Findings Of Fact Pursuant to its Administrative Complaint filed July 12, 1982, the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners, seeks to revoke, suspend or take other disciplinary action against the Respondent as a licensed physician in the State of Florida. It was stipulated by the parties that the Respondent is a physician licensed by the State of Florida. The petitioner is an agency charged with the licensure and regulation of licensure status, professional practice and discipline of physicians licensed in Florida. The Respondent is licensed to practice medicine also in the states of Virginia and North Carolina. He graduated from medical school at the University of Virginia in 1949 and has been in active practice in Florida since 1959, when he began practice at Fernandina, Nassau County, Florida. The Respondent maintains an office at Fernandina, as well as one in Jacksonville. He is 63 years of age and practices in the area of family practice. He has been a member of the American Academy of Family practice since 1973. He is also a member of the Duval County Academy of Family Practice and has served as an officer of that organization and an active participant. The Respondent has been on probation pursuant to a stipulation entered into with the Board of Medical Examiners in December, 1981. The Respondent was placed on probation for a period of two years, effective January 4, 1982, after having admitted, by stipulation, that he issued a pre-signed prescription for Sultrin Creme for use by a nurse midwife in 1980; and that he prescribed Percocet and Percodan inappropriately to a patient in 1980. The Respondent's practice is primarily an office practice with practice at clinics around the state to which he devotes a certain number of days per month. The St. Augustine Maternity Clinic, Inc., apparently owned and operated by Carolle Baya (the evidence does not establish her precise relationship to the clinic) is one type of such clinic. Carolle Baya is a lay midwife, who at times pertinent hereto was not licensed to practice lay midwifery in the State of Florida. Because of her continuation in the practice of lay midwifery in St. Johns County, she was prosecuted in 1979 by the State Attorney for St. Johns County, which criminal charges were later dropped. She was then sued by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in an attempt by that Department to enjoin her from practicing lay midwifery without a license. Carolle Baya obtained a favorable judgment in that civil action when the lay midwifery statute, then in effect, was declared unconstitutional by the Circuit Court in and for St. Johns County, Florida. Thus, Carolle Baya, at times pertinent hereto, was practicing lay midwifery, although without a license, under the legal aegis of the Circuit Court of the 7th Judicial Circuit, pursuant to that final judgment entered on October 10, 1979, in Case No. 79-313 (Respondent's Exhibit 4). Under the law as it existed at times pertinent to this case, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services required lay midwives to associate themselves with physicians, at least for purposes of providing examination of their patients prior to home births. (Rule 10D-36.25(a), Florida Administrative Code, "Supervision") Nevertheless, no physician in St. Johns County undertook to provide an association or "backup" to Carolle Baya for examination or backup care for her patients. Indeed, as established by Dr. Mussallem (for the Petitioner), the obstetricians in St. Johns County were responsible in general and Dr. Mussallem in particular, for the complaint lodged against Carolle Baya regarding her practice as a lay midwife. Thus, it was that Carolle Baya formed some sort of "backup" examination arrangement for her patients with the Respondent. On or about January 25, 1982, a newspaper advertisement was placed in the St. Augustine Record, stating that the Respondent was associated with the St. Augustine Maternity Center, Inc. The Respondent's name at the time of the filing of the Administrative Complaint on July 12, 1982, apparently appeared on the front of the St. Augustine Maternity Center, Inc., on a sign, although no evidence established that it was present on that facility at any earlier pertinent date. It was not established how the newspaper advertisement came to be published in the newspaper, and it was not shown for what purpose the Respondent's name appeared on the sign on the front of the St. Augustine Maternity Center, Inc. (either owned or operated by Carolle Baya) At the time the Administrative Complaint was filed, the Respondent was visiting that maternity clinic once a month for purposes of performing examinations of Carolle Baya's patients and general gynecological consultation and/or treatment. Dr. Mussallem, the only witness with any knowledge of the contents of the newspaper advertisement and the supposed sign, could not show whether or when the unintroduced newspaper advertisement was actually placed in a newspaper, nor the person responsible for its publishing, nor did he have any direct knowledge regarding whether the sign was actually displayed on the front of the clinic, nor who might have been responsible for doing so. His testimony in this regard is thus entirely hearsay and not creditable herein. Crystal Mull was a patient of Carolle Baya's throughout the entire term of her pregnancy, with a view toward having a midwife perform home delivery of her baby. Her entire prenatal care was under the direction of Carolle Baya. The Respondent, however, did examine Crystal Mull in approximately the eighth month of her pregnancy, October, 1981, with her mother present. Crystal Mull's mother, Mrs. Luellen McNairy, was of the belief that Dr. Britton was "like a sponsor or something like that." She admittedly was not sure what his relationship was with Carolle Baya, but that she "felt" that Carolle Baya referred to him for any medical questions she was unable to answer concerning a patient. The testimony of Mrs. McNairy and the testimony of Dr. Mussallem concerning what they "understood" the relationship between Britton and Baya to be (they admittedly had no direct knowledge), is the only testimony or evidence adduced by the Petitioner to show any sort of association of the Respondent with Carolle Baya's midwifery practice. The Respondent only went to Carolle Baya's clinic one day a month to perform gynecological examinations of her patients and was not present at the clinic supervising or advising Carolle Baya as to the care of her patients on a day-to-day or even a weekly basis, particularly the patients who are the subject of the Administrative Complaint. In any event, Carolle Baya wanted the doctor to meet her patient, Crystal Mull, to examine her so he could be familiar with her medical history. When he