The Issue Is Respondent employer guilty of an unlawful employment practice, pursuant to Section 760.10, F.S., for discrimination on the basis of handicap, to wit: diabetes?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner was employed part-time at Respondent Jackson County Hospital as an x-ray aide. In this position, he transported patients to and from the x-ray department. Petitioner had diabetes when he was hired by Respondent. He disclosed his diabetes on his initial health information sheet. The employer was aware of Petitioner's diabetes when he was hired. However, on his initial health information sheet Petitioner also represented his health status as "excellent" and denied having any physical condition which impaired his body as a whole. He further represented that he had no defect "which may prevent your performance in the job. . . ". Accordingly, the employer did not know that he had a handicap, if any, when it hired Petitioner. While he was employed as an x-ray aide, Petitioner had two "reactions" on the job due to his diabetes, and he was laid off immediately prior to having a third "reaction." Petitioner did not describe the nature of his diabetic "reactions", and no other record evidence revealed their symptomatology. Nonetheless, Petitioner felt that he did his job well and got along well with everyone. This testimony was unrefuted. Indeed, both of Respondent's witnesses acknowledged that Petitioner performed his job duties acceptably. Petitioner went to Respondent hospital's emergency room as soon as he had these reactions. He assumed that some of the x-ray technicians whom he worked with in the hospital x-ray department talked to Wayne Austin, the head of the x-ray department, about his situation. No other witnesses supported his assumption. No forms reporting either of Petitioner's "reactions" were received by Jim L. Treglon, Respondent hospital's assistant administrator. Wayne Austin knew of Petitioner's diabetes but had no knowledge of either of Petitioner's "reactions" prior to laying him off. When Mr. Austin laid Petitioner off on August 15, 1994, he told Petitioner that it was due to the hospital's economic restructuring. Petitioner believed, upon the basis of conversations with other employees who were not called to testify, that he was laid off due to his diabetes. According to Mr. Treglon and Mr. Austin, the employing hospital underwent a personnel restructuring process by reduction of work force for financial reasons, and Petitioner was laid off as part of the larger financial conservation scheme. Petitioner had the least seniority and was a part-time employee, so his position was eliminated. There is no evidence that Petitioner's position was ever recreated or refilled. At the same time Petitioner's position was eliminated, another x-ray aide with more seniority was allowed to work weekends only, thereby reducing the hours for which that aide was paid. It is possible, but not proven, that this other aide's hours were eventually increased or restored when the hospital's economic situation improved. At the same time Petitioner's position was eliminated, the x- ray department's clerk-secretary was allowed to resign, and that position was not filled. As part of the employer's restructuring process, a total of 17 employees were eliminated from the employer's total work force based only upon seniority at approximately the same time Petitioner's position was eliminated. Mr. Treglon testified that as of the date of formal hearing, the employer employed at least 40 people who have disclosed disabilities. The definition of "disability", as used in his testimony, was not given.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief herein and determining that Petitioner recover nothing thereby. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1996.
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice under section 760.10, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of handicap or disability, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact North Florida Sales Company (North Florida), the Respondent in this case, is a beer and ale wholesaler that does business in Florida and employs over 15 people. Window Mitchell, Petitioner in this case, began working at North Florida as a custodian in the maintenance department on June 22, 2009. His normal schedule at North Florida was Monday through Friday. Near the time he was hired, Petitioner received a copy of Respondent's "Employee Information Handbook." The handbook advised Petitioner of North Florida's "open door" policy that permitted employees to take any complaints or problems directly to the Human Resources Manager, the General Manager, or the President. It further advised employees that it was North Florida policy to treat all employees equally without regard to race, color, religion, sex, age, marital status, disability, or national origin. It stated that any violation of North Florida's equal opportunity policies must be reported immediately to the Human Resources Manager or General Manager without delay. The employee handbook also advised Petitioner of North Florida's policies on attendance. It required employees to give advance notice of any absence or lateness, and noted that employees who fail to maintain an acceptable attendance record would be subject to disciplinary action. On September 10, 2009, Petitioner received an Employee Warning Report noting that Petitioner had missed six days of work during his 90-day probationary period. The report stated that this amount of absenteeism was considered excessive and that immediate improvement was expected. It was signed by Petitioner and Petitioner's supervisor. On November 10, 2009, Petitioner received another Employee Warning Report. It stated that Petitioner's attendance continued to be a problem and that it was creating a burden on the maintenance department. It stated that further incidents of absenteeism, or arriving late or leaving early, would result in termination. It was signed by Petitioner, Petitioner's supervisor, and Margaret Lombardi, Human Resources Manager. There is no evidence that Petitioner ever received any further "Employee Warning Reports." On June 3, 2010, Petitioner received an Employee Performance Review. In his review, Petitioner was given a rating of "3" out of "10" on "dependability." The comment under that heading indicated that Petitioner was "out from work too many days." Petitioner received two other "3"s on his evaluation and received no evaluation above a "5" in any area. In the final section, entitled "Objectives for the Next Review Period," the first of two objectives listed was "keep all curbs in warehouse painted." The second was, "try to be at work all of the time." On July 17, 