Findings Of Fact Respondent, Robert Hildreth (Hildreth), was a city commissioner for the City of Coral Gables (City) from 1983 through 1993. The Country Club of Coral Gables (Country Club) was established by City founder George Merrick, prior to the City's incorporation. Since 1929, the City which owns the land and buildings from which the Club operates, has leased the property to private entities. Since 1935, the lessee of the property has been the Country Club, a non-profit corporation run by a board of directors elected by the Country Club membership. Between 1935 and 1958, the lease underwent various modifications and extensions. In 1958, the City Commission voted to extend the lease to July 31, 1990. Under the terms of the lease, the Country Club paid three percent of its gross annual income, but in no case less than $5,000 per year, to the City as rent. In 1977, the Country Club again came before the City Commission requesting a lease extension, this time to the year 2002. There was no change in the rent amount. The request for extension was to allow the Country Club to borrow money for construction, and the request was approved. In 1978 the Country Club asked the City Commission for rezoning so that it could expand its tennis courts. This request was approved. In May, 1980, the Country Club asked the City Commission for a $23,000 loan to repair its roof. The City Attorney advised that the City could not lawfully make such a loan, and no further action was taken on the matter. In 1981 the Country Club asked to expand its tennis club facilities, and this request was approved. In 1983 a significant portion of the Country Club burned down. A request by the Country Club to support its efforts to raise funds from citizens for the Country Club, was on the July 26, 1983, City Commission agenda, but was not taken up. A discussion of the status of the building was held on that date, but no action was taken. Instead of rebuilding the burned section with the insurance money, the Country Club decided to construct an already planned new section. On November 22, 1983, representatives of the Country Club presented a plan for restoration to the City Commission, which on motion of Commissioner Kerdyk, approved the plan. On March 27, 1984, the City Commission authorized the City Manager to sign an affidavit needed by the Country Club to obtain a building permit. In April 1984, the Country Club requested extension of its lease to the year 2020. On motion of Commissioner Kerdyk, the City Commission agreed to the extension. In September 1984, the Country Club asked that the lease be reworded in order to satisfy the lending institutions from which the Country Club was borrowing money for renovations. The request was approved. When the Country Club initially undertook its restoration and remodeling plan, the Country Club leadership believed that there would be sufficient funds to accomplish both the rebuilding and the new construction. Cost overruns, diminishing membership, and other factors combined, however, to leave the Country Club with a new section, an old, burned-out section, and a significant debt. In 1987, the Country Club asked the City Commission to assist it, by contributing funds or otherwise, in overcoming that debt. On November 24, 1987, the City Commission met and discussed the problem. The only action taken was to invite the Country Club leadership to an up coming City Commission meeting to discuss proposed improvements. On January 26, 1988, the City Commission met with the Board of Directors of the Country Club to discuss the Country Club's request. The City Commissioners were informed that the Country Club's rent payments had been generating approximately $40,458.64 per year in income to the City. The Country Club vice-president proposed that the City rebuild the outside shell of the building, at a cost of $1,000,362 and the Country Club finance the remainder of the construction, about $1,900,000. The City Attorney advised that the City could not loan funds to the Country Club, because it was a private club. However, he opined that the City could participate in the rebuilding because it was the owner of the property. Action was postponed until the next meeting. On February 3, 1988, the Country Club made an offer to the City to increase its rent payment from three percent to six percent, if the City would rebuild the shell. The matter was raised at the February 9, 1988, meeting of the City Commission. Mayor Corrigan proposed that the City finance the rebuilding, but made no motion. Commissioner Wolff proposed that the City obtain funds from the Sunshine State Governmental Financing Commission and lend that money to the Country Club. The motion was seconded by Commissioner Kerdyk, and ultimately the City Commission resolved to refer the matter to the acting city manager to "work out financing without using taxpayer dollars." At the February 9 meeting, discussion was had on the issue of whether the City Commissioners had conflicts of interest, since they all had complimentary memberships to the Country Club. Mr. Zahner, the City Attorney, advised that they had no conflict. The issue of conflict of interest was again raised in subsequent meetings. Alternative proposals identified by the City Manager for funding the Country Club's rebuilding were discussed at the City Commission's March 8, 1988 meeting, but no action was taken. On June 30, 1988, the Country Club proposed that the City forgive lease payments until the year 2000. On August 30, 1988, the City Commission voted to suspend the lease payments, with the funds going instead to the maintenance and reconstruction of the facility. Membership in the Country Club is open to any person, provided they can pay the initiation fee and membership dues. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the initiation fee was $1,000, although it sometimes was reduced to $500 during membership drives. The annual fee was $750. Membership entitles the member and his or her family to use the swimming pool, health club, tennis courts, and bar and restaurant. Members must pay for their meals. For more than twenty years the Country Club has awarded memberships to city officials and various other persons. The Country Club bylaws provide for such memberships. The bylaws provide for honorary memberships and complimentary memberships. There is only one honorary member of the Country Club, a founding member who was also at one time mayor of the City. The difference between what the Country Club calls a complimentary membership and an honorary membership is the difference in the duration of the membership. A complimentary membership is given on a year-to-year basis and ends when the person no longer holds the position which entitled him to have the free membership. Complimentary memberships run from year to year. Persons awarded complimentary memberships include the City Commissioners, Mayor, City Manager, Assistant City Managers, the City Clerk, City Attorney, Director of Public Works, Finance Director, City Architect, Fire and Police Chief, the University of Miami President, Football Coach, and Assistant Athletic Director, the Golf Pro at the City golf course, and the editor of the local social magazine. The complimentary memberships are reviewed each year and are not renewed after the recipient leaves his or her office. Hildreth has been a member of the Country Club since October 1, 1982, and was a member when he was elected to the City Commission in 1983. Subsequent to his election, Hildreth's membership was changed by the Country Club to a complimentary membership. Under the terms of the complimentary membership, Hildreth was not allowed to vote in Country Club elections or hold an office in the Country Club, but continued to retain all the other benefits he had been