examined her he noted that the baby was quite large and he made a statement, according to Mrs. McNairy, to the effect that she might not be able to have the baby regularly and might have to be transported to the hospital. In the words of Mrs. McNairy, the Petitioner's witness herself, "It seemed to me that he was alerting us to the possibility that she might have to go to the hospital; there might be a difficult labor." Ultimately, Crystal Mull did have to be transported to the hospital for her delivery, although she had a normal, uneventful delivery and healthy baby. On the morning of her delivery, however, after progressing with her labor to a point, she failed to progress further and ceased to dilate. At approximately 1:30 or 2:00 on the morning of November 22, 1981, Ms. Baya came to the residence of Crystal Mull and her mother Luellen McNairy. Ms. Baya did a vaginal examination and periodically checked the fetal heart rate. The fetal heart rate was closely monitored to determine if any fetal distress was indicated by the baby's heartbeat. At approximately 10:00 the following morning, Carolle Baya called an unidentified person supposedly to consult with regarding doing something to relieve her patient's discomfort and pain, after she had been in labor for approximately 10 hours. Witness McNairy "believed" that Carolle Baya called Dr. Britton, however, the witness had no direct knowledge of who was on the other end of the telephone conversation with Carolle Baya and she is unaware of the substance of that conversation. A short time after the end of the telephone conversation, Mrs. McNairy observed Carolle Baya give Crystal Mull an injection in the hip and she seemed to relax some after that. Mrs. McNairy has no knowledge of the nature of the substance which was injected (although she surmised it might be Demerol). At about 12:30 pm on November 22, the membranes were ruptured, but the patient had not yet dilated as far as 8 centimeters. Thus, it was that Carolle Baya suggested that her patient and the patient's mother decide what they wished to do, that she did not want to make the final decision herself. Accordingly, the patient was admitted to the hospital at about 1:00 that afternoon. Ultimately, Crystal Mull experienced a normal delivery and she and her baby are currently in good health. On January 2, 1982, Dr. Anthony Mussallem saw Susan Thompson at around 6:30 or 7:00 in the evening. Her sister-in-law brought her in to see him at that time, at which she had reached in essence the full term of her pregnancy with her child being due on approximately January 7 or 8, 1982. The patient reported to Dr. Mussallem that Carolle Baya had been taking care of her prenatal course of care up until that point. While Carolle Baya was examining her that day in the St. Augustine Maternity Center, Inc., the patient's amniotic fluid began leaking and, inasmuch as labor usually begins within 24 hours of such an event, but in her case did not commence within 24 hours, the patient became worried and ultimately came in to see Dr. Mussallem. Dr. Mussallem did not speak with Carolle Baya concerning the condition of Susan Thompson nor did he see any medical records which had been maintained by Carolle Baya's maternity center concerning that patient. The doctor never talked to Dr. Britton concerning this patient. The patient informed him that she was given some tablets, supposedly to stimulate her labor and did not go into labor, but the doctor could not say what type of tablets were administered to the patient and, indeed, had no direct knowledge whether they were administered and, if so, who had administered them. Neither Dr. Mussallem nor Dr. Larroude have ever met the Respondent and neither could establish in any way the Respondent's connection, if any, with the maternity center owned or operated by Carolle Baya, nor with her practice as a lay midwife as any such relationship might have related to either patients Mull or Thompson. The most Dr. Mussallem, and indeed Dr. Larroude, could establish (in a "hearsay on hearsay" fashion), was that they "understood" that Dr. Britton provided "backup" to Carolle Baya in her midwifery practice. Dr. Mussallem could not say whether Pitocin or any other drug had actually been given Susan Thompson before he saw her as a patient on January 2. In any event, there was also no demonstration that the Respondent was aware at all that any medication had been prescribed either of the above-named patients or administered to them by Carolle Baya or anyone else. If indeed the patients were administered the drugs alleged in the Administrative Complaint, the Respondent did not support this activity nor have any knowledge of it. Susan Thompson was ultimately delivered of her baby on January 2, at 11:54 p.m., and both mother and child had a normal, uneventful birth. Susan Thompson could have been delivered of her baby by a trained midwife, inasmuch as she had a normal delivery, with no problems arising. In summary, the testimony of Drs. Mussallem and Larroude was predicated in all portions related to the charges in the Administrative Complaint on hearsay and those witnesses had no direct knowledge of the care given the patients in question at Carolle Baya's clinic by Carolle Baya and no knowledge of what type medication, if any, Carolle Baya or others unknown may have administered to those patients. Further, these witnesses do not know the Respondent, have no knowledge of the character and nature of his practice and have no direct knowledge regarding his professional relationships with Carolle Baya or her clinic, if any. These frailties render it impossible to accord significant weight to the testimony of these two witnesses. Ruth Hunter, Patricia Elaine Martin and Mary Ruth Ann Arick are all owners or supervisors of various women's health clinics. Dr. Britton is employed as a contract physician at each of these clinics and works at each clinic one or more times a month. The clinics are in Gainesville, Orlando and Holly Hill. The doctor is employed to perform first trimester abortions, vasectomies, insertion of IUDs, fitting of diaphragms and to provide miscellaneous gynecological care. All three of these witnesses established that the doctor is the best of any of the physicians employed by them, competently and professionally performing such procedures with a high degree of care and interest in the patient's condition. His practice at these clinics is characterized by his spending a great deal of time conversing with his patients and generally taking an interest in their condition and problems. They have all experienced that Dr. Britton has the lowest "complication rate," that is, problems arising after he performs various procedures, of any doctor who practices at their clinics. The testimony of these three witnesses was corroborated