2010, Petitioner was returning from a barbecue with four friends. He testified that he had not been drinking. The car he was driving ran into a pole head-on. Petitioner's knee and leg hurt and became badly swollen. He had "little chunks of meat" missing from his left elbow and forearm. He was seen by an emergency doctor at Baptist Medical Center about 9:45 p.m., released, and given discharge instructions. On July 19 or 20, 2010, Ms. Lombardi received a paper entitled Adult Discharge Instructions on a Baptist Health form dated July 17, 2010. It indicated that Petitioner had been in the vehicle collision and had been treated for abrasions and a contusion on his right knee. In the instructions, Petitioner was told to take medications as instructed, follow up with the doctor in two days, and return to the emergency room for worsening symptoms. A box was checked indicating "no work for 2 days." Ms. Lombardi interpreted the note as excusing Petitioner from work on Sunday and Monday, and therefore expected Petitioner to return to work on Tuesday, July 20, 2010. When Petitioner did not return to work on Tuesday, Ms. Lombardi called him. Petitioner said he did not realize that the doctor's note had excused him for only two days. Ms. Lombardi told Petitioner that it did, and she told him he needed to come to work that day. Petitioner complained that his arm and leg were still hurting. Petitioner said he would return to work that afternoon, but did not. Petitioner did not come to work on Wednesday, July 21, 2010. Petitioner left a message for Ms. Lombardi and she called him about 10 a.m. Petitioner told Ms. Lombardi that he had gone to the doctor the day before and had another note excusing him from work. Ms. Lombardi asked Petitioner why he had not called her or the supervisor to let them know. Petitioner stated that he had called the supervisor, but had been unable to reach him and had been asked to call back. Petitioner said he did not call back because he did not get out of the doctor's office until after 5:00 pm. Ms. Lombardi directed him to have the note sent to her by facsimile transmission (fax). Ms. Lombardi received a form faxed from Baptist Health entitled "Discharge Instruction" about 4:38 p.m. that day, as indicated in her note prepared for Petitioner's file. It had a subtitle of "Work Release Form." The form stated that Petitioner had been seen again on July 21, 2010, and that he could return to work on July 25, 2010. The form had date and time blocks indicating "July 21, 2010" and "4:31 p.m." Ms. Lombardi testified that the form from Baptist Health indicated that Petitioner had been seen by a doctor that same day and that "I received it shortly after-–there was a discharge time on it." On the following day, July 22, 2010, Ms. Lombardi again called Petitioner. When asked about an excuse from the doctor whom Petitioner had seen on July 20, 2010, Petitioner replied, "Oh, that was a different doctor." Petitioner said that the excuse from the visit on July 21, 2010, was from the same doctor he saw on July 17, 2010. Ms. Lombardi's file note stated that this was "the second time that Mitchell has incurred absences with inconsistency in the facts surrounding that absence." Petitioner gave evasive and inconsistent testimony at hearing about whether there was ever a third doctor's excuse, in addition to the excuses of July 17, 2010 and July 21, 2010. Any of Petitioner's testimony suggesting that there was third excuse was not credible. There were only two doctor's excuses. On July 22, 2010, Ms. Lombardi filled out a "Status/Payroll Change Report" that discharged Petitioner from employment at North Florida. In the "Reason" portion of the form, Ms. Lombardi wrote, "Excessive absenteeism and multiple incidences of inconsistent facts surrounding his absences." Petitioner was immediately notified by telephone that his employment had been terminated. In that conversation, Petitioner asked Ms. Lombardi why he was being discharged. Ms. Lombardi told Petitioner that the basis for his discharge was his poor attendance. Petitioner was recovering from the injuries he received in the accident for about a week-and-a-half. After that he was fully recovered. Petitioner's substantial interests are affected by Respondent's decision to discharge him. It has been difficult to find work in the depressed economy and Petitioner has financial responsibilities. Petitioner has three children. Petitioner was employed by Wage Solutions, working the warehouse at Liberty Furniture, unloading furniture and bringing it to the showroom from March 2011 to August 2011. Petitioner lost that job because that business closed. At the time of hearing Petitioner was not employed. Petitioner went to the Florida Commission on Human Relations. He did not complain to them that he had been discriminated against on the basis of a handicap or disability. He just wanted an investigation into his discharge because he believed he had been terminated unfairly. He testified: Doing – I guess, telling my side of the story to file whatever they wanted me to file. I didn't even know it was doing – about the disability or not. I didn't know they signed me up under that. The only thing I thought, they were going to investigate to see why I got terminated. * * * And from there, I guess that – that's it. I knew I had to come to court from there, so I was just really based on that. I knew I had to show up to court for – I wasn't looking for all of this to come down to this. The only thing – I just wanted to know why I got fired, because I – about my attendance or being absent, but I had excuses for them. On October 12, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief against Respondent claiming an unlawful employment practice, alleging that he was wrongfully fired because of a mishap, which was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings the same day.