The Issue Whether or not the Petitioner, Conduces Club, Inc., is entitled to the issuance of a Series 11-C alcoholic beverage license.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Conduces Club, Inc., a nonprofit corporation incorporated in the State of Florida, has applied to the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, for the issuance of a series 11-C alcoholic beverage license. This license is described in Rule 7A-1.13, Florida Administrative Code, as a club license to sell to members and nonresident guests only. The terms and conditions for the issuance of such a license are as set forth in Subsection 561.20(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and Subsection 565.02(4), Florida Statutes. The Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco has denied the application of the Petitioner premised upon the assertion that the Petitioner has failed to meet the requirements set out in the aforementioned sections of the Florida Statutes. The Petitioner has disagreed with that interpretation and a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, hearing was scheduled and held on April 10, 1979. The crucial language to be considered in determining whether or not the Petitioner should be extended the privilege of operating under a Series 11-C alcoholic beverage license is found in the Subsection 561.20(7)(a), Florida Statutes, which reads as follows: "(7)(a) There shall be no limitation as to the number of licenses issued pursuant to 565.02(4). However, any licenses issued under this section shall be limited to: Subordinate lodges or clubs of national fraternal or benevolent associations; Golf clubs and tennis clubs municipally or privately owned or leased; Nonprofit corporations or clubs devoted to promoting community, municipal, or county development or any phase of community, muni- cipal, or county development; Clubs fostering and promoting the general welfare and prosperity of members of showmen and amusement enterprises; Clubs assisting, promoting, and de- veloping subordinate lodges or clubs of national fraternal or benevolent associa- tions; and Clubs promoting, developing, and main- taining cultural relations of people of the same nationality." (Although the introductory phrase in the above-quoted Subsection makes reference to Subsection 565.02(4), Florida Statutes, as being involved in the process of issuing a license, Subsection 565.02(4), Florida Statutes, true function is the establishment of the requirement that chartered or unincorporated clubs pay an annual state license tax of $400.00, and it is this Subsection 561.20(7)(a), -- Florida Statutes, which establishes those categories of candidates who may receive a Series 11-C alcoholic beverage license.) Of the possible categories for licensure, the one which appears to be the focal point of the controversy is that provision found in Subsection 561.20(7)(a)3., Florida Statutes. In support of its request, the Petitioner presented certain witnesses and items of evidence. Among those items was the testimony of Mrs. E. R. Atwater, Social worker Supervisor with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Management Division, assigned to the Blodgett Community in Jacksonville, Florida. The Blodgett Community is a housing development of some 53 acres which contains 628 housing units with a breakdown of that population containing 301 senior citizens and 1,069 juveniles, with cost of the heads of the households being female. Those persons living in the Blodgett development are described as having a poor economic circumstance. Mrs. Atwater indicated that the Conduces Club, Inc., had on occasion sponsored girls softball teams and boys basketball teams for those young persons living in the Blodgett Community and she had expressed her appreciation in the form of correspondence of January 17, 1979, which is the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. In addition, Mrs. Atwater indicated that the Conduces Club, Inc., had provided transportation for a trip for the residents of the Blodgett Community to Six Gun Territory located near Ocala, Florida. Arrangements were made for three busses; two of the busses which transported residents on July 16, 1977, and the third bus transported them on August 11, 1977. The trips involved both young people and adults as participants. The letters requesting the assistance of the Conduces Club, Inc., and the confirmation of that request may be found as Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3, admitted into evidence consecutively. The president of the Conduces Club, Inc., Mr. Cornell Tarver, testified in support of the petition. He indicated that the club had been originally formed as the Pacesetter Club but its name was changed in September, 1976, because of a conflict concerning the utilization of the name, which had been preempted by another club. The club was chartered as a nonprofit corporation by the State of Florida on September 22, 1976, under the name, "Conduces Club, Inc." A copy of the Articles of Incorporation may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. Mr. Tarver indicated that the purpose of the club was to help the youth and senior citizens and principally the kids of the Blodgett Community, to include organizing softball and baseball and providing uniforms. He also testified that a certain banquet was hold for these young persons and the parents of those children were invited to attend, and enough food was prepared to food cost of the individuals who reside in the Blodgett Community. He produced certain plaques and trophies awarded to the club. The plague was given by the mothers of the children in the sports programs and the trophy was presented by an unaffiliated club that the Conduces Club had helped to organize. The witness, Tarver, indicated that the club was financed by functions such as dances, fish fries, food sales in their club house, dues of the members and fines. The club itself has twenty-seven members. Other projects the club has participated in, were the contribution of money to local churches and the donation of an organ to one of those churches. On December 16, 1977, the club contributed $500.00 to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The club house is open every day and there are certain activities through the week, to include club meetings and entertainment for the benefit of club members. The members run the club without compensation and the club does not maintain any regular employees. The official statement of the club's purposes may be found in the Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. This is a composite exhibit which contains part of the application for the license and a copy of the Bylaws. The objectives of the corporation may be found in Article II of the Bylaws and the activities of the corporation may be found in Article VIII of the Bylaws. Article II states: "The objectives of this organization shall be as follows: To unite fraternally all persons who the membership may from time to time take into the club. To promote brotherhood, sportsmanship, friendship and charity for the membership and their families. To strive at all times to promote and protect the welfare of every member. To promote a spirit of cooperation between its members and the public. To honor outstanding individuals in the City of Jacksonville for their achievement. To do anything necessary, including, but not limited to, the ownership of property, real and personal, for the accomplishment of the foregoing objectives, or those which may be recognized as proper and legal objectives of this club, all of which shall be consistent with the laws, the public interest and the interest of its mergers. To sue or to be sued as a natural person. To bear a seal to be placed on all of the club's official correspondence." Article VIII states: "COMMITTEES Section 1. The following standing committees and such other committees as the directors may, from time to time deem necessary, shall be appointed by the president of the association. Social Committee Athletic Committee Scholarship Committee The duties of the standing committee shall include the following, which shall not, however, prelude other activities by such committees. Section 2. The social committee shall be composed of six members. It shall be the duty of this canted to supervise the use of club room and to plan such club meetings of a purely social nature as it may deem necessary. These may include parties, picnics, and other such social or athletic events sponsored by the organization. Section 3. The athletic committee shall be composed of three members. It shall be the duty of this committee to supervise and manage all athletic activities for the association, including but not limited to management of various athletic teams sponsored by the club. Section 4. The scholarships committee shall be composed of six members. It shall be the duty of this committee to screen applicants for scholarships and deserving students in Duval County, Florida, and to make recommendations to the general membership of its findings of worthwhile recipients of scholarships, or awards." It can be seen that the Petitioner's members have a commendable concern for the community in which the club has its principal base of operation and this concern has been expressed through the activities of the club members which have been described in the course of this Recommended Order; however, it appears from an examination of the testimony in this hearing and the official statement, that is, the Bylaws of this corporation, that the principal purpose of the club is as stated by the Article II B. of the Bylaws, which language states, "To promote brotherhood, sportsmanship, friendship and charity for the membership and their families," and this attitude carries over to foster good relations between those members and the members of the general public. Therefore, the Petitioner is not perceived as being a club which meets the criterion, "devoted to promoting community, municipal or county development or any phase of community, municipal or county development." See Subsection 561.20(7)(a)3., Florida Statutes. This conclusion is reached in examining the definition of the word "devoted," as found in Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, College Edition. That definition states that to be devoted one must be, "1. vowed; dedicated; consecrated. 2. very loyal; faithful." and although the community concern of the Petitioner is very high, it does not reach the level of devotion. Consequently, the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco was correct in denying the application for a Series 11-C alcoholic beverage license.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco deny the Petitioner, Conduces Club, Inc.'s request for a Series 11-C alcoholic beverage license. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building MAILING ADDRESS 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jennings H. Best, Esquire 3410 North Myrtle Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Francis Bayley, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 J. M. Ogonowski Richard P. Daniel Building, Room 514 111 East Coast Line Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32202
