The Issue Whether Respondent's license to practice medicine in the state of Florida should be revoked, suspended or otherwise disciplined.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all time relevant to this proceeding, the Respondent was licensed to practice medicine in the state of Florida, having been issued license number 0024212. Respondent is also licensed to practice medicine in the states of Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey and Illinois. Respondent is an anesthesiologist who was board certified in 1962, and has had experience as a professor of anesthesiology. The two cases involving patients L. Y. and O. G. that are in issue in this proceeding arose while Respondent was practicing at Manatee Memorial Hospital in Bradenton, Florida. It is the recovery room nurse's responsibility to fill out the post anesthesia care unit (PACU) record which documents the patient's course through the recovery room. The record includes notations which track the patient's activity, respiration, blood pressure, consciousness and color. Each category is scored on the basis of 0, 1 or 2. Each individual score is determined by the recovery nurse's observation of the patient and her judgment of the patient's condition at that particular moment. Ambu-bagging is a procedure whereby a mask with a reservoir bag of oxygen is placed over the nose and mouth of the patient and the bag is squeezed to force air and oxygen into the lungs of patient. Ambu-bagging is used in situations where the patient is not breathing and the procedure, in effect, breathes for the patient. PATIENT, L. Y. L. Y., a 72 year-old female who presented with abdominal pain and was initially evaluated in the emergency room of Manatee Memorial Hospital on March 22, 1988. The emergency room physician, James A. DeRespino, M. D., diagnosed the patient's condition on admission as abdominal pain/rule out perforated viscus. Jose Estigarriba, M. D., the physician called in for consultation on March 23, 1988 by Robert A. Fishco, the attending physician, diagnosed the patient's condition as acute abdomen, peritonitis, possible perforated viscus. L. Y. was in extremely ill health upon her admission. L. Y. had diabetes, chronic high blood pressure, coronary artery disease, recurrent heart failure, congestive heart failure and a history of pulmonary edema. L. Y. was on multiple medications for her diabetes and cardiovascular disease. Both Dr. Estigarribia, the patient's surgeon, and Dr. Fishco felt that immediate surgical intervention was necessary to determine and correct the problem. L. Y. initially refused to have the surgery for approximately 24 hours. However, after talking with Dr. Fishco the patient finally consented to surgery late in the afternoon of March 23, 1988, approximately 24 hours after admission to the hospital. After the patient consented to surgery, Dr. Estigarribia immediately discussed with the patient the various invasive monitoring techniques and retaining the patient on a respirator after surgery. The patient refused these procedures because of difficulties she had experienced during similar procedures in the recent past. At this point, Dr. Estigarribia determined that it was best to move the patient to surgery as quickly as possible and dispense with such devices as swan-ganz catheters because he was concerned that she may change her mind and decide against surgery. The Respondent was first notified of the surgery approximately fifteen minutes prior to L. Y. being transported to the operating room. Respondent saw the patient in the operating room and took a history. Dr. Estigarribia informed the Respondent of the urgent situation and of the patient's refusal to consent to ventilation therapy and invasive monitoring. Respondent anesthetized the patient using a rapid sequence induction. Dr. Estigarribia then performed an exploratory laparotomy, resection of the small bowel, end-to-end anastomosis, and peritoneal lavage on the patient. After the surgery was completed but prior to the patient being extubated, Respondent checked the patient's blood pressure (120/70) and pulse rate (90), found the patient's color to be good and her oximetry (oxygen saturation of blood) readings to be satisfactory. Just prior to extubation, the patient's blood pressure was 140 over 90, her pulse rate 90, her oximetry reading was 96, she was breathing on her own and was conscious to the point of being able to communicate with Respondent by opening her eyes when asked a question. After making certain that the patient was breathing on her own and was conscious, Respondent extubated the patient while still in the operating room. Shortly thereafter, approximately 10 minutes, the patient was moved to the recovery room. The patient progressed satisfactorily in the recovery room. The patient's PACU score upon arrival in the recovery room at 10:30 p.m. was 5 out of a possible 10, with consciousness and activity each being given a score 0 by the recovery room nurse and respiration a score of 1. However, within 10 minutes the patient had improved to a total score of 9, with a consciousness and activity each being given a score of 2 and the respiration score remaining at 1. The total score remained at 9 until 12 midnight, approximately one and one-half hours after the patient was delivered to the recovery room. At 12:30 a.m., approximately two hours after her admission to the recovery room, the patient's score dropped to a total of 4 and the patient experienced ventricle fibrillation and expired as a result of this cardiac event at approximately 12:47 a.m. There is competent substantial evidence in the record to establish facts to show that Respondent's treatment of patient, L. Y. was within that level of care, skill, and treatment recognized as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances at the time of extubation and subsequent recovery room care, notwithstanding the testimony of Dr. Monroe and Dr. Kruse to the contrary which was based primarily on the hospital's records and more specifically on the recovery room nurse's scores and notes in the PACU records. PATIENT, O. G. Patient, O. G., is a sixteen year old male athlete who sustained a fractured mandible in an athletic event. O. G. was admitted as an emergency case to the Manatee Memorial Hospital on June 9, 1988 with a diagnosis of acute fracture of the mandible and laceration of the mouth. On June 9, 1988 the patient's attending surgeon performed an open reduction of the right angle of the mandible and the removal of four impacted wisdom teeth. Respondent placed the patient under general anesthesia for the above scheduled procedure. When the operative procedure ended (at approximately 6:55 p.m.), Respondent remained in the operating room with the patient approximately 30 minutes to assess the patient's post-operative condition. While still in the operating room the patient exhibited the usual indicators for extubation. The patient's oximetry readings were good, his blood pressure and pulse were good, he was breathing on his own with adequate title volume, he responded when given verbal commands, and was able to lift his head. At this point in time, the patient was having adverse reaction to the tube used by Respondent to maintain the patient's airway. Based on his training and experience as an anesthesiologist, using the above indicators, the Respondent determined that the patient was ready to be extubated. The patient was extubated in the operating room by the Respondent before being transferred to the recovery room. Upon being delivered to the recovery room, at approximately 7:25 p.m., the patient's condition began to deteriorate. The patient's breathing became shallow and he did not respond to verbal commands. The Respondent had the recovery room nurse remove the blanket covering the patient so that the Respondent could observe the patient's respiratory pattern and coloration to determine if the patient needed assistance with breathing and to give assistance, if needed. The Respondent had the nurse place the patient on 100% oxygen. Normally, a patient is placed on 40% oxygen. The patient did not recover from the anesthesia as quickly as the Respondent had anticipated. Notwithstanding the recovery room nurse's testimony as to her observation of the patient's condition as set out in the PACU records, the patient's condition was not so life threatening as to require intervention by the Respondent prior to the time he decided to call in a pulmonologist. While I do not doubt the competence of the recovery room nurse, the Respondent's testimony that his observation of the patient's condition during this period of time led him to believe that it was not life threatening was more credible. It was the Respondent's observation of the patient's condition that guided him in choosing a conservative procedure in his handling of the patient. Although Respondent was assisting with other operations in the hospital during this time, he stayed within voice range of the patient and nurse, monitoring the patient's condition and periodically assisting or having the nurse assist the patient in breathing by using an Ambu-bag and when necessary, either the Respondent or the nurse, would suction off blood secretions