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner from her employment based on perceived handicap discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired by Respondent on March 5, 1991, to work as a server at Respondent's restaurant, Bon Appetit. Shortly thereafter, on or about April 8, 1991, Petitioner was promoted to restaurant manager. During her tenure as restaurant manager, Petitioner was counselled about her appearance and personal hygiene. Additionally, Petitioner had problems with Respondent's performance including balancing the cash and credit card receipts collected during her shifts. Respondent required its managers to notify Respondent in advance of any absence due to a medical condition where possible. In all cases; however, managers were required to communicate with Respondent concerning their absence so that Respondent could schedule and plan for a manager's absence to avoid any disruption in its business and the scheduling of other employees. During her employment as restaurant manager, Petitioner was diagnosed as having "hammer toes". Petitioner was out of work for three weeks to have this condition surgically corrected. This absence was approved in advance by Respondent and Petitioner received full compensation for that medical leave. Following the scheduled three week absence for the surgery, there was an additional two to three week period during which Petitioner reported for work late or would leave early. Respondent considered those late arrivals and early departures to be unexcused absences. Following foot surgery, Petitioner returned to her position as manager with the same pay. Subsequently, during May 1992, Petitioner was out of work for surgery to have an ovarian cyst removed. This absence was approved by Respondent and Petitioner was out of work for five days. During this period of medical leave, Petitioner received her pay and returned to work following surgery. Following the cyst surgery, Petitioner complained of lower back pain which her gynecologist attributed to swelling from the cyst surgery. On May 30, 1992, Petitioner went to the emergency room at Morton Plant Hospital in Tampa suffering from lower back pain. Petitioner contacted restaurant manager, Leo Enciso, and told him of her visit to the hospital and "not to count on her reporting for work that day". Petitioner also informed Enciso that she would call as soon as she had been examined to give an update on her status. Subsequent to her initial phone call to Enciso on May 30, 1992, Petitioner did not speak with Enciso nor did he receive any messages from Petitioner concerning her status from May 30, 1992 to June 8, 1992. Following her treatment in the emergency room at Morton Plant, Petitioner sought treatment on that same date, May 30, 1992 from chiropractor Dr. Lynn Colucci. At that time, Petitioner knew she would be out of work until at least one more day. Petitioner did not communicate that information to Respondent or any of its management personnel. Petitioner's next consultation with her chiropractor to evaluate her condition was June 1, 1992. Following that session, Petitioner was advised that she would be out of work for at least two more days. Petitioner did not communicate this information to Respondent or any of its management staff. Petitioner again met with her chiropractor on June 3, 1992 and was told that she would be unable to return to work until June 8, 1992. Petitioner failed to communicate this information to any of Respondent's management or staff. Kailie Borzoni, Peter Kreuziger and Sharon Verhage, all managerial employees of Respondent, made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Petitioner by phone. Verhage left a message on Petitioner's answering machine but Petitioner did not return her phone call. Petitioner was released to return to work by her treating chiropractor on June 9, 1992. There were no restrictions placed on her when she was released for work and her physician related that Petitioner's back problem had "resolved itself". Petitioner was discharged by Respondent on June 9, 1992, when she reported for work. Peter Krueziger made an independent decision to discharge Petitioner based on what he considered to be poor performance, poor appearance, excessive absences and failing to truthfully advise of her work status and whereabouts from May 30, 1992 to June 8, 1992. When Petitioner was initially employed as a restaurant manager, Respondent's manager, Krueziger, noticed that Petitioner's dress apparel did not meet up to the standards of a "four star" restaurant that Respondent was operating. As a result, Respondent spoke with Petitioner about his expectations with regard to her dress and advised the controller to advance Petitioner some funds to purchase a wardrobe. Respondent sent one of its managerial employees to accompany Petitioner on a shopping trip to upgrade her wardrobe to reflect what Respondent considered to be appropriate dress for a restaurant manager. Respondent's managerial staff noted and complained to Petitioner on several occasions after she was given a new wardrobe, that her attire did not measure up to the standards that they expected of a manager. Negative comments were made about Respondent's stained clothing, her fingernails and her unkempt hair. Petitioner conceded that she had an exceptionally hard time balancing her cash and credit card accounts at the end of each shift. While some managers experience difficulty at the outset of their employment because an antiquated accounting system was being used, they soon became proficient in closing out the cash and credit card accounts following their shift. Respondent discharged Petitioner based on her failure to properly notify it of her absence from work during the period May 30, 1992 through June 8, 1992. Petitioner's medical condition, real or perceived, played no part in Respondent's decision to terminate her.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's petition for relief as she failed to establish that she was terminated from employment because of a perceived handicap. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 3 adopted as modified, paragraph 2 recommended order. Paragraph 4 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 5 recommended order. Paragraph 5, adopted as modified, paragraph 4 recommended order. Paragraph 7, adopted as modified, paragraphs 9 and 10 recommended order. Paragraph 8 rejected, irrelevant. Paragraphs 9 and 10 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 15 recommended order. Paragraphs 11-16 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Paragraph 17 rejected, irrelevant and unnecessary. Paragraphs 18 and 19 rejected, conclusionary. COPIES FURNISHED: C. A. Sullivan, Esquire 311 S. Missouri Avenue Clearwater, FL 34616 Charles A. Powell, IV, Esquire Peter W. Zinober, Esquire Zinober and McCrea, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Ste. 1750 Tampa, FL 33602 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