by that of Dr. John Freeman, a full-time physician with the Gainesville Women's Health Center, who established that the Respondent easily meets the appropriate standard of practice in all the work that he has performed for the Gainesville health center and excels above that standard of practice in most cases. Dr. Freeman was aware of the charges against Respondent in a general sense and established that injudicious use of drugs is totally out of character for the Respondent and that the Respondent is very conservative in prescribing any drugs, especially pain medications. Dr. Freeman is the staff physician at the clinic who reviews all procedures performed by other physicians. Ruth Hunter is a registered nurse, employed with the Gainesville Women's Health Center, who has worked with the Respondent in the vasectomy clinic at that facility. She has been an operating room nurse for approximately 15 years, and, based upon her experience with such duties and with physicians, she demonstrated that the Respondent is very capable in performing the procedures he was retained to perform for the clinic, with a very low complication rate and a very low incidence of prescribing any drugs at all during his practice at the clinic. Dr. Willard R. Gatling testified by deposition as an expert witness on behalf of the Respondent. He has known the Respondent professionally for approximately 15 years and the two of them have regularly attended educational and other meetings of the Duval County Academy of Family Practice on numerous occasions. Dr. Gatling has practiced medicine in the Jacksonville area for over 35 years as a family practitioner and obstetrician. He has seen the Respondent's patients on a number of occasions and the Respondent has seen Dr. Gatling's patients on a number of occasions since 1967. He is aware of the Respondent's current level of care for and treatment of his patients and based upon his experience with seeing patients who have previously seen Dr. Britton, his treatment of patients appears to be appropriate and proper and complies with the standard of care of a competent medical doctor as is accepted and practiced in northeast Florida. Dr. Gatling is aware of the Respondent's current probation and his past disputes with other physicians in Fernandina which resulted in those physicians voting him off the staff of the hospital there. Neither these problems nor the current charges have changed his opinion of the Respondent's competency. Raymond Michael Eichorn was director of the Nassau County Alcohol and Drug Abuse Council from November, 1975, to November, 1979. He became acquainted with the Respondent during that time because the Respondent was on the board of directors of that council until the council was disbanded two years ago. Dr. Britton was very active during those years in the council's work with the court and school systems in the area of drug education and combating drug abuse. He performed voluntary free physicals for alcoholics who were entering the antabuse treatment program. He performed this service despite the fact that he received no compensation and that the program provided him with no malpractice insurance coverage for this work. Since 1979, witness Eichorn has been employed in the personnel department of Container Corporation at its paper mill in Fernandina. He has continued to refer mill employees with alcohol problems to the Respondent for him to perform physicals for purposes of their entering the antabuse program. He has found the Respondent to be civic-minded and to continue to be interested in and working with the current drug abuse program in Nassau County. J. Chandler McLauchlan is, by training, a psychologist. He operates a cabinet making business and also works as a sculptor. He and Charles W. Howard and their families are patients of the Respondent. The Respondent, at all times, has proven to be a compassionate, conservative physician with regard to his care and prescription of drugs for these witnesses and their families. The Respondent frequently has charged substantially lower fees than other physicians for the same services and has generally shown himself to he a competent, caring physician, more concerned with patients' welfare than financial remuneration. He is strictly conservative regarding prescriptions of medicines and, in the words of Charles Howard, "he likes us to rough it."
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses of the Respondent, who testified in person, as well as the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint in its entirety. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Charlie L. Adams, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Stephen P. Smith, Esquire Smith and Smith, P.A. 2601 University Blvd., West Jacksonville, Florida 32217 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue presented herein is whether or not a CON to construct a 60-bed short-term psychiatric hospital in District XI should be issued to Florida Medical Center (FMC).
Findings Of Fact FMC seeks a CON for a 60-bed free-standing psychiatric facility to be located in the Key Largo area of Monroe County in HRS District XI. FMC intends to provide 6.25 percent of its patient days at no charge to indigent patients. It further intends to provide another 6.25 percent of its patient days to HRS' clients and Baker Act patients at 50 percent of its projected charge, or $200 per day. (FMC Exhibit 2, Table 7). FMC proposes to build this facility at a cost of $6,060,000. Dr. Richard Matthews, Ph.D., has been executive director of the Guidance Clinic of the Upper Keys since 1973 and is a clinical psychologist. He is responsible for the overall administration and supervision of mental health, alcohol, drug abuse and out-patient services provided under contract with HRS. Dr. Matthews was qualified as an expert in clinical psychology and the mental health delivery health system in Monroe County. (FMC Exhibit 13). There are three guidance clinics in Monroe County, one each for the upper, lower and middle Keys. HRS contracts through each of these clinics to provide mental health care for its clients. There are no community mental health centers in Monroe County and the clinics are the sole means of delivering mental health care on behalf of HRS' clients within the county. Currently, the guidance clinic of the upper Keys places its in- patients in Harbor View Hospital in Dade County at a cost of $236 per day. Neither Harbor View nor any other hospital provides free days to any of the guidance clinics for in-patient psychiatric care. (FMC Exhibit 13, P. 9) Jackson Memorial Hospital does not accept indigent or charity psychiatric patients from Monroe County. There have been occasions where patients without resources have been unable to be hospitalized although hospitalization was