, and that TCC's conditional contract for purchase constituted a conditional option to purchase. The conditions of the option to purchase and the chain of title, among myriad other matters were subjects of proof at the formal hearing. The conditions of the option to purchase and various complicated real property concepts arising from recorded and unrecorded parts of the chain of title constituted the thrust of the recommended order's assessment that TCC's "control" was speculative only. It is here noted that the totality of the "chain" of title might have been unavailable even by "abstract" due to the lack of recordation of some documents. The lengthy formal hearing adduced evidence concerning the factual issue of whether or not the conditional option to purchase was between TCC and an entity which had such a sufficiently unequivocal interest in the proposed property that it could convey title to TCC in time for TCC to fulfill its obligations under its proposed lease to HRS. There is no evidence that HRS knew of these problems on August 27, 1991, when it gave notice of its intent to award the bid to TCC. Hernando Plaza, Ltd. was the entity with which TCC had contracted. At formal hearing, TCC relied on the legal concept that all interests in the property had merged in the non-title holder, Hernando Plaza, Ltd. This concept, together with recorded and unrecorded elements in the chain of title which were presented at formal hearing, were determined in the recommended order to be too "speculative" on the issue of TCC's control. However, it was also found, upon evidence submitted at formal hearing, that TCC's bid contained no other material deviations from the requirements of the ITB, that the signator of TCC's bid had sufficient status to submit the bid for the TCC corporation, and that TCC's signator could not submit the bid as an agent of the owners of the real property. TCC and its bid signator had never purported to have submitted the bid on behalf of the owners of the real property. (See the recommended order of the underlying bid case.) These issues were raised by PROCTOR and they addressed more than just the facial compliance of TCC's original bid documents which was all HRS had to consider when it made its initial decision in favor of TCC and against PROCTOR. However, the recommended order found HRS to have materially deviated in a number of ways from the bid process in its initial evaluation of PROCTOR's bid, not the least of which was determining that PROCTOR had complied with the ITB requirements for demonstrating control. All such evaluation flaws had been committed by HRS in favor of PROCTOR. Both TCC's and PROCTOR's bids were ultimately found to be unresponsive in the recommended order entered on December 20, 1991. The recommended order also found both had standing to be involved in the bid protest and formal hearing. The recommended order recommended rejecting both bids and readvertising the ITB. The Final Order of HRS entered on January 20, 1992 dismissed PROCTOR's protest on the basis that he lacked standing to protest, as his bid was unresponsive, and awarded the bid to TCC. HRS did not give PROCTOR notice that his bid was not responsive until it issued its Final Order. The Final Order of HRS was appealed to the First District Court of Appeals by PROCTOR. The First District Court of Appeals entered an order on June 22, 1992 finding PROCTOR had standing and remanding the case back to HRS for the purpose of a decision of the issue of whether TCC's bid was also unresponsive. On July 27, 1992, HRS entered its Amended Final Order determining both bids to be unresponsive and that the lease should be relet for bids. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the Amended Final Order of HRS in a per curiam opinion without discussion on October 13, 1992. HRS did not reject both bids and rebid the contract until after this per curiam opinion. No motion for rehearing was filed with respect to either of the First District Court of Appeals' orders entered June 22 or October 13, 1992, nor was any notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court filed. PROCTOR did file a motion for rehearing solely on the court's denial of PROCTOR's motion for appellate fees. Mandate was issued by the Clerk of the First District Court of Appeals on December 3, 1992. HRS entered an Order Directing Release of Bid Protest Cost Bond on December 18, 1992, in which HRS stated: Petitioner, Derick Proctor, has prevailed in the above styled bid protest. Petitioner's domicile and principal place of business is Vero Beach, Florida. Petitioner has one employee. Petitioner is a sole proprietorship. Petitioner's net worth does not exceed $2,000,000.00. HRS was not a nominal party in the underlying bid case. HRS did not initially challenge PROCTOR's "small business party" status in this instant fees and costs proceeding. Therefore, that allegation of the fees and costs petition is not at issue. Also, Petitioner's "small business party" status is now stipulated to exist. The parties have stipulated that the maximum statutory fee is $15,000.00 and that $15,000.00 is a reasonable fee if an award of attorney's fees is due. HRS has not protested or objected to the amount of costs claimed, $411.25, if costs are due.
The Issue The issue is whether Kelly Services is the lowest responsive bidder on Bid No. 89-23 and should be awarded the bid.