The Issue Whether Respondent wrongfully failed or refused to hire Petitioner because of her physical handicap, obesity, if she was otherwise qualified, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Rose E. Blake, at all time relevant, is a Certified Nurses Assistant in the State of Florida. In the summer of 1991, Petitioner was a 45 year old female, whose height was 5 feet, 4 inches and she weighed in excess of 250 pounds. Respondent, Sunset Point Nursing Home, is a health care facility that provides nursing home care for patients, and employs more than five employees. On March 11, 1991, Petitioner completed an application for the position of Nurses Aide at Respondent's facility. Petitioner's employment application made no claim of "handicap" of obesity or otherwise. Prior to being interviewed, Petitioner withdrew her name from consideration, and accepted a position at another health care facility. On July 11, 1991, Petitioner contacted Respondent's personnel department, and asked that her application for the nurse's aide position be reactivated. They did so and Petitioner was interviewed for a position on July 15, 1991. On July 15, 1991, she was informed that she was accepted for the position of nurse's aide, but would be required to undergo pre-employment orientation and a physical examination before she could start work in the next few days. On July 16, 1991, she went through a two hour orientation training at Respondent's facility which was conducted by Respondent's staff. On the same day, July 16, 1991, Petitioner underwent a physical examination at the office of a Dr. Johnson, a physician that Petitioner was referred to at Lakeside Medical Center. On the following day, after receiving a message from the physicians office, Helen Mills, Respondent's Assistant Director of Nursing, talked with Dr. Johnson on the telephone. After performing a physical examination, he recommended against hiring Petitioner on the basis that she was susceptible to developing low back problems, due to her obesity. Based on this conversation alone, Mills called Petitioner, and withdrew her offer of employment at Respondent's facility as a CNA. The position of CNA is physically very demanding. A CNA is required to lift patients, transfer them from bed to chair, bed to bathroom, bed to wheelchair. There is a great deal of stooping, bending, and lifting involved throughout a CNA's shift. A CNA is also required to feed patients, turn and position them in their beds. A CNA is also required to be on their feet constantly throughout her shift. Petitioner had successfully performed the functions of a CNA for 27 years, with the last ten years having been certified by the State of Florida. During this period of time, Petitioner has weighed in excess of 200 pounds, and her weight has not impaired her functioning successfully as a CNA. There was no expert medical evidence offered to establish whether Petitioner's obesity is endogenous (metabolic) or exogenous (caused by overeating). There was no competent evidence offered upon which to find Petitioner's obesity is physiological in origin or that it is permanent. Petitioner did not offer evidence to show damages.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered holding that: The Petitioner was discriminated against on the basis of her handicap when Respondent failed or refused to hire her; The Petitioner receive any damages she has suffered in accordance with applicable law. Respondent be ordered to cease and desist said discriminatory practices. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1992. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Neither party submitted proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald W. Stutzman Qualified Representative Vice President for Human Resources Harborside Healthcare 470 Atlantic Avenue Boston, Ma. 02210 Ms. Rose E. Blake P.O. Box 616 Dunedin, Florida 34698 City of Clearwater Legal Department P.O. Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748 Dana Baird, Esquire Commission on Human Relation 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4113
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to discrimination in the work environment by the Department of Corrections (DOC) due to Petitioner's race, sex, and handicap in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Thaise Hampton, is a female African- American. On January 20, 1995, Hampton was hired by the Correctional Educational School Authority (CESA) to work as a teacher at DOC's Apalachee Correctional Institution (ACI). Hampton had not worked before that time. During the 1995 legislative session, CESA was abolished by the State of Florida Legislature. CESA’s education and job training program functions were transferred to DOC along with most positions, inclusive of Hampton’s. Hampton was placed on probationary status as a DOC employee, effective July 1, 1996. On April 12, 1996, Hampton had an on-the-job injury when she slipped and fell in the cafeteria of the institution. The State of Florida's Division of Risk Management (Risk Management) administered the workers’ compensation case for the State of Florida. Hampton was treated by a physician and excused from work because of the injury. Hampton was evaluated by Michael W. Reed, M.D., an authorized treating physician for Hampton’s work-related injury, on July 15, 1996. By correspondence dated July 22, 1996, Dr. Reed reported his evaluation of Hampton. Dr. Reed found that Hampton suffered from lumbar degenerative disc disease. He recommended physical therapy and light duty work restrictions on lifting objects greater than 20 pounds. On August 29, 1996, DOC received further correspondence forwarded by Risk Management from Dr. Reed. In that correspondence dated August 28, 1996, Dr. Reed stated that Hampton could return to work full duty and that she had reached Maximum Medical Improvement, with a 0 percent permanent impairment rating. He did not indicate that there were any work restrictions. Hampton reported to work on September 3, 1996. At that time, she was utilizing a walker to ambulate around the compound. Joseph Thompson, the Warden at ACI, and the hiring/firing authority over Hampton at that time, expressed security concerns that Hampton was utilizing a walker. He asked the personnel manager, Derida McMillian, to inquire into the situation. As a result, McMillian contacted Paul Bohac, Hampton’s supervisor, and requested that both he and Hampton come to her office. She then informed Hampton that she was not authorized to utilize a walker unless a physician had prescribed one for her use. She told Hampton that she was in receipt of a letter from Dr. Reed that indicated she could return to work on regular duty with no restrictions and that a walker represents such a restriction. McMillian then told Hampton that she could not use a walker at work until she produced a medical report indicating a need for same. She also told Hampton that a physician’s statement would be needed or her leave would not be authorized. Hampton stated that she understood and would provide the appropriate medical reports on September 5, 1996. McMillian relayed Hampton’s statements that she would provide documentation by September 5, 1996, to Margaret Forehand, a personnel technician who was a liaison with the Division of Risk Management at that time. Because no such documentation was received by September 5, 