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LEONARD V. SMITH vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 07-004004SED (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 04, 2007 Number: 07-004004SED Latest Update: Jun. 12, 2008

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent properly reclassified Petitioner's position as a Senior Management Analyst Supervisor from career service status to selected exempt status pursuant to Sections 110.205(2)(x) and 447.203(4), Florida Statutes (2001).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner worked for Respondent for approximately 30 years. He was a Board Certified Behavior Analyst and had training as a Risk Manager. During his state employment, Respondent became known as Respondent's expert for the Baker Act, Chapter 394, Part I, Florida Statutes (Baker Act). The Baker Act sets the standard in Florida for determining whether people can be involuntarily examined and treated within public and private mental health facilities. Petitioner's work as Respondent's Baker Act expert involved very independent work. He performed extensive research related to the laws of other states in the mental health area. He analyzed and made recommendations on subjects such as misuse of seclusion and restraints, the absence of documentation or doctor's orders, and the availability of medication upon release from a mental health facility. Petitioner's research and review of national accreditation standards led to the development of standards for state-wide Baker Act procedures and associated clinical care in state-run mental health receiving and treatment facilities. Ensuring compliance with these procedures and/or standards impacted state employees administering state facilities. Petitioner reviewed professional journals to learn federal block grant requirements. Petitioner's research and recommendations often resulted in proposed amendments to state law and associated Florida Administrative Code rules. Petitioner's assignments included answering constituent requests about the Baker Act from stakeholders on behalf of legislators and the Governor's Office. He conducted public hearings on the subject and gathered comments from a variety of sources, including but not limited to, the Florida Psychiatric Society, the Florida Psychological Society, the National Alliance on Mental Illness, the Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, the Florida Council for Community Mental Health, and the Florida Alcohol and Drug Abuse Association. In other words, Respondent relied on Petitioner to answer inquiries about the Baker Act from the following: (a) families with members who have mental illness; (b) Respondent's district staff members; (c) the staff members of private provider agencies; (d) labor unions; (d) trade associations; (e) the judiciary; (f) law enforcement; and (g) legislative staff. To say the least, Petitioner's duties regarding the Baker Act were not of a routine clerical or administrative nature. Sometime after 1997, Respondent reorganized its adult mental health unit into two sections. The state mental health treatment facilities constituted one section consisting of six or seven state-operated or state-contracted facilities for people needing long-term care. The other section consisted of community mental health facilities that provided mental health services to people in communities, including people in crisis or with forensic involvement. After the reorganization, Petitioner worked primarily in the adult community mental health section with private providers. Petitioner worked with Ron Kizirian, his counterpart in the state mental health treatment facilities section. Petitioner used his Baker Act expertise, working as a team with Mr. Kizirian, to coordinate and address all issues state-wide regarding the Baker Act. Respondent's staff generally considered the adult community mental health services to be more progressive in attempting to provide patients with appropriate services. The state institution services were typically characterized as reactive, custodial, and generally, not positive. Petitioner's duties after the reorganization included explaining the things he did in the community side so that the institutional side would understand the concepts and issues. At the time of the reorganization, there were approximately 550 to 600 private, not-for-profit community mental health providers with state contracts. The adult community mental health section managed these contracts. Petitioner's duties included engaging in preliminary contract discussions with private providers, clarifying issues, and generally participating in the development of the contracts and their associated budgets and grants. He also was involved in recommending amendments to the contracts. As a contract manager, Petitioner monitored the activities of private providers. He initiated corrective action procedures. Petitioner's duties included the following: (a) making sure private contractors stayed within their budgets; (b) ensuring that private contractors agreed to performance standards; (c) pre-auditing the vouchers of vendors; and (d) submitting vouchers for payment. Petitioner's job included investigating high profile events on Respondent's behalf. For instance, Petitioner was sent to investigate alleged abuses in crisis stabilization units in Orlando, Florida. Petitioner would then draft a report for his superiors. Petitioner would often represent his superiors in meetings. Petitioner also performed as acting supervisor in the absence of his immediate supervisor. On or about October 1, 2000, Petitioner was a career service employee, serving as an Operations and Management Consultant. On March 6, 2001, Respondent changed the title of Petitioner's position to Senior Management Analyst II and then back to Operations and Management Consultant on the same day. On March 16, 2001, Petitioner's position changed again to Senior Management Analyst II. On June 27, 2001, and effective July 1, 2001, Petitioner's position title was reclassified to Senior Management Analyst Supervisor, a selected exempt service position. Petitioner was serving in that capacity when Respondent terminated his employment on December 3, 2002. Petitioner never supervised any other employees except to the extent that he served as acting supervisor in his immediate supervisor's absence. He signed a performance evaluation on March 27, 2002, indicating that critical elements involving directing leadership, staffing, performance appraisal/feedback and discipline administration did not apply to his performance for the rating period from October 30, 2001, to March 6, 2002. Petitioner performed the same duties and functions before and after reclassification from career service to selected exempt services. At the time of reclassification, Petitioner inquired of his immediate supervisor why Respondent changed his position from career service to selected exempt service. The immediate supervisor referred Petitioner's inquiry to next higher level supervisor who advised Petitioner not to challenge the determination but to "just keep his job." During the discovery phase of this proceeding, Respondent contended that Petitioner's position was reclassified for the following reason: Petitioner's position was reclassified to Select Exempt Service because his position was managerial with [sic] the meaning of Section 447.203(4), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's duties and responsibilities as Senior Management Analyst Supervisor was not of a routine, clerical or ministerial nature and required the exercise of independent judgment and the position also required the Plaintiff [sic] to develop performance guideline for the state mental health facilities, supervise adult mental health staff and facilitate resolution of complex programmatic, management, administrative or regulatory issues affecting state mental health facilities and districts. During the discovery phase of this proceeding, Respondent produced a generic selected exempt service position description for a Senior Management Analyst Supervisor. The position description contains the duties and responsibilities for senior staff in Respondent's state mental health facilities section and Respondent's adult community mental health facilities section. The position description sets forth some of Petitioner's duties relative to the Baker Act for state-wide public and private mental health institutions and/or facilities and relative to other mental health issues in adult community mental health facilities as follows: (a) provides consultation to the state mental health treatment facilities and districts on operational and programmatic mental health system issues; (b) facilitates resolution of complex programmatic, management, administrative or regulatory issues affecting state mental health treatment facilities and districts; (c) develops/coordinates development of performance guidelines for state mental health treatment facilities; (d) reviews/analyzes data and develops written reports as needed; (e) coordinates or participates as a member of various workgroups and project teams to address issues affecting provision of mental health services within the state; (f) assists with negotiating or developing contracts with private providers as needed; (g) prepares various reports and correspondence; (h) assists with the development of budget and rate amendments for mental health entities; (i) develops and utilizes consultant expertise as need in various projects; (j) researches information regarding mental health programs/systems; and (k) provides on-site visits to districts and state facilities to provide technical assistance regarding administrative and/or programmatic issues.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner's position of Senior Management Analyst Supervisor was that of a select exempt employee. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon Country, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry F. Traynham, Esquire Patterson & Traynham 315 Beard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 Juan Collins, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert A. Butterworth, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John J. Copelan, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (5) 110.205110.604120.569120.57447.203
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FMC HOSPITAL, LTD. vs THE NORTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT, D/B/A BROWARD GENERAL MEDICAL CENTER AND AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 96-004031CON (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 28, 1996 Number: 96-004031CON Latest Update: Jul. 06, 1998

The Issue Whether the certificate of need application to convert 30 acute care beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General Medical Center meets the statutory and rule criteria for approval.