entitled to as a paying Country Club member. Hildreth understood that the complimentary memberships were a tradition in the City. Hildreth did not report the Country Club membership as a gift on his 1989 or 1990 financial disclosure statements. He was told by the City Attorney, Robert Zahner, that the membership was not a gift and was not required to be reported. Hildreth relied on that advice in deciding not to report the membership on his financial disclosure form. Hildreth used the Country Club for meetings of the Tenth Holer's Club, which is golf social club. In order to belong to the Tenth Holer's Club, a person must also belong to the Country Club. Hildreth also used the Country club eight times in ten years for dining purposes. He did not use the swimming pool, the workout room, the tennis courts, or the cardroom. Hildreth paid his own initiation fees. The County Court has dismissed criminal charges against Hildreth and two other members of the City Commission as well as City Attorney, Robert Zahner, concerning alleged violations of Section 2-11.1(e) of the Dade County Code. That section mirrors the provisions of Section 112.3148, Florida Statutes. Those cases are currently on appeal. The County Court refused to dismiss an identical charge against City Police Chief, Charles Skalaski.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics enter a final order and public report finding that Robert Hildreth violated Section 112.313(4), Florida Statutes, for accepting a free membership in the Coral Gables Country Club and Section 112.3148, Florida Statutes for failing to disclose the free membership in 1989 and 1990 on his financial disclosure statement. I recommend a civil penalty of $750 and restitution of $750 for violation of Section 112.313(4), and a civil penalty of $1.00 for each of the failure to report violations, for a total penalty of $1502. The civil penalty is mitigated for the Section 112.313(4) violation because of the advice which Hildreth received from the City Attorney concerning a conflict of interest. The civil penalties for each of the disclosure violations is mitigated by Hildreth's seeking advice from the City Attorney on whether the membership had to be disclosed and relying on the City Attorney's advice that the membership was honorary and did not have to be disclosed. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23th day of May, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3908EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1 18: Accepted. Paragraph 19: The first sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 20: The first sentence is accepted. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 21: Accepted. Paragraph 22: The first sentence is accepted. The second sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 23-26: Accepted. Paragraph 27: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 28-33: Accepted. Paragraphs 34-35: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 36: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 37: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 38-39: Accepted. Paragraph 40: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 41-42: Rejected as constituting argument. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-4: Accepted. Paragraphs 5: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 6: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 7-8: Accepted. Paragraph 9: The first three sentences are accepted. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 10-13: Accepted. Paragraph 14: The first and third sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 16-17: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 18: Accepted. Paragraph 19: The first two sentences are accepted. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 20-23: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 24: Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Raoul G. Cantero, Esquire Suite 1600 2601 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33133 Virlindia Doss, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, Esquire General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahasee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue This case concerns the issue of whether Respondent's alcoholic beverage license should be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined for violations of Chapter 849, Florida Statutes, which prohibits gambling. At the formal hearing, the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco called as witnesses Beverage Lieutenant Thomas Stout and Beverage Officer Stephen Tompkins. The Respondent called as witnesses Jack Bent, Wade Byington, Sam Fritz, Daniel Cronin, John Hengerle, Ward Hill, Earl Martel and Neal Mills. The Petitioner offered and had admitted seven exhibits and the Respondent offered and had admitted three exhibits. A drawing of the licensed premises as contained in the Division of Alcoholic Beverages official records was placed into evidence as Hearing Officer's Exhibit No. 1. Counsel for the Petitioner and counsel for the Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for consideration by the undersigned Hearing Officer. To the extent that these proposed findings and conclusions of law are inconsistent with the findings and conclusions herein they were considered by the Hearing Officer and rejected as being unsupported by the evidence or unnecessary to a resolution of this cause.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent held Beverage license No. 18-67, Series 11C issued to the licensed premises at 629 Tamiami Trail, N.W., Port Charlotte, Florida. Elks Lodge No. 2153 is a local chapter of the National Elks Lodge. It is a fraternal organization having 2,994 members in the local lodge. The licensed premises at 629 Tamiami Trail, N.W., is the club facility where the members hold meetings and also socialize together. The lodge building is a large building consisting of a lobby, lounge area with bar, kitchen, and large dining and meeting room. Additionally, there is a smaller room which is located behind the lounge area. This small room is called the "Stag Room" and is open to and used only by the local members of Elks Lodge No. 2153. No guests, wives, or nonmembers are allowed in the Stag Room. The Stag Room contains a pool table area, card table area with several tables, a shuffleboard court, a bar, and an area of tables for just lounging. The bar is tended by a bartender. The local lodge is governed by a Board of Governors which sets policy for the lodge and a Board of Trustees which is responsible for the financial matters and building and other physical assets of the lodge. The chief operating officer of the lodge is elected by the members and has the title of "Exalted Ruler." The manager of the club facility is hired by the Board of Governors. On January 27, 1983, at approximately 11:30 a.m., Beverage Officer Tompkins, of the Ft. Myers District, visited the licensed premises of the Respondent. His purpose was to investigate a complaint that the lodge had sold kegs of beer to another club. After speaking with the manager of the club facility, Officer Tompkins made a routine inspection of the licensed premises. As a part of his routine inspection, Officer Tompkins entered the Stag Room and first checked the bar area of that room. Behind the bar, he found a slip of paper (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) which reflected bets between unknown individuals on the Super Bowl game to be played within a few days between the Washington Redskins and the Miami Dolphins. The sheet was undated and unsigned and was laying in the open on a counter behind the bar. After checking the bar area, Officer Tompkins proceeded to inspect the contents of a cabinet located between the pool