1996, Forehand called Hampton at home on September 9, 1996. Hampton advised her that she would get her attorney to obtain a doctor’s statement. On September 10, 1996, Hampton called Forehand and said that her lawyer would obtain a doctor’s statement and send it to DOC. On September 17, 1996, Hampton contacted Forehand with questions regarding her paycheck received on September 13, 1996. Forehand advised that DOC had not received the physician’s statement that was to have been provided on September 5, 1996. Forehand reiterated at that time that Hampton needed to provide a doctor’s note as to her status. Hampton told Forehand that her attorney would be taking care of the matter. On September 18, 1996, Forehand spoke with Alice Taylor at the Division of Risk Management and was advised that Risk Management had received a letter from a Dr. Ayala regarding Hampton’s condition. Taylor told Forehand that Ayala's letter did not change anything--Hampton had not been removed from work or prescribed a walker. Neither McMillian nor Forehand was aware of any prescription for a walker by a Dr. Randall dated June 3, 1996, until March 11, 1997, when they were shown the prescription. Additionally, Forehand had no record indicating that Dr. Randall was approved by the Division of Risk Management as a treating physician. On September 19, 1996, Hampton appeared at the personnel office. She did not have a prescription for a walker at that time. Thus, Hampton was considered to be on unauthorized leave status since September 5, 1996. Warden Thompson terminated Hampton’s employment on September 19, 2001, for excessive unauthorized absences. Hampton alleged that several white male employees and an inmate were allowed accommodations: Mr. Ammons; Paul Bohac; and inmate John Peavy. Warden Thompson testified that he approved a request for Mr. Ammons to use a wheelchair after receiving a request from the CESA Personnel Office. He was informed that Mr. Ammons would be retiring in 30 days. Mr. Ammons was not a DOC employee. Warden Thompson stated that he was not aware that Paul Bohac had worn a back brace into the office or that he had brought an ergonomic chair into the office. If he had known that he was using special medical equipment, he would have requested a prescription for the devices. Paul Bohac was not utilizing a walker. Warden Thompson was not aware that inmate John Peavy was issued a walking stick; however, inmates were allowed to utilize assistive walking devices if the medical department authorized it. Warden Thompson approved Hampton’s termination because of her unauthorized absences. She refused to work at full duty or provide a physician’s statement documenting any work restrictions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Marva A. Davis, Esquire 121 South Madison Street Post Office Box 551 Quincy, Florida 32353-0551 Gary L. Grant, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Melvin Blum ("Mr. Blum"), was employed by the Respondent National Enquirer, Inc. ("National Enquirer"), 2/ from 1962 until his voluntary resignation in June 1980. The National Enquirer publishes a weekly tabloid newspaper in Palm Beach County, Florida. Since joining the National Enquirer, Iain Calder ("Mr. Calder") has held various positions as an employee and officer of the publication and its affiliated companies. Mr. Calder first joined the Enquirer in 1964 as London Bureau Chief. In 1967, he came to the United States as articles editor, a position he held until the early 1970's. In due course, he was promoted to senior articles editor, executive editor, editorial director, and then editor in 1975. In 1976, Mr. Calder became President of the National Enquirer. After the death of the owner, Mr. Pope, in 1988, Mr. Calder became Chairman of the company in order to sell the publication. After new owners acquired the publication, Mr. Calder became editor-in-chief of the publication and executive vice- president of the parent company. In December 1995, Mr. Calder stepped down as editor-in-chief and president and assumed the position of editor emeritus. Mr. Calder has known Mr. Blum for close to 30 years. Mr. Calder was familiar with Mr. Blum's work. When Mr. Calder was editorial director and then editor, Mr. Blum indirectly reported to him through his department head. Additionally, Mr. Calder would occasionally sit in as managing editor to learn the business of layouts. During those occasions, he would directly supervise Mr. Blum. While not close friends, Mr. Calder and Mr. Blum occasionally socialized outside of work. In Mr. Calder's view, while Mr. Blum was talented in using photographs, he had problems with headlines and with writing. Malcolm Hayes ("Mr. Hayes") first joined the National Enquirer in 1973. On his first stint at the publication, he held the positions of deskman, assistant editor, associate editor, and then managing editor. Mr. Hayes left the National Enquirer in 1986. Upon his return in 1989, he served in the position of assistant managing editor and then assumed his current position of managing editor upon the death of the prior managing editor, Nat Chrzan. Mr. Hayes first met Mr. Blum when he joined the National Enquirer in 1973. They worked together for seven years. While working together, Mr. Hayes had an opportunity to observe Mr. Blum's work. It was Mr. Hayes' general impression that while Mr. Blum was efficient, thorough, and had good layout skills, he had problems with words and headlines. Mr. Blum has had a hearing impairment since he was 17 years old. During the 18 years Mr. Blum worked at the National Enquirer, he wore a hearing aid. Both Mr. Calder and Mr. Hayes knew Mr. Blum wore a hearing aid while he worked at the National Enquirer. Neither Mr. Calder nor Mr. Hayes felt it was an impediment to his work. It was never considered a negative factor. Mr. Calder believed he communicated well with Mr. Blum while he worked at the publication. Mr. Calder did not view it as limiting Mr. Blum's ability to perform his job in any way. In July of 1990, Mr. Blum wrote to Mr. Calder inquiring about the possibility of returning to work at the National Enquirer. Mr. Calder wrote a cordial letter in reply indicating that there were no openings for the position of a deskman. Additional letters were exchanged between Mr. Blum and Mr. Calder. In a February 1, 1991, letter, Mr. Calder wrote to Mr. Blum informing him there were still no available positions on the "desk." He further indicated that should a position become available, it would be the decision of the Managing Editor whether to rehire him. While Mr. Calder had the authority to hire and always retained veto power, it was his philosophy and policy not to mandate that his department heads hire a particular individual. Upon the