Findings Of Fact On June 2, 1988, the School Board of Bay County issued Bid Request No. 89-23 for garbage collection services at thirteen locations. A quotation sheet was included in the bid package. The quotation sheet indicated the thirteen locations with a blank next to each location and a dollar sign in front of each blank where each bidder was to indicate its average monthly total charge for each location. There was also a quotation schedule where the bidder was to indicate the calculations which went into the total bid for each location. The bid request provided: The Board reserves the right to waive formalities and to reject any and all bids or to accept any bid or combination of bids deemed in the Board's best interest and the decision of the Board will be final. Bidders desiring that their bid be considered on an all-or-none basis, either in whole or part, shall so indicate. It is the intent of this bid request to secure prices and establish contracts for garbage collection services for the twelve schools specified herein and the District Maintenance Department. Awards will be made by location and will be based on an average monthly total charge as calculated on the quotation sheet. The bids were opened at 10:00 am., June 13, 1988, at the offices of the Bay County School Board. Three completed bid packages were submitted. Kelly Services, Argus and M&O each submitted a completed bid quotation sheet containing the bid for each location. M&O also submitted a letter which stated: We would like to submit this bid on an all- or-nothing basis as specified in paragraph four of the cover letter to the bid. For an estimated cost of $3,391.84. The quotation sheet and quotation schedule submitted by M&O did not reflect the all-or-nothing bid amount. Instead, the quotation sheet and quotation schedule showed a total bid of $3,738.24 when calculated by location. Based on the bids submitted by each bidder as shown on the quotation sheet add quotation schedules, Kelly Services was low bidder on five locations (Callaway, Tyndall, Waller, Southport, and Cedar Grove) ; Argus was low bidder on six locations (Parker, Hiland, Haney, Mosley, Beach and Merritt Brown); and M&O was low bidder on two locations (West Bay and the District Maintenance Department). Prior to the deadline for submitting bids, John Harrison, Purchasing Agent for the Board, responded to an inquiry from M&O by advising M&O that it could submit two bids, one as specified in the Bid Request by location and one as an all-or- nothing bid. No other bidders were advised that they could submit two bids. At the bid opening, M&O did not submit a quotation sheet or schedule for its all-or-nothing bid. A bid which did not have a breakdown per dump per container per facility would not be acceptable to the Board and does not meet the specifications in the Bid Request. The breakdown per dump per container per location is necessary to verify proper invoicing for specific locations on months when there is a change in the number of dumps or containers at that location. After opening the bids, the Board compiled the low bid for each location and then totaled that list. That total of $3,606.09 was greater than the all-or-nothing bid by M&O. Because M&O's all-or-nothing bid failed to meet the specifications by not having a location breakdown the Board contacted M&O to determine if its "estimated" bid was firm and to request a breakdown on the quotation schedule form for the all- or-nothing bid. On June 15, 1988, two days after the bid opening, M&O submitted a letter to the Board clarifying that its all-or- nothing bid was a firm bid for each location and M&O submitted a quotation schedule for each location per dump per container (see page 7 of Joint Exhibit 1 and the last page of Joint Exhibit 2). The charge for each location in this quotation schedule is different than the quotation schedule submitted by M&O at the bid opening and is for the most part lower per location than either M&O's first quotation schedule or the low bids taken from the quotation schedules submitted at the bid opening. Based on the letter and all-or-nothing quotation schedule filed by M&O on June 15, 1988, the Board determined to award the bid for garbage collection services to M&O for the all- or-nothing bid of $3,391.84.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that The School Board of Bay County enter a Final Order rejecting all bids and readvertising the bid request for garbage collection services as specified in Bid Request No. 89-23. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 1988. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-3768BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Kelly Services: 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-3(1-3); 4-6(3); 7-11(7-11); and 12 (9) Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, School Board of Bay County: Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(2); 3(10&11); and 5(8). Proposed findings of fact 6, 7, and 9 are irrelevant. The first sentence of proposed finding of fact 2 is unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. The remainder of proposed finding of fact 2 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 3. Proposed finding of fact 4 is rejected as being unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. The last sentence of proposed finding of fact 5 is rejected as being argumentative, conclusory and unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. Proposed finding of fact 8 is unnecessary. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Intervenor, Argus Services, Inc.: Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 2-4(1-3); 6-8(5); 9 & 10(6) 11(3); and 12(11). Proposed findings of fact 1 and 5 are unnecessary. Proposed findings of fact 13-17 are rejected as constituting argument and not findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffrey P. Whitton Attorney at Law Post Office Box 1956 Panama City, Florida 32402 Franklin R. Harrison Attorney at Law 304 Magnolia Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 Scott W. Clemons Attorney at Law Post Office Box 860 Panama City, Florida 32402 School Board of Bay County Post Office Drawer 820 Panama City, Florida 32402-0820 M&O Sanitation, Inc. 266 N. Star Avenue Panama City, Florida 32404
