Findings Of Fact A request for bids to remodel and make additions to Washington Elementary School was issued by Respondent on August 15, 1990, for Project No. 0191-8210. The request for bids included requests for a base work (the "base bid") and additional work described in various alternates (the "total bid"). Respondent had the option of selecting one or more alternates or none of the alternates. Bids were filed by four bidders on January 15, 1990. Bid tabulations were posted on January 23, 1991. Petitioner was the lowest bidder, and Select Contracting, Inc. ("Select"), was the second lowest bidder. Petitioner's base bid was in the amount of $1,406,500. Petitioner's bid for the alternates eventually selected by Respondent was in the amount of $1,594,300. 2/ The bid documents required bidders to include a bid bond in an amount not less than five percent of the bid. Petitioner included a bid bond with its bid in the amount of $75,000 which was more than five percent of its base bid but less than five percent of the total bid calculated after taking into account the alternates selected by Respondent. Respondent recommended to its Superintendent that the contract should be awarded to Petitioner. Select filed a bid protest on January 25, 1991, seeking an informal hearing. Select alleged that Petitioner's bid was not responsive because it failed to include a bid bond for five percent of Petitioner's total bid, including the alternates selected by Respondent. Select included a bid bond for five percent of its total bid, including the alternates selected by Respondent. Respondent conducted an informal hearing on February 6, 1991, and proposed that all bids should be rejected and the project re-advertised. Respondent determined that Petitioner's bid was non-responsive in that it failed to include a bid bond in an amount equal to five percent of the total bid, including all alternates selected by Respondent. Respondent further determined that relevant language in the bid documents is ambiguous and may create an economic advantage for bidders who provide a bid bond in an amount less than that provided by other bidders. In a written analysis of the basis for recommending the rejection of all bids, the General Counsel stated: In the instant case, since bid amount is not specifically defined by the SCHOOL BOARD, one bidder may receive an unfair economic advantage over another by only including in its bid amount the cost for obtaining a bond which was less than the actual bid amount, (i.e. base bid plus alternates). The only reason that Respondent did not regard the amount of Petitioner's bid bond as a minor irregularity was that Respondent wanted to assure that all bidders were placed on ". . . an equal playing field . . ." by avoiding an unfair economic advantage for one or more bidders. 3/ Relevant language in the bid documents which defines the amount of the required bid bond is ambiguous. The Advertisement For Bid, in relevant part, requires that bids ". . . must be accompanied by a bid bond or cashier's check in an amount not less than five percent (5%) of the bid . . . ." Section 3.05(d) of the Instructions to Bidders refers bidders to Section 3.08 for purposes of the bid bond. Section 3.08 in relevant part requires bids to be accompanied by a bid bond ". . . of not less than five percent (5%) of the amount of the Bid . . . ." The bid proposal form, however, provides that the bidder ". . . further agrees that the security in the form of a Bid Bond, or Cashier's Check in the amount of not less that five percent (5%) of the total Bid Price . . . accompanies this Bid " A bid bond in an amount equal to five percent of the base bid satisfies the requirements in the bid documents for a bid bond in all but one instance. A bid bond in an amount not less than five percent of the base bid is not consistent with the representation in the proposal form that a bidder has included a bid bond equal to five percent of the total bid price. Respondent's bid documents have historically required a bid bond for only five percent of the base bid. The reference in the bid proposal form to a bid bond equal to five percent of the total bid is a recent change made by Respondent and is limited to the bid proposal form. The inclusion of a bid bond for only five percent of the base bid is consistent with Petitioner's historical practice in bidding previous jobs offered by Respondent. Petitioner obtained no unfair economic advantage over Select by including a bid bond for only five percent of the base bid while Select included a bid bond equal to five percent of the total bid, including the alternates selected by Respondent. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that both Petitioner and Select obtained their respective bid bonds at no cost to either bidder. Companies that issue bid bonds, including the companies that issued bid bonds to Petitioner and Select, do not impose a charge for issuing a bid bond in the ordinary course of doing business. Such companies make their money if and when they issue a performance and payment bond for the successful bidder. 4/ Respondent did not know at the time it formulated its proposed agency action that no unfair economic advantage was gained by a bidder who submitted a bid bond for five percent of the base bid rather than five percent of the total bid. Respondent was uncertain of the economic advantage derived from submitting a lower bid bond, if any. Counsel for Select represented that an economic advantage was gained by Petitioner. Respondent decided to reject all bids and look ". . . for . . . direction from a Hearing Officer. " Petitioner is ready, willing, and able to contract for and perform the work necessary to complete the Project. Petitioner is a pre-qualified contractor for projects undertaken by Respondent. Petitioner has a bonding limit substantially in excess of that required to complete the Project and substantial experience in similar projects for the Broward County School Board. Respondent is confident and has no concern over Petitioner's ability to complete the Project. 5/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's written formal protest be GRANTED and the contract awarded to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 3rd day of April, 1991. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1991.
The Issue Petitioner and Lyell Hintz protest the Department's intent to award the bid for Lease No. 550-0209 to Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc. Issues derived from the pleadings, the joint prehearing stipulation and the evidence and argument at hearing are: Whether Petitioner has standing to protest the bid award; Whether Petitioner and Lyell Hintz have waived the right to contest evaluation criteria; If not, whether those criteria are valid; Whether the Respondent has properly applied the criteria to the bid proposals; Whether Southeastern's bid was nonresponsive; Whether Southeastern changed its bid after opening; Whether Petitioner's bid was defective for failure to include a waiver of existing lease; Whether the bid should be awarded to Lyell Hintz or Petitioner; and Whether all bids should be rejected and the lease re-bid.
Findings Of Fact The Bid Solicitation On or about January 31, 1991, the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) advertised its request for proposals (RFP) for a full service lease for its District Five, Operations and Planning Office, Public Transportation Office and Construction Office. The RFP is identified as lease #550:0209. Specifications include net square footage of 13,640 + 3% (13,231 - 14,049), divided into 90% office and 10% storage space, to be available by July 1, 1991, or within 30 days of notice of bid award, whichever occurs last. The space is to be available in a northern section of Orange County designated on a map attached to the RFP, in the Winter Park/Maitland/Orlando area surrounding the intersection of Lee Road and I-4. The following evaluation criteria (award factors) are included in the RFP: The successful bid will be that one determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated below: Rental, using total present value methodology for basic term of lease... (weighting: 15) Conformance of and susceptibility of the design of the space offered to efficient layout and good utilization and to the specific requirements contained in the Invitation to Bid (not to exceed a weight of 10 award factors). (weighting: 10) Provision of the aggregate square footage on a single floor. Proposals will be considered, but fewer points given, which offer the aggregate square footage in not more than two floors. (weighting: 25) The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it, on the efficient and economical conduct of Departmental operation planned for the requested space. (not to exceed a weight of 10 award factors) (weighting: 10) Offers providing 100 s.f. of street-level secured storage. (weighting: 10) * * * [deleted criteria given 0 weight and not relevant] Option period rental rate proposed is within projected budgetary restraints of the department. (weighting: 15) Accessibility to an I-4 Interchange. (weighting: 15) total award factors = 100 (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 7 of 10) Paragraph D.1., General Provisions, includes a notice that failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), F.S., constitutes a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, F.S. The notice references an attachment which includes the text of Chapter 90-224, Laws of Florida, requiring posting of a bond at the time of formal written protest. Paragraph D.6.A., General Provisions states: Each proposal shall be signed by the owner(s), corporate officers, or legal representatives(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an Agent, written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal. If the agent is to execute the lease, the authority must be supported by a properly executed Power of Attorney. If the Bid Submittal is offered by anyone other than the owner or owner's agent, proof of the bidder's authority to offer the facility, i.e., copy of bidder's Option to Purchase, must accompany the proposal. This option must be valid through the validity date established for bids. If a corporation foreign to the State of Florida is the owner of record, written evidence of authority to conduct business in Florida must accompany the Bid Submittal. If there is an existing lease extending beyond the required availability date for all or any portion of the premises being offered to the agency a release of the applicable lease must accompany the Bid Submittal. (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 8 of 10) Paragraph D.8., General Provisions, provides the Department reserves the right to reject any and all bid proposals, waive any minor informality or technicality in bids, to accept that bid deemed to be the lowest and in the best interest of the state, and if necessary, to reinstate procedures for soliciting competitive proposals. Paragraphs D.12 and 13, General Provisions, establish a March 4, 1991 bid opening and a February 11, 1991 preproposal conference, respectively. On the RFP/Bid Proposal Submittal form, below the bidder's signature space, there is a list of required attachments and notice that failure to include such, if applicable, "...shall render the proposal nonresponsive and such proposal shall be rejected". (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 10 of 10) The relevant attachments include a map with location of the facility, photograph, floor plan, authorization as agent for bidder, and release of existing leases. The RFP/Bid Proposal Submittal Form was furnished to the DOT by the Department of General Services (DGS). As permitted, DOT made some modifications to the criteria to meet the specific needs of the agency. No protests of the bid solicitation were filed by any party. The Bid Responses Four proposals were timely received at the bid opening deadline, March 4, 1991: Clayton's Realty (Petitioner) submitted two proposals, Lyell Hintz submitted one proposal, and Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc., submitted one proposal. Clayton's bid for its building at 611 Wymore Road, Winter Park ("Clayton Bldg.") offers 13,984 square feet for $1,136,200.00 for the five-year rental period and $1,398,400.00 for the option years. Some of DOT's offices are already in this building. Clayton's bid for its building at 5600 Diplomat Circle, Orlando, ("Promenade Building") offers 14,049 square feet at $965,868.75 for the 5-year rental term, and $1,229,287.50 for the option period. Both of Clayton's buildings offer space on two floors. Lyell Hintz offers 14,049 square feet at 1241 S. Orlando Avenue, Maitland. The five year rental cost is $895,623.75, and the option period rental is $1,123,920.00. All of the space is offered on a single first floor. Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc., offers 14,049 square feet in the Adlee Building at 5151 Adamson Street, Orlando, for $1,009,139.67 for the 5- year rental term and $1,288,012.32 for the option period. Southeastern contends that it is offering 100 square feet of storage space on the first floor and the remainder of space on the second floor. Committee Analysis of the Bids An evaluation committee comprised of four DOT employees met on March 6, and March 12, 1991, to evaluate the bids. Their evaluation included a visit to each site with pre-established questions. The four employees were Nancy Houston, District Five District Director for Planning and Public Transportation; Donna Sovern, Ms. Houston's Administrative Assistant; Jim Hamelin, Resident Engineer in charge of construction in District Five; and Steven J. Nunnery, Office Manager for District Five Construction. The committee had prior experience in the leasing process on only one occasion. In November 1990, this same lease #550:0209 was bid. Lyell Hintz and Southeastern were the bidders. All bids were rejected after it was discovered that Southeastern's bids included typewritten language added by the bidder and in conflict with standard requirements. No protest was filed from that agency decision. In the November bid the committee simply utilized the criteria provided in the DGS packet. Later the Committee learned that criteria could be modified by the individual agency. With this understanding, the Committee changed the criteria for the March 1991 bids to provide that space be offered on no more than two floors, rather than two buildings; that points would be awarded for offers of 100 square feet of street level storage space, rather than all space on the street level; and that accessibility to an I-4 Interchange would be an additional evaluation factor. The committee felt these criteria appropriately addressed agency need to collocate programs and share facilities, to have ground floor storage for heavy samples and equipment, and to provide easy access by field staff and others using I-4 regularly. The committee devised a methodology for awarding points to each bidder in each category described in paragraph 3, above. The methodology is stated in the minutes of the evaluation committee meeting dated March 6, 1991. For item no. 1, the committee awarded 15 points (the highest) to the lowest bid. The percentage of difference between each bid and the lowest bid was multiplied by 15 to determine the point value. Hintz received 15 points; Clayton (Promenade Building) received 14 points; Southeastern received 13 points; and Clayton (Clayton Building) received 12 points. For item no 2, the committee stated it would take into account the design and other factors in the description of this item, including the parking requirement addressed in the invitation to bid. Southeastern received the maximum, 10 points; Hintz received 8 points; and the two Clayton buildings received 6 points each. As part of the November bid process, when the agency initially intended to make the award to Southeastern, Nancy Houston's husband, an architect in private