indicated. The middle Keys has a crisis hospitalization unit with a limited number of beds. Patients needing hospitalization longer than three days must be transferred to Harbor View or some other facility in the District. The 15 beds at Depoo Hospital in Key West are not readily accessible to residents of the upper Keys. Residents needing psychiatric services usually go to hospitals in Dade County. Coral Reef Hospital, the nearest psychiatric facility to Petitioner's proposed facility, has in the past refused to negotiate a discounted rate with the guidance clinic. Dr. Matthews, on one occasion, sent a patient to Coral Reef who was refused treatment. Currently, no psychiatrist practices in Key Largo because there are no psychiatric beds to which a psychiatrist could admit patients. The discounted rate of $200 per day quoted by FMC is some $36 per day less than the guidance clinic currently pays to providers for referrals of its patients for psychiatric care. Additionally, the 6.25 percent of free care that Petitioner proposes is greater than the free care which the guidance clinic currently receives from any facility since no facility presently gives any free care to the clinic. The guidance clinic supports Petitioner's CON application and will contract with Petitioner who provides services for in-patients. Grant Center is a long-term 140-bed psychiatric hospital specializing in the treatment of children and adolescents. It is the nearest facility to Petitioner's proposed facility. Grant Center has agreed to refer adult patients to Petitioner. Grant Center treats 2-3 adults a month who need psychiatric care. (FMC Exhibit 14). There is one hospital providing psychiatric care in Dade County which was surveyed by the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) in March, 1988. Currently, a third party insurance carrier no longer utilizes Grant Center because of price. If a facility has prices which carriers consider too expensive, utilization will go down. (FMC Exhibit 14, P. 7). Grant Center currently contracts with HRS to provide its clients care at a rate of approximately $350 per day, a rate one half of Grant Center's normal rate. Jackson Memorial is the only Dade County hospital which will treat an indigent psychiatric patient. Grant Center intends to assist Petitioner with staffing or programmatic needs. It has 80-100 professional staff, most of whom live in close proximity to Key Largo. Robert L. Newman, C.P.A., is the chief financial officer at FMC. He testified, by deposition, as an expert in hospital accounting and finance. Newman analyzed the Hospital Cost Containment Board (HCCB) reports for each hospital in District XI which provides psychiatric care. There is no free standing psychiatric hospital in the District which reports any indigent or uncompensated care. Among area acute care hospitals which have psychiatric units, Miami Jackson rendered 38.89 percent indigent care, Miami Children's rendered 6.5 percent indigent care, and no other facility reported that it rendered more than 1.75 percent indigent care. (FMC see Exhibit 11, disposition exhibit 1). Jackson provides no free care to Monroe County residents and Miami Children's care is limited to treating children while Petitioner is seeking adult beds. Jayne Coraggio testified (by deposition) as an expert in psychiatric staffing and hiring. She is currently Petitioner's director of behavioral sciences. The ideal patient to staff ratio is 4 to 5 patients per day per professional staff member. During the evening shift, the ideal patient ratio per professional staff member is 7 to 8 patients. (FMC Exhibit 12, PP. 6-7). Petitioner's facility is adequately staffed based on the above ratios. FMC is considered overstaffed in the psychiatric unit by some of the other area hospitals since they do not staff as heavily as does Petitioner. Lower staffing ratios can affect quality of care since patients and their families would not receive as much therapy. Family therapy is important because the family needs to know about changes in the patient in order to make corrective adjustments. The family that is required to travel in excess of 45 minutes or more one way is less likely to be involved in family therapy. Islara Souto was the HRS primary reviewer who prepared the state agency action report (SAAR) for Petitioner's CON application. (FMC Exhibit 15). District 11 has subdivided into five subdistricts for psychiatric beds. Florida is deinstitutionalizing patients from its mental hospitals. To the extent that private psychiatric hospitals do not accept nonpaying patients, their existence will not solve the problem of caring for such patients. Souto acknowledged that the local health councils conversion policy discriminates against subdistrict 5 because there are so few acute care beds in the subdistrict. In fact, the conversion policy actually exacerbates the maldistribution of beds in the district. (FMC 15, page 26). The psychiatric facility nearest the proposed site (Coral Reef), had an occupancy of 90.3 percent. Souto utilized a document entitled Florida Primary Health Care Need Indicators, February 1, 1986, and determined that Monroe County has not been designated as a health manpower shortage area, nor a medically underserved area. This information is relied upon by health planners to determine the availability of health manpower in an area. This report refers both to physicians and R.N.'s. The average adult per diem for free-standing hospitals in District 11 range from $430 at Charter to just over $500 at Harbor View. Although districts have established subdistricts for psychiatric beds, no psychiatric bed subdistrict in any district has been promulgated by HRS as a rule. The access standard that is relevant to this proceeding is a 45-minute travel standard contained in Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)5.G. That standard states: G. Access Standard. Short-term inpatient hospital psychiatric services should be available within a maximum travel time of 45 minutes under average travel conditions for at least 90 percent of this service area's population. Here, the standard refers to the service area which is determined to be an area different than a service district. Applying the travel time standard on a service area basis makes the most sense since the subdistrict is established by the local health council and not the applicant. Analyzing this access standard on a sub-district level, 90% of the sub-districts population is not within 45 minutes of any facility anywhere in sub-district V since the sub-district is more than two hours long by ordinary travel and the population is split two-thirds in lower Dade County and one-third in Monroe County, the bulk of which is in Key West. (FMC Exhibit 17). Therefore, a facility located on either end of this sub-district is not readily accessible by the applicable travel standards to citizens at the other end of the sub-district. This access standard must however be measured and considered with the needs for psychiatric services of the kind Petitioner is proposing to provide. Petitioner has not presented any access surveys or assessments of the caliber relied upon by the Department in the past. Petitioner's facility which would be located in the Key Largo area will no doubt provide better geographic accessibility to residents of District XI who live in the Key Largo area. HRS has in the past used a sub-district analysis to determine geographic accessibility for psychiatric beds even though it has not promulgated a rule for sub-districts for psychiatric beds. See, for example, Psychiatric Hospital of Florida vs. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and Pasco Psychiatric Center, DOAH Case No. 85-0780. Likewise, the Department has approved the conversion of acute-care beds to psychiatric beds even though it found that there was a surplus of psychiatric beds in the district. (Petitioner's Exhibit 7). The Department has in the past used a geographic access analysis to approve psychiatric beds in District XI and has used the sub- district analysis or a time travel analysis in its review of Cedars, Coral Reef, Depoo (for psychiatric beds) and the Glenbiegh case (for long term substance abuse). The bed need calculations for the January, 1992 planning horizon shows a surplus of 180 short-term in-patient psychiatric beds. (HRS Exhibit 2). The occupancy level for short-term psychiatric beds in the district is below 70%. (HRS Exhibit 2, pages 11-12). Additionally, the occupancy standards of the local and state health plan, of which the department is required to review CON applications, have not been met in this instance. (HRS Exhibit 2, Pages 6-7). Petitioner has not submitted any documentation to HRS regarding special circumstances need. Petitioner's proposal at final hearing for a staff referral agreement with another local hospital was not contained in the CON application filed with HRS. (FMC Exhibit 14, pages 11-12). Although Petitioner has alluded to some unspecified access problem for residents in the Florida Keys, Petitioner has not documented a real access problem and certainly not a demonstration of inaccessibility under the rule access standard. (Florida Administrative Code Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)5.g.)(HRS Exhibit 2, pages 14-15). Although the proposed project would increase availability and access for underserved groups in the district, the percentage of total patient days for "indigents" is not substantial and certainly not to the point to warrant deviation from the usual access criteria. 2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT: Petitioner's application for a Certificate of Need to build a 60-bed free- standing psychiatric hospital in District XI be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation filed in this cause, the testimony of the witnesses, and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Respondent, Randall E. Pitone, M.D., is a medical doctor licensed (license number ME 0029098) by the State of Florida since 1976. Respondent is a diplomate in psychiatry having received certification from the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent was in the practice of psychiatry in the State of Florida. Respondent has been affiliated with or authorized to practice in a number of hospitals in the Pinellas County area. He enjoys a good reputation among the community of practicing psychiatrists and has covered for several of them during the course of his practice. The Respondent became Patient 1's treating psychiatrist in 1982 when the patient was almost 18 years of age. Patient 1 has a borderline personality disorder and other problems for which she required treatment. In order to more effectively provide treatment for borderline patients, Respondent attended at least two courses related to borderline personality disorder during the early 1980s. From September, 1982 through May, 1988, Respondent treated Patient 1 with individual psychotherapy. During this time, Patient 1 was hospitalized on several occasions and Respondent counseled with her within the hospital setting and at his office. Borderline patients are typically very needy, seductive, and manipulative in their approach to others. During her period of treatment Patient 1 frequently attempted to initiate a romantic relationship with Respondent who diplomatically refused her advances. On each of these occasions, Respondent explained to Patient 1 that he could not have a romantic relationship and continue therapy. Also during this period, Respondent was married and devoted to his family. In May, 1988, Respondent and Patient 1 ended their formal physician- patient relationship. Patient 1 was not sincerely pursuing therapy. Additionally, she had a new boyfriend with whom she seemed happy. Respondent encouraged her to seek therapy but she mistakenly believed that she did not need it. Although she would periodically drop by to visit with Respondent, she did not make appointments for therapy. Nor did she obtain therapy from another psychiatrist despite Respondent's encouragement for her to do so. Respondent's wife left him sometime in 1988. Her departure was very difficult for Respondent. The couple divorced in June, 1988, and Respondent's former wife remarried shortly thereafter and moved to Georgia. Respondent's children resided with him until sometime in 1989 when they moved to their mother's home. Subsequently, Respondent allowed Patient 1 to move into his home. She resided with him from June, 1989 until April, 1990. Throughout this period of cohabitation, Respondent included Patient 1 in his family activities. She went to his brother's home with him for Christmas and went on a cruise to Jamaica with his relatives. Respondent did not hide their relationship from his family or friends. During this period Respondent and Patient 1 engaged in sexual intercourse. Patient 1 has been hospitalized on several occasions since 1982. During one such hospitalization, on or about October 30, 1988 (after formal therapy had ended), Dr. Helm consulted with the Respondent regarding Patient 1's suspected drug abuse. Patient 1 has a serious addiction to alcohol, cocaine, and crack cocaine. This addiction dates at least as far back as the summer of 1989, and perhaps earlier. Respondent knew of Patient 1's addiction to cocaine and of her abuse of other substances. Respondent prescribed medications for Patient 1 in a misguided effort to wean her from street drugs. Whenever Respondent refused to give Patient 1 prescriptions, she would become outraged and destructive. On one such occasion, Patient 1 exited the car in which the couple