The Issue Does the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Condominiums, Timeshares and Mobile Homes’ (“the Division”), approval of timeshare developers’ requests to provide purchasers with a public offering statement via a website link amount to an unadopted rule within the meaning of section 120.52(8)(a), Florida Statutes (2017).1/ Also, does the Division’s approval of timeshare developers’ requests to provide purchasers with public offering statements via a website link amount to an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of section 120.52(8)(c).
Findings Of Fact The following findings of fact are based on exhibits accepted into evidence, admitted facts set forth in the pre- hearing stipulation, and matters subject to official recognition. Relevant Statutes and Rules Pertaining to Timeshares Chapter 721 of the Florida Statutes is known as the “Florida Vacation Plan and Timesharing Act” (“the Act”). § 721.01, Fla. Stat. The Florida Legislature intends for the Act to “[p]rovide full and fair disclosure to the purchasers and prospective purchasers of timeshare plans.” § 721.02(3), Fla. Stat. The Division is the state agency responsible for enforcing the Act. Section 721.10(1), Florida Statutes, provides that a purchaser2/ can cancel a contract to purchase a timeshare interest “until midnight of the 10th calendar day following whichever of the following days occur later: (a) The execution date; or (b) The day on which the purchaser received the last of all documents required to be provided to him or her ” (emphasis added). Section 721.10(1) further provides that “[t]his right of cancellation may not be waived by any purchaser or by any other person on behalf of the purchaser. Furthermore, no closing may occur until the cancellation period of the timeshare purchaser has expired.” A “public offering statement” is the term describing a single-site timeshare plan or a multisite timeshare plan, including any exhibits attached thereto as required by sections 721.07, 721.55, and 721.551. Section 721.07(6)(a) requires that a timeshare developer “shall furnish each purchaser” with “[a] copy of the purchaser public offering statement text in the form approved by the division for delivery to the purchasers.” (emphasis added). Florida Administrative Code Rule 61B-39.004(1) provides that “a developer of a single-site timeshare plan shall deliver to every purchaser of the single-site timeshare plan a single-site purchaser POS.” (emphasis added). Rule 61B-39.004(1) mandates that a public offering statement shall contain: A copy of the single-site registered public offering statement text as prescribed in Section 721.07(5), Florida Statutes, and Rule 61B-39.003, F.A.C.; A copy of the exhibits prescribed in Sections 721.07(5)(ff)1., 2., 4., 5., 8., and 16., Florida Statutes, as applicable. Pursuant to Section 721.07(6)(b) and Section 721.07(5)(ff)19., Florida Statutes, if the single-site is one created as a tenancy-in-common, the purchaser shall receive the document or documents creating the tenancy-in-common, including at a minimum a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions; and Any other exhibit that the developer has filed with the division pursuant to Section 721.07(5), Florida Statutes, and Rule 61B-39.003, F.A.C., which the developer is not required but elects to include in the purchaser POS pursuant to Section 721.07(6)(d), Florida Statutes. In short, a public offering statement contains all of the documents that a timeshare developer is required to give to a purchaser. Its purpose is to apprise a purchaser of everything that he or she needs to know about a timeshare. As a result, a public offering statement can be as much as 100 pages long. Section 721.07(3)(a)1. requires that: Any change to an approved public offering statement filing shall be filed with the division for approval as an amendment prior to becoming effective. The division shall have 20 days after receipt of a proposed amendment to approve or cite deficiencies in the proposed amendment. If the division fails to act within 20 days, the amendment will be deemed approved. The Division allows timeshare developers to provide purchasers with a POS through “alternative media.” As set forth in rule 61B-39.008(1), Developers may provide purchasers with the option of receiving all or any portion of a single-site or multi-site purchaser POS through alternative media in lieu of receiving the written materials in the format prescribed in Rule 61B-39.004 or 61B- 39.006, F.A.C., as applicable. The purchaser’s choice of the delivery method shall be set forth in writing on a separate form which shall also disclose the system requirements necessary to view the alternative media, which form shall be signed by the purchaser. The form shall state that the purchaser should not select alternative media unless the alternative media can be viewed prior to the 10 day cancellation period. The alternative media disclosure statement shall be listed on the form receipt for timeshare documents in the manner prescribed in DBPR Form TS 6000-7, Receipt for Timeshare Documents, or DBPR Form TS 6000-7, Receipt for Multisite Timeshare Documents, as both of which are referenced in Rule 61B-39.003, F.A.C. Rule 61B-39.001(1) defines “alternative media” as “any visually or audibly perceptible and legible display format which may require the use of a device or a machine to be viewed, including CD-ROM, microfilm, electronically transferred data, computer disk, computer or electronic memory, cassette tape, compact disk or video tape.” Rule 61B-39.008(3) provides that: Prior to delivery of the purchaser POS through alternative media, the developer must submit to the division a copy of the purchaser POS through the alternative media proposed to be used by the developer together with an executed certificate, using the form prescribed in DBPR Form TS 6000-8, the Certificate of Identical Documents, referenced in Rule 61B-39.003, F.A.C., certifying that the portion of the purchaser POS delivered through the proposed alternative media is an accurate representation of and, where practical, identical to the corresponding portion of the written purchaser POS. Facts Specific to the Instant Case Orange Lake Country Club, Inc. (“Orange Lake Country Club”), is the “developer” within the meaning of section 721.05(1) for the timeshare plans known as Orange Lake Country Club Villas, a Condominium (“Orange Lake”); Orange Lake Country Club Villas III (“Orange Lake III”); and Orange Lake Country Club Villas IV, a Condominium (“Orange Lake IV”). The aforementioned timeshare plans shall be collectively referred to as the “Orange Lake Timeshare Plans.” The Orange Lake Timeshare Plans are “single-site timeshare plans” as defined by rule 61B-39.001(13). Via letters dated April 24, 2015, Orange Lake and Orange Lake III filed amendments to their alternative media disclosure statements with the Division. In addition to providing for purchasers to receive documents such as the POS in writing or via CD-ROM, the amended alternative media disclosure statements gave purchasers the option of receiving documents through the internet at http://orangelake.com/legaldocuments/index.php. The amended alternative media disclosure statements contained a notice that a PDF reader and one of three web browsers (Internet Explorer 9 or above, Google Chrome, or Firefox) were required. The amended alternative media disclosure statements instructed purchasers how to access documents through the link: Open the link, http://orangelake.com/ legaldocuments/index.php. in your web browser. Enter the user name: hoEXliday and password: welcome! Follow the following steps: Step 1: Please select the link to your resort. Step 2: Please select the Condominium, if applicable. Step 3: Please select the State where you purchased. Step 4: Please select the Public Offering Statement. Via letters dated April 28, 2015, the Division approved the amended alternative media disclosure statements “for filing and use in the timeshare plan.” Before retiring, Mr. Rudisill worked as a regional service manager for York International. He oversaw 50 service technicians and sales engineers. Mr. Rudisill used a computer at work and had an e-mail address associated with his position at York International. Mr. Rudisill acquired his first home computer 35 to 40 years ago and has owned a home computer ever since. He currently has an e-mail address and internet access via three different web browsers. Ms. Rudisill has no reported employment history. She uses a home computer and has an e-mail address. The Rudisills maintain a permanent residence in Georgia but travel to Florida for vacations. Between 2002 and 2015, the Rudisills purchased approximately 11 timeshare interests for use as vacation residences. Neither Mr. Rudisill nor Ms. Rudisill read any of the public offering statements associated with the aforementioned timeshare purchases. Ms. Rudisill considers she and her husband to be well- versed with the process of purchasing timeshares. On June 14, 2015, the Rudisills executed purchase agreements to acquire week 32 for unit 5280 at Orange Lake and week 29 for unit 87911 at Orange Lake III. These purchases were made so that they would have vacation residences. Both acquisitions utilized the alternative media disclosure statements that had been approved by the Division on April 28, 2015. As noted above, the Rudisills had the option to receive documents in written format, via a CD-ROM, or through a website link. The Rudisills placed their initials next to a box indicating they agreed to accept documents electronically via a link to http://orangelake.com/legaldocuments/. On June 14, 2015, the Rudisills executed documents pertaining to the Orange Lake and Orange Lake III timeshares stating that “[t]he undersigned acknowledges that the items listed below have been received and the timeshare plans and specifications have been made available for inspection.” The aforementioned items included “Public Offering Statement Text.” However, neither Mr. Rudisill nor Ms. Rudisill ever attempted to access the link provided to them by the Orange Lake Country Club. Neither Mr. Rudisill nor Ms. Rudisill ever asked for the documents to be provided in a different format. The Rudisills initiated the instant litigation in order to cancel the purchase agreements. They cannot afford the timeshares and are unable to travel. There is no allegation that Orange Lake Country Club coerced the Rudisills into purchasing the timeshares at issue or took advantage of them in any way.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the terms, conditions, privileges, or provision of services in connection with the rental of a dwelling from Respondent, based on her race, in violation of section 804(b) or 804(f) of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988 and the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes (2011).
