Findings Of Fact Bennie Mae Rutledge, Petitioner, owns property located at 422 Madison Avenue, Clearwater, Florida which is the northwest corner of the intersection of South Madison Avenue and Brown Street. The legal description of the property is Lot 12, Block 1, Moase and Harrison Subdivision. The property is zoned commercial general. David Legault has a contract with Petitioner to purchase the subject property which is conditioned upon the granting of the variance which Petitioner is seeking. Legault's primary objective in this proceeding is to enhance business opportunities available to him through the purchase and use of Petitioner's property, if the variance sought herein is granted. On or about July 24, 1956 an application for a variance of the side property setback line requirement was submitted on behalf of Petitioner. This variance would permit the construction of an indoor storage or warehouse building 3.6 feet from the side property line, rather than ten feet. This is a variance of 6.4 feet. On August 14, 1986 the Development Code Adjustment Board denied this variance, and a timely appeal was taken on behalf of Petitioner. Prior to submission of this variance request, the Petitioner had sought four variances which were also denied. At that time, a 2,500 square foot building was proposed for the property which has now been reduced to a 2,000 square foot building, 100 feet long and 20 feet deep. The subject property is 136 feet long and 48.6 feet deep. Given the dimensions of the lot, and considering the requirements for parking, green space, and other setbacks, the variance sought herein is the minimum necessary to use this property for a warehouse or indoor storage. Without this variance, the building could only be 13 feet deep, and this would not be functional. Therefore, the particular size and shape of the subject property will result in an unnecessary hardship upon the Petitioner if the provisions of the Clearwater Land Development Code are strictly applied since the maximum depth of a commercial warehouse constructed on the lot could only be 13 feet. According to John Richter, development code administrator, there are several commercial warehouses in the area of the subject property, and in his opinion the approval of this variance would neither have an adverse impact on the neighborhood, nor would it be a benefit.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Silver Sands Estates, Inc., has demonstrated, pursuant to the Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, Florida, that a vested rights certificate to undertake development of certain real property located in Clay County should be issued by Clay County, notwithstanding the fact that part of such development will not be in accordance with the requirements of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Property. Pursuant to Warranty Deeds dated August 15, 1975, and November 10, 1980, Silver Sands Estates, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Silver Sands"), acquired certain real property located in Clay County, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"). At the time Silver Sands acquired the Property, the applicable zoning district permitted the development of the Property for single-family residential development at a maximum density of one unit per acre. Development of the Property; Government Action Relied Upon by Silver Sands. In 1979-1980, Silver Sands prepared a development plan for the Property which included the planned single-family residential development known as "Little Rain Lake Estates." The planned development consisted of a total of 96 single-family residential lots. Phase One and Phase Two consisted of 13 lots in each phase. In approximately 1979-1981, Silver Sands improved and maintained an unpaved private road, Little Rain Lake Road, which was to be used for the development of Phases One and Two of Little Rain Lake Estates. The approximate costs to Silver Sands for these actions was $1,000.00. In 1979-1981, Silver Sands caused surveys, topographical surveys, and engineering plans to be prepared for the construction of a portion of Little Rain Lake Road as a paved dedicated road. Little Rain Lake Road was intended to serve Phases One and Two of Little Rain Lake Estates. The road was planned to eventually extend approximately 3,640 linear feet east from State Road 21. The approximate cost to Silver Sands for these items included the following: surveys, $4,000; topographic surveys, $6,000; engineering, $6,000. Plans for the construction of approximately 1,400 linear feet of Little Rain Lake Road were submitted to Clay County in 1980 for review and approval. This portion of Little Rain Lake Road was intended to serve nine of the lots within Phase One of Little Rain Lake Estates; the lots were shown on the plans for the road submitted to Clay County. The plans also depicted a temporary turnaround at the end of the 1,400 linear feet of the road submitted for approval. It was evident from the plans that Silver Sands planned a future extension of the road to serve the rest of Little Rain Lake Estates. Subsequent to the filing of the plans for the construction of the first 1,400 linear feet of Little Rain Lake Road, Clay County requested that Silver Sands submit the development plan for all phases of Little Rain Lake Estates (as described in Finding of Fact 3). Silver Sands complied with this request. Clay County was, therefore, aware of Silver Sands' plan to develop Little Rain Lake Road in conjunction with its development of Phases One and Two of Little Rain Lake Estates. On November 12, 1980, the proposed plans for the construction of the first 1,400 linear feet of Little