The Issue At issue is whether Christopher Kocher, a deceased minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan. If so, whether the notice requirements of the Plan were satisfied.
Findings Of Fact Findings related to the parental award and past expenses At hearing, the parties stipulated that there were no monies owing for past expenses, as they had been paid by collateral sources (private insurance). Section 766.31(1)(a). The parties further agreed that Petitioners, as the parents of Christopher Kocher, a deceased minor, be accorded a lump sum award of $100,000.00, as well as an award of $1,500.00 for funeral expenses. Section 766.31(1)(b). Findings related to attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with the filing of the claim To support their claim for attorney's fees, Petitioners offered what was titled "Ferraro & Associates, P.A.'s Time Sheet." (Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 1, "Ferraro & Associates, P.A.'s Time Sheet"). As explained by Plaintiffs' counsel, at hearing MR. JOHNSTON: And these were -- these are the hours that were reconstructed. Our firm doesn't normally keep time records. We're a plaintiffs firm. But Mr. Falzone did go through and estimated the time that was spent on the NICA related matters and put them in this time sheet . . . . The time sheet reflected 17 hours dedicated to the case by Mr. Falzone, for which Petitioners requested an hourly rate of $500 (a total of $8,500.00), and 109.25 hours dedicated to the case by "different associates," for which Petitioners requested an hourly rate of $250.00 (a total of $27,312.50), for a total award of $35,812.50. Notably, such time sheet is hearsay, and was received into evidence subject to the limitations of Section 120.57(1)(c). ("Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence, but it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions.") Consequently, since no witnesses were called or competent evidence offered detailing the services rendered or the prevailing hourly rate charged in the community by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation, for similar services, there is no competent proof to support an award of attorney's fees. Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Johnson, 431 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)("[Attorney's] failure to present detailed evidence of his services is fatal to his claim."); Yakubik v. Board of County Commissioner's of Lee County, 656 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)("The testimony of an expert witness concerning reasonable attorney's fees is necessary to support the establishment of the fees.") Nevertheless, at hearing, Respondent agreed that it would accept 37.25 hours (the hours ostensibly expended from November 7, 2000, through April 28, 2001), as reasonably expended in pursuing the claim, and $175.00 as a reasonable hourly rate, for a total fee award of $6,518.75. Here, given that the claim was routine, and lacked any novel aspect that would warrant the time claimed by Petitioners' counsel, Respondent's concession is reasonable. Consequently, given that Petitioners' counsel obviously expended some time pursuing the claim, and there is no competent proof to otherwise support an award of attorney's fees, an award of $6,518.75 is appropriate. Finally, Petitioners seek to recover certain expenses they claim were reasonably incurred in connection with pursuing the claim for compensation. Such costs total $4,139.30. (Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 1, "Case Expense Report," page 3). Respondent does not object to the costs reflected on counsel's "Case Expense Report," page 3, commencing with the entry of November 7, 2000 ($15.00), and extending through the entry of March 20, 2001 ($15.50), totaling $1,036.02. Accordingly, those costs are awarded, without further discussion. As for the balance of expenses claimed, and opposed by Respondent, the record is devoid of proof to support their recovery. Notably, as with their claim for attorney's fees, Petitioners offered neither testimony nor competent evidence detailing the nature of the expenses claimed. Consequently, it would be pure speculation to conclude such expenditures constitute costs that are traditionally taxable, that they were reasonable in amount, or that they were necessarily incurred in pursuing the claim for compensation. Consequently, such expenses are not recoverable.
The Issue At issue in the proceeding is whether Selvin McCoy, a minor, suffered an injury for which compensation should be awarded under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan.
Findings Of Fact As observed in the preliminary statement, neither Petitioner nor anyone on her behalf appeared at hearing, and no proof was offered to support her claim. Respondent, in light of such failure, declined the opportunity to offer any evidence. Consequently, there being no proof, it cannot be factually resolved whether Selvin McCoy, a minor, suffered a "birth-related neurological injury" as alleged in the claim for benefits.
The Issue Whether Bryan Siravo has suffered an injury for which compensation should be awarded under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as alleged in the claim for compensation.
Findings Of Fact Bryan Siravo (Bryan) is the natural son of Robert and Mauro Siravo. He was born a live infant on March 13, 1990, at Plantation General Hospital in Broward County, Florida, and his birth weight was in excess of 2500 grams. The physician delivering obstetrical services during the birth of Bryan was Edward Buonopane, M.D., who was, at all times material hereto, a participating physician in the Florida Birth- Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Bryan Siravo was delivered by cesarean section because of a breach presentation and maternal obesity. The delivery was without complications and Bryan presented with Apgar scores of 8 at one minute and 9 at five minutes. Resuscitation was not required in the immediate postdelivery period, and there was no evidence of fetal distress. After birth, Bryan was transported to the regular or newborn nursery and was found in a cyanotic state approximately three hours after birth. Bryan was subsequently transferred to the neonatal intensive care unit where he was intubated after about one hour. Bryan's condition continued to deteriorate over the next 24 hours and an echocardiogram revealed the presence of a large patent ductus arteriosus and heart valve insufficiency. Due to the continued deterioration of his condition, Bryan was transferred to Miami Children's Hospital on March 15, 1990. At Miami Children's Hospital, Bryan was diagnosed with respiratory distress syndrome type I, severe; a condition which impairs the ability to breath, and which arises after birth when the infant is required to breath outside the womb. Bryan also underwent multiple ultrasound and CT scans of the brain. These neuroimaging studies revealed the presence of a Grade IV intraventricular hemorrhage. Based on the credible proof of record, it is concluded that Bryan suffered an injury to the brain caused by oxygen deprivation which rendered him permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. Such injury did not, however, occur during labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period. Rather, the proof demonstrated that the origins of Bryan's hemorrhage and his resultant neurologic injury were a combination of respiratory distress syndrome and patent ductive arteriosus, which began to operate after his delivery. Such mechanism, acting in consort, increased, over time, the pressure in the draining veins from Bryan's brain and, therefore, the pressure in his brain, with the consequent hemorrhage.