The Issue The issue in this bid protest is whether Respondent acted arbitrarily when it decided to reject all of the bids it had received in response to a solicitation seeking bids on a contract for roof repairs.
Findings Of Fact On January 10, 2008, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (the "Department" or "DEP") issued an Invitation to Bid (the "ITB"), the purpose of which was to solicit competitive bids from qualified contractors on a project whose scope of work envisioned repairs to the wind-damaged roofs of several buildings located on the grounds of the Hugh Taylor Birch State Park in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Some of the buildings to be repaired were single-family residences. Work on these structures accordingly needed to conform to the requirements prescribed in the 2007 Manual of Hurricane Mitigation Retrofits for Existing Site-Built Single Family Residential Structures (the "Manual"), which the Florida Building Commission (the "Commission"), following an explicit legislative directive, see Section 553.844(3), Florida Statutes,1 recently had adopted, by incorporative reference, as a rule. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 9B-3.0475 (2007).2 The Rule had taken effect on November 14, 2007, giving the Manual's contents the same status and force as the Florida Building Code. Id. Just before the Department issued the ITB, the Commission had approved, at a meeting on January 8, 2008, a modified version of the Manual, which it called the 2007 Manual of Hurricane Mitigation Retrofits for Existing Site-Built Single Family Residential Structures, Version 2 (the "Revised Manual"). In consequence of the Commission's approval of the Revised Manual, the Florida Department of Community Affairs ("DCA") caused a Notice of Proposed Rule Development to be published on January 25, 2008, in the Florida Administrative Weekly. This official advertisement announced that the Commission intended to amend Rule 9B-3.0475, so that its incorporative reference would mention the Revision Manual instead of the Manual. See 34 Fla. Admin. W. 461-62 (Jan. 25, 2008).3 DCA caused a Notice of Proposed Rule respecting the intended revision of Rule 9B-3.0475 to be published on February 1, 2008, in the Florida Administrative Weekly. See 34 Fla. Admin. W. 605 (Feb. 1, 2008).4 On February 5, 2008, the Department issued Addendum No. 4 to the ITB (the "Addendum"). The Addendum provided in pertinent part as follows: Bidders shall bid the project as specified despite the recent change in Rule 9B-3.0475 relating to hurricane mitigation retrofits. Any additional water barrier will be accomplished by Change Order after award of the contract. (The foregoing provisions of the Addendum will be referred to hereinafter as the "Directive"). On February 12, 2008, the Department opened the bids it had received in response to the ITB. Ten (out of 12) of the bids submitted were deemed responsive. The bid of Petitioner Spinella Enterprises, Inc. ("Spinella") was one of the acceptable bids. On February 19, 2008, DEP posted notice of its intent to award a contract to the lowest bidder, namely Spinella, which had offered to perform the work for $94,150. The second lowest bidder was The Bookhardt Group ("Bookhardt"). Bookhardt timely protested the intended award, raising several objections, only one of which is relevant here. In its formal written protest, dated March 3, 2008, Bookhardt alleged that "[t]he new State of Florida law F.S. 553.844 was not part of the solicitation." On April 4, 2008, Rule 9B-3.0475, as amended to incorporate by reference the Revised Manual, took effect. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 9B-3.0475 (2008). On May 16, 2008, DEP posted notice of its intent to reject all bids received in response to the ITB. (Bookhardt's protest, which remained pending, had never been referred to DOAH for a formal hearing.) Spinella timely protested the Department's decision to reject all bids. In an email sent to Spinella on July 22, 2008, DEP's counsel explained the rationale behind the decision: The reason the Department rejected all bids follows. When the Department posted the notice of intent to award the contract to Spinella Enterprises, Inc., the second low bidder (Bookhardt Roofing) protested the intent to award. The second low bidder's basis for protesting the intended award was that Addendum 4 directed bidders to ignore certain rules of the Construction Industry Licensing Board [sic], which had become effective after the bid opening, which was not in accordance with the law. As a result, this may have caused confusion and the Department had no assurance that bidders were bidding the project correctly. In addition, the statement in Addendum 4 that the Department would add the required moisture barrier afterward by change order set up a situation where bidders had no idea how much the Department would be willing to pay for the change order. Further, the moisture barrier was not the only thing required by the new rules. Potential bidders may not have bid due to these uncertainties. The Department agreed with Bookhardt's assertions and rejected all bids . . . . Notwithstanding Spinella's protest, the Department issued a second invitation to bid on the project in question. As of the final hearing, the bids received in response to this second solicitation were scheduled to be opened on August 12, 2008. Ultimate Factual