Rain Lake Road were approved by Clay County. Between 1981 and 1991 eight lots within Phase One of Little Rain Lake Estates were sold. Silver Sands' Detrimental Reliance. In December 1980 and January 1981 Silver Sands constructed the first 1,400 linear feet of Little Rain Lake Road approved by Clay County. The cost of the construction was $26,845. In February, 1981, Clay County confirmed that the first 1,400 linear feet of Little Rain Lake Road approved by Clay County had been constructed pursuant to Clay County specifications. By Warranty Deed dated March 2, 1981, Silver Sands dedicated the portion of Little Rain Lake Road serving Phase One of Little Rain Lake Estates to Clay County. Also between 1981 and 1991, Silver Sands continued to maintain the unpaved and private portion of Little Rain Lake Road extending the remaining approximately 2,240 feet of the portion of Little Rain Lake Road intended to serve Phase One and Phase Two. The approximate cost to Silver Sands for these actions was $1,000.00. In 1997, Clay County requested Silver Sands to convey to the County approximately 34 acres of property along Little Rain Lake Road, formerly a part of Phases One and Two of Little Rain Lake Estates. Silver Sands conveyed the property to the County. Also in 1997, Clay County requested Silver Sands to dedicate the remaining approximately 2,240 feet of Little Rain Lake Road which had been surveyed and engineered by Silver Sands in 1979-1980. The County also requested Silver Sands to provide the surveys and plans which Silver Sands had prepared in 1979- 1980. Silver Sands dedicated the remaining portion of the road and provided the surveys and plans to the County. Rights that will be Destroyed. In 1991, Clay County adopted the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Comprehensive Plan"). Pursuant to the Comprehensive Plan the land use category applicable to development of the Property as single-family residential limits density to one unit per 10 acres. Under the provisions of the Comprehensive Plan adopted in 1990, Phases One and Two of the planned development of the Property cannot be developed for the 13 lots located in Phases One and Two which still remain in Silver Sands' ownership. The portion of the Property still owned by Silver Sands which has not been developed consists of the four lots in Phase One and the nine lots in Phase Two (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property"). The Subject Property does not include the lots in Phase One which were sold between 1981 and 1991 or the acreage conveyed to Clay County in 1997. If Silver Sands must comply with the Comprehensive Plan, the Subject Property cannot be developed for the 13 lots originally intended on the Subject Property in Phases One and Two of Little Rain Lake Estates. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended, have been met.
Findings Of Fact On or about April 5, 1988, Petitioner filed an application for a variance to replace an existing four foot fence extending to the seawall on his property at 643 Harbor Island, Lot 12 Island Estates, Clearwater, Florida. The subject property is zoned RS-6. Petitioner had already replaced his previous fencing prior to the filing of this application with wooden fencing which extends on the north and south side of his property through the setback to the seawall. The Development Code Adjustment Board considered Petitioner's application at its meeting on May 12, 1988, and based upon the Petitioner's explanation that the variance was sought simply to replace an existing fence that had termite damage, the Board approved his application on a 3 to 2 vote. The variance approval was conditioned upon the Petitioner obtaining a building permit within one month of the approval. Petitioner failed to obtain the required building permit, and no excuse was offered for this failure. Therefore, he had to reapply for the variance. On or about July 21, 1988, Petitioner filed his variance reapplication. The Development Code Adjustment Board considered this reapplication on August 25, 1988, at which time Petitioner again stated that he was simply replacing an existing fence. Due to a tie vote, consideration of the reapplication was continued to the Board's meeting of September 8, 1988. At the meeting on September 8, he explained for the first time that while the fencing on the south side of his property was simply the replacement of a previous fence which had extended to the seawall, the fencing on the north side was not. The previous fence on the north side of his property had stopped prior to the fifteen foot setback. With this clarification, the Board approved his variance reapplication for the south side of his property, but denied the variance for the north side. Petitioner has timely appealed the denial of his variance reapplication as it relates to the north side of his property. Petitioner testified at hearing that prior to the construction of his current wooden fence, he had a wood fence all the way to the seawall on the south side of his property. Since he had to replace that fencing due to termite damage, he took the opportunity to also replace and extend the wooden fencing on the northern side of his property through the setback. This action was not based on any hardship, but simply because he and his family felt it would look better if he had the same fencing on both sides of his property. It is clear and undisputed that Petitioner constructed a new fence on the north side of his property through the setback without obtaining a variance or permit. He did this simply for aesthetic reasons, and not due to any hardship. He failed to disclose this in his applications, or when the Board met on May 12 and August 25, 1988 to consider this matter.