practice, prepared without charge a layout of Southeastern's building to see if Southeastern could meet DOT's needs. At Clayton's and Southeastern's requests, that layout was provided to the bidders, except for Hintz. Since Hintz' building is basically a shell, and he assured DOT he would make the renovations they needed, Ms. Houston did not feel that he needed the floor plan. After the bids were rejected in November, the layout became a public record, available to anyone upon request. However, Ms. Houston opined at hearing that they could not get a good layout that would work for the Hintz building. This contradicts Mr. Hintz' testimony that the suggested floor plan attached to the RFP could easily fit in his building. The floor plan attached to the RFP is not the same floor plan prepared by Ms. Houston's husband for the Southeastern building and the fact that Hintz' building is a shell capable of a vast variety of layouts impeaches Ms. Houston's opinion. Item no. 3 requests aggregate square footage on a single floor, with fewer points for space on two floors. The committee methodology was to give 25 points for space on one floor and "reduction given accordingly" for two floors. (Joint Exhibit #6, attachment A, page 1) Hintz and Southeastern were each granted 25 (maximum) points. Although various committee members testified that two floors should have warranted 1/2 the points, or 13, Clayton's buildings were awarded 16 points each. Southeastern is not proposing to provide all space on one floor, as it is offering storage on the first floor and office space on the second floor. The committee considered this worthy of full points, as all of the office space is on one floor. Item no. 4 is related to environmental factors such as aesthetics of the building and surrounding areas. The committee methodology states that aesthetics of the building and area would be considered along with "...the economical factor relating to the conduct of our everyday activities from and in each space proposed." (Joint Exhibit #6, Attachment A) Southeastern was awarded 10 points (maximum); Clayton's Clayton Building and Promenade Building were awarded 6 and 8 points respectively; and Hintz was awarded 3 points. Item no. 5 relates to provision of 100 square feet of storage on the street level. The committee methodology provides that full ten points will be awarded if this is met; if not, the score would be "adjusted accordingly". Each bid was awarded the full 10 points. The committee members learned that Southeastern was willing to provide street level storage when they made their site visit and inquired. The space was not described in Southeastern's written proposal. Item no. 11 relates to rental cost for the option period. The methodology adopted by the committee for this item is the same as for item no. Hintz, the lowest bidder for the option term, received 15 points; Clayton's Promenade Building received 14 points; Southeastern received 13 points; and the Clayton Building received 12 points. Item no. 12, accessibility to an I-4 Interchange, is worth 15 points maximum. For its methodology the committee devised a formula of granting the closest building a full 15 points. The I-4/Lee Road interchange was selected as the reference hub. The Clayton Building, .2 miles from the interchange, was given 15 points. Southeastern's building .6 miles away, three times as far, was given 1/3 value, 5 points; the Promenade Building, .4 miles away, or twice as far, was given 1/2 full value, or 7.5, rounded to 8 points; and Hintz' building, 2 miles away, or 10 times as far, was given 1.5 points, rounded to 2. The total values thus awarded by the committee were: 86 points to Southeastern; 78 points to Hintz; 77 points to Clayton (Clayton Bldg.); and 76 points to Clayton (Promenade Bldg.). The committee, after meeting on March 6th and making its awards, decided to meet again on March 12th, after obtaining more information on phone service, zoning regulations, crime, and bidder's previous experience in renovations. Although some additional information was obtained and the committee did meet again, it determined that the additional information (not clearly related to any of the seven criteria above) did not warrant changing any of the scores. The committee recommended award of the lease to Southeastern. Southeastern's Bid Allegedly Defective Southeastern's bid is signed by Gilmore E. Daniel, Vice President of Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc., as agent for the owner, Cynwyd Investments, a partnership which operates under about 150 different partnerships. The building in issue is owned by an entity designated "Adlee Building, Cynwyd Investments General Partnership". Attached to Southeastern's bid is a letter on Cynwyd Investments letterhead, dated February 7, 1991, addressed to Mr. Gil Daniel, re: Adlee Building, 5151 Adamson Street, Orlando, Florida, stating: As leasing and managing agent for the above captioned property, you are hereby authorized to negotiate on our behalf with the State of Florida in order to procure the Department of Transportation as a tenant in our building. (Joint Exhibit #5) The letter is signed by Stephen Cravitz, CSM. Although the language of the letter is inartful (the agent was not "negotiating" a lease), the intent is plain on its face that the agent procure a lease. This is sufficient to convey authority for Gil Daniel to act on behalf of the owner. The requirement of the RFP, paragraph 6.A. is met. (see paragraph 5, above) There are several tenants currently occupying space proposed to be leased to DOT under lease no. 550:0209. There are three "agreements" attached to Southeastern's bid proposal for three tenants. Each agreement provides the tenant will move by April 15, 1991 "...contingent upon the landlord being the successful bidder for the State of Florida Department of Transportation lease no. 550:0209, and having an executed lease with the State." (Joint Exhibit #5) The tenants have not moved, but neither has the contingency been satisfied; and when or if it is, the tenants will move. These agreements are sufficient "release" to meet the requirements of RFP paragraph 6.A. The remaining tenant does not have a lease. Clayton's Bid Allegedly Defective Clayton's bids did not include any releases from tenants. There is a tenant currently in part of the space offered in the Clayton Building. There is also a lease agreement dated August 28, 1989, between the Claytons and Canam Steel Corporation describing a lease term of three years and termination date of September 14, 1992. Edward Fielding, Jr. is Director of Operations in the Leasing Department for Charles and Malcolm Clayton. He is well aware of the requirements for state leasing as he and the Claytons have been involved for several years in leasing space to state agencies. Canam Steel Corporation provided a letter in April 26, 1990, stating that it is closing its Orlando operation and requesting that its lease be terminated. It still occupies the space, but Edward Fielding is assured that it wishes to leave, and will do so immediately upon approval by Clayton. The lease and release was not included with the bid packet, as Fielding properly determined that it was no longer binding on the landlord. The Clayton Building bid does not violate the requirement of RFP, Paragraph 6.A. F. Alleged Bias of the Committee in Favor of Southeastern and Improper Award of Points Hintz and Clayton contend that the bid process was thoroughly tainted with a bias in favor of an award to Southeastern. Clayton did not respond to the November bid; Hintz did, and did not protest the earlier process, although he apparently brought to DOT's attention the language added to Southeastern's bid response that led to the rejection of all bids and reinitiation of the process. The committee changed its evaluation criteria when it learned that DGS's form criteria are not binding on the agency. The committee's alterations and addition of the I-4 accessibility requirement were intended to better meet the specific needs of the programs that would be using the space. The changes did not specifically benefit Southeastern; it was neither the closest nor next closest building to the I-4 interchange. For those criteria which could be objectively quantified, such as rental rate and proximity to I-4, the committee attempted in good faith to devise formulae. That the point spread for the I-4 criteria was substantially wider than for rental rates does not invalidate those formulae. For those criteria requiring a subjective analysis, the conformance/design and environmental factors, Petitioner and Hintz failed to prove the committee's point awards were patently wrong or fraudulent. One committee member, James Hamelin, admitted that Clayton should have received 13, rather than 16 points for providing space on more than one floor, but that error, if it indeed was an error, inured to the benefit of Petitioner and made no impact on Hintz, the next highest scorer. None of the floor plans presented by the bidders with their proposals are attached to the exhibits received in evidence, and those floor plans are not part of the record in this proceeding. One committee member, Donna Sovern, admitted that all of the square footage proposed by Southeastern was initially on the second floor. When the site visit was made and the committee discussed the space, Southeastern offered 100 square feet of storage on the first floor. (Transcript, pp 200-201) Because of this, Southeastern was awarded the full 10 points for Item No. 5, requiring 100 square feet of street-level secured storage. Allowing Southeastern to change its bid thus provided an advantage of 10 additional points. Assuming that the change was appropriate, Southeastern should not have also received the full 25 points for Item No. 3, provision of aggregate square footage on a single floor, since the remainder of its space is on the second floor. The award of points in these two items by the committee is inconsistent and erroneous. Page 4 of 10 of the RFP describes the space to be included in the 13,640 square feet to be leased. The description includes storage areas. (Joint Exhibit #1) The bidders were on notice that "aggregate" square footage includes storage space. The total number of points awarded to Southeastern must be reduced by either 10 (the after-the-fact storage space on the first floor) or 9 (the difference between the full 25 points and 16, the points awarded to Clayton for space on two floors). This results in a total of either 76 or 77 points for Southeastern. In either case, Hintz becomes the highest scorer, and Clayton and Southeastern are tied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the agency enter its Final Order awarding lease no. 550:0209 to Lyell Hintz. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 12th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 7. - 5. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 20. Adopted in paragraph 31. Adopted in summary in paragraph 18. Rejected as immaterial. and 11. Adopted in part in paragraph 5, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Southeastern's name is typewritten. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraph 31, otherwise rejected as immaterial. and 15. Adopted in part in paragraph 33, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Adopted in paragraphs 17 and 18. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Adopted in paragraph 19. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraphs 20 and 27, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 21, 26 and 27. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 37. Adopted in part in paragraph 29, otherwise rejected as irrelevant as points were not awarded or subtracted for the additional factors. Rejected as irrelevant. Lyell Hintz' Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 2. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraphs 13, 15, 16 and 21. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraphs 17 and 18. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 8. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraphs 31 and 32. - 11. Rejected as immaterial and contrary to the weight of evidence. The letter attached to the bid was sufficient authority. 12. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 13. and 14. 15. Adopted Adopted in in paragraph 25. paragraphs 3 and 25. 16. Adopted in paragraph 38. 17. - 21. Adopted in paragraphs 3 and 22. 22. Rejected as argument rather than finding of fact. 23. Rejected as immaterial and unsupported by the evidence. 24. Adopted in paragraph 3. 25. - 34. Adopted in summary in paragraphs 23, 14 and 16. 35. and 36. Adopted in paragraph 38. Adopted in paragraphs 3 and 24. - 50. Rejected as immaterial. According to the evidence these factors did not change the committee's evaluation. 51. - 53. Rejected as immaterial and, as to the DGS requirement, unsupported by the record. Respondent and Southeastern's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 17. Adopted in paragraphs 18 and 19. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in part in paragraph 3, otherwise unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 25. Adopted in paragraph 19. Adopted in paragraph 27. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 28. Adopted in paragraph 24. Rejected as contrary to the evidence, specifically the RFP which unambiguously included all storage and office space in the "aggregate." - 19. Rejected as irrelevant or unsupported by the record. Adopted in paragraph 31. Adopted in paragraph 33. Adopted in part in paragraph 34, but the letter requesting its lease be terminated is sufficient release. Adopted in part in paragraph 12. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Marvin L. Beaman, Jr., Esquire 605 North Wymore Road Winter Park, FL 32789 Wings L. Benton, Esquire P. O. Box 5676 Tallahassee, FL 32314-5676 Susan P. Stephens, Esquire Dept. of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Kenneth M. Meer, Esquire 423 Country Club Drive Winter Park, FL 32789 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. #58 Dept. of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Dept. of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue These proceedings arose as the result of a bid solicita- tion issued by Respondent, Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), whereby DOAH sought the lease of office space. DOAH disqualified two proposals submitted by Petitioner, Parkway- Oakland General Partnership (Parkway), and proposed to award the lease to Intervenor, American National Bank of Florida (American Bank). Parkway protested the disqualification of its proposals and the intended award. The Koger Company (Koger) also protested the intended award, but filed a voluntary dismissal prior to the final hearing in Case No. 88-3357BID. By separate order, this Hearing Officer has entered an order closing her file on Case No. 88-3357BID. The disputed issues are described as follows by the parties in their prehearing stipulation and at final hearing: 1. Whether Parkway bid an existing, dry and measurable building. 2. Whether American Bank bid an existing dry and measurable building. 3. Whether DOAH acted arbitrarily and capriciously by disqualifying Parkway's proposals and by evaluating American Bank's proposal. At final hearing, Parkway called Jack B. Tobin, Tony Benton, William M. Baldwin, and Al Rudolph as witnesses. Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 3 were received into evidence. DOAH called Linda C. Spears, Mary V. Goodman, and Stephen F. Dean as witnesses. DOAH's Exhibits 1 through 2 were received into evidence and portions of the deposition of Marilyn Lawrence were read into the record. . American Bank called Donald L. Feather as a witness, The transcript of the hearing was filed on August ll, 1988, and the parties were to file Proposed recommended orders within ten days of the filing of the transcript. The parties’ Proposals have been addressed in the appendix to this recommended order.