resignation of a key member of Mr. Hayes' staff, Mr. Hayes attempted to fill a position on the "desk" with an individual who had in addition to "desk" experience, desktop publishing skills and management potential. The paper was moving into computers and was looking for someone with those skills. Additionally, Mr. Hayes' deputy at the time indicated that he did not want to serve in that role and fill-in for Mr. Hayes in his absence. As the term is used at the National Enquirer, a deskman is an individual who is a layout editor and writes headlines, writes captions, edits copy, and basically puts the pages together. Two members of Mr. Hayes' staff recommended William Condie ("Mr. Condie") for the position. Both individuals had worked with Mr. Condie when they were employed by the New York Post. Mr. Condie was at the Post at the time he was recruited. The National Enquirer had previously been very successful in recruiting newspaper people from the New York Post. Mr. Condie met both the experience requirements and the skill requirements that the National Enquirer was seeking. Mr. Condie had been involved in "desk work" for thirty years. He had served in various "desk" capacities at the London Daily Express, New York Daily News, and New York Post. Mr. Condie had a lot of experience in laying out pages. He was also a very good headline writer with good word skills. In addition to his extensive desk experience, Condie had worked with computers both at the New York Daily News and the New York Post. He also had a personal computer at home and was somewhat of a computer buff. Mr. Condie's background also reflected management experience. Prior to coming to the National Enquirer, Mr. Condie held the position of Night Managing Editor at the New York Post; the Post was considered one of the premier tabloids in the country. Mr. Condie was responsible for supervising all aspects of production of the newspaper after the first edition. He had performed in other management positions as well. Mr. Calder had known Mr. Condie for more than 30 years. Mr. Calder had an opportunity to work with Mr. Condie when Mr. Condie had previously worked at the National Enquirer. At one point in time early in their careers, Mr. Calder had reported to Mr. Condie. Based on his experience and skills, Mr. Condie was invited to the National Enquirer for a try-out in May 1991. At the end of the trial period, Mr. Condie was offered a position. The decision to hire Mr. Condie was made on or before June 5, 1991. Mr. Hayes made the decision to hire Mr. Condie which was approved by Mr. Calder. Mr. Condie began his full-time employment at the National Enquirer on July 8, 1991. The National Enquirer hired Mr. Condie on the basis of his qualifications. Since Mr. Condie was hired, no other positions on the "desk" became available at the National Enquirer. Neither Mr. Hayes nor Mr. Calder viewed the hiring process as a competition between Mr. Condie and Mr. Blum. Had Mr. Condie never been a candidate, Mr. Blum would not have been selected for the position. Mr. Blum lacked the qualifications that the National Enquirer was looking for in a candidate. Both Mr. Hayes and Mr. Calder were familiar with Mr. Blum's abilities and limitations. Mr. Hayes had worked with Mr. Blum for seven years. During that time, Mr. Hayes had an opportunity to observe Mr. Blum's professional work. While he felt Blum was efficient and thorough and had good layout skills, he felt Mr. Blum had problems with words and headlines. The nature of the publication had also changed since Mr. Blum had worked at the National Enquirer. Mr. Blum also did not have the management experience that Mr. Hayes was looking for in a candidate. During his entire time at the National Enquirer, Mr. Blum was never in a management position. Since leaving the National Enquirer, Mr. Blum's only managerial experience was at Senior Power, a free newspaper he started with another individual. While Mr. Blum was responsible for all business decisions, editorial decisions, and finances at Senior Power, it was a naive business concept and a financial failure. Given their personal experience with Mr. Blum, both Mr. Hayes and Mr. Calder felt that his personality was not conducive to supervising people. Additionally, Mr. Blum had no desktop computer experience at a major tabloid. Given their familiarity with Mr. Blum's experience and skills, neither Mr. Hayes nor Mr. Calder considered Mr. Blum a viable candidate for the position for which Mr. Condie was hired. Mr. Blum has no written evidence that the National Enquirer discriminated against him on the basis of his hearing. Mr. Blum knows of no statements made by Mr. Hayes, Mr. Calder, or anyone else evidencing discrimination against him on the basis of his hearing. In fact, Mr. Blum believes he was not rehired because of a grudge. Mr. Blum's hearing impairment played no role in the National Enquirer's decision not to rehire him. Mr. Blum filed his Charge of Discrimination on March 26, 1992.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case dismissing the Petition For Relief and denying all relief sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 1996, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 1996.
The Issue Whether Honda of Bay County/Volkswagen of Panama City (Respondent), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01-760.11, Florida Statutes,1 by discriminating against Maurice Hargrove (Petitioner) because of his disability and race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Maurice Hargrove, is an individual of African-American descent, who resides in Chipley, Florida. Respondent, Honda of Bay County and Volkswagen of Panama City are automobile dealerships located in Panama City, Florida. Petitioner alleges that he was not hired by Respondent because of his race and because of a disability. Petitioner’s alleged disability relates to his wearing a supportive brace on one of his legs at the time he applied for the job position with Respondent. Petitioner first made contact with Respondent’s business after seeing a “now hiring” sign in front of Respondent’s facility in Panama City. According to Petitioner, after seeing the sign, he walked into the building and filled out a job application. Petitioner could not recall when this occurred, but he believed it was sometime prior to Hurricane Michael, which struck the Panama City area in October 2018. Exact time frames and sequence of events as to what happened after Petitioner initially filled out the application are less than clear because Petitioner repeatedly changed his testimony during the final hearing. Nevertheless, the findings set forth below, derived from the combined testimonies of Petitioner and Respondent’s manager, Mr. Boatwright, detail