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's revocation of Respondent's modified permit, authorizing a cross- fence on Petitioner's fee owned right-of-way, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The South Florida Water Management District (District) is a public corporation in the State of Florida, existing by virtue of Chapter 25270, Laws of Florida (1949), and operating pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and Title 40E, Florida Administrative Code, as a multi-purpose water management district. The District's principal office is West Palm Beach, Florida. In executing its multi-purpose, the District, as local sponsor for the US Army Corps of Engineers' Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project, acquired canal rights-of-way. The District's rights-of-way were acquired to enable the Corps of Engineers to construct the flood control project and to maintain the system after its construction. The District operates a proprietary-based right-of-way program to manage the various property interests of the canal rights-of-way. The purpose of the District's right-of-way program is, to the extent possible, to allow uses of the rights- of-way that do not conflict with the flood control project. The rights-of way are used by both public and private concerns, including adjacent property owners, governmental entities, and utility companies. Jesus G. Quevedo is a private individual. His address is 2615 North Federal Highway, Lake Worth, Florida. The property at this address was vacant when Mr. Quevedo purchased it, and he has owned the property for approximately ten (10) years. The District has fee simple title to a strip of land on the south side of the District's C-51 Canal, immediately west of the Federal Highway/Olive Avenue bridge (C-51 Right-of-Way). Mr. Quevedo's property is located at the side of and adjacent to the C-51 Right-of-Way. The C-51 Right-of-Way is also located within the boundaries of Spillway Park as established in the agreement between the District and the City of Lake Worth. Generally described, Spillway Park includes the District's fee simple owned right-of-way on the south side of the District's C-51 Canal, beginning at the west side of the Federal Highway/Olive Avenue bridge and continuing to the east side of the Dixie Highway bridge. Mr. Quevedo has no real property interest in the C-51 Right-of-Way. Prior to purchasing his property, Mr. Quevedo was aware that the District owned the C-51 Right-of-Way. Historically, portions of Spillway Park and the C-51 Right-of-Way, in particular, have been a unique and popular location for excellent snook fishing by the public. These areas continue to be considered as such. On February 11, 1993, Mr. Quevedo was issued SFWMD Permit No. 9801 (Permit), a right-of-way occupancy permit, by the District’s Governing Board. The Permit authorized him to make use of the District’s lands and works as follows: 20’ X 50’ BOAT DOCK WITH WALKWAY, BURIED WATER AND ELECTRICAL SERVICE, POP-UP SPRINKLERS, AND SODDING WITHIN THE SOUTH RIGHT OF WAY OF C-51 LOCATED IMMEDIATELY WEST OF THE OLIVE AVENUE/FEDERAL HIGHWAY BRIDGE. During the permit application process, but prior to the issuance of the Permit, Mr. Quevedo had discussed with the District's staff the erection of a cross-fence based on allegations of improper or criminal activities by members of the public. Subsequently, in November 1995, Mr. Quevedo again discussed with the District's staff erection of a cross-fence based on the same allegations but he also included a new allegation of public safety as to the C-51 seawall. Based on the concern for public safety, the District's staff recommended that Mr. Quevedo be granted a modification to the Permit for a cross-fence. On November 14, 1996, the District's Governing Board approved, as part of its consent agenda, and issued SFWMD Permit MOD No. 9801 (MOD Permit)3 authorizing the following: CHAIN LINK CROSS FENCE WITH 16’ VEHICULAR GATE ALONG THE WEST PROPERTY LINE WITHIN THE SOUTH RIGHT OF WAY OF C-51 LOCATED AT 2615 NORTH FEDERAL HIGHWAY. The MOD Permit, as did the Permit, provides in pertinent part on its face the following: The permittee, by acceptance of this permit, hereby agrees that he shall promptly comply with all orders of the District and shall alter, repair or remove his use solely at his expense in a timely fashion. . . . This permit is issued by the District as a license to use or occupy District works or lands. . . By acceptance of this permit, the permittee expressly acknowledges that the permittee bears all risk of loss as a result of revocation of this permit. The MOD Permit, as did the Permit, contained standard limiting conditions, as provided in Rule 40E-6.381, Florida Administrative Code, and special conditions. The limiting conditions provide in pertinent part as follows: Permittee agrees to abide by all of the terms and conditions of this permit, including any representations made on the permit application and related documents. . . . This permit does not create any vested rights, and except for governmental entities and public or private utilities, is revocable at will upon reasonable prior written notice. Permittee bears all risk of loss as to monies expended in furtherance of the permitted use. Upon revocation, the permittee shall promptly modify, relocate or remove the permitted use. In the event of failure to so comply within the specified time, the District may remove the permitted use and permittee shall be responsible for all removal costs. This permit does not convey any property rights nor any rights or privileges