through the nasal passage. The Respondent chose this conservative procedure of monitoring the patient's condition rather than performing a "blind" intubation through the nasal passage or by cutting the wires holding the patient's jaws shut and intubating through the mouth thinking the patient would respond without the necessity of reintubation. The first procedure would have involve the risk of pushing possible blood clots into the lower portion of the patient's airway, while the second procedure would necessitate that the patient undergo an additional operation. Eventually, when O. G. failed to respond, Respondent decided to reintubate the patient. However, since the Respondent had decided against a "blind" intubation through the nasal passage or cutting the wires on the jaws to intubate through the mouth, he decided to intubate using a fiber optic bronchoscope in order to visualize the airway and remove any blood clots that may have formed in the upper portion of the airway as a result of the surgery. This procedure would avoid the risk of pushing the blood clots down into the lower part of the patient's airway. Since Respondent was not a pulmonologist he was not given the privilege at Manatee Memorial Hospital to use a fiber optic bronchoscope. Therefore, Respondent sought the services of David Law, M. D., a pulmonologist on call at the hospital that evening, to perform the reintubation using the fiber optic bronchoscope. Dr. Law reintubated the patient using the fiber optic bronchoscope. Dr. Law found blood clots in the upper portion of the patient's airway which were removed before attempting the reintubation. The patient was then transported to the Intensive Care Unit and afterwards recovered satisfactorily. Dr. Law opined that he would not have attempted a "blind" nasal reintubation of the patient under the circumstances here because of the possibility of pushing blood clots down into the lower portion of the patient's airway. In the medical community a pulmonary physician is the specialist most experienced with the use of a fiber optic bronchoscope, and it would be unusual for a non-pulmonary physician to use a fiber optic bronchoscope under circumstances similar to those occurring with this patient. There is competent substantial evidence in the record to establish facts to show that Respondent's treatment of the patient, O. G. was within that level of care, skill, and treatment recognized as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances at the time of extubation and subsequent recovery room care, notwithstanding the testimony of Dr. Monroe and Dr. Kruse to the contrary which was based primarily on the hospital's records and more specifically on the recovery room nurse's scores and notes in the PACU records.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed in this case. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of January, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-0596 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed findings of fact 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 are adopted in substance as modified in findings of fact 1, 6, 7, 5, 13, and 16, respectively. Proposed finding of fact 2 is unnecessary. Proposed finding of fact 7 is neither material nor relevant to the conclusion reached in the Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 8 and 16 go to the credibility of the expert witnesses and are unnecessary as findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact 10-15 and 17-22 are rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence since there is more credible evidence supporting a finding contrary to the findings set forth in these proposed findings of fact. 6. Proposed findings of fact 23, 24-25, 29, 30, 31, 33-35, 39- 42, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44 are adopted in substance as modified in findings of fact 19, 20, 21, 23, 22, 4, 23, 25 and 5, respectively. Proposed finding of fact 26 although acceptable is unnecessary. Proposed findings of fact 27 and 28 go to the credibility of a witness and while they may be accurate they are unnecessary. 9. Proposed findings of fact 32, 36-38, 45-51, 55-71, 73, 75, 77, 78, 80-82, 84, 85, 88-96 are accepted as the testimony of the recovery nurse and the experts who testified in this case and a reflection of the hospital's records, particularly the PACU records upon which the experts relied in given their testimony or opinions. However, they are not necessarily adopted as findings of fact because the more credible evidence is to the contrary. See findings of fact 22-30. Proposed finding of fact 52 is accepted but unnecessary since it relates to proposed findings of fact 53 and 54 which are rejected as not being supported by competent evidence in the record. See finding of fact 25. Proposed finding of fact 72 is rejected as not being supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Proposed findings of fact 74, 76, 79 and 83 are adopted in substance as modified in findings of fact 27, 28, 30 and 24-26, respectively. Proposed finding of fact 86-87 are accepted but unnecessary since there was no showing that patient suffered heart failure and pulmonary edema. Proposed findings of fact 97-101, 103 and 104 are more a restatement of testimony than findings of fact but see findings of fact 24-26. Proposed finding of fact 102 deals more with the credibility of a witness but see finding of fact 24. Proposed finding of fact 105 is rejected, see findings of fact 24-26. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed finding of fact 1 is unnecessary. Proposed findings of fact 2 - 20 and 22 are adopted in substance as modified in findings of fact 1, 2, 1 & 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, IS, 18, 17, 17 and 18, respectively. Proposed finding of fact 21 is more of a discussion of the testimony of Drs. Monroe, Kruse and Kozma rather than being stated as a finding of fact and is therefore, rejected. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard A. Grumberg, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Allen Bobo, Esquire Roger Lutz, Esquire Lutz, Webb, Bobo and Baitty, P. A. One Sarasota Tower Two North Tamiami Trail Sarasota, Florida 34236 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Did the Respondent commit the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint dated March 2, 2001, and if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Board is the agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine in the State of Florida. Respondent, Carl W. Liebert, Jr., M. D. (Dr. Liebert) is and, at all times material hereto, has been licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME0047601. Respondent is Board-certified in surgery. On January 29, 1997, Respondent performed an abdominal aortic aneurysm repair and an aortobifemoral graft on E. T., a male patient, approximately 70 years of age. The site of the graft for the left femoral artery intruded partially upon the site of a previous graft of the femoral artery performed in 1986. This graft failed immediately after the procedure. Respondent sutured the graft at the left femoral artery partially into old scar tissue from the 1986-failed graft. After the surgery, on the Sunday before his release from the Naples Community Hospital (Hospital) on Thursday, February 6, 1997, E. T. suddenly and abruptly fell in his hospital room. Respondent was concerned about the possible damage this fall may have caused to the surgical repair. Although E. T. experienced pain in his left groin area, the location of one of the aortobifemoral grafts, while in the Hospital, there is no evidence that any harm resulted from the fall or that the pain was a result of the fall. After the surgery, during E. T.'s stay in the Naples Community Hospital (Hospital), there was lymphatic drainage, a pinkish colored fluid, from the incision in his left groin. While the lymphatic fluid may have been blood stained resulting in the pinkish color, the lymphatic drainage was not as described in the nurse's notes as being "a bloody discharge." On Thursday, February 6, 1997, E.T. was discharged from the Hospital. After E. T.'s discharge from the Hospital, his wife cared for him in their home in Naples, Florida. As expected by Dr. Liebert, the incision in E. T.'s left groin area continued to have lymphatic drainage after E. T.'s discharge from the Hospital. The incision in E. T.'s left groin area continued to drain a pinkish colored fluid. The lymphatic drainage from the incision in E. T.’s left groin continued over the weekend and on Monday, February 10, 1997, E. T.'s wife contacted Respondent's office to advise Respondent of the drainage and of the pain E. T. was experiencing. Although E. T.'s wife did not speak directly to Respondent, she assumed that the person to whom she spoke with over the telephone conveyed her message to Respondent. E. T.'s wife was given a prescription for Percocet for pain and told that Respondent would see E. T. in his office on Thursday, February 13, 1997. On Wednesday, February 12, 1997, while showering and cleansing the incision on his left groin, E. T. inadvertently disturbed the incision on his left groin, which caused the incision to drain