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and manages the Country Club Woods residential community in Starke, Florida. Country Club Woods is a racially-mixed community. The current residential mix includes 29 African-American families and 6 white families. County Club Woods receives low-income housing subsidies in the form of tax credits through the Florida Housing Finance Corporation. Some residents qualify for federal Section 8 housing subsidies. Petitioner is African-American. On February 4, 2011, Petitioner signed a lease agreement for a home in Country Club Woods. Rent was $698.00 per month. The home was vacant, and power and water had been turned off. Respondent asked Petitioner to activate power and water so that repairs and unit preparation could be performed, and she did so. Petitioner?s rent for February was partially prorated to account for the period during which she did not occupy the unit. The lease agreement required that all occupants of the house be listed, and provided that “[n]o other occupants are permitted.” Guests were limited to stays of no more than 14 consecutive days. Due to the status of Country Club Woods as an affordable housing community, it is subject to restrictions on the income and criminal history of its residents. Therefore, all permanent occupants are required to undergo income and background screening to ensure that the low income housing tax credit rules are being met. The failure to do so could jeopardize the tax credits. When she signed the lease, Petitioner knew what the lease required regarding the occupancy of the house. Petitioner listed Aulettia Russ and Aarian Russ, her daughter and son, as occupants with her in the home. After the lease contract was signed, Respondent performed a few repairs and updates to prepare the unit for Petitioner. Mr. Sam Baker, who performed maintenance services for County Club Woods, fumigated the house and painted some of the interior walls. He performed a minor repair to the roof, which consisted of applying tar around the cracked rubber boot of the roof drain vent. Mr. Baker moved a stove into the house from another unit because there was no stove when the lease was signed. He also replaced the toilet with a new one. Petitioner moved into the unit on February 16, 2010. She was joined by her fiancé, Kevin Sampson, and her older son, Kelsy Roulhac, neither of whom were listed as occupants. Mr. Sampson was on probation for several felony offenses. Both Mr. Sampson and Mr. Roulhac were residents for the entirety of Petitioner?s tenancy. At no time during the tenancy did Petitioner seek to add Mr. Sampson or Mr. Roulhac to the lease. Petitioner testified that Rebekkah Baker, the property manager, knew that Mr. Sampson was a permanent occupant, but had no objection. Ms. Baker denied that she consented to his occupancy, given that it would have been a violation of Country Club Woods policy against leasing to persons with a criminal history in the past seven years. Given the consequences of failing to meet the occupancy and background screening requirements, Ms. Baker?s testimony is credited. When Petitioner moved in, there were still problems with the unit. Problems noted by Petitioner included a broken dishwasher, mildew on a number of surfaces, dead insects -- likely from the fumigation -- in the cabinets, a hole in the foyer wall caused by the adjacent door?s doorknob, a ceiling stain from the roof leak, a missing shower head, a broken light fixture, and a missing smoke alarm. In addition, the carpet was stained and in generally very poor condition. Petitioner resolved the mildew problem by cleaning the affected surfaces with Tilex. Petitioner?s son, Mr. Roulhac, got rid of the dead insects and cleaned the cabinets. Petitioner replaced the showerhead on her own. Shortly after she moved in, Petitioner notified Respondent that her roof was leaking. Mr. Baker went to the house, advised Petitioner?s daughter that he was there to fix the roof, and went onto the roof. He determined that the leak was occurring at the location of his previous repair. He completed the repair by re-tarring the roof drain vent boot. Petitioner testified that the roof continued to leak after heavy rains. She indicated that she made a subsequent complaint via a message left on Ms. Baker?s telephone answering machine. Ms. Baker testified that she received no subsequent complaints, and there is no other evidence to suggest that Respondent received any subsequent complaints regarding the roof. Mr. Baker performed no further repairs. Petitioner complained that the dishwasher was holding water. She testified that Respondent never came to fix the dishwasher. Both Mr. Baker and Ms. Baker testified that Mr. Baker was tasked to repair the dishwasher, but upon arriving at the house was denied entry, with the explanation that the dishwasher had been fixed by a friend, and the problem resolved by removing a plastic fork that had clogged the drain. From the time Petitioner moved in, until the time she vacated the home, Mr. Baker fixed the hole in the foyer wall and the broken light fixture. In addition, Mr. Baker came to the house to fix the refrigerator, which was a problem that was not on the original list. From the beginning of her tenancy, Petitioner complained of the carpet. The carpet was badly stained and worn. In addition, the carpet contained a dye or some other substance that aggravated Aarian Russ?s asthma. It was Petitioner?s desire to have the carpet replaced before the time of her daughter?s graduation. Respondent agreed to replace the carpet, and had employees of a flooring company go to Petitioner?s house to measure for new carpet. The flooring company employees were allowed entry to the house by Petitioner?s daughter. They measured the rooms, except for Petitioner?s bedroom, which was locked. Respondent advised Petitioner that the measurements of the bedroom of an identical unit could be provided to the carpet company. It is not known if that was done. Due to difficulties on the part of the flooring company, the new carpet was not installed before Petitioner vacated the unit. There was no evidence offered to suggest any relationship between the failure to install new carpet and Petitioner?s race. Petitioner complained that she had not been given notice that the flooring company employees were coming, and complained that Respondent had not performed a background check on the workers. She argued that she was entitled to have a background check done on anyone providing services before she would have to allow them into her home. There is no relationship between Petitioner?s complaints regarding the lack of a background check on the workers and Petitioner?s race. The lease agreement provides that “[m]anagement will make repairs . . . after receipt of written notice.” Respondent occasionally prepared work orders describing the nature of the problem at a unit, and the work done to resolve the problem. However, the evidence demonstrates that written work orders were likely the exception rather than the rule. It appears that most problems were reported by verbal requests, and resolved by Mr. Baker?s maintenance and repairs. Most of Petitioner?s requests for repairs and maintenance were made verbally. At some point, due to the number of items, Petitioner provided Respondent with a list of items for repair. There is no evidence that any repairs at Petitioner?s home were documented with a work order. In any event, there was no evidence that the failure to document the work, which was common, was the result of Petitioner?s race. Petitioner did submit seven work orders in evidence. Six of the work orders reflected repairs made by Respondent to the homes of African-American families upon verbal requests. One of the work orders reflected repairs made by Respondent to the home of a white family upon a verbal request. Petitioner questioned why none of her repairs were memorialized in work orders. The work orders do not substantiate that Petitioner was discriminated against on account of her race, and in fact serve to indicate that Respondent provided maintenance services equally, without any consideration to the race of the person requesting such services. Petitioner complained that Mr. Baker did not have “credentials,” and questioned him regarding any education or licenses that qualified him to perform maintenance, including electrical work. Whether qualified to do so or not, Mr. Baker performed maintenance for all of the residents of Country Club Woods, regardless of their race. There is no relationship between Petitioner?s complaints regarding Mr. Baker?s credentials and Petitioner?s race. Beginning in April, 2011, Petitioner began to fall behind on her rent. Petitioner was paid bi-weekly, though how that affected her ability to plan for monthly rental payments was not clearly explained. On April 21, 2011, Ms. Baker posted a notice on Petitioner?s door demanding that the $279.60 balance of the April rent payment be made. Petitioner denied having seen the notice. However, the copy of the notice put in evidence includes the notation from Ms. Baker that “[p]romised to pay balance w/ May 2011?s rent.” On May 9, 2011, Ms. Baker posted a notice on Petitioner?s door demanding that the rent payment be made. The amount in arrears was calculated to be $1,077.60, which included a late fee. Petitioner denied having seen the notice. However, the copy of the notice put in evidence includes the notation from Ms. Baker that “pd. $698 on 5/11/11.” On June 1, 2011, Ms. Baker posted a notice on Petitioner?s door demanding that the rent payment be made. The amount in arrears remained at $1,077.60. Petitioner denied having seen the notice. On July 27, 2011, Respondent provided a notice to Petitioner indicating that due to unauthorized occupants and $1,975 in unpaid rent, Petitioner had until August 1, 2011, to vacate the premises, or Respondent would commence eviction proceedings. Petitioner admitted to having received that notice. Respondent?s resident history report indicates that by the time Petitioner vacated the home on August 31, 2011, her rent was $2,075.60 in arrears. Some of that was due to assessed late charges, but the majority reflected unpaid rent. When Petitioner vacated the unit, Petitioner?s security deposit was applied, the remaining arrearage was assigned to a collection company, and Respondent?s books were cleared. Ms. Sheila Palmer and Ms. Tynesha Epps testified at the hearing. They have been residents of Country Club Woods for 16 years and for 1 year and 3 months, respectively. Both are African-American. Both testified that they had never been refused maintenance at their homes, and that Respondent was responsive to their requests for maintenance which were generally verbal. Neither Ms. Palmer nor Ms. Epps was aware of any instance in which management of Country Club Woods had discriminated against any tenant due to their race, though neither personally knew Petitioner. Ms. Headrick, Ms. Baker, and Mr. Baker each testified that they never denied or limited repair and maintenance services to any resident of Country Club Woods account of their race. They each testified convincingly that race played no factor in their duties to their tenants. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent failed or refused to provide services to Petitioner under the same terms and conditions that were applicable to all persons residing in the Country Club Woods community. There was not a scintilla of evidence that, in providing services to Petitioner, Respondent deviated from its standard practice of providing maintenance services to all residents of Country Club Woods regardless of their race, income, or any other reason. The evidence does support a finding that Petitioner materially breached the terms of the lease agreement, both by allowing undisclosed persons to reside at the house, and by failing to timely pay rent. Petitioner?s race had nothing to do with the timing or manner in which maintenance and repair services were provided to her by Respondent, and it is expressly so found. The evidence did not demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2012H0004. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Eulinda M. Russ Post Office Box 902 Starke, Florida 32091 Sean Michael Murrell, Esquire Murrell Law, LLC 4651 Salisbury Road South, Suite 503 Jacksonville, Florida 32256 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether petitioner should rescind its approval of prospectus amendments contained in amended prospectuses petitioner accepted for filing on June 23, 1988?