area and the card playing area. In that cabinet, Officer Tompkins found several items which he seized as evidence. In the top drawer of the cabinet, Officer Tompkins found three white pieces of paper, each appearing to be scoresheets for a game of some sort. On the first sheet (Petitioner's Exhibit 2-A) appears the first names of six individuals in columns with scores or running totals under each name. These totals consist of plus and minus numbers which after each round totaled zero. These numbers appear to represent amounts owed to and from each player and at the bottom of five of the columns is the entry "Pd." This sheet was used to keep track of winnings and losses in some type of game. No evidence was presented which identified the individuals named or the date the sheet was prepared. The second sheet (Petitioner's Exhibit 2b) contains several paired columns titled "We" and "They" at the top of each pair. These columns contained numbers which appear to be scores in some type of game. Some of these numbers contain decimal points, such as "14.67" which appear to represent dollar amounts. The third sheet (Petitioner's Exhibit 2c) is similar to Petitioner's Exhibit 2b, but does not contain decimal numbers or numbers that appear to represent dollar amounts. In that same drawer Officer Tompkins found three yellow envelopes with writing on the front of each envelope. The first envelope (Petitioner's Exhibit 3a) was empty and on the outside of the envelope was written "3 players." The second envelope (Petitioner's Exhibit 3b) also was empty and bears the notation "4 players." The third envelope (Petitioner's Exhibit 3c) bears the notation "tally sheets" and contained two sheets of paper that appear to be tally sheets for some type of game. In the same cabinet, but not in the drawer, Officer Tompkins found two paper bags bearing the business name "Quick Print." (Petitioner's Exhibits 4a and 4b). Each bag contained several hundred blank tally sheets. These sheets are similar to tally sheets used in card games such as bridge. These sheets were not purchased by the Respondent. Also in the same cabinet in Respondent's Stag Room, Officer Tompkins found a yellow folder, Petitioner's composite Exhibit No. 5, containing a typewritten rule book called "Eight Ball Tournament House Rules" dated August 23, 1982, with a notation that it was amended October 8, 1982. The rule book provides that "[e]xcept for the rules specified herein, the Official Book of Rules in the Stag Room will apply." The book further provides that the players' positions on the singles and doubles elimination sheets will be determined by lot. Also contained within the yellow folder, Petitioner's composite Exhibit No. 5, were original elimination sheets designed for tracking the players, drawn by lottery, through various levels of play in a pool tournament. These elimination sheets are titled "Elk's Lodge 2153 Pool Tourney." (See Petitioner's composite Exhibit No. 5). In that same cabinet in the Stag Room of Respondent's licensed premises Officer Tompkins found a manila envelope containing Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, a handwritten registration sheet titled Registration - 8 Ball Tournament 22 Jan 83 Doubles Fee: $3.00. This sheet contains four columns - two titled "Name" and two titled "Fee Paid." In the first column entitled Name are listed five names after which, in the Fee Paid column, is listed the amount of $3.00. This sheet further indicates that the listing was made as of 11 a.m. on 22 Jan 83 and that the money was refunded. Also found within that manila folder were "Guidelines for Coordinator on Day of Play." (See Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7). Those guidelines provide that if less than 12 players sign up for the tournament, the tournament will be cancelled and the money refunded. Those guidelines further provide that, using the registration sheets, names will be drawn by use of numbered pills and given a position on the elimination sheet. The guidelines provide for prizes for first and second place winners in the doubles and for first, second and split third place winners in the singles. While play is underway, the coordinator is to calculate prize money by arriving at the "kitty" with $2.00 per player for the 12 to 15 players, then deduct $3.00 for the coordinator's services. The balance of the kitty would be divided with 45 percent going to the first place winner, 30 percent going to the second place winner, and 25 percent going to the third place winner to be split 50/50 between the two third place winners. A different method for calculating allocation of the kitty is provided for the doubles play. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7). Also contained within that folder found in the cabinet in the Stag Room of Respondent's licensed premises were copies of the original elimination sheets previously seen in Petitioner's composite Exhibit No. 5. The above described guidelines were prepared for a proposed pool tournament which did not take place. Sometime in the fall of 1982, the officers of the Respondent club became aware that a pool tournament was being planned. Upon learning of this, the Exalted Ruler, the chief presiding officer, cancelled the pool tournament and instructed those persons who were planning the tournament that such an event could not be held in the lodge. The Respondent has a policy against gambling on the lodge premises. Section 210 of the annotated statutes of the Grand Lodge of Elks prohibits gambling, in any and all forms, in any lodge room, club room or social parlor connected with a lodge. Failure to abide by a section of the annotated statutes can result in revocation of the local lodge's charter. The officers of Respondent were not aware of any gambling taking place on the lodge premises and after receiving notice from Officer Tompkins that he suspected gambling was occurring, the Lodge published an article in its monthly newsletter reminding its members of their duty to not gamble and to abide by the annotated statutes of the lodge. Petitioner presented no evidence that gambling had actually been observed by anyone on the licensed premises. No gambling had been observed by the officers or trustees of the lodge.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be found not guilty of the charges alleged in the Notice to Show Cause and that such charges be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of October 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Janice G. Scott, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert M. Bader, Esquire 209 Conway Boulevard, N.E. Port Charlotte, Florida 33952 Howard M. Rasmussen, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Helen T. Cook, (formerly Griffin), started working for the Respondent, St. Petersburg Motor Club as Personnel Director on May 15, 1979. In that capacity, she reported to the Chief Executive Officer who was, at the time, Mr. James Hendry. Mrs. Cook remained as Personnel Director until August, 1984, when she was promoted to the position of Managing Director for Personnel, and made a part of senior management. As the Managing Director for Personnel, she was the senior personnel officer within the organization and was required, among other duties, to interview applicants for employment; counsel employees and conduct exit interviews; implement approved company policies; research employee benefits and administer them; serve on the pension committee responding to the Board of Directors; work out personnel solutions with supervisors and employees; maintain legal personnel files on all staff; and represent the Club on all compliance hearings regarding worker's compensation, unemployment compensation, and equal employment opportunity. She reported to the Executive Vice