profusely. After leaving the shower, E. T.'s wife assisted E. T. in drying-off his body and controlling the drainage from the incision. The wife stemmed the flow of the drainage with a towel and called the Collier County Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and Respondent's office. The wife explained to the person answering Respondent's telephone, the circumstances of the occurrence with E. T., and that she had called the Collier County EMS personnel. The wife also requested that Respondent come to the Hospital. On February 12, 1997, in response to E. T.'s wife's call, the Collier County EMS personnel responded to E. T.'s home at approximately 7:25 a.m., performed an initial treatment for the drainage from E.T.'s left groin and transported E. T. by ambulance to the Hospital. The EMS personnel noted that E. T. complained of bleeding and it was their initial impression that E. T. was bleeding from his femoral artery. However, the EMS personnel did not confirm that E. T. was bleeding from his left femoral artery. The EMS personnel also noted what they considered to be a large amount of thick, clotty blood, which they estimated to be approximately 1000 milliliters (ml's) or 1000 cubic centimeters (cc's), surrounding E. T. Based on the records of the EMS personnel and on E. T.'s description given to Dr. Mulert, E. T.'s wife's testimony that the incision spurted blood for approximately 3- 4 feet appears to be somewhat exaggerated. The EMS personnel, assuming that E. T. had recently loss blood, administered 300 cc of fluid intravenously to E. T. When the EMS personnel attempted to move E. T., the drainage from the incision started again, but was controlled with a trauma dressing and pressure applied by a sandbag. The EMS personnel presented E. T. at the Emergency Room (ER) of the Hospital at approximately 7:52 a.m. on February 12, 1997. The ER nurse noted that a pressure dressing along with a sandbag had been applied and that the drainage or bleeding was under control. The ER nurse drew blood from E. T. and noted in her record that it was for a "type and cross" in preparation for a blood transfusion should one become necessary. However, Dr. Robert Mulert, the ER physician who attended E. T. while in the ER, noted in his records that he had requested a "type and hold," a less elaborate procedure than a "type and cross," which requires checking the antibodies and making sure the blood in question is compatible blood. Based on his estimate of E. T.'s blood loss and E. T.'s vital signs and other health conditions, Dr. Mulert did not consider E. T. as a patient in need of a blood transfusion. Upon E. T.'s arrival at the Hospital, Dr. Mulert made a brief assessment of E. T.'s condition to confirm that there was no active bleeding and that the patient did not need emergent intervention. Although Dr. Mulert is not a vascular surgeon or even a general surgeon, he has one year of residency training in surgery and is a Board-certified emergency room physician who has been working as an emergency room physician for approximately 27 years. Dr. Mulert is qualified to examine patients such as E. T. and advise the primary treating physician of his findings. Dr. Liebert has worked with, and relied on, Dr. Mulert's expertise as an emergency room physician in treating many of his patients who are presented at the Hospital for emergency treatment for approximately 15 years. Dr. Mulert discussed E. T.'s condition by telephone with Dr. Liebert on two separate occasions during E. T.'s visit to the Hospital on February 12, 1997. The first occasion was shortly after E. T. was admitted to the Hospital ER. During this first occasion, Dr. Mulert advised Dr. Liebert that his patient, E. T. had been admitted to the Hospital with a reported acute hemorrhaging or bleeding of the incision in the area of his left groin and that E. T.'s wife was asking for Dr. Liebert. In some instances, the primary physician will assume treatment at this juncture. However, it is not unusual for the ER physician to continue treatment. The decision was for Dr. Mulert to continue treatment and to keep Dr. Liebert advised as to E. T.'s condition. There is nothing in the record to indicate Dr. Liebert's location on the morning of February 12, 1997; nor is there any evidence to indicate that Dr. Liebert was prevented from examining E. T. on the morning of February 12, 1997. Also, during this first discussion, Dr. Mulert advised Dr. Liebert, based on the information that he had gathered, that E. T.'s blood loss was approximately 500 cc's but that there was no active bleeding at that time. Dr. Mulert also advised Dr. Liebert that he intended to deal with the patient's problems by proceeding with his plan to assess E. T.'s blood count, to monitor E.T.'s vital signs, and to see if the patient met Dr. Mulert's criteria for stability: Can he get up? Can he walk? Can he talk? Does the patient make sense? Does the patient have discharge stability? Subsequent to this first discussion, Dr. Mulert made a more detailed examination of the wound to determine if the wound was infected, the depth of the wound, and the need to pack the wound with sterile dressing, etc. After reviewing the EMS personnel records, E. T.'s history, talking with E. T., and reviewing the results of his examination, Dr. Mulert's impression was that E. T. had a hematoma under a surgical wound; that the wound had come apart; and that the collection of blood (old blood) within the hematoma had expressed from that surgical wound. The blood within the hematoma is referred to as "old blood" in that it was no longer in the vascular system and was not being replenished with oxygen. While E. T.'s vital signs were low compared to his vital signs taken while in the Hospital on visits prior to February 12, 1997, they were not significantly lower and were within a normal range for a patient, such as E. T., who was on beta blockers. E. T.'s vital signs were inconsistent with an aggressive femoral graft leak. The hematocrit and hemoglobin values on February 12, 1997, were slightly lower than the hematocrit and hemoglobin values while in the hospital during his most recent visit in January 1997. However, based on the testimony of Dr. Liebert, which I find to be credible, that was to be expected since E. T. had been given a significant amount of auto-transfused blood during his surgery on January 29, 1997. Also, the lower values were consistent with a 500 cc or less blood loss by a patient that had just recently undergone surgery. During either the first or second conversation, Dr. Mulert advised Dr. Liebert that the surgical site had come apart. During his care of E. T., Dr. Mulert became aware that Dr. Liebert had performed an abdominal aortic aneurysm repair earlier in the year, and that the repair was under the nine-inch incision on E. T.’s left groin but did not know the exact location of the repair. If Dr. Liebert made a diagnosis, he did not convey such diagnosis to Dr. Mulert. Neither Dr. Liebert nor Dr. Mulert discussed or made a differential diagnosis. However, it was the testimony of both Dr. Mulert and Dr. Liebert, which I find to be credible, that based on the facts presented in respect to E. T. by Dr. Mulert, a differential diagnosis was unnecessary. A differential diagnosis is a mechanism physicians use to identify and evaluate possible alternative causes for observed symptoms. During the second telephone conversation, Dr. Mulert advised Dr. Liebert that the patient had been stable for approximately four hours, that his vital signs were within normal ranges, that his blood counts were basically unchanged, that there was no active bleeding and had not been any active bleeding for approximately four hours, that the patient was up and walking around the ER, that the patient was asymptomatic when vertical that the patient was not orthostatic when walking, that the patient wanted to go home, and that the incision in the left groin area needed to be repaired. There was no discussion between Dr. Mulert and Dr. Liebert concerning the admission of E. T. to the Hospital for the purpose of further examining the possibility of arterial bleeding. Ultrasound and computerized tomography (CT) were available to patients at the Hospital. While these tests don't always "rule out" internal bleeding or suture line disruptions, they can, in certain instances, "rule in" these conditions. Based on the facts in respect to E. T.'s condition presented by Dr. Mulert on February 12, 1997, particularly that they were dealing with an open wound, and Dr. Liebert's feelings as to the somewhat limited use of these tests in this type situation, there was no ultrasound or CT scan performed. Based on the facts in respect to E. T.'s condition as presented by Dr. Mulert on February 12, 1997, the failure of Dr. Liebert to utilize the ultrasound or CT scan to further examine E. T. in regard to arterial bleeding does not constitute the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonable prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances, notwithstanding the testimony of Michael J. Cohen, M.D. to the contrary. Subsequently, Dr. Mulert sewed up the incision which had come apart. Dr. Liebert did not personally examine E. T. at any time while he was in the ER to evaluate the cause of E. T.'s problem in relation to arterial bleeding, but relied on Dr. Mulert to provide him with facts surrounding E. T.'s condition based on Dr. Mulert's examination of E. T. and his assessment of E.T.'s problem. Based on the facts in respect to E. T.'s condition in relation to arterial bleeding as presented by Dr. Mulert on February 12, 1997, the failure of Dr. Liebert to personally examine E. T. prior to his discharge or to delay E. T.'s discharge so as to allow time for Dr. Liebert personally examine E. T. to determine for himself E. T.'s problem in relation to arterial bleeding does not constitute the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonable prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances, notwithstanding the testimony of Michael J. Cohen, M.D. to the contrary. 