The Issue Whether Relocation Assistance Appeal of Petitioner should be granted. Petitioner was not represented by legal counsel or other representative at the hearing. After an explanation of her rights in administrative hearings conducted under the provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, Petitioner stated that she wished to proceed in her own behalf.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner moved into an apartment located at 1013 West Broward Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida on June 9, 1977. (Testimony of Petitioner, supplemented by Exhibit 2) On August 3, 1977, Petitioner acknowledged receipt of a letter from Respondent which notified her that Respondent was in the process of acquiring right-of-way for a state road project located where she lived and that negotiations for the purchase of the property had begun on June 23, 1977. The letter enclosed an informational brochure entitled "YOUR RELOCATION" and expressed the desire of Respondent to assist in Petitioner's relocation necessitated by the property acquisition. (Exhibit 1) In late November or early December, 1977, Petitioner vacated her apartment upon the request of the landlord for non-payment of the rent. (Testimony of Petitioner, supplemented by Exhibit 2) Respondent purchased the property where Petitioner had resided from the West Broward Land Corporation on February 8, 1978. The purchase was accomplished pursuant to the Federal Highway Aid Program (PL 91-646) and involved the widening of Broward Boulevard (SR 842). Guidelines under the federally funded program are implemented by the Federal Aid Highway Program Manual and by Chapter 14-14.05, F.A.C., which incorporates by reference Respondent's Right-of-way Bureau Operating Procedures. These procedures include eligibility criteria for receipt of monetary payments by individuals who have been displaced from real property as a result of its acquisition by the state. (Testimony of Moon, Exhibit 3) On February 15, 1978, Petitioner was present at the residence of another tenant of the apartment building at the time Respondent's right-of-way agent was explaining relocation benefits to that individual. Petitioner asked the agent if she could return to her former apartment and resume occupancy, but he explained that he had no authority to grant such permission. Thereafter, Petitioner moved back into the apartment. She testified at the hearing that one of Respondent's employees named Bill Barnette had told her she could occupy the premises. This alleged authorization however, took place at the time Petitioner was given a check for $320 for moving expenses by Barnette sometime in March, 1978. (Testimony of Way, Petitioner, Crawford, Johnson, supplemented by Exhibits 2, 5) Thereafter, Petitioner made application with Respondent for rent supplement payments, but by letter of October 2, 1978, Respondent denied any such payment on the ground that Petitioner was not living on Broward Boulevard when the state obtained legal possession of the property. (Testimony of Moon, Case File)
Recommendation That Petitioner's appeal be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Sallie Mae Ray 429 1/2 North West 7th Terrace Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33311 Also mailed to Ms. Ray at: Apartment 14 North West 10th Avenue and 7th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida
Findings Of Fact On February 29, 1984, DOT received bids on a highway construction project designated as follows: Federal Aid Project No. F-300-2(3)(JOB No. 11070-3504), Lake County, Florida ("the project"). Six bids were submitted. Intervenor was the apparent low bidder, having submitted a bid in the amount of $5,479,403.76. Petitioner was the apparent second low bidder at $5,491,602.16. Following a review of the bid submitted by Intervenor, DOT determined Intervenor to be the lowest responsible bidder and announced its intention to award the project to Intervenor by posting the bid tabulations on April 9, 1984. Thereafter, Petitioner filed its notice of protest with DOT within the time provided in Section 120.53, Florida Statutes. The project at issue in this proceeding is a federal aid project. In order for DOT to receive federal aid funding from the United States Department of Transportation for the project, the Federal Highway Administration must concur in DOT's decision to award the contract to a particular contractor. At the time of the bid letting, Petitioner held a Certificate of Qualification with DOT. Thereafter, however, on April 20, 1984, Petitioner was convicted by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division, of conspiring to submit collusive, non- competitive and rigged bids in violation of Title 15, United States Code, Section 1. Thereafter, on June 1, 1984, DOT sent Petitioner a notice by certified mail that it intended to revoke Petitioner's Certificate of Qualification pursuant to Section 337.165, Florida Statutes. The notice advised Petitioner that it could request a hearing within ten days of receipt of notification, but Petitioner chose not to request such a hearing. Thereafter, by final agency action of June 18, 1984, DOT revoked Petitioner's Certificate of Qualification to participate as a contractor on DOT projects for a period of 36 months commencing June 18, 1984. On June 18, 1984, the Federal Highway Administration declared Petitioner unacceptable for employment on any future highway projects requiring Federal Highway Administration approval or concurrence for a period of six months commencing June 1, 1984, and ending December 17, 1984. This action was based upon Petitioner's aforementioned conviction.