Determinations The Department's decision to reject all bids is premised, ultimately, on the notion that the Directive told prospective bidders to ignore an applicable rule in preparing their respective bids.5 If this were true, then the Directive could have been a source of potential confusion, as the Department argues, because a prudent bidder might reasonably hesitate to quote a price based on (possibly) legally deficient specifications. The Directive, however, did not instruct bidders to ignore an applicable, existing rule. Rather, under any reasonable interpretation, it instructed bidders to ignore a proposed rule and follow existing law. Such an instruction was neither confusing nor inappropriate. To be sure, the first sentence of the Directive——at least when read literally——misstated a fact. It did so by expressing an underlying assumption, i.e. that Rule 9B-3.0475 recently had been changed, which was incorrect. In fact, as of February 5, 2008, the Rule was exactly the same as it had always been. (It would remain that way for the next two months, until April 6, 2008).6 DEP's misstatement about the Rule might, conceivably, have confused a potential bidder, at least momentarily. But DEP did not factor the potential for such confusion into its decision to reject all bids, and no evidence of any confusion in this regard was offered at hearing.7 More important is that the unambiguous thrust of the Directive was to tell bidders to rely upon the "not recently changed" Rule 9B-3.0475, which could only have meant Florida Administrative Code Rule 9B-3.0475 (2007) as originally adopted, because that was the one and only version of the Rule which, to that point, had ever existed. Thus, even if the Department were operating under the mistaken belief, when it issued the Addendum, that Rule 9B-3.0475 recently had been amended; and even if, as a result, DEP thought it was telling prospective bidders to ignore an applicable, existing rule, DEP nevertheless made clear its intention that prospective bidders follow the original Rule 9B- 3.0475, which was in fact the operative Rule at the time, whether or not DEP knew it. Indeed, as any reasonable potential bidder knew or should have known at the time of the Addendum, (a) the Commission recently had approved the Revised Manual, but the contents thereof would not have the force and effect of law unless and until the Revised Manual were adopted as a rule, which had not yet happened; (b) the Commission had initiated rulemaking to amend Rule 9B-3.0475 so as to adopt the Revised Manual as a rule, but the process was pending, not complete; (c) Rule 9B-3.0475 had not been amended, ever; and, therefore, (d) the Manual still had the force and effect of law. See endnote 6. The Directive obviously could not alter or affect these objective facts. At bottom, then, a reasonable bidder, reviewing the Directive, would (or should) have concluded either (a) that the "recent change" which DEP had in mind was the Commission's approval of the Revised Manual (or the subsequent announcement of the proposed amendment to Rule 9B-3.0475) or (b) that DEP mistakenly believed the Rule had been changed, even though it had not been. Either way, a reasonable bidder would (or should) have known that the Department wanted bidders to prepare their respective bids based not on the Revised Manual, but the Manual. In other words, regardless of what DEP subjectively thought was the existing law, DEP clearly intended (and unambiguously expressed its intent) that bidders follow what was, in fact, existing law. This could not have confused a reasonable bidder because, absent an instruction to exceed the minimum required legal standards (which the Directive was not), a reasonable bidder would have followed existing law in preparing its bid, just as the Directive required. Once it is determined that the Directive did not, in fact, instruct bidders to ignore an applicable, existing law, but rather told them to rely upon the applicable, existing law (notwithstanding that such law might change in the foreseeable future), the logic underlying the Department's decision to reject all bids unravels. Simply put, there is no genuine basis in logic or fact for concluding that the Addendum caused confusion. The other grounds that DEP has put forward do not hold water either. Contrary to the Department's contention, the possibility that a Change Order would be necessary if an "additional water barrier" were required could not possibly have confused potential bidders or caused them to be uncertain about how much money the Department would be willing to pay for such extra work. This is because Article 27 of the Construction Contract prescribes the procedure for entering into a Change Order, and it specifies the method for determining the price of any extra work. See ITB at 102-05. The fact that the proposed amendment to Rule 9B-3.0475, if it were to be adopted and become applicable to the instant project, might require other additional work, besides a water barrier, likewise could not reasonably have caused potential bidders to refrain from bidding, for the same reason: The Construction Contract contains explicit provisions which deal with the contingency of extra work or changes in the work. Id. In sum, DEP's intended decision to reject all bids cannot be justified by any analysis that a reasonable person would use to reach a decision of similar importance. It is, therefore, arbitrary.