Findings Of Fact Based on stipulations of the Parties, on the exhibits received in evidence and ‘on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: 1. DOAH issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for over 2,000 square Feet of office space in Tallahassee, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2) ‘The RFP was prepared using the Department of General Services! (DGS) guidelines (TR 89) and DGS Porm BPM 4136, which is a solicitation format Prepared by DGS for use by all State agencies. (TR 123 and Rule 13M-1.015(3)(e)) 2. Parkway submitted three bid Proposals, two of which were disqualified by DOAH. American Bank submitted a proposal which was determined by the evaluation committee to be the lowest and best proposal. (Prehearing Stipulation) 3. One of the disqualified Proposals submitted by Parkway was known as the "Option Proposal." In this arrangement, DOAH was to continue occupying the space it was currently leasing until October, 1988 at which time, DOAH would move into Building "B" located at 2001 Old St. Augustine Road. (TR 18, 19, 86, and Pet. Exhibit 1) - 4. The other disqualified Proposal submitted by Parkway was known as the "Park Proposal." The Park Proposal was for 2001 Old St. Augustine Road, where two buildings called Building "a" and Building "B" were being constructed. Both buildings were identical in size, shape and total construction. (TR 28) ‘The Park Proposal submitted by Parkway contains two Photographs and four drawings. (Pet. Ex, 2) One of the Photographs depicts Building "A." (TR 34) Three of the four drawings relate to Building "B" and one of the drawings relates. to Building "A" and related site development. The Proposal never clearly identified a specific building at 2001 Old St. Augustine Road as being the building bid. However, during the evaluation committee's site visit at 2001 Old st, Augustine Road, a representative of the Parkway indicated Building "B" was the building proposed for lease by DOAH. (TR 98) 5. American Bank submitted a Proposal for the space located in a former bowling alley on Apalachee Parkway. This space is herein referred to as the old bowling alley. (TR 60) 6. Form BPM 4136, which is the bid solicitation document, contains the following requirement: The proposed space must be in an existing building. To be considered as existing, the space must be dry and capable of being physically measured to deter-— mine net rentable square footage at the time of bid Submittal. Renovations to bring the facility into compliance with all applicable Federal, State and local codes and regulations and/or to meet the desired arrangements are permitted, it (sic) carried out in accordance with prescribed Procedures. (Emphasis in original.) 7. DGS interprets the requirement of an existing building to mean that the building must be enclosed with flooring, a roof, and walls and that exterior doors and windows must be in Place or the building must be such that the exterior is enclosed so that it is dry in adverse weather. Additionally, the building must be capable of being measured by pulling a tape inside the building to determine the net rentable Square footage. (TR 116) The purpose of having the dry and measurable criteria is to distinguish between an existing building and one that is to be built or that is Partially complete. (TR 119) 8. On May 13, 1988, the date of the bid submittal, Building "B" was not an existing building. (Prehearing Stipulation) Building "A" had a roof, a Slab, and walls, which comprised 50 percent of the vertical Plane from the slab to the roof. The windows and exterior doors in Building "A" had not been installed on May 13, 1988, (TR 40-42, 96-97, 147) Building "a" had a four foot overhang but the testimony of Mr. Tobin that the Overhang prevented rain from entering the building is not credible, given the large amount of window space which was not enclosed. (TR 51) 9. On May 13, 1988, the old bowling alley had walls, a slab, and portions of the exterior walls were boarded over, possibly in the location of existing windows or window openings. (TR 63, 109, 133, 134) The roof did have a hole, which was approximately three feet in length and allowed water to leak into the building. (TR 118, 119) The interior of the old bowling alley was capable of being measured. (TR 67, 119) The old bowling alley is an existing building. (TR 118-119) 10. After the bid solicitation document was issued, representatives of the Parkway met with staff of DOAH, (TR 27, 91) A DOAH staff member advised Parkway representatives that Parkway could "bid the park," but it had to bid an existing building which was dry and measurable. (TR 46, 80, 93, 138, 139) ll. At the prebid conference, DOAH representatives advised a Prospective bidder, in the Presence of a Parkway representative, that in order for a building. to be considered for the contract, it must be existing and dry and measurable at the time the bids were submitted. (TR 94, 95) 12. At the time Parkway submitted its proposals, neither Building "A" nor Building "B" was an existing building as defined by the bid solicitation document. 13, At the time Parkway submitted its proposals, Parkway was negotiating with a Private company for the lease of Building "A" (TR 77,27) and Parkway entered into a lease for Building "A" with the Private company on dune 13, 1988. (TR 43, 45) Thus, even if Building "A" had -been an existing building at the time the bids were Submitted, it is not available for lease to DOAH. (TR 45)
Conclusions CASE NO. CASE NO. 88-3357BID 88-3358BID On September 1, 1988, the Hearing Officer who conducted a formal administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, in the above-styled case submitted her Recommended Order to the undersigned and all parties of record. A copy of the Recommended Order is attached as Exhibit A. In ays accordance with Rule 28-5.404, all parties were allowed twenty days in which to. file..exceptions..to.. the. Recommended Order. °.To date, none of the parties have submitted exceptions. The Recommended Order came before me as agency head for final agency action.” Having considered the Recommended Order, the exhibits admitted into evidence at final hearing and the transcript of the final hearing conducted on August 1, 1988, it is ORDERED that.the Recommended Order, attached as Exhibit A, is adopted as the final order of the agency. Accordingly, the protest filed by Parkway-Oakland General Partnership in Case No. 88-3358BID is dismissed and Lease No. 510:0049 is awarded to American National Bank of Florida. DONE AND ORDERED this o%/~& day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. | Lh aap A ssi SHARYN SMITH Director Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this Qist day of September, 1988.
Recommendation SEE NVDATION Based on the foregoing, it recommended that the Division of Administrative Hearings enter a final order dismissing Case No. 88-3358BID ang awarding Lease No. 510:0049 to American National Bank of Florida. st : RECOMMENDED this /*~ day of September, 1988, in buce BK ghhad SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Office of General Counsel Department of General Services Room 452, Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0955 (904)487-1082 Tallahassee, Florida. Filed with the Clerk of the Department of General Services this /od day of September, 1988 Copies furnished to: Kim Cecile Rice Lobrano & Kincaid, P.A. Suite 810, 121 Forsyth Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 William A. Bald, Esquire Dale & Bald 2900 Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Robert D. Newell, Jr. Newell and Stahl, P.A. 817 North Gadsden Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6313 Mark Rubin, Esquire 777 Arthur Godfrey Road Suite 320 Miami Beach, Florida 33140 10 APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 68-3358B1D The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case, ’ Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner Parkway-Oakland General Partnership Proposed Finding of Fact No. 1 is incorporated in Finding of Fact Nos. 1 and 2. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 2 is incorporated in Finding of Fact Nos. 2, 3, and 4. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 3 is incorporated in Finding of Pact No. 8 and is covered in the Introduction and Issues, Proposed Finding of Fact Wo. 4 is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. . Proposed Finding of Fact No. 5 is covered in the Introduction and Issues. The first sentence in Proposed Finding of Fact No. 6 is subordinate and unnecessary. The remainder of the proposed finding of fact is rejected as not supported by the record as a whole, as conclusionary, and as mere recital of testimony. . The first sentence in Proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 8. The remainder of the proposed finding of fact is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. The portion of Proposed Finding of Fact No. 8 which indicates that windows were not installed at the time of the bid submittal and that the building had a four foot overhang is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 8. The remainder of the proposed finding of fact is rejected as mere recitation of testimony, conclusionary, speculative and not supported by the record as a whole. The first two sentences of Proposed Finding of Fact No. 9 are cumulative in part and subordinate and unnecessary to the facts aB found. ll 10. ll. 12, 13. 14, 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 2i. 22. 23. 24. In Proposed Finding of Fact No. 10, the fact that the building proposed by American Bank had a hole in the roof is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 9. The remainder of the Proposed finding of fact is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 11 is cumulative. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 12 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 10. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 13 is rejected as not supported by the record as a whole. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 14 is rejected as not supported by the record as a whole. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 15 is subordinate and unnecessary as to the facts as found. The first paragraph in Proposed Finding of Fact No. 16 is mere recitation of testimony, subordinate, and unnecessary. The last paragraph is rejected as conclusionary and not supported by the record as a whole. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 17 is rejected as conclusionary and not supported by the record as a whole. Ms. Goodman's testimony did not contradict the testimony of Ms. Spears. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 18 is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. . Proposed Finding of Fact No. 19 is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 20 is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 21 is mere recitation of testimony, subordinate, and unnecessary to the facts as found. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 22 is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. . Proposed Finding of Fact No. 23 is subordinate and unneccessary to the facts as found. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 24 is cumulative and mere recitation of testimony. To the extent that the testimony indicates that Building "A" was not an existing building that is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 12. 12 25. 10. Ti. 12. 13. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 25 is subordinate and unneccessay to the facts as found. Specific Rulings on Joint Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted By DOAH and American Bank Proposed Finding of Pact No. 1 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. l. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 2 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 6. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 3 is incorporated in Finding of Pact Nos. 2, 3, and 4. To the extent not subordinate and unnecessary, Proposed Finding of Pact No. 4 is incorporated in Finding of Fact - Nos. 4 and 8. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 5 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 8. . Proposed Finding of Fact No. 6 is subordinate and unnecessary. To the extent not subordinate and unnecessary, Proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 8 is subordinate and unnecessary. To the extent not subordinate and unnecessary, Proposed Finding of Fact No. 9 ig incorporated in Finding of Fact No. To the extent not subordinate and unnecessary, Proposed Finding of Fact No. 10 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 13. Proposed Finding of Fact Nos. 11, 12, and 13 are subordinate and unnecessary. . To the extent not subordinate and unnecessary, Proposed Finding of Fact No. 14 is incorporated in Finding of Fact No. 4. : Proposed Finding of Fact No. 15 is subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. 13 Proposed Finding of Pact No. unnecessary. Proposed Finding of Fact No. unnecessary. Proposed Finding of Fact No. in Finding of Fact No. 7 Proposed Finding of Fact No. in Finding of Fact No. 9. Proposed Finding of Fact No. in Finding of Fact No. 9 To the extent not subordinat Finding of Fact No. Proposed Finding of Fact No. unnecessary. Proposed Finding of Fact No. in Finding of Fact No. 10, Proposed Finding of Fact No. in Finding of Fact No. 10. Proposed Finding of Fact No. of Fact Nos. 10 and 1l. 16 17 18 19 20 is is is is is subordinate and subordinate and modified and incorporated modified and incorporated modified and incorporated e and unnecessary, Proposed 21 is incorporated in Finding of Fact 22 is subordinate and 23 is is is modified and incorporated modified and incorporated incorporated in Finding oye STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS THE KOGER COMPANY, Petitioner, “Vs. DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, Respondent, and AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA, Intervenor. PARKWAY-—OAKLAND GENERAL PARTNERSHIP, Petitioner, vs. DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, Respondent, and AMERICAN NATIONAL” BANK OF ~ FLORIDA, Intervenor. ew
Other Judicial Opinions A...PARTY .WHO..IS.. ADVERSELY AFFECTED. BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS ARE GOVERNED BY THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. SUCH PROCEEDINGS ARE COMMENCED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF THE DIVISION OF. ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS AND A SECOND COPY, ACCOMPANIED BY FILING FEES PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT, OR WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE PARTY RESIDES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO REVIEWED. Copies furnished: Kim Cecile Rice, Esquire LOBRANO & KINCAID, P.A. Suite 810, 121 Forsyth Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 William A. Bald, Esquire DALE & BALD 2900 Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Robert D. Newell, dr., Esquire NEWELL AND STAHL, P.A. 817 North Gadsden Street __ Se Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6313 Mark Rubin, Esquire 777 Arthur Godfrey Road Suite 320 Miami Beach, Florida 33140 Susan B. Kirkland, Esquire Office of General Counsel Department of General Services Room 452, Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0955
Findings Of Fact The Department of Transportation sought bid proposals for mechanical sweeping on three road projects identified as Project No. 87906-9175, Project No. 87906-9176 and Project No. 87906-9177, which involve street sweeping in Dade County, Florida. The contract documents provided that a mandatory pre-bid conference would be held in Miami on August 7, 1986. The purpose of the pre-bid conference was to answer any questions the contractors might have to assure that the contractors understood the full scope of each of the contracts and to assure the Department that it would receive responsible bids. Two prospective bidders attended the pre-bid conference: Dave Smith & Company and Power Sweeping Services, Inc. Charles Larry Roberts attended the pro-bid conference on the three subject projects as the sole representative of Dave Smith & Company. Florida Sweeping, Petitioner herein, did not exist at the time of the pro-bid conference. Roberts was in attendance at the pro-bid conference from the beginning until the end of the conference. The pre-bid conference would not have been conducted in a different manner had Roberts signed in as agent for Petitioner rather than as agent for Dave Smith & Company. Although there was a mandatory pro-bid conference requirement, the contracts were routine in nature. Prior to the bids being submitted for the subject contracts, the relationship between Dave Smith & Company and Roberts was terminated. Other than the attendance by Roberts at the pre-bid conference, Roberts did not participate in the preparation of the bids on behalf of Dave Smith & Company. After Roberts and Dave Smith & Company terminated their relationship, Roberts chose to submit bids for the contracts himself under the name of Florida Sweeping. Subsequent to the pro-bid conference, Roberts went to the Department and picked up the bid specifications for the three projects, signing his own name as the party receiving the packages. Laurel Bryan, the District Contracts Coordinator, was aware that Roberts signed his own name in picking up the bid specifications. In response to the Department's request for bids, bids were submitted on all three projects on behalf of three bidders: Dave Smith & Company, Power Sweeping Services, Inc., and Petitioner. At the time scheduled for bid opening, Roberts delivered to Bryan the three bids on behalf of Petitioner, at which time they were accepted by Bryan who knew that while Roberts had in fact attended the pre-bid conference, he did not attend the conference in the capacity of representative of Petitioner. She also knew that Roberts had previously bid on other similar projects. At the time the bids were submitted and accepted, they were in sealed envelopes and Bryan was unaware as to which of the three bidders was the low bidder. At the time of the bid opening, the Department made no inquiry as to whether the Dave Smith & Company bids were prepared with the benefit of Roberts' attendance at the pre-bid conference. The bids submitted by all three bidders were opened on August 14, 1986, and tabulated, disclosing that Petitioner was the low bidder with respect to all three contracts. The Department admits that attendance by Roberts at the pre-bid conference as representative of a company other than Petitioner would not affect his ability to bid for and to perform the work under the subject contracts. On August 18, 1986, the Department of Transportation advised Petitioner that its bid proposals had been declared nonresponsive and irregular for two reasons: (a) Petitioner did not send a representative to the mandatory pre-bid conference; and (b) Petitioner did not present adequate proof of ability to obtain a performance bond. Part of the bidding specifications included a document entitled "Instructions to All Bidders". Paragraph 4 of "Instructions to All Bidders" reads as follows: 4. IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 1 OF THE MINI-CONTRACT GENERAL: SPECIFICATIONS, ALL BIDS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY PROOF OF THE ABILITY TO ACQUIRE A PERFORMANCE BOND. AS PROOF, ALL BIDS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A NOTARIZED LETTER FROM A BONDING COMPANY, BANK OR OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTION STATING THAT THEY INTEND TO ISSUE A BOND IN THE AMOUNT OF YOUR BID, WITHIN THE REQUIRED TIME LIMIT, SHOULD YOUR FIRM BE AWARDED THE CONTRACT. Petitioner with respect to each contract, submitted a notarized letter dated August 12, 1986, from A. W. Bradshaw & Co., Limited. A. W. Bradshaw & Co., Limited, is a financial institution. The letter stated that A. W. Bradshaw & Co., Limited, would "cash" bond any contracts awarded to Petitioner by the State of Florida. Although the Department of Transportation's written requirement concerns a bond from either a surety or insurance company, or from a bank or other financial institution, a cash bond is acceptable to the Department. It is, therefore, not necessary that a bond be provided by a surety. After rejection of Petitioner's bids, the Department determined that Power Sweeping Services, Inc., was the lowest responsible bidder. The bid from Power Sweeping Services, Inc., includes a letter from William Douglas & Associates, an independent insurance agent, as the letter intended to comply with the bonding letter requirement of the Instruction to Bidders. That letter states in part: With regard to Item #1, Qualifying Bonding Company, I have been advised by the present carrier, Southeastern Casualty and Indemnity Company that they do not anticipate any problems in issuing the Payment and Performance Bond in the total aggregate amount of $158,915.70, which consists of the following . . . . The bond letters submitted with the Power Sweeping Services, Inc., bids are not notarized and do not bind any bonding company, bank, other financial institution or even Southeastern Casualty and Indemnity Company, to issue a bond for Power Sweeping. The Department accepted the letter from William Douglas & Associates, Inc., as opposed to requiring a letter directly from Southeastern Casualty and Indemnity Company due to the fact that Bryan had prior independent knowledge of the agent as she had dealt with the agent on previous occasions. If Bryan had any questions about the William Douglas & Associates, Inc., letter, she would have called the agent. Although Bryan could not read the signature on the letter from William Douglas & Associates, Inc., she felt she could recognize the signature of a Mr. Savoie on behalf of William Douglas & Associates, Inc., by virtue of her previous dealings with him. The Department rejected Petitioner's letter from A. W. Bradshaw and Co., Limited, for the following reasons: (a) because Bryan could not read the signature of the person who signed it; and (b) because Bryan did not know the cities or countries or islands where the company was located, did not see a recognizable to her address on the letter, and did not see a recognizable to her telephone number with a three digit area code and a seven digit number. Bryan did not ask Roberts at the bid opening or at any subsequent time where A. W. Bradshaw and Co., Limited, was located, whether A. W. Bradshaw and Co., Limited, was a financial institution, or how A. W. Bradshaw and Co., Limited, could be contacted by telephone. The only reasons why Petitioner's bids were rejected were the two specific reasons stated in the letters of August 18, 1986.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding the bid proposals submitted by Florida Sweeping with respect to State Project Nos. 87906-9175, 87906-9176 and 87906-9177, to be the lowest responsive bids, accepting those bids, and awarding the three contracts in question to Petitioner. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of November 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Drawdy, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Barry S. Webber, Esquire Post Office Box 8549 Hollywood, Florida 33084-0549 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue The issues in this protest are whether Respondent's intended action——i.e., deeming Petitioner's application ineligible for funding on the grounds that the amount of capital the applicant's equity proposal states will be invested during construction is insufficient to cover development costs——is contrary to governing statutes, administrative rules, or the specifications of the solicitation; and, if so, whether this erroneous action is contrary to competition, clearly erroneous, or arbitrary or capricious.