Findings Of Fact The Legislature created Respondent in 1963 by enacting Chapter 63-573, Laws of Florida, codified as Chapter 348, Part V, Florida Statutes. Section 348.754(1)(a) authorizes Respondent to construct, maintain, and operate the Orlando-Orange County Expressway System. Petitioner constructs highways. In 1991, Respondent awarded Petitioner with two highway construction contracts. The two construction contracts incorporate by reference the 1991 edition of the Florida Department of Transportation Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction ("Gray Book"). Commonly used in Florida highway construction, especially on state projects, the Gray Book is a code of standards for road and bridge construction projects. In 1993 and 1994, Petitioner requested $5 million from Respondent in extra compensation for the two construction contracts. In reviewing the requests, Respondent asked Petitioner for various documents, claiming that Article 3-8 of the Gray Book entitled Petitioner to receive these documents for audit. Article 3-8 of the Gray Book states: Upon execution of the Contract, [Respondent] reserves the right to conduct any necessary audit of the Contractor's records pertaining to the project. Such an audit, or audits, may be conducted by [Respondent] or its representatives at any time prior to final payment, or thereafter pursuant to 5/13. [Respondent] may also require submittal of the records from either the Prime Contractor, the Subcontractor or both. For the purpose of this Article, records shall include all books of account, supporting documents and papers deemed necessary by [Respondent] to assure compliance with the contract provisions. Failure of the Contractor or Subcontractor to comply with these requirements may result in disqualification or suspension from bidding for future contracts or disapproval as a Subcontractor at the option of [Respondent]. The Contractor shall assure that his Subcon- tractor will provide access to his records pertaining to the project upon request by [Respondent]. Petitioner declined to give Respondent audit access to all the requested records, taking the position that the records were not necessary and that Article 3-8 did not give Respondent the access to records claimed by Respondent. By letter dated July 11, 1995, Respondent notified Petitioner that it intended to consider whether to suspend or disqualify Petitioner from participating in future public bidding on Respondent's construction contracts. The letter advised that Respondent would hold a public hearing to consider the facts and circumstances of [Petitioner's] failure to provide contract documents requested by [Respondent]. At the hearing the Board will decide whether to suspend or disqualify [Petitioner] for its failure to comply with the Contract." The July 11 letter informed Respondent that it had the right to be represented by counsel, to present oral and written evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence. The letter prohibited ex parte communications with members of Respondent's board because they would be acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. The Orlando-Orange County Expressway System consists of about 81 miles of multi-lane limited access highway in Orange County. Respondent's offices are in Orange County, which is where its employees work. Respondent establishes its own annual budget and sets tolls without review by the Legislature or Department of Transportation. Respondent compensates its employees without regard to State of Florida personnel policies or guidelines. Respondent's employees do not receive State of Florida health insurance benefits. They receive health insurance through the Orange County group health policy that covers all otherwise- covered Orange County employees. Transportation issues involve frequent contact between Respondent's employees and employees of the Public Works Department of Orange County and the City of Orlando. Contact between Respondent and the governments in and of surrounding counties is largely limited to participation in the Greater Orlando Metropolitan Planning Organization. In general, Respondent engages in transportation planning for, and studies the transportation needs of, Orange County, but not other counties. In 1994 the Legislature enacted Chapter 94-237, Laws of Florida. Section 11 of Chapter 94-237 created 348.7545, Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.), which authorized Respondent to construct, finance, operate and maintain that portion of the Western Beltway known as the Western Beltway Part C, extending from Florida's Turnpike near Ocoee in Orange County southerly through Orange and Osceola Counties to an interchange with I-4 near the Osceola-Polk County line . . .. Chapter 94-237, Laws of Florida, did not expressly authorize Respondent to exercise powers of eminent domain in Osceola County. In 1995 the Legislature enacted Chapter 95-257, Laws of Florida. Section 61 of Chapter 95- 257 amended 348.7545 to allow expressly Respondent to use its eminent domain power in connection with the Western Beltway Part C. Not considering itself an agency subject to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, Respondent has not complied with any requirements of Chapter 120 except for the adoption of rules governing bid protests, as provided by 120.53(5). Respondent has not adopted as rules pre-qualification procedures and requirements, disqualification and suspension procedures and provisions, or procedures for formal hearings. Respondent has adopted various rules and policies, but not in accordance with Chapter 120. As far as it is aware, Respondent has not previously considered whether to suspend or disqualify a contractor, and therefore Respondent issued the July 11 letter on an ad hoc basis.
Findings Of Fact Leamington (Petitioner herein), is a road maintenance and construction contractor doing business since approximately 1985. John Hummell is Petitioner's President and is responsible for all bids submitted for contract awards. Petitioner contracts primarily with the Florida Department of Transportation (Respondent herein). Since 1985, Petitioner has entered into approximately forty-one (41) contracts with Respondent. Petitioner was one of seven bidders on State Job #17030-3536, Contract E-1706, let by Respondent in District I. Respondent notified Petitioner of its decision to award the bid to the second lowest bidder, Simco, by notice posted on April 19, 1993 stating that Leamington's bid was rejected because it was considered not to be responsible and was not in the best interest of the Department (to contract with Leamington). The work in question involves the repairs of the bridge located at SR- 789 at Little Ringling Causeway west of Sarasota in Sarasota County. The work entails removal and replacement of silicone sealant on the bridge deck and replacement and rejacketing of piling with grout epoxy. The bid tabulations revealed that Petitioner's bid was approximately $500.00 less than that of the second lowest bidder, Simco, Inc., of Sarasota. The Department has a procedure called the "district contracts procedure". Part of the procedure calls for the awards committee to review bids and determine who the bid should be awarded to. The awards committee, which was chaired by Glenn Ivey, the District Director of Operations, reviewed the bid submitted for project E-1706. The awards committee voted unanimously to reject Leamington's bid on Contract E-1706. The decision to reject Petitioner's bid, by the awards committee, was based on Petitioner's