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that its decision to reject all bids was arbitrary. Because the Department elected not to comply with the statutory directive to abate this procurement pending the outcome of Spinella's protest, with the result that the contract at issue possibly has been awarded already to another bidder; and because the choice of remedies for invalid procurement actions is ultimately within the agency's discretion, the undersigned declines to make a recommendation regarding the means by which DEP should rectify the harm to Spinella, but he urges that other appropriate relief be granted if Spinella cannot be awarded the contact. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Section 287.042(2), Florida Statutes, the Department of Management Services (DMS), lets various Invitations to Bid (ITB) for the benefit of state agencies, cities, counties and other local government agencies so that these entities may purchase a variety of goods and services. On August 24, 1993, DMS issued Invitation To Bid #28-070-700-P. The bid was one of 225 Invitations to Bid issued by DMS in 1993. The bid was for the purchase of medium and heavy trucks. The bid which is the subject of this case involves truck #150. The truck #150 bid has thirteen pages with forty- seven options plus base truck bid blanks. General Condition 1 of the Invitation to Bid requires that "all corrections made by bidder to his price must be initialed." Other documents provided by the Department to interested bidders as part of the bid package reiterate the requirement that all price changes must be initialed. These documents include the "Checklist," a document entitled "Common Problems That Result in Bid Being Rejected" and the document entitled "Medium and Heavy Trucks Index." The requirement in General Condition I of the Invitation to Bid, that all price changes must be initialed, contains no printed exceptions with respect to "nonpreselected" options. The purpose of the requirements of General Condition 1 of the Invitation to Bid is to protect both the State of Florida as well as competing vendors. The reason for the requirement that all price changes or alterations be initialed by the vendor is to protect both the State of Florida against a successful bidder later inserting higher option prices and charging the state agencies those prices, and the vendor against the State later inserting lower prices and attempting to hold the vendor to those prices. General Condition 13 of the bid document states: LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: Applicable provisions of Federal, State and Local law and all ordinances, rules, and regulations shall govern development, submittal and evaluation of all bids received in response hereto and shall govern any and all claims and disputes which may arise between persons(s) submitting a bid response hereto and the State of Florida, by and through its officers, employees and authorized representatives, or any other person, natural or otherwise; and lack of knowledge by any bidder shall not constitute a cognizable defense against the legal effect thereof. . . (Emphasis added.) General Condition 13 incorporates Rule 60A-1.001(3), Florida Administrative Code, which permits the State to waive minor irregularities in the conformance of a bid proposal to the formal bid requirements. The lowest bidder is determined by two factors. The first factor is the price for the base truck. The base truck is the minimum truck which can be ordered in this contract with no options. It is basically a chassis with an engine. The second factor involves additions to the truck called preselected options or predetermined options. All of the other options for the particular vehicle are deemed nonpreselected options. Preselected options are generally the most frequently ordered additions to the base truck along with some other less frequently ordered options. The preselected options can vary from bid to bid; however, DMS always determines the preselected options before opening the bids. The price of any option cannot exceed retail price. There is, therefore, a ceiling for the prices of preselected and nonpreselected options. The preselected options are not announced until after the bid is posted to prevent dishonestly low prices on preselected options and to promote competitive prices throughout the contract document. The bidders therefore do not know which options are preselected when they are composing their bids. There is nothing to be gained by a bidder loading a particular option with a high markup, because the bidder cannot guarantee that the option will not be preselected. The bid evaluation price is the base truck price plus the price of the combined chosen preselected options. DMS received numerous bids on the ITB, including a bid from Petitioner and Intervenor. Atlantic Ford bid a combined price of $38,737.00, and was the apparent low bidder; Duval Ford bid a combined price of $39,944.00 and was the apparent second low bidder. Upon receipt of the bids from the bidders, the bids were held in a locked room until the bid opening. After the bid opening, the purchasing specialist assigned to this bid reviewed each bid for conformity to the general non-technical specifications. Only the Bureau of Procurement is responsible for the nontechnical review although other Bureaus or Divisions may review and have input into the review process. However, these other Divisions' input is not binding. In the nontechnical review the purchasing specialist reviewed each bid's signatures, whether or not the bid was signed in ink, and numerous other requirements. The purchasing specialist also reviewed the bids to determine if all base bid blanks and price blanks for preselected options were filled in and that no corrections were made to those prices without a bidder's initials acknowledging the change. The bids which failed to meet the general conditions of the bid for base bid items and