other than those specified herein. . . . Having been granted the MOD Permit, Mr. Quevedo erected the cross-fence within and onto the C-51 Right-of-Way. The C-51 Right-of-Way is located adjacent to Mr. Quevedo’s property, as indicated earlier, and continues westerly to the permitted cross-fence. The C-51 Right-of-Way is enclosed by the cross-fence, preventing access by the public, and is located easterly of the cross-fence. As the C-51 Right-of-Way is located within the boundaries of the Spillway Park, the cross- fence is also located within the boundaries of the Spillway Park. During the time that Mr. Quevedo has owned his home, including prior to and after erection of the cross-fence, he, his family members and/or guests have frequently fished from the C-51 seawall and used the C-51 Right-of-Way enclosed by the cross- fence. Prior to and after the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo and his family members have selectively controlled access by the public to the C-51 Right-of-Way at the C-51 seawall. Prior to the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo chased members of the public off the C-51 Right-of-Way. Mr. Quevedo and members of his family also called law enforcement officers to remove members of the public who were located on the C-51 Right-of-Way, even if the members of the public were fishing from the C-51 seawall. After the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo and his family members continued to engage in this conduct of selective access. Subsequent to the erection of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo had a member of the public arrested for trespassing. The person allegedly jumped over or went around the cross-fence to fish from the C-51 seawall in the C-51 Right-of-Way. With the existence of the cross-fence, Mr. Quevedo has prevented the general public from using the C-51 Right-of-Way, including the C-51 seawall. As a result, he has acquired the exclusive, private use of the C-51 Right-of-Way at the C-51 seawall, which is publicly owned land, and has, almost doubled the size of his adjacent property without the obligations and expense of acquisition, assuming he could acquire the property through acquisition. The District's policy is that public land should be open to the public. Contrary to this policy, Mr. Quevedo's cross-fence precludes access to the District's right-of-way (C-51 Right-of-Way), including the seawall, for passive recreational use. Similar cross-fencing, although not within the boundaries of Spillway Park, have been erected behind residences on the northeast, northwest, and southeast sides of Federal Highway, along the District’s C-51 Canal bank. The cross-fencing prevents public use of the District’s C-51 Canal bank at these locations. The City of Lake Worth made improvements within the boundaries of Spillway Park; however, it made no improvements, and does not intend to make any improvements in the future, at the C-51 Right-of-Way where Mr. Quevedo’s cross-fence is located or at the other private lots west of Mr. Quevedo's property. All of the improvements made at Mr. Quevedo’s cross-fence at the C-51 Right-of-Way have been made by him even though the C-51 Right-of- Way is located within Spillway Park. The original public safety rationale for authorizing Mr. Quevedo to erect the cross-fence blocking public access was revisited by the District. Additional investigation by safety experts (Risk Management staff) revealed that no unreasonable danger existed by allowing public access to the C-51 seawall at the C-51 Right-of-Way. In the absence of the public safety basis for closure of the C-51 Right-of-Way, such closure was contrary to District policy. As a consequence, the District’s staff recommended to the District’s Governing Board that the MOD Permit, authorizing Mr. Quevedo’s cross-fence, be revoked. After conducting two public meetings and receiving comments from Mr. Quevedo, members of the public, and the District’s staff as to the policy issue of pubic access to the C- 51 Right-of-Way, the District’s Governing Board determined that the C-51 Right-of-Way should be open to the public. Consequently, the Governing Board decided to revoke Mr. Quevedo's MOD Permit. Allegations of criminal activity within the general boundaries of Spillway Park and, specifically, in the C-51 Right- of-Way at the cross-fence area, were made by Mr. Quevedo as a basis to not revoke the MOD Permit and allow the cross-fence to remain. Such allegations have no bearing on the revocation of the MOD Permit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order revoking SFWMD Permit No. MOD 981 issued to Jesus G. Quevedo. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 1999.
Findings Of Fact On or about August 11, 1987, an application for conditional use approval to allow on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages (2COP) was filed on behalf of Leland Farnsworth for property located at 2838 Gulf to Bay Boulevard in Clearwater, Florida. The property is zoned general commercial (CG) and single family residential (RS-8). A public hearing before the Planning and Zoning Board was held on September 1, 1987. The Planning and Zoning Board voted 4-1 to grant conditional use approval for this application. A timely appeal was taken by Petitioners on September 15, 1987. Petitioners are surrounding property owners whose property is located within five hundred feet of the subject property. With this application, Farnsworth seeks approval for on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages since he intends to convert the use of the property from a motel to a restaurant and bar. The parties stipulated that the property in question is within five hundred feet of several residences, including Petitioners'.