performance on its more recent Department contracts. Specifically, the awards committee considered projects E-1649, for sidewalk repair in several counties; contract E-1545, a concrete repair job in Lakeland; and contract E-1652, a roadway shoulder repair job. Leamington's contract on the concrete repair job (E-1545) was rated as being poor when Leamington was, in effect, asked to leave the job. Based on Leamington's poor workmanship and difficulties encountered on that contract, Respondent terminated work on the contract after approximately sixty percent (60 percent) of the work was completed. The remainder of that project was completed by another contractor. Specifically, Job No. E-1545 called for Petitioner to remove and replace portland concrete slabs on Memorial Boulevard in Lakeland. Petitioner failed to restore the concrete slabs to a smooth surface, making it necessary for Respondent to have the slabs ground such that motorists had a smooth driving surface. After several warnings, Respondent cancelled the project and, as noted, approximately forty percent (40 percent) of the work was completed by another contractor. Another project reviewed by the awards committee was Contract E-1652, a roadway shoulder repair contract. On that project, Petitioner was advised that the shoulder had to be graded at a certain angle and was shown, by several of Respondent's engineers, the proper manner in which to accomplish the task. Petitioner failed to grade the shoulder at the correct angle as requested. Petitioner also routinely failed to provide proper traffic control during the performance of Contract E-1652 and frequently disputed Respondent's employees advice as to work instructions and ways to eradicate the poor workmanship on that project. Additionally, Petitioner failed to use skilled workers and did not have ample equipment on the job to perform the work on Contract E-1652. Initially, Petitioner had limited equipment at the beginning of the work on Contract E-1652. After Petitioner received a letter from Respondent advising that there wasn't adequate equipment to complete the project, Petitioner obtained additional equipment. The Department terminated Petitioner's work under Contract E-1652 because Petitioner had approached the contract deadline for completion and due to of the numerous problems the Department experienced with Petitioner in getting the work completed acceptably. Bobby Cranford, the Assistant Maintenance Engineer for the Petitioner's Sarasota Maintenance Unit, recommended that Petitioner not be awarded any more roadway shoulder repair contracts based on the difficulties experienced by Petitioner's "poor" workmanship on contract E-1652. Another project reviewed by the awards committee was Petitioner's work performance on Contract E-1649, a sidewalk repair job which encompassed several counties. Petitioner did not have the required personnel and expertise to perform the sidewalk job correctly. Petitioner was kept informed of deficiencies and necessary corrections to correctly perform the sidewalk repair job, however, the proper repairs have not been made. The Respondent introduced a composite of twenty-three (23) photos showing the extent of the problems Petitioner needed to correct the sidewalk repairs with notes as to the corrective action that was needed. Specifically, Petitioner used little expansion joint materials and no edging tools were utilized on the project. Similar problems were found throughout the four county area in which Petitioner was engaged on the sidewalk project. By letter dated May 13, 1993, Respondent advised Petitioner of the numerous problems on contract E-1649. Specifically, Petitioner's President was told of visual inspections which showed substandard work on the original work as well as the work wherein Petitioner attempted to correct deficiencies which were discovered by Respondent. For example, Petitioner was advised that at 506 First and Main Streets in Wachula, there were sections of concrete sidewalk removed and scheduled for replacement with adjacent sections now damaged. Petitioner was further advised that workers had driven trucks on the sidewalk damaging several slabs not marked for replacement. Finally, Petitioner was asked to correct broken sprinklers at the work site and to resolve a claim filed by a Mrs. Campbell, which was registered with Respondent. The awards committee also relied upon an independent inspection report prepared by Bobby Cranford. That report is a forty (40) page report citing numerous deficiencies on the sidewalk repair project. Respondent requires that contractors employ english speaking superintendents at each work site to assist in communicating with its inspectors. Petitioner utilized superintendents who did not speak english and thereby created a language barrier making communication difficult with Respondent's personnel. Respondent had to monitor Petitioner's projects extensively and at a cost which increased the Department's overhead disproportionately when compared to other projects let to other district contractors. Based on a review of Respondent's work on Petitioner's recent contracts, no other contractors performing contracts in District I had a performance record as poor as Petitioner. When the awards committee made its decision to reject Petitioner's bid on the subject contract, it also relied on a memorandum from , Wally Clark, a District I attorney. In the memorandum it was concluded that Petitioner had subcontracted work to Hummell, Inc., a separate entity and that the required prior written approval of the subcontracting had not been obtained from Respondent. The investigation also revealed that the subcontractor, Hummell, Inc., had not been paid for its services (by Petitioner). An internal audit also prepared by Wall revealed that Hummell, Inc. was an unpaid subcontractor of Petitioner. The awards committee also considered allegations from Phillip Spears, a subcontractor of Petitioner, who had not been paid for work performed on Respondent's contracts. The committee also considers a newspaper article which stated that Petitioner was under investigation by local law enforcement officials for failure to pay subcontractors on the Interstate 75 project. Dennis Hall is the District Investigator for District I. Hall accompanied Wall, the author of the internal audit report, on investigations and interviews in compiling the audit report. One of the persons interviewed by Wall and Hall was Larry Zavitz. Zavitz was an inspector employed by Petitioner in excess of twenty- eight (28) years and had performed the inspection on Petitioner's sidewalk repair project under Contract E-1649. During the interview of Zavitz, he admitted to receiving a loan of $1,000.00 from John Hummell which Zavitz had not fully repaid at the time of the interview. Upon Zavitz admission of accepting the loan, he was asked and later resigned from the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner's protest of the rejection of its bid on Contract E-1706 be rejected and the Department enter its award of the subject contract to the second lowest responsible bidder, Simco, Inc. of Sarasota. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 8th day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire General Counsel Haydon Burns Building 562 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 William H. Roberts, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Michael E. Riley, Esquire 106 East College Avenue Post Office Box 10507 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether a sign owned by Respondent and located on the northbound side of 27, at 853 U.S. 27 South, Lake Placid, Florida, is located in the road right-of-way, and must be removed.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) is the state agency charged with the duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, which regulates outdoor advertising structures along the state highway system. U.S. 27 in Highlands County, Florida, is a part of the state highway system, and title to the right-of-way for said highway is held in the name of the State. Respondent is the owner, and maintains a two sided sign structure (sign) located at 853 U.S. Highway 27 South, Lake Placid, Florida, in Highlands County, which has been erected in the DOT right of way of U.S. Highway 27, inventory section 44, approximately 300 feet South on the North bound side of the highway. The sign is approximately 8 foot by 8 foot made of wood with wooden poles, and contains the advertising copy: "Mrs. CLAIR Psychic...Tarot...Palms...(Se habla espanol)", followed by a telephone number. On March 22, 1991, Respondent was served with a Notice of Violation from the DOT concerning said sign, and was advised that said sign was erected in violation of Florida law, and must be removed within ten working days of the notice. Said sign is presently standing in the DOT right-of-way, as of the date of the formal hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's request for an exemption from the provisions of Section 479.11(8), Florida Statutes, be DENIED and that Respondent be ordered to remove said sign from the DOT right of way, in accordance with the provisions of Section 479.107, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 1991. Copies furnished: Jay O. Barber, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Laura Uwanawich Mrs. Clair 853 U.S. 27 South Lake Placid, FL 33852 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. #58 Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact 1. On or about January 18, 1988, a DOT sign inspector observed Respondent's signs 600 and 625 feet south of Candlewood Drive in Pasco County on what appeared to be the easterly right-of-way of U.S. 19. The right-of-way of U.S. 19 at this location extends 59 feet from the easterly edge of the pavement of U.S. 19. Respondent's signs were 49 feet from the edge of the paved surface of U.S. 19. U.S. 19 is a Federal Aid Primary Highway. Respondent located his signs east of the berm along U.S. 19 which he believed to be off of the DOT right-of-way.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Department of Transportation ("Respondent"), has demonstrated that Petitioner, Frank C. Kunnen, Jr., d/b/a U.S. 19 Commerce Center's ("Petitioner"), right-out driveway to U.S. Highway 19 will present a safety and operational problem following Respondent's reconstruction of Highway 19. Whether Petitioner's access to the state highway system will be reasonable if Petitioner's existing right-out driveway is closed. Whether Respondent is legally entitled to administratively close Petitioner's driveway, pursuant to Rule 14-96.011, Florida Administrative Code, and applicable Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of real property located within the city limits of Clearwater, in Pinellas County, Florida, which property abuts U.S. Highway 19 (State Road 55). It has a right-in and right-out driveway connection to U.S. Highway 19. Petitioner's current right-in, right-out driveway does not create a safety or operational problem with the existing configuration of U.S. Highway 19. Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida created pursuant to Chapter 20, Florida Statutes. Respondent regulates access to the state highway system. Respondent initially cited Rule 14-96.011, Florida Administrative Code, in the Notice as authority for the intended agency action. This Rule pertains to closure or modification of permitted driveways. At hearing on March 20, it was discovered that Respondent had intended to cite Rule 14-96.012, Florida Administrative Code, which pertains to closure or modification of unpermitted driveways that had been in existence since before July 1, 1988, the effective date of the State Highway System Access Management Act. The Rule refers to these driveways as "grandfathered." As of March 20, Respondent was not aware that Petitioner's driveway might have been permitted. In order to provide Petitioner all due process to which he was entitled, Respondent requested that the hearing be continued. After reviewing its files, Respondent indicated to Petitioner on June 28, 2001, that Respondent would be requesting an additional continuance to conduct an engineering study pursuant to Rule 14- 96.011, Florida Administrative Code.