Findings Of Fact The North Broward Hospital District (NBHD) is a special taxing district established by the Florida Legislature in 1951 to provide health care services to residents of the northern two-thirds of Broward County. NBHD owns and operates four acute care hospitals: Coral Springs Medical Center, North Broward Medical Center, Imperial Point Medical Center (Imperial Point), and Broward General Medical Center (Broward General). NBHD also owns and/or operates primary care clinics, school clinics, urgent care centers, and a home health agency. FMC Hospital, Ltd., d/b/a Florida Medical Center (FMC) is a 459-bed hospital with 74 inpatient psychiatric beds, 51 for adults separated into a 25-bed adult unit and a 26-bed geriatric psychiatric unit, and 23 child/adolescent psychiatric beds. FMC is a public Baker Act receiving facility for children and adolescents and operates a mental health crisis stabilization unit (CSU) for children and adolescents. FMC also operates separately located facilities which include a partial hospitalization program, an adult day treatment program, and a community mental health center. At Florida Medical Center South, FMC operates another day treatment program and partial hospitalization program. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) is the state agency which administers the certificate of need (CON) program for health care services and facilities in Florida. The NBHD applied for CON Number 8425 to convert 30 acute care beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General. Broward General operates approximately 550 of its total 744 licensed beds. It is a state Level II adult and pediatric trauma center and the tertiary referral center for the NBHD, offering Level II and III neonatal intensive care, pediatric intensive care, cardiac catheterization and open heart surgery services. Broward General has 68 adult psychiatric beds and is a public Baker Act receiving facility for adults. Public Baker Act receiving facilities have state contracts and receive state funds to hold involuntarily committed mental patients, regardless of their ability to pay, for psychiatric evaluation and short-term treatment. See Subsections 394.455(25) and (26), Florida Statutes. Although they serve different age groups, both FMC and Broward General are, by virtue of contracts with the state, public Baker Act facilities. When a Baker Act patient who is an indigent child or adolescent arrives at Broward General, the patient is transferred to FMC. FMC also typically transfers indigent Baker Act adults to Broward General. At Broward General, psychiatric patients are screened in a separate section of the emergency room by a staff which has significant experience with indigent mental health patients. If hospitalization is appropriate, depending on the patient's physical and mental condition, inpatient psychiatric services are provided in either a 38-bed unit on the sixth floor or a 30- bed unit on the fourth floor of Broward General. In July 1995, Broward General also started operating a 20-bed mental health CSU located on Northwest 19th Street in Fort Lauderdale. Prior to 1995, the County operated the 19th Street CSU and 60 CSU beds on the grounds of the South Florida State Hospital (SFSH), a state mental hospital. Following an investigation of mental health services in the County, a grand jury recommended closing the 60 CSU beds at SFSH because of "deplorable conditions." In addition, the grand jury recommended that the County transfer CSU operations to the NBHD and the South Broward Hospital District (SBHD). As a result, the SBHD assumed the responsibility for up to 20 CSU inpatients a day within its existing 100 adult psychiatric beds at Memorial Regional Hospital. The NBHD assumed the responsibility for up to 40 CSU inpatients a day, including 20 at the 19th Street location. The additional 20 were to be redirected to either the 68 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General or the 47 adult psychiatric beds at Imperial Point. CSU services for adult Medicaid and indigent patients in the NBHD service area were transferred pursuant to contracts between the NBHD and Broward County, and the NBHD and the State of Florida, Department of Children and Family Services (formerly, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services). Based on the agreements, the County leases the 19th Street building in which Broward General operates the CSU. The County also pays a flat rate of $1.6 million a year in monthly installments for the salaries of the staff which was transferred from the County mental health division to the NBHD. The County's contract with the NBHD lasts for five years, from December 1995 to September 2000. Either party may terminate the contract, without cause, upon 30 days notice. The State contract, unlike that of Broward County, does not provide a flat rate, but sets a per diem reimbursement rate of approximately $260 per patient per day offset by projected Medicaid revenues. The State contract is renewable annually, but last expired on June 30, 1997. The contract was being re-negotiated at the time of the hearing in November 1997. Based on actual experience with declining average lengths of stay for psychiatric inpatients, the contract was being re-negotiated to fund an average of 30, not a maximum of 40 patients a day. If CON 8425 is approved, NBHD intends to use the additional 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General to meet the requirements of the State and County contracts, while closing the 19th Street CSU and consolidating mental health screening and stabilization services at Broward General. NBHD proposes to condition the CON on the provision of 70 percent charity and 30 percent Medicaid patient days in the 30 new beds. By comparison, the condition applicable to the existing 68 beds requires the provision of 3 percent charity and 25 percent Medicaid. When averaged for a total of 98 beds, the overall condition would be 23.5 percent charity and 26.5 percent Medicaid, or a total of 51 or 52 percent. The proposed project will require the renovation of 10,297 gross square feet on the fourth floor of Broward General at a cost of approximately $450,000. The space is currently an unused section of Broward General which contains 42 medical/surgical beds. Twelve beds will be relocated to other areas of the hospital. The renovated space will include seclusion, group therapy, and social rooms, as well as 15 semi- private rooms. Twelve of the rooms will not have separate bathing/showering facilities, and seven of those will also not have toilets within the patients' rooms. Need in Relation to State and District Health Plans - Subsection 408.035(1)(a), Florida Statutes The District 10 allocation factors include a requirement that a CON applicant demonstrate continuously high levels of utilization. The applicant is given the following evidentiary guidelines: patients are routinely waiting for admissions to inpatient units; the facility provides significant services to indigent and Medicaid individuals; the facility arranges transfer for patients to other appropriate facilities; and the facility provides other medical services, if needed. Broward General does not demonstrate continuously high utilization by having patients routinely waiting for admission. Broward General does meet the other criteria required by allocation factor one. The second District 10 allocation factor, like criterion (b) of the first, favors an applicant who commits to serving State funded and indigent patients. Broward General is a disproportionate share Medicaid provider with a history of providing, and commitment to continue providing, significant services to Medicaid and indigent patients. In fact, the NBHD provides over 50 percent of both indigent and Medicaid services in District 10. See also Subsection 408.035(1)(n), Florida Statutes. Allocation factor three for substance abuse facilities is inapplicable