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Roland Peterson, is the owner of Lots 4, 5 and 6, Block 7, Vilano Beach, in an unincorporated area of St. Johns County, Florida. Vilano Beach lies just eastward of the City of St. Augustine, Florida, and north of St. Augustine Inlet. The three lots are adjacent to each other. By applications dated June 7, 1985 petitioner sought the issuance of three coastal construction control line permits by respondent, Department of Natural Resources, Division of Beaches and Shores (Division), to authorize construction seaward of the coastal construction control line or setback line on Lots 4, 5 and 6. More specifically, petitioner sought approval to construct a beach-side snack bar with associated beach walkover, driveway and attached decks on Lot 4, and single family residences with associated dune walkover; driveway and attached decks on Lots 5 and 6. These applications were assigned Application Numbers SJ 220, SJ 221 and SJ 222 by the Division. They were deemed to be complete on August 6, 1985. After evaluating the three applications, the Division formulated recommendations to deny the requested permits. These recommendations were adopted by the Governor and Cabinet sitting as head of the agency at its November 5, 1985 meeting. Notice of such intended action was previously forwarded to petitioner on October 23, 1985. Said notice prompted the instant proceeding. As grounds for denying the permits the Division concluded that the three projects were located seaward of the seasonal high- water line and were therefore prohibited by a law, the projects lay in an area "highly vulnerable" to a major storm; and the cumulative impact of locating these and other structures further seaward could be expected to adversely impact the beach and dune system of the Vilano Beach area. The parties have stipulated that the Division has properly calculated the seasonal high water line in the questioned area, and that petitioner's three projects lie seaward of that line. The parties have also stipulated that the three projects lie seaward of the frontal dune within the meaning of Subsection 161.053t6)(a)1., Florida Statutes (1985).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that application numbers SJ 220, SJ 221 and SJ 222 filed by Roland Peterson to construct various structures on Lots 4, 5 and 6, Block 7, Vilano Beach in St. Johns County, Florida, be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of May, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 1986.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Frenchy's Rockaway Grill, Inc., is the owner and operator of a restaurant and alcoholic beverage establishment located at 7 Rockaway Street, Clearwater, Florida. Petitioner purchased the property in 1991. Michael Preston is president of Petitioner. Petitioner's establishment is immediately adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico and Clearwater beach on the west, to the north is a public parking lot, to the east is a motel, and to the south is the Clearwater Beach Hotel, which is owned and operated by Hunter Hotel Co., as indicated above. On the beach side of Petitioner's establishment there is an existing 972 sq. ft. wooden deck. The existing deck was initially constructed on or about 1987 by prior owners without receiving appropriate variance approvals. Subsequent alterations to the deck occurred between 1987 and 1991, also without appropriate variance approvals. In 1991 Charles and Ypapanti Alexiou/Anthony Alexiou, former owners of the subject property, filed an application for variance approval with the Board seeking three variances relating to the construction of the deck at the 7 Rockaway establishment. Specifically, the variances sought were: "1) 55.5 ft. to permit deck seaward of the coastal construction control line; 2) 15 ft. to permit a deck zero feet from a street right-of-way; and, 3) seven parking spaces to permit a 1,338 sq. ft. deck at 7 Rockaway Street, Miller's Replat, Lot 2 & vacated beach Drive on W and Lot 3, zoned CR 28 (resort commercial) & OS/R (open space recreation)." At public meeting on August 8, 1991, the application was considered by the Board. At that time Mr. Cline, as counsel for Hunter appeared in opposition to the application stating that approval of the variance requests would adversely impact the Clearwater Beach Hotel, that the request was for economic gain, that any hardship was self-imposed, and that development and traffic in the area was already heavy. The Board, however, granted the variance requests as to variances number 1 and number 2., and as to the third request, the Board denied the proposed 1,338 sq. ft. deck, but approved a variance of five parking spaces to permit the existing deck of 972 sq. ft. On or about July 13, 1993, a variance application was filed with the Board by Howard G. and Jean B. Hamilton and Palm Pavilion of Clearwater, Inc., seeking approval of four variances required for an 800 sq. ft. expansion of an existing deck at a restaurant at 10 Bay Esplanade, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The Palm Pavilion applicants were also represented by Mr. Cline. Like Petitioner's establishment, Palm Pavilion is a beachfront restaurant, which is located directly across the public parking lot to the north of Petitioner's establishment. Unlike Petitioner's establishment, Palm Pavilion is bordered by parking to the south and the east, and is not immediately adjacent to other buildings. On August 26, 1993, the Board granted the Palm Pavilion variance application for expansion of an existing