¹ Petitioner agreed to both continuances. The study was dated August 20, 2001, and was delivered to Petitioner's counsel just after that date. This study was presented as Respondent's Exhibit 5 at the resumption of the hearing on September 20, 2001. The Study sets out the essential safety and operational bases for Respondent's agency action in this case and was signed and sealed by a professional engineer registered in the State of Florida. Prior to the reconvened hearing, Petitioner did not seek to depose the author of the engineering study nor did he request documents utilized in creating the study. Petitioner decided to wait until the hearing and make a series of objections to the study's admissibility. Prior to and after the study was admitted into evidence, Petitioner's counsel conducted extensive cross-examination of the engineer who signed and sealed the study, Vibert Griffith, P.E., and his assistant in the creation of the study, Julian Parsons. Petitioner did not present any evidence of prejudice resulting from the timing of the creation of the study. Any prejudice which may be presumed was cured by Respondent's requesting a continuance specifically to search its records for evidence of a permit; Respondent's requesting another continuance to create that study; Petitioner's agreeing to both continuances; and Respondent's producing the study approximately one month prior to hearing. This gave Petitioner time to conduct discovery regarding the study, not to mention sufficient time to prepare for the hearing itself. The Notice did not state whether mediation was available in this case. However, the lack of mention of mediation in the Notice was of no prejudice to Petitioner in light of the fact that that Petitioner proposed several alternative driveway designs to Respondent, and that these alternatives had been closely studied and considered. Petitioner did not present any evidence that he had asked whether mediation was available or was denied an opportunity to mediate this case. Accordingly, any error in the lack of information regarding mediation in the Notice was harmless, and any prejudice was cured. Petitioner elicited testimony with respect to a third procedural point in this case. Rule 14-96.011(1)(e), Florida Administrative Code, states that if Respondent seeks to close a driveway, Respondent will offer to meet with the property owner or his representative on-site. As Petitioner's counsel stated during his opening remarks, however, there is a long history of litigation between Petitioner and Respondent, including two pervious mediations. Again, the unrebutted testimony at hearing was that over the last several years Respondent evaluated three alternative designs submitted by Petitioner for access to U.S. Highway 19. Petitioner did not present any evidence of prejudice in not being able to meet on-site with Respondent in this case. Any error in relation to this issue was harmless. U.S. Highway 19 runs north-south through Pinellas County, Florida and is a part of the Florida Intrastate Highway System. In the vicinity of Petitioner's property, U.S. Highway 19 has three lanes of traffic each for northbound and southbound traffic (total of six lanes). As part of the reconstruction of U.S. Highway 19, Respondent has plans to create "grade separated intersections" or "urban interchanges" at the cross street to the south and north of Petitioner's property. The cross street to the south is Drew Street, and the cross street to the north is Coachman Road. Also, just to the north of Petitioner's property, U.S. Highway 19 is elevated over railroad tracks, and will continue to be so elevated after reconstruction. In its reconstructed state, vehicles will reach mainline U.S. Highway 19 by a series of frontage roads and on and off ramps. Vehicles that stay on mainline U.S. Highway 19 will not have to stop for signals at intersections with cross streets because the mainline will travel over the cross streets. The effect of U.S. Highway reconstruction will be to create a more efficient transportation facility by improving safety and capacity. The overall improvements to U.S. Highway 19 are necessary. Although Respondent is closing Petitioner's right-out driveway to mainline U.S. Highway 19, Respondent is not acquiring any property from Petitioner. Accordingly, Respondent provided Petitioner with notice of the intended agency action and right to an administrative hearing (the "Notice"). Respondent's Proposal Respondent proposes, as part of its planned improvements to U.S. Highway 19, to provide Petitioner a right- in only entrance from a frontage road running adjacent to and parallel to U.S. Highway 19. Respondent also proposes to build a new two-way road, referred to as Access Road A, which runs north-south, parallel to U.S. Highway 19, intersects Drew Street, and from that point provides vehicles the option of traveling either north or south on mainline U.S. Highway 19, or east or west on Drew Street. Petitioner's northerly neighbor, a maintenance yard owned by Pinellas County, would also send all of its traffic, including large trucks and emergency vehicles, out Access Road A to Drew Street. Other properties, including several car dealerships, to the south of Petitioner's property would also have access to Access Road A. No other property owner, including Pinellas County, objected to Respondent's proposed access system. It is undisputed that Respondent has all of the right-of-way necessary to construct Access Road A to Petitioner's property line. During construction, the City of Clearwater will install a temporary traffic signal at the intersection of Access Road A and Drew Street. Based on a traffic study conducted by the Pinellas County MPO and endorsed by the City of Clearwater and Pinellas County, the traffic light will become permanent when construction is completed. Even if the temporary light is removed after construction, Access Road A will function properly for right turns onto Drew Street which will provide access to the northbound and southbound mainline lanes of U.S. Highway 19. This is true, even assuming that all of Petitioner's neighbors send all of their traffic out Access Road A. In addition, Petitioner's neighbors to the south have several alternate means of access to travel west on Drew Street and either north or south on U.S. Highway 19. Respondent is closing Petitioner's right-out driveway to U.S. Highway 19 because, post-construction, the driveway would be located on an on-ramp. The frontage road and on-ramp, as currently designed by Respondent, would prevent placement of a right-out driveway in such a location. It is Petitioner's position that Respondent could have designed the frontage road and on-ramp in front of Petitioner's property in such a way as to allow the safe operation of a right-out driveway in the approximate location of Petitioner's current right-out driveway. Petitioner's Proposal In support of his contention that Respondent could have designed a right-out driveway, Petitioner offered an aerial map and overlay (Petitioner's Exhibit 3), which purported to show that Respondent could have designed an on-ramp from Drew Street and an off-ramp to Coachman Road to the north in such a way as to allow Petitioner a right-out driveway. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 was a concept based upon what was referred to as the "Lochner Study" at hearing. The "Lochner Study" was a study performed by the engineering firm H. W. Lochner, and showed a right-in, right-out driveway from Petitioner's property onto a frontage road/on-ramp in approximately the same location as Petitioner's current driveway. In the past Petitioner had proposed other alternatives for access to U.S. Highway 19. Petitioner withdrew from consideration at this hearing all other alternative designs for a right-out driveway for Petitioner. The Lochner Study was undertaken with the specific purpose of determining whether needed improvements to U.S. Highway 19 could be safely constructed within right-of-way already owned by Respondent. The Lochner Study concluded that placing a driveway for Petitioner in the location shown in the study would provide "substandard operation and is very undesirable from a safety stand point." The primary reason for this conclusion was that the physical separation of northbound mainline U.S. Highway 19 and the frontage road ended south of the driveway's location. This lack of physical separation would allow vehicles on northbound mainline U.S. Highway 19 to cross over the frontage road and enter Petitioner's property, creating unsafe traffic movements. Petitioner's witnesses agreed that this lack of separation would be a safety problem. Petitioner's Exhibit 3, prepared and testified about by Reginald Mesimer, attempted to alleviate this admittedly unsafe aspect of the Lochner plan by extending the physical separator between northbound mainline U.S. Highway 19 and the frontage road/on-ramp to a point just beyond the location of where Petitioner's driveway would be. The area of physical separation is the "gore" area. In effect, this extension also would shift the beginning of the on-ramp to the point of Petitioner's driveway. Thus, the issue raised was whether the location of the on-ramp could be safely designed to co-exist with the location of the off-ramp for the next interchange at Coachman Road. The standards for determining whether this design is safe are set by the American Association for State Highway and Transportation Officials ("AASHTO"), who publish these standards in the "Green Book," known as the "Bible" of transportation engineers. In examining Petitioner's Exhibit 3, as well as the requirements of AASHTO submitted in this case, it is clear that the requirements for an on-ramp followed by an off-ramp are: (1) an acceleration area for the on-ramp; (2) a weaving area for vehicles going from the on-ramp to mainline, and for vehicles going from mainline to the off-ramp; (3) a deceleration area for the off-ramp, and (4) a queue area for vehicles at the terminus of the off-ramp. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 shows the start of the acceleration area for the on-ramp at the location of Petitioner's right-out driveway, which indicates that the on- ramp for vehicles leaving Petitioner's property would begin at his driveway. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 shows a 2,000-foot weave area, also beginning at the location of Petitioner's right-out driveway. Placing the start of the acceleration area and the weave area at the same point on an on-ramp is contrary to AASHTO design standards. The beginning of the weave area should be near the end of the acceleration area, which, on Petitioner's Exhibit 3, is supposed to be where vehicles on the on-ramp are traveling at the design speed of the highway they are attempting to enter. AASHTO places the beginning of the weaving area where the outside lane of the mainline and the inside lane of the on- ramp are separated by two feet. The weave area extends to a point where there is a twelve-foot separation of the mainline and off-ramp lanes at the next interchange. The design speed of U.S. Highway 19 is 55 miles per hour. It is uncontested that vehicles leaving Petitioner's property will be in a stopped condition prior to entering the on-ramp. Thus, looking at Petitioner's Exhibit 3, the beginning of the weave area should be placed approximately 965 feet to the north of the current location shown on Petitioner's Exhibit 3. In turn, this forces the deceleration area for the off-ramp to Coachman Road shown on Petitioner's Exhibit 3 to be shifted 965 feet to the north. Petitioner's expert testified that the off- ramp deceleration area at Coachman Road could be shifted between 300 and 400 feet to the north. Assuming this to be correct, this places the start of the off-ramp deceleration area approximately 965 feet to the north of its current location, which is 565 to 665 feet beyond the farthest point Petitioner's expert testified it could be moved. Respondent's experts also examined Petitioner's Exhibit 3 under the dictates of AASHTO. Unlike Petitioner, Respondent assumed a design speed of 50 miles per hour, and assumed that shorter distances for acceleration, weaving, and deceleration could be applied in this situation under AASHTO. Respondent's findings demonstrate that under the "Petitioner's best case scenario" the off-ramp at Coachman Road would still have to be moved approximately 600 feet to the north, which is at least 200 feet past the farthest possible shift testified to by Petitioner's expert. Moving the off-ramp would obviously require redesign and delay of the Coachman Road project to the north, already designed and funded for construction. Further, Petitioner's Exhibit 3 also did not take into account any need for increased acceleration distance on the on- ramp due to the grade of the road. For certain portions of the acceleration area of the on-ramp in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 the grade is steeper that 3 percent, and averages over 2 percent. AASHTO does not require an increase in acceleration distance where the grade is "less that two percent." AASHTO requires an increase when the grade is more than 3 percent. This is, according to Petitioner's witness, a "gray area" in AASHTO. In this situation, while AASHTO may not require a multiplier be applied to the entire acceleration distance, it would be safer for the traveling public to apply the multiplier at least to the portions above 3 percent and perhaps to the entire acceleration distance, and to acknowledge that the grade of the road militates against application of strict minimum AASHTO standard distances. Adjusting at all for grade would result in a longer on-ramp and require pushing the off-ramp at Coachman even further north, which makes Petitioner's Exhibit 3 alternative even less viable. Another factor that Petitioner's Exhibit 3 did not take into account was that a significant amount of traffic leaving the proposed right-out driveway would be fully-loaded heavy trucks both from Petitioner's property and the Pinellas County maintenance yard. The AASHTO acceleration distance of 965 