President of the Club. When Mrs. Cook first went to work for the Club, the organization had no rule regarding nepotism. However, in August, 1984, in order to correct a situation then existing involving numerous instances of nepotism among Club employees, the Board of Directors promulgated a rule which was implemented in January, 1985 and which prohibited employment of individuals related to Club employees. When the rule was enacted, incumbent employees related to other employees were grandfathered, but non-related incumbent employees who later married other Club employees were to be covered by the policy. At the time of it's implementation, Mrs. Cook opposed it. Mrs. Cook's husband, Richard, was already employed by the Club when she was hired. They were not married at the time. Mr. Cook was Director of the Club's service center and in her job as director of personnel, she presented potential future employees to him for hire. Mr. Cook was not in her direct line of authority. He worked for the Managing Director of Services, Mr. Schatzman. At the time the problem here came about, Mrs. Cook was the Managing Director of Personnel and on a parallel with her husband's boss. Mrs. Cook and Mr. Cook started dating in April, 1985, approximately one month after the death of his wife. Mrs. Cook immediately notified the Club management of this fact. In her opinion, management seemed delighted because of their affection for both parties. No one attempted to dissuade them from continuing the relationship, nor did anyone ever suggest that the relationship was detrimental to the Club. In her opinion, the matter was so well handled that no one could tell they were dating. Mr. and Mrs. Cook were married on July 14, 1985. At the time, both parties knew that the policy against nepotism was in effect. In June, 1985, before the marriage, Mrs. Cook informed Mr. White, then either Executive Vice President or President and Chief Executive, of their plans. He asked her to hold up on any action while the Board looked into the policy to see if it would be applied to her. Nonetheless, they married and after the marriage she again approached Mr. White, to determine if the anti-nepotism policy would apply to her. At this time, she hoped he could convince the Board to make an exception to the policy for the Cooks. He asked her to hold off on any resignation action to allow the Board to look into the policy in an effort to determine if it was legal and if it would be applied to her. There was never any question in Mrs. Cook's mind that if the rule were to be enforced against them, she, not her husband, would submit a resignation and she informed Mr. White of this prior to the final decision the Board to invoke the policy. A special meeting of the Board was held on November 14, 1985 at which the Board decided that the policy would be applied and enforced in this case. Mr. White was not present at this Board meeting but was informed of it either that day or the next morning by Mr. Harris, Vice Chairman of the Board. That same day, or the next day, Mr. White informed Mrs. Cook of the Board's decision. He appeared to be upset by it and so was she. However, she suggested to Mr. White that a memorandum be sent out by him to advise employes of her departure and the reason therefor. This memo was dated November 20, 1985. The minutes of the Board meeting of November 19, 1985 reflect Mrs. Cook had already elected to resign. Consequently, it is found she was advised of the Board's decision on or before November 19, 1985. Her complaint of discrimination was filed with the Commission on May 19 1986, no less than 181 days after she received notice of the action complained of. Her resignation was effective in January, 1986. From the time she and her husband started dating the relationship, Mrs. Cook believes, never created any problem for the Club. She would not have left her employment but for the Club's policy. In her opinion, problems could have been avoided by taking her out of the loop relating to actions regarding her husband. This would not, however, have avoided the appearance of impropriety, regardless that no actual impropriety existed. In her position as Managing Director of Personnel, Mrs. Cook had access to all personnel files for the more then 300 employees of the Club. She was a policy maker and a member of the top management team. She was aware of all employees' salaries and evaluations and attended evaluation meetings with the Chief Executive Officer and managing directors concerning the evaluations of all directors under them. Though she did not rate any personnel except those who were in her immediate division, nor did she have any say on salaries outside her division, she was aware of them and was a part of the management team which controlled the day to day operation of the Club. Managing directors got together at least twice a day in informal meetings to discuss Club business and at those meetings, such things as evaluations, assignments, and promotions were discussed. Therefore, though she did not rate or direct her husband, she could have had a substantial impact on his career by virtue of her relationship with other managing directors. This is not to say, however, and it must be recognized, that there was any evidence that at any time Mrs. Cook interfered in her husband's career. By her own admission, however, she was a valuable employee and her position was sensitive. On December 31, 1984, prior to her marriage, she executed an Employment at Will statement which acknowledged that her employment could be terminated by either herself or the employer at any time. When Mr. White first learned that the Cooks had developed a personal relationship, it presented no problem for him. He did not believe it would be detrimental to the Club and, in fact, he received no complaints about it from anyone. He was aware of the Club's policy regarding nepotism. When he first became aware of the policy, he requested that the Board reconsider its decision because he felt that it might be illegal. Nonetheless, at no time did he bring the matter up with the Cooks because, to his knowledge, Mrs. Cook was fully aware of it nor did he indicate to her that the Board would not apply it to her. He believed, however, that both Mr. and Mrs. Cook should be allowed to remain as employees even after their marriage and made that recommendation to the Board. Nonetheless, the Board chose to implement the policy. According to Mr. Gregory, a member of the Club's Board, because of a situation regarding the former president, Mr. Henry's hiring of several family members under circumstances incompatible with good morale and discipline within the Club staff, and because of the growing number of Club employees married to other Club employees, (approximately 45 employees were involved), the Board implemented the rule against nepotism. A committee had discussed several alternatives before recommending the anti-nepotism policy and the Board was unanimously in favor of its implementation except for Mr. Henry who, at the time, was still on the Board. When the Board was made aware that the Cooks intended to marry, members were concerned because of Mrs. Cook's position and the image that might be created in the eyes of other employees. As a result, the Board felt compelled, as a business necessity, to enforce the policy notwithstanding Mr. White's urging that Mrs. Cook be kept on because of her value to the Club. The decision to invoke the rule was made reluctantly. It was acknowledged she was a good and valuable employee. However, because of the circumstances, and because of Mrs. Cook's position as Managing Director of Personnel, the Board felt compelled to enforce it. Had it not been for the sensitivity of Mrs. Cook's position, and given Mr. White's desire to keep her, the Board might have been able to look at the situation differently. Under the circumstances, however, it could do nothing else. The decision in no way reflected Board dissatisfaction with Mrs. Cook's performance or any animosity toward her or her husband. The problem was that her position, when considered against the apparent potential for abuse, was the most sensitive of all jobs related to Club personnel. This factor differentiated her situation from other situations involving nepotism and necessitated her departure. This was an appropriate decision under the facts of this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued by the Florida Commission of Human Relations dismissing Petitioner's charge of discrimination against the Respondent. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of September, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-2095 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. For the Petitioner: Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein except for the last sentence which has not been proven but is a matter of opinion. Accepted. Accepted as indicating a perception for possibility of abuse, not that Mrs. Cook was guilty of any breach of trust. Accepted and incorporated herein. For the Respondent: Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted but not controlling. 4 - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein except for the testimony quoted which is not a Finding of Fact but a recitation of testimony. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as not being a proper Finding of Fact relative to the issues of fact herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert F. McKee, Esquire 1724 East 7th Avenue Post Office Box 75638 Tampa, Florida 33675-0638 Michael K. Houtz, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1441 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731-1441 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Margaret Agerton, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 =================================================================
The Issue Did Respondent, MHC Windmill Manor, LLC (Windmill Manor), discriminate against Petitioner, Rental Asset Management of Florida, LLC (Rental Asset), in violation of section 760.23(1), Florida Statutes (2017?)1/
Findings Of Fact Ronnie Portee is a member of a racial minority who wished to rent a mobile home lot in Windmill Manor to provide housing for his disabled brother, William Portee. William Portee is also a member of a racial minority. Ronnie Portee planned to rent the lot using his LLC, Rental Asset, to lease a lot at Windmill Manor for a mobile home that he purchased. He intended for William Portee to occupy the mobile home. Windmill Manor is a community association that manages a mobile home park also known as Windmill Manor. Equity Lifestyle Properties, Inc. (ELS), owns Windmill Manor and the lots in Windmill Manor. Rental Asset purchased a mobile home from All Aces Realty, Inc. The mobile home was already on a lot in Windmill Manor. Ronnie Portee intended for William Portee to live in the mobile home once Rental Asset leased the lot. All Aces Realty, Inc., did not lease the mobile home’s lot from Windmill Manor. Windmill Manor only leases to natural persons. Windmill Manor does not lease to business entities. Windmill Manor maintains this policy because the limited liability of business entities, such as an LLC, would limit Windmill Manor’s ability to obtain payment from tenants in default. Windmill Manor requires lease applicants to provide a driver’s license to verify their identity and to ensure that Windmill Manor meets its obligations under the “55-plus exemption” to the Florida Fair Housing Act. Windmill Manor also requires applicants to submit a residency form used to conduct a criminal background and a credit history check. For the criminal background check and the credit history check to be processed, an applicant must submit his or her date of birth and social security number. Windmill Manor’s computer system generates leases from the approved residency application. Occupants who will live on the property but do not sign the lease are only screened through a criminal background check. Ronnie Portee attempted to submit a Windmill Manor residency application for Rental Asset. Windmill Manor was unable to process the application because Windmill Manor’s system requires an applicant’s date of birth and social security number to conduct its background check. So, Ronnie Portee completed the residency application using his name and personal information. Ronnie Portee passed the criminal background and credit history check. Ronnie Portee submitted an application for William Portee only as an occupant on the leased property. William Portee passed the criminal background check required for occupants. Ronnie Portee wanted Rental Asset to lease the lot from Windmill Manor because he did not want to be personally obligated under the lease. Windmill Manor’s system could not generate the lease under the name of Rental Asset because the system generates leases from processed residency applications. Windmill Manor informed Ronnie Portee of its policy against leasing to business entities. Windmill Manor offered to make an exception to the policy and allow Rental Asset to lease a lot if Ronnie Portee signed a guarantee for the lease. Ronnie Portee rejected the offer. Windmill Manor also offered to lease the lot to Ronnie Portee instead of Rental Asset. Ronnie Portee refused this offer too. Ronnie Portee tried to put the lease under his brother’s name. However, William Portee had not completed a residency application. Consequently, he had not been screened through the prerequisite credit history check. Therefore, he could not lease the lot. Windmill Manor did not lease the property to Ronnie Portee. It also did not provide him with the lease agreement and other documents when he requested them. In spite of not having a lease, Ronnie Portee moved his brother into the mobile home. Ronnie Portee submitted a rent payment from Rental Asset to Windmill Manor on July 1, 2017. Windmill Manor returned the money. Not long afterwards, Windmill Manor began an eviction proceeding against Rental Asset. Windmill Manor leases lots to members of racial minorities. Windmill Manor, in accordance with its policy, does not lease to business entities, although ELS owns some mobile homes in Windmill Manor. Ronnie Portee asserts that Windmill Manor discriminated against him and William Portee because of their race and discriminated against William Portee because of his disability by refusing to rent to Rental Asset. Ronnie Portee believes that Windmill Manor treated him differently during the application process once he provided his and his brother’s driver’s licenses, which identified them as members of a racial minority. Ronnie Portee also believes that Windmill Manor rents property to other business entities and that Windmill Manor discriminated against Rental Asset because the owner was a racial minority. The evidence does not support these beliefs. Among other things, there is no evidence of the race of the principals for the business entities Ronnie Portee claims rented lots at Windmill Manor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order denying the Petition for Relief of Rental Asset Management, LLC, of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 2018.
Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The Applicant is the owner of approximately 799.58 acres of land (hereinafter referred to as the "Country Club Property"), located on Loch Rane Boulevard, Clay County, Florida. In the early part of 1987, the Applicant applied to rezone the Country Club Property as a planned unit development district (hereinafter referred to as a "PUD"). The Country Club Property is to be developed in phases. At issue in this proceeding is that portion of the Country Club Property other than Unit One, which consists of lots 1 through 295. Development of the Property; Government Action Relied Upon by the Applicant. Prior to approving the rezoning of the Country Club Property requested in the early part of 1987, Clay County advised the Applicant that it would be required to commit to resignalize and expand the Loch Rane/Blanding Boulevards interchange as a condition to Clay County approving the rezoning of the Country Club Property as a PUD. Clay County approved the requested rezoning of, and the master land use plan for, the Country Club Property on March 24, 1987. The master land use plan specifies that the Country Club Property will include development of the following: (a) up to 599 single-family dwelling units within the residential portion; (b) ten acres of commercial uses, including retail shops, a day-care center and a restaurant; (c) a sales center; and (d) a golf course and club facilities. Engineering plans for phase one of the proposed development were submitted to Clay County in 1987. As part of the engineering plans, the Applicant obtained permits from the Army Corps of Engineers, the St. Johns' River Water Management District and the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation. The plat for phase one of the Country Club Property was submitted to Clay County and on May 12, 1987, Clay County approved the final plat for phase one. In April, 1989, the Applicant applied for building permits for construction of the golf course clubhouse, pool facilities and the golf cart storage barn. Permits for these facilities were issued by Clay County in October, 1989. In 1991, engineering plans for phase two of the Country Club Property were submitted to Clay County. They were approved effective January 1, 1992. On February 12, 1993, Clay County issued a Vested Property Certificate for phase one of the development, Lots 1 through 295 of Unit One, pursuant to Section 20.8-6 of the Vested Rights Review Ordinance of Clay County, Florida. The Applicant's Detrimental Reliance. In reliance on Clay County's actions in approving the PUD rezoning and accompanying master plan and the engineering plans for phase one and phase two, the Applicant constructed master infrastructure improvements for the project. Improvements have included drainage, water and sewer systems, a master road system designed and sized to serve the entire development at a cost of approximately $4,972,670.00. These improvements were made between November, 1988 and April, 1990. The Applicant has also constructed the entry features for the Country Club Property, master recreational facilities, including an eighteen-hole golf course, golf course clubhouse, pool and tennis facilities and a sales center. Total costs of these improvements were approximately $7,224,917.00. These improvements were made between November, 1988 and April, 1990. Finally, the Applicant has resignalized and expanded the Loch Rane/Blanding Boulevards interchange. The cost of these improvements was approximately $72,000.00. These improvements were made between October, 1991 and January, 1992. Rights That Will Be Destroyed. Pursuant to the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan, the portion of Blanding Boulevard impacted by the Country Club Property development does not have sufficient capacity to develop the property as proposed. To comply with the comprehensive plan will require considerable delays in completion of the project which will result in a substantial adverse financial impact on the Applicants. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of the Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended by Clay County Ordinance 92-22 have been met.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Respondents were licensed real estate salesmen in the State of Florida, with Mr. Blanc's license being 0406481 and Ms. Kirkland's license being 0399466. The Division of Real Estate is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility of regulating the practice of real estate in this state. In November, 1985, Mr. and Mrs. William A. McKie were owners of Week 43 in Unit 1 of a time share condominium located at the Anchorage Resort and Yacht Club in Key Largo, Florida. About that time, they received a card issued by the Florida Bay Club to visit a time share condominium there. Because they were somewhat disappointed in the condition of their Anchorage unit, they went to see the Florida Bay Club facility and met with Respondent Kirkland who took them on a tour of the facility and the model apartment. Mrs. McKie was quite impressed with it, but indicated she could not afford it, because she and her husband already owned a time share unit at the Anchorage. When told that, Ms. Kirkland introduced the McKies to Respondent Blanc, who in the course of his sales presentation, suggested that the McKies use their ownership at the Anchorage as a trade-in worth $4,000 off of the in excess of $11,000 price of the Florida Bay Club unit. The McKies agreed and signed certain documents incident to the purchase including a worksheet, purchase agreement, disclosure agreement, and settlement statement, all prepared by Respondent Blanc. The worksheet reflected that the unit being purchased by the McKies, Week 44 in Unit A-5, had a purchase price of $6,500 toward which the McKies made a down payment of $650 by three separate charges to their Master Card and Visa cards, two for $300 each and one for $50. This left a mortgage balance to be financed of $5,850 payable for 7 years at 15 1/2 percent with monthly payments of $114.54. No reference was made in the worksheet to a trade in of the Anchorage unit. The purchase agreement also signed by the McKies and by Respondent Kirkland for the Florida Bay Club reflects a purchase price of $6,500 with a down payment of $650. The truth in lending form reflects that the amount financed would be $5,850 at 15.5% resulting in a finance charge of $3,771.36 with a total monthly payment amount of $9,621.36 which, when added to the $650 deposit, showed a total sales price of $10,271.36. The settlement statement signed by the McKies reflects a sales price of $6,500 with a $650 deposit. At no place, on any of the documentation, is the $4,000 trade-in for the Anchorage unit reflected. As a part of the transaction and at the suggestion of Respondent Blanc, the McKies were to sign a quitclaim deed to him as the representative of the seller to receive credit for the $4,000 trade-in. The documents, except for the quitclaim deed, were signed by the McKies on their first visit to Florida Bay Club on November 17, 1985. Mrs. McKie does not recall either Respondent signing the documentation, but there is evidence that Ms. Kirkland signed the purchase agreement and the worksheet and Mr. Blanc approved the worksheet. Neither the disclosure statement, the settlement statement nor the quitclaim deed, which was prepared by Respondent, Blanc, and furnished to the McKies on their second visit, was signed by either Respondent. The McKies went back to Florida Bay Club approximately a week later to sign for the prize they had been notified they had won and to sign the quitclaim deed, which had not been ready for them on their first visit. Respondent Blanc explained what the quitclaim deed was for and according to both McKies, they would not have purchased the property at Florida Bay Club had they not been able to trade-in their Anchorage unit. They definitely could not afford to pay for both units, a fact which was repeatedly explained to Respondents on both visits. Mrs. McKie believed that when she signed the quitclaim deed to the Anchorage unit, she would no longer be responsible for making payments