the pertinent facts. Petitioner initially inquired about a job as a service technician working on vehicles at the dealership. When Petitioner met with Respondent’s manager, however, Mr. Boatwright told Petitioner that he did not need a service technician at the time. Further, Petitioner had no prior experience working on vehicles. Mr. Boatwright further informed Petitioner that, although he did not need a service technician, he needed a shuttle driver for the dealership. According to Petitioner, because of his conversation with Mr. Boatwright, he marked through “service tech” on the job application and wrote in “driver.” Mr. Boatwright’s testimony, and sometimes Petitioner’s testimony, was that when Mr. Boatwright first met Petitioner, Mr. Boatwright noticed a brace on Petitioner’s leg and asked Petitioner what was the situation with the brace. Petitioner told Mr. Boatwright that he had injured his leg in a workplace fall for which he received workers’ compensation, but that he was no longer on workers’ compensation. 2 Mr. Boatwright asked Petitioner to obtain a note from a doctor clearing Petitioner to work, to which Petitioner agreed. At some point, Petitioner returned to Respondent’s dealership with a doctor’s note clearing him to work with no restrictions. Mr. Boatwright interviewed Petitioner for the driver position and said he would contact 2 Petitioner’s statements regarding his leg brace were inconsistent. Petitioner testified that he wears a brace on one of his legs for support after surgery for a broken leg. Petitioner also testified that he broke his leg “just walking one day in the neighborhood, and I turned, and it just gave out on me.” According to Mr. Boatwright, Petitioner told him when he was applying for the job that Petitioner had fallen off a ladder when working as a painter and received workers’ compensation for a leg injury. Petitioner did not take issue with this version of the events during his questioning of Mr. Boatwright. Petitioner further testified that he did not remember the year he broke his leg, when he had surgery on his leg, or when his doctor advised him to wear the brace. Regardless of the origin of the leg condition, Petitioner testified that the leg did not restrict him in any way. Petitioner about the job later. Both Petitioner and Mr. Boatwright believed that the interview went well. After interviewing ten candidates for the driver position, Mr. Boatwright believed that, based upon Petitioner’s maturity level as compared to other applicants, Petitioner was the best candidate. After Petitioner was interviewed, Mr. Boatwright’s bosses decided not to fill the driver position, but, instead, decided to have the driving duties shared amongst existing employees. At the final hearing, Mr. Boatwright recalled communicating this to Petitioner, but that if he did not, he offered his apologies. Petitioner first testified that Mr. Boatwright contacted him and told him that he would not be hired, describing a conversation with Mr. Boatwright in which Petitioner expressed his sadness with Mr. Boatwright about not getting the job. Later in the hearing, Petitioner said he did not ever hear back from Mr. Boatwright, and that it was Respondent’s attorney who advised him that Respondent had decided not to fill the driver position. Regardless of when and how Petitioner was informed that the job position was not being filled, Respondent chose not to fill the shuttle driver position. As of the date of the final hearing, well over a year after Petitioner applied for the job, Respondent had still not filled the driver position, opting instead to share driving duties amongst the existing employees. Petitioner presented no evidence that his race played any part in the decision not to hire him. His sole offering on this point was the fact of his race. Petitioner’s disability discrimination claim was based on the facts that Mr. Boatwright noticed the brace on his leg and asked him to get a doctor’s note clearing him to work. Although Petitioner testified late in the hearing that Mr. Boatwright said something to him about not feeling like he would be able to do the job, Petitioner’s statement was made after several accounts of conversations with Mr. Boatwright in which Petitioner never made this allegation. When asked about this new allegation on cross-examination, Petitioner could provide no details, quickly trailed off topic, and asked “Say what?” There was no allegation in his Charge of Discrimination or his Petition for Relief with the Division of Administrative Hearings that alleges that Mr. Boatwright suggested that Petitioner could not do the driver job. Considering these factors, as well as the inconsistency with Petitioner’s prior recollection that his interview with Mr. Boatwright went well, it is found that Petitioner’s late-asserted allegation that Mr. Boatwright said something to him about feeling that Petitioner could not do the job is untimely and is otherwise not credited. Further, Petitioner testified that his leg did not restrict him in any way, and failed to present evidence that he had a medical condition that substantially impaired any life activity.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S James H. Peterson, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Maurice Hargrove 1672 Sunny Hills Boulevard Chipley, Florida 32428 Russell F. Van Sickle, Esquire Beggs & Lane Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32591 (eServed) Tammy Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a woman who suffered an aneurysm in 1987 which resulted in paralysis. Subsequently, she regained full use of her body except for her left hand. She possesses gross motor skills in her left hand but lacks fine motor skills. Respondent is a retail furniture store, which at times pertinent did about three million dollars in business annually. Respondent at times pertinent employed 23 to 26 full-time employees. Respondent went out of business on September 24, 2001. Petitioner interviewed with Doris Hudson and Cindy Gentry about three weeks prior to June 8, 2000. Petitioner was informed that she was hired and could begin work on June 8, 2000. The position she was hired for was accounts payable clerk. During the interview, the matter of the facility of Petitioner's left hand was not noted or discussed. Petitioner believed that the job consisted of mostly working on a keypad with numbers, in the accounts payable section of the bookkeeping office. Petitioner reported for work on June 8, 2000. Doris Hudson, Respondent's Comptroller, an employee of Respondent for over 41 years, provided her with a tour of the premises. Petitioner's first assignment was to type checks. She did this slowly because she could type only with her right hand. Typing