Findings Of Fact FHFC is the housing credit agency for the state of Florida whose responsibilities include the awarding of low- income housing tax credits, which developers use to finance the construction of affordable housing. Tax credits are distributed pursuant to a competitive process similar to a public procurement that starts with FHFC's issuance of a request for applications.1/ On January 9, 2019, FHFC issued Request for Applications 2019-105 (the "RFA"). Eighteen applications were submitted in response to the RFA on February 6, 2019. A Review Committee was appointed to evaluate the applications and make recommendations to FHFC's Board of Directors (the "Board"). Pursuant to the ranking and selection process outlined in the RFA, applicants were evaluated on eligibility items and were awarded points for other items. Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-60.006 provides that "[t]he failure of an Applicant to supply required information in connection with any competitive solicitation . . . shall be grounds for a determination of nonresponsiveness with respect to its Application. If a determination of nonresponsiveness is made by [FHFC], the Application shall be considered ineligible." The RFA sets forth a list of mandatory Eligibility and Point Items that must be included in a response. The RFA expressly provides that "[o]nly Applications that meet all of the Eligibility Items will be eligible for funding and considered for funding selection." As an Eligibility Item, each applicant was required to submit, as part of its application, a Development Cost Pro Forma detailing both the anticipated costs of the proposed development, as well as the anticipated funding sources for the proposed development. In order to demonstrate adequate funding, the Total Construction Sources (including equity proceeds/capital contributions and loans) as shown in the pro forma must equal or exceed the Total Development Costs reflected therein. During the scoring process, if a funding source is not considered or is adjusted downward, then Total Development Costs might wind up exceeding Total Construction Sources, in which event the applicant is said to suffer from a construction funding shortfall (deficit). If an applicant has a funding shortfall, it is ineligible for funding. The Development Cost Pro Forma does not allow applicants to include in their Total Construction Sources any equity proceeds to be paid after construction completion. Instead, the applicant must state only the amount of "Equity Proceeds Paid Prior to Completion of Construction." The pro forma defines "Prior to Completion of Construction" as "Prior to Receipt of a Final Certificate of Occupancy." The RFA requires, as well, that an equity proposal letter be included as an attachment to the application. For a housing credit equity proposal to be counted as a source of financing, it must meet the following criteria: Be executed by the equity provider; Include specific reference to the Applicant as the beneficiary of the equity proceeds; State the proposed amount of equity to be paid prior to construction completion; State the anticipated Eligible Housing Credit Request Amount; State the anticipated dollar amount of Housing Credit allocation to be purchased; and State the anticipated total amount of equity to be provided. (Emphasis added). The Review Committee found 14 applications eligible and four applications ineligible, including the Vistas application. Two applications were recommended for funding: Lincoln Village Apartments and Winchester Place. At a meeting on March 22, 2019, the Board approved the Review Committee's eligibility and funding recommendations. In its application, Vistas requested an allocation of $1,325,000 in housing credits. In formulating its intended action on the RFA, FHFC determined that Vistas is not eligible for an award of housing credits for failing to state in its application that an amount of equity sufficient to cover the anticipated development costs would be invested in the project prior to construction completion. Vistas protests this determination of ineligibility. Due to the limited availability of credits and Vistas' position in the ranking, Winchester Place, a putatively successful applicant, would end up being deselected if FHFC's final agency action were to find Vistas eligible. Thus, Winchester Place has intervened in this proceeding to defend the intended agency action. As Attachment 14 to its application, Vistas submitted an equity proposal letter from RBC Capital Markets ("RBC") executed by David J. Urban (the "Equity Proposal"). In relevant part, the Equity Proposal states: Anticipated Total Equity to be provided: $12,586,241* Equity Proceeds Paid Prior to or simultaneous to closing the construction financing: $2,013,799* (min. 15%) Equity Proceeds to be Paid Prior to Construction Completion: $7,048,295 Pay-In Schedule: Funds available for Capital Contributions #1: $2,013,799* be paid prior to or simultaneously with the closing of the construction financing. Funds available for Capital Contribution #2 $1,887,936* prior to construction completion. Funds available for Capital Contribution #3 $3,146,560* concurrent with permanent loan closing. Equity Proceeds Paid at Lease Up $4,405,184* Equity Proceeds Paid at 8609 $1,132,762* *All numbers rounded to nearest dollar. The Pay-In Schedule in the Equity Proposal refers to "permanent loan closing" as the moment when Capital Contribution #3 will be made "available." The Equity Proposal does not, however, define or discuss permanent loan closing, and, to the point, does not specify when it is expected to occur. Of potential relevance in this regard is a letter from JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (the "Chase Letter"), which is included as Attachment 15 to Vistas' application. Unlike the Equity Proposal, the Chase Letter, if not the last word on the subject, at least sheds some light on the timing of the crucial milestone, i.e., "permanent loan closing." Although the Chase Letter is full of escape clauses and does "not represent a commitment" or "an offer to commit," the document nevertheless outlines the terms for the closing of the proposed construction and permanent loans. The proposed terms call for the payment of a $10,000 Conversion Fee at permanent loan closing and impose preconditions for the conversion from the construction loan to the permanent loan, which include a requirement that there have been "90% economic and physical occupancy for 90 days." No evidence was presented as to the meaning of this language, but the term "physical occupancy" is clear and unambiguous——and it plainly happens after receipt of a final certificate of occupancy, which, under the RFA, is the end point of the construction phase. Winchester Place argues that the Pay-In Schedule casts doubt on whether the entire amount stated in the Equity Proposal's line-item entry for "Equity Proceeds to be Paid Prior to Construction Completion" ($7,048,295) will be paid before the final certificate of occupancy is issued. According to Winchester Place, the Pay-In Schedule shows that the third capital contribution will be paid after construction completion because the second capital contribution, which is the earlier of the two, is due to occur "prior to construction completion." Thus, Winchester Place contends that Vistas' construction financing sources should be reduced by $3,146,560, thereby creating a construction financing shortfall and rendering the Vistas application ineligible for funding. Winchester Place's argument supports FHFC's intended action but is opposed by FHFC in this proceeding. This turnabout on the part of FHFC is the result of FHFC's intended acceptance, as eligible, of the application that Fountains at King's Pointe Limited Partnership ("Fountains") submitted in response to Request for Applications 2018-110 ("RFA 2018-110"). That proposed agency action is relevant because Fountains had attached to its application an equity proposal letter from RBC whose terms and conditions——other than the dollar amounts and (obviously) the applicant's name——are identical to those of the Equity Proposal for Vistas. During the evaluation of applications under RFA 2018-110, which took place at around the same time as the review of applications pursuant to the RFA at issue here, FHFC's scorer determined that Capital Contribution #3 should be included in the amount of equity proceeds to be paid to Fountains prior to construction completion, with the result that Fountains' application, showing a construction funding surplus, was deemed eligible for funding. The Vistas and Fountains applications, competing in separate solicitations, were scored by different FHFC staff members. The evaluator who scored the financial section of Vistas' application sought advice concerning her interpretation of the Equity Proposal, discussing the matter with FHFC's Director of Multifamily Programs and legal counsel at a reconciliation meeting that occurred before the Review Committee convened; this evaluator encountered no resistance to her plan of making a downward adjustment to Vistas' equity funding. The evaluator of the Fountains application did not likewise discuss her scoring rationale and thus received no input or guidance from FHFC's management. Ultimately, however, because each scoring determination belongs to the Review Committee member herself or himself, inconsistent or conflicting results are possible, as these cases demonstrate. Once in litigation, FHFC discovered that it had reached opposite scoring conclusions based on the same material facts. In this proceeding and in the 2018-110 Protests, FHFC has stressed its desire to take a consistent approach to the identical Equity Proposals. To that end, FHFC has reversed course here and argued that, contrary to its intended action, the Equity Proposal provided by Vistas fully satisfies the requirements of RFA; there is no funding shortfall; and Vistas' application is eligible and should be selected for funding. Deeming Vistas' application eligible would achieve consistency, of course, by giving favorable treatment to the applications of both Fountains and Vistas, which are similarly situated as to the Equity Proposal. Naturally, Winchester Place urges that consistency be found the other way around, through the rejection of both applications, or, alternatively, that the inconsistency be tolerated as the price of affording the agency wide discretion in making scoring decisions. In support of its decision to change positions on Vistas' Equity Proposal, FHFC relies upon the following premises: (i) the Equity Proposal plainly specifies, in the line-item entry for "Equity Proceeds to be Paid Prior to Construction Completion," the amount to be paid prior to construction completion; (ii) permanent loan closing does not necessarily have to occur after construction completion; and (iii) the information contained in the Pay-In Schedule is not information that is required by the RFA. The disputes arising from the scoring of the Equity Proposal are solvable as matters of law and therefore will be addressed below.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order fully implementing its intended action, as no basis for reversal has been established in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of July, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of July, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this cause is whether costs and attorney's fees are due Petitioner, hereinafter PROCTOR, from Respondent, hereinafter HRS, pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, as a result of Division of Administrative Hearings Case Number 91-5963-BID, and, if so, the amount of costs and fees.
Findings Of Fact The petition for fees and costs herein is brought exclusively under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and relates back to a bid protest wherein PROCTOR and TCC #3 LTD., INC., hereafter TCC, were the only bidders on HRS lease 590.236. PROCTOR was the protestant/Petitioner and TCC was the apparent successful bidder/Intervenor in Derick Proctor v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No. 91-5963BID. HRS' Invitation to Bid (ITB) for lease 590:236 required bidders to submit evidence of control of the property being offered, including the parking areas. Evidence of control could take the form of a deed for the property, an option to purchase the property, or a lease or option to lease showing a right to sublease. TCC did not submit a document labelled "deed," "option to purchase," "lease," or "option to lease" with its bid. TCC submitted as its evidence of control a contract for sale and purchase of the property with Hernando Plaza, Ltd., executed by Edward M. Strawgate and Harold Brown representing themselves to be general partners of the limited partnership. At all times material, the actual record title of the property submitted by TCC for the bid was in the Victor and Lillian Brown Foundation. At the times of the bid opening, evaluation, and August 27, 1991 notice of intended award, HRS had no reliable information as to what entity actually owned the property offered by TCC, and TCC had not disclosed to HRS that its contract to purchase the property was with an entity other than the record owner. Up to then, at least, Hernando Plaza, Ltd. had represented itself to TCC as being the owner of the property. The ITB did not require an abstract of title to be submitted with the bid. HRS normally does not require an abstract from successful bidders, although the ITB contained provisions for future disclosures from successful bidders. Absent some reason to "go behind" facial evidence of control, HRS' ITB attempted at the time to protect HRS by requiring successful bidders to post an irrevocable letter of credit to be forfeited in the event a successful bidder could not perform and for future disclosures concerning the chain of title. (See the recommended order in the underlying case). HRS accepted the contract to purchase the property from Hernando Plaza, Ltd. as TCC's required evidence of control, believing it to constitute an option to purchase. (See Findings of Fact 15-17 infra, this final order). On August 27, 1991, PROCTOR received from HRS a notice of intent to award the bid to TCC. This notice constituted the "window" for protests, if any, to be filed. PROCTOR then timely filed a notice of intent to protest and a formal written protest of the award to TCC. The filing of this protest resulted in an automatic suspension of the bid solicitation and contract award process and referral of the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Section 120.53(5)(c), Florida Statutes. This protest formed the basis of the underlying bid case, DOAH Case No. 91-5963BID. No later than the time of the Prehearing Order of September 23, 1991 in Case No. 91-5963BID, the law firm of Gibbs and Rudzik had made known to the hearing officer and counsel for both PROCTOR and HRS its retention as counsel for TCC. TCC moved for leave to intervene in a motion filed September 30, 1991, which was granted in an order of October 4, 1991. In a letter of October 10, 1991, counsel for PROCTOR made counsel for HRS aware of a question of whether TCC could obtain good title to the property. Counsel for PROCTOR proposed in a letter of October 14, 1991 to counsel for HRS that HRS reject both PROCTOR's and TCC's bids and rebid the lease, but this letter was primarily devoted to determining if HRS wished to interpose a new defense that PROCTOR's bid was unresponsive. In the instant fees and costs case, PROCTOR relies on its October 14, 1991 letter as the point from which HRS should have acted to avoid incurring attorney's fees and costs. After the receipt of the two letters, HRS did not reject both bids and rebid the contract but proceeded to formal hearing on October 30, 1991. PROCTOR and HRS share the mutual impression that had HRS accepted PROCTOR's proposal to reject both bids, HRS would have to have allowed TCC an opportunity to protest that decision. At the final hearing in Case No. 91-5963BID, evidence was offered that Hernando Plaza, Ltd. had a conditional option to purchase the property from the record title owner, the Brown Foundation. However, it was not established at the hearing that the conditions of the option had been fulfilled or that TCC or Hernando Plaza, Ltd. could otherwise gain good title to the property through a valid option. It was concluded as a matter of law in Case No. 91-5963BID, that on its face, the ITB stated that control could be evidenced merely by attachment of an "option to purchase," that the ITB stated no further requirements concerning the internal provisions of the option to purchase, and that TCC's conditional contract for purchase constituted a conditional option to purchase. The conditions of the option to purchase and the chain of title, among myriad other matters were subjects of proof at the formal hearing. The conditions of the option to purchase and various complicated real property concepts arising from recorded and unrecorded parts of the chain of title constituted the thrust of the recommended order's assessment that TCC's "control" was speculative only. It is here noted that the totality of the "chain" of title might have been unavailable even by "abstract" due to the lack of recordation of some documents. The lengthy formal hearing adduced evidence concerning the factual issue of whether or not the conditional option to purchase was between TCC and an entity which had such a sufficiently unequivocal interest in the proposed property that it could convey title to TCC in time for TCC to fulfill its obligations under its proposed lease to HRS. There is no evidence that HRS knew of these problems on August 27, 1991, when it gave notice of its intent to award the bid to TCC. Hernando Plaza, Ltd. was the entity with which TCC had contracted. At formal hearing, TCC relied on the legal concept that all interests in the property had merged in the non-title holder, Hernando Plaza, Ltd. This concept, together with recorded and unrecorded elements in the chain of title which were presented at formal hearing, were determined in the recommended order to be too "speculative" on the issue of TCC's control. However, it was also found, upon evidence submitted at formal hearing, that TCC's bid contained no other material deviations from the requirements of the ITB, that the signator of TCC's bid had sufficient status to submit the bid for the TCC corporation, and that TCC's signator could not submit the bid as an agent of the owners of the real property. TCC and its bid signator had never purported to have submitted the bid on behalf of the owners of the real property. (See the recommended order of the underlying bid case.) These issues were raised by PROCTOR and they addressed more than just the facial compliance of TCC's original bid documents which was all HRS had to consider when it made its initial decision in favor of TCC and against PROCTOR. However, the recommended order found HRS to have materially deviated in a number of ways from the bid process in its initial evaluation of PROCTOR's bid, not the least of which was determining that PROCTOR had complied with the ITB requirements for demonstrating control. All such evaluation flaws had been committed by HRS in favor of PROCTOR. Both TCC's and PROCTOR's bids were ultimately found to be unresponsive in the recommended order entered on December 20, 1991. The recommended order also found both had standing to be involved in the bid protest and formal hearing. The recommended order recommended rejecting both bids and readvertising the ITB. The Final Order of HRS entered on January 20, 1992 dismissed PROCTOR's protest on the basis that he lacked standing to protest, as his bid was unresponsive, and awarded the bid to TCC. HRS did not give PROCTOR notice that his bid was not responsive until it issued its Final Order. The Final Order of HRS was appealed to the First District Court of Appeals by PROCTOR. The First District Court of Appeals entered an order on June 22, 1992 finding PROCTOR had standing and remanding the case back to HRS for the purpose of a decision of the issue of whether TCC's bid was also unresponsive. On July 27, 1992, HRS entered its Amended Final Order determining both bids to be unresponsive and that the lease should be relet for bids. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the Amended Final Order of HRS in a per curiam opinion without discussion on October 13, 1992. HRS did not reject both bids and rebid the contract until after this per curiam opinion. No motion for rehearing was filed with respect to either of the First District Court of Appeals' orders entered June 22 or October 13, 1992, nor was any notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court filed. PROCTOR did file a motion for rehearing solely on the court's denial of PROCTOR's motion for appellate fees. Mandate was issued by the Clerk of the First District Court of Appeals on December 3, 1992. HRS entered an Order Directing Release of Bid Protest Cost Bond on December 18, 1992, in which HRS stated: Petitioner, Derick Proctor, has prevailed in the above styled bid protest. Petitioner's domicile and principal place of business is Vero Beach, Florida. Petitioner has one employee. Petitioner is a sole proprietorship. Petitioner's net worth does not exceed $2,000,000.00. HRS was not a nominal party in the underlying bid case. HRS did not initially challenge PROCTOR's "small business party" status in this instant fees and costs proceeding. Therefore, that allegation of the fees and costs petition is not at issue. Also, Petitioner's "small business party" status is now stipulated to exist. The parties have stipulated that the maximum statutory fee is $15,000.00 and that $15,000.00 is a reasonable fee if an award of attorney's fees is due. HRS has not protested or objected to the amount of costs claimed, $411.25, if costs are due.