preselected options were rejected as nonresponsive bids. After the initial nontechnical review, the bids were sent to the Division of Motor Vehicles and Watercraft for a technical evaluation. However, since each bid document contains bids for several trucks, there may be a mixture of responsive and nonresponsive bids for various trucks in the same document and the Division of Motor Vehicles and Watercraft may receive responsive and nonresponsive bids for technical review. John Bevins of the Division of Motor Vehicles and Watercraft reviewed the technical parts of the bid. This information included manufacturer's codes for options and base truck features as well as the manufacturer's retail price which no bidder can exceed. After John Bevins completed his review, he filled out a bid rejection recommendation form. John Bevins chose to include nontechnical items in his recommendation, although this was beyond the scope of his review. Mr. Bevins indicated on his bid evaluation form that Atlantic Ford failed to initial a typewritten correction on option 8206 of truck 150. Mr. Bevins returned the reviewed bids to the purchasing specialist along with his recommendation that Atlantic Ford's bid was not responsive since it failed to initial the typewritten correction on option 8206. The purchasing specialist discussed the failure of Atlantic Ford to initial the typewritten correction on option 8206 with H. P. Barker, Jr., the Bureau Chief of Procurement. H. P. Barker, Jr. has the final authority within the Bureau of Procurement to decide if a bid is responsive. He is the customary agency decision-maker on these matters. After careful consideration and discussion, H. P. Barker, Jr., determined that the failure of Atlantic Ford to initial the typewritten correction on a credit is a minor irregularity according to the Department's purchasing rules, since option 8206 was a nonpreselected option and did not effect the total bid price for determining the lowest bidder. Barker's decision was based on the State's interest in obtaining trucks at the lowest price, thereby obtaining the most goods per contracting dollar. Duval Ford conceded that the typewritten correction was faint and does not appear on photocopies of the bid. Barker testified that DMS accepts photocopies of bids. If Atlantic Ford had submitted a photocopy of its bid, as it could have legally done, then the typewritten correction would probably not have been noted by the Department or the other bidders. Barker also testified that bids are not rejected if nonpreselected option blanks are not filled in. Dealers can choose not to offer all nonpreselected options. Finally, in this case option 8206 was a credit. Even if a purchaser under the contract orders option 8206, it will pay six dollars ($6.00) less for the overall truck from Atlantic Ford than if the truck was ordered from Duval Ford. Duval Ford offered evidence from 1991, that DMS had rejected a bid of another dealer for failure to initial a price change on a nonpreselected option. However, Nelson Easom, Duval Ford's manager had not been able to discover any similar rejections in the subsequent two years. Barker testified that the policy regarding noninitialed nonpreselected options changed three years ago. DMS then decided to treat them as minor irregularities. The policy change was based on the public policy to award the lowest bid whenever possible and to prevent minor deviations in bids from causing the state to pay higher prices for goods and services. Moreover, the evidence did not show any abuse of the bid process which would occur should price changes not be initialed. The alleged "protection" afforded to bidders by requiring every change to be initialed is at best tenuous since any fraudulent price changes could easily be recognized by the party against whom the change was made. Given these facts, this case over initials appears to be much ado about nothing, and the failure of Atlantic Ford to initial its price change on a nonpreselected option is a minor irregularity and waiveable by DMS. DMS therefore did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner by waiving the irregularity and awarding the bid to Atlantic Ford.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a Final Order in this case dismissing Petitioner's formal protest and awarding the contract for the Project to Atlantic Ford. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-6790BID The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, and 19, of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance insofar as material. Paragraphs 15 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact was legal argument. The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 13, 17, 18, 21 and 24 of the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 11 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact were immaterial. The facts contained in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. 9. The facts contained in paragraphs 22 and 23 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact were not shown by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Cook Howell, III Howell, O'Neal & Johnson Suite 1100 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Cindy Horne Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services Knight Building, Suite 309 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Kerri L. Barsh Attorney at Law Greenberg Traurig et al. 1221 Brickell Avenue Miami, FL 33131 Paul A. Rowell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Management Services 312 Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 William H. Lindner Secretary Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950