feet shown in that Exhibit is for automobiles. Knowing that heavy, fully loaded trucks would be utilizing this driveway on a regular basis, the acceleration distance for such trucks reaching 55 or even 50 miles per hour would be longer than for a normal passenger vehicle. Petitioner's alternative proposal was fatally flawed in its misplacement of the weave area, and was defective in other respects such as not considering the slower heavy truck traffic or the grade of the road. Thus, it is apparent that under any interpretation of the AASHTO standards, Respondent could not safely design an on-ramp from the Drew Street area and an off-ramp to the Coachman Road interchange and provide Petitioner a right-out driveway in the approximate location of his existing right-out driveway. Based upon all the evidence presented at hearing, Respondent demonstrated that AASHTO standards preclude moving the on-ramp to the location proposed by Petitioner. Therefore, closing Petitioner's right-out driveway to reconstructed U.S. Highway 19 is mandated for safety and operational reasons. Access-Reasonableness Issues Following the reconstruction of U.S. Highway 19, the access proposed by Respondent for Petitioner's property is reasonable. An objective comparison of the alternative proposed by Petitioner and Respondent's proposal reveals that Respondent's design results in safer and more efficient access to the state highway system for Petitioner and direct access to east and west travel on Drew Street. One measurable point of comparison is the relative distance a vehicle would have to travel to reach the state highway system under Respondent's proposal versus Petitioner's. Prior to Petitioner's withdrawing from consideration all alternatives other than what was represented in Petitioner's Exhibit 3, Respondent presented testimony regarding two of Petitioner's earlier alternative concepts. These previous alternatives were referred to as Proposal One and Proposal Two. Proposal One was basically a right-out driveway in the form of an on-ramp that would have tied in to mainline U.S. Highway 19 prior to the railroad tracks. Proposal Two was a right-out driveway/on-ramp that tied into the off-ramp for Coachman Road. As far as comparing relative travel distances, both Proposals One and Two are similar to the alternative in Petitioner's Exhibit 3. For vehicles to travel north from Petitioner's property on U.S. Highway 19 in Respondent's design, vehicles travel south on Access Road A, west on Drew Street, and then south on the frontage road/on-ramp. This is a distance of .44 miles. To reach the same point using the access provided in Proposal One, Proposal Two, or Petitioner's Exhibit 3, a vehicle must travel north to the Coachman interchange, and double back south, a distance of approximately 1.45 miles. Thus, when added together, the distances for vehicles to travel north and south on U.S. Highway 19 in Respondent's design total 1.12 miles, or .33 miles less than the 1.45 miles to reach the same points using any of Petitioner's alternative driveway proposals. In addition, for vehicles that wish to travel east or west on Drew Street from Petitioner's property, Respondent's alternative is much shorter. It is .32 miles to reach Drew Street along Access Road A, and 1.6 miles to reach Drew Street from Proposal One, Proposal Two, or Petitioner's Exhibit 3. Another measurable point of comparison are conflict points, places such as intersections and merge areas where vehicles can be expected to change lanes. In Respondent's design, there are four or five conflict points to travel north on U.S. Highway 19, three or four to travel south on U.S. Highway 19, and one to travel east or west on Drew Street. Petitioner's Exhibit 3 shows two conflict points to travel north (right-out turn to on-ramp and merge to mainline), six or seven to travel south on U.S. Highway 19, and seven or eight to travel east or west on Drew Street (same as south on U.S. Highway 19 plus turn from off-ramp). For vehicles traveling north and south on U.S. Highway 19 from Petitioner's property, the number of conflict points in either Respondent's design or Petitioner's alternative are essentially even, but when travel on Drew Street is included in the comparison Respondent's design is clearly safer. A third point of comparison is that Petitioner's alternative provides one way in and one way out. Respondent's design provides two ways in and one way out. Respondent's design provides reasonable access to Petitioner's property. In comparison to Petitioner's alternative, Respondent's design provides for shorter combined travel distances. In regard to conflict points, Respondent's design is as safe as Petitioner's alternative, and safer if travel on Drew Street is included in the comparison. Finally, Respondent's design provides an additional point of ingress. Both witnesses called by Petitioner opined that the access proposed by Respondent was not reasonable, primarily because the access is not "direct." The basis of that opinion was limited to their belief that a "better" access plan, the alternative shown in Petitioner's Exhibit 3, was viable. Neither of Petitioner's witnesses knew the relative travel distances, nor did either witness testify about actual conflict points or any other possible objective points of comparison. Petitioner's witnesses' view are flawed because the alternative shown in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 is not viable. Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner's Exhibit 3 reflected a safe design, and assuming that this access is reasonable, it would be contrary to logic to conclude that Respondent's design results in unreasonable access. The only "advantage" in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 versus Respondent's proposal is a right-out "direct" connection to U.S. Highway 19 via the on-ramp. However, comparing travel distances, conflict points, and points of ingress, Respondent's design is comparable if not superior, and thus, reasonable. Petitioner stressed that all other property owners along the U.S. Highway 19 corridor have right-in and right-out driveways on frontage roads, and that Petitioner is the only property owner required to use a facility like Access Road A for egress. Even if true, this circumstance does not in and of itself change Respondent's designed access for Petitioner's property into unreasonable access. Based upon objective criteria, Respondent's design is comparable or superior to Petitioner's alternative, and Respondent's design is comparable or superior to the access enjoyed by all other property owners in