38. E. T. was discharged from the Hospital at approximately 12:00 noon on February 12, 1997. After his discharge on February 12, 1997, E. T. had an uneventful afternoon and evening. After getting out of his bed on the morning of February 13, 1997, E. T. walked from his bedroom into the kitchen and as he stood in the kitchen the left groin incision erupted again, hemorrhaging blood onto the kitchen floor. The EMS personnel were called responded to the call around 5:30 a.m. Prior to the arrival of the EMS personnel the bleeding had stopped. The EMS personnel noticed a moderate blood loss. The EMS personnel dressed the left groin wound, administered fluids and transported E. T. to the Hospital where he was admitted to the ER at approximately 6:00 a.m. Although E. T. received blood and fluids, his condition deteriorated rapidly and E. T. expired at approximately 7:24 a.m. on February 13, 1997. No autopsy was performed. However, the cause of death was most likely myocardial infarction that resulted from a loss of blood.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Board enter a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint dated March 2, 2001. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert C. Byerts, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Ralph L. Marchbank, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 3979 Sarasota, Florida 34230 Tanya Williams, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent was licensed as an osteopathic physician in the state of Florida, having been issued license number 050004170. Respondent practices in the field of general surgery, and at all times material to this action, Respondent was on staff as Chief of Surgery at the University Hospital, Holly Hill, Florida. The incident which gave rise to the charges herein arose on August 5, 1987 when Respondent inserted a chest tube into patient W.T.'s right chest wall so as to relieve a pneumothorax which had actually occurred in W.T.'s left lung. A pneumothorax is a pocket of air in the cavity surrounding the lung which causes the lung to contract upon itself. At all times material, Patient W.T. had a subcutaneous pacemaker on the left side of her chest. However, the evidence from all credible witnesses is consistent that pacemakers are routinely placed on either the right or left side and that there is no reasonable medical presumption that pacemakers are always placed in someone's left chest area. The subcutaneous pacemaker did not enter significantly into W.T.'s case management at University Hospital. It operated on "automatic" and since it did its job, none of the University Hospital physicians involved in W.T.'s care paid much attention to it. W.T. was admitted to University Hospital for treatment of a drug overdose on July 9, 1987. As a part of her treatment, an Ewald tube was inserted into her stomach by a physician other than the Respondent. Patient W.T. was discharged from the hospital on July 18, 1987 with a portion of the tube inadvertently left in her stomach and her esophagus. On July 21, 1987, W.T. was readmitted to University Hospital. She was suffering from septicemia and bilateral pneumonia. X-rays revealed that a portion of the tubing had not been removed. This tubing was removed by the Respondent via successful gastroesophagoscopy on July 23, 1987. At Respondent's order, W.T. was placed in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) following the removal of the tube. Dr. Desai was called in as a pulmonologist. When W.T. had been admitted to University Hospital on July 21, 1987, she already had been in a "guarded" condition. Despite successful removal of the Ewald tube, W.T.'s overall condition continued to deteriorate. Prior to the night of August 4, 1987, W.T. had developed adult respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) which involves a breakdown in the capillary barriers within the lung itself, resulting in a diffuse leakage of fluid throughout all of the air space of the patient's lung. Because of the patient's serious lung condition, Dr. Desai placed her on a volume respirator, and the respirator pressure (PEEP) was progressively increased during her admission until it was set at 20 PEEP at the time of the incident. Twenty PEEP is an unusually high level of respirator pressure which was necessary in this case because of the patient's severe lung problem. The volume respirator essentially breathed for the patient and involved a tube being secured in her mouth. Often, between her admission to the ICU and the date of the incident, W.T. had torn the respirator tube out of her mouth, so she had been continuously restrained and sedated to keep this from happening again. Each time W.T. had extubated herself she had been "blue coded," meaning she had suffered either cardiac arrest or shock. Whether or not W.T. weighed between 225 and 250 pounds or weighed 350- plus pounds cannot be determined with any reasonable degree of accuracy since there is equally credible evidence over the entire foregoing range of poundage. It is material, however, that by all accounts of all witnesses, W.T. was markedly and grossly obese to the extent that her size, shape, and weight contributed to her several health problems and rendered her a patient more difficult to diagnose, more difficult to x-ray, more difficult to move, and more difficult to nurse and medically attend than she would have been otherwise. The evidence as to whether W.T.'s obesity impeded medical personnel from correctly interpreting her breath sounds on August 5, 1987, the date of the incident, is divided, as is the evidence as to whether or not on that date W.T.'s pacemaker was visible to the naked eye, but upon the greater weight of the credible evidence as a whole, it is found that on August 5, 1987, W.T.'s obesity, generally deteriorated condition, and left pneumothorax rendered the presence, volume, and location of breath in each lung subject to interpretation and "judgment call," and that unless one were specifically looking and feeling for a pacemaker, one would not necessarily have been able to detect the pacemaker in W.T.'s left chest due to the extraordinarily heavy pad of fat and the absence of scarring in that location. The foregoing finding of fact has been reached because with the exception of the complaining witness, Nurse Counihan, all factual witnesses either testified that they did not notice a pacemaker scar or they specifically noticed there was no scarring on W.T.'s chest. Also, with regard to breath sounds, both Mr. Starr and Respondent listened for W.T.'s breath sounds on the morning of the incident and within a very few minutes of each other. Mr. Starr described W.T.'s breath sounds when he entered her room as decreased on the right and absent on the left. His findings were consistent with a left pneumothorax but he never informed Respondent what he had found. Respondent arrived only a few minutes later and could not get any breath sounds from either side. Dr. O'Leary, accepted as an expert in pulmonology and the insertion of chest tubes, opined persuasively that one could not rely on breath sounds to locate which side the pneumothorax was on in the face of a recent x-ray. Also, the use of the respirator could have been misleading to either or both Mr. Starr or Respondent. X-rays taken of W.T.'s chest at least ten times between July 23, 1987 and July 31, 1987 clearly depict that the pacemaker was on the left side of W.T.'s chest. These x-rays were reviewed by Respondent with a radiologist the day before the events which are the focus of these charges took place. The radiology reports of W.T.'s chest x-rays dated July 25, 1987, July 28, 1987, and July 31, 1987 specifically mention the pacemaker but only the report dated July 28, 1987 states that the pacemaker overlies the left thorax. Respondent did not review any narrative reports when he and the radiologist were reviewing the actual x-rays together. There is no evidence that this procedure was outside the appropriate standard of care. Dr. Dworkin, expert in radiology and quality assurance and review, Dr. O'Leary, and Dr. Rosin, Petitioner's internal medicine expert, all testified that it is not below the professional standard of care for a treating physician to forget within a day after such an x-ray review which side a pacemaker is on unless the pacemaker enters significantly into his treatment