to Broward General which does not have substance abuse inpatient services. Allocation factor 4 for an applicant with a full continuum of acute medical services is met by Broward General. See also Rule 59C-1.040(3)(h), Florida Administrative Code. Broward General complies with allocation factor 5 by participating in data collection activities of the regional health planning council. The state health plan includes preferences for (1) converting excess acute care beds; (2) serving the most seriously mentally ill patients; (3) serving indigent and Baker Act patients; (4) proposing to establish a continuum of mental health care; (5) serving Medicaid-eligible patients; and (6) providing a disproportionate share of Medicaid and charity care. Broward General meets the six state health plan preferences. See also Rule 59C-1.040(4)(e)2., Florida Administrative Code, and Subsection 408.035(1)(n), Florida Statutes. Broward General does not meet the preference for acute care hospitals if fewer than .15 psychiatric beds per 1000 people in the District are located in acute care hospitals. The current ratio in the District is .19 beds per 1,000 people. Rule 59C-1.040(4)(3)3, Florida Administrative Code, also requires that 40 percent of the psychiatric beds needed in a district should be allocated to general hospitals. Currently, approximately 51 percent, 266 of 517 licensed District 10 adult inpatient psychiatric beds are located in general acute care hospitals. On balance, the NBHD and Broward General meet the factors and preferences of the health plans which support the approval of the CON application. See also Rule 59C- 1.040(4)(e)1. and Rule 59C-1.030, Florida Administrative Code. Numeric Need The parties stipulated that the published fixed need pool indicated no numeric need for additional adult inpatient psychiatric hospital beds. In fact, the numeric need calculation shows a need for 434 beds in District 10, which has 517 beds, or 83 more than the projected numeric need. In 1994- 1995, the District utilization rate was approximately 58 percent. The NBHD asserts that the need arises from "not normal" circumstances, specifically certain benefits from closing the 19th Street CSU, especially the provision of better consolidated care in hospital-based psychiatric beds, and the establishment of a County mental health court. The NBHD acknowledges that AHCA does not regulate CSU beds through the CON program and that CSU beds are not intended to be included in the calculation of numeric need for adult psychiatric beds. However, due to the substantial similarity of services provided, NBHD contends that CSU beds are de facto inpatient psychiatric beds which affect the need for CON- regulated psychiatric beds. Therefore, according to the NBHD, the elimination of beds at SFSH and at the 19th Street CSU require an increase in the supply of adult psychiatric beds. The NBHD also notes that approval of its CON application will increase the total number of adult psychiatric hospital beds in Broward County, but will not affect the total number of adult mental health beds when CSU and adult psychiatric beds are combined. After the CSU beds at SFSH closed, the total number of adult mental health beds in the County has, in fact, been reduced. NBHD projected a need to add 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General by combining the 1995 average daily census (ADC) of 48 patients with its assumption that it can add up to 10, increasing the ADC to 58 patients a day in the existing 68 beds. Based on its contractual obligation to care for up to 40 CSU inpatients a day, the NBHD projects a need for an additional 30 beds. The projection assumed that the level of utilization of adult inpatient psychiatric services at Broward General would remain relatively constant. With 40 occupied beds added to the 48 ADC, NBHD predicted an ADC of 88 in the new total of 98 beds, or 90 percent occupancy. The assumption that the ADC would remain fairly constant is generally supported by the actual experience with ADCs of 48.1, 51.5, and 45.8 patients, respectively, in 1995, 1996, and the first seven months of 1997. NBHD's second assumption, that an ADC of 40 CSU patients will be added is not supported by the actual experience. Based on the terms of the State and County contracts, up to 20 CSU patients have already been absorbed into the existing beds at the Imperial Point or Broward General, which is one explanation for the temporary increase in ADC in 1996, while up to 20 more may receive services at the 19th Street location. In 1996 and 1997, the ADC in the 19th Street CSU beds was 15.3 and 14.2, respectively, with monthly ranges in 1997 from a high of 17 in April to a low of 12 in June. The relatively constant annual ADCs in psychiatric and CSU beds are a reflection of increasing admissions but declining average lengths of stay for psychiatric services. The NBHD also projects that it will receive referrals from the Broward County Mental Health Court, established in June 1997. The Court is intended to divert mentally ill defendants with minor criminal charges from the criminal justice system to the mental health system. Actual experience for only three months of operations showed 7 or 8 admissions a month with widely varying average lengths of stay, from 6 to 95 days. The effect of court referrals on the ADC at Broward General was statistically insignificant into the fall of 1997. Newspaper reports of the number of inmates with serious mental illnesses do not provide a reliable basis for projecting the effect of the mental health court on psychiatric admissions to Broward General, since it is not equipped to handle violent felons. One of Broward General's experts also compared national hospital discharge data to that of Broward County. The results indicate a lower use rate in Broward County in 1995 and a higher one in 1996. That finding was consistent with the expert's finding of a growth in admissions and bed turnover rate which measures the demand for each bed. The expert also considered the prevalence of mental illness and hospitalization rates. The data reflecting expected increases in admissions, however, was not compared to available capacity in the County nor correlated with declining lengths of stay. The District X: Comprehensive Health Plan 1994 includes an estimate of the need for 10 CSU beds per 100,000 people, or a total of 133 CSU beds needed for the District. FMC argues that the calculation is incorrect because only the adult population should be included. Using only adults, FMC determined that 116 CSU beds are needed which, when added to 434 adult psychiatric beds needed in the February 1996 projection, gives a bed need for all mental health beds of 550. That total is less than the actual combined total number of 567 mental health beds, 517 adult psychiatric beds plus 50 CSU beds in 1995. Whatever population group is appropriate, the projection of the need for CSU beds is not reliable based on the evidence that, since the end of 1995, CSU services have been and, according to NBHD, should continue to be absorbed into hospital- based adult psychiatric units. For the same reason, the increase in adult psychiatric bed admissions from 1995 to 1996 does not establish a trend towards increasing psychiatric utilization, but is more likely attributable to the closing of CSU beds at SFSH. FMC's expert's comparison of data from three selected months in two successive years is also not sufficient to establish a downward trend in utilization at the 19th Street CSU, neither is the evidence of a decline in ADC by one patient in one year. Utilization is relatively static based on ADCs in existing Broward County adult psychiatric beds and in CSU beds. FMC established Broward General's potential to decrease average lengths of stay by developing alternative non-inpatient services as FMC has done and Broward General proposes to do. See Finding of Fact 37. Based on local health council