beachfront deck with certain conditions. On October 6, 1994, Petitioner submitted its application to the Board requesting five variances required for a 650 sq. ft. expansion of the existing wooden deck at 7 Rockaway Street. Specifically, the variances sought were: 1) 13.22 ft. to permit a lot depth of 86.78 ft. where 100 ft. is required; 2) 8.2 ft. to permit it a rear setback of 6.8 ft. where 15 ft. is required; 3) 14 percent to permit 11 percent of open space where 25 percent is required; 4) three parking spaces to permit zero parking spaces where three additional are required; and, 5) 52.14 ft. to permit a structure seaward of the coastal construction control line. The subject property at 7 Rockaway Street is properly zoned CR-28 (resort commercial). Any scrivener's error indicating that the property is zoned OSC (open space recreation) has been corrected. Petitioner's restaurant, Frenchy's Rockaway Grill, is a popular beachside establishment. It is one of very few freestanding restaurants fronting the Gulf of Mexico on Clearwater Beach. Some patrons particularly enjoy dining on the open air deck adjacent to the beach. During peak hours, there is often over an hour's waiting time for tables on the deck. Petitioner is currently unable to accommodate the demand for seating on the beachside deck. Petitioner would sustain an economic benefit if more patrons could be accommodated on an expanded deck. Because of the size constraints of the lot and the establishment's location directly on the beach, development and improvement of the facility is highly restricted. The back of some residential rooms of the Clearwater Beach Hotel are immediately adjacent to the south of Petitioner's establishment. There are small bathroom windows from these residential rooms that face Petitioner's establishment. Petitioner's proposed expansion of the open air deck would place the proposed deck in very close proximity to the back of these residential hotel rooms. The City's staff reviewed the Petitioner's application and recommended approval with the following conditions: 1) the applicant shall obtain the requisite occupational license within 12 months; 2) the applicant shall obtain the necessary building permit within 6 months; 3) there shall be no outdoor entertainment and no outdoor speakers; 4) the applicant shall obtain the requisite alcoholic beverage separation distance variance from the City Commission. Petitioner agreed to the conditions recommended by staff. The recommendations of staff are not binding on the Board. In addition to the application for the five variances filed with the Board, Petitioner also filed a conditional use request with the Planning and Zoning Board. The conditional use request was approved on September 13, 1994, and imposed certain other conditions including the construction of a six foot wall on the south side of the proposed deck to buffer the adjoining hotel. Petitioner agreed to the conditions imposed by the Planning and Zoning Board.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether a development order (Resolution No. 233- 1991) issued by Monroe County on June 26, 1991, to Key Largo Associates, Ltd., is inconsistent with Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Regulations, and/or whether it violates a Joint Stipulation of Settlement previously executed by the Department of Community Affairs ("DCA"), Monroe County (the "County"), and Key Largo Associates, Ltd.'s predecessor in title.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: DCA is the State Land Planning Agency charged with the responsibility to administer the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Monroe County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida and is responsible for issuing development orders for development in unincorporated Monroe County. The County issued the Development Order which is the subject of this proceeding. Most of Monroe County, including the subject property, is within the Florida Keys Area of Critical Concern as designated in Sections 380.05 and 380.0552, Florida Statutes. Development orders issued by a local government agency for an area of critical state concern are subject to review by DCA pursuant to Section 380.07, Florida Statutes. On April 8, 1985, DCA, Monroe County, and I. D. Properties, the previous owner of the subject property, executed a Joint Stipulation of Settlement regarding DCA's challenge to a prior development order for the subject property. That Joint Stipulation of Settlement required the preservation of certain tropical hammock on the site including Paradise Tree hammock. After executing the Joint Stipulation of Settlement, I. D. Properties quitclaimed its interest in the site to Key Largo Associates, Ltd. Key Largo Associates, Ltd. proceeded to seek approval from Monroe County to develop the property inconsistent with the terms of the Joint Stipulation of Settlement. Those efforts resulted in the Development Order which is the subject of this case. The County Commission issued the Development Order granting a major conditional use permit for the Project to Key Largo Associates, Ltd., after being ordered to do so by the Circuit Court for Monroe County. The Development Order purports to authorize the complete elimination of existing tropical hammock on the site including the Paradise Tree hammock. The Development Order is inconsistent with the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan and the Land Development Regulations adopted thereunder. In addition, the Development Order is contrary to the terms of the Joint Stipulation of Settlement.