of the patient, which in this case it did not. By the early morning hours of August 5, 1987, W.T. had become even more critically ill with multiple system failures, including a failure in the cardiopulmonary systems, a neurological deficit, and failure of her renal functions. The mortality rate of a patient suffering from ARDS, without considering the other conditions from which W.T. was suffering, exceeds 50%, and responsible medical retrospective estimates made at formal hearing of W.T.'s specific survival chances in the early morning hours of August 5, 1987 fall in the 10-50% range. During the early morning hours of August 5, 1987, the nurses on duty in ICU were having trouble maintaining W.T.'s blood pressure. They began telephoning Dr. Desai and Respondent at approximately 4:00 a.m. One of those doctors, most probably Dr. Desai, ordered a portable chest x-ray of W.T., which was accomplished at 6:30 a.m. by Josephine Christnagel, R.T., who is a registered x-ray technologist. At the time this x-ray was performed, W.T. was already in critical condition and could not speak or respond. W.T.'s condition was such that she probably was not salvageable when Respondent arrived on the scene at 7:00 a.m. on August 5, 1987. Unbeknownst to anyone at this point in time, the 6:30 a.m. x-ray had been inadvertently mislabeled by Ms. Christnagel so that the left side of the patient's chest appeared on the x-ray with a lead marker, "R" (for "right") , on it. This chest x-ray revealed that W.T. had a pneumothorax, and because it was mislabeled, the pneumothorax appeared to be on the right side. If a chest tube is properly inserted from the outside chest wall on the side of the pneumothorax, into the chest cavity, the air can be released and the lung can re-expand, delivering oxygen to the patient and raising blood pressure to normal. At all times material on August 4-5, 1987, the ranking ICU nurse on W.T.'s case was Carey Beninger ne' Counihan, R.N. The ICU nurses notified Dr. Desai by phone of the pneumothorax and he, in turn, notified Respondent. Because Respondent was more nearly ready to go to the hospital, Respondent rushed to the hospital to insert a chest tube into W.T., treatment which he and Dr. Desai, the attending pulmonologist, had agreed was the appropriate treatment for W.T.'s pneumothorax. For the reasons given infra with regard to the time the nurses' notes were compiled and Nurse Counihan's confusion over the x-ray itself, the evidence is not clear and convincing that Respondent was ever told by Dr. Desai or by the nurses by phone that the pneumothorax was on W.T.'s left side (the correct side). Even if Respondent had been so informed by Dr. Desai, since Dr. Desai had never seen the x-ray, it still would have been appropriate for Respondent to rely on the x-ray itself once he got to the hospital, unless at the hospital, something or someone clearly alerted him to the fact that the pneumothorax was actually on the left side. At approximately 7:00 a.m., just prior to the arrival of Respondent, Dr. Michael Danzig, D.O., who was the day-shift emergency room doctor, and Wesley Starr, R.P.T., a respiratory therapist, arrived at ICU and entered W.T.'s room. At approximately the time they arrived, the night-shift emergency room doctor, Dr. Haas, left the room. By all accounts, there was a continuing "commotion," a "ruckus," or "an emergency situation" in progress with at least two nurses, including Nurse Counihan, and other personnel providing various therapies to W.T. who had no palpable blood pressure and was in shock. This atmosphere continued after Respondent arrived shortly thereafter, with the nurses' and Mr. Starr's attention directed to care of the patient. When Respondent arrived, Dr. Danzig became, essentially, an observer. Upon arrival at W.T.'s room, Respondent examined the 6:30 a.m. x-ray against a window with daylight showing through. The x-ray, as it was mismarked, showed a massive tension pneumothorax on W.T.'s right side and a pacemaker on the same side, the right. After review of the x-ray, Respondent examined W.T., including listening for breath sounds. He heard nothing significant from either lung. Dr. O'Leary's opinion that such a finding was not unusual and that Respondent could not rely on either his own examination of breath sounds or that of Mr. Starr (had he even known of Mr. Starr's hearing breath sounds on the right but not the left) at that point is persuasive. Under these circumstances, breath sounds would not have alerted Respondent to a mislabeled x-ray. Respondent relied on the mislabeled x-ray and began to prep the right side of the patient for the chest tube. As Respondent began to prep W.T.'s right side, a dispute arose between himself and Nurse Counihan. Having weighed and evaluated all the testimony and the documentary evidence and exhibits, having reconciled that evidence which can be reconciled, and having eliminated that evidence which is not credible, it is found that the most credible version of this dispute is that Nurse Counihan asked Respondent why he was prepping the right side if W.T. had a left pneumothorax, and Respondent replied, "No, it isn't. Look at the x-ray." To this, Nurse Counihan said, "Yes, it is. I'm sure of it," and pointed to the lung on the x-ray which did not show a pneumothorax (the side next to the nameplate and the side without either a pacemaker or a pneumothorax). Respondent said, "No, it isn't. Look at the damn x-ray!" Respondent then proceeded to intubate on the right side while referring frequently to the mislabeled x-ray. In making the foregoing finding, it is noted that there were significant differences between the testimony of Nurse Counihan and all other witnesses, both factual and expert. Nurse Counihan deposed/testified that both she and another nurse had pointed out to Respondent that the patient's pacemaker was on the patient's left side and so was the pneumothorax. The other three factual witnesses, Starr, Danzig, and Respondent, all testified that they have no recollection whatsoever of anyone mentioning a pacemaker. Even Wesley Starr, called by the Petitioner, and who was present in W.T.'s room at the head of the patient's bed throughout the time of these discussions, testified that, to the best of his recollection, no one mentioned a pacemaker and that he did not recall anyone except Nurse Counihan challenging the Respondent's prepping W.T.'s right side. Also, Dr. Danzig, who was present in the room during the argument, and who testified that he had placed over 200 chest tubes during the course of his medical residency training, testified that if Nurse Counihan had, indeed, mentioned a pacemaker, he would have intervened in order to assist Respondent in determining the correct side of the pneumothorax. Although Petitioner asserted that Dr. Danzig is not credible due to his friendship with Respondent, that argument is not persuasive both due to the remoteness and degree of the friendship and Dr. Danzig's insistence that if Respondent should say that Nurse Counihan pointed to the side of the x-ray showing the pacemaker, then Respondent would be wrong. Respondent apparently did not review W.T.'s records either before or after the dispute with Nurse Counihan. These records were either in her room or elsewhere in the ICU unit, but since, at that point, the nurses' notes had not been compiled from their scratch pads to the patient's chart since before 4:00 a.m., there was nothing in W.T.'s chart/records to alert Respondent that the x- ray was mislabeled or that the patient had a pneumothorax on the left side even if he had reviewed the record. Also, he would have had to go back to the July 31 x-ray or the July 28 radiology narrative before he could have discovered that the pacemaker was on the left. This would have been very time consuming. Also, Dr. Danzig, who actually had made a cursory review of the patient's records when he first arrived in the room, was not alerted by Nurse Counihan's words or her pointing to the x-ray to any reason to search the records for information about the pacemaker. In further assessing Nurse Counihan's testimony, the undersigned has weighed in her favor the consistency of her recent deposition testimony with her notes and the incident report which she completed within five hours after the intubation incident on August 5, 1987. However, weighing against her credibility with regard to her statements then and now that she told Respondent that the pacemaker was on W.T.'s left side is the fact that even her August 5, 1987 report and notes were prepared in the glow of a hindsight favorable to her position and that her deposition shows that she is confused about how a pneumothorax appears on an x-ray. Reconciling all the testimony one can, it is remotely possible that Nurse Counihan said, "It is a left pneumothorax," while pointing to the lung shown on the x-ray as not having a pneumothorax and which, due to the "R" marker on the other lung could be inferred to be the left lung. It is even remotely possible (although not probable or persuasive given the three other factual witnesses' testimony that she had never mentioned a pacemaker) that Nurse Counihan could have told the Respondent, "The pneumothorax is on the