Findings Of Fact Respondent (Water Oak) manages a mobile home park in Lake County known as Water Oak Country Club Estates (the park). The previous owner envisioned phased development of an eventual total of 1,479 lots, and so stated in the original or "P" prospectus filed with petitioner's Bureau of Mobile Homes (the Bureau). The "P" prospectus contemplated a 587-lot "Golfside Villas" section when phase II of the park was developed. The "P" prospectus disclosed plans to build a separate recreational complex for Golfside Villas, leaving the main recreational complex for the exclusive use of other park residents. But the "P" prospectus stated: Water Oak Estate Mobile Home Park has a clubhouse, swimming pool, tennis courts and a shuffleboard center, which will be available for use by the park residents. The maximum number of lots that will use these shared facilities at the present time is 1,479, which is the total number of lots within the park. The Golfside Villas Section will use these facilities until November 1, 1987, at which time they will use their own facilities, and will no longer use Water Oak Estate facilities except by invitation from the Water Oak Residents' Association, or the Park Management. After Water Oak, Ltd. acquired the park, respondent or its agent filed an amended prospectus ("P86") with the Bureau. The "P86" prospectus differed from the "P" prospectus only to the extent required by the 1986 amendments to Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1989), and did not alter disclosures regarding recreational facilities. A third Water Oak prospectus ("P2"), preserved the Golfside Villas concept and the idea of a separate recreational complex. As filed with the Bureau, however, the P2 prospectus stated: The recreational and other common areas discussed above are completed and available for use by the residents. The maximum number of home sites that are presently entitled to use these facilities is 590. FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS-- Water Oak Country Club Estates will build an additional clubhouse, a swimming pool, and a shuffleboard center, which will be for and in the Golfside Villas Section. Management may increase or decrease the size or modify the use of any of the shared facilities to serve the changing needs of the community, as determined by management. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, p. 7. In due course, the Bureau approved all three prospectuses, "P", "P86" and "P2", one after another. In approving prospectuses "P86" and "P2", the Bureau implicitly deemed them consistent with earlier approved prospectus(es). Because of considerations not pertinent here, Water Oak decided to abandon the idea of a discrete Golfside Villas section with its own exclusive recreational complex. Instead, it proposed, in developing phase II, to build the recreational complex contemplated in prospectuses "P", "P86" and "P2" (the original prospectuses) but to make both the phase II recreational complex and the original complex available to all residents of the park. Accordingly, Water Oak proposed amendments to the original prospectuses outlining its revised plans, and on April 16, 1988, filed them with the Bureau. Water Oak's cover letter explained: More specifically, a new clubhouse, heated swimming pool and shuffle board center open to all park residents will soon be available for use and so information concerning those facilities has been moved from the "Future Improvements" sections of these documents to the "Recreational and Other Common Areas" section. The proposed amendments are designed to make the "RECREATIONAL AND COMMON FACILITIES" section of all these prospectuses identical, and thus the existing versions of that section are deleted in their entirety in each prospectus and the new language substituted. . . . One other point is relevant to your consideration in this matter. The original owner of Water Oak Country Club Estates intended to designate a section of the park as the "Golfside Villas." However, no such section was ever developed ant the current owner has decided not to develop that section as such. Therefore, the Golfside Villas section of the park will not be created. Thus, all references to the Golfside Villas are now proposed to be deleted from all of the prospectuses in use in the park. No homeowner has leased a lot in an area designated as "the Golfside Villas," nor has any resident received any lease or other notification stating that his lot is in an area known as the Golfside Villas. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 (Emphasis in original.) Bureau personnel reviewed the amendments and approved the applications. Respondent's Exhibits Nos. 4 and After the approval, Water Oak gave prospective lessees amended P2 prospectuses, and entered into 60 or more leases with new residents to whom they had furnished amended prospectuses. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7, a printed map of the park that is not part of any prospectus, labels a shaded portion in the northeast as "GOLFSIDE VILLAS AREA." Margerie Monski received a copy of the map on August 4, 1987, (T.411) before she and her husband leased a lot depicted on the unshaded portion of the map, in phase I. Respondent leased lot No. 2472 to Mr. and Mrs. Edward Reposa on April 4, 1988. T. 445; Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11. When respondent filed proposed prospectus amendments two days later, it had leased no other lot within the shaded area on Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Respondent leased lot No. 2510 to Mr. and Mrs. Alador Kurucz on April 20, 1988, and lot No. 2519 to Mr. and Mrs. Lloyd W. Wunder on June 8, 1988. Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 12 and 13. Lots Nos. 2472, 2510 and 2519 all lie within the part of the park represented by the shaded area on Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. But, as far as the evidence showed, none of the three lots' lessees has ever seen Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7 or any other map of the park on which Golfside Villas was depicted as a discrete section. No prospectus ever indicated that lots had been or were being leased in Golfside Villas. Unbeknownst to Water Oak, Mel Bishop Enterprises, Inc., the predecessor in interest who initially continued as park manager for Water Oak, filed a map similar to Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7 with the Bureau on October 27, 1987 (a prerequisite to its lawful use as advertising.) Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. Lots depicted in the shaded area number far fewer than the 587 mentioned in the original prospectuses. The three original prospectuses, "P", "P86" and "P2", contain maps of phase I only. Front, back, left side and right side lot dimensions are listed for phase I, lot by lot. With respect to Golfside Villa lot dimensions, only the following appears: Front Left Side 1-587 - - - - 56 90 Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. On April 6, 1988, respondent's principals were under the impression that no specific area within the park had ever been officially designated as Golfside Villas. Nothing in any of the materials they reviewed when respondent acquired the park located Golfside Villas at a particular spot on the land reserved for development in phase II. Testifying at hearing, petitioner's personnel conceded that respondent had no intention to mislead the Bureau with regard to any fact material to approval or acceptance of respondent's prospectus amendments. Nor did the evidence show that the fact that the respondent leased three lots depicted within the shaded area on Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7 would have been material in the Bureau's original decision to approve respondent's prospectus amendments.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss its notice and order of rejection. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 26, 30, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 41, 45 and 49 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 6, the pertinent part of the letter is quoted. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 10, 15, 28, 33, 34, 39, 40, 42 and 50 pertain to immaterial matters. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 19, 24, 27, 43 and 44, no prospectus located a "Golfside Villas section of the park" at any specific place. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23, 25 and 47 pertain to subordinate matters. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 29, Mr. Stoppa made the allegation, but no prospectus located a "Golfside Villas section of the park" at any specific place. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 36, only two such leases were proven. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 46, see paragraph 10 of the findings of fact. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 48, it was not clear from the evidence what the basis was. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 21 22, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37, 38, 42, 43, 44 and 45 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 4, the number was 587. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 10, 25 and 39 pertain to immaterial matters. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 32, 33, 36 and 41 pertain to subordinate matters. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 23, it is not clear what petitioner's policy was at any given time. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 40, petitioner failed to prove its materiality. Copies furnished: Debra Roberts, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman Davis, Marks & Rutledge, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street First Florida Bank Bldg., Suite 400 Tallahassee, FL 32301 E. James Kearney, Director Department of Business Regulation Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated in its hiring and employment practices against Petitioner based upon his age.