there and in fact, the McKies notified the Anchorage Resort Club that Respondent Blanc had assumed their Week at the Anchorage, a fact which was confirmed by the Anchorage to Mr. Blanc by letter dated February 13, 1986. It is further noted that on January 30, 1986, Ms. Berta, general manager of the Florida Bay Club, by letter of even date, notified Mr. Blanc who was no longer an employee of Florida Bay, that the McKies' payment book, invoices for taxes due on the Anchorage property, and the quitclaim deed were being forwarded to him as evidence of the change of ownership of the Anchorage Resort unit from the McKies to Respondent Blanc. In this letter, Blanc was requested to notify the Anchorage of the change so the McKies would not be dunned for continuing payments. At the closing of the Florida Bay unit, when Mrs. McKie and her husband signed the quitclaim deed, Respondent Blanc told her she would continue to get payment notices from the Anchorage while the transfer was being processed, but she should bring those payment notices to him at the Florida Bay Club and he would take care of them. When Mrs. McKie received the first notice, she brought it to the Florida Bay Club to give to Mr. Blanc, but he was no longer located there. On this visit, she spoke to Ms. Berta, who advised her that the Florida Bay Club did not take trades. Ms. Berta called Respondent Blanc at his new place of business by phone in Mrs. McKie's presence and Respondent indicated at that time that he would buy the Anchorage unit himself and assume the payments. As a result, Mrs. McKie sent the delinquent notices to him at his new place of business, Gulf Stream Manor. In the meantime, she continued to make her new payments at the Florida Bay Club. Notwithstanding Respondent Blanc's agreement to assume payments, Mrs. McKie continued to receive mortgage payment delinquent notices from the bank for the Anchorage unit. During later negotiations with the bank regarding this, Mrs. McKie was told that she would still be responsible for making the payments even if Respondent Blanc took over and didn't pay and as a result, in order to relieve herself from this impending burden, she made arrangements to pay off the entire amount due for the Anchorage unit. After that she made several efforts to get Respondent Blanc to pay her back for the amount paid. Respondent Blanc agreed to make the payments and said he would pay the taxes on the unit, but he never reimbursed the McKies for any of the amount they had to pay. The McKies now own the Anchorage unit and have worked out a settlement agreement with the Florida Bay Club to get out of the responsibility for the unit there. Review of the quitclaim deed in question, prepared by Respondent Blanc and signed by the McKies, reflects that the McKies are both the grantors and grantees of the property and that Respondent Blanc's name nowhere appears on the document. It is of no force and effect. Respondent contends that when the McKies indicated they were unable to purchase a new unit since they still had a prior unit to pay for, relying on his understanding that the marketing organization selling the Florida Bay Club units had in the past taken a unit in trade, he discussed the matter with his supervisor who advised that he could offer up to $4,000 in trade on the unit. In order to do this, Respondent Blanc had to price the new unit at $10,500 and credit the McKies with $4,000. However, none of the documentation shows this was ever done. At no place on any of the documentations is the $4,000 trade-in referenced. It is clear the offer of a trade-in was a sham to induce the McKies to purchase a unit at Florida Bay Club. Ms. Berta, who was manager at Florida Bay Club at the time in question, indicated that no trade-ins were ever taken by the club. The prior trade-in referenced by Mr. Blanc was a unit which was completely paid for as opposed the McKies' which still had a substantial outstanding balance on it. Respondent Kirkland who was not a party to any of the negotiations subsequent to her initial interview with the McKies indicates that she "probably" quoted the McKies a price of $10,500. When Mrs. McKie indicated that they could not afford such a high price, she turned them over to Mr. Blanc who thereafter handled the entire transaction. Respondent Blanc tells a somewhat different story about the reaction of the McKies when his failure to assume responsibility for the trade-in unit at the Anchorage Bay Club came to light. He indicates that it was never intended that he would take title to this unit at first. The trade in was to be absorbed by the marketing company, Resort Sales International, for whom he worked, and he assumed, when he left the following week to go to a different facility, the company would follow through with its agreement to assume the McKie's Week at the Anchorage. He was quite surprised, he contends, to learn that this had not been done and since he wanted a unit in the Key Largo area anyway, he agreed to then assume it personally after first offering Mrs. McKie the opportunity to back out of the purchase. When she said that she wanted to be at Florida Bay Club, he was sent the payment books and the deed. He called the bank to notify them that he was going to assume responsibility for the loan, but the bank would give him no information regarding it and the bank official, Ms. Brown, was adamant in her representation that the McKies could not quitclaim deed the property to him. No reason was given for this, however. Mr. Blanc claims he made a series of telephone calls between January 30 and March 31, 1986, in an attempt to straighten out the difficulty involved. These included sixteen calls to Ms. Berta, eight calls to his former supervisor at Resort Sales, four calls to the Anchorage, three calls to the bank and three calls to Mrs. McKie. Mrs. McKie denies receiving calls from the Respondent and contends that her numerous calls to him remained unanswered. In a call he made after she paid off the loan on the Anchorage and settled with Florida Bay Club for approximately $2,183, Mrs. McKie advised Blanc to forget about it, that they were tired of messing with him and with the property. As a result, he admittedly gave up and did and heard nothing more regarding the property until he was contacted by a DPR investigator. On January 30, 1988, Mr. Blanc offered to buy Mrs. McKie's unit at the Anchorage for $2,900 which was exactly the amount owed on the property when she paid it off. She refused to accept that offer since she had paid $6,800 for the unit initially.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondent Sandra Kirkland be dismissed and that Respondent Blanc's license as a real estate salesman in Florida be suspended for six months. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee this 19th day of April, 1988. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Darlene F. Keller Department of Professional Acting Executive Director Regulation DPR, Division of Real Estate Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Sandra S. Kirkland Post Office Box 9264 Panama City, Florida 32407 John G. Blanc 17501 West Highway 98 Panama City, Florida 32407