same side as the pacemaker," which also was consistent with the x-ray as mislabeled. However, upon the credible evidence as a whole, the only reasonable conclusion is that if Nurse Counihan did mention a pacemaker at the time of her dispute with Respondent, she was ineffective in clearly conveying to Respondent or to anyone else in the room that the pacemaker and the pneumothorax were on the patient's left side or that there was any reason to further search the records or the patient's body to resolve the dispute. It is uncontroverted that, prior to the insertion of the chest tube in W.T.'s right side, absolutely no one, including Nurse Counihan, was aware that the x-ray was reversed, and that Ms. Counihan never informed the Respondent that the x-ray was reversed. Respondent's testimony is accepted that upon placement of the chest tube in W.T.'s right side (the side without the pneumothorax) he heard an immediate audible gush of air. That others in the room did not hear this rush of air is understandable due to the noise and confusion in the room, particularly the respirator sounds. Also, it is uncontroverted that upon placement of the chest tube in W.T.'s right side, the patient's blood pressure, which had been zero, immediately rose into normal range. A dramatic and rapid reestablishment of the patient's blood pressure is the expected result of a proper placement of a chest tube with a tension pneumothorax. All health care personnel present seem to have regarded the blood pressure stabilization as proof that the Respondent had placed the chest tube on the correct side of the patient, because no one, including Nurse Counihan, thereafter protested that a misplacement had occurred. Release of pressure and a return in blood pressure is not normally associated with placement of a chest tube in the wrong side of a patient and there is no definitive medical explanation of why it occurred in this instance, despite Dr. O'Leary's speculation that the gush of air could have been a leak of air across the Mediastrum. After placement of the chest tube in the patient's right side, Respondent ordered an immediate repeat chest x-ray to be certain the tube was placed in the correct lung and was placed correctly. After the patient's blood pressure had been reestablished, Dr. Danzig left the intensive care unit because he believed that the pneumothorax had been relieved completely and because the patient was now stable. If W.T. had not been stable, Dr. Danzig would have remained in the room since he was the day- shift emergency room doctor and he did not know if any physicians other than Respondent and himself were even in the hospital yet. After securing the chest tube and dressing the chest, Respondent left the floor and went to the operating room (OR) to notify the OR staff that there would be a delay before he could begin previously scheduled surgery. Thereafter, on his way to check the new x-ray he had just ordered, Respondent met Ms. Christnagel, who was bringing it to him. Ms. Christnagel then informed Respondent that she had mislabeled the 6:30 a.m. preintubation x-ray. Respondent simultaneously reviewed the new, postintubation x-ray and discovered that he had placed the chest tube in the wrong side of W.T.'s chest. At approximately the same time, W.T.'s blood pressure again dropped and a "code blue" was called. Dr. Gloria Mikula, M.D., who happened to be in the ICU at the time W.T. coded, "ran the code" to attempt to reestablish the patient's blood pressure. Throughout the time in which Dr. Mikula was running the code on this patient, no one, including Nurse Counihan, said anything to the effect that W.T. may have had a chest tube placed in the wrong side. In fact, the nursing staff did not even inform Dr. Mikula that this patient had had a pneumothorax and chest tube insertion prior to the code being called. Such information would have been important from a medical standpoint because it would have allowed Dr. Mikula to act immediately to relieve the tension in the patient's chest. Immediately upon reviewing the repeat chest x-ray and upon hearing the announcement of the code blue at the same time, Respondent rushed back to W.T.'s room, placed a chest tube in the patient's left side, and the patient's blood pressure was again reestablished. However, some time later in her hospitalization, W.T. expired. Nurse Counihan's failure to say anything to Dr. Mikula about the pneumothorax is further indicative of her immediate satisfaction that Respondent's intubation on the right side had been acceptable and that it was only after he discovered his error through the new x-ray and correctly intubated W.T. on the left side that Nurse Counihan completed her notes and incident report describing his error for the chart. The notes were transposed from her scratch pad and memory at approximately noon, August 5, 1987. Dr. Rosin, Petitioner's expert in internal medicine, criticized Respondent's performance as below the professional standard of care because he felt that once Respondent was made aware in the patient's room by Nurse Counihan that the pneumothorax could be on the patient's left side, Respondent had an obligation to make further inquiry or investigation before inserting the chest tube in the patient's right side. In Dr. Rosin's opinion, Respondent's investigation could have taken several routes: review of earlier x-rays and the patient's record, further conversation with the nurse, further hands-on examination of the patient for signs of the pacemaker, and/or ordering a new x- ray. Although Dr. Rosin testified that Respondent should have ordered a repeat x-ray so as to resolve the dispute with Nurse Counihan before inserting the chest tube on W.T.'s right side, he also conceded that the only possible adverse effect of the decision Respondent made was the delay in relieving W.T.'s condition. The chest intubation involved is not a benign or casual procedure, but no actual harm occasioned by misplacement of the chest tube was demonstrated in this case, and the maximum amount of time which would have been saved, under Dr. Rosin's approach, would have been that short period of time it took for the Respondent to place the chest tube and dress the wound. Under the circumstances, if Respondent had delayed intubation, W.T. would probably have "coded blue" before the correctly labelled chest x-ray could have been performed anyway. In light of the confused state of the patient's breath sounds, obesity, and lack of scarring, the fact that no nurses' notes had been codified since before 4:00 a.m., Nurse Counihan's own confusion about the mismarked x-ray, and how far back in the patient's chart Respondent would have had to look before he would have been able to locate anything useful about the pacemaker, it is found that Respondent behaved reasonably in an emergency situation, and Dr. O'Leary's and Dr. Dworkin's expert opinions that he did not violate the professional standard of care in the first insertion of the chest tube are accepted. It is also found that the Respondent's procedure in ordering the new chest x-ray and leaving the room after the first intubation without further search of the records or further conversation in the room was reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Osteopathic Physicians enter a Final Order dismissing all charges against Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of July, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 1991.
Findings Of Fact The current petition Following the entry of a final order of the Board of Medicine dismissing the administrative action previously filed against her, petitioner filed the pending request for an award of attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to Sections 57.111 and 120.57(1)(b)5, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine (Department), has conceded that: the underlying licensure disciplinary "action in Department of Professional Regulation v. Ada Gonzalez, M.D., DBPR Case No. 90-06789, was initiated by the Department of Professional Regulation (now Department of Business and Professional Regulation), a state agency, and, therefore, the Department is not a nominal party only"; the "Petitioner qualifies as a small business party as defined by Section 57.111, Florida Statutes"; the "Petitioner prevailed in the underlying case . . . in that the Board of Medicine dismissed the case with a Final Order filed on October 27, 1993"; and, the "Petitioner's claimed attorney's fees and costs [attorney's fees of $20,189.00 and costs of $3,784.95] seem reasonable; however, Respondent asserts that the statutory cap of $15,000.00 inclusive of fees and costs, is applicable." Under the circumstances, the sole issue with regard to the claim for attorney's fees and costs under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, is whether the actions of the Department were "substantially justified" when it initiated the underlying disciplinary action and, with regard to the claim for attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.57(1)(b)5, Florida Statutes, apart from the applicability of such section to the instant case, is whether any pleading, motion or other paper was filed in the underlying proceeding for an "improper