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order which sustains the appeal filed by the Department of Community Affairs and which rescinds the issuance of Monroe County Resolution No. 233- 1991. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of August 1993. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Terrell K. Arline Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Betty J. Steffens, Esquire McFarlain, Wiley, Cassedy & Jones Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32316-2174 Blackwater Associates Partnership 7225 S.W. 108th Terrace Miami, Florida 33156 Ray Parker Parker Real Estate 2028 North Dixie Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33305 Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 G. Steven Pfeiffer General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 David K. Coburn, Secretary FLWAC Exec. Office of the Governor 311 Carlton Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Appellant was wrongfully denied a variance of 21.33 feet to construct a second floor deck at 673 Bay Esplanade, Five Palms Motel Condo, Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact John Shaw, a resident of Massachusetts, purchased the condominium for which the variance is here requested in December, 1988 without first visiting the property or inquiring about zoning restrictions. The unit purchased is on the second floor of a two story building earlier converted from a hotel or motel into condominiums. The seller told Shaw he could construct a deck over the existing deck on the ground floor condominium below the unit purchased by Shaw. While the construction of this deck was in progress it was discovered no permit had been pulled for the project and the work was stopped. The subsequent application for a permit was denied because the proposed deck encroached some 21.33 feet into the setback area. The application for a variance was denied by the Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board and this appeal followed. The two buildings comprising this complex were erected many years ago and are non-conforming, i.e., the buildings themselves violate the current Development Code. An existing deck extending into the setback area was constructed on the unit directly below the condominium purchased by Shaw and a similar deck extending to the seawall was constructed on an adjacent building. No permits are on file for those decks. Construction of the proposed deck would improve the livability of the condominium greatly by expanding the area usable for looking seaward. The condominium has been used without this deck for many years. This property is zoned CR-24 and the setback requirement is 25 feet from the water's edge.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioner Cargor Partners VIII – Long Bar Pointe, LLLP (“Cargor”) is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2017).
Findings Of Fact Notice On February 17, 2017, the attorney for Cargor sent Joseph McClash a letter on law firm stationary. In the first paragraph of the letter it states, “Please allow this letter to serve as notice of Cargor’s intent to seek relief pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (the “Statute”) against you, individually as qualified representative, and the named Petitioner.” Cargor sent an email to McClash on February 28, 2017, reminding McClash that “the 57.105 deadline is March 10, 2017.” McClash referred to a motion for attorney’s fees that he received on or about March 13, 2017, but the motion was not shown to the Administrative Law Judge nor introduced into evidence. On April 5, 2017, the same day that McClash voluntarily dismissed the petition for hearing in DOAH Case No. 17-0655, Cargor filed with DOAH its motion for attorney’s fees under section 57.105. Contested Claims The renewal of a FDOW is governed by section 373.421(2), Florida Statutes, which states in relevant part that the FDOW shall be renewed “as long as physical conditions on the property have not changed, other than changes which have been authorized by a permit pursuant to this part, so as to alter the boundaries of surface waters or wetlands.” If the boundaries of wetlands or other surface waters have been altered without a permit, the FDOW cannot be renewed and an application for a new FDOW is required. The SWFWMD reviewer explained in a letter requesting additional information from Cargor: Please be advised that letters of exemption do not qualify as permits issued under Part IV of chapter 373, F.S. and therefore if work has been done on the site that has altered the wetlands or other surface water boundaries in association with a letter of exemption, a new formal determination application will be required. McClash claims Cargor did not qualify for the renewal of its FDOW because Cargor altered the boundaries of surface waters or wetlands on its property after the 2011 FDOW was issued and the some of the alterations were made pursuant to letter of exemption. In its February 17, 2017, letter to McClash, Cargor set forth six grounds for Cargor’s contention that McClash’s petition for hearing should be withdrawn. The first three grounds were described in Cargor’s letter as follows: The Formal Determination of Wetlands and Other Surface Waters, dated December 28, 2016, which is the subject of this Proceeding, does not authorize any construction activity. Consequently, no standing to challenge is or could be properly presented. There is no injury in fact and no one is in immediate danger of a direct injury from the issuance of the Formal Determination of Wetlands and Other Surface Waters, dated December 28, 2016, as of the date and time of filing the Petition in this Proceeding. Consequently, no standing to challenge is or could be properly