The Issue Whether Respondent acted contrary to the agency's governing statutes, rules or policies, or the bid specifications in its proposed decision to award Contract No. T1285 to Intervenor Kamminga & Roodvoets, Inc. ("K & R").
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of the proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On May 14, 2008, the Department released its bid solicitation for Contract T1285. The proposed contract was for the construction of a one-way pair through Lake Alfred, including new construction, reconstruction, milling and resurfacing, widening, drainage improvements, lighting, signalization, signing and pavement marking and landscaping on State Road 600 (U.S. 17/92). Polk County, the location of the project, lies in the Department's District 1. Qualified contractors, including Mid-State and K & R, received an electronic disk containing the solicitation, bid blank, plans and specifications for Contract T1285. The letting date for this project was June 18, 2008. Bids were to be submitted on or before that date via Bid Express, the electronic bidding system used by the Department. No party submitted a protest of the terms, conditions, and specifications contained in the solicitation pursuant to Subsection 120.57(3)(b), Florida Statutes. The work to be performed on Contract T1285 included the installation of limerock road base to be paid for in accordance with line item 0175, Optional Base Group 09 ("Base Group 09"). The bid documents included a set of "Supplemental Specifications." Section 6 of the Supplemental Specification was titled "Control of Materials." Subsection 6-3.3, titled "Construction Aggregates," provided as follows: "Aggregates used on Department projects must be in accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-103."2 Under the heading "Developmental Specifications" is a February 15, 2008, revision to the Construction Aggregates subsection that provides: Subarticle 6-3.3 (Page 54) is expanded by the following: 6-3.3.1 Department Directed Source for Aggregates: For this Contract, obtain aggregates for use in limerock base from the following vendor: Vulcan Construction Materials LP. Upon award of the Contract, provide the vendor and the Department a schedule of project aggregate needs. Once a schedule has been provided to both the Department and vendor, the Engineer will issue written authorization, with a copy to the vendor, for the purchase of aggregates from the vendor. This authorization is required before aggregates will be released by the vendor. Pick up the required aggregate such that the project schedule will be maintained. Payment to the vendor by the Contractor will be due upon receipt of the materials pursuant to the Department's Vendor Contract No. BDH50. This rate is the unit price agreed upon by the Department and the vendor and will be made available to bid proposal holders at the time of bid at http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/aggregate /aggregate.htm. The Department will make payment to the Contractor for the aggregates on progress estimates as a part of the bid unit price for the appropriate pay items. The rate is subject to change and adjustments for such changes will be made to the bid unit price of the appropriate pay items. Disputes with the vendor concerning aggregate supply will not be cause for Contract time adjustments, time suspensions or monetary adjustments to the Contract amount. The Contractor will be solely responsible for providing the necessary advance notice to the vendor and other coordination to obtain timely aggregate supply for the project. The import of Developmental Specification 6-3.3.1 was that all bidders would be required to obtain the limerock needed for Base Group 09 from a single vendor, Vulcan Construction Materials LP ("Vulcan"). The winning bidder would agree to pay Vulcan in accordance with a separate contract negotiated between Vulcan and the Department. The hyperlink provided in Developmental Specification 6-3.3.13 led to a document called "Aggregate Guidance" produced by the Department's State Construction Office. The front page of the Aggregate Guidance document contained "Bidder Information" consisting of a spreadsheet setting forth the Vulcan price per ton for limerock base and limestone coarse aggregate, with the price varying depending on the date and port of delivery. Between January and June 2008, the Vulcan price per ton for limerock base from both the Port of Tampa and Port Canaveral was $16.93. The Aggregate Guidance page contained additional hyperlinks with the following titles: "Aggregate Vendor Contract Usage," "Aggregate Vendor Contract," "Aggregate Vendor Projects List," "Aggregate Vendor Authorization Letter," "Aggregate Vendor Contract Frequently Asked Questions," and "Aggregate Price Adjustment Sheet." Alvin Mulford is the vice-president of Mid-State who, along with his estimator, put together his company's bid for Contract T1285. Mr. Mulford testified that his company has been bidding on Department work, and that he has never before seen a provision similar to Developmental Specification 6-3.3.1. Mr. Mulford directed his estimator to obtain clarification from the Department, to be sure that the bidders were required to purchase the limerock base from Vulcan. One reason for Mr. Mulford's concern was the "exorbitant" rate charged by Vulcan in comparison to other vendors. The restriction to a single supplier was so abnormal, and that supplier's rate was so out of line with the market, that Mr. Mulford decided to seek guidance from the Department through the question and response internet bulletin board provided by the Department for its projects. The question posed by Mid-State was as follows: Does the contractor have to use Vulcan materials for the limerock base at a rate of $16.93 per ton as stated in the Developmental Specifications 6-3.3.1? If so from which location is the material to be picked up? Is it also true that payment to the vendor (Vulcan Materials) will be due immediately upon receipt of the materials? I wanted to clarify this issue as it is unusual for the contractor to be limited to the use of only one vendor. The Department's response was as follows: The unit rate for the Material can be found at the following website: http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/ Aggregate/Aggregate.htm Pickup locations for the Material can be found at the following website: http://www.dot.state.fl.us/construction/ Aggregate/Aggregate.htm Payment should be issued by the Contractor to the Vendor (Vulcan Construction Materials LP) upon receipt of the materials as defined in Developmental Specification 6-3.3.1. Because the Department's response did no more than redirect him to the Department's website, Mr. Mulford decided to look at the website in more detail. He investigated the hyperlinks, including the Vulcan contract with the Department. When he clicked on the hyperlink titled "Aggregate Vendor Contract Usage," he found a document that provided as follows, in relevant part: Aggregate Vendor Contract Usage by Districts With the execution of the contract with Vulcan Construction Materials LP, contract number BDH50, Vulcan has committed to provide aggregate in the types and quantities defined in the contract (attached). The process for this contract in Districts 1, 5, and 7, is as follows: Include in the projects identified in the attached spreadsheet the appropriate special provision beginning with the July 2007 lettings. The District Specifications Engineer and District Construction Office will need to coordinate this effort. There are two special provisions for the purpose of notifying construction contract bidders of the Department's intention toward the aggregate. The first special provision is the mandatory version that will direct the bidder to obtain aggregates for the specified work from Vulcan. The second special provision provides the bidder an option to obtain its aggregates from Vulcan. * * * After these projects have been awarded, the contractor is required to notify FDOT and Vulcan a schedule of its aggregate needs for the project. After receiving this schedule, FDOT's Resident Engineer will issue written authorization to the contractor, with copy to Vulcan. This authorization is required before Vulcan will release aggregate to the contractor. Payment to Vulcan will be from the contractor. FDOT will pay cost of aggregate on progress estimates as part of the contractor's bid price for the work. The contractor is required to include in its bid price for the work the cost of the aggregate at the Vulcan rate. The Vulcan rate will be posted on the FDOT State Construction Website showing the rate. When adjustments are made to the Vulcan rate, FDOT will make adjustments in the construction contract unit price. . . . (Emphasis added.) Mr. Mulford testified that he understood the underscored language in the hyperlinked document to be a directive to the bidders and therefore a mandatory requirement of the bid specifications. He did not ask the Department for further clarification because he believed the requirement was clearly stated in the hyperlinked document. David Sadler, the director of the Department's office of construction, testified that the hyperlinked document was developed by his office to offer guidance to the districts as to the concept behind and use of the aggregate vendor contract. The document was not a part of the bid solicitation document. Mid-State's bid price was $7,429,398.44. Mid-State's price for Base Group 09 was $619,645.80, or $19.30 per square yard. This price reflected the Vulcan rate for limerock base of $16.92 plus tax and Mid-State's costs for the work associated with Base Group 09. 19. K & R's bid price was $7,370,505.24, or $58,893.20 lower than the bid price of Mid-State. K & R's price for Base Group 09 was $256,848.00, based on a stated unit price of $8.00 per square yard for limerock base. K & R's price for Base Group 09 was $362,797.80 lower than that of Mid-State, accounting for more than the differential between the overall bids of Mid-State and K & R. Marcus Tidey, Jr., K & R's vice president in charge of its Florida division, testified that K & R was well aware that the Vulcan price for limerock base was $16.93, and that K & R understands its obligation to pay that price to Vulcan should K & R be awarded Contract T1285. Mr. Tidey testified that at the time of bid submission, he cut K & R's bid price to $8.00 per square yard as a competitive strategy to win the contract. Mr. Tidey made a conscious decision that K & R would absorb the difference between $8.00 bid price and the Vulcan price of $16.93. Mr. Tidey testified that K & R needed to win this job in order not to have its crews and equipment sit idle during the economic downturn, and therefore decided to take all of its markup, roughly $250,000, out of the bid. He could have made the $250,000 cut on any item or items in the bid, but decided on Base Group 09 because the limerock base was a big item and therefore easy to cut by a large amount. Mr. Tidey also testified that the contract provides a $400,000 incentive payment for early completion of the job, meaning that K & R will be able to work "faster and smarter" and make up for the price reduction at the end of the job. Mr. Tidey testified that he obtained the Vulcan prices from the Department's website as instructed by Developmental Specification 6-3.3.1. He did not click on the hyperlinks, which appeared to reference the contract between the Department and Vulcan and therefore was of no concern to him. The Department and K & R dispute Mid-State's assertion that the underscored language of the hyperlink set forth in Finding of Fact 15 was a requirement of the bid specifications, based on Mr. Sadler's direct testimony and the underlying illogic and unfairness of requiring bidders to seek out hidden specifications. The Department and K & R concede that if the bid specifications did in fact require the bidders to include in Base Group 09 the full costs associated with obtaining the limerock base from Vulcan, then K & R's bid is nonresponsive. Developmental Specification 6-3.3.1 directed bidders to the Department's webpage for the purpose of obtaining the current Vulcan rate quote. It did not instruct the bidders to investigate the hyperlinks or to assume that the information contained therein was mandatory. Absent an instruction to bidders to review the information contained in the hyperlinks, the Department could not make such information mandatory without placing less curious bidders at a competitive disadvantage. The Department had no intent to play hide-and-seek with the bid specifications in the manner suggested by Mid-State. In addition, K & R points to three line items of the bid specifications in which the Department eliminates competition, instructing the bidders not to bid and inserting a fixed unit price and bid amount for all bidders as to those items. K & R reasonably asserts that the Department was fully capable of treating Base Group 09 in the same fashion, had it intended to require the bidders to pass through to the Department all the costs associated with obtaining the limerock base from Vulcan. However, the Department supplied the bid quantity (31,106 square yards) and left it to the bidders to determine the price per unit they would bid. K & R's bid was responsive. Nothing in the bid specifications prevented K & R from absorbing part of the cost of the Vulcan limerock base and passing the savings on to the Department, or required bidders to pass on to the Department the full costs of complying with the bid specifications regarding Base Group 09. The sole remaining issue is whether K & R's bid, though facially responsive, was materially unbalanced. The Department routinely conducts reviews of bid line items that appear "unbalanced," i.e., for which there appear to be significant differences between the price bid and the Department's cost estimate, in order to determine whether the price difference is due to a quantity error by the bidder. The Department's review confirms that the bid quantity specified on the bid blank is accurate. If a quantity error is found, the bids are recalculated using the bidders' unit prices and the correct quantities to determine whether the bid rankings would change. A bid for which there is a discrepancy between the bid and the Department's estimate is termed "mathematically unbalanced." A mathematically unbalanced bid that affects the ranking of the low bid is "materially unbalanced." A mathematically unbalanced bid is acceptable, but a materially unbalanced bid affords the bidder an unfair competitive advantage and must be rejected. The Department followed its usual procedure in analyzing the K & R bid to determine whether it was unbalanced. Philip Gregory Davis, the Department's state estimates engineer, testified that there were some unbalanced items in the K & R bid, but no quantity errors that would have changed the ranking of the bids. Richard Ryals, the project designer who conducted the unbalanced bid review, testified that the quantities were correct for Base Group 09. As noted above, K & R's low bid for Base Group 09 was an intentional strategy, not the result of a quantity error. K & R's current bonded capacity qualification with the Department is $258 million in contracts at any one time. K & R posted a bid bond, and has more than enough capacity to comfortably perform this contract. There is no economic danger to the Department in accepting K & R's low bid.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing Mid-State's formal written protest and awarding Contract T1265 to K & R. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2009.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner was the lowest responsive bidder in Lease No. 590:1975, and therefore entitled to the contract award.