purpose." The underlying disciplinary action On or about May 22, 1990, the Department received, pursuant to statutory requirement, a closed claim report from the Department of Insurance. The report reflected that an indemnity of $160,000 had been paid to the family of Patient C. D. through a settlement within the presuit period prescribed by Section 768.57, Florida Statutes. The predicate for the claim against petitioner, Ada Gonzalez, M.D., was the apparent assertion that the patient died as a consequence of petitioner's failure to appropriately treat her. By memorandum of May 22, 1990, the Division of Medical Quality Assurance recommended to the Department of Professional Regulation's complaints department that a case be opened. That memorandum provided: DISCUSSION: This review is predicated upon receipt of a closed claim DOI report. The specific allegation is that the doctor treated the patient for PID - rule out urinary tract infection. The patient was reportedly treated with antibiotics on 11/14/88 and on 11/16/88 appeared better. However, the patient reportedly did not improve and died of a ruptured ovarian abscess on 11/18/88. There are no medical records to review and there is no history or explanation given as to what happened in the time period from the onset of the pain to the demise of the patient. * * * COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: I recommend a case be opened. There is a question of stan dard of care. Records should be obtained and referred to a similarly placed physician for review. As a consequence of the foregoing referral, the Department opened its Case No. 90-06789, and assigned its investigator Providence Padrick to the case. The investigator obtained a copy of the Palm Avenue Physicians Center and the Fatima HMO medical records, which included the documentation reflecting petitioner's treatment of the patient; the Jackson Memorial Hospital medical records, the facility at which the patient expired; and the autopsy report. Petitioner was duly informed by the Department that the case had been opened against her, and she was offered an interview but declined. The Palm Avenue Physicians Center and Fatima HMO medical records reflect that the patient was first seen by petitioner on November 14, 1988, and presented with a complaint of bilateral flank pain radiating to the lower abdomen, frequency of urination with some tingling on urination, a yellowish vaginal discharge, and a low grade temperature; such symptoms of approximately one day duration. Examination revealed lower abdominal tenderness to palpation, cervical motion tenderness, and a brown cervical discharge. Petitioner diagnosed pelvic inflammatory disease ("PID") and possible urinary tract infection ("UTI"). As a consequence of the history and examination, petitioner ordered x- rays of the abdomen, biochemical profile, pregnancy test, syphilis test and cultures of the vaginal discharge and urine; prescribed antibiotics; made a referral for the patient to see a gynecologist in two weeks; and, advised the patient to return for a follow-up visit in two days. As for the testing results, the urine culture and sensitivity came back positive for a urinary tract infection; however, all of the other laboratory tests came back negative. The patient was next seen by petitioner on November 16, 1988, for her follow-up visit. At the time, the patient reported that she felt better, and petitioner's examination revealed less vaginal discharge and discomfort, although she still suffered a low grade fever. Petitioner confirmed her earlier diagnosis of pelvic inflammatory disease, and prescribed another antibiotic (Septra DS) for urinary tract infection. The following day, November 17, 1988, the patient returned to see petitioner complaining of severe abdominal pain over the whole abdomen, nausea and vomiting. Examination revealed that the patient was in distress, with a distended abdomen, decreased bowel sounds and positive tenderness on palpation over the abdominal area. Petitioner again diagnosed pelvic inflammatory disease and urinary tract infection, and referred the patient to the Fatima HMO for observation, IV fluids and x-rays. The patient refused, however, to go to the Fatima HMO and, in fact, evidenced her intent to cancel her membership in the HMO. At or about 6:34 p.m., November 17, 1988, the patient presented to the Jackson Memorial Hospital Emergency Room complaining of severe abdominal pain, nausea and vomiting, and yellow vaginal discharge. Routine laboratory work was undertaken, but when she was taken to the x-ray department and placed on the table she became unresponsive. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation was immediately commenced without success, and the patient was pronounced dead at 11:25 p.m. that evening. An autopsy performed by the Dade County Medical Examiner revealed the following abnormal findings: Diffuse peritonitis Ruptured left fallopian tubal abscess Crude intrauterine contraceptive device Bilateral ovarian cysts Soft liver, spleen, and kidneys Congested lungs Gallstones Scarred gallbladder The autopsy concluded that the cause of death was acute diffuse peritonitis due to ruptured fallopian tubal abscess. On August 11, 1992, the Department forwarded its investigative report and related exhibits to its expert, Stanley H. Bernstein, M.D., for review and opinion concerning petitioner's adherence to the appropriate standard of care. By letter of August 20, 1992, Dr. Bernstein responded to the Department's request as follows: The subject A. G. [petitioner] was treating this 49 year old female for symptoms related to the genito-urinary tract. The scant information noted in the medical office records suggested that the patient had a urinary tract infection as well as symptoms suggesting pelvic inflammatory disease. How ever no studies were initiated to define the extent of the infection in the pelvis. No consultations from either a urologist of [sic] gynecologist were obtained. Although antibiotic was given, there was no realization that the infection in the pelvis might have needed much more intensive therapy. The subject is unknown to me. There was no adequate assessment of the patient's condition. Since pelvic inflammatory disease was suspected, a consultant gynecologist and/or appropriate x-rays of the pelvis should have been done. Since the subject did not suspect the true diagnosis in this case, inappropriate antibiotics were given. Since appropriate diagnostic tests such as ultrasound and/or cat scan of the pelvis were not done the diagnosis could not be appreciated. The plan of treatment was inadequate. There was no adequate monitor being carried out for this patient in regard to antibiotic therapy. The written medical records were woefully inadequate. The applicable standard of care for this patient was not met since the subject did not appreciate the possibility that the patient had more extensive infection in her pelvis. The subject did note that pelvic infection was probably present but she never used appropriate consultants. This suggests that the subject had a poor understanding of the extent to which such infections can cause major catastrophic events. It seem to be that the subject needs further training-certainly in medical conditions where infection is present. On September 24, 1992, the probable cause panel of the Board of Medicine (Board) met in Tampa, Florida. Those present at the meeting were panel members Louis Murray, M.D., chairman, and Mr. Gilbert Rodriguez; Alan Grossman, Assistant Attorney General; Larry McPherson, Jr., chief medical attorney for the Department; Randolph Collete, senior attorney for the Department; and, James Reese, chief medical investigator for the Department. At the commencement of the meeting, the panel members (Dr. Murray and Mr. Rodriguez) acknowledged that they had received and reviewed the complete investigative file pertaining to, among others, the petitioner. With regard to petitioner's case, the transcript of that meeting reflects the following brief discussion: MR. COLLETTE: Item A-03 is on Ada Gonzalez, M.D., case number 90-06789. The case is before the Panel on a recommendation that probable cause be found and an adminis trative complaint be filed. It's alleged that the respondent practiced medicine below the acceptable level of care by failing to appropriately diagnose and treat the patient C. D.'s condition and mistakenly treating her for a urinary tract infection with antibiotics when, in fact, the patient was suffering from an ovarian abscess; and that the respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment; and that the records are sketchy and inadequate. Based upon these facts, the Department is alleging a violation of 458.331(1)(t) and (m), and recommends that probable cause be found and an administrative complaint be filed. MR. RODRIGUEZ: Move a finding of probable cause and the filing of an administrative complaint. MR. MURRAY: Second. MR. MURRAY: So moved a finding of probable cause and the filing of an administrative complaint, seconded, and passed without objection. On October 8, 1992, an administrative complaint was filed against petitioner alleging that she violated the Medical Practices Act, Section 