reports, FMC's data reflects a rise in the ADC at Broward General to 52.7 in 1996, and a return to 46 in the first seven months of 1997. Using a 14.2 ADC for the 19th Street CSU, FMC projects that Broward General will reach an ADC of approximately 60 in the first year of operations if the CON is approved, not 88 as projected. Broward General acknowledged its capacity to add 10 more patients to the ADC without stress on the system. Having already absorbed 20 of up to 40 CSU patients at Imperial Point and Broward General in 1996 and 1997 resulting in an ADC of 48, and given the capacity to absorb 10 more, the NBHD has demonstrated a need to accommodate an ADC of 10 more adult psychiatric patients at Broward General, or a total ADC of 68 patients. The need to add capacity to accommodate an additional 10 patient ADC was not shown to equate to a need for 30 additional beds, which would result in an ADC of 68 patients in 98 beds, or 69 or 70 percent occupancy. Special Circumstances - Rule 59C-1.040(4)(d) The psychiatric bed rule provides for approval of additional beds in the absence of fixed numeric need. The "special circumstance" provision applies to a facility with an existing unit with 85 percent or greater occupancy. During the applicable period, the occupancy at Broward General was 74.15 percent. However, occupancy rates have exceeded 95 percent in the CSU beds on 19th Street. If up to 20 patients on 19th Street are added to the 48 ADC at Broward General, the result is that the existing 68 beds will be full. A full unit is operationally not efficient or desirable and allows no response to fluctuations in demand. Therefore, the state has established a desirable standard of 75 percent occupancy for psychiatric units, a range which supports the addition of 10 to 15 psychiatric beds at Broward General. Available Alternatives - Subsection 408.035(1)(b) and (d), Florida Statutes, and Rule 59C-1.040(4)(e)4., Florida Administrative Code The psychiatric bed rule provides that additional beds will "not normally" be added if the district occupancy rate is below 75 percent. For the twelve months preceding the application filing, the occupancy rate in 517 adult psychiatric beds in District 10 was approximately 58 percent. FMC's expert noted that each day an average of 200 adult psychiatric beds were available in District 10. Broward General argues that the occupancy rate is misleading. Five of the nine facilities with psychiatric beds are freestanding, private facilities, which are ineligible for Medicaid participation. Historically, the freestanding hospitals have also provided little charity care. One facility, University Pavilion, is full. Of the four acute care hospitals with adult psychiatric beds, Memorial Hospital in the SBHD, is not available to patients in the NBHD service area. Imperial Point, the only other NBHD facility with adult psychiatric beds, is not available based on its occupancy rate for the first seven months of 1997 of approximately 81 percent, which left an average of 9 available beds in a relatively small 47-bed unit. That leaves only Broward General and FMC to care for Medicaid and indigent adult psychiatric patients. FMC is the only possible alternative provider of services, but Broward General was recommended by the grand jury and was the only contract applicant. The occupancy rate in FMC's 51 adult beds was approximately 80 percent in 1995, 73 percent in 1996, and 77 percent for the first seven months in 1997. FMC has reduced average lengths of stay by having patients "step down" to partial hospitalization, day treatment and other outpatient services of varying intensities. The same decline in average lengths of stay is reasonably expected when Broward General implements these alternatives. Adult psychiatric services are also accessible in District 10 applying the psychiatric bed rule access standard. That is, ninety percent of the population of District 10 has access to the service within a maximum driving time of forty- five minutes. The CSU license cannot be transferred to Broward General. Broward County holds the license for CSU beds which, by rule, must be located on the first floor of a building. Although Broward General may not legally hold the CSU license and provide CSU services on the fourth floor of the hospital, there is no apparent legal impediment to providing CSU services in psychiatric beds. Quality of Care - Subsection 408.035(1)(c), Florida Statutes and Rule 1.040(7), Florida Administrative Code Broward General is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations. The parties stipulated that Broward General has a history of providing quality care. Broward General provides the services required by Rule 59C-1.040(3)(h), Florida Administrative Code. Services Not Accessible in Adjoining Areas; Research and Educational Facilities; Needs of HMOs; Services Provided to Individuals Beyond the District; Subsections 408.035(1)(f),(g),(j), and (k), Florida Statutes Broward General does not propose to provide services which are inaccessible in adjoining areas nor will it provide services to non-residents of the district. Broward General is not one of the six statutory teaching hospitals nor a health maintenance organization (HMO). Therefore, those criteria are of no value in determining whether this application should be approved. Economics and Improvements in Service from Joint Operation - Subsection 408.035(1)(e), Florida Statutes The consolidation of the psychiatric services at Broward General is reasonably expected to result in economies and improvements in the provision of coordinated services to the mentally ill indigent and Medicaid population. Broward General will eliminate the cost of meal deliveries and the transfer of medically ill patients, but that potential cost-saving was not quantified by Broward General. Staff and Other Resources - Subsection 408.035(1)(h), Florida Statutes The parties stipulated that NBHD has available the necessary resources, including health manpower, management personnel, and funds to implement the project. Financially Feasibility - Subsection 408.035(1)(h) and (i), Florida Statutes The parties stipulated that the proposed project is financially feasible in the immediate term. The estimated total project cost is $451,791, but NBHD has $500,000 in funds for capital improvements available from the County and $700,000 from the Florida Legislature. As stipulated by the parties, NBHD has sufficient cash on hand to fund the project. Regardless of the census, the County's contractual obligation to the NBHD remains fixed at $1.6 million. The State contract requires the prospective payment of costs offset by expected Medicaid dollars. If the number of Medicaid eligible patients decreases, then state funding increases proportionately. The state assumed that 20 percent of the patients would qualify for Medicaid, therefore it reimburses the per diem cost of care for 80 percent of the patients. One audit indicated that 30 percent of the patients qualified for Medicaid, so that State payments for that year were higher than needed. The State contract apparently makes no provision to recover excess payments. The application projects a net profit of $740,789 for the first year of operations, and a net profit of $664,489 for the second year. If the State contract with NBHD is renewed to contemplate an average of 30 patients per day as opposed to up to 40 patients per day, then annual revenue could be reduced up to $400,000. Projected net profit will, nevertheless, exceed expenses when variable expenses are reduced correspondingly. If 20 state funded patients are already in psychiatric beds, and 20 more could be transferred from 19th Street, the result is an ADC of 68. Based on the funding arrangements, there is no evidence that the operation of a total of 98 beds could not be profitable, even with an ADC of 68, although it would be wasteful to have 30 extra beds. Impact on Competition, Quality