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Timothy Cahill, is a 1976 graduate of the University of Iowa with a degree in education. He spent ten years working as a manager for Hy-Vee Foods, Inc. (Hy-Vee), one of the larger privately held food and grocery chain stores in the country. Petitioner was also a skilled, competitive golfer. After working for Hy-Vee for ten years, Petitioner decided to change careers and pursue a career as a golf professional. In 1986, he began working as an assistant golf professional at a private golf club in Omaha, Nebraska. The following year, he was hired as an assistant golf pro at Tiger Point Golf and Country Club in Gulf Breeze, Florida, which was owned by Jerry Pate, a well-known playing professional and golf course architect. Petitioner worked at Tiger Point for two years completing the Professional Golf Association’s (PGA) Golf School Business School curriculum, the player’s ability test, oral comprehensives, and apprenticeship program. This certified him as a PGA “Class A” Professional (Class A Professional). Petitioner was employed as the Head Golf Professional at Musgrove Country Club an 18-hole facility in Jasper, Alabama, from 1989-1992. There was an average of 15,000 rounds of golf played at this club annually when he resigned to take a position at Oxmoor Valley. Petitioner was employed in 1992 as the property manager and director of golf at Oxmoor Valley, the first of the Robert Trent Jones Golf Trail courses in Alabama. In this position he coordinated and developed a $2.1 million budget for the facility in Birmingham, Alabama. This course was a 36-hole course that immediately drew 83,000 rounds of golf a year. In 1994, Petitioner was recruited to return to Tiger Point, which had been purchased by K.S.L. Fairways Group (KSL), as the “Director of Golf/Head Golf Professional.” He managed golf operations at Tiger Point. At this time, Petitioner was 39 years old. He reported directly to the property manager at Tiger Point, Lance Guidry. The property manager’s office was in the club’s clubhouse, and Guidry was primarily responsible for club operations including food and beverage, coordinating course maintenance, and golf operations. Petitioner was primarily involved with operations of the golf store, where his office was located, scheduling golfing events, and golfing operations. He eventually oversaw the golf operations at affiliated courses as head golf professional. This permitted young golf professionals to apprentice under him, and he was a resource person for managing their operations. During all times material to Petitioner’s complaint, KSL owned and operated Tiger Point and 27 other golf courses and clubs around the country. At the time Petitioner was hired, KSL owned two smaller, 18-hole courses in the panhandle of Florida: Scenic Hills in Pensacola and Shalimar Point in Shalimar/Ft. Walton Beach. Shortly after August 1995, KSL purchased a fourth 18-hole course named Hidden Creek in Navarre. KSL is subject to the Florida Civil Rights Act. Tiger Point was typical of KSL’s operation. It was a country club; however, it was open to public play. In this regard, it was a drawing card to visitors enjoying golfing junkets to the region. Tiger Point drew over twice as many package rounds as the other clubs owned by KSL in the region. It was the primary draw, and Petitioner, as mentioned above, functioned as the PGA golf professional for the other clubs. This meant that the golf professionals at the other facilities could apprentice under him as a Class A Professional, and earn credit towards becoming Class A Professionals. This was a drawing card for these professionals, who were mostly young, former college golfers attempting to make careers as touring or club professionals. Joey Garon was the District Manager for club operations in the panhandle. When Petitioner was hired, Garon was physically located at the Scenic Hills golf course where he was also the property manager. In January 1995, Garon moved to Tiger Point, transferred Guidry to Shalimar Point, and took over as the property manager at Tiger Point. On March 29, 1995, Garon performed an evaluation of Petitioner’s performance of his duties as Head Golf Pro. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 5. Garon rated him highly; the sales from his golf store were among the highest in KSL. He was well respected by members, young professionals who worked under him, and guests at the facility. Property managers averaged $45,000 per year, and the Tiger Point Property Manager made $50,000 a year. Garon had additional duties and made more. Petitioner was making $40,000 in the early fall of 1995. In the late summer of 1995, Hurricane Erin stuck the Florida panhandle and did serious damage to the area, including Tiger Point. Damage was done to the club, to the course, and to facilities in the area such as hotels and motels. Power was lost in many areas for two to three weeks. Traffic was restricted to Santa Rosa Island. Less than two months later, Hurricane Opal struck the same region causing greater damage. Because of the nature of Tiger Point’s business, these storms seriously impacted business. Various cost-cutting measures were instituted and some assets were sold to reduce losses. A review of all the positions in the panhandle was conducted. Personnel expense on hourly employees was reduced by sending non-essential personnel home early. Garon and the President of KSL, Eric Affeldt, decided to reduce Petitioner’s salary by 25 percent, from $40,000 to $30,000. Petitioner was told in November that his salary would be reduced in this manner, and if he did not like it, he could leave. At the same time, his assistant club professional, Sam Harrell, was discharged. Garon explained to Petitioner that Harrell was being fired because “new blood was needed,” “Harrell did not fit the image,” and “new faces” and “younger legs” were needed. Harrell was in his late 30’s. No evidence was received that other salaried employees at Tiger Point or the other clubs were discharged or had their salaries reduced although there were salaried employees at the other KSL facilities whose profits had been impacted adversely by the storms. Petitioner accepted the salary cut because the holidays were coming up; he had a family to feed; and there was no way he could quit so abruptly. Sam Harrell was permitted to stay on at the facility at give golf lessons, however, as an independent contractor. In December 1995, while on a golfing trip to a KSL course in South Florida, Garon advised Petitioner that Eric Affeldt had decided to restore his former salary. Petitioner was not offered his lost salary. Garon stated at hearing that the reason this was done was that it was the right thing to do; his testimony in this latter regard is not credible. Nothing was mentioned to Petitioner at this time or at any other time about plans to eliminate or consolidate positions within the company because of the bad earnings. Two weeks after Petitioner’s pay was cut, KSL transferred Patrick Barrett to Tiger Point as the property manager and increased his salary to $50,000 year. Garon stayed on as Regional Manager until June of 1996. His pay was charged to Tiger Point for 60 days after he departed and assumed duties at a new KSL facility. On the morning of March 26, 1996, there was a staff meeting at Tiger Point chaired by Barrett. Barrett mentioned that there might be personnel reductions; however, after the meeting, Petitioner specifically asked Barrett about him and his staff. Barrett stated that they had done well and had added to the facilities' bottom line. Petitioner had worked to increase dues-paying club memberships as a means to offset financial losses from the loss of tourists’ dollars. That afternoon, Garon announced to Petitioner that Petitioner was terminated immediately. KSL wrote a letter that indicates that Petitioner’s discharge was in no way performance related. Garon testified at hearing that Petitioner had indicated in early 1995, before the storms and before the financial problems, that he did not want a club management position based upon his experience with these positions in Alabama. This was Garon’s rationale for not offering the property manager’s position to Petitioner, and promoting Barrett. It is not credible that Garon held an honest belief that Petitioner would not accept the position of property manager at an increase of $10,000 a year in salary as an alternative to discharge. Petitioner stated that he did not want to be in management in two off-hand remarks to an abstract inquiry about his interest in a management position. Petitioner's comments were irrelevant to the post-storm situation facing Petitioner. It is not controverted that Barrett is younger than Petitioner. Garon testified that Barrett performed the duties of Director of Golf and Property Manager. This is not supported by the facts. The testimony of those who were in a position to observe golf operations before and after Petitioner’s discharge indicated that Barrett was seldom in the golf store and had nothing to do with the day-to-day duties of the Director of Golf. He did not run the store; he did not organize events; he did not supervise the employees directly. The budget for 1996 had been prepared by Petitioner before his discharge. The duties previously performed by Petitioner were performed by a succession of younger, less qualified employees all of whom were paid substantially less than Petitioner. From March 26 until June 3, 1996, John Fell performed the duties. Fell was 29 or 30 years old. He ran the golf shop, he conducted tournaments, and he supervised the other employees. When he resigned in June, John Ferrel was brought in. Ferrel was approximately the same age as Fell. Ferrel handled golfing play; and Gary James was retail coordinator, ordering and selling merchandize. These men did what Petitioner had done at Tiger Point. Leah Head transferred to Tiger Point in late 1996. She was in her late 20’s or early 30’s. She started at $25,000 as the head golf pro, but when she realized that she was to be responsible for all of the shop and golf, she demanded and got a salary of $30,000. Her performance evaluation indicates that she was performing the duties of Director of Golf to include improving sales and service, managing inventory, golf operations, tournaments, conducting employee/department meetings, setting goals for the department, and taking responsibility for poor staff performance. She was unaware that Barrett was calling himself “Director of Golf,” and considered him the general manager of the property. Head and others testified there was no essential difference between the titles Director of Golf and Head Golf Professional. The facts reveal that Petitioner’s duties were performed by younger persons, in some instances, transferred to Tiger Point for that purpose. Barrett did not really assume responsibility for the golf, and was Director of Golf in name only as reflected in Head’s designation of duties on her performance evaluation by Barrett. Tamara Bass testified regarding her experience at Tiger Point. Bass was in her 20’s. She had begun at Tiger Point a month before Petitioner’s discharge. His discharge adversely impacted her plans for obtaining her Class A Professional’s certification. She spoke with Barrett about this, and Barrett stated to her that he was interviewing to replace Petitioner with someone younger, cheaper and less experienced. Within several months, Head was hired. Following his discharge, Petitioner sought employment in the Panhandle area. He owned a house adjoining the Tiger Point course, his wife was employed at a local hospital, and his school age children were in local schools. It was not practical to uproot the family at this juncture. His job search was not helped by the fact that KSL owned several of the courses in the area; however, he did find employment, and eventually reached the salary he was making when discharged by KSL. However, he was without meaningful employment for several months; he was under-employed for several months, and it was several years before he reached the salary he was making when he was discharged, and, then, had to commute 86 miles to work. Petitioner received unemployment from April until October 12, 1996, in the amount of $11,141. He would have made $19,994 