458.331(1)(m) and (t), Florida Statutes, by failing to practice medicine at the accepted standard of care in that petitioner was guilty of "mistakenly treating [the patient] for a urinary tract infection with antibiotics, when in fact [the patient] was suffering from an ovarian abscess," and that petitioner's "medical records are sketchy and inadequate in that they fail to justify [her] course of treatment." Subsequent to the filing of the administrative complaint, petitioner's counsel employed an expert, Martin Arostegui, M.D., to review the matter and render an opinion regarding the merits of the claim against petitioner. Based on his review of the investigative file and an interview with petitioner, Dr. Arostegui concluded: . . . As a result of my extensive review, I have come to an opinion that is substantially different from that of the other physician who previously reviewed this file. I attribute this difference to the level and intensity of my review and scrutiny of the file records and my interview with Dr. Gonzalez who I found to be very professional, concerned and wholly credible. CONCLUSION: Dr. Ada Gonzalez was faced with a very difficult patient who was obese and, as a result, difficult to examine and who appeared to be clinically less sick than she really was. This patient developed a severe pelvic infection as a result of a home made intrauterine contraceptive device which probably was placed illegally and without regard for patient safety. The device was not disclosed to Dr. Gonzalez by the patient and it is reasonable to expect that Dr. Gonzalez would not uncover the device under the circumstances. Dr. Gonzalez attempted to get proper surgical evaluation and care for this patient but the patient refused, went home and, at least six hours later, appeared at an emergency department where the continuity of communication with Dr. Gonzalez was broken, the diagnosis was completely missed and the patient expired. In my opinion, Dr. Ada Gonzalez' care did not fall below community standards. However, Dr. Gonzalez did a less than satisfactory job of documenting her care of this patient and this probably had a role in the formulation of the different opinion by the other reviewing physician. It is particularly worth noting that the physician reviewer did not mention the existence of the home made intrauterine contraceptive device. On or about February 11, 1993, petitioner's counsel provided the Department a copy of their expert's report with the understanding that the Department would provide the report to its expert and if the expert's opinion was materially changed as a result the Department "would entertain taking this case back to probable cause, perhaps dismissing it or softening at least the consent agreement by eliminating perhaps probation or other items" [TR. pp. 15- 16]. Upon receipt and review of the aforesaid report, the Department amended the administrative complaint to correct certain factual inaccuracies. In this regard, paragraphs three, four and five of the original compliant, which had inaccurately averred that petitioner had treated the patient on October 8 and 31, 1988, were dropped; paragraph 7 of the original complaint, now paragraph 4 of the amended complaint, was amended to reflect that petitioner had "referred her [the patient] to a gynecologist in two weeks, and asked her to return in two days," as opposed to having simply "scheduled her to see a gynecologist" as alleged in the original complaint; and paragraph 10 of the original complaint, now paragraph 7 of the amended complaint, was amended to correctly reflect that petitioner referred the patient to Fatima HMO for observation, as opposed to referring her to Jackson Memorial Hospital as alleged in the original complaint. Other than such factual corrections, the premise for the charges leveled against petitioner remained unchanged. On April 16, 1993, the Department forwarded a copy of the amended complaint, which had been filed that date with its clerk, and a copy of petitioner's expert report to Dr. Bernstein for review. The cover letter that accompanied such materials concluded "Please read over the enclosed materials. If you see anything that you want to bring to my attention, please give me a call . . . ." Here, the proof fails to demonstrate any change in Dr. Bernstein's opinion as a consequence of his review of the materials, but fails to explicate why no change occurred. 2/ By letter of April 19, 1993, the Department advised petitioner's counsel of the amendment of the complaint, consequent to her review of his expert's analysis, and encouraged petitioner's agreement to a proposed stipulation for settlement of the case. Ultimately, in September 1993, the parties entered into a written consent agreement, subject to Board approval, to resolve the subject dispute. On or about October 2, 1993, the consent agreement was presented to the Board of Medicine for consideration. Present were fourteen members of the Board; however, one member, Dr. Louis Murray, was excused from participating since he had served on the probable cause panel. Pertinent to this case, the transcript of the Board meeting reflects the following comments by Board members: CHAIRMAN DAUER: Thank you. I just want to make a few opening comments here. I was a little bit disturbed when I saw the materials here, and let me express my concerns here. I think the doctor in this case probably did everything right. You had a patient that she first saw on November 14th, she ordered a beta HCG, it's clearly on the order here, the pregnancy test came back negative, there's no history of the IUD, she appropriately treated her, I think her medical records are adequate, and what happened, she even referred her to a gynecologist. She got the patient back in 48 hours, and I think it was an incident that could not be expected. There's no way to expect this woman to have a ruptured tubal with the results she had done, the history that was not adequate. I think this doctor did everything right. I looked at this case material and I said why is this even here. I think the case should have been dismissed. * * * DR. ECHEVARRIA: I thoroughly agree with your comments, Mr. Chairman. As I read the original AC, I made a note to take issue with the Administrative Complaint to start with, and I really feel that she did things according to the book and it is an unfortunate final ending in this case, and I'm kind of wondering why peritonitis with a ruptured tubal would kill her this quickly. We see people with ruptured diverticulitis, ruptured appendices that linger on and on and on, and it doesn't kill them. So I don't know why the death occurred so quickly without a lot of other symptoms being associated with it. So I think there may have been something like toxic shock or whatever, as a result of the foreign body. I would agree, I would certainly favor a move to dismiss. Following such dialogue, a motion was made by a member of the Board to reject the consent agreement and dismiss the case. The motion passed unanimously, and by final order dated October 8, 1993, filed with the Department of Professional Regulation October 27, 1993, the consent agreement was formally rejected and the case dismissed. Whether the action of the agency was substantially justified or other special circumstances exist which would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust. Here, facially, the probable cause panel had before it evidence in the form of its expert's report that would, if his opinions were credited at final hearing, suggest that petitioner had failed to maintain adequate medical records and had failed to maintain the appropriate standard of care. The reliability or efficacy of that expert's opinions has, however, been rendered suspect by the Board's unanimous conclusion that petitioner's medical records and treatment were appropriate. Under such circumstances, and the Department having failed to demonstrate, at hearing, that the information upon which the Board based its decision differed in some marked degree from that considered by the probable cause panel or to offer proof to explicate the basis or reasonableness of the expert's conclusions, the expert's report cannot be accepted at face value as reasonably indicating that the violations had occurred. Therefore, it must be concluded that the Department has failed to demonstrate that its decision to initiate the underlying action was substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust. While the Department may have failed in its burden to demonstrate that its action was substantially justified, such does not compel the conclusion that any pleading or paper filed by the Department was interposed for an "improper purpose," such that attorney's fees and costs would be appropriately awarded under Section 120.57(1)(b)5, Florida Statutes. To the contrary, the proof fails to support such conclusion. Moreover, and most importantly, the proof fails to demonstrate that the subject charges ever pended before the Division of Administrative Hearings and, therefore, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, there is no basis upon which to assess attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.57(1)(b)5, Florida Statutes.