Assurance and Cost-Effectiveness - Subsection 408.035(1)(l), Florida Statutes With a maximum of 68 inpatients or more realistically, under the expected terms of a renegotiated State contract, 58 to 60 inpatients in 98 beds, Broward General will reasonably attempt to expand the demand for its inpatient psychiatric services. Within the NBHD's legal service area, one-third of adult psychiatric patients not admitted to Broward General are admitted to FMC. Assuming a proportionate impact on competitors, FMC's expert projected that one-third of approximately 30 unfilled beds at Broward General will be filled by patients who would otherwise have gone to FMC. The projection of a loss of 9 patients from the ADC of FMC is reasonably based on an analysis showing comparable patient severity in the most prevalent diagnostic category. Given the blended payor commitment of approximately 51 or 52 percent total for Medicaid and charity in 98 beds, Broward General will be able to take patients from every payor category accepted at FMC. The loss of 9 patients from its ADC can reduce revenues by $568,967 at FMC. The impact analysis is reasonably based on lost patient days since most payers use a per diem basis for compensating FMC. For example, although Medicare reimbursement is usually based on diagnosis regardless of length of stay, it is cost-based for the geriatric psychiatric unit. Net profit at FMC, for the year 1996-1997, was expected to be approximately $4.5 million. FMC will also experience increased costs in transporting indigent patients from FMC to Broward General for admission and treatment. Because of the additional distance, the cost to transfer indigent patients is $20 more per patient from FMC to Broward General than it is from FMC to the 19th Street CSU. FMC typically stabilizes indigent adult psychiatric inpatients, then transfers them to either the 19th Street CSU or Broward General. From March through September of 1997, FMC transported approximately 256 indigent patients from FMC to the 19th Street CSU. In terms of quality assurance, the consolidation of psychiatric services at Broward General will allow all patients better access to the full range of medical services available at Broward General. The NBHD's operation of the 19th Street CSU is profitable. Approval of the CON application should reasonably eliminate all costs associated with operation of the 19th Street facility, and shift more revenues from the State and County contracts to Broward General. Some savings are reasonably expected from not having meal deliveries to 19th Street or patient transfers for medical care. The NBHD did not quantify any expected savings. Costs and Methods of Construction - Subsection 408.035(1)(m), Florida Statutes Broward General will relocate 12 of 42 medical/surgical beds and convert 30 medical/surgical beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds on one wing of the fourth floor, which is currently unused. Fifteen semi-private medical/surgical patient rooms will be converted into semi-private adult psychiatric rooms. Existing wards will be converted to two social rooms, one noisy and one quiet. With the removal of the walls of some offices, the architect designed a group therapy room. An existing semi-private room will be used as a seclusion room. Of the fifteen semi-private rooms, twelve will not have bathing or showering facilities and seven will not have toilets within the patients' rooms. At the time the hospital was constructed, the state required only a lavatory/sink in each patient room. AHCA's architect agreed to allow Broward General to plan to use central bathing and toilet facilities to avoid additional costs and diminished patient room sizes. Because the plan intentionally avoids construction in the toilets, except to enlarge one to include a shower, there is no requirement to upgrade to Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) standards. Therefore, the $23,280 construction cost contingency for code compliance is adequate. Although the projected construction costs are reasonable and the applicable architectural code requirements are met, the design is not the most desirable in terms of current standards. Patient privacy is compromised by the lack of toilets for each patient room. Past and Proposed Provision of Services to Promote a Continuum of Care in a Multi-level System - Subsection 408.035(1)(o), Florida Statutes Broward General is a tertiary acute care facility which provides a broad continuum of care. Because it already operates the CSU and provides CSU services in adult psychiatric beds, the proposal to relocate patients maintains but does not further promote that continuum of care. Broward General's plan to establish more alternatives to inpatient psychiatric care does promote and enhance its continuum of care. Capital Expenditures for New Inpatient Services - Subsection 408.035(2), Florida Statutes Broward General is not proposing to establish a new health service for inpatients, rather it is seeking to relocate an existing service without new construction. The criteria in this Subsection are inapplicable. Factual Conclusions Broward General did not establish a "not normal" circumstance based on the grand jury's findings and recommendations. The grand jury did not recommend closing 19th Street facility. Broward General did generally establish not normal circumstances based on the desirability of consolidating mental health services at Broward General to provide a single point of entry and to improve the quality of care for the 19th Street facility patients. Broward General failed to establish the need to add 30 beds to accomplish the objective of closing the 19th Street facility. Although the existing beds at Broward General may reasonably be expected to be full as a result of the transfer of 19th Street patients, the addition of 30 beds without sufficient demand results in an occupancy rate of 69 or 70 percent, from an ADC of 68 patients in 98 beds. Broward General has requested approximately twice as many beds as it demonstrated it needs. Broward General's CON application on balance satisfies the local and state health plan preferences. In general, FMC is the only alternative facility in terms of available beds, but is not the tax-supported public facility which the grand jury favored to coordinate mental health services. Broward General meets the statutory criteria for quality of care, improvements from joint operations, financial feasibility, quality assurance, cost-effectiveness, and services to Medicaid and indigent patients. The proposal is not the most desirable architecturally considering current standards. More importantly, Broward General did not demonstrate that it can achieve its projected occupancy without an adverse impact on FMC. The NBHD proposal will add too many beds to meet the targeted state occupancy levels in relatively a static market. Broward General's application does not include a partial request for fewer additional beds which would have allowed the closing of 19th Street, while maintaining some empty beds for demand fluctuations and avoiding an adverse impact on FMC.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration deny the application of the North Broward Hospital District for Certificate of Need Number 8425 to convert 30 medical/surgical beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General Medical Center. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Paul Vazquez, Esquire Agency For Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire R. David Prescott, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 David C. Ashburn, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley, Valdes-Fauli & Stewart, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 830 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 120.57394.455408.035408.039 Florida Administrative Code (2) 59C-1.03059C-1.040