Findings Of Fact In 1988, the Department made the determination that it would not exercise its option on leased space owned by the Petitioner Dyess, in Clewiston, Florida. Bid documents were prepared by the agency for its current office space needs. Bid proposals were solicited through newspaper advertisements and personal contact with owners, developers, and realtors within the Clewiston area. The Department included Dyess in its solicitations. He was sent an Invitation to Bid for Existing Facilities by the Department. This bid package contained all of the bid documents for the bid referred to as Lease Number 590:1975. The Invitation to Bid was issued by the Department for approximately 7,962 square feet of net rentable office space in Clewiston, Florida. The invitation was prepared using HRS Facilities Form R01-87. The form used by the Department for soliciting and accepting competitive proposals for the leased space was required to comply with all conditions and requirements adopted by the Department of General Services, as set forth in Rule 13M-1.015(3)(e), Florida Administrative Code. The Department of General Services is the agency which administers real property leasing for the State of Florida for leased space of 2,000 square feet or more in privately owned buildings. During the bidders' conference held on April 26, 1988, Mr. Michael J. Sedgwick, the agency's representative, was questioned about the agency's interpretation of the term "dry and capable of being physically measured" which is set forth on page two of the Invitation to Bid and page three of the Bid Submittal Form. Page two of the Invitation to Bid is a glossary which defines various terms used within the bid documents. The term "existing building" is defined as follows: To be considered as existing, the entire space being bid must be dry and capable of being physically measured to determine net rental square footage at the time of the bid submittal. Paragraph 10 on page three of the Bid Submittal Form reiterates the definition of an "existing building" as set forth in the Invitation to Bid. The language in the bid documents which defines the term "existing building" is identical to the language in Form BPN 4136, which has been promulgated as a rule by the Department of General Services as the format for specifications for the solicitation of leased spaces by the State of Florida. In response to the request for an interpretation, Mr. Sedgwick contacted Mr. George Smith, who administers the leasing program for the Department in Tallahassee, and obtained the following definition: "Dry and measurable" consists of four things: a slab, four corners, a roof, and a valid building permit if construction is in progress. The definition given by Mr. Smith was verbally communicated to the prospective bidders who attended the conference. This definition was verbally communicated to the Petitioner by Mr. Sedgwick on April 27, 1988. The Petitioner timely submitted a bid in Lease Number 590:1975 on the Department's Bid submittal Form by May 24, 1988. On page three of this form, each bidder was required to acknowledge the bid requirements contained on that page by placing his initials in the bottom right hand corner. The Petitioner Dyess acknowledged the requirement that the proposed space must be an "existing building" at the time of the bid submittal. On May 24, 1988, the date of the bid opening, Petitioner's building did not meet the requirements of an existing building as defined within the bid documents or the Department's verbal clarification of the definition. The building did not have a roof, a slab, or a valid building permit. After the bids were opened, the District VIII Bid Evaluation Committee visited each of the proposed lease locations. When the Petitioner's proposed location was reviewed by the committee two days after the close of bids, the addition was found to consist of the following: two partially completed block walls which connected the two existing buildings. The existing buildings were still intact, but it was apparent that an expansion was taking place, and that the completed project would be one building. A slab had not yet been poured in the addition, and it was without a roof. The plans submitted to the Department with the Petitioner's bid suggested that this expansion was capable of producing the square footage required by the Department. The City of Clewiston was aware of the Petitioner's expansion project, but he was not required by this authority to have a building permit at the time the project was viewed by the committee and evaluated by the Department. The Petitioner's bid was rejected by the Department because, on the date of the bid submittal, the proposed addition was not an "existing building" as defined by the bid documents and the further verbal interpretation by the agency. The bid submitted by the Intervenor Tibbetts did not contain the complete contract for the purchase of the property. However, the right to purchase was evidenced by a document submitted with the bid. Full Disclosure Statements of Ownership are not required under Rule 13N-1.015, Florida Administrative Code, until after a bid is awarded. The property was not properly zoned at the time of the Intervenor Tibbetts' bid submittal.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the Department of Transportation's (hereinafter "Department") declaration that the bid of Ranger Construction, Inc. (hereinafter ("Ranger") was materially irregular and therefore unresponsive to an invitation to bid on contracts in highway construction projects 93110-3539, 3543, 3525, on State Road 80, (Avenue E), in West Palm Beach, Florida.
Findings Of Fact On December 4, 1991, both Petitioner, Ranger, and Intervenor, Community, submitted bids for job numbers 93110-3539, 93110-3542, and 93110-3525, for a construction project on State Road 80, (Avenue E), in Palm Beach County. Petitioner's bid was in the total amount of $2,554,390.37, and Intervenor's was in the total amount of $2,557,071.42. On the basis of those figures, Petitioner was the apparent low bidder. Bid specifications incorporated in all this agency's bids indicate that a bid may be rejected for irregularities. The term, "material" is not used in that specification. When bids are opened, agency procurement officials look at each bid to insure that any award is based on balanced bids containing all appropriate signatures and other requirements, and in the event of an irregularity, a decision is made on the question of whether any irregularity is material in that specific contract. This decision, made by the Awards Committee, is whether the irregularity is material enough to declare the questioned bid unresponsive and award the contract to the next lower bidder. When bids are first opened at the Department auditorium, they are checked to see if the bid bond or a cash or cash equivalent alternative is present. Then the figures are read off and recorded. The bids are then taken back to the contracts office and safeguarded until the minority business enterprise office looks at them. When this is done, the bids are then passed out to the checkers for examination. This more detailed review of the bids submitted revealed that Ranger's bid bond form, though attested to by the corporate secretary, and executed by George H. Friedlander, Agent for the bonding company, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, did not bear the signature of either Ranger's president or vice president. This is considered by Department representatives as being a requirement of a responsive bid. Community's bid bond was properly signed and attested to, and bore the signature of the agent for Reliant Insurance Company, the surety. Community failed to put the company name on the certificate of non- collusion, but in light of the fact that the certificate was signed by the president and was attached to other Community documents, it was identifiable as a part of that bid. In addition, further review of Ranger's bid revealed that on item 630-1- 12 of the computerized price breakdown, certain conduit was listed with a unit price of $621.00 per linear foot. The computer disc furnished to the bidders by the Department, which was used to compute the pricing breakout, reflected 38 linear feet of this conduit would be required. The price of $621.00 per foot on the bid form was in error, however. It should have been $6.21 per linear foot. The error occurred when Ranger's representative punched in the typographically incorrect figure, a clearly clerical error, at the time the bid forms were being completed. This was done, according to Mr. Slade, Ranger's vice president and the person responsible for the bid preparation, in the press of last minute preparation in a motel room in Tallahassee, under less than optimum circumstances. Notwithstanding the fact that this was a clerical error which was not caught by any Ranger official on review of its bid prior to submittal, Department officials considered the use of that large figure made Ranger's bid "unbalanced." This defect, plus the failure of the bid bond to be signed by Ranger's president or vice-president, were both considered to be material deviations by the members of the Department's technical review committee which, based on those deviations, recommended to the Department's Contract Award Committee that Ranger's bid be declared unresponsive. This was notwithstanding the fact that even with the incorrect pricing for the amount of the conduit stated on the Department's discs, Ranger's bid was still low. It must be noted, however, that the 38 linear foot quantity of conduit listed in the Department's discs was an incorrect amount. The project plans, furnished to all bidders prior to the bid process, reflected, in the breakdown of specifications, that the correct amount was 97 linear feet of conduit required. When Ranger's incorrect price of $621.00 per foot was applied to the actual footage required, the result was a bid figure for Ranger which was substantially higher than that submitted by Community and, therefore, caused a reversal in the order of the bidders. The Department applies a deviation standard of 7% to flag bids for more careful scrutiny. Here, the $621.00 item price was clearly in excess of that standard. As will be seen below, Ranger was not the only party to make a mistake in this procurement. The Department's discs erroneously reflected the quantity of conduit required at 38 feet when the actual amount called for was 97 feet. There is a difference, however, between the Department changing its specifications, as would be the case here, and the bidder correcting a unit price after opening. The Department can but the bidder can't. The bid documents, furnished to each prospective bidder, reserve the Department's right to make changes. Though the evidence indicates that it was not unknown in the past for Department officials to call a bidder for clarification of an unclear point in its bid, prior to bid award in this case, even though the pricing of the conduit was, at a figure almost 100 times the average/estimate of $7.30 per foot, no call was made to Ranger by any Department official to insure that the stated figure was the intended figure for inclusion. Mr. Griner, upon inquiry by the Hearing Officer, indicated that though while not usual, such an intentional inflation was not unknown to happen in bidding on Department contracts. No specific cases were cited, however. The evidence also indicates that this particular item was not the only item the Department considered to be unbalanced. There were three others in Ranger's bid, but this one was the only one which was felt to be inappropriate. By the same token, Community's bid also contained several items considered to be unbalanced, but they were not considered to be in the disqualifying category that the conduit price in Ranger's bid was in. Unbalanced bids are considered bad by the Department because, if successful, they allow the contractor to recoup or receive a larger portion of the contract price at the beginning of the contract term thereby making it less disadvantageous for him to walk away from the contract and making agency control over the contractor more difficult. Here, Mr. Slade unequivocally denies it was Ranger's intention to unbalance its contract for any purpose and claims it was no more than a clerical error in inserting the decimal point in the unit price when entered into the computer which resulted in the error. He claims that if he had been contacted by the Department when the obvious error was discovered, as he asserts, has been done in the past, he would have corrected it. It is clear that while query calls may have been made by the Department to bidders in the past, they were of a nature which did not affect the price of the contract. Ranger never received any notice from the Department about any problem with its bid. The first information Mr. Slade had of any problem with Ranger's bid came when his estimator made a routine call to the Department and was told of the problem with the unbalance. Thereafter Mr. Slade spoke with Mr. Newell to determine what route the subsequent proceedings would take. The Department contends, through the testimony of Mr. Newell and Mr. Griner, that it is Department policy to consider the failure to have a required signature on a relevant document to be grounds for declaring a bid non- responsive. Their testimony further reflects, however, that while the recommendations of the Technical Review Committee, (TRC), and the Contract Award Committee, (CAC), are uniformly to that effect, the Department Secretary has, on occasion, rejected such a recommendation and awarded a contract to a bidder whose bid did not contain a "required" signature. Consequently, it cannot be said to be Department policy to reject all bids containing an unsigned document since the Secretary, who as the agency head, sets agency policy, has acted inconsistent with such a "policy." Further, Mr. Morefield indicated that the Awards Committee could waive a failure of signature if it felt to do so was appropriate. To the best of his knowledge, however, that has not been done on this type of contract documents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order in this case dismissing the protest of Ranger Construction Industries, Inc., in regard to project Nos. 93110- 3539, 3543, and 3525 in West Palm Beach, Florida. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 20th day of April, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-1538 BID The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: I 1. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. II 1. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as contra to the evidence. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 12. Accepted. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 31. Accepted. 32. - 41. Accepted and incorporated herein. 42. - 44. Accepted and incorporated herein. 45. - 48. Accepted and incorporated herein. 49. & 50. Accepted. - 53. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by the evidence. - 61. Accepted. & 63. Accepted. Accepted. & 66. Accepted. 67. & 68. Accepted. 69. Accepted to the extend that the correction is of mathematical calculations of the bid price - not corrections of pricing elements. 70. Accepted. 71. & 72. Accepted. 73. Accepted as a probability 74. Accepted. 75. & 76. Accepted. 77. Accepted. 78. Accepted. 79. Accepted and incorporated herein. 80. Accepted as to the Bond defect; rejected as to the pricing error. FOR THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. 10. & 11. Accepted. 12. - 14. Accepted. 15. Accepted and incorporated herein. 16. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. - 22. Accepted. 23. - 26. Accepted and incorporated herein. 27. - 30. Accepted. 31. - 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. 34. & 35. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a summary of testimony. & 38. Accepted. Irrelevant and not related to basis for denial. - 42. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 44. Accepted and incorporated herein. First and Second sentences accepted. Balance accepted and incorporated herein. & 47. Accepted and incorporated herein. 48. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan P. Stephens, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Douglas S. Roberts, Esquire 123 S. Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32314 Mary M. Piccard, Esquire 1004 DeSoto Park Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0589 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the decision of respondent, Department of Transportation (Department), to award the subject bid to intervenor, The Walsh Group, Ltd., Inc. and Subsidiaries d/b/a Archer-Western Contractors, Ltd. (Archer-Western), comported with the essential requirements of law.
Findings Of Fact The bid process In June 1995, the Department of Transportation (Department) issued an invitation to bid (ITB), State Project Number 93280-3504, Contract Number E- 4866, for the repair and rehabilitation of the Royal Park Bridge, a two span, four leaf bascule bridge, which spans the Intercoastal Waterway and connects the town of Palm Beach to West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida. Prospective bidders were contacted through a bid solicitation notice, which was sent to prequalified contractors, and interested firms ordered bid packages, which included plans and specifications. The subject project was experimental, and was an effort to identify the most cost-effective means of repainting bridges that contained, inter alia, lead-based paint, a hazardous material, while minimizing exposure of workers and the public as well as the environment (the Intercoastal Waterway), to the hazardous materials. The technical specifications or capabilities of the equipment to be used to abrade and prepare the bridge surfaces for repainting, keeping in mind the objective of the project, were developed by the Department's consultant, Kenneth C. Clear, and are noted in section 560, subsection 1.01.1, of the specifications, discussed infra. At the time, Mr. Clear was aware of one system, the "Cavi-Tech" or "Cavi-Blast" method, a proprietary system devised by Cavi-Tech, Inc., that could comply with the technical specifications, but did not know of any other company that had a similar process. Consequently, in drafting the technical requirements at issue in this bid challenge, discussed more fully infra, he identified the "Cavi-Blast" system of Cavi-Tech, Inc., as capable of satisfying the technical requirements, and further provided, at the bidder's election, for the use of alternative equipment if it could be shown to meet the surface preparations standards described in the ITB. Pertinent to this case, Section 560 of the specifications, entitled Repainting Exposed Steel, at page 560-1 of the ITB, specified the following technical requirements for surface preparation equipment: Surface Preparation Equipment Surfaces shall be abraded and prepared for recoating using an energy enhanced water jet generated by equipment capable of sustained operation at pressures in excess of 17,000 psi. Nozzles shall operate using resonation and cavitation technology. Production rates shall be at least 600 square feet per machine and production shift in the case of full coating removal (CB-4 per section 1.2), and 1,500 square feet per machine and production shift for sweep- off blasts which remove all oil, grease, dirt, loose paint, loose rust, rust scale and loose mill scale, and profile the remaining paint (CB-1 per section 1.2). The equipment shall include closed-loop water handling and filtration systems capable of repeated reuse of blast water and on-site treatment of the water upon completion such that it is rendered non-hazardous. Abrasives, steel shot and/or chemical strippers shall NOT be used. The surface preparation equipment shall be capable of achieving the surface preparation standards described in section 1.2, and document ation of its successful use on at lest 10 similar bridge or industrial structures totaling at least 250,000 square feet shall be submitted with the bid. Additionally, detailed project documentation and air monitoring historical data from at least 5 projects in which paint containing a lead primer was completely removed without the use of negative pressure enclosures, shall be submitted with the bid. These data shall show conclusively that, on each of the projects, the lead exposure to individuals WITHOUT breathing apparatus located 5-feet and further from the water jet nozzle was less than the OSHA action level (i.e. the air qualified as non-hazardous, breathable air in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations 29 CFR 1926.62 "Lead") when the equipment was operated at full capacity for at least 8-hours. The Cavi-Tech, Inc., Inc. (2108 Moon Station Drive, Kennesaw, Georgia 30144; phone Number 404-424-4015; fax Number : 404-424-4009) "Cavi-Blast" system meets the above requirements. The ITB package did not require, apart from any implications that may be drawn from the foregoing provisions, that the bidder specify the type of surface preparation equipment it proposed to use, and no form was included with the bid package on which such election could be denoted. The bid package did include, however, a standard proposal to be executed by the bidder, which bound the bidder "to perform all necessary work, as provided for in the contract, and if awarded the Contractor [Bidder] to execute the contract within 20 calendar days after the date on which the notice of award has been given." The ITB further required a proposal guarantee, payable to the Department, of not less than five percent of the total actual bid, "which guarantee is to be forfeited as liquidated damages if . . . the Proposal is accepted [and] the Bidder . . . fail[s] to execute the attached Contract under the conditions of this proposal. " On August 17, 1995, after the pre-bid conference, the Department issued Addendum Number 1 to the ITB, which included the following clarification as to the painting specifications for the project: Surface preparation equipment requirements are specified in Section 1.01 of the painting specifications. Cavi-Tech, Inc. is indicated as a company having equipment and experience meeting the requirements of this specification section. Other companies meeting the requirements of Section 1.01 can bid on this project. In response to the ITB, the Department received five bids for the project. The lowest bid was submitted by Archer-Western, $2,868,816.35, and the second lowest bid was submitted by Coastal, $2,930,461.68. The three other firms that bid on the project were PCL Civil Contracts, Inc. (PLC), with a bid of $2,943,370.20, Gilbert Southern Corp. (Gilbert), with a bid of $2,967,928.10, and M & J Construction Co. of Pinellas County (M & J), with a bid of $3,274,867.17. The bid price proposal submitted by each bidder contained various items which were tallied to derive the total amount bid. Item Number A560 1 was for painting structural steel, and Archer-Western listed a price of $425,300, Coastal a price of $500,000, PCL a price of $350,000, Gilbert a price of $450,000, and M & J a price of $575,348.45. Pertinent to this case, while Archer-Western did secure a quotation from Cavi-Tech, Inc., for Cavi-Blast and coating services, as well as historical data regarding its use, it did not include such documentation with its bid. Consequently, the bid submitted by Archer-Western, as well as the bid of PCL, contained no information in response to subsection 1.01.3, regarding surface preparation equipment. Contrasted with those bids, Coastal, in what it perceived as the appropriate response to subsection 1.01.3, included information from Cavi-Tech, Inc., on the Cavi-Blast system. Gilbert and M & J likewise included documentation on the Cavi-Blast system. The Department, following its evaluation, deemed the five bids responsive, and on October 4, 1995, posted notice of its intent to award the contract to Archer-Western. Coastal timely protested the proposed award (DOAH Case No. 95-5702BID). On October 9, 1995, the Department notified all bidders that it was rescinding its notice of intended award and proposed to reject all bids. Coastal timely protested such decision (DOAH Case No. 95-5703BID).3 Finally, on October 24, 1995, the Department, following reconsideration of its position, resolved to rescind its rejection of all bids and, consistent with its initial decision, award the contract to Archer-Western. Coastal timely protested such award (DOAH Case No. 95-5701BID). The bid protest Here, Coastal contends that Archer-Western's proposal (bid) was not responsive to the ITB because it did not include documentation in response to subsection 1.01.3 of the ITB. By such failure, Coastal suggests Archer-Western failed to commit to using the Cavi-Blast system or identify an alternative system it would use and, therefore, its bid was at material variance from the ITB. That variance, Coastal avers, accorded Archer-Western the opportunity to reevaluate its bid, after bid opening, and then decide whether to adhere to is bid or refuse to abide its bid without penalty due to its non-responsiveness. Contrasted with Coastal's perception of subsection 1.01.3, the Department views that subsection, when read in pari materia with subsections 1.01.1 through 1.01.4, as only requiring documentations when the bidder proposes to use surface preparation equipment other than the Cavi-Blast system. Indeed, the Department observes, it would be superfluous to include documentation demonstrating that the Cavi-Blast system was capable of achieving the surface preparation standards when subsection 1.01.4 specifically states that the Cavi- Blast system meets requirements. Accordingly, where, as here, the bidder does not provide any documentation in response to subsection 1.01.3, the Department contends it may be fairly implied, based on the bidder's agreement in the proposal "to perform all necessary work, as provided for in the contract," that it has proposed to use, and is bound to use, the Cavi-Blast system. Consequently, the Archer-Western bid was, in the Department's opinion, responsive to the ITB. Reading the provisions of subsections 1.01.1 through 1.01.4 in para materia, it must be concluded that the Department's conclusion in this case is supported by logic, and that its decision to award the contract to Archer- Western did not depart from the essential requirements of law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing Coastal's protests and, more particularly, its protest of the award of the subject bid to Archer- Western. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of February 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February 1996.