checks is an important function of the accounts payable clerk. Most vendors were paid by checks which were prepared by data processing equipment but it was necessary to prepare many checks for local vendors on a typewriter. During the hour and a-half Petitioner worked at the typewriter, she correctly prepared three checks. Ms. Hudson expected an accounts payable clerk to prepare 25 to 35 checks in an hour and a-half. An accounts payable clerk, according to Ms. Hudson, should be able to type 55 words per minute; Petitioner could type only 30 words per minute on a good day. An accounts payable clerk's daily activities included kneeling on the floor and opening a large safe; swinging open a heavy door which has to be unlocked with two keys simultaneously; counting 30 to 50 checks per day and counting currency and coins; and printing out reports which were inserted in a large binder. A substantial part of the duties of the accounts payable clerk required excellent typing and data input skills. The accounts payable clerk was required to reload the printers and this required the coordination of two hands. The accounts payable clerk was required to prepare deposits which required that the employee flip each individual check with one hand and operate a calculator with the other. Ms. Hudson did not discover the deficiencies with regard to Petitioner's left hand until she made inquiry after noting the small number of checks which Petitioner prepared. Ms. Hudson could not use an employee who could not do the activities described in paragraph eight and nine, above. Ms. Hudson could not call others in the office away from their jobs to help a person who had limited use of one hand. She did not have enough employees. When Ms. Hudson's office was fully staffed there were many times when it was difficult to accomplish all necessary duties in an eight-hour day. It was Ms. Hudson's opinion that Petitioner could not perform the duties of accounts payable clerk and that it was impossible to accommodate her deficiencies without disrupting the orderly functioning of her office. After considering Petitioner's capabilities and the requirements of the accounts payable clerk, Ms. Hudson decided that Petitioner was not suitable for employment as an accounts payable clerk and as a result, discharged her. Petitioner was paid $22.61 for 2.66 hours of work. This reflected an hourly wage of $8.50. Petitioner worked as an administrative assistant at Century Boats in Panama City prior to obtaining the job with Respondent. She lost that job in February of 2000, due to a reduction in workforce. After Petitioner left Respondent's place of business she went to work at a clinic run by Bay Medical. She began working there on August 28, 2000, as an insurance coder and biller and was paid $8.00 per hour. She lost that job on February 28, 2001, when the facility closed. She was offered a job in the radiology section but it paid less so she elected to remain essentially unemployed for a year. She did work a one- week job with Cardiology Associates and worked for C-1 Medical Clinic for a month and a-half during that period. Petitioner, at the time of the hearing, was employed by Nextel Communications as a customer care representative and was paid $9.50 per hour. She started February 18, 2002. Petitioner has a hard time buttoning clothes but she can drive an automobile. She testified she could do, ". . . everything pretty much what everybody does." She can't throw a ball up with her left hand or play tennis anymore. She can lift heavy objects up to at least 75 pounds. She has no medical restrictions placed on the use of her left hand.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Human Relations Commission enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Amended Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Chesser 6802 Penny Road Panama City, Florida 32404 Michael Mattimore, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4019 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of age for the reasons stated in the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was born in 1953. At the time of the events which form the basis for his claim, he was more than forty years old. The Petitioner was born in Cuba and spent most of his life in Cuba. The Petitioner came to the United States of America approximately two years before the events which form the basis for his claim. The Petitioner speaks fluent Spanish, but does not speak English. In October of 1999, the Petitioner was hired by the City of Hialeah Gardens as a laborer in the Parks Department at a pay rate of $6.50 per hour. The Petitioner is still employed by the City of Hialeah Gardens as a laborer in the Parks Department at a pay rate of $6.50 per hour. The Petitioner's pay rate has never been changed during his employment with the City of Hialeah Gardens. During his employment with the City of Hialeah Gardens, the Petitioner has never held either the position of "Maintenance Supervisor" or the position of "Assistant Parks Director." During his employment with the City of Hialeah Gardens, the Petitioner has never been demoted from either the position of "Maintenance Supervisor" or the position of "Assistant Parks Director." The Mayor of the City of Hialeah Gardens has the sole authority and responsibility to make employment decisions. The Mayor appointed Nivaldo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to the position of Assistant Parks Director. At the time of the appointment, Rodriguez was in his late twenties. At the time of the appointment, Rodriguez spoke fluent English and Spanish. At the time of the appointment, Rodriguez was a friend of the Mayor and the Mayor was aware of his qualifications for the position. The Mayor appointed Rodriguez to the position of "Assistant Parks Director" because he thought he was qualified for the position. The Mayor also thought that the Petitioner was not qualified for the position because, among other things, the Petitioner did not speak English. It is necessary to be able to speak English in order to fulfill all of the duties of the position of "Assistant Parks Director." The Mayor had credible non-discriminatory reasons to appoint Rodriguez as "Assistant Park Director," and not to appoint the Petitioner to that position. There is no credible evidence that the Mayor's reasons for appointing Rodriguez were pretextual. Age was not a factor in the decision to appoint Rodriguez rather than the Petitioner. The evidence regarding the Respondent's hiring and termination practices does not establish any pattern of age based discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the petition in this case and denying all relief sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2002.