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OAKCREST EARLY EDUCATION CENTER, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 05-002616 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Jul. 21, 2005 Number: 05-002616 Latest Update: Jul. 11, 2006

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Department should deny the Petitioner's pending application for a new one-year license effective June 8, 2005, because of an alleged violation that occurred on June 7, 2005, where a three-year-old child was left in a van, suffering purportedly life-threatening injuries (heat stroke). See § 402.305(10), Fla. Stat. and Fla. Admin. Code R. 65C-22.001(5). If the violation occurred, it must also be determined whether denial of license renewal or some other authorized penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a large daycare center owned and operated by Joann Jones. It is located in Ocala, Florida and has been licensed since 1992. The Petitioner normally operates its daycare center caring for as many as 250 to 275 children with a staff of 45 to 50 people. The Petitioner and its owner Ms. Jones, has provided child care in Marion County for many years, operating as many as five daycare centers. Ms. Jones has an extensive history in training, education and experience in operating daycare centers and her experience includes working with the former Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the Department of Children and Family Services on various committees and licensing groups for the State of Florida. Prior to the incident on June 7, 2005, the Petitioner had had relatively minor infractions of the Agency's administered statutes and rules involving operation of a daycare center. These infractions primarily included compliance documentation errors and an instance in which a first aid kit did not have all of required the type of supplies, and an instance where a van driver failed to have in his possession and make proper use of a head count check-list on a field trip. In these instances when the Petitioner was found not to be in compliance, compliance was corrected normally by the close of the inspection day when the infraction was discovered. The van driver who failed to have his checklist with him was terminated for violating the Petitioner's policy that a roster including all childrens' names would go on the van at any time the van was being used to transport children. In addition to the above instances, the Petitioner was documented on an inspection checklist on May 13, 2003, for failure to properly maintain a transportation log; for enrollment form violations; for failing to document law enforcement background checks for staff; and for failing to maintain appropriate documentation of Level II screening for staff members. These were violations of Florida Administrative Code Rules 65C-22.006(4)(5) and 65C-22.001(6)(f). The Petitioner's exhibit thirty-five references a re- inspection from October 9, 2003, and is a checklist. At this time the facility was in violation of Florida Administrative Rule 65C-22.003(2)(a), for failure to have staff appropriately trained and the training certificates documented; for violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-22.004(2)(a), and for failure to maintain first aid kit in the facility's vans and buses (the violation referenced above involving not having all required items in one first aid kit on this occasion). The Petitioner was also in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-22.006(2), for failure to properly maintain immunization records and Rule 65C-22.003(2)(a) for failure to properly maintain relevant documentation. An inspection was conducted April 22, 2004. At this time, the facility was in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-22.003(2)(a), for failing to document that all staff had completed a 40-hour training course and for failure to properly document the training course. An inspection made April 26, 2005, revealed that the facility was in violation of the proper staff to child ratio established in Section 402.805, Florida Statutes. The proper staff to child ratio on that occasion was 17 to 5 and the Petitioner, when observed, had a 17 to 4 staff to child ratio. The problem was corrected on the spot that same day. On April 27, 2005, an inspection was conducted and the facility was found to be out of compliance with Florida Administrative Code Rules 65C-22.004(2) and 65C-22.006(5)(d), and Section 435.04, Florida Statutes, for, respectively, failing to properly maintain first aid kits; and failing to properly provide finger prints to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement for the purpose of obtaining required background screening for staff. These prior infractions mostly involved documentation errors rather than actual deficiencies in the operation of the Petitioner's facility and daycare services. The Petitioner has not had a proceeding actually filed against her facility and license by the Department prior to this one, with the possible exception of an occurrence some seven years ago when the Petitioner received a $100.00 fine related to a documentation error. These prior infractions were not shown to have been serious ones involving an immediate threat to the health or safety of the children in Petitioner's care. Most of these infractions were shown to have been corrected on the same day they were noted on the relevant inspection reports. A three-year-old child was inadvertently left in a van when it was returned and parked at Petitioner's daycare center, on June 7, 2005. this incident caused the instant proceeding to deny the Petitioner's re-licensure. On that day two vans from the Petitioner's facility left to take a group of three-year- olds on an outing for lunch for pizza party. On that date the Petitioner had in operation, policies that required all teachers to keep rolls of their children, to count their children every hour and to complete a log which was to be turned into the directors of the daycare center at the end of the day. The Petitioner was responsible for providing these logs to the Respondent Agency upon routine inspections. There was also a policy in effect regarding operation of vans and buses for transportation of children. The teachers and bus drivers were required to keep a log of the children riding on the vans. The teachers were required to take a "head count" when the children left the classroom and when they entered and exited the vans or buses. The teachers were required to carry a roll with all the children's names with them at all times. They were required to carry this roll on a clip board and this policy even if the teachers took the children out on the playground, where they were still required to do head counts. The Petitioner held meetings periodically with its employees and informed them regarding the policy concerning head counts and the log for using the vans, which involved head counts. Ladonna Cunningham was a van driver for the Petitioner on the date in question, June 7, 2005. She established that she was aware of the policy of counting children before they got on the van, after they got on the van, and when they got off the van again, as well as the fact that the vans were to be checked ("van sweeps") after all the children were off the van to make sure that no one was still on the van. On June 7, 2005, she and the teacher going on the field trip with her van, Katrice Robinson, counted their children and Katrice did a van sweep when they returned to the daycare center after the trip. Ladonna Cunningham did a second van sweep to make sure that there were no children on her van and was aware that this was in accordance with the Petitioner's policy. On June 7, 2005, a three-year-old child (N.B.) was taken on the field trip to the pizza party. The van returned to the daycare center sometime after 1:40 p.m. There were two vans used on this field trip. One van was driven by Ladonna Cunningham, accompanied by the teacher Katrice Robinson. The