at Tiger Point during that period, his expenses were estimated (See Exhibit 16) and are disallowed. His economic loss was $8,853 for this period. From October 13, 1996 until December 1996, Petitioner made $7,296 at Ft. Walton Beach Golf Club. He worked 66 days, and commuted each working day 76 miles. At $.31/mile he had $1,555 in travel expenses. His meals were included in his compensation at Tiger Point, and he had to pay for his meals at Ft. Walton Beach Golf Club. His lunch was $3.00 each working day for a total of $198. He would have earned $9,228 at Tiger Point. Petitioner’s economic loss for this period was $3,685. From January until October 1997, Petitioner made $24,320 at Ft. Walton Beach Golf Club. He would have made $30,760 at Tiger Point. His economic loss for the period was $6,440. From November until December 1997, Petitioner made $7,668 at Ft. Walton Beach Golf Club. He would have made $9,228 at Tiger Point. His lost wages for November and December are $1,560. His expenses to commute to Ft. Walton Beach for the year were based upon a 50-week year, working six days a week, and commuting 76 miles each day at $.31/mile. This was a total of $7,068. His meals for 298 days at $3.00 a day were $894. His total economic loss for 1997 was $15,962. From January until April 25, 1998, Petitioner made $12,780 at Ft. Walton Beach Golf Club. He would have made $15,380 at Tiger Point. He commuted a total of 96 days, 76 miles each day at a cost of $.31/mile. This was a total of $2,261.61. His meals for 96 days at $3.00/ day were $288. His total economic loss for the period was $5,149.61. From May until December 1998, Petitioner made $29,536 at Glen Lakes Golf and Country Club. He would have made $24,608 at Tiger Point. He commuted a total of 192 days, 86 miles each day at a cost of $.31/mile. This is a total of $5,118.72. His total economic loss for the period was $190.72. For 1999, Petitioner made $48,000 at Glen Lakes Golf and Country Club. He would have made $40,000 at Tiger Point. He commuted a total of 275 days, 86 miles a day at $.31/mile. This was a total of $7,331.50. For the first time since his discharge, Petitioner exceeded his prior salary by $668.50.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusion of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter its final order finding that Respondent engaged in age discrimination, directing Respondent to pay Petitioner the amount of Petitioner's economic losses and directing Respondent to cease and desist from discriminatory employment practices in its businesses. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: John C. Barrett, Esquire 5 Calle Traviesa Pensacola Beach, Florida 32561 David S. Shankman, Esquire Post Office Box 172907 Tampa, Florida 33672-0907 Denise Crawford, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Florida Golfweek, Inc., was incorporated in March of 1975. During the year 1975 it began to publish "Florida Golfweek" which is a weekly publication concerning the golf industry in Florida. The Petitioner has published "Florida Golfweek" continuously since 1975, and it now has approximately 10,000 paid subscribers from every state and some foreign countries. Eighty-five to ninety percent of these subscribers are Florida residents. The Petitioner started a golf tournament called "Florida Women's Open" in 1978. This tournament was held at Errol Estate at Apopka in 1978, and in 1979, at Rolling Hills at Fort Lauderdale in 1980, at Plantation Inn in Crystal River in 1981 and 1982, and at Grenelefe Resort in Haines City in 1983. The Petitioner sets the dates for this tournament each year, and engages the golf courses. The event is publicized in its publication "Florida Golfweek," and in daily newspapers throughout the state, as well as on radio stations. Posters are printed and are circulated for display at golf courses. Entry blanks for the tournament are published in "Florida Golfweek" and these are sent to all Florida golf courses, about 60 of them. The entry blanks show the entry fee and where it should be mailed, normally to the Petitioner's address in Winter Haven, Florida. Both professionals and amateurs from the State of Florida play in this tournament, which has been established for Florida women golfers. A total of 260 played in the 1983 event. There has never been a fee charged for spectators, and the tournament has never been named anything but "Florida Women's Open." The Petitioner pays the prize money to the tournament winners, checks to the professionals and merchandise to the amateurs. It arranges for cocktail parties, and bears all of the expenses of the tournament including the golf course, carts, and green fees since 1978. The Petitioner makes a profit from this tournament, and as the field of players grows the profit potential will increase. There is a projection that a total of 400 golfers will participate in this tournament eventually. The Petitioner does not intend to abandon either the tournament or its name "Florida Women's Open." The Petitioner moves the tournament around Florida so as to return some business to golf courses and organizations which advertise in "Florida Golfweek," and also in deference to the participants, to get the event into their area. In March of 1983 the Petitioner learned that Plantation Inn at Crystal River intended to put on a similar tournament which had been named "Florida Women's Open," and that a corporation had been formed with the name Florida Women's Open, Inc. This tournament was put on by the Respondent at Plantation Inn at Crystal River in October of 1983. The Petitioner's president received a brochure about the Respondent's tournament, and he saw this brochure at a number of golf courses in Florida. He received telephone calls at the office of "Florida Golfweek" about the two opens, inquiring which is which. He also saw articles in the St. Petersburg Times publicizing the Respondent's tournament. These are the facts which have been found as a result of the Petitioner's proof. From the pleading presented by the Department of State's Division of Corporations, it is also found that the Respondent was issued Charter No. G11537 permitting the use of the corporate name Florida Women's Open, Inc., on December 3, 1982, and that on April 19, 1983, Mark Registration No. 929223 was issued to the Petitioner, Florida Golfweek, Inc., permitting the use of the trademark "Florida Women's Open" by the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of State enter its Final Order finding that on the evidence presented the Respondent is entitled to use the corporate name Florida Women's Open, Inc., and that the Petition of Florida Golfweek, Inc., be denied. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 26th day of October, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Randall G. Blankenship, Esquire Post Office Box 917 Winter Haven, Florida 33882 W. T. Green, Esquire Route One, Box 403 Crystal River, Florida 32629 Carole J. Barice, Esquire General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 George Firestone Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent Bisayne Menage Club, Inc., trading as Chantel Menage on the Bay, located at 2333 Brickell Avenue, Miami, Florida held 4-COP-SRX alcoholic Beverage license No 23-4231. The Respondent being a corporation, records of the Division of Business Regulation reflected that the sole corporate officer was Mitchell J. Segal who was president, secretary, and treasurer. On October 22, 1982, pursuant to an ongoing investigation, Officer Jonas Sears, in an undercover capacity, entered the Respondent's club where he met with Jose' Carballea (Coco), who he knew from some other narcotic transactions prior to this time which occurred off the licensed premises. At this time, Coco took Sears back into the kitchen area and, from a small metal key container which he had in his pocket, removed two small plastic bags containing a white powdery substance, one of which he sold to Sears for $80.00. The substance purchased by Sears then was subsequently identified as cocaine. From the access that Carballea had to all areas of the club, utilizing keys in his possesssion, and from the fact that he had advised Sears that his nephew owned the club, Sears concluded, and the evidence clearly establishes, that Core was, in some form or fashion, substantially high in the management of the operation. Sears, accompanied by Detective Ramirez, went back to the club on October 26, 1982 in the afternoon. As on the previous visit, the club was not open to the public at this time and the two officers met with Coco in the office area and then walked into the lounge. At this point Sears advised Coco he was there to buy another gram of cocaine. Coco took him to one of the offices off the kitchen where from a desk he removed a clear plastic bag containing a white powdery substance from the metal container he had used previously. He gave this bag to Sears in return for which Sears gave him $80.00. Before leaving, Sears was served a beer by Coco. The white powder substance purchased by Sears on this occasion was subsequently identified as cocaine. On November 9, Sears, again accompanied by Ramirez and another officer went to the club at 3:45 p.m. and met Coco in the kitchen. After a short discussion there, Coco took Sears into his office where he removed two plastic packages of white powder from the three that were in his metal key container. Sears gave Coco $160.00 for the two packets which were subsequently identified as containing cocaine. On this occasion, Coco indicated to Sears that consistent with the previous conversation they had had, he was interested in buying "Club" which was another name for Canadian Club whiskey. He took a piece of paper from a legal pad and wrote thereon the words, Canadian Club" and several other liquors including "J&B," "Amaretto," "Tia Maria," and "Red/Black" asking Sears if he could get the liquor the same day. This conversation transpired after Sears had asked Coco if his boss still wanted liquor. Coco had previously asked if Sears could get filet mignon. On November 18, 1982, in the afternoon, Sears, Ramirez, and a U.S. Customs agent, all in an undercover capacity, entered the club, When they arrived there, they were advised that Coco was not there. After a short wait, the officers left, returning approximately 40 minutes later. At this time, Sears came in by himself, meeting Coco in the lounge area. When Coco asked about the meat, Sears replied that none was available. However, he had the requested liquor in a friend s car parked outside. The liquor in question was liquor which had been purchased by the Miami Police Department for this operation and consisted of various liquors in case lots. It included some whiskeys that Coco had not mentioned. Coco negotiated with Ramirez in Spanish during which Ramirez allowed himself to be beaten down considerably in price from the original asking figure. Once the par ties struck the bargain the officers were instructed by Coco to carry and stack the cases in the rear office previously mentioned. This office was occupied by Letitia Thomas who was seated at a desk in the office. It was Ms. Thomas who took $245.00 from the pile of cash on her desk and paid Ramirez. Ms. Thomas was obviously an employee of the club. On the way out, Coco called Sears and Ramirez over and asked if Sears wanted to buy any more cocaine. When Sears said he did not have enough