presented. The Formal Determination of Wetlands and Other Surface Waters, dated December 28, 2016, is not a permit, license, or authorization. Consequently, no standing to challenge is or could be properly presented by an association. These were issues of law and they were decided against Cargor in an Order dated February 28, 2017. The fourth and fifth grounds described in Cargor’s letter involve the central issue in the case: Changes in the land have been previously authorized by the Southwest Florida Water Management District (“SWFWMD”) pursuant to existing and final permits including (i) SWFWMD ERP No. 43040157.001, dated August 6, 2014, (ii) SWFWMD CONCEPTUAL ERP No. 49040157.002, dated September 4, 2015, (iii) SWFWMD ERP No. 4304157.003, dated March 31, 2016, and (iv) SWFWMD Notice of Qualification for Permanent Farming Exemption, dated August 30, 2016. Changes in the land are authorized by the identified permits and authorizations. All changes in the land have occurred pursuant to the identified permits and authorizations. Allegations to the contrary are simply false and are not supported by material facts. In 2015, Cargor was issued a “Conceptual ERP” permit, which describes, among other things, planned modifications to some agricultural ditches. However, the conceptual permit does not allow the commencement of construction activities. On August 30, 2016, SWFWMD issued to Cargo a Permanent Farming Exemption, pursuant to section 373.406(13), which authorized Cargor to excavate three agricultural ponds in uplands. In its application for the exemption, Cargor also proposed to modify some agricultural ditches. On March 31, 2017, SWFWMD issued Cargor an ERP Individual Construction Major Modification, which, among other things, authorized work in ditches. This permit was issued just before McClash’s voluntary dismissal and, therefore, could not have authorized the changes on Cargor’s property that McClash described in the petition for hearing. Before filing his petition, McClash consulted with a wetland scientist, Clark Hull, about the merits of McClash’s proposed challenge to the FDOW renewal. Hull gave McClash an affirmative response, but his input was speculative because it was based on assumptions and representations that Hull had not investigated. McClash consulted with another wetland scientist, Pamela Fetterman, who conducted an “aerial, desktop review of publically available Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data.” Fetterman described her initial review as an evaluation of potential undelineated wetlands and other surface waters. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the delineation approved by the 2011 FDOW became final and could not be challenged by McClash. McClash then asked Fetterman to review changes in physical conditions on the property that occurred after the FDOW was issued. Fetterman produced a report (McClash Exhibit R-6), in which she opined that the changes to physical conditions on Cargor’s property “have a high likelihood of affecting the previously delineated landward extent of wetlands and other surface waters.” She stated further: [C]hanges in physical conditions of the property took place prior to issuance of the [FDOW renewal] as purported “exempt agricultural activities”, and include ditch dredging alterations to delineated other surface waters. . . . A Permanent Farming Request for Exemption Confirmation letter was applied for on August 23, 2016 for construction of these ponds and modification of existing ditches, some of which were determined to be jurisdictional other surface waters by the subsequently re-issued [FDOW]. At the final hearing on fees, neither McClash nor Cargor made clear to the Administrative Law Judge: (1) the physical changes to the property that were alleged to be authorized by permit, (2) the physical changes that were alleged to be authorized by exemption, or (3) any physical changes that were alleged to be unauthorized. The sixth ground described in Cargor’s letter is as follows: The picture attached to the Petition as set forth in Paragraph 9, and the stop work allegation set forth in Paragraph 10 are irrelevant and have no factual relationship to any issue in the proceeding. Since any changes in the land have occurred pursuant to identified permits and authorizations, the allegations are simply false and/or intentionally misleading. It is not a basis for an award of attorney’s fees under section 57.105 that an irrelevant photograph was included in a petition for hearing. Moreover, the aerial photograph in McClash’s petition was relevant in this case because it showed the physical conditions of Cargor’s property. In the petition, McClash states that Manatee County issued a stop work order on November 16, 2016, for construction activities commenced on Cargor’s property without a County- approved erosion control plan. This allegation also pertained to physical changes to the property. All evidence about physical changes was relevant in determining whether Cargor was entitled to renewal of the FDOW. Fees Cargor claims fees based on 48.4 hours of attorney time (Edward Vogler) at an hourly rate of $410, and 3.6 hours of attorney time (Kimberly Ashton) at an hourly rate of $385, for a total of $21,230.00. The fees Cargor is seeking include the hours spent on legal issues raised by Cargor that were rejected by the Administrative Law Judge. These fees amount to at least $1,025. See Cargor Exhibit 1, Invoice entries for February 20, 2017. Cargor’s attorney testified that the fees are reasonable. Cargor did not call an expert witness to corroborate the reasonableness of the hourly rate and the reasonableness of the hours expended.