second van, with N.B. aboard, was operated and supervised by two other employees, Amina Francious and Regina Brown. Neither Francious nor Brown made a head count of the children or a van sweep after returning to the daycare center. Regina Brown told investigators that she knew they were supposed to make a head count when they returned to the daycare center that day but neither she nor Amina Francios had done so. The evidence also shows that Katrice Robinson, who was N.B.'s teacher, "checked him off" as being in the classroom at 2:00 p.m., that day for a snack when he was in fact outside in the closed van. This erroneous fact was entered by Katrice Robinson on the head count sheet provided by the Petitioner. All teachers are required to make a head count every 30 minutes and to note the time a meal, snack, or lunch is served to a child. Later that afternoon the child N.B. was discovered either asleep or unconscious in the closed van which had been parked in the hot sun. The child was difficult to arouse or unresponsive and had an external Fahrenheit temperature of 104 degrees. At 4:02 p.m., he was taken by EMS personnel to the hospital where he was ultimately diagnosed with hyperthermia or heat stroke. He was unresponsive, having seizures, actively vomiting, and had to be intubated since his left lung had collapsed. The Department received abuse report 2005-396658 as a result of this incident. Fortunately, the child recovered. On June 8, 2005, Ms. Littell, a Department representative interviewed the three employees, Regina Brown, Katrice Robinson, and Amina Francois. Both Ms. Francios and Ms. Brown admitted failing to conduct a van sweep after they returned to the Petitioner's facility on June 7, 2005. All three of these employees were arrested for felony child neglect. These interviews, as well as Petitioner's owner and operator Joann Jones, in her testimony, confirmed that on June 8, 2005, the Petitioner's assistant director Irma Ramjit, had asked Ms. Francois and Ms. Brown to sign for an employee handbook that they had never actually received. Thus Ms. Ramjit had asked these employees to falsify documentation after the child had been left in the van, in an apparent attempt to show that the facility had followed its own procedures when in fact it had not. This action by Ms. Ramjit was not at the behest or condoned of the Petitioner's owner, Ms. Jones, however. The abuse report referenced above was ultimately closed and finalized as "verified for neglect and inadequate supervision" as a result of the child being left in the van. Physical injury had occurred as a result of the physical injury suffered by the child from heat exposure. Obviously the Petitioner's policy of conducting head counts every 30 minutes was not done properly on June 7, 2005. Indeed, the last head count for the class of the child who was left on the van was conducted at 9:30 a.m., on June 7, 2005. Joann Jones the Petitioner's owner was shocked and devastated by the events of June 7, 2005. She had never had such an occurrence previously in the 20 years she had been engaged in the daycare business. After this incident happened and before the issue regarding her license arose she had already acted to ban any further field trips for three-year-old children and had elected to hire a person to perform nothing but head counts each day to make sure that the policy was carried out and such an event never again occurred. The evidence shows that the Petitioner's facility has otherwise been operated in a quality manner, as shown by the testimony of Kimberly Webb. Ms. Webb was an employee of the Petitioner for some 15 years and was well aware of the Petitioner's rules concerning conducting head counts of children, doing "van sweeps" and the general policies to ensure child safety in the day-to-day operations of the care center. Marjorie McGee is employed by Child Hood Development Services and testified for the Petitioner. Ms. McGee went to the daycare center on numerous occasions to monitor the Childhood Development Services Program and the Head Start Program. Ms. McGee observed that Ms. Jones and the daycare center staff provided quality child care. Any concerns she ever had were immediately addressed and corrected by Ms. Jones or one of the directors of the center. Ms. McGee, in fact, established that the Petitioner's facility in one of the highest-rated daycare centers in Marion County. This testimony is corroborated by several parents who testified concerning the operation of the daycare center and by Juanita Thompson, who works as a childhood curriculum specialist and over the years had done consulting for the Petitioner in preparing curriculums. She attested to the high quality care provided by the Petitioner.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services denying licensure to the Petitioner, Oakcrest Early Education Center, Inc., effective with the application of April 11, 2005, without prejudice to the Petitioner re-applying for licensure in June 2006, in conjunction with an appropriate monitoring program by the Respondent Agency designed to ensure that all operational and documentation provisions of the applicable statutes and rules are complied with upon an ongoing basis. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: John J. Copeland, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Edward L. Scott, Esquire Edward L. Scott, P.A. 409 Southeast Fort King Street Ocala, Florida 34471 T. Shane DeBoard, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57402.301402.305402.310402.319435.04
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STANLEY T. HILL vs. RALPH D. TURLINGTON, COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION, 83-000399 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-000399 Latest Update: Jan. 03, 1984

Findings Of Fact On September 9, 1982 Petitioner filed an application with the Teacher Certification Section of the Florida Department of Education to be re-certified as a teacher in the State of Florida. He was previously certified as a teacher in Florida from September 3, 1974 until 1979 in the field of cooperative distributive education. Mr. Hill is a graduate of the University of South Florida with a bachelor's degree in distributive education and he has 20 to 25 hours of credit towards his master's degree in administration Supervision. From 1974 until 1977 he successfully taught school in the Orlando area. In December of 1979 Petitioner had an argument with his father. During the course of that argument Mr. Hill picked up a 12 gauge shotgun and hit his father in the stomach several times. Petitioner was arrested, charged with aggravated assault, and subsequently adjudicated not guilty by a reason of insanity. The court order adjudicating him not guilty found that "At the time of the alleged offense, defendant's psychological condition caused him to function under paranoid delusions and persecutory relations. He not only had such thoughts and beliefs, but they were held so firmly that he was acting upon them." After the entry of that order on March 24, 1980, Petitioner was found to meet the criteria for involuntary commitment to a state mental hospital pursuant to the provisions of the Baker Act. He was treated at G. Pierce Wood Memorial Hospital until June 1980 and then released to the Peace River Center for Personal Development as a resident there. In either October or November 1981 Mr. Hill ceased taking the psychotropic medication which had been prescribed for him. By March 1982 he was again readmitted as an involuntary patient at G. Pierce Wood Memorial Hospital and after treatment there he was released in August 1982 back to the Peace River Center. Dr. M. Saleem Jeewa has been his treating psychiatrist since June of 1980. At the present time Dr. Jeewa prescribes Mellaril, a major tranquilizer, and Pamelor, an anti-depressant medication for Petitioner. Mr. Hill now visits Dr. Jeewa on a monthly basis unless something