was travelling and bolted in front of an oncoming truck. As a result Patient 1 was hospitalized with a broken pelvis. Between May, 1988, and March, 1990, Respondent wrote or authorized the prescriptions listed in attachment A for Patient 1. These prescriptions were given to Patient 1 despite the fact that she was no longer formally receiving psychotherapy from Respondent. Moreover, many of the prescriptions issued are not of the type generally associated with the treatment of psychiatric patients since they are more commonly associated with pain relief. Amitriptyline is a legend drug. Dalmane is a brand name of flurazepam, a legend drug and controlled substance. Valium is a brand name of diazepam, a legend drug and controlled substance. Xanax is a brand name of alprazolam, a legend drug and controlled substance. Darvocet is a brand name of a compound containing propoxyphene, a legend drug and controlled substance. Tylenol #3 and Tylenol #2 are brand names of acetaminophen or apap with codeine, legend drugs and controlled substances. Percodan is a brand name of oxycodone with aspirin, a legend drug and controlled substance. Percocet is a brand name of oxycodone with acetaminophen or apap, a legend drug and controlled substance. Legend drugs are required by federal or state law to be dispensed only on a prescription. Respondent inappropriately prescribed legend drugs/controlled substances to Patient 1. Respondent prescribed drugs for Patient 1 after they were living together and engaging in sexual relations. The types and quantities of prescriptions written by Respondent for Patient 1 were not justified by examinations and records maintained by the Respondent, were not issued in the course of medical practice, and were clearly excessive. By prescribing the drugs listed in attachment A, Respondent failed to provide Patient 1 with that level of care, skill and treatment, which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as acceptable under the conditions and circumstances of this case. Respondent also failed to seek consultation in connection with his concerns over Patient 1. Instead, Respondent set himself up as her sole provider and savior. This action was medically inappropriate and further evidences Respondent's loss of objectivity in this instance. In effect, Respondent became a patient in need of treatment as a result of his erroneous and misguided efforts to assist Patient 1. On April 11, 1990, an order of emergency restriction of Respondent's license was issued by Larry Gonzalez, acting as Secretary of the Department. That order placed specific restrictions on the Respondent's license which include: -the prescription of controlled substances utilizing sequentially numbered triplicate prescriptions; -the review of each prescription by a supervisory physician; -the prohibition of providing medical services to Patient 1; and -the submission of monthly reports by a monitoring physician which includes specific information regarding Respondent's practice, any problems, a review of prescriptions and patient records. To date, Respondent has complied with the restrictions placed on his license. Additionally, Respondent has sought and obtained psychiatric counseling in connection with his errors in thinking related to his relationship with Patient 1. Respondent developed a rescue fantasy in which he perceived that he alone could assist Patient 1 recover from her illnesses. This was not a medically sound approach to the dilemma within which Respondent became embroiled. As Respondent fell in love with Patient 1, he lost his professional perspective and undertook this ill-fated rescue of her. An examination of Respondent's medical records does not suggest that the activities which gave rise to the allegations of this case have occurred regarding other patients. From the circumstances of this case, it is unlikely another incident or series of incidents of this type will recur. Sexual activity between a psychiatrist and his patient has detrimental effects on the patient. In this instance, that conduct had detrimental effects on both the Respondent and Patient 1. Since Respondent fell prey to Patient 1's manipulative nature, his judgment became impaired and she was able to orchestrate an inappropriate response from Respondent. It cannot be found, however, that Respondent used their relationship to induce Patient 1 to engage in sexual activity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine enter a final order finding the Respondent guilty of violating Sections 458.331(1)(m), (q), and (t), Florida Statutes, and imposing the following penalties: suspension of the Respondent's license for a period of one year during which time the Respondent shall continue counseling, followed by a two year period of probation under the terms set forth in the emergency order issued April 11, 1990, together with an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000.00. DONE and ENTERED this 14 day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14 day of November, 1990. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 90-3276 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraphs 1 through 20 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 21 it is accepted that Respondent provided the prescriptions as described, however, he had formally ended psychotherapy of Patient 1 in May, 1988. It was inappropriate for him to issue the prescriptions. Paragraphs 22A. and 22C. are accepted. Paragraph 22D. is rejected to the extent that it finds Respondent did not maintain appropriate records, otherwise, rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Note: there is no paragraph 22B. Paragraph 23 is accepted. Paragraph 24A. is accepted. Paragraphs 24B. and 24C. are rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. With regard to paragraph 25 it is accepted that Respondent prescribed substances for Patient 1 inappropriately and excessively, otherwise the paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence or a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 26, 27, 30 and 31 (because it allowed her to manipulate Respondent into prescribing inappropriately--he should have been the physician not a co-patient) are accepted. Paragraphs 28 and 29 are rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: Paragraphs 1 through 3 are accepted. To the extent addressed in findings paragraphs 3 through 7, Respondent's paragraphs 4 through 9 are accepted; otherwise rejected as irrelevant or a recitation of testimony. With the exception of the last sentence, paragraph 10 is accepted. The last sentence is rejected as speculative or conjecture--it is accepted that Respondent was in a stress-filled, emotional situation. Paragraphs 11 through 14 are accepted. Paragraph 15 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 16 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 17 is accepted. Paragraphs 18 through 19 are accepted. Paragraphs 20 through 23 are rejected as recitation of testimony but see findings of fact paragraphs 27, 28, and 29. Paragraphs 24 through 28 are rejected as recitation of testimony. With regard to paragraph 29 it is accepted that the Respondent does not pose a threat to the public under his current circumstances. Otherwise, paragraph 29 is rejected as recitation of testimony or irrelevant. Paragraph 30 is accepted. Paragraph 31 is rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraph 32 is accepted. Paragraph 33 is accepted. ATTACHMENT A Date Drug Prescribed 5/14/88 Dalmane 6/02/88 Valium 7/15/88 Percodan 7/20/88 Percodan 7/27/88 Xanax 7/27/88 Percodan 8/12/88 Percodan 9/06/88 Percodan 9/13/88 Zantac 9/23/88 Percodan 10/7/88 Darvocet N-100 10/29/88 Xanax 11/18/88 Percodan 01/6/89 Xanax 1 mg 01/09/89 Xanax 1 mg 01/10/89 Percodan 01/11/89 Xanax 01/16/89 Xanax 01/18/89 Xanax 01/21/89 Xanax 01/20/89 Tylenol 3 01/24/89 Tylenol 3 01/25/89 Tylenol 3 01/26/89 Xanax 01/31/89 Xanax 02/02/89 Percodan 02/04/89 Xanax 1mg 02/04/89 Percodan 02/04/89 Xanax 1mg 02/09/89 Percodan 02/10/89 Xanax 02/10/89 Percodan 03/03/89 Xanax 03/03/89 Percodan 03/13/89 Percodan 03/14/89 Xanax 1mg 03/17/89 Percodan 03/20/89 Xanax 03/24/89 Xanax 03/24/89 Percodan 03/27/89 Percodan 03/27/89 Xanax 03/29/89 Percodan 03/31/89 Percodan 04/07/89 Xanax 1mg 04/10/89 Percocet 5mg 04/11/89 Percodan 04/21/89 Percodan 04/24/89 Percodan 04/25/89 Percodan 04/25/89 Xanax 04/26/89 Percodan 04/28/89 Percodan 04/28/89 Xanax 04/29/89 Percodan 05/01/89 Xanax 05/02/89 Percodan 05/04/89 Percodan 05/05/89 Percodan 05/09/89 Xanax 05/11/89 Xanax 05/14/89 Xanax 1 mg 05/18/89 Xanax 1 mg 05/20/89 Xanax 1 mg 06/06/89 Xanax 1 mg 06/08/89 Percodan 06/09/89 Xanax 1 mg 06/09/89 Percodan 06/14/89 Xanax 1 mg 06/14/89 Percodan 06/16/89 Xanax 1 mg 06/23/89 Xanax 1mg 06/24/89 Percodan 06/26/89 Percodan 07/01/89 Xanax 07/07/89 Xanax 1 mg 07/07/89 Percodan 07/10/89 Percodan 07/15/89 Percodan 07/17/89 Percodan 07/20/89 Percodan 07/21/89 Valium 10 mg 07/21/89 Percodan 07/28/89 Percodan 07/30/89 Valium 07/31/89 Percodan 08/02/89 Percodan 08/04/89 Percodan 08/05/89 Valium 10 mg 08/07/89 Valium 10 mg 08/07/89 Percodan 08/09/89 Percodan 08/20/89 Valium 10 mg 09/01/89 Percodan 09/04/89 Valium 09/06/89 Percodan 09/19/89 Percodan 09/22/89 Valium 09/22/89 Percodan 09/28/89 Percodan 10/01/89 Percodan 10/02/89 Percodan 10/02/89 Valium 10 mg 10/04/89 Valium 10 mg 10/04/89 Percodan 10/05/89 Xanax 1 mg 10/06/89 Percodan 10/13/89 Darvocet-N. 100 10/13/89 Valium 10/13/89 Tylenol #2 10/17/89 Tylenol #2 10/19/89 Valium 5 mg 10/20/89 Tylenol #3 10/24/89 Tylenol #3 10/24/89 Valium 5 mg 10/25/89 Tylenol #3 10/26/89 Percocet 10/30/89 Percocet 10/30/89 Tylenol #4 10/30/89 Valium 10 mg 11/03/89 Percodan 11/17/89 Percodan 11/17/89 Valium 10 mg 11/24/89 Valium 10 mg 11/24/89 Percocet 11/27/89 Percocet 11/29/89 Percocet 01/02/90 Valium 10 mg 01/02/90 Percodan 01/12/90 Tylenol #3 01/12/90 Valium 10 mg 01/13/90 Xanax 1 mg 01/17/90 Tylenol #3 02/04/90 Xanax 1 mg 02/17/90 Percodan 02/20/90 Percodan 02/28/90 Percodan 03/10/90 Percodan 03/16/90 Percodan 03/17/90 Percodan COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb Chief Trial Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 730 Sterling Street, Ste. 201 Tampa, Florida 33609 Grover C. Freeman FREEMAN, LOPEZ & KELLY, P.A. 4600 West Cypress, Ste. 500 Tampa, Florida 33607 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should deny Petitioner's application to operate a registered family day care home on the grounds that two incidents of child neglect demonstrate Petitioner's inability to ensure the safety of children under Petitioner's care.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for registering family day care homes in Florida. Respondent operated a registered family day care in her home from sometime before July 30, 2001, until the registration expired on July 29, 2002. In November 2002, Petitioner applied to operate a registered family day care home, Respondent proposes to deny that application. Respondent's licensing division conducted a background screening investigation of the applicant in accordance with applicable statutes and rules. The investigation revealed two reports in the Florida Abuse Hotline Information System (FAHIS) in which children under Petitioner's care suffered injuries. By letter dated January 27, 2002, Respondent notified Petitioner that Respondent proposed to deny Petitioner's application to operate a registered family day care home (Notice of Denial). The Notice of Denial provides that the two incidents of injuries to children under Petitioner's care demonstrate an inability to "ensure the safety of children to the level necessary to be registered as a family day care." On August 9, 2000, Respondent received a report alleging that a child in Petitioner's care received bite marks. Respondent investigated the report and closed the report in an untimely manner sometime in 2002 as verified for maltreatment. The final report named Petitioner as the perpetrator of maltreatment. On July 30, 2001, Respondent approved Petitioner's application to operate a registered day care home. Respondent approved the application after Respondent received the report of maltreatment on August 9, 2000, but before Respondent closed the report in 2002. The registration approved by Respondent on July 30, 2001, expired on July 29, 2002. On November 1, 2001, Respondent received a second report alleging that a child under Petitioner's care was injured. Respondent investigated the report and timely closed the report verified for inadequate supervision. The report found that a child in Petitioner's care received bite marks, bruising, scratches, and a swollen upper lip while in an unsupervised room with two other children. The report found that the cause of the injuries was unknown. Petitioner did not request a hearing to challenge either the report of maltreatment or the report of inadequate supervision. The time for contesting the content of the reports has expired. Petitioner's registration to operate a family day care home expired on July 29, 2002. Respondent should not grant Petitioner's application to operate a registered family day care home. The evidence is clear and convincing that Petitioner is unable to ensure the safety of children to the level necessary to operate a registered family day care home.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application to operate a registered family day care home. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Cato, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 Sheila D. Engum, Esquire Post Office Box 620837 Oviedo, Florida 32762-0837 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jerry Regier, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Ruth Rogers is a licensed medical physician authorized to practice medicine in this state. The Complaint allegations centered around testimony of the Respondent, Ruth Rogers, during a custody proceeding in which the Child Protective Services (a State Agency) was attempting to gain custody of one Dena (Nikki) Decker based on facts which will be set forth in detail hereinafter. Jack McGowan, a medical doctor engaged primarily in pediatrics in Fort Pierce, Florida, testified that he first treated Dena Decker during August of 1973, at which time Decker was approximately seven weeks old. Dr. McGowan made subsequent treatments of Dena Deckur on a regular basis through December of 1976. During December, Dr. McGowan noted that Decker's lymph glands were enlarged and he ordered that certain lab work be performed, the results of which were returned to him sometime during early January of 1977. Based on the lab results, Dr. McGowan tentatively diagnosed Dena Decker as being a patient suffering from acute leukemia. To confirm this diagnosis, he referred her to the Shands Teaching Medical Center in Gainesville, wherein Dr. McGowan's diagnosis was confirmed. The treating physicians of Patient Decker at Shands Teaching Hospital were Drs. Jerry L. Arbosa and David Pockmore. It was their medical opinion that Dena was in fact suffering from acute lymphoblastic leukemia and that this disease should be treated by chemotherapy at Shands Teaching Hospital in Gainesville. Drs. Barbosa and Rockmore explained to the parents of Dena Decker the benefits and side effects of chemotherapy treatment, and they suggested that this was the best method of treating a patient such as Dena Decker, who was suffering from acute lymphoblastic leukemia. They noted, however, that there were some side effects, such as loss of hair and the destruction of certain "good" cells as well as "bad" cells. Dema Decker's parents requested time to consider the chemotherapy treatment and Drs. Barbosa and Rockmore stressed to her parents that "time was of the essence". After a few days, the parents of Dena Decker declined the treatment and at that juncture, Drs. Barbosa and Rockmore called in the Child Protective Services of Gainesville wherein a custody proceeding was convened, with the State seeking a custody award of Dena Decker. During that proceeding, Dr. Ruth Rogers, Respondent, testified that she would treat such a patient suffering from acute lymphoblastic leukemia with natural foods, herbs and optimal psychological support. It was Drs. Barbosa and Rockmore's opinion that the method of treatment outlined by the Respondent would be futile and that the patient would die in a short period of time. There was no evidence that the Respondent, Ruth Rogers, counseled with Dena Decker's parents or that she at any time treated Dena Decker by the method to which she testified during the custody proceeding in Gainesville. Following the conclusion of the Petitioner's case, Respondent's counsel moved for a directed verdict, summary judgment, or a judgment based on a failure on the Petitioner's part to establish a prima facie case. After some consideration, the undersigned concluded that, based on the evidence adduced during the Petitioner's case in chief, insufficient evidence was offered to establish that the Respondent had violated Chapter 458.1201(m), Florida Statutes, as alleged. Section 458.1201 is the section of the Medical Practices Act which deals with the power of the Board in the denial, suspension, revocation of license, and other discipline of medical practitioners. It reads, in pertinent part: "458.1201l--Demial, suspension, revocation of license; disciplinary powers-- The board shall have authority to deny an application for a license or to discipline a physician licensed under this chapter or any antecedent law who, after hearing, has been adjudged unqualified or guilty of the follow- ing: (Here is set forth several categories of disqualification or misconduct included in which is subsection (m))." Subsection (m) sets forth as grounds for. . . discipline of a physician, the following facets of misconduct: "(m) Being guilty of immoral or unprofessional conduct, incompetence, negligence or will- ful misconduct. Unprofessional conduct shall be any departure from, or the failure to conform to, the standards of acceptable and prevailing medical practice in his area of expertise as determined by the board, in which proceeding actual injury to a patient need not be established; when the same is committed in the course of his practice whether committed within or without this state." (Emphasis supplied) The administrative charge herein claimed to be proscribed by the above- quoted section of the statutes deals only with the testimony of the Respondent as to a method of treatment that she would use for treating acute lymphoblastic leukemia. Based on my examination of this record and an analysis of the reported case law, I conclude that the giving of such testimony is not proscribed unprofessional conduct as that term is included within this particular subsection of Chapter 485.1201(m). As the Court of Appeals stated in Lester v. Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, Fla.App., 348 So.2d 923 (1977), the Court stated: "In construing the language and import of this statute we must bear in mind that it is, in effect, a penal statute since it imposes sanctions and penalties in the nature of denial of license, suspension from practice, revocation of license to practice, private or public reprimand, or probation, upon those found guilty of violating its prescriptions. This being true the statute must be strictly construed and no conduct is to be regarded as included within it that is not reasonably pro- scribed by it. Furthermore, if there are any ambiguities included such must be construed in favor of the applicant or licensee." This being so, I conclude that the above-cited conduct claimed to be violative of Chapter 458 is not proscribed by Chapter 458.1201(m) and I shall recommend that the Board enter a final administrative order dismissing the instant action against the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, hereby RECOMMEND: That the Administrative Complaint filed herein against the Respondent be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of August, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Michael I. Schwartz, Esquire Suite 201 Ellis Building 1311 Executive Center Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Rogers, Esquire 3101 Maguire Boulevard Post Office Box 20065 Orlando, Florida 32814 George S. Palmer, M.D. Execuivo Director State of Florida, Board of Medical Examiners 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 220 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