money with him, Ramirez offered to pay and Coco removed a small plastic bag containing a white powder from the small metal key container he carried and sold it to Sears for $80.00. This substance was subsequently identified as cocaine. When Sears and Ramirez went into the club again on December 3, 1982, to meet with Coco as per a prior arrangement, Coco again asked Sears if he wanted to buy cocaine. At this point, Sears said he wanted he grams. On this occasion, Coco sold Sears two packages of a substance subsequently identified as cocaine for $70.00 per package instead of the normal $80.00 per package. On December 8, 1982, Sears and Ramirez again went to the Respondent's club. They had previously discussed with Coco not only the sale of liquor and meat but also video recorders which the officers had clearly represented as being stolen. On this occasion, Coco said that his nephew wanted a recorder for his home and when this nephew, identified as Roberto Carbajal, arrived at the club, they discussed the video recorder with him. During this conversation, Carbajal indicated that he knew that the merchandise was stolen. After discussion back and forth, the parties arrived at a purchase price of $120.00 for the brand new unit. The officers were instructed by Carbajal to put the recorder in Coco's office and Carbajal paid Ramirez from his pocket. Carbajal, at this time, was a management employee of the license holder. On December 16, 1982, Sears and Ramirez went to the licensed premises as instructed by Coco. At that time, they had 56 cases of Dom Perignon champagne. Coco had told them to bring the champagne, which, he had indicated, was to be used by the club management. Their understanding with Coco was that he would buy the champagne upon delivery and would also sell them larger amounts of cocaine. When they arrived, Coco was not there and they dealt with other people in the club's employ. The man who approached them was identified as Mario Cordoves, who indicated that neither Coco nor Carbajal were there. Cordoves went off for a moment and returned a few moments later with an individual identified as John Radney who, he indicated, would be interested in buying the champagne. Radney agreed to take all 56 cases but stated that he could not take delivery at the club. He asked them to put some of it in his car. He also indicated that part of the 56 cases could be sold to someone else through his arrangement which was all right with Ramirez so long as the price remained the same. While this was going on, another individual, identified as George Kovacs, approached Ramirez and Sears, and negotiated to buy 18 of the cases of champagne for $100.00 per case. Kovacs left and came back with another individual who was to help him load the champagne into his car. All of this took place on the licensed premises attended by a bartender and two kitchen helpers in addition to Cordoves, Radney, Kovacs, and Kovacs assistant. When the deal was set, all the parties moved out into the parking lot and part of the champagne was placed into Kovacs vehicle. When this was done, Ramirez and Sears identified themselves as police officers and placed Kovacs under arrest. While this transaction was unfolding, Sears was told by Kovacs or someone at the club that the champagne would be sold in the club as part of a "Dom Perignon special" at $100.00 per bottle instead of the normal $200.00 per bottle they usually got. At the time of their arrest, Kovacs and Radney indicated they were up-front operators for the licensed club through an arrangement with Mr. Carbajal but were having difficulty with him. They indicated that Carbajal was the actual owner of the club while Mr. Segal was referred to as an attorney who was acting as registering agent for the corporation which he had set up. Neither Sears nor Ramirez ever saw Segal at the club on any of the visits they made there. Regardless of who was the beneficial owner of the stock in the corporation, Segal was listed as the sole officer and as such, was responsible for the operation.
The Issue Whether the Respondent violated Sections 112.313(6), 112.313(7)(a), and 112.313(8), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Robert Lee Thomas, served as Mayor of Glen St. Mary for approximately fourteen years prior to his resignation on June 6, 1995. In early December 1994, Ed Harvey, vice-president of the Baker County Shrine Club, telephoned Respondent regarding certain real property owned by the Shrine Club. Mr. Harvey told Respondent that the Shrine Club wanted to sell the property for $20,000. The Shrine Club had previously purchased the property from the City of Glen St. Mary. Pursuant to a provision in the deed conveying the property, the Shrine Club was obligated to give the city right of first refusal should it ever decide to sell the property. Consistent with this provision, Mr. Harvey contacted Respondent in his role as Mayor so that the matter could be presented to the Glen St. Mary City Council (Council). At the time Ed Harvey called Respondent regarding the sale of the Shrine Club property, information that the property was for sale was not available to the general public. When initially contacted by Mr. Harvey regarding the sale of the Shrine Club property, Respondent was aware that the City of Glen St. Mary had a right of first refusal on the Shrine Club property. During their telephone conversation, Respondent asked Mr. Harvey if the Shrine Club would sell the property to anyone other than the City of Glen St. Mary. Mr. Harvey told Respondent that the property was available to anyone for $20,000, subject to the City of Glen St. Mary's right of first refusal. After learning that the Shrine Club property was for sale, Respondent contacted his cousin, C. Parker Thomas, pastor of the Midnight Cry Ministry Church. Respondent informed C. Parker Thomas of the availability of the Shrine Club property because he knew that his cousin was looking for property in the Glen St. Mary area. As a result of Respondent's communication with C. Parker Thomas, the church decided to purchase the Shrine Club property and use it as an outreach center. On December 15, 1994, Respondent met with Jimmy Robbins, an elder of the Midnight Cry Ministry Church, and C. Parker Thomas at Respondent's home. At this meeting, Respondent accepted a $2,000 binder check dated, October 15, 1994, from Mr. Robbins on behalf of the Midnight Cry Ministry Church. The binder check was given to Respondent in exchange for his agreement to sell the Shrine Club property to the church for $30,000. Respondent asked Mr. Robbins to postdate the December 15, 1994, binder check to December 21, 1994. However, Mr. Robbins refused to postdate the check. Respondent brought the issue of the Shrine Club property up before the Council at its December 20, 1994, meeting. Specifically, the issue brought to the Council by Respondent was whether the City should exercise its right of first refusal and purchase the Shrine Club property. In presenting the issue to the Council for a vote, Respondent pointed out that the City of Glen St. Mary already had more land than it needed. Comments made by Respondent were intended to persuade the Council members not to purchase the Shrine Club property. After a brief discussion of the issue, the Council voted to decline to purchase the Shrine property. At no time did Respondent inform the Council that he had an agreement to sell the Shrine Club property to the Midnight Cry Ministry Church for $10,000 more than the Shrine Club was asking for the property. On December 23, 1994, three days after the Council voted to decline to exercise its right of first refusal, Respondent cashed the December 15, 1994, binder check from the Midnight Cry Ministry Church and used the money to purchase a $2,000 cashier's check as a binder on the Shrine Club property. The cashier's check was made payable to the Shrine Club with Respondent named as the remitter. On or about December 24, 1994, Respondent delivered the $2,000 binder check made payable to the Shrine Club to Ed Harvey. On February 23, 1995, Respondent purchased the Shrine Club property from the Shrine Club for $20,000. On that same date, Respondent sold the Shrine Club property to the Midnight Cry Ministry Church for $30,000. Winston Byrd was a Glen St. Mary City Commissioner on December 20, 1994, and participated in the vote regarding the City's right of first refusal on the Shrine Club property. Mr. Byrd voted not to purchase the Shrine Club property, but would have voted differently if Respondent had disclosed that the Midnight Cry Ministry Church was willing to purchase the property for $30,000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order and Public Report be entered finding that Respondent, Robert Lee Thomas, violated Section 112.313(6), 112.313(7)(a) and 112.313(8), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994); imposing a civil penalty of $1,000 per violation; ordering the restitution of the $10,000 profit Respondent made on the land deal to the City of Glen St. Mary; and issuing a public censure and reprimand. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of January, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric S. Scott CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUMCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of January, 1997. Assistant Attorney General Attorney General's Office PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Mr. Robert Lee Thomas Post Office Box 185 Glen St. Mary, Florida 32040 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Kerrie J. Stillman Complaint Coordinator Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
Findings Of Fact General. The Respondent, Cliff Hayden, Jr., served as the Executive Director of the Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority (hereinafter referred to as the "Authority"), from January, 1985, until January 19, 1990. Stipulated Fact I. 3. The Respondent was the Executive Director of the Authority at all times pertinent to the Complaint at issue in this proceeding. Stipulated Fact II. 4. The Authority was established pursuant to Part V of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, which provide for the establishment of regional transportation authorities. Stipulated Fact I. 2. The Respondent was employed by the Authority for 13 years prior to his employment as the Executive Director. John King served as a member of the Board of Directors of the Authority (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), the governing body of the Authority, from 1982 through 1987. From 1987 through 1989, Mr. King served as Chairman of the Board. Stipulated Fact I. 16. Expenditures at the Tampa Club. During the 1980's the Authority began efforts to build a bus terminal on Marion Street in Tampa, Florida. Initially, the Authority was not sensitive to the concerns about the proposed terminal of business owners on Marion Street. This insensitivity caused the Authority to have difficulties with business owners in the area which the Board believed needed to be rectified in order to effectively carry out the responsibilities of the Authority. During 1985 or 1986, as a result of the difficulties with Marion Street business owners, the Chairman of the Board, Charles Banks, suggested that a membership be established at a Tampa social club that served meals. Stipulated Fact I. 4. As a result of Mr. Banks' suggestion, the Respondent