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent Bisayne Menage Club, Inc., trading as Chantel Menage on the Bay, located at 2333 Brickell Avenue, Miami, Florida held 4-COP-SRX alcoholic Beverage license No 23-4231. The Respondent being a corporation, records of the Division of Business Regulation reflected that the sole corporate officer was Mitchell J. Segal who was president, secretary, and treasurer. On October 22, 1982, pursuant to an ongoing investigation, Officer Jonas Sears, in an undercover capacity, entered the Respondent's club where he met with Jose' Carballea (Coco), who he knew from some other narcotic transactions prior to this time which occurred off the licensed premises. At this time, Coco took Sears back into the kitchen area and, from a small metal key container which he had in his pocket, removed two small plastic bags containing a white powdery substance, one of which he sold to Sears for $80.00. The substance purchased by Sears then was subsequently identified as cocaine. From the access that Carballea had to all areas of the club, utilizing keys in his possesssion, and from the fact that he had advised Sears that his nephew owned the club, Sears concluded, and the evidence clearly establishes, that Core was, in some form or fashion, substantially high in the management of the operation. Sears, accompanied by Detective Ramirez, went back to the club on October 26, 1982 in the afternoon. As on the previous visit, the club was not open to the public at this time and the two officers met with Coco in the office area and then walked into the lounge. At this point Sears advised Coco he was there to buy another gram of cocaine. Coco took him to one of the offices off the kitchen where from a desk he removed a clear plastic bag containing a white powdery substance from the metal container he had used previously. He gave this bag to Sears in return for which Sears gave him $80.00. Before leaving, Sears was served a beer by Coco. The white powder substance purchased by Sears on this occasion was subsequently identified as cocaine. On November 9, Sears, again accompanied by Ramirez and another officer went to the club at 3:45 p.m. and met Coco in the kitchen. After a short discussion there, Coco took Sears into his office where he removed two plastic packages of white powder from the three that were in his metal key container. Sears gave Coco $160.00 for the two packets which were subsequently identified as containing cocaine. On this occasion, Coco indicated to Sears that consistent with the previous conversation they had had, he was interested in buying "Club" which was another name for Canadian Club whiskey. He took a piece of paper from a legal pad and wrote thereon the words, Canadian Club" and several other liquors including "J&B," "Amaretto," "Tia Maria," and "Red/Black" asking Sears if he could get the liquor the same day. This conversation transpired after Sears had asked Coco if his boss still wanted liquor. Coco had previously asked if Sears could get filet mignon. On November 18, 1982, in the afternoon, Sears, Ramirez, and a U.S. Customs agent, all in an undercover capacity, entered the club, When they arrived there, they were advised that Coco was not there. After a short wait, the officers left, returning approximately 40 minutes later. At this time, Sears came in by himself, meeting Coco in the lounge area. When Coco asked about the meat, Sears replied that none was available. However, he had the requested liquor in a friend s car parked outside. The liquor in question was liquor which had been purchased by the Miami Police Department for this operation and consisted of various liquors in case lots. It included some whiskeys that Coco had not mentioned. Coco negotiated with Ramirez in Spanish during which Ramirez allowed himself to be beaten down considerably in price from the original asking figure. Once the par ties struck the bargain the officers were instructed by Coco to carry and stack the cases in the rear office previously mentioned. This office was occupied by Letitia Thomas who was seated at a desk in the office. It was Ms. Thomas who took $245.00 from the pile of cash on her desk and paid Ramirez. Ms. Thomas was obviously an employee of the club. On the way out, Coco called Sears and Ramirez over and asked if Sears wanted to buy any more cocaine. When Sears said he did not have enough money with him, Ramirez offered to pay and Coco removed a small plastic bag containing a white powder from the small metal key container he carried and sold it to Sears for $80.00. This substance was subsequently identified as cocaine. When Sears and Ramirez went into the club again on December 3, 1982, to meet with Coco as per a prior arrangement, Coco again asked Sears if he wanted to buy cocaine. At this point, Sears said he wanted he grams. On this occasion, Coco sold Sears two packages of a substance subsequently identified as cocaine for $70.00 per package instead of the normal $80.00 per package. On December 8, 1982, Sears and Ramirez again went to the Respondent's club. They had previously discussed with Coco not only the sale of liquor and meat but also video recorders which the officers had clearly represented as being stolen. On this occasion, Coco said that his nephew wanted a recorder for his home and when this nephew, identified as Roberto Carbajal, arrived at the club, they discussed the video recorder with him. During this conversation, Carbajal indicated that he knew that the merchandise was stolen. After discussion back and forth, the parties arrived at a purchase price of $120.00 for the brand new unit. The officers were instructed by Carbajal to put the recorder in Coco's office and Carbajal paid Ramirez from his pocket. Carbajal, at this time, was a management employee of the license holder. On December 16, 1982, Sears and Ramirez went to the licensed premises as instructed by Coco. At that time, they had 56 cases of Dom Perignon champagne. Coco had told them to bring the champagne, which, he had indicated, was to be used by the club management. Their understanding with Coco was that he would buy the champagne upon delivery and would also sell them larger amounts of cocaine. When they arrived, Coco was not there and they dealt with other people in the club's employ. The man who approached them was identified as Mario Cordoves, who indicated that neither Coco nor Carbajal were there. Cordoves went off for a moment and returned a few moments later with an individual identified as John Radney who, he indicated, would be interested in buying the champagne. Radney agreed to take all 56 cases but stated that he could not take delivery at the club. He asked them to put some of it in his car. He also indicated that part of the 56 cases could be sold to someone else through his arrangement which was all right with Ramirez so long as the price remained the same. While this was going on, another individual, identified as George Kovacs, approached Ramirez and Sears, and negotiated to buy 18 of the cases of champagne for $100.00 per case. Kovacs left and came back with another individual who was to help him load the champagne into his car. All of this took place on the licensed premises attended by a bartender and two kitchen helpers in addition to Cordoves, Radney, Kovacs, and Kovacs assistant. When the deal was set, all the parties moved out into the parking lot and part of the champagne was placed into Kovacs vehicle. When this was done, Ramirez and Sears identified themselves as police officers and placed Kovacs under arrest. While this transaction was unfolding, Sears was told by Kovacs or someone at the club that the champagne would be sold in the club as part of a "Dom Perignon special" at $100.00 per bottle instead of the normal $200.00 per bottle they usually got. At the time of their arrest, Kovacs and Radney indicated they were up-front operators for the licensed club through an arrangement with Mr. Carbajal but were having difficulty with him. They indicated that Carbajal was the actual owner of the club while Mr. Segal was referred to as an attorney who was acting as registering agent for the corporation which he had set up. Neither Sears nor Ramirez ever saw Segal at the club on any of the visits they made there. Regardless of who was the beneficial owner of the stock in the corporation, Segal was listed as the sole officer and as such, was responsible for the operation.