this vicinity. Engineering Study Pursuant to Rule 14-96.011, Florida Administrative Code, Respondent conducted an engineering study to examine the closure of Petitioner's right-out driveway. Normally, an engineering study is prepared prior to Respondent serving its Notice of Intent to close or alter a permitted driveway connection. The engineering study documents that there is a safety or operational problem with a particular driveway connection, and ensures that Respondent has an engineering basis to seek closure or alteration of the driveway. However, at the time this case came to hearing on March 20, 2001, Respondent was not aware that Petitioner's driveway may have been permitted. That is the reason the study was conducted during a continuance of this case and delivered to Petitioner on or around August 17, 2001. Petitioner agreed to the continuance for Respondent to conduct the study, and Petitioner had adequate time to conduct any further discovery in this case after receipt of the study. Thus, any procedural error in the timing of the study was waived by Petitioner and/or cured by Respondent. The Study does provide safety and operational bases for Respondent's agency action in this case. The study summarizes the history of the U.S. Highway 19 improvement project, discusses the current conditions, explains the proposed improvements, and reviews the safety and operational issues specific to Petitioner's right-out driveway in the post construction condition. The study also explains why two alternative right-out driveway configurations were not acceptable to Respondent. The study contains exhibits showing traffic patterns in the existing and possible future post construction conditions. The study was signed and sealed by a professional engineer registered in the State of Florida. The study did not discuss the Petitioner's alternative advocated at hearing. The reason the study did not address this concept was that at the time of its creation, Respondent did not have Petitioner's Exhibit 3. One other item not addressed was traffic accident data. Since the improvements of U.S. Highway 19 have not been constructed, there is no accident data for the right-out driveway in the post construction condition. Respondent stipulated that Petitioner's existing right-out driveway is safe, so any accident data relating to current conditions is not relevant.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation enter a final order approving the closure of Petitioner's right- out driveway as part of the future constructed improvements to Highway 19 and the construction of Access Road A. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2001.
The Issue Case No. 87-1735T: Whether respondent's sign located .14 miles east of Old San Ann Road on State Road 52 violates the spacing rule and was erected without a required permit. Case No. 87-1736T: Whether respondent's sign located .07 miles west of Ann Road, on State Road 52 was erected without the required permit.
Findings Of Fact Case No. 87-1735T: Respondent owns an outdoor advertising sign adjacent to State Road 52 and .14 miles east of Old San Ann Road. The sign advertises Dick Jarrett Ford, Dade City. The sign site is located within the corporate limits of Dade City, Florida. At the site of the sign, State Road 52 is a federal-aid primary highway. The sign is located approximately 100 feet from the edge of the highway pavement, and the edge of the highway pavement is 12 feet from the center line of the road. There is a 50-foot right-of-way on the eastbound side of the road, which places the sign approximately 62 feet from the right-of-way. The sign is visible to traffic on State Road 52. When the sign was observed by Linda K. Brown, an Outdoor Advertising Inspector for the Department of Transportation, the sign had no permit tag attached to it. Further, the sign was located 460 feet from a permitted sign on the same side of the highway. A review of Department of Transportation records revealed that no permit had been issued for the sign in question. The inspection and review by Ms. Brown resulted in the issuance of the Notice of Violation dated March 12, 1987. Case No. 87-1736T: Respondent owns a sign located on the eastbound side of State Road 52, .07 miles west of Ann Road, in Pasco County, Florida. At that location, State Road 52 is a federal-aid primary highway. The sign is located approximately 50 feet from the edge of the road pavement, which is 12 feet from the center line of the road. There is 50-foot right-of-way on the eastbound side of the road. Thus, the sign is approximately 12 feet from the road right-of-way. The sign is visible to traffic on State Road 52. The sign is owned by Joe Bryant, the respondent, and is located on property where Mr. Bryant has his residence. The sign is located approximately 50 feet from his front door. When Ms. Brown initially observed the sign, on March 11, 1987, the sign contained an advertisement for General Home Development and the model center located on the 98 Bypass. The model center is approximately 2 miles from Mr. Bryant's property. Mr. Bryant does not work as a sales representative for General Home Development and General Home Development has no offices or sales representatives on his property. Respondent's intent is to receive revenue for the subject sign. On March 11, 1987, the subject sign had no permit tag attached to it, and a subsequent review of the records of the Department of Transportation showed that no permit had been issued for the sign. Based on the inspection and review by Ms. Brown, the Notice of Violation was issued. Subsequently, the face of the sign was removed by Mr. Bryant.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that the signs involved in Case No. 87-1735T and 87-1736T were erected without the permits required by statute, directing that respondent remove both signs, including the structures, within thirty (30) days from the day of the Final Order, and providing that should respondent fail to comply with the order, the petitioner shall remove the signs and charge the respondent for the cost of removal. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of June, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE A GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-1735T & 87-1736T Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in paragraph 1 Accepted in paragraphs 1 & 2 Accepted in paragraph 3 Accepted in paragraphs 4 & 5 COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 3299-0458 Joe Bryant Post Office Box 805 Dade City, Florida 33525 Kaye Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064