checked into the cost of joining several Tampa social clubs that served meals, including one known as the Tampa Club. See Stipulated Fact I. 4. Following discussion of the Board at a Board meeting, the Board unanimously approved the opening of an account for use by the Executive Director at the Tampa Club. Stipulation of Fact I. 4. and 5. The Board authorized and directed the Respondent to open an account at the Tampa Club. The Board also authorized and directed the expenditure of Authority funds to reimburse the Respondent for the initial membership fee of the Tampa Club, monthly charges for the membership in the Tampa Club and the cost of meals incurred by the Respondent at the Tampa Club for meals at which Authority business was discussed by the Respondent. The Respondent was authorized by the Board to use the Tampa Club for personal purposes if he reimbursed the Authority for any such expenditures. Stipulated Fact I. 7. The Respondent did not use the Tampa Club for any personal purposes. The Respondent was a member of the Tampa Club from February, 1986, until September 30, 1989, his entire term as Executive Director. Stipulated Fact I. 8. and 11. Membership in the Tampa Club was an employment benefit and part of the Respondent's economic compensation from the Authority. Stipulated Fact I. 12. This finding of fact was stipulated to by the parties, although evidence was presented by the Advocate suggesting a different conclusion. That evidence is rejected because of the agreement of the parties that Stipulated Fact I. 12. is an established fact. The Board also established and approved a public-relations account during 1985 or 1986. The public-relations account was to be used by the Executive Director and Authority Board members in furtherance of Authority business. Funds were to be paid out of this account for Authority business- related social activities, including expenditures incurred by the Respondent at the Tampa Club. Stipulated Fact I. 14. The public-relations account, like the membership in the Tampa Club, initially was established because of the difficulties with Marion Street business owners. The Respondent was directed by the Board to "hold hands" with the Marion Street business owners and to use the Tampa Club and the public-relations account for that purpose. Pursuant to the direction of the Board, the Respondent paid the Tampa Club $1,500.00 as a membership entrance fee. The Respondent was reimbursed by the Authority for this expenditure. Stipulated Fact I. 6. During the three years and seven months that the Respondent was a member of the Tampa Club the Authority paid a total of $5,854.08 for food and beverages charged by the Respondent at the Tampa Club. Stipulated Fact I. 8. and 9. The Authority also paid monthly membership charges of the Tampa Club during the time that the Respondent was a member. Monthly charges ranged from $40.00 to $65.00 per month. Stipulated Fact I. 10. Amounts expended out of the public-relations account, including amounts paid to the Tampa Club, were included in the Authority's Board-approved budget. During the fiscal year ending September, 1988, the amount of the public-relations account approved by the Board was $3,023.47. During the fiscal year ending September, 1989, the amount of the public-relations account approved by the Board was $4,215.89. Stipulated Fact I. 15. The Authority's budget was prepared by the staff of the Authority. The public-relations account was included as a separate item in the budget. The particular expenditures to be paid from the public-relations account, including amounts to be paid for the Tampa Club, were not specifically identified in the budget submitted to the Board for approval. Information concerning the specific expenditures to be covered by the public-relations account was, however, available to Board members. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the manner in which the public-relations account was presented to the Board for approval and review was inconsistent with generally accepted accounting principles. The Board reviewed and approved the Authority's budget, including the public-relations account. Although the Board did not closely scrutinize the budget, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that any attempt was made by the Respondent or any other person on his behalf to conceal information about the public-relations account or his use of the Tampa Club from the Board or the public. The Board's failure to closely review the Authority's budget was a problem of the Board and not the Respondent. All expenditures made by the Authority out of the public-relations account, including amounts paid to the Tampa Club, were part of the records of the Authority and constituted public records available to the public and the members of the Board. Each month, approximately three to four days before each Board meeting, Board members were provided with a monthly summary of Authority expenditures. This summary included the total amount expended from the public- relations account, including amounts paid to the Tampa Club. The Board was not provided with a detailed break-down of each expenditure from the public- relations account. The weight of the evidence failed to prove, however, that the manner in which the account was reported was inconsistent with generally accepted accounting principles or that any attempt was made by the Respondent or any other person on his behalf to conceal information about the public-relations account or his use of the Tampa Club from the Board or the public. All expenditures from the public-relations account, including those for the Respondent's use of the Tampa Club, were reviewed by the Respondent. The expenditures were paid by the Authority's accounting staff after approval by the Respondent. Expenditures from the public-relations account for lunch and breakfast charges at the Tampa Club made by the Respondent were also authorized by the John King, Chairman of the Board. Stipulated Fact I. 17. In 1989, John King was alleged in Commission Complaint No. 89-58, to have misused his office by charging to a credit card issued to him by the Authority meals taken with business associates. This Complaint was dismissed by the Commission with a finding of no probable cause. Stipulated Fact I. 18. The Respondent's membership in the Tampa Club was used solely for business lunches and breakfasts by the Respondent. Stipulated Fact I. 13. The Respondent only charged food and beverages to the Tampa Club for payment by the Authority for food and beverages consumed while discussing Authority business with members of the Board and staff members, or guests of the Authority and staff members. Staff members only accompanied the Respondent to the Tampa Club if a Board member or guest of the Authority was present with the Respondent. The Respondent took Board members to the Tampa Club approximately 30% of the time and guests of the Authority approximately 70%. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Respondent charged any amount to the Authority for use of the Tampa Club that was not directed and authorized by the Board. Although the Respondent benefited from the food and beverages he consumed at the Tampa Club, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Respondent used of the Tampa Club with the intent of securing a special privilege, benefit or exemption for himself or others or that his action was taken with a wrongful intent. The Respondent was carrying out the instructions of the Board concerning how the Tampa Club was to be used. Expenditures for Golf. Randolf Kinsey is a member of the Authority's Board. Mr. Kinsey has been a member of the Board since approximately 1987. Mr. Kinsey has, as a member of the Board, been an advocate for the use of Black businesses by the Authority and the hiring of Blacks by the Authority. At times Mr. Kinsey has advocated for Blacks to the exclusion of other minorities. During all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Kinsey and the Respondent did not get along. A great deal of friction has developed between Mr. Kinsey and the Respondent. Following a Board or committee meeting in 1988, John King and legal counsel for the Authority met with the Respondent concerning the problems between Mr. Kinsey and the Respondent. During this meeting Mr. King, who was then the Chairman of the Board, told the Respondent to resolve the problem with Mr. Kinsey. It was suggested by Mr. King that the Respondent "get Mr. Kinsey in a more relaxed environment" and "mend the broken fences between them." The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. King specifically suggested that the Respondent play golf with Mr. Kinsey. The Respondent contacted Mr. Kinsey and suggested lunch. When Mr. Kinsey declined lunch, the Respondent invited Mr. Kinsey to play golf. Mr. Kinsey accepted. On November 10, 1988, the Respondent and Mr. Kinsey played golf together at Northdale Golf Course in Tampa. Stipulated Fact II. 1. The greens fees charged to play golf for the Respondent and Mr. Kinsey totalled $69.01. Stipulated Fact II. 2. The Respondent charged the greens fees for himself and Mr. Kinsey on a credit card issued to him by the Authority. Stipulated Fact II. 4. The greens fees were ultimately paid by the Authority as a charge to the public-relations account. During the golf outing the Respondent and Mr. Kinsey discussed Authority business, including the hiring of a Black at the administrative level by the Authority. The Respondent is an avid golfer. The Respondent played golf approximately 10 to 15 times with other members of the Board. The Respondent did not, however, charge any of the fees attributable to these golf outings to the Authority. This fact supports a finding that the golf outing with Mr. Kinsey was not a social occasion. Because of the animosity between the Respondent and Mr. Kinsey, the only reason the Respondent played golf with Mr. Kinsey was to attempt to resolve their differences. This fact further supports a finding that the golf outing with Mr. Kinsey was not a social occasion. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Respondent attempted to conceal the fact that he had charged the golf outing with Mr. Kinsey to the Authority. The charges were public records. Although the Respondent benefited from the free golf outing, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Respondent played golf with Mr. Kinsey or charged the outing to the Authority with the intent of securing a special privilege, benefit or exemption for himself or others or that his action was taken with a wrongful intent. The Respondent reasonably believed that he was carrying out the instructions of the Chairman of the Board to resolve a problem between the Executive Director of the Authority and a Board member which was adversely impacting on the Authority.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics enter a Final Order and Public Report finding that the evidence failed to prove that the Respondent, Cliff Hayden, Jr., violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Complaint No. 89-127. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1601 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 David M. Carr, Esquire 600 Madison Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Bonnie J. Williams Executive Director Commission on Ethics The Capitol, Room 2105 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