unusual happens in the interim. Additionally Petitioner attends group therapy three times a week and lives in one of the satellite apartments at Peace River Center. The satellite apartments are an arrangement where three or four patients live together to share expenses and help each other as a peer group. The satellite apartments are not part of a residential facility but are leased out in the community by the Peace River Center. In April 1983 Petitioner began working at American Building Maintenance, a Tampa janitorial service. His other employment history subsequent to his arrest, but prior to this hearing, includes janitorial work for Goodwill Industries. This employment was terminated when, due to an automobile accident, Mr. Hill was injured and physically unable to perform his job. Prior to that employment he worked for a CETA program where he assisted in locating jobs for handicapped persons. With respect to Mr. Hill's present psychological state he has no evidence of any thought disorder. His speech is logical, coherent and relevant. He has a fair amount of insight into his own condition and his judgment is adequate. No psychosis is apparent. He continues however to display a mild form of mixed anxiety and depression. At the present time it would be difficult however, for Mr. Hill to handle a job where he is fairly independent, must be flexible with considerable responsibilities and handle a variety of tasks. In order for Mr. Hill to be a successful teacher in a classroom situation with responsibility for 15 to 20 children, he would initially need some additional assistance and support over and above that normally required by a new teacher. It is unlikely that due to Mr. Hill's present condition he would cause any harm or be dangerous to students or other people around him. While it is within the realm of possibility that Petitioner, if certified, could successfully handle the responsibilities of a distributive education teacher, that possibility is not probable in view of Petitioner's present fragile psychological state.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the State Board of Education as the head of the Department of Education, enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for certification as a teacher in the field of distributive education. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 4th day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 1983.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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ELIZABETH R. HILLEGAS vs MENTAL HEALTH COUNSELORS, 90-001611 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Mar. 14, 1990 Number: 90-001611 Latest Update: May 25, 1990

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence offered at the formal hearing in this case, the following facts are found: The Petitioner, Elizabeth R. Hillegas, took the Mental Health Counselor licensure examination administered on April 21, 1989. The Petitioner's examination was given a failing grade. The Petitioner needs to receive credit for correct answers on at least two more questions in order to be entitled to a passing grade. The Petitioner's answers to questions 8, 17, and 33 on the subject examination were incorrect. 2/ All three of the challenged questions, namely questions 8, 17, and 33, inquire as to matters which are part of the basic training in the field of Mental Health Counseling or matters which are crucial to competent practice in the field of Mental Health Counseling. The challenged questions ask about matters which should be known by a competent Mental Health Counselor. Therefore, the challenged questions are within the appropriate subject matter domain for a licensure examination for the profession of Mental Health Counselor. 3/

Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Mental Health Counselors issue a final order in this case dismissing the Petition and assigning to the Petitioner a failing grade on the April 21, 1989, Mental Health Counselor licensure examination. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 25th day of May 1990. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May 1990.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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SYLVAN STAHL | S. S. vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 98-001448 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Leesburg, Florida Mar. 23, 1998 Number: 98-001448 Latest Update: Aug. 18, 1998

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves a request by Petitioner, Sylvan L. Stahl, Jr., for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust. If the request is approved, Petitioner's wife would be allowed to operate a child day care center in her home, a position she is now barred from holding because her husband has a disqualifying offense and lives in the same household. Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of approving or denying such requests. In a preliminary decision entered on February 13, 1998, a DCFS committee denied the request. Petitioner is now barred from employment in which he would have contact with children because of a disqualifying offense which occurred in September 1989. At that time, Petitioner was arrested in Citrus County, Florida, for the offense of armed robbery, a felony under Chapter 812, Florida Statutes (1989). Although the documents pertaining to the offense were not made a part of this record, Petitioner established that in September 1989, he attempted to rob a bank with a firearm. Under a plea bargain arrangement with the prosecutor, he pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced to four and one-half years in prison, to be followed by ten years of supervised probation. Petitioner served only the three-year mandatory minimum sentence, and he then successfully completed his probation after only three years. No person was injured during the incident. After being released from prison, Petitioner worked for three years with a pallet firm owned by his father, rising to the position of supervisor. During his three-year tenure with the firm, Petitioner increased the size of the company from five to twenty employees. For the last six months or so, Petitioner has been employed by Emergency One, an Ocala firm which manufactures fire trucks. He also has a second job with his brother-in-law's landscaping firm. The two jobs require that Petitioner begin his work day at 7:00 a.m. and that he continue working until 1:30 a.m. Petitioner's wife intends to operate a small day care center out of the family home. It is fair to infer that due to Petitioner's lengthy working hours, he will spend little, if any, time at his home while the children are entrusted to his wife's care. Since his arrest and plea of guilty almost nine years ago, Petitioner has had no other blemishes on his record. He has been steadily employed since 1994 in positions of responsibility. Petitioner is married to a minister's daughter, has a young child, and has recently purchased a new home. Letters received in evidence corroborate the testimony of him and his wife that he will pose no threat to children if the exemption is granted. Petitioner expressed remorse for his actions in 1989, calling his conduct "stupid," and indicating he was "confused" at that time. Given his continuous employment history, good conduct during his shortened probation period, stable family life, and the time elapsed since the disqualifying offense, it is found that Petitioner is sufficiently rehabilitated to justify granting the exemption.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order granting Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204Z 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sylvan L. Stahl, Jr. 